Populist Framing of Immigrants in Dutch Policymaking: A Discourse-Historical Analysis

Master Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, program Public Administration, University of Twente

by

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2022-2023

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Abstract

Since the arrival of the first immigrants in the 1960s, the Netherlands has witnessed contentious discourses on immigrants and minorities. This involved new ways of discussing immigrant and minority issues in integration policies. With the rise of anti-migrant populism since the 1980s, immigrant and minority discourse has become more populistic. Immigrants and minorities are increasingly framed in a populist fashion by policymakers as some dangerous or radical 'other'. Scholars have noted the shift from a positive discourse on immigrants to a more negative discourse. Given the upsurge of populism and the continued increase of immigrants, the question arises in what particular ways the populist framing of immigrants and minorities has changed from 1960 until 2022. In this master thesis, this question is answered by dissecting the conceptual elements of populist frames and by the employment of a critical Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Research material comprises Dutch policy documents such as acts, vision notes, and reports from the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). This thesis reveals the populist frameshifts over time, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, where the framing of immigrants as a threat gained ground. The changing events surrounding Islam particularly since the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1978-1979) and the Rushdie Affair in 1988, have contributed to the transformation of Islam's image in the West from a passive to an aggressive culture. After the turn of the millennium, following 9/11 and other terrorist attacks, and the rise of the radical right, allochthones were increasingly associated with violence and terrorism. The migration crisis in 2015 led to the portrayal of refugees as a catastrophe and a heightened focus on closing Europe's borders. Finally, the recent decade illustrates the need to protect Dutch culture and identity from immigration, with policymakers emphasising the diminishing acceptability of immigrants and the necessity for additional limitations and border control for refugees.

Keywords: Populism, Migration, Dutch Integration Policy, Critical Discourse Analysis.

1. Introduction

1.1 Topic Introduction

Over the previous decades, there has been a progressive increase in immigration to European countries. This unprecedented flood of immigrants sparked heated arguments about immigration and integration, with high levels of hostility and a wide range of alternative perspectives, or frames, on the matter (Bos et al., 2016). Subsequently, ethnic minorities, immigrants[1], and/or multicultural societies have risen to the top of public and political agendas (Van der Valk, 2003), involving new ways of identifying and thinking about immigration, classifying the groups in question, various explanations about how to address the matter, and divergent normative viewpoints on the plurality of Dutch society (Entzinger, 1975). Within the Dutch context, policies often adopt strong anti-migration discourse (Brouwer et al., 2017). For example, immigration is often connected with negative categories such as criminality, risks to public order, religious extremism, national decline, and increased societal costs (Van der Valk, 2003). As such, the Netherlands appears to have evolved from a nation characterised by pillarisation to an immigration society due to migration (Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009). This transition entails various frameshifts in integration policy and the strong anti-migration discourse around these policies (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021; Penninx, 2020; Brouwer et al., 2017; Scholten, 2011).

The first frameshift occurred following WWII, which entailed large-scale immigration from former colonies and labour migration (Penninx, 2020; Entzinger, 1975). But the Netherlands, like other Western European countries, had a significant rule that it should not be an immigrant country (Entzinger, 1975). Therefore, immigrants from the Dutch East Indies, Morocco, and Turkey were classified as 'guest labourers' in the Netherlands in 1960 because the immigrant residence was intended to be temporary. However, another frameshift occurred when it became clear that many immigrants would remain permanently in the 1980s, which shifted the purpose of integration policy from promoting a return to socioeconomic engagement to preventing sociocultural isolation (Slootman, 2018). This policy moved towards a multiculturalist approach focusing on ethnic or cultural minorities as collectives, boosting socio-economic participation, opposing prejudice, and supporting minority emancipation (Scholten, 2011). However, in the early 1990s, the combination of the fatwa against Rushdie, and Bolkestein's that claimed Islam was an ideological threat to Western values, placed Islam onto the agenda of the Dutch integration policies (Uitermark, 2012). Increasingly, the term 'guest-workers' was replaced with 'allochthones', and the minority policy was changed into an integration policy, emphasising immigrants' social-economic engagement (Scholten, 2011).

After the turn of the millennium, a sequence of events combined with the pressure from populist anti-immigrant parties changed the Dutch integration landscape (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2018; Callejo et al.,

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[1] The concept of migrant and immigrant will be used as a general category

2007). After the September 11 terrorist attacks and the assassination of populist politicians Pim Fortuyn 2002 and Verdonk, new nationalist and anti-Islamic politics emerged (Aziz, 2020; Slootman, 2018; Wodak et al., 2015). This resulted in unfavourable images and stereotypes of immigrants, and anti-Islam populism flourished, which led to the 'death of multiculturalism' (Ossewaarde, 2014). Undoubtedly, extreme right parties and populist actors in particular have played an important role in shaping the migration discourse (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021). Consider, for instance, Liberal minister Verdonk in 2004, who framed immigrants as having "characteristics that are an obstacle to their successful integration into Dutch society" (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2017).

More recently, populist actor Wilders has been a prominent figure in Dutch politics, receiving political success in recent years. Wilders' intense opposition to Islam and portrayal of it as a totalitarian doctrine with no nuances has been a prominent subject in his party's electoral campaigns, with the 2010 program supporting a fight against Islam and a halt to what was assumed to be mass migration (Slootman, 2018). The far-right 'Forum for Democracy' had grown to become the largest party in the 2019 provincial elections, even overtaking Prime Minister Mark Rutte's conservative-liberal party. Despite being depicted as radical and racist, the significant growth implies that the party's message, including anti-immigrant sentiments, resonates with numerous Dutch citizens (Van Raalte et al., 2021).

Taking into account the influence of anti-immigrant populist politicians on the integration policies (Lutz, 2019; Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021), the genre of policy discourse addressing issues of immigrants and minorities has also shifted (Mepschen, 2019). In a populist discourse, immigration is frequently associated with crime, the burden on the economy, and threats to culture and religion, allowing for threat-based arguments. After all, populist discourse frequently makes a specific ethnic, linguistic, religious, or minority group the scapegoat for the majority, if not all, contemporary problems. This framing frequently depicts the group as perilous and a threat to 'us' or 'our' country (Sengul, 2019). Moreover, minorities and immigrants may be framed as adversaries of the 'real people' in populist discourses, resulting in social divisiveness (Müller, 2016). Thus, the rise of populism has resulted in a populist immigrant and minority discourse, in which populist actors or policymakers use framing methods to portray and present immigrants and minority issues in a certain manner.

1.2 Research Problem

Within Dutch politics, government, and academia, the creation of a Dutch policy on integrating immigrants and minorities prompted fierce debate (Scholten and Holzhacker, 2009). As mentioned before, the Netherlands has changed its integration policy in various ways which involve new ways of framing and categorising immigrants and minorities (Entzinger, 1975). These shifts have been influenced by the upsurge of anti-immigrant populism and populist actors, which led to more anti-immigrant stances and negative

framing of minorities and immigrants (Bell et al., 2021). Dutch policymakers have primarily focused on integration or assimilation, but not the contributions that immigrants and their cultures can bring to Dutch society (Penninx, 2020; Entzinger, 2006). This illustrates the development of a more nationalist pattern in Dutch politics that followed the emergence of populist politicians like Fortuyn and Wilders (Siebers & Koster, 2021; Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that populism endangers the liberties of those who are not considered 'people' as well as the rights of immigrants and minorities in democracies (Lutz, 2018). After all, equality of treatment, regardless of ethnic background or any other ascriptive marker, is unquestionably the hallmark of all democratic countries and is protected by their constitutions (Joppke, 2007). Therefore, it lends itself well to analysing how the discourses on immigrants and minorities have changed so radically over the past few decades, emphasising the populist frameshifts of immigrants. Given the present rise and current character of populism, this seems like a reasonable inquiry in combination with the significantly rising numbers of arrivals of immigrants.

1.3 Research Question
Therefore, this study aims to gain insights and knowledge regarding the presence and gradual shifts of populist frameshifts in Dutch immigrant integration policy in different periods. The radical right has established itself in the Dutch party system with the emergence of anti-immigrant populism in the last four decades and the past two decades. This upsurge has put immigrant integration back on the political agenda and called the policies that have been implemented a failure. The fact that right-wing populism has shaped immigrant integration policy thus offers an opportunity to study how the populist framing of immigrants in Dutch integration policy has developed over time. To that end, the following research question is being addressed: *In what ways has the populist framing of immigrants in Dutch integration policy changed over time in the period 1960 until 2022?*

The subsequent questions have been created to respond to this research question:
- What were the dominant populist frames surrounding immigrants that emerged, declined, and resurfaced in Dutch integration policy documents during the period 1960 until 2022?
-How are immigrant identities represented and constructed in the dominant populist frames during the period 1960 until 2022? The research question for this thesis stems from a perceived knowledge deficit in the field of populistic framing of immigrants and minorities in the integration policy. Therefore, seeking to answer the research question is an attempt to fill this void in our knowledge of the topic from a scientific standpoint. Previous research has dealt with understanding populism and party discourse, behaviour, or motivations (Lutz, 2019; Gruber and Rosenberger, 2021), and the populist discursive framing of immigrants by various actors on online media (Biegon, 2019). However, not much has been written to date about the presence of populist frames in the integration policy discourse related to immigrants. And how the populist frames of

immigrants have developed in different periods. This study hopes to build on the existing knowledge of populism and migration by analysing the discursive elements involved in the production of populist framing of immigrants in integration policy discourse. More specifically, the aim is to understand how the immigrant discourse has changed and which populist frames can be retrieved within the discourse in the Netherlands in the period 1960 until 2022.

1.4 Societal Relevance

Besides the scientific relevance of this research, getting a better understanding of populism and migration adds to the societal relevance of this study. As mentioned in the introduction, populist parties have gained power and more favourable political opportunities for the implementation of policies, especially in the context of migration (Gruber and Rosenberger, 2021). Knill and Tosun (2012) argue that agenda-setting is a key power source. Therefore, investigating the populist framing of immigrants and minorities may provide more insight into how populists strive to influence policy agendas when it comes to immigration policies. This study could shed light on how populist framing affects the first process of the policy cycle, which includes problem definition and agenda formulation., a model of the policy process that separates four distinct policy stages. Ultimately, the rational method of formulating policy starts with the recognition of a societal issue and its inclusion on the political agenda.

Moreover, concerning the rise of populism and its growing impact on societies (Müller, 2016; Wodak et al., 2013), the way immigrants and minorities are framed by populists could conceivably affect how societies are likely to view this group. Government, lawmakers, policymakers, and policy advisors must be aware of these patterns. As previously mentioned, certain politicians are growing and even gaining power by blaming minorities, immigrant groups, and refugees. Racism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and nationalism are all on the rise. This dangerous trend threatens to undo the current human rights which limit abuse. To live in dignity, these rights need to be protected. However, the hostility towards immigrants and minorities threatens not only human rights but also democratic values (Roth, 2017). Hence, it might be beneficial for governments and politicians to think about how to respond to this, and to determine whether populism is driving these trends. This study may present an excellent starting point in this regard.

2. Theoretical Framework

As previously indicated, addressing the research question requires a discourse analysis of the populist framing of immigrants and minorities in Dutch integration policy. However, it is critical to construct a theoretical framework for facilitating this research. The concepts and theories identified will inform the coding scheme and facilitate the interpretation of data within the established framework. Hence, it is critical to be able to recognize populist frames in data so that the combinations and constructions of these frames and elements may be used to understand the findings. The theoretical foundation of this research will be constructed by identifying the key concepts relevant to the research subject. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the theoretical foundations of the concepts, including populism, immigration, discourse, and frames. Specifically, the chapters will explore the rise of populism, the rise of populist discourse on immigration, and the role of populist frames in integration policy discourses. First, this section works towards a conceptualisation of populism.

2.1 The Rise of Populism

Researchers (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016) argue that no agreement on a definition of populism is considered appropriate for research purposes because the notion lacks a strong theoretical foundation. Regardless of definitional differences, there are several essential components that most scholars would agree are always present among populists (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015, p.4). Therefore, this section will continue by exploring the background information on the definition of populism, populism in politics, and populism as a communication style. Several concepts of populism by different scholars are introduced in this section, however, the conceptualisation by Mudde (2007) will be applied on answering the research question. Accordingly, populism is understood as a political style and expression, in which communication signals can shape the creation of an out-group who is presented as a threat and are blamed for the problems of society and excluded. Moreover, the conceptualisation used in this study combines Wodak's (2010) perspective on populism as a discourse with Mudde's (2004) perspective on populism as an ideology.

Populism's origin

First, it should be noted that there is a widespread error in current scholarly and public discourse in asserting that populism is a new phenomenon (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017). On the contrary, populism can be traced back to the Roman times. In ancient Roman terms, populism is the belief that only the plebs (as opposed to the patrician class) constitute the Populus Romanus and that only a specific form of Populares represents the actual people (Müller, 2016). However, populism increased in the industrialised world at a time when liberal democracy was considered to have prevailed over alternative forms of political organisation such as communism and authoritarian regimes. So, populism might be deemed essentially anti-democratic, as it

undermines the fundamental pillars of modern democracy, such as the acknowledgement of a varied population, and political representation (Müller, 2016).

Moreover, According to Riedel (2017), contemporary populism is an anti-democratic reaction to the anti-democratic trends of globalisation and technocracy. Essentially, populism is a response to the idea of responsible governance by an elite group of professionals who consciously disregard the needs of ordinary people (Müller, 2016). Furthermore, populist actors and leaders remain unconcerned with knowledge or truth even. In the name of the people, it can offer a power that refuses to be restrained by institutional procedures that limit authority, particularly those that relate power to wider truths or knowledge (Singer, 2021). They also play a significant role in integrating a variety of specific interests and shaping them into a broad understanding of the common good (Bickerton & Accetti, 2015).

Defining populism

That being said, populism is a highly contentious notion that has been explored by scholars from a variety of academic disciplines, utilising a variety of theoretical lenses and techniques (Mudde, 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Müller, 2016; Laclau, 2005). Building on this thought, scholars (Fahey, 2021; Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; Woods, 2014) separate four main conceptual approaches: discourse, strategy, pathology, and political style. Even if these definitions overlap, this study is mainly focused on the discursive side of populism, that is the distinctive arrangements of ideas through narratives. Despite its 50-year existence, Kögl (2010) contends that the significant obstacle of populism literature is the absence of a coherent theory of populism, and he relates this discussion with the challenge of definition. To address these conceptual challenges, Mudde (2017, p.5) provided a minimal definition of populism. His understanding of the phrase is notoriously 'ideational', that is, he regards populism as a legitimate ideology, albeit a thin one rather than simply a political strategy or leadership strategy. Although not a universal definition of populism, the ideational approach has been used to explain the rise of populism in recent years in both the Americas and Europe. According to the author himself:

> "More concretely, populism can be characterised as a thin-centred ideology that posits the division of society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and that believes that political decisions should reflect the will of the people as whole" (Mudde, 2017, p5-6).

Perhaps predictably, the consistent basic aspects of populism highlighted by Mudde (2004) are present to a considerable extent in the definition provided by Woods (2014), who defines populism as the homogenous presence of the 'people', the claim to advocate the 'real people', and additionally, the designation of a specific out-group. Inevitably, then, populists reject pluralism. In other words, populists claim to be the single

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representative of the people, which leads them to feel that their political rivals, the 'elite', are dishonest and must not be acknowledged (Velasco, 2020). This thin discursive definition of populism is advanced in this context as a system of beliefs that cause societal division and focus on problems that reflect this divide.

The political spectrum of right-wing populism

Moreover, while 'the people' can be ambiguous, it is a common theme in all types of populism- whether left or right (Woods, 2014, p.12). This presence is frequently characterised by identity politics, whereby populists claim to represent the actual people or the promotion of a specific group's interest (Woods, 2014, p.13). A crucial aspect of identity politics is defining the out-group (Woods, 2014; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015, p.4). Political parties that stress exclusion or discrimination against specific social groups have an ethno-nationalistic and potentially racist agenda, professing to represent the people yet defining themselves via their exclusion of others (Wodak et al, 2013). The elites, the political establishment, and capitalists are typical examples of the 'other' for populists (Woods, 2014, p.14).

However, Wodak et al. (2015) argue that there has been a shift in the construction of the 'other', focused on the portrayal of foreigners. Wodak et al. (2013) indicate that populism simplifies complex phenomena by hunting for blame. They argue that accountability must be allocated because the foreigner and their culture, the opponent, have already pierced the stronghold of the nation-state. Similarly, according to right-wing populism, multiculturalism is a recipe for denationalizing one's nation and deconstructing one's people. Right-wing populist parties frequently suggest simplistic and straightforward solutions to such concerns and difficulties. These solutions often require the identification of scapegoats and opponents, commonly referred to as 'others', who are responsible for the prevailing issues. Furthermore, these parties frequently rely on traditional communal prejudices and depictions of the perceived enemy. The process of identifying scapegoats is impacted by historical traditions within certain circumstances, resulting in the targeting of specific groups such as Jews, Muslims, or other minority communities. These groups are frequently targeted because of qualities such as 'race,' 'religion,' or 'language' (Wodak, 2015, p.4).

This is in line with Mudde (2004) and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015, p.6), who claim that certain isolated groups do not share the positive features of the people. The true populist not merely emphasises the irreconcilable difference between the people and the elites but also holds that certain groups' beliefs and behaviour are incompatible with the general interest of the people and prevent them from being regarded as members of the natural community established by the people. As previously mentioned, other scholars (Müller, 2017; Béland, 2019) describe this form of populism as identity politics, however, not every identity politics movement is inevitably populist. For instance, the phrase identity politics has largely been used in American politics to characterise political activism by various minority groups to combat prejudice and be involved in the democratic process. However, the new identity politics observed mostly in Europe is

exclusionary. It is centred on promises to safeguard the silent majority from the negative repercussions of globalisation, further European integration, and immigration.

And so, the notion of defining the opponent also helps to define the concerns adopted by populist discourse and is used as a political card (Özerim & Tolay, 2021). Numerous populist movements that embrace anti-establishment ideas, focus on cultural norms, immigration policies, taxation, religious practices, and civic freedoms. Amidst these widely supported populist concerns, immigration has taken centre stage (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p.4). Indeed, the problem of immigration has served as a rallying point for the right-wing populism that has expanded across Europe (Özerim & Tolay, 2021). Such populism is rooted in contradiction to immigration and the dissatisfaction of immigrants and minorities (Mudde, 2007). To clarify, right-wing populism is frequently associated with far-right politics and is defined as a synthesis of populist, nationalist, and authoritarian beliefs (Mudde, 2007). It emphasises the value of national identity and sovereignty while opposing multiculturalism and globalism (Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Radical right-wing populism contends that 'the people' are endangered not only by the elites but also by 'others' living in society who do not share their identities or views (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015, p.4; Akbaba, 2018). This is referred to as exclusionary discourse Othering (Mudde (2007), which entails foreigners, particularly immigrants, minorities and Muslims, as the outgroup (Thiele et al., 2022).

Right-wing populism in this argument is thus based on the existence of anti-immigrant rhetoric and the concept of a homogenous people. Nativism and ethnicity are thus major distinguishing factors between populism and right-wing populism. While it might be challenging to establish whether populism is an ideology or a political approach. The focus of this study, however, is mostly inspired by the notion that populism is a form of politics rather than an ideology. Because considering populism as an ideology would suggest that any actor who used populist terminology can be referred to as a populist. Thus, an actor could adopt right-wing populist discourse without being branded as one.

Populism in integration policy discourses

Regarding exclusionary othering, researchers argue that populism in integration policy discourses often manifests through the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing ideologies (Blankvoort et al., 2021; Lutz, 2019; Bos et al., 2016). The pervasive presence of radical right-wing populist parties in the political landscapes of the majority of Western European nations suggests that the political right wields significant influence over the formulation of integration policy, often steering it in a more restrictive direction (Lutz, 2019; Wodak, 2015). These policies have been criticized for actively partaking in othering, which entails the discursive construction of an other – namely, a migrant who is regarded as undesirable and fundamentally different from the native citizen (Blankvoort et al., 2021). In an ideal world, integration policies address both socio-structural disadvantages and the socio-cultural disparities that accompany international migration and

mobility (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021). However, how specific migrant integration strategies are designed is primarily determined by the politicians that are in control of the policy, as well as their principles and motivations that drive a policy decision (Akkerman, 2012).

In general, social-democratic parties have historically embraced a liberal and welcoming stance to balance citizen concerns with immigrant demands. However, they have been pushed into restrictive leanings by the populist right-wing, who have historically politicized and agitated the topic and are considered the primary advocates for restricting immigration or limiting opportunities and facilities for new immigrants (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021; Lutz, 2019). The most common element that is shared by the right-wing ideologies, is their ethno-nationalistic, xenophobic stance that promotes exclusion and division of immigrants (Lutz, 2019; Bos & Brants, 2014). Within this perspective, it is argued that immigration threatens the (homogenous) nation-state (Lutz, 2019), and promotes narratives such as the 'failed integration' of newcomers (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021). Therefore, demands are placed on immigrants to adopt certain values of host nations, in which these demands have taken the form of restricted integration policies (Morgan, 2017; Wodak, 2015).

Populist communication

While Mudde (2004) argues that the lack of a theoretical definition of populism results in the lack of an accepted definition suitable for use in research. Woods (2014), on the other hand, argues that this gives the ability to enhance the possibilities of researching and understanding populism. Woods (2014, p.4) concurs that populism lacks a clear theoretical underpinning, but maintains that it is a sound concept that may be utilised in several conceptual frameworks. The concept's nature is used as a reason for this theoretical restriction: In terms of what it is designed to define and explain, populism is essentially a contested idea with conflicting demands. Examining the various political, social, and historical situations whereby populist traits emerged as well as the many reasons behind their emergence is necessary to explain these two characteristics. After all, populism as a concept appears to have developed in response to historical circumstances that necessitated some sort of categorisation and identification. For example, there is a pervasive anti-populism bias with historical roots in Europe. Populist movements are frequently associated with risky policies or other forms of political exploitation. In the United States, on the other hand, populism is frequently considered a progressive trend (Woods, 2014; Müller, 2016).

Moreover, the presence of conflicting imperatives, which involve interdependent but contradicting aims or motivations, underpins many social and political connections. This reveals why the concept is often studied and analysed from multiple viewpoints (Woods, 2014). Accordingly, and for this thesis, it can be suggested that the primary elements of populism are a distinct set of ideas, styles, and policies. (1) Appealing to the people above 'others' is a crucial component of right-wing populist movements. A good and

homogeneous people is juxtaposed against a 'dangerous others', with each one portrayed as robbing the sovereign people of their rights, principles, abundance, and voice. Whereas outgroups, which often involve immigrants and minorities, are identified as a threat to security, welfare, and identity and must be frantically dealt with, if not simply expelled from the domain of the population; (2) a discourse style indicating the populist's anti-immigrant stance or appeal; (3) policies aiming to represent and justify processes of inclusion and exclusion, whereby the implementation of these policies divide society and criticise some types of migration, particularly multiculturalism. Considering populism as a discourse style, one is referring to political expressions or communication rather than the traits of the political actor who are disseminating the message.

So, the emphasis is on the use of discourse techniques to communicate this ideology (Biegon, 2019; de Vreese et al., 2018). Populism as a mode of political expression necessitates a departure from the notion that populism is a one-dimensional ideology. But rather is viewed as a medium for communication that everyone can use, regardless of their political affiliation. Therefore, inclusion as manifested in 'people-centrism' and exclusion as manifested in 'threatening others' are two essential elements of populist communication (Järviniemi, 2022). This conceptualisation aligns with what Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) describe as right-wing populism, which is characterised by a deeply adversarial worldview that sees the 'virtuous people' as being endangered by 'others' (Thiele et al., 2022). That is to say, populism in the context of this study can be described as political communication that contains the exclusionary notion of the 'other', which involves immigrants and minorities. This is achieved through a method called framing in communication, in which speakers employ specific phrases, images, rhetoric, and stylistic decisions to favour some worldviews over others (Fahey, 2021; Entman, 1993).

2.2 Rise of Populist Discourse on Immigration

Recently, populism has risen as a significant political movement throughout the world. Interestingly, migration is one of the main topics that populist discourse has focused on, which has grown to be an increasing political and social concern. Populist movements frequently present immigration as a threat to the nation's prosperity, cultural identity, and security. This has resulted in a divided and frequently acrimonious debate about immigration policy (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017). This chapter will examine the theoretical framework of the rise of populist discourse on immigration. To this end, in the first section, the theoretical assumptions underlying the study of discourses are discussed. Followed by the intersection of populism and discourse analysis in studying migration. The last section carves out the migration discourse, whereby it is shown that the migration discourse has become more populistic.

Discourses and populist discourse

As mentioned before, the focus of this study is populist communication or rather discourses. Discourses, according to contemporary researchers (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.66), are typically understood as a sort of linguistic social activity that takes place in both spoken and written language. However, Laclau and Mouffe (1987, p.82) argue that discourse can be understood not only in linguistic terms but photographs and other visual elements can also be part of a discursive process. In other words, images and other visual components can also be used in discursive processes because they are used to express meaning and create social reality (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001). Essentially, discourse is the full total field of interpersonal, media, or other communication interactions in which actors absorb, communicate, and develop their own held truths as well as the truths of others through further communication (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987).

Second, Van Dijk (2006) indicates the significance that discourses have for ideologies as a means by which individuals of various social groups can create, reproduce, express, maintain, defend, legitimate, alter, and propagate their ideas in the contexts of interaction. Indeed, ideologies are frequently concealed or latent inside texts, frequently camouflaged within metaphors (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.9). For instance, ideology can reflect the polarised patterns of underlying attitudes and ideas, such as a structure that typically stresses positive traits of the in-group, and negative traits of the out-group (Van Dijk, 2013).

Similarly, populist discourse can be characterised as an ideological tool to mystify power mechanisms and domination. That is to say, ideology can be used to exercise power through the working of language (Wodak, 2015b, p.34; Van Dijk, 2009; Fairclough, 1995). This is consistent with Salmela and Von Scheve's (2018) emphasis on the specific emotional dynamic that distinguishes right-wing populism, including an attempt to turn fears into anger, so demonstrating a relationship between social power structures and emotions. For this purpose, speakers typically employ a variety of linguistic and logical strategies to persuade the audience. Speakers employ these to perform a variety of purposes, including concealing the truth, influencing the listeners, conveying resistance and disapproval, and giving legitimacy to a specific group (Omar et al., 2020). In other words, the employment of logical and linguistic strategies is frequently tied to populist discourse strategic goals. Based on this concept, right-wing populist movements' communication strategies can be viewed as a means of directing and mobilising people towards exclusionary political goals while persuading them through the effective use of contentious themes like migration that stir up strong emotions like fear and a sense of vulnerability (Thiele et al., 2022).

Populist discourse on immigration

Regarding the populist discourse on migration, discourse is particularly effective in understanding how language is used to generate a specific vision of migration and immigration. It enables the detection of

linguistic features, themes, and narratives utilised to build a discourse that appeals to specific populations and promotes the populist message. As indicated by Van Dijk (2003), discourses play a major role in the development, preservation, and modification of social power relations, especially those between groups with diverse ethnic or cultural backgrounds. Concerning the immigration discourse, scholars (Callejo et al., 2007) illustrate the rising tension and changes in migration discourse as it manifests in policy and political discourse. For instance, Newton (2008), emphasises the tendency in political discourse to describe immigration using crisis language such as 'war' and 'invasion' is as ancient as the occurrence itself. Similarly, Buonfino (2006) argues that the threat and security concern associated with immigration has evolved into a dominant discourse type in government policy. This discourse type perpetuates a dominant narrative that serves to justify and maintain existing power structures and social norms. To understand the changes in the migration discourse throughout the years, it is first necessary to establish the context of immigrants as the 'other'.

Immigrants as the Other

Recalling Mudde's (2007) definition of exclusionary othering discourse, immigrants are constructed as 'others' who do not belong. The construction of otherness is frequently manifested in portraying immigrants as outsiders who are in some way distinct from the host community (Sassen, 2005). Considering what Van Dijk (2000) indicates as the qualitative analysis of actors in migration discourse, an examination of how actors are described in immigration discourse reveals underlying sentiments against immigrants. In other words, how immigrants are referred to and described might provide insights into underlying attitudes about immigrants. For instance, Ghorashi (2005) demonstrates that migrants are portrayed as temporary guests who do not belong in society because of the close connection between migration and return. To clarify, the discourse on migration in the 1960s is dominated by the arrival of guest workers. Post-war economic expansion and the necessity for unskilled labour compelled governments to turn beyond their borders, fostering labour contracts with Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia (Slootman, 2018; Castles & Miller, 2009). The term guest worker stressed the temporary nature of the migration and the workers' expectation to return home after a set period (Ghorashi, 2005).

Second, once it became clear that immigrant groups remained permanent, the discourse surrounding migration became more negative (Ossewaarde, 2014). Unlike the 1960s, in which multiculturalism tried to preserve the cultural distinction among the nation by portraying migrants as unique people with various attitudes and viewpoints based on their identity, culture, and religion (Žúborová & Borárosová, 2017; Ossewaarde, 2014). By the 1980s and 1990s, new terms emerged to describe the growing diversity of migrant populations, while guest workers were increasingly labelled as Muslims (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016; Ossewaarde, 2014). Schain (2018) and Betz (2003) note that the growth of Islamic

terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s in combination with the pace and scale of arrivals of immigrants, created a radical right narrative of out-of-control borders and dangerous immigrants entering without appropriate identification. Simultaneously, terms like 'newcomers' and 'allochthonous' were used to refer to migrants who were seen as being foreign and having little to no ties to the host culture (Van Dijk, 2000). According to Ghorashi (2005), allochthon does not refer to any non-native, such as US, British, or German immigrants, but rather to non-natives of colour and immigrants with actual or attributed Muslim identity. The process of exclusion is the manifestation of ethnicity in physical appearance, which moulds the perception of migrants as 'others' (Ghorashi, 2005). In other words, to secure the nation's/people's survival, all that is alien must be detected and ruled out. The concept of the other is rather fluid, whereby today's others are mostly immigrants and the Muslim culture (Wodak et al., 2013).

In sum, this chapter examines the rise of populist discourse on migration and its theoretical underpinning. The study focuses on the role of discourses in understanding ideologies and how language is utilised to sustain power relations between social groups. Populist discourse, in particular, uses language to obscure power structures and dominance. Furthermore, discourse analysis is particularly effective in comprehending the migration discourse, which has gotten increasingly populist in recent years. It promotes the portrayal of immigrants as outsiders who are distinct from the in-group. Hence, the study emphasises the importance of discourse in understanding the impact of populist discourse on migration.

2.3 The Role of Populist Frames in Integration Policy Discourses

As previously stated, populist discourses aim to reconstruct the current reality and propose an alternative centred around mass ideology (Ramahi & Rashid, 2019). Populist discourses feature frames that initiate an implicit dichotomization of the social identity into an 'us identity' versus 'them' (Wodak et al., 2013). Benford and Snow (2000) contend that political leaders stress strategic framing to effectively persuade audiences to adopt their version of reality. So, populist frames are cultivated in the political and policy sphere to construct a dichotomization of an 'us' versus 'them' identity.

Frames

Framing and frames are especially important in research that analyses discourse. A discourse, like a frame, is defined as a 'specific way of speaking about and understanding what is happening' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.1). Therefore, the components of a text that represent a particular discourse are called frames. They identify and categorise certain passages in a document as belonging to a particular discourse type (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

It should be noted that framing conceptualisations nowadays range in complexity. Most of these conceptualisations, however, are at least somewhat consistent with Entman's (1993:53) classical definition

of framing, which entails selecting specific components from a seen reality and highlighting them in a communication text to support a given explanation of an issue or generating a certain interpretation. In other words, frames might lead to interpretations simply by stressing certain features of the topic over others. Emphasising particular elements of an event or topic is a crucial component of emphasis framing, as stated by Hameleers (2019a), which is similar to Entman's strategy. This calls for the clustering of frame components, which can be done in a variety of methods. This is in line with Matthes and Kohring's (2008) definition of framing, which considers frames as sequences that emerge from the systematic interaction of frame components. According to this theory, frames include various interpretations, problem definitions, assessments, and suggested solutions. These elements can be thought of as variables, and each variable can include different categories. For instance, different frames of immigrant integration can highlight various aspects of the issue (such as socioeconomic or social-culture concerns), as well as different individuals or categories (such as foreigners or minorities), and they can provide various justifications for what occurs (such as discrimination or poor citizenship) (Scholten, 2011b, p.33).

Using this conceptualisation of emphasis framing (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohring, 2008), a growing number of empirical studies investigated the portrayal of illegal immigrants by politicians and policymakers (Rydgen, 2018). Relying on the emphasis framing approach, Newton (2008) investigates the multiple interpretations, problems definitions, and causes offered in politics. Frequently mentioned interpretations are fiscal crisis, welfare abuse, crime, and Mexican immigration. Politicians and policymakers frequently use terms like 'illegal alien criminals' or 'criminal aliens' to emphasise the alleged danger that immigrants pose to public safety (Hier & Greenberg, 2002). This framing suggests that all immigrants are dangerous criminals, regardless of their legal status. This framing reinforces negative stereotypes and encourages anti-immigrant sentiment, making it not only incorrect but also harmful. Former president Trump, for example, used emphasis framing to defend his administration's immigration policies. When discussing undocumented immigrants, he frequently used terms like 'bad hombre', implying that they were all criminals or were prone to criminal behaviour (Zepeda-Millán & Wallace, 2018).

Populist frames
Taking into account various viewpoints on framing and frames, the question arises of what is considered populist frames then. As mentioned before, right-wing populism is recognized for using communication tools to disseminate essential parts of populist ideology, and frames are among these tools (de Vreese et al., 2018; Biegon, 2019). The central populist message, which is the exclusion of out-groups such as immigrants and minorities, is not necessarily associated with a single actor or speaker but rather is a frame that can be embraced by a variety of actors (Aalberg et al., 2017; Bos et al., 2019). Moreover, the particular features that distinguish populist discourse are linguistic exploitation and the meaning populists wish to give to their

messages. So, it is the content of their rhetorical forms, rather than the employment of metaphors, that distinguishes the populist. This discovery is consistent with Biegon's (2019) view of populism as a distinct framing style that acts as a technique for generating a combative dynamic between 'the people' and their opponents.

Focusing on the populist frames of immigrants and minorities, indeed, one could describe the populist framing of immigrants as antagonistic frames, including ideological threats, critical statements, and the development of opponents (Bartha et al., 2020). In other words, antagonistic framing refers to how an issue is presented in a negative light, with a focus on the potential harms and threats rather than the positive contributions and benefits. When it comes to migration, antagonistic framing frequently includes portraying migrants as threats to not only the culture, language, and values of society but also relates immigrants as threats to social cohesion, crime, and economic costs (Riegert & Hovden, 2019; Horsti, 2013; Newman et al., 2012). This type of scapegoating is effective in politics because it allows complicated issues like unemployment, social injustice, housing, or crime to be addressed in a highly simplified manner. Attributing blame to a specific group, such as migrants, channels a general, unspecific sense of political discontent and defines complex political issues in a simplified logic of us versus them. Migrants are an easy target for such scapegoating because they have a very limited public and political voice, especially in European societies (Schmidtke, 2021). However, the repercussion of the antagonistic framing of immigrants is significant. It has the potential to normalise hate speech and xenophobic views, thereby marginalising and excluding immigrant groups (Hameleers, 2019b).

Populist Frames in integration policy

Regarding the exclusion of immigrants, scholars (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2018; Brubaker, 2010; Wimmer, 2008) argue that integration policies can be viewed as a way for nation-states to perform boundary work and create a sense of belonging with their imagined communities. As a result, states use integration policies to exercise their symbolic power by categorising individuals as either belonging to the 'in-group', the 'out-group' or occupying an ambiguous position in between (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2018).

More recently, scholars (Rydgren, 2018, Bonjour, 2013) who focus on the culture and identity axes of exclusion, argue that integration policies have shifted into renewed assimilationism and culturalization of citizenship. This is in line with King & Collyer (2016) who believe that multiculturalism has harmed economic integration by encouraging cultural and religious divergence. Recent studies across several social science disciplines have examined the topic of threat perception, particularly concerning security concerns. Critical studies from various schools have multiple approaches to tackling security concerns. Scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) have been particularly active in re-examining traditional views of security (Štefančík et al., 2021). Waever defines security as an act of communication,

transmitted through a statement rather than a simple signal directed at a third party. As a result, a specific assertion of security represents an action in and of itself whereby the state cannot be considered a spectator in security-related problems (Waever, 2007). The reasons why some groups of immigrants are viewed as a cultural threat are complicated. Individual cultures vary depending on the standards that migration destination countries use to decide who can join their community, under what circumstances, to whom they can admit them, and which groups will be viewed as potential dangers (Štefančík et al., 2021).

A threat is realised through several arguments which, according to Krzyżanowski (2020), Buonfino, (2006), and Greussing & Boomgaarden (2017), are usually articulated around four main frames; securitisation, economisation, cultural/religious, and criminality. The rise of the securitisation frame is driven by national governments' need to regulate influxes, appease media demands, and relieve popular concerns about being 'swamped' by foreigners (Buonfino, 2006). The securitisation of migration is a construction that stems from the shifted focus from human rights to human security. Human security is concerned with potential vulnerabilities and threats to populations, whereby immigrants are seen as threatening to the receiving country's population (Ibrahim, 2005). The citizen is endangered because the integration of migrants will result in an unstable host state. Therefore, boundaries are created between us and others, between inside and outside. However, securitisation as a technique for sustaining community cohesion, endangers human rights, peaceful coexistence, freedom, and justice (Buonfino, 2006; Ibrahim, 2005). And so, the securitisation frame reflects the subject of crossing borders in combination with a stereotypical depiction of migrants as an unmanageable, dehumanised horde that seeks to gain entry into the country (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017). Poverty, environmental degradation, and uncontrolled population growth have pushed underdevelopment into the realm of security (Ibrahim, 2005).

Second, Ibrahim (2005) differentiates between state security, which includes political and environmental risks, to sovereignty and societal risks, which relate to threats to cultural identity. Threats to cultural identity might take the form of many languages, races, and religions. The cultural/religious frame depicts that a society's ability to survive is a question of identity since this is how a society expresses existential threats: if this occurs, we will not be able to live as 'us' (Waever, 1993,p.40). The concept of 'us' indicates a society with uniform ideals, traditions, and beliefs. When migration is referred to represent a threat to society, it refers to how migrants will alter the identity of the host country (Ibrahim, 2005). In other words, immigration is blamed for causing unrest and insecurity since newcomers do not understand Western society and do not follow 'our' standards and regulations (Rydgren, 2005). A great recurring issue is the notion that Islam and Muslims pose a threat (Verkuyten, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). For instance, Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) indicate how Islam is portrayed as a threat to fundamental Western values such as gender equality, freedom of expression, and separation of religion and state.

Moreover, the economisation frame maintains the perception of migrants as financial burdens and threats to the welfare and stability of the host nation (Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017). This is in line with what Rydgren (2005) describes as the welfare chauvinist frame, in which the real or alleged costs of immigration are viewed as a threat to the generous welfare programs of Western societies. Immigrants are frequently portrayed as 'economic refugees' or 'social welfare tourists' who have come to live good parasitic lives on public benefits. Similarly, immigration is pitted against real or perceived flaws in public health and education, among other things. To cast immigrants as illegitimate rivals for scarce resources, radical right-wing populists frequently allege that immigrants take jobs from natives and that immigration is a major cause of unemployment (Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017). Their economic standing within society dictates that their articulation of immigration discourse will centre on concepts perceived to be threatened by immigration. Their identity, in terms of their position, is viewed as threatened by the entrance of immigrants - it is also via this perception of us/them divide that their identity is created in the first place (Buonfino, 2006).

Lastly, the criminality frame fosters a problem-based perception by identifying immigrants with illegal ways of transit and fostering an environment of distrust (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). Historically, the approaching 'other' has always caused widespread fear in the receiving society. Today, this fear has been resurrected as a growing and intense public concern about threats to safety and health, and it is frequently manifested as the criminalisation of foreigners (Buonfino, 2006). Rather than relying on intelligence-driven criteria or individualised suspicion, governments have frequently utilised national origin as a proxy for proof of dangerousness, raising mistrust, stigmatisation, and terror among the community of resident ethnic minorities and migrants (Buonfino, 2006). And so, immigrants are increasingly being investigated as prospective participants in uprisings and terrorist operations (Ibrahim, 2006). In this context, racial and xenophobic narratives cross with frameworks of illegality and criminality, further dehumanising immigrants by feeding pre-existing panic over the deviant and dangerous immigrant other (Haw, 2022). Therefore, in this study, the idea of populist frames of immigrants and minorities includes all of the above frames.

In conclusion, the populist framing of immigrants may be regarded as primarily emphasising specific components of the matter addressed in the message, notably policy texts issued by policymakers. Formulating the concept of populist framing of immigrants is characterised by antagonistic frames, which depict immigrants as threats to the cultural, economic, and social foundation of the nation's society. However, this framing also marginalises and excludes migrant groups, making it difficult for them to integrate into their new communities. Integration policy is crucial in determining whether migrants are integrated or excluded from society. The framing of migrants as a homogeneous and dangerous group can lead to policies that favour assimilation over inclusion and diversity.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

The theory presented gives a basis to understand populism and its characteristics, with historical background and its relation to migration. Furthermore, it explains the perspective of which the analysis of the discourse will be to understand the populist framing of immigrants in the integration policy discourse. The theory has demonstrated that populism as a discourse style to communicate this ideology can help indicate the anti-immigration character or appeal of the populist. In addition, Mudde's (2007) conceptualisation of populism, which includes exclusionary othering of immigrants, not only aids in understanding what populism in context represents but also provides the opportunity of identifying populist elements within the chosen data. The exclusionary othering in contemporary politics often entails immigrants, identified as the 'other' who pose a threat to the nation's security, welfare, and identity. Immigration discourses from 1960 were dominated by multiculturalism because of the temporary nature of migrant workers. The rise of Islamic terrorism in the 1980s in combination with the pace and scale of arrivals of immigrants changed the immigration discourse negatively, and immigrants were increasingly labelled as Muslims and, 'allochthones'. Given the conceptualisation of immigrants as the threatening 'other', theory has also demonstrated how populist frames in integration policy can create the dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them'. Concerning the populist frames of immigrants, is it anticipated that these would manifest as the four theoretically conceptualised populist frames, including securitisation, economisation, cultural/religious, and criminality frame. Identifying the dominant frames in policy documents in different contextual backgrounds, then, aids in the possibility to examine how immigrant identities are constructed in the various policy years, as it is expected that the presented and constructed migrant identities vary per policy and historical event.

3. Methods

This study seeks to uncover in what ways the populist framing of immigrants in the migration discourse has changed over time. This is accomplished by conducting a Critical Discourse Analysis with Wodak's method of Discourse-Historical approach (DHA) as the foundation. Wodak's DHA has evolved as a powerful tool for evaluating political discourse, particularly in terms of the creation of in-groups and out-groups. It provides a theoretical and methodological framework for analysing the discursive strategies and argumentative structures utilised in the construction of such groups (Wodak, 2015b; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Moreover, DHA allows us to examine the construction of 'anti-immigrant' rhetoric in political discourse and how it serves as a discursive instrument to exclude out-groups. The study's particular procedures will be categorised according to the DHA's main components in the parts that follow, including the necessary steps to gather the data required to address the research question. In addition, the case description and selection will be covered in more detail in the following parts, focusing on the decision to select the Netherlands as a case study.

3.1 Case Description: The Case of the Netherlands

Starting with the case description, increasingly, the perception of immigrants and minorities in the Netherlands has changed throughout the years. Every decade or so, the migration discourse as it manifests in the immigration and integration discourse changes involving new ways of identifying and conceptualising immigrants and minorities (Vasta, 2007). First of all, starting in the 1960s, the Netherlands adopted the so-called differential framing of immigrants, in which the presence of immigrants, which refers to the Turk, Moroccan, Southern European, and Surinamese foreign workers, was regarded as temporary (Slootman, 2018; Castles & Miller, 2009; Van Amersfoort, 1984). To avoid giving the idea that they were permanent residents, foreign workers were also referred to as 'guest workers', 'international commuters', and other terms (Van Amersfoort, 1984).

Second, the discourse surrounding immigrants shifted in the 1970s and 1980s into the so-called minorities policy. The policy in question sought to promote ethnic minorities' integration while still allowing them to keep their cultural heritage, revealing a rather multiculturalist policy frame (Scholten, 2012). Notably, this policy approach tried to preserve cultural variety by enacting measures such as dual citizenship programs, national funding for minority organisations and multicultural issues-focused public broadcasting time (Ossewaarde, 2014). That is to say, policies aimed at emphasising immigrants' rights to integrate and providing supportive programs for them to do so (Kymlicka, 2012).

However, since the 1990s, when it becomes clear that guest workers would remain in the country, a new integration policy was introduced (Vasta, 2007). This coincides with the retreat from multiculturalism, which is motivated by the fears within the majority groups that diversity accommodation has 'gone too far'

and is endangering their way of life (Kymlicka, 2012). The anti-immigration discourse gradually shifted toward newcomers from Muslim countries (Lucassen, 2005). The Islamic revolution in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and the first Gulf War against Iraq a few years later accelerated the rise of religion and culture as primary markers of colour and race. Since then, culture, rather than race, has been the keyword, frequently defined in global terms. In addition, the events of September 11, 2001, as well as the 'war on terrorism', have added fuel to the belief that Islam and Western society are incompatible. This Manichean dichotomy has had a tremendous impact on how Muslim immigrants and their descendants are perceived in Western Europe, and it explains the highly charged debates regarding Muslim's purported incapacity to integrate (Lucassen, 2005). This sparked a profound discussion on the positive representation of non-Western immigrants and the portrayal of immigrants as susceptible, powerless, and easily controlled and exploited by those in positions of authority (Ossewaarde, 2014), which changed into negative images and prejudices of non-western immigrants. Anxieties about this particular group often display in the growth of populist right-wing political organizations (Lucassen, 2005). This change presents itself in various integration policies, such as emphasising the social-economic engagement of immigrants or 'allochthonous' rather than promoting their independence as a minority community (Scholten, 2011a). The term 'allochthon' designates two mutually exclusive groups that divide 'us' from 'them'. It distinguishes between the reputable, authentic Dutch, the newcomers, and the unrefined Dutch. Moreover, the term has taken on a negative connotation throughout the years and appears to relate to those having a 'non-western' migration background (Essed & Trienekens, 2008). Moreover, the integration policy aimed to promote active citizenship among immigrants, including responsibility for their integration into society, and the labour market, as well as the responsibility to put effort into studying Dutch and obtaining an understanding of Dutch society (Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009).

Moreover, while the largest immigrant group in the Netherlands mainly consists of Polish immigrants since 2004 (Kleinepier et al., 2015), the Dutch government refers to non-western immigrants as the target population in integration policies (Mügge & Van der Haar, 2016). And so, the worldwide events surrounding Islam in combination with the rise of right-wing politicians Fortuyn, Verdonk and Wilders, changed the perception of Muslim immigrants and contributed to the increase of Islamophobia (Matindoost, 2015; Wodak et al., 2013). As a result, immigration is viewed as a threat, whilst perceived cultural differences among newcomers are viewed as a problem that must be addressed by particular integration strategies that result in assimilation. In contrast to the integration policy, which placed a lot of emphasis on the idea of 'active citizenship', the so-called 'new style' integration policy's implementation switched its emphasis to encouraging a sense of 'common citizenship' among immigrants. This required aggressively promoting social cohesion based on shared traits, such as proficiency in Dutch communication and

commitment to core Dutch values. Persistent social and cultural inequalities were now viewed as a barrier to immigrant assimilation (Slootman, 2018; Scholten, 2011a).

In recent years, the Dutch government has become increasingly public in its condemnation of diversity by emphasising the need for a shared national identity (Morieson, 2021), and declaring that the multicultural society has failed (Ossewaarde, 2013). Hence, the integration policy mainly represents a symbolic meaning: the rhetoric is becoming more strict and the law itself too but in practice only a few seem interested. The amendment means that the government has completely withdrawn from integration since 2013 at the national and local levels. This is the ultimate expression of the view that immigrants are responsible for their integration (Entzinger, 2016 p.90). While the Dutch government is known for its strict integration policies, recent development has revealed an increased emphasis on assimilation and a more critical approach to immigration. The rapid growth in the number of asylum seekers since 2015 has fuelled a more heated debate concerning refugee reception (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). For instance, the opposition to the opening of reception centres by local communities in the Netherlands is mainly driven by concerns about potential challenges to societal stability, such as an increase in criminal activity and the possibility that Islamic extremists may be present among the refugee population (Alencar et al., 2021). In this thesis, it is therefore assumed that the integration policy consists of populist frames that define citizens with a migration background as being distinct from the envisioned national society (Vasta, 2007). In that regard, the discourse's purpose of enabling actors to impose negative targeting of specific groups, which likely increases segregation, exclusion and inequality, takes centre stage.

3.2 Methods of Data Collection
Moreover, in this thesis, the focus lies on the discursive development of populist framing of immigrants and minorities, a discourse analysis has to be conducted. The collecting of qualitative written textual data is one component of Wodak's approach to discourse analysis. Because this study is focused on textual analysis and hence does not have a pre-existing dataset, its conclusions will be based on observations and interpretations of Dutch policy documents. It is followed by gathering essential official data about the immigrant integration policy. This is required since it is presumable that policy documents serve as a medium through which officials communicate and spread populist rhetoric within the context of the discourse (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021; Bartha et al., 2020). Therefore, Dutch policy documents relating to immigrants and minorities are selected and analysed for themes and patterns. Before describing the various documents relevant to the research, it is necessary to provide insights into the Dutch parliament.

Firstly, the political system in the Netherlands is characterised by a parliamentary democracy, whereby the Parliament consists of the House of Representatives (The Second Chamber) and the Senate (The First Chamber). The Second Chamber oversees legislative activity and has 150 members, giving it

greater influence than the First Chamber (Ramkema et al., 2008). Given its influence on policymaking, the Second Chamber's policy statements will be important for this study and will be thoroughly explored.

Second, while the parliament has law-making, controlling and representative duties, the government allocates international treaties and establishes policies. The Dutch government consists of the head of state (the monarch) and ministers, according to the constitution. The ministers hold complete responsibility for whatever the monarch does and says. The Council of Ministers is responsible for decisions on behalf of the government (Ramkema et al., 2008). And so, the Dutch government includes a system of ministries in charge of several policy areas, including migration and integration. Therefore, Dutch policy documents regarding immigrants are selected and analysed for themes and patterns, which consist of the following ministries: Ministry of Justice and Security (JenV), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ), and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW). The reason for the choice of these ministries is because it is precisely in these areas that policy development of immigrants is described such as asylum proceedings, integration of refugees and other migrants, integration into the Dutch labour market, and the international migration and refugee issues (House of Representatives, n.d.)

Given the government's considerable influence in shaping Dutch policy-making (Ramkema, 2008), this study will examine the government's policy statements to see how they reflect the migration discourse. The policy documents used in the discourse analysis were obtained from Official Publication, which contains parliamentary documents, including letters to parliament, acts, notes, reports, and vision notes and mainly comprises actors of the government and administrative institutions. Moreover, reports from the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) had a critical part in shaping the policies, therefore, publications from the WRR are added to the list of documents used for analysis. The data used for the analysis are listed in Appendix A, including the policy year and number of pages.

Furthermore, the explicit period of 1960 to 2022 is chosen because the specific time-frames cover major policy shifts, concerning different discourses on immigrants and minorities, such as 'guest workers' in the seventies and 'minorities' in the eighties as indicated in Figure 1. The policy documents as a sample are examined against the backdrop of four major phases as indicated in Figure 1: the seventies and before (categorical policy or no integration policy), the eighties (minority policy), the nineties (integration policy) and the years 2000 to the present (integration policy new style). The sample of Dutch policy documents contains 40 documents in total and the data collection process searching for policy documents took place from October 1, 2022, to December 2022.

	No integration policy <1978	Minorities Policy 1978–94	Integration Policy 1994–2003	Integration Policy New Style >2003
Terminology	Integration with retention of identity	Mutual adaptation in a multicultural society	Integration, active citizenship	Adaptation, 'common citizenship'
Social classification	Immigrant groups defined by national origin and framed as temporary guests	Ethnic or cultural minorities characterised by social-economic and social-cultural problems	'Citizens' or 'allochthonous', individual members of specific minority groups	Immigrants defined as policy targets because of social-cultural differences
Causal stories	Social-economic participation and retention of social-cultural identity	Social-cultural emancipation as a condition for social-economic participation	Social-economic participation as a condition for social-cultural emancipation	Social-cultural differences as obstacle to integration
Normative perspective	The Netherlands should not be a country of immigration	The Netherlands as an open, multi-cultural society	Civic participation in a de facto multicultural society	Preservation of national identity and social cohesion

Figure 1 Dutch Immigrant integration policy frames since the 1970s
Source: Scholten, p. (2011a) Constructing Dutch Immigrant Policy: Research-Policy Relations and Immigrant Integration Policy-Making in the Netherlands

3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Moreover, the purpose of the next section is to explain the steps taken to unveil the populist immigrant and minority discourse. Since populist frames are created and also perpetuated, and therefore represented by discourse. A logical step is to choose an analysis that observes discourse. And so, the analytical method that is in line with this study is critical discourse studies. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies language in use and is interested in its use beyond the sentence level. Language and power are given special consideration. The goal of CDA is to deconstruct discourses that generate and reproduce power relations and uneven frameworks of dominance, discrimination, power, and control (Wodak, 2015). Moreover, CDA can be defined as problem-oriented multidisciplinary research that encompasses many methodologies, which involve various methods and theoretical models. Therefore, a wide range of discourse analytical methodologies are compatible with CDA principles. (Sengul, 2019).

CDA originated in the late 1980s, with its most renowned co-creators being Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk. According to van Dijk (2015), CDA scholars share a socio-political commitment to social equality and justice. CDA is thus located within the socio-political orientation of critical social theory, where the term 'critical' typically denotes a certain degree of detachment from facts (Wodak, 2009). Although Fairclough's three-dimensional approach and van Dijk's sociocognitive framework have been fascinating points of departure, Wodak's Historical Discourse Approach has been the primary inspiration for this research endeavour.

Discourse-Historical Approach (HDA)

CDA sets itself apart through its ability to critically analyse the ideological underpinnings of racism, gender inequity, and cultural ignominy. However, populist strategies aimed at empowering ordinary people and assisting them in the development of multi-emancipatory projects are not completely articulated in the CDA (Ramahi & Rashid, 2019). In this context, it is critical to evaluate Wodak's (2015) discourse-historical

approach (DHA), which has been used to analyse right-wing populist discourse. As implied by the preceding section, CDA comprises a variety of techniques, one of which is the DHA. Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) was critical in organizing methods for investigating out-groups in discourse and providing a framework for the key argumentative and discursive components of anti-foreigner rhetoric (Wodak, 2015b; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Khosravinik, 2010a). Moreover, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) list topoi[2] that were frequently employed in discourse practises, such as the topoi of advantage/usefulness, danger/threat, burdening/weighting down, culture, and abuse (Khosravinik, 2010a). Before delving deeper into the discursive and reasoning tactics, certain concepts require clarification to determine how they are presented in the DHA.

HDA terminology

The terms ideology, power, discourse and text are defined in this section, as described by Reisigl and Wodak (2009), and Wodak (2009, 2015b). Wodak (2009) points out that discourse is constituted by dominance, exists in time and space, and legitimizes uneven power relations based on certain ideologies. The DHA discourse analysis approach is founded on three fundamental concepts: power, history, and ideology. Within this framework, ideology is described as a restricted and sometimes one-sided perspective or worldview made up of a collection of convictions, ideas, attitudes, and assessments (Wodak, 2015b, p.4). Language is considered a means of meditating ideology, allowing the development and maintenance of uneven power relations. Language only becomes powerful through the use of powerful people. Power is thus viewed as a relation of difference, particularly in social institutions and texts as locations of power battles between opposing ideologies. Power is also defined as the ability to enforce one's will in a way that is in contrast to the interests of others (Wodak, 2009).

Discursive strategies

CDA aids in the interpretation of ideology communicated through discursive patterns by detecting the relationship between the text, ideologies, and power relations (Wodak, 2015b; Wodak, 2009a). This facilitates the possibility to investigate how out-groups are represented and how the social and political context in which such representation becomes meaningful (Khosravinik, 2010a; Omar et al., 2020). Moreover, DHA includes a collection of approaches in the discursive analysis of prejudiced discourses towards minority out-groups including argumentation strategies (Khosravinik, 2010b). Argumentation strategies feed on an array of topoi to justify negative attributions, as well as social and political exclusion,

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[2] Topoi, often referred to as 'commonplaces' or 'topics', are reoccurring thoughts or arguments that are frequently brought up in discourse. They function as rhetorical tools or presentational strategies for building and making arguments (Žagar, 2010).

discrimination or preferential treatment of specific individuals (Khosravinik, 2010b). It should be noted that the argumentation is developed in the general manner of semantic polarization, that is, it is strictly governed by we/they dichotomy (Beloshitchkaia, 2019).

Therefore, the framework that best fits the context of this study is Wodak's DHA of analysing out-groups. DHA follows a multilevel structure that differentiates between thematic or content-oriented, the examination of discursive strategy, notably argumentation, and linguistic/textual analysis (Wodak, 2015b, p.12). This entails examining the text's coherence by first identifying the content. In determining what thematic frames to focus on, the following consensus in the literature and as identified in the theoretical chapter is followed which offers a link between migration and populism along four axes: securitisation, economisation, cultural/religious, and criminality. The second level focuses on essential discursive strategies, particularly argumentation patterns. This study makes use of the primary category of topoi (also known as argumentation schemes/headings), with a specific emphasis on prominent political anti-immigrant topoi such as danger/threat, burden/cost, and cultural/religious differences. The last step consists of the different linguistic devices used to realise the intended meaning. The historical dimension is addressed by integrating all accessible historical background material as well as primary sources that provide discursive 'events' (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).

Moreover, since DHA adheres to critical theory's socio-philosophical approach, which allows for discourse-immanent critique, it is possible to discover contradictions, paradoxes and inconsistencies in the discourse-internal structures (Wodak, 2015, p.3). Although the state behaves as a single actor with its inhabitants, it is far from a monolithic actor. When different, perhaps conflicting or even excluding, frames are defined within one policy statement and the state's plurality becomes obvious. The state is a dynamic actor that changes over time as various coalitions may hold state-governing positions (Roggeband & Verloor, 2007).

3.4 Coding

With the use of the program ATLAS.ti and a coding scheme developed for text analysis, it is possible to extract knowledge about the discourse's linguistic patterns. The notion of populist frames had to be operationalised to evaluate the textual data of populist frames within migration discourse. To accomplish this, the four frames previously identified as indicative of populist discourse were used as sub-concepts to be evaluated in the research. This phase, which relates to the first sub-question, is related to populist frames within the discourse, in which the selected migration integration policy documents in the period 1960 until 2022 were coded. During this inductive phase, a coding scheme was utilised to conduct a discourse analysis of the key policy texts on the subject of migration and integration. These documents were coded, after careful and repeated reading of the underlying meaning of the text (Babbie, 2018), based on the theoretical

elements of populist frames, and operationalised by the four frames as indicated in Table 1. The coding scheme contains keywords to assure that all potential variations are incorporated in the analysis. The purpose of this method is to discover dominant and/or competing frames in the discourse of political actors or speakers that make sense of different situations and events. The identified frames were applied to the forty policy documents, in two rounds of coding, as proposed by Kuckarts (2019). This shows that the results can be reproduced when the research is repeated under the same conditions, which then aids the coding process's reliability (Babbie, 2018).

In the literature, there is disagreement over how many frame devices are necessary to activate a particular frame (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Previous research indicates that frames may not always require extensive coverage in a text (Hellsten et al., 2010), and that brief labels or metaphors are adequate (Burgers et al., 2016; Leskovec et al., 2009). Based on these findings, this study proposes that a frame is activated when at least two suggestive phrases exist in a text and these terms convey the semantic meaning of the frame (Chyi and McCombs, 2004).

Moreover, as mentioned before, the changing policy discourse consists of various conceptualisations of immigrants and minorities. In KhosraviNik's (2009) study of the representations of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants, for example, notes a basic contrast in the use of key terms. The linguistic shift from 'refugee' to 'asylum seekers' marks a political shift to a more negative view of these groups. In other words, this approach offers the ability to detect positive, negative, and neutral mixed images or attitudes. Indeed, negative images or attitudes toward immigrants and minorities depict a more populist immigrant and minority discourse (Krzyzanowski, 2020; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Therefore, this coding phase involves locating singular, plural, indefinite and definite forms of the following keywords: 'refugee', 'immigrant', 'newcomer', 'immigration', 'allochthonous', 'minority', and 'foreign workers'.

The second phase consists of interpreting the results, which then aids in the possibility to answer the second sub-question. While the first phase is dedicated to analysing data to identify populist frames in policy documents in different policy years, the second phase entails the interpretation of the results about the contextual background and elements of populism. The purpose of this phase includes the changing ways in which immigrant identities are represented and portrayed over time and in different historical contexts. This is executed by interpreting the results and by providing contextual background for the perceived change. Finally, the main research question will be thoroughly addressed by setting the findings within a broader context and illustrating the implications of the findings.

Table 1: Coding Scheme

Theoretical concept	Topoi	Keywords	Clarification
Economisation	Topoi of burden/cost	benefits costs education housing (un)employment*	This frame fosters the notion that immigrants are an economic burden/cost to the host countries' prosperity and welfare. Immigrants are displacing native-born labour, driving down wages, and putting demand on public services (education, housing).
Securitisation	Topoi of numbers	arrival border congestion flow increase limit million return	This frame indicates the border crossing issue in combination with the picture of immigrants as an uncontrollable, dehumanised swarm seeking to enter the country. Stressing the significance of regulating and controlling cross-border migration.
Criminality	Topoi of threat/danger	crime* drugs illegal nuisance police suspicion terrorism* unsafety violence	The criminality frame reflects a problem-oriented image by creating an atmosphere of suspicion, and by associating immigrants with crime, violence, abuse, illegality, and terrorism. Immigrants are therefore transformed into a highly dangerous threat to the internal security of the host country.
Cultural/religious	Topoi of culture/religion	culture identity Islam* language norms/values religion tradition	Associating immigrants' culture and religion (Islam) as a threat to Dutch cultural identity, language, and values.

A coding scheme, as shown in Table 1, is used to operationalise populist discourse into measurable categories. To account for all potential language variants in the analysis, certain keywords comprise an Asterisk (*).

3.5 Concluding Remarks

In sum, a discourse analysis was performed, and a sampling procedure involving case and data selection. The selected material was then analysed using Discourse Historical Analysis, which identified present frames by assigning codes. The results of the Discourse Historical Analysis, which identified the current

frames using code assigning, generated a framework for analysis whereby policy texts and related codes provide a summary of what is found in the data about populist frames. Consequently, these findings were then evaluated and interpreted empirically in the following two chapters.

4. Analysis

This chapter indicates the findings of the critical discourse analysis, emphasising the detected frames and keywords. Following that, an in-depth examination of these data will be explored explaining their relevance within the larger framework of the populist framing of immigrants. Citations from the analysed sources will be used to justify the ideas and interpretations offered. The representation of the various frames will be further explained in this section. In doing so, it contributes to the first sub-question: What were the key populist frames surrounding immigrants that emerged, declined and resurfaced in Dutch integration policy documents during the period 1960 until 2022? Appendix A contains a list of the documents used in the discourse analysis. The last component of this chapter is divided into five parts: the first provides an overview of the findings, followed by four sections on the results and the populist frames per policy period that were sought after and investigated throughout the analysis. This will make it easier for the audience to understand how the researcher explained and interpreted the data.

4.1 Overview of the Findings

The findings of a qualitative assessment of documents from 40 immigration-related policy papers published between 1960 and 2022 are presented in this section. The analysis of policy documents revealed identified frames that were thought to be present in the policy texts. According to these established frames, and each framing feature, the procedure of revealing the findings relevant to the specified frames within the policy documents will thus be followed.

Figure 2 Analysis scheme of the reproduction of the four frames in policy documents

To begin with, Figure 2 depicts the chart of the populist frames including each coded frame as well as the distribution of the four policy years. Moreover, the data is presented in absolute numbers for each period.

Overall, the graph shows interesting trends in the distribution of the four groups across time. One significant trend is the increase of all four frames over time, with a sharp increase in the 2003-2022 time period. For example, the criminality frame went from 2 in the period 1978 and before, to 49 in the period 2003 until 2022, whereas the cultural/religious frame increased from 1 to 58 in the period 2003 until 2022. This pattern shows that these frames have gotten more prominent over time. Regarding the most dominant frame in general, the criminality frame appears to be the most frequently utilised, with a total of 49 between 2003 and 2022. This is followed by the culture/religious frame, which occurred 58 times within the same period. The securitisation frame also saw a notable increase in usage, with 36 instances in the 2003-2022 period. The economisation frame, on the other hand, scored the lowest with a total of 50 mentions across all periods. It also did not see a notable peak in usage in any particular period.

Overall, the graph demonstrates that policymakers have increasingly employed these frames to describe immigrants over time, with a particular emphasis on criminality and cultural/religious frames. The upcoming sections highlight the content of the populist migration discourse with an overview of the different frames in the Netherlands. But first, it is important to demonstrate the various terms used in policy documents regarding immigrants.

Various terms to depict migrants
The terms refugees, allochthones, migrants, immigrants, foreigner, foreign worker, minority, and newcomer provide a strong indication of the stance adopted in their representation. Table 3 shows the code co-occurrence table, which shows how often specific codes appear together within policy documents. The table shows the association of terms across the four frames and provides the frequency of these terms in each frame. From the results, it was found that 'allochthonous' appears in almost all frames, with a total count of 52. Other frequently used terms were 'minority', with a count of 40, 'foreign worker' with a count of 25, and 'refugee' with a total of 20.

Table 2 Migrant terms in association with frames

	Criminality	Cultural/religious	Economisation	Securitisation	Total count
Allochthonous	25	8	15	4	52
Foreign worker	4	0	3	18	25
Immigrants	0	2	5	5	12
Immigration	0	0	0	3	3
Migrant	4	5	5	4	18
Minority	18	9	9	4	40
Newcomer	0	2	2	2	6
Refugee	5	0	4	11	20
Total count	56	26	43	51	176

4.2 Cultural/Religious

This section will present the findings of the four populist frames in policy documents regarding immigrants. First of all, a frequently used frame to portray immigrants is the cultural/religious frame. In this frame, policymakers often depict religion and culture, primarily Islam, as a problem for the host society (Ibrahim, 2005; Waever, 1993; Verkuyten, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). The possible conflict with the values and beliefs of the host society is one of the key problems with the cultural and religious practices of immigrants. These values and beliefs may include different ideas about gender roles and family structures that are different from those of the host society. Social friction and conflict can result from the host society's belief that immigrants are unwilling to assimilate and adopt its values and conventions (Ibrahim, 2005; Rydgren, 2005). Therefore, justifications based on culture and religion are frequently invoked to support discriminatory laws and practices involving immigrants. The data analysis makes it evident that the cultural/religious frame is the most prevalent throughout the period from 2003 until 2022. The data shows that the frame had little presence in the period pre-1978, followed by a slight increase in the period 1978 until 1994 and 1994 until 2003. Finally in the more recent period, 2002-2022, this frame had a frequency of 58.

Figure 3 'Cultural/religious' keywords and their frequency across the analysed policy documents

Cultural and religious threat

One way that policymakers bring this frame into account is by using topoi of culture and religion, which refers to the shared beliefs of practices that promote hostility towards immigrants and their cultural and religious practices. The category culture/religion involved the following keywords as the search inquiry throughout the documents: culture, identity, Islam, language, norms/values, religion, and tradition. Figure 3 displays that 'Islam' was the prevailing keyword within the cultural/religious frame with a total count of 43, followed by 'norms' and values' with a total count of 14. This implies that, within the cultural/religious

frame, Islam dominates the discussion surrounding immigration. As identified in the policy documents, one way in which policymakers portray immigrants as a cultural/religious threat is by describing their religion, mostly Islam, as a threat to Dutch or Western values. Policymakers use Islam to portray immigrants as backward and uncivilised, and therefore, reinforce the idea that Western civilisation is superior to all others. That is to say, within the cultural/religious frame, Islam dominates the discussion surrounding immigrants. The following citations illustrate this tendency:

> "About the sometimes somewhat high threshold that minorities have to participate in sport. This threshold mainly consists of their own cultural background, which either hardly knows the sport at all or does not know certain sports, and the problem that sometimes religion, Islam , especially for women and girls".
> (33:1 p 6 in Special committee for minority policy, 1985-1986)

Here, policymakers use the culture and religion of immigrants to reinforce negative stereotypes of cultural minorities. The citations imply that their lack of knowledge of sports and the primary barrier to participation is due to their cultural background. Importantly, policymakers not only refer to the religion of immigrants but 'Islam' specifically as the cause of problems for women and girls participating in sports. Not only does this assumption diminish the challenge that minorities encounter in participating in sports, but it also ignores socioeconomic variables that lead to unequal access to resources and facilities, which might alter participation rates among minority groups. The notion of the cultural background of immigrants as the primary obstacle can also be found in the following citation:

> "In the memorandum on 'Crime in relation to the integration of ethnic minorities' it was established that causes must also be sought in 'the socio-cultural background of the various minority groups and the resulting integration and acculturation problems that groups experience. Norms - and value patterns, appropriate to the socio-cultural situation in the mother country, for example with regard to the upbringing of children, are not always adequate in Dutch society".
> (38:8 p 10 in Note Integration Policy, 1998-1999)

This citation suggests that integration issues faced by ethnic minorities are primarily a result of cultural differences and a lack of assimilation. It has been implied that their socio-cultural norms and values are inadequate in Dutch society. Thus, policymakers aim to suggest a focus on the adaption and assimilation

to Dutch society, rather than inclusionary. Another example of referencing the culture and religion of immigrants, specifically Islam, can be found in the following statement:

> "The growth of Islam in our country has been accompanied by a declining acceptance of it. Islam is associated by many with practices and views that do not fit in with the modernization process that Dutch society has gone through in the past forty years".
> (11:13 p 33 in Standpoint of the Cabinet, 2003-2004)

In the letter of the Standpoint of the Cabinet, Verdonk reproduces the image that 'Islam' does not belong 'here'. To clarify, the sentence 'the growth of Islam in our country', implies a sense of invasion, as if Islam is something imposed on the Netherlands rather than a religion practised by a varied set of people. Second, the use of the possessive word 'our' strengthens this sense of ownership and entitlement to the country. The text then suggests that Islam has a 'declining acceptance', implying that there was once a level of acceptance that has since declined. This framing implies that Islam is intrinsically incompatible with Dutch society and that any amount of acceptability is predicated on Islam's conformity to Dutch norms and values. Additionally, the text implies that Islam is associated with actions and perspectives that are incompatible with the modernisation process that Dutch society had undergone over the last four decades. This perpetuates an image that Islam is outdated, and it casts Muslims as outsiders unable to conform to modern standards and values. Moreover, the statement implies that there is a widespread consensus throughout Dutch society regarding the incapability of Islam and modernism, which is why the word 'many' is important in this context. This framing, however, ignores the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within Dutch culture and instead portrays Islam as a monolithic and homogenous entity. Another example in which Islam is portrayed as incompatible is when referring to the separation between church and state:

> "The example of Islam shows that the institutional design of religions of immigrants does not automatically fit with the organization of religious denominations maintained in the Netherlands and the associated separation between church and state".
> (28:3 p 14 in WRR Netherlands as immigration country, 2001-2002)

The citation suggests that the institutional design of Islam does not correspond with the organization of religious groups and the separation of church and state in the Netherlands. The term 'religions of immigrants' implies that these religions are different from or less legitimate than religions followed by the mainstream culture. This terminology fosters the notion of a religious hierarchy, with the dominant religion serving as the standard against which others are measured. Moreover, the fact that policymakers refer to the separation between church and state implies a form of secularism that excludes religious groups who do not fit within

the dominant understanding of religion. Furthermore, it should be noted that policymakers often refer to religious symbols, such as clothing that express religious views. For instance, policymakers often link the headscarf with the 'oppressive and patriarchal tradition' that clashes with Dutch norms and values:

> "Different pieces of clothing and jewelry can express religious or philosophical views. Well-known examples are the Islamic chador, niqab and headscarf, the Jewish yarmulke, the Sikh turban and necklaces with a Christian cross or a Fatima hand. Of these pieces of clothing and jewelry the Islamic headscarf occupies an important place in the debate on the pluralistic society, integration and the clash of fundamental rights".
> (8:4 p 14 in Note Fundamental rights in a Pluralistic Society, 2003-2004)

Another example that confirms the discourse surrounding immigrants as a religious threat is portraying Islam as juxtaposing it against the idea of a 'democratic constitutional state'. As demonstrated below in the statement by the Minister of Interior and Kingdom relations, the democratic constitutional state, which is portrayed as an achievement may be jeopardized due to the existence of Islam. This premise implies that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democracy and that the mere existence of Muslims in the country endangers the country's democratic values. Moreover, policy texts often contain contradicting terms, for example, the statement below illustrated the tension between the government's commitment to 'religious freedom' and its perceived need to 'eliminate' concerns about Islam. The statement claims that the government is neither limiting Islamic religious freedom nor expressing disregard for the faith, but it also implies that the government sees Islam as a problem that must be solved.

> "This does not alter the fact that the government is aware of the fact that Islam, which as the religion of many immigrants has quickly become one of the more extensive religions in the Netherlands, is arousing concern among parts of the population because of different traditions, views and the association with violence and radicalism elsewhere in the world as well as in the Netherlands. In their view, the achievements of a democratic constitutional state could come under pressure".
> (16:9 p 8 in Vision Integration Policy, 2010-2011)

More importantly, the citations also refer to the association of Islam with violence and radicalism. Although the statement indicates an awareness of fears expressed by some sections of the population regarding Islam, it does not contest these worries instead presuming that they are justified and reasonable. In other words, policymakers imply that the association between Islam and violence is a given, rather than a constructed narrative, and thus further reinforces the idea that Islam is inherently violent and incompatible with Dutch society. The example below from the policy year 2013-2014 will further confirm this assertation:

> "The increasing visibility of Islam in our society, the other traditions and views, and the association with violence and radicalisation have led to people experiencing Islam as a threat. This is understandable, but also worrying at the same time, because this threatens the cohesion and stability of society".
> (40:1 p 3 in Agenda Integration, 2013-2014)

And so, the cultural and religious frame perpetuates the notion of a single, uniform Dutch identity to which everyone should comply. This often incorporates the notion that Dutch citizens experience a loss of a certain kind. Consider, for example, the following citation:

> "For example, a substantial proportion of people with a Dutch background experience a loss of control due to the presence of people with a migration background. They also experience a loss of culture and identity, especially due to the presence of Muslims".
> (29:6 p 82 in WRR Report Migration Diversity and Social Cohesion, 2020-2021)

This citation is a clear example of an exclusionary discourse that pits one group against another by using notions of 'us' versus 'them'. The reference to 'people with a Dutch background' and 'people with a migration background' creates a binary division between two distinct groups, in which the presence of the immigrant group threatens the culture and identity of the other. This framing implies that immigrants are to blame for the feelings of loss that citizens with Dutch background experience. More notable is, again, the reference to Muslims, as a key factor contributing to the loss of control and cultural experiences by people with a Dutch background. This framing further indicates that Dutch citizens and immigrants are inherently different and incompatible, neglecting how they share common experiences and aspirations.

4.3 Criminality

Another frequently used frame in policy documents regarding immigrants is the criminality frame. The criminality frame reflects a problem-oriented image by creating an atmosphere of suspicion, and by associating immigrants with criminality (Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017). There has been increasing concerns about threats to safety and health, and it is frequently manifested in what one would term the criminalisation of foreigner (Buenfino, 2006). Immigrants are therefore transformed into a highly dangerous threat to the internal security of the host country (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). The high criminal-involvement rate of immigrants is one of the main justifications advanced by populists (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). Regarding the high crime rates, there have been increasing concerns about threats to safety and health, and it is frequently manifested in what one would term a criminalisation of the foreigner (Buenfino, 2006). Populists use this antagonistic frame to portray immigrants as a danger or threat to crime (Riegert & Hovden, 2019; Horsti, 2013; Newman et al., 2012). Interestingly, the criminality frame dominated the policy

documents between 2003 and 2022, accounting for 49 of the total distribution. This suggests that the criminality frame has been a significant frame used to portray immigrants in more recent years. In contrast, the frame was less dominant in the earlier periods covered by the data. In the period before 1978, the frame accounted for only 2 of the total distribution. Overall, the data suggest that the criminality frame has become more prominent over time, with the frame being the most dominant in the period 2003 until 2022.

Figure 4 'Criminality' keywords and their frequency across the analysed policy documents

Threat and danger

The criminality frame consists of topoi of threat and danger, which consists of 10 keywords that were utilised as search queries. The data provided in the figure shows the frequency with which certain keywords related to the criminality frame are used by policymakers to describe immigrants. From the results, it was found that the most frequently used keyword by policymakers is 'crime', with a total count of 40. This is followed by the keywords 'unsafety', 'terrorism', and 'illegal'. Less identified keywords were 'drugs', 'trafficker', and 'police'. This implies that throughout the migration discourse, immigrants were perceived as a threat to the safety of the Dutch population due to high crime rates. That is to say, the anxiety over the high crime rates of immigrants was not a concern about the immigrants, but for the safety risk, they posed to native Dutch citizens. The over-representation of immigrants in criminality became the focal point of safety issues regarding immigrants. Consider the following passage:

"Biervliet's description of the development of the new 'hossel-subculture' among unemployed youth Surinamese in large cities in the Netherlands with its elements of drug use, crime, violence paints the picture of the total marginalization and maladjustment of a fairly large group of young people, who get little or no opportunities in Dutch society".
(14:17 p 93 in WRR Report Towards an Overall Ethnic Minority Policy, 1979-1980)

The statement of a significant number of young people with little or no opportunity perpetuates a prevalent victimisation discourse that portrays marginalised individuals as passive recipients of their circumstances rather than addressing possible inequalities and societal conditions that contribute to their situation. Noteworthy in this statement is the negative tone towards young Surinamese by associating them with the 'hossel-subculture' which includes elements of drugs, crime, and violence. The fact that young Surinamese are mentioned specifically is another interesting theme in the criminality frame, as it appears that the association of young immigrants and crime is a recurring theme within this framing:

> "However, there are sufficient indications to establish that the crime of part of certain groups, especially younger allochthones (immigrants), should be regarded as serious".
> (27:3 p 4 in Minority Policy, 1992-1993)

Noteworthy in this statement is the negative and stigmatising discourse towards younger immigrant groups by positioning them as problematic groups. Although policymakers use words like 'sufficient indications' and 'establish' to imply the remark being made is a fact-based observation rather than a subjective opinion, this frame serves to strengthen the criminalisation discourse. The reference to 'young allochthones' perpetuates preconceptions about immigrant groups and frames them as outsiders who constitute a threat to the social order and require control and surveillance. Besides the use of the term 'allochthones', policymakers also explicitly identify the ethnic or national origin of the group, which emphasises the issue of ethnicity and immigration in discussions of crime and criminality:

> "Crime among young allochthonous (immigrants), and especially petty street crime in which, for example, Moroccans and Antilleans are overrepresented, gives the impression of a loose youth who leaves school for what it is and embarks on the criminal path".
> (41: 2 p 171 in WRR Report-Values-norms-burden-behavior,2002-2003)

The emphasis in this citation is more explicitly on the ethnicity and national origin of the group being examined, and the term allochthones is increasingly linked with Moroccans and Antilleans. This association reinforces the racialisation discourse and contributes to the stigmatisation and isolation of these groups. Interestingly, within the portrayal of immigrants as a threat to safety and security, policymakers often refer to groups of young allochthonous. Their participation in crime rates is highlighted by comparing it to the crime rates of native Dutch citizens, which is described as less high. As demonstrated in Table 2, 'allochthonous' is often associated with the criminality frame with a total score of 25, followed by the term

'minority' with a score of 18. Consider, for instance, the citation below in which the term allochthones is used with terrorism:

> "The feeling of unsafety is reinforced by the radicalization that occurs among a relatively limited part of the allochthonous (immigrant) population and by the terrorist attacks in the name of Islam". (20:54 p 10 in Note "make sure you belong," 2007-2008)

The statement suggests that the Dutch people's safety is compromised by the presence of immigrants. This framing generates a story about the loss of something formerly enjoyed, which is now being taken away by immigrants. It indicates that immigrants are to blame for the current unsafety. Further evidence for the construction of the criminalisation of immigrants can be observed in the fact that 12 counts of the criminality frame in the analysis involve the term 'unsafety'. There is an overwhelming tendency by policymakers to associate the concerns of unsafety with immigrants, as opposed to all citizens. For example, when referring to fear and unsafety amongst residents in neighbourhoods, policymakers claim that the cause can be found in the high diversity as a result of the arrival of many different groups with different backgrounds and cultures.

Another critical element of the criminalisation of immigrants revealed in policy documents is the association of immigrants with 'terrorism'. Interestingly, this keyword mostly appears in the policy year 2003 until 2022. Indeed, the given texts in policy documents employ language that creates a discourse that portrays them as potential terrorists. Interestingly, this is often done by linking their religious beliefs to the issue of terrorism, specifically Islam. For instance, policymakers often use the terms 'Muslim terrorism', 'Muslim youth', and 'jihad', to perpetuate the idea that Islam is inherently linked to extremist behaviour. Consider the following statement:

> "Countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have said: we would rather not have Islamic migration, but we are open to Christians. That statement is condemned by everyone, as I remember, but not by the PVV, because that is a good statement "So there are indeed opportunities for Christian people. But this case of Asia Bibi is a symbol of Western cowardice. If you do not allow someone who is threatened with death and has nowhere to go, while at the same time you allow thousands of fortune hunters, criminals and terrorists allows, then you have to say in all fairness: send back a few thousand of those fortune seekers and take Christians into the shelter. That is the point of the PVV, chairman".
> (54:1 p 7 in Immigration policy, 2018-2019)

The statement confirms that policymakers associate Islam with crime and terrorism by using terms such as fortune seekers, criminals, and terrorists. In addition, the statement reflects a selective approach to migration, where some immigrant groups (Christian) are deemed to be more deserving than others (Islamic).

Furthermore, the statement claims that this is condemned by everyone but the PVV, which indicates a polarised debate on migration, with different perspectives on the admittance of immigrants depending on their religious affiliation.

4.4 Economisation

Despite being less frequent than the frame that reveals immigrants' culture and religion as a threat, policymakers create frames through which immigrants' economic position is regarded as a threat to the host nation. The economisation frame is based on the notion that immigrants are displacing native-born labour, driving down wages, and putting demand on public services, and that they do not contribute to society. Therefore, this framing fosters the notion that immigrants are an economic burden to host societies (Rydgren, 2005; Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017; Bueonfino, 2006). Unlike the other frames, the analysis scheme demonstrates that the economisation frame is the least dominant of all frames. Moreover, the distribution of the frame has been somewhat consistent throughout the years, with no particular peaks. The frame had the lowest occurrence in the policy year 1978.

Figure 5 'Economisation' keywords and their frequency across the analysed policy documents

Economic burden

Figure 5 displays that 'benefits' was the most common keyword with a total count of 14 within the economisation frame, closely followed by '(un)employment', scoring a total of 12. This demonstrates that within the economisation frame, benefit-related topics surrounding immigrants dominate the discourse. Policy documents regarding immigrants made repeated reference to the fact that immigrants are often unable

to provide for themselves and therefore dependent on benefits and a social security safety net. Consider, for example, the following passage:

> "The approach towards minorities in our country is strongly related to the development of the welfare state. Initially, the growth of immigration and that of the welfare state were almost synchronous. However, the stagnation in the development of the welfare state has made clear how much in philosophy and the policy of this state individual citizens, and especially the weak groups among them, were regarded as care categories, instead of offering them opportunities for independence The consequences of this development have become clear in recent years: many immigrants have become dependent on government care, for example through benefits, and are therefore extra vulnerable to cutbacks".
> (31:25 p 14 in R036-Immigrant policy, 1989-1990)

The statement demonstrates immigrants as weak and reliant on government aid, emphasising how their perceived vulnerability is connected to the rise of the welfare state. The statement established a clear link between the growth of immigration and the welfare state, implying that these two phenomena are inextricably intertwined. Moreover, the use of language in this text is essential in influencing the discourse surrounding immigrants and their perceived dependency. For instance, immigrants are often framed as 'weaker groups', which conveys weakness and incompetence, as though these groups are incapable of caring for themselves without aid. Additionally, the text employs the term 'care categories' to define how the welfare state regards persons. This rhetoric supports the notion that people are viewed as passive recipients of care rather than active agents capable of contributing to society. This frame portrays immigrants as burdens on society rather than valued citizens with distinct skills and viewpoints. Another trend in their portrayal as a burden is the relation between immigration, economic development and unemployment:

> "In the previous Annual Review, the government warned that the strong growth of the labour force due to immigration, together with the disappointing economic development, could pose a serious threat to a continued decline in unemployment".
> (9:4 p 15 in Minority Policy, 1994-1995)

According to the given statement, immigration and its impact on the labour market may constitute a severe danger to the Netherlands' continuing unemployment rate. It cites the government's warning about the strong rise of the labour force owing to immigration as a reason for concern, as well as the poor economic development. Unlike the first citation in the policy year 1976 -1977, the presence of immigrants in the labour market is an issue that must be addressed, rather than a source of growth and benefit. This framing is an example of the portrayal of immigrants as a burden on the economy.

Secondly, the discourse surrounding immigrants in policy documents often highlights that language and disadvantage issues as well as lack of education, increase the likelihood that immigrants would be unable to fend for themselves:

> "Unemployment among young people from ethnic minorities thus remains almost two and a half times higher than among their native peers. The reasons for this lagging position are diverse. Research shows that especially the low level of education, especially among the first generation, poor or insufficient command of the Dutch language, the age distribution – the group of non-Western immigrants is relatively young compared to the native Dutch –, the composition of immigrant households (relatively many single mothers with children) are explanatory factors for the relatively poor labour market position of this group".
> (20:50 p 91 in Integration note, 2007-2008)

The statement implies a clear separation between 'ethnic minority' and 'native peers'. This dichotomy is founded on the concept of a dominating group (native Dutch) and a subordinate group (ethnic minorities), which maintains the power dynamics between these two groups, where one is the norm and the other is considered the 'other'. Moreover, the policymaker continues by concentrating on the variables that explain ethnic minorities' poor labour market position, which is their lack of education and inadequate knowledge of the Dutch language. This implies that policymakers blame immigrants' lack of qualifications or skills instead of addressing possible racism or bias contributing to ethnic minorities' limited chances. This framing perpetuates the perception that immigrants are exclusively responsible for their success or failure, rather than considering the broader socioeconomic influences that contribute to their experiences. Unlike the previous citations, which framed immigrants as an economic burden because of their dependence on welfare systems, their lack of participation in the labour market and the expected costs to integrate immigrants, the following statement seems to indicate a different outlook on immigrants:

> "Due to the continued aging of the population in our country until about 2040, the proportion of inactive people in Dutch society will increase. To fill these structural shortages in the labor market, not only highly educated knowledge migrants are probably needed, but also medium and lower-skilled labor migrants".
> (29:19 p 20 in WRR-report-103-Together-in-diversity, 2020-2021)

The statement seems to suggest that immigrants have a critical role in addressing labour market shortages in the Netherlands. It highlights the need for both highly knowledgeable immigrants and low-skilled labour immigrants. This frame contrasts with the aforementioned frames, which portray immigrants as a burden on the economy.

4.5 Securitisation

Finally, the securitisation frame type perpetuates the image of immigrants as an unmanageable and dehumanised mass seeking to enter the country in combination with the theme of border control, stressing the significance of regulating and controlling cross-border migration (Bueonfino, 2006; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). The issue of border control is crucial in the securitisation frame of the migration discourse. The depiction of immigrants as an unmanageable mass awaiting entry into the country gives the impression that borders are under threat and must be secured (Ibrahim, 2005). This view frequently leads to stronger border control laws and the employment of more advanced techniques to dissuade immigrants from crossing the border (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020; Huysmans, 2000). Similar to the previous frames, the securitisation frame experiences an increase over time, with a dominance in the policy year 2003 until 2022 and less dominant in the early 1960s.

Figure 6 'Securitisation' keywords and their frequency across the analysed policy documents

Border control

Policymakers use topoi of threats to national security to emphasise the importance of controlling and regulating migration. According to Figure 6, which shows the identified keywords and their frequency, it can be observed that the keyword 'flow' is the most dominant, with a total score of 30, followed by 'increase' with a total of 30. Less frequent, but equally significant are the keywords 'return', and 'arrival'. To begin with, in the early 1990s, the policymakers indicate the continued immigration as a burden on public services, and proposes the need to limit immigration due to the high population density:

> "On the contrary, the cabinet also expects that immigration to Western Europe, and therefore also to the Netherlands, will continue for the time being. Unlike the traditional immigration countries, which attract new residents for demographic and economic reasons, the cabinet envisages immigration as much as possible limited because of the high population density and the burden on public facilities".
> (7:10 p 7 in Immigrant policy, 1989-1990)

The policymaker indicates that immigration to the Netherlands will continue, but quickly switches to a negative frame of immigration as a burden on public facilities and advocates limiting immigration as a result of the high population density. This demonstrates that rather than being seen as a possible benefit or opportunity, immigration is seen as a problem that needs to be solved. Moreover, the reference to traditional immigration countries implies that the Netherlands must not be seen as an immigration country and is closed to newcomers. Another example regarding immigration restriction is the phrase 'much as possible', which implies that there is an urgency to limit immigration due to high population density and the burden on public services. Another example in which these texts employ a range of linguistic strategies to construct immigrants as a problem that must be managed and controlled is when discussing the issue of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. The language used in the text seems to depict immigrants as a threat, particularly through the use of the terms 'swelling flow' and the distinction between 'genuine' and 'economic' refugees. The following passage illustrates this tendency:

> "In the first place, this is the need for a European asylum policy to manage the swelling flow of refugees, and in the second place the agreement to put more dynamism and speed into the implementation of the current policy and the application of the current applicable legislation and, thirdly, great diligence in the introduction of new strict legislation to distinguish between 'genuine' and 'economic' refugees".
> (23:4 p 1 in Refugee policy, 1994-1995)

Firstly, the term 'swelling flow' is significant since it implies an overwhelming and unmanageable rush of people into Europe. This rhetoric depicts refugees as a group, rather than as individuals with distinct experiences and motivations for requesting asylum. This expression implies that refugees are a burden on European countries and that they are arriving in such large numbers that they cannot be controlled or absorbed. Secondly, the text implies that the current asylum policy is not effective and needs to be applied with more 'dynamism and speed'. This suggests that refugees are a problem that must be dealt with swiftly and efficiently as if they were an emergency. This framing can contribute to the perception of immigrants as a horde of individuals difficult to govern and regulate, posing a threat to society's stability and security. Another tendency by policymakers is to distinguish between 'genuine' and ' economic' refugees, which suggests that there are some refugees who are not genuine and are trying to take advantage of the system. This terminology portrays refugees as a threat, implying that some are attempting to deceive European countries to obtain access. This distinction is not always evident, and the use of this language can be seen as an attempt to simplify a difficult subject and frame the refugee in a more easily manageable manner. The need for more restrictive policies to regulate immigration can also be found in policies that advocate for

border control and anti-migration measures such as visa policies. The following citation illustrates this tendency:

"It is possible that more effective border control and anti-migration measures in countries of origin, such as visa policies, will increase the importance of people smugglers' services for asylum seekers and economic refugees".
(28:18 p 43 in WRR Netherlands-immigration society, 2001-2002)

This framing emphasises that migration is largely perceived as a problem that must be managed and controlled through rigorous visa regulations and border control. The sentence implies that such policies may help limit migration, but they may also increase demand for the services of people traffickers. This means that migration is not only difficult to manage, but also a lucrative business for those who facilitate it. Another example that reflects a discourse on migration that prioritizes the control and restriction of movements of asylum seekers and refugees can be found in the following passage:

"After all, if the asylum reception and asylum procedures are no longer there, there will be no asylum seekers either. It is feasible, because the Refugee Convention, for example, can be terminated unilaterally. If the State Secretary wants to, he can terminate that treaty today. The other point of Ms. Gesthuizen, closing the borders, does indeed mean that we will introduce border control at the Dutch borders. The PVV wants that to be done by the Ministry of Defence. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) must guard the border posts and patrol between the border posts. In this way we can indeed close borders for asylum seekers".
(52:11 p 6 in Immigration policy, 2015-2016)

While it can be suggested that the first citation acknowledges the complex and often dangerous routes that immigrants take to reach their destination via smugglers. The statement above supports a more uncompromising stance on migration, in which the termination of international treaties and the closure of borders are considered as realistic means to reduce the number of asylum seekers. To clarify, the passage illustrates a narrative that is primarily concerned with closing borders and stopping asylum procedures. The passage implies that the Refugee Convention, which offers legal protection to refugees, can be ended unilaterally, and that closing the borders effectively ends the entrance of asylum seekers. This framing suggests that restricting and regulating the number of refugees who arrive is the main goal rather than protecting them. Moreover, the fact that the policymaker suggests having the Ministry of Defence block the borders and the Royal Marechaussee protect the border checkpoints and patrol between them perpetuates the image that migration is a problem to be solved through law enforcement and military means, rather than

through policies that address the core reasons for migration. Lastly, policymakers indicate the associated population growth associated with migration as well as its consequences:

> "This unbridled population growth as a result of migration is disrupting the Netherlands and has major consequences for the housing market, the welfare state, social cohesion, our security, healthcare, education, and our freedom".
> (53:1 p 3 in Immigration policy, 2022-2023)

The statement reflects a securitisation perspective that sees migration as a threat to Dutch society. The term 'unbridled' to characterise population expansion implies a lack of control over the situation, reinforcing the notion of a threat. The housing market, welfare state, social cohesion, security, healthcare, education, and freedom are all mentioned in the list of consequences, and they are all significant to citizens and can instil fear. By linking migration to these sectors, the policymaker implies that the negative consequences of migration are felt in many areas of society, amplifying the perceived threat. Noteworthy is the term 'disrupting', which suggests that migration harms the normal functioning of society. And the phrase 'our security' implies that Dutch people's physical safety is in danger as a result of migration, which is a notion that could inspire fear and serve as justification for the implementation of tougher policies. Concerns about the migration influx can also be detected in a more direct example:

> "This high influx cannot continue like this. We see that the system is jammed on all sides. Aid workers, teachers, doctors: everyone in the asylum chain is overburdened. In this way it is not sustainable, not for local residents, not for employees and not for the asylum seekers themselves. It is therefore good that the government is making an international effort to reduce the influx of asylum seekers. We see that this has recently been fully addressed at the European summit. Something is now being prepared for the next peak. My question to the secretary of state is whether the progress at the moment is sufficient, or whether, given the current high influx, this is not the time to ring the alarm again".
> (55:1 p 9 Report of a Committee Debate Immigration Policy, 2022-2023)

This fragment reflects the need for more restrictive migration policies by reducing the influx of asylum seekers, as their high influx is perceived as a burden for all members of Dutch society. While the passage acknowledges international efforts, given the high influx, it also raises concerns about the adequacy of such measures. This restrictive approach is also noticeable in the following passage:

"This government has no control over the influx, so solutions and limitations must be thought about to stop this influx and this demographic transition The solutions are actually quite simple. Let me give you some of them. We can implement an immediate asylum ban, except for direct war refugees. This is even included in the VVD election program. We can cancel the 1951 Refugee Convention and start determining our own asylum policy. This is also included in the VVD election program. We can intensify border control. Denmark and Sweden are already doing that successfully, by the way. We can create a mini-Schengen zone with surrounding countries to jointly monitor the borders. We can deport safe-landers immediately. They have no business here. Moreover, they are more often involved in incidents".
(53:5 p 4 in Migration Policy,2022-2023)

The statement emphasises the government's inability to control the influx and offers solutions to stop the demographic transition. The policymaker proceeds by listing several, precise but aggressive solutions, for the influx. The solutions provided in the statement consist of an asylum ban, intensifying border control, the creation of a mini-Schengen zone with surrounding countries and, cancelling the 1951 Refugee Convention. Moreover, the statement also mentions deporting safe-landers as they are more prone to causing incidents. The statement implies that the proposed remedies, according to the policymakers, are required to solve the problem of uncontrolled immigration while also maintaining safety and security. The rhetoric shows an approach that favours immigration control over humanitarian concerns.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, this section of the study presents the findings of the critical discourse analysis, focusing on the selected and identified frames and keywords. By elaborating on the representation of various frames, this section contributes to the understanding of the dominant populist frames surrounding immigrants that emerged, declined, and resurfaced in Dutch integration policy documents from 1960 until 2022. This section offers key insights that have emerged from this analysis. In the analysed policy documents, all four populist frames appear, whereby the data revealed that most frames have become more prominent over time, with the criminality and cultural/religious frame being the most dominant. A general tendency seems to be that policymakers frequently depict immigrants' cultural and religious practices, as incompatible with the norms, values, identity and culture of the Netherlands. It is mostly 'Islam' that is portrayed as incompatible with the Dutch democratic constitutional state, modern culture, and the separation between church and state. Therefore, policymakers tend to focus on immigrants' assimilation into Dutch society. Moreover, policymakers tend to associate allochthonous immigrants with violence and radicalism, and a as threat to the safety of the Dutch population because of their high participation in crime. Another key insight is the

tendency of policymakers to portray immigrants as a burden on the economy because of their dependence on government aid by receiving benefits and their participation in unemployment. Moreover, policymakers frequently emphasise border control and anti-immigration regulations such as visa policies due to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. Another strategy policymakers advocate for restricting immigration is by blaming them for societal issues, including those relating to housing, welfare, social cohesion, healthcare, and education.

5. Interpretation

In addition to the frame types employed by policymakers, the analysis provided insight into how immigrants were constructed and portrayed during certain policy years. Whereas the preceding chapter and analysis offered an overview of the detected frames, this section concentrates on their interpretation. This includes the aim to uncover how immigrants have been conceptualised and represented in populist discourses and how these discourses have evolved or changed over the years. Importantly, this section strives to demonstrate how historical factors have influenced how immigrants are portrayed and defined in populist discourse by focusing on the different periods. Together, this results in an attempt to answer the sub-question: How are immigrant identities represented and constructed in the dominant populist frames in the period 1960 until 2022?

The historical discourse analysis of Dutch integration policy discourse revealed four populist frames that each invoke a particular vision of immigrants, either as a threat to the safety, identity, economic well-being or security of the Netherlands. This section will contribute to the interpretation of the results. First, it has been determined from the elaborated theory how the migration discourse, as it manifests in integration policy, has been significantly influenced by populism, which has changed how people think about and talk about immigration (Brouwer et al., 2017; Gruber & Rosenberger, 2021, Callejo et al., 2007). Populism has fuelled anti-immigrant sentiments and a drive for stricter immigration policies (Gruber and Rosenberger 2021). Building on this thought, the study suggested that policymakers may portray immigration in a way that causes fear since it is an inherent element of their political strategy and practice. This framing might entail portraying immigrants as a threat to national identity, security, and economic well-being (Riegert & Hovden, 2019; Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017; Newman et al.,2012; Horsti, 2013; Buonfino, 2006). Given the probable shift in the prominence of immigration concerns and immigrant groups across time, this section gives contextual background on various periods, including major events that may have shaped their identity.

Cultural and Religious Threat

When reviewing again the data analysis of policy documents relating to immigrants, indeed several indications seem to signify that a part of their migration themes policies portray immigrants as a cultural and religious threat (Ibrahim, 2005), which might take the form of many languages, races and religions (Waever, 1993). This section will, therefore, offer an interpretation of the frames used by policymakers against the backdrop of the theoretical concepts.

To start with, as indicated in the data analysis scheme (figure 2), the presence of the cultural and religious frame seems to gradually increase over time. The frame seems to be less present in the policy year 1978, which depicts the 60s and 70s, but instead, becomes more prominent in the following years. In other words, the migration discourse as manifested in policy documents does not seem to depict immigrants as a

cultural and religious threat in the 60s and 70s. Since the 80s, however, the migration discourse seems to have witnessed an increased use of cultural and religious arguments to portray immigrants as a threat. Moreover, it is striking to observe that the cultural and religious framing of immigrants is mainly fixated on Islamic immigrants, as it has been demonstrated that Islam dominates the discourse surrounding immigrants.

From 1980 to 1990: the rise of Islam as a political issue

Given the definition of the concerning frame, its indication in the policy documents mainly points to the cultural and religious practises of immigrants as the potential clash with the values and principles of the host society, and in the form of policy, this frame is often used to justify policies that aim to promote assimilation and integration of immigrants into Dutch society: *"The continuing individualisation also clashes with the group-oriented orientations and the resulting norms of behaviour of some minority groups - sometimes also supported by religion. The position of women, the relationship between husband and wife and between parents and children, the hierarchical relationships and the accompanying authority orientation are already sources of conflict. It should be expected that the social life - with which one has to maintain many contacts anyway - will exert a strong pressure to conform (14:15 pp 14 – 15, WRR report Ethnic Minority Policy, 1979-1980).* Here it becomes evident that policymakers indicate the incapability of immigrants' culture and religion to the Dutch individualistic norms and in turn advocates pressure for their assimilation, which is indicated by the term 'pressure to conform'. However, this seems paradoxical to the previous aforementioned statement that multiculturalism gained ground in the 1980s, which promoted the tolerance of ethnic and cultural diversity.

Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that this message is mostly focused explicitly or implicitly towards Muslim immigration, resulting in an Islamist-centred, threat immigration nexus in which Islamism is linked with all (Muslim) immigration. To illustrate, on the one hand, policymakers tend to describe the culture and religion of immigrants in a general sense to appear inclusive and tolerant. On the other hand, policymakers often selectively target Islam when discussing cultural and religious differences among immigrants. As previously mentioned, large-scale immigration from Islamic countries began in Europe in the 1950s, with Turks and Moroccans arriving in the Netherlands. Since these newcomers were primarily viewed as temporary employees with limited opportunities for integration into the economy, their cultural identity initially attracted little attention (Slootman, 2018; Castles & Miller, 2009). Their religious practice was regarded as a private matter that could probably be accommodated within the framework of existing arrangements. When Europe closed its doors to low-skilled labour migration but left open the prospect of family reunion in the mid-1970s, Islam became increasingly visible. Muslim immigration populations quickly rose as they transitioned from single male migrants to families seeking permanent residence in the 1980s (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). The fact that most first-generation immigrants, from rural areas with low

education and conservative backgrounds, remained in the Netherlands led to a rather negative perception. The focus was mostly on the family dynamics including the strict division between the sexes, including the role of women confined to the private sphere and home (Slootman, 2018): *"The problem that sometimes religion, Islam, especially for women and girls" (33:1 p 6 in Special committee for minority policy, 1985-1986).*

While the portrayal of immigrants in the 1980s and begin the 1990s was rather focused on the incompatible norms and value patterns, such as the hierarchical family dynamic, the 1990s experienced a frameshift as a result of the changing worldwide events surrounding Islam, which changed the hosts' perception of Islam radically by increasingly portraying Islam as incompatible to Dutch society. Among these events were, for example, Nasserist Arab nationalism in the Middle East had been replaced by Saudi hegemony, the establishment of Islamic fundamentalist groups, the Iran-Iraq war (Zolberg & Woon, 1999), and the 1988 Salman Rushdie Affair, which led to protests and the debate on freedom of speech and religious tolerance in Western societies (Majed, 2015). The evolution of Western ideas on Islam has resulted in a shift from viewing Islam as a passive culture to one that is characterised as hostile. This change has specifically resulted in the idea that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with liberal democracy (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). Therefore, the combination of the fatwa issued against Rushdie and Bolkestein's proclamation of the alleged superiority of Western civilisation, which, as the leader of the right-wing liberal faction, posited that Islam constituted an ideological threat to Western values, effectively propelled the issue of Islam to the forefront of Dutch integration policy discussions (Uitermark, 2012): *"Namely the observed (possible) tension between (adherents of) Islam and Western values" (28:5 p 173 in WRR Report-Netherlands as immigration society, 2001-2002).*

Year 2000: 9/11, Fortuyn, Verdonk & Wilders
Another frameshift occurred after the turn of the millennium, in which critical events fuelled mistrust and animosity towards Islam like the impact of catastrophic media events like the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the following assassinations of politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. These incidents provided a solid foundation for right-wing populist politicians like Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk, and Geert Wilders to promote new nationalist and anti-Islamic politics (Aziz, 2020; Slootman, 2018; Wodak et al., 2013, p.204). Therefore, it can be implied that immigrants were increasingly associated with violence and terrorism: "*The government is aware of the fact that Islam, which as a religion of many immigrants has quickly become one of the more extensive religions in the Netherlands, is arousing concern among parts of the population because of different traditions, views and the association with violence and radicalism. In their view, the achievements of a democratic constitutional state could come under pressure (16:9 p 8 in Vision Integration Policy, 2010-2011).* Interestingly, the statement indicates a contradiction in two ways.

The first issue with the remark is that it perpetuates the idea that Islam is incompatible with Dutch values and traditions while also recognising the necessity to integrate Muslim immigrants into Dutch society. This creates a conflict because the government's stated goal of integration is hindered by the negative associations and prejudices fostered by its discourse. Second, the fact that policymakers emphasise the possible challenges it poses to the achievements of a democratic constitutional state, which is set to guarantee religious freedom and equality and protect the rights of all religious groups (Saharso & Lettinga, 2008), implies that Islam is incompatible with democracy. This paradox emphasises the issues' complexities since it is difficult to reconcile the principles of Dutch democracy and religious freedom with concerns about the possible threat posed by Islam. A prime example is the fact that policymakers frequently point to the issue of headscarves: *"Of these garments and jewellery, the Islamic headscarf occupies an important place in the debate on pluralism, integration and the clash of fundamental rights" (8:4 p 14 in Note Fundamental rights in a Pluralistic Society, 2003-2004).* Policymakers frequently use the significance of Dutch democracy, particularly the division of religion from the state, to argue against the Islamic headscarf. Within this framing, policymakers portray the headscarf as a means of restricting women and the fact that the emancipation of women is at stake.

Moreover, it is critical to mention that the discourse in this decade is mostly focused on associating immigrants with violence and radicalism: *"The lack of democracy and sectarian violence in many Islam-dominated countries have also given Islam a bad reputation. The combination of these phenomena has meant that Islam does not make the social integration of Muslims in our country any easier" (20:41 p 48 in Note Integration Policy, 2007-2008).* It is striking to observe that policymakers blame Muslim immigrants for challenges and difficulties of integration due to factors outside of their control such as the political stability elsewhere. Moreover, it is also unusual to observe that the negative portrayal of Muslim immigrants by policymakers is in contradiction with policymakers emphasising the freedom of religion and belief: *"The government wants to emphasise that freedom of religion and belief is a great asset in our country. This freedom encompasses all religions, including Islam" (40:5 p 3 in Agenda Integration,2013-2014).*

Recent trends: terrorist attacks, Trump and Baudet
Lastly, another unusual phenomenon to observe is the frequency rate of the cultural and religious frame in the last decade. Policymakers emphasise the idea of a fixed, homogeneous Dutch culture that is under threat from outside forces: *"For example, a substantial proportion of people with a Dutch background experience a loss of control due to the presence of people with a migration background. They also experience a loss of culture and identity, especially due to the presence of Muslims" (29:6 p 82 in WRR report migration diversity and social cohesion, 2020-2021).* This statement perpetuates the notion that Dutch cultural identity is a fixed and homogenous entity, ignoring the complex and diverse nature of Dutch society. This can be explained by the reappearance of nativist politics in the year 2017, after a combination of several terrorist attacks in

European countries and the rise of the radical right such as Trump and the political party FVD in the Netherlands (Larsen et al., 2020; Morieson, 2021; Khan et al., 2019). Between 2014 and 2017, an estimated 63 acts of 'jihadist terrorism' occurred in Europe (Larsen et al., 2020). EU member states ranked terrorism as the most pressing issue confronting the European Union (Larsen et al., 2020). Donald Trump, for instance, emphasises that America is at war against terrorism, and, presented his Muslim ban (Finley & Esposito, 2020). Similar to the Dutch Party for Freedom, which has stated its intention to 'de-Islamize' the nation through the implementation of several measures, including the revocation of refugee residence permits, the prohibition of the construction of mosques and the wearing of Islamic headscarves, the detention of Muslims deemed radical and threatening to national security, and the dismissal of dual citizens. (Morieson, 2021). Subsequently, the far-right populist and Christian secular discourse have had a substantial impact on the Dutch centrist right. VVD leader Mark Rutte, for example, has taken an assertively nationalist stance similar to Wilders', emphasising the importance of defending Dutch culture from immigrants. For instance, Rutte urged Dutch-Turkish demonstrators who supported Erdogan to head to Turkey if they were unwilling to adopt Dutch principles when he launched his re-election campaign (Morieson, 2021).

Hence, the cultural and religious frame, which portrays immigrants' culture and religion, especially Islam, as a threat to the Dutch identity, highlights the importance of identity and cultural values in defining a society's ability to survive. According to this frame, a society's identity is expressed through shared beliefs, traditions and ideals that are seen as essential to its survival (Waever, 1993). When migration is perceived through this lens, it is frequently depicted as a threat to the host society's identity and way of life. This is because immigrants may bring diverse cultural and religious traditions that contradict the host society's existing norms and values. The host society's ability to survive will be jeopardised as a result of the loss of a unified identity. This corresponds to the theoretical underpinning of populism's ethno-nationalistic character, which represents a shift from the traditional focus on the enemy from above to an enemy from abroad (Wodak et al., 2013, Mudde, 2004).

The criminalisation of the Immigrant

The second frame to discuss and that has been identified in the migration discourse, is the notion of threats to safety. This argument is often linked to concerns about terrorism and crime. As illustrated in the data analysis scheme, the criminality frame appears to be the dominant frame within the migration discourse as it manifests in policy documents. Similar to the cultural/religious frame, the criminality frame seems to increase over time. Indeed, the policy years 1960s and 1970s do not seem to indicate notions of the criminality frame, but gradually appear from the policy years 1978 until 2022, with its highest peak in the policy year 2003 until 2022.

The 1980s and 1990s: Replacing Guest-workers with allochthones

Similar to the previous frame, the 1980s marked a critical period towards a negative frameshift of the so-called guest workers. This frameshift manifested in replacing guest workers with allochthones and its associations with a crime: *"This should be apparent in particular from a high proportion of allochthones (immigrants) in common crime, such as theft, vandalism and burglary" (31:11 p 184 in WRR-Immigrant policy,1989-1990).* The term has dominated the discourse since the 1980s, which is used to describe people of foreign origin or who have foreign ancestry (Van Dijk, 2000; Ghorashi, 2006). However, the term has been controversial as it reinforces the binary view of 'native' Dutch people and 'others'.

While the guest workers entailed various nationalities, it is striking to observe that young Moroccans are often targeted as criminals. This corresponds to the theoretical assumption that the term allochthon only refers to non-natives of colour (Ghorashi, 2005). For example, in the policy year 1994 until 2003, policymakers increasingly classified Moroccans as a policy issue, in which they are consistently seen from a position of latent criminal potential: *"Networks around Moroccan youths who get into trouble and threaten to commit a crime" 4:1 p 52 in Note Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities,1998-1999).* The text indicates a negative view of young immigrants (allochthones) as a group prone to criminal behaviour. This way of framing portrays immigrants as dangerous and who should be feared. This is consistent with Wodak's (2015) assertion that populist communication often entails the use of 'foreigners' to construct fear of real or imagined dangers. The focus on a specific ethnic group differs from previous categories used in Dutch policy, such as foreigners, guest workers, minorities, immigrants or allochthones, which are made up of numerous ethnic groups. The label Moroccan youngsters distinguished them as a distinct group characterised by nationality and age. The marker 'Moroccan' focuses on the origin of the ancestors and provides for racialization.

The classification of Moroccans as a policy issue can be explained by the critical events surrounding Islam. To illustrate, their categorisation as a policy issue is linked to political debates in the Netherlands about failed integration policies, which became increasingly prominent during the 1990s (Entzinger, 2006). As previously indicated, the critical International events surrounding Islam as well as far-right Dutch political figures, who portrayed Islamic culture as one of the major challenges to Dutch culture, resulted in division between Dutch society and Islamic culture (Roggeband & Van der Haar, 2018). This contributed to the stigmatisation of Islamic immigrants, in particular, Moroccan youngsters: *"Crime among young allochthonous (immigrants), and especially petty street crime in which, for example, Moroccans and Antilleans are overrepresented, gives the impression of a loose youth who leaves school for what it is and embarks on the criminal path" (41: 2 p 171 in WRR Report-Values-norms-burden-behaviour, 2002-2003).*

2000: Allochthones as a security threat

The year 2000 marks another frameshift, in which policymakers portray immigrants as a security threat, linking them with radicalism. It is striking to observe that, again, the notion of Islam can be detected. This corresponds to the contextual background in the previous section, in which the combination of terrorist attacks (9/11), and the rise of Right-wing populists changed the political landscape into anti-Islamic politics. Together, this implies that immigrants are frequently associated with feelings of unsafety: *"Combined with the constant global threat from violent radical movements in Islam, many citizens experience the changed relationship as an undermining of their sense of security" (20:27 p 14 in Integration Note 2007-2008).* And so, immigrants are frequently portrayed as a source of crime and insecurity, with the presumption that they are to blame for higher crime rates and a lack of safety in Dutch communities. The statement positions native Dutch citizens as the victims of insecurity, while immigrants are portrayed as perpetrators. This corresponds to the theoretical assumption that populists often use immigrants as scapegoats for problems faced by the majority (Wodak, 2015).

Recent trends: Islamic terrorism

More recently, policymakers have been associating immigrants with terrorism by deploying terms such as 'Muslim terrorism', 'Terrorist attacks in the name of Islam', and 'Islamic terrorism'. By associating Islam with terrorism, policymakers perpetuate an image of a large group of Muslim immigrants as potential terrorists: *"Muslim terrorism is first and foremost a real security problem" (11:20 p 36 in Standpoint of the Cabinet regarding report "Building bridges", 2003-2004).* This framing implies that the threat of Muslim terrorism is more urgent and significant than other forms of terrorism or non-terrorism-related security threats. Lastly, connected to rising terrorist attacks and the influence of the radical right on Dutch Mainstream politics, policymakers tend to adopt a nationalistic tone in politics, this is done by emphasising the associated issues with diversity: *"The more diversity in the neighbourhood, the greater the chance that residents will not open the door at night because they consider it unsafe, avoid unsafe places in the neighbourhood, feel unsafe when they walk on the street in the neighbourhood at night or if they are home alone, and that they are afraid of becoming a victim of crime themselves" (29:11 p 84 in WRR-report-Together-in-diversity, 2020-2021).* This statement further stigmatises certain communities and contributes to a culture of fear and mistrust. Therefore, it can be implied that the findings in this section are in line with the theoretical underpinnings of portraying immigrants as outsiders who do not belong in Dutch society, thereby creating us versus them narrative.

Border Control

Another populist frame to consider is the securitisation frame which regards migration as a security issue and justifies the employment of security measures to restrict and limit migration movements (Huysmans, 2000). Bearing this in mind, this section will offer an interpretation of the frame in connection to the theoretical concepts. To begin with, the results seem to indicate that the frame appears to increase sharply from the 1990s, with a prominent presence in the more recent periods between 2003 and 2022. This can be explained by three main events, which entail the so-called Fortress Europe, the migration crisis in 2015, and the housing crisis.

From 1990s: Fortress Europe

First, advances in technology, such as the development of new surveillance systems and border control technologies, led to the broad adoption of the securitisation framework in the 1990s. During this time, the use of security measures to regulate migratory movements rose significantly, including the expansion of border barriers, more patrols, and harsher visa regulations (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). Building on this thought, as previously mentioned, immigration became increasingly a subject of policy debates in the 1980s about maintaining public order and stability. More than 4 million people applied for asylum in Europe, including the top four asylum-seeking countries Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Stalker, 2002). When tackling this issue, policymakers often emphasise the population growth caused by a large number of immigrants: *"It can be assumed that immigration will continue for the time being and that the share of immigrants in the total population will continue to grow"* *(31:31 p 16 in WRR-Immigrant policy, 1989-1990).*

However, it is striking to observe that as the number of asylum seekers and refugees increased, policymakers increasingly portrayed immigration as an uncontrollable phenomenon that needs to be regulated: *"The coalition agreement states that a European asylum policy is necessary to steer the growing flow of refugees in the right direction"(23:7 p 22 in Note Refugee Policy(1994-1995).* This framing can be perceived as a form of crisis discourse, reinforcing the impression that immigrants are a burden on society and must be managed and controlled. This can be explained by the fact that Fortress Europe was built in 1993 when the European Union formally closed its doors to immigrants after the Council of Ministers of the Interior and Justice issued a resolution severely restricting foreign entry into all European Union states (Koff, 2008). This was done in response to the 1990 Convention Implementation of the Schengen Agreement, which linked immigration with terrorism, transnational crime, and border security (Huymans, 2000). The walls of 'Fortress Europe' are occasionally physical (such as the 13-kilometre barbed-wire fence on the Greece-Turkey border), more often, however, they are less visible but possibly more effective.

Modern Europe's segregation zones have been largely built, expanded, and maintained through high-tech initiatives such as Frontex, resulting in what some commentators refer to as 'Cyber-Fortress Europe' - A migration exclusion zone on the technologically advanced mechanism of social segregation (Milivojevic, 2013). Yet, despite the barriers built by European Union member states to prevent immigration, non-EU nationals continue to enter Europe, both legitimately and irregularly (Koff, 2008): *"The influence of internationalization on migration flows and the regulatory capacity of the state gives the impression that migration is 'out of control', has become inexplicable and unpredictable" (28:19 p 43 in WRR-Netherlands-immigration society, 2001-2002).* The fact that policymakers regard the influence of internationalisation on migration flows as a negative influence is in itself a paradox. On the one hand, policymakers refer to a need for a European asylum policy that increases the interconnectivity and the development of more standardised rules and procedures. On the other hand, policymakers indicate that internationalisation has caused migration to be 'out of control', implying the absence of any order or structure. And so, this statement represents a discourse that recognises the complexities of migration and the challenges the Dutch government faces in regulating it.

2015 Migration crisis

The 2015 migration crisis resulted in an influx of refugees, prompting a renewed emphasis on the securitisation of immigration. The crisis started in 2015, when 1.25 million refugees arrived at the European border, many of whom required international protection because of conflict, violence, and persecution in their home countries (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). Germany, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, originally opened its borders and was praised as the moral compass of Europe's migration policy (Engelbert et al., 2019). However, this decision resulted in a rapid increase in the number of immigrants arriving in Germany and other European nations. The majority of EU member states rapidly characterised this enormous surge as a problem of crucial importance for their domestic politics as they sought a long-term solution (Greussing & Boomgaande, 2017). This resulted in a more restrictive approach to border surveillance, with countries constructing fences and other barriers to prevent immigrants from entering (Engelbert et al., 2019): *"Chancellor Merkel has completely lost her way and has set our continent on fire. We, therefore, say to this cabinet: finally distance yourself from that foolish policy, close the borders to the flow of asylum seekers and take control" (52:9 p 27 in Immigration Policy, 2015-2016).* This citation highlights the negative stance of policymakers towards the flow of asylum seekers, who cause chaos and destruction. It portrays the immigrant influx as a catastrophe, implying a sense of urgency and the necessity for quick action. Considering Wodak's politics of fear (2015), populist framing often utilises fear and concern to position themselves as the only ones who can provide a solution to the situation. Second, the text presents Merkel's decision to open borders to refugees as a mistake and criticises her for it. This type of

criticism of a political leader is a frequent populist strategy for creating a sense of us vs. them and positioning oneself as the people's advocate against the elites.

Recent trends in migration: Ter Apel, and Housing shortage

In addition, the housing crisis and Ter Apel have added a new dimension to the issue of border control, with populist politicians attributing the blame on immigrants and refugees. Indeed, the most pressing issue in the Dutch housing market is a lack of sufficient houses. In 2018, the housing shortage grew by roughly 3.2 per cent because of a rise in the number of households due to immigration (Boelhouwer, 2020). To reduce the substantial number of refugees in the Netherlands, which caused the housing crisis and overcrowding at asylum-seeker shelters such as Ter Apel, limitations were imposed (Independent, 2023). Together, this implies that in recent years, the securitisation frame entails the portrayal of asylum seekers as a threat. Blaming asylum seekers for certain crises such as the housing shortage leads to further stigmatisation of the immigrant groups: *"The asylum agreement is a disaster for the Netherlands: more homes for asylum seekers with a residence permit, hundreds of forced extra reception locations, priority for status holders over a house, no less than 700 million euros of tax money to fund the business" (53:4 p 4 in Immigration Policy, 2022-2023).*

Economic Burden

The last populist frame to consider that was identified in policy documents regarding immigrants is the economisation frame. The frame entails framing immigrants as an economic issue, where immigrants are regarded as a threat to the host society's economic welfare (Greussing & Boomgaarde, 2017: Huysmans, 2002). And so, this section will offer an interpretation of the economisation frame regarding the theoretical assumptions. It should be noted that the economisation framing of immigrants appears to be the least dominant frame identified in policy documents. Nevertheless, policymakers often emphasise immigrants as a burden to the economy, based on the conception that they rarely contribute to the economy and instead rely on government benefits. The results seem to indicate that within the economic logic of the migration discourse, the discourse surrounding immigrants' economisation is dominated by benefit-related issues. This framing is frequently employed to reinforce populist political narratives that emphasise us versus them narrative. Immigrants are frequently presented as weak and reliant on government assistance, fostering the idea that they are a burden on society rather than valued citizens. This framing is often used to support populist rhetoric that blames immigrants for economic problems. Populist politicians may utilise this rhetoric to appeal to the public's fears and vulnerabilities, emphasising the need to defend 'our' resources from 'them' (Greusing & Boomgaarde, 2017). However, similar to the previous frames, the economisation frame seems to be less dominant in the policy year of the 1960s and demonstrates an increase in the 1970s.

From the 1950s to 1974: Guest workers

First of all, the results seem to indicate that immigrants were not perceived as an economic threat in the 1960s. For the majority of the post-war period throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant Dutch discourse centred on labour market demands (King & Collyer, 2016; Castles & Miller, 2009). The influx of labourers from the Mediterranean region helped to make up for the lack of unskilled workers (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). International migration was generally regarded favourably during this period due to its economic benefits in both sending and receiving countries (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016; Schierup et al., 2006). However, the plan was to engage such workers temporarily, whereby governments had no desire to create settlement policies, and the term guest workers were employed to emphasise this point (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016).

From 1970 to the end of 1980: The oil crisis

However, it is striking to observe that since the 1980s, guest workers are increasingly associated with draining recourses through welfare programs. To clarify, following the oil crisis of the 1970s, in which the demand for unskilled labour in the Netherlands declined dramatically and led to a shift in the perception of immigrants (Schierup et al., 2006). The 1973-1974 oil crisis had a significant impact on Europe's economic landscape. The crisis accelerated economic restructuring, substantially lowering the demand for labour. Around this time, optimism about unrestricted economic growth waned (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016). Guest workers, who worked in low-skilled positions in the industrial sector were primarily vulnerable and therefore suffered the most from increased unemployment in the early 1980s. Low-skilled immigrants (guest workers) found themselves unemployed, enrolled in early retirement programs, or receiving disability benefits (Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). Policymakers often emphasise their dependence on welfare programs and benefits: *"Many members of minority groups have become directly or indirectly dependent on government care, for example through benefits and welfare services, or for their housing"* (31:24 p 7 in WRR-Immigrant policy, 1989-1990).

Regarding government reliance, policymakers also emphasise the associated costs of immigrant facilities. For instance, the 1980s witnessed a sharp rise in the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands (Ghorashi, 2005). Housing schools, medical services, and other public facilities were essential for immigrant facilities (Schierup et al., 2006). Even if it was not publicly acknowledged, the foreign worker system was dead. European leaders had to unwillingly face the unanticipated necessity to permanently integrate millions of immigrants into their social, political, and cultural institutions (Schierup et al., 2006). Therefore, it can be suggested that policymakers often focus on the financial costs of immigration above the benefits: *"The costs of a number of specific policy measures proposed by the council for the reception of new immigrants and*

their children can be globally estimated at several hundred million guilders per year at current immigration levels" (31:23 p 11 in WRR-Immigrant policy (1978-1990). The term 'costs' implies that there is a financial burden associated with the integration of new immigrants, which reinforces the discourse of immigrants as an economic burden.

An important background to government dependency is the welfare state. To clarify, during the 1990s, migration from previous guest worker countries was overshadowed by the entrance of numerous refugees and asylum seekers (Doomernik & Callejo, 2016; Zorlu & Hartog, 2001). By the end of the 1990s, immigration, asylum, migrants, and the integration of ethnic minorities had risen to the top of the EU agenda (Doomernik & Callejo, 2016). Meanwhile, a significant development occurred which was the growing public prominence of irregular migration, specifically, Western Europe had a unique problem in this regard. These countries have long been characterised by inclusive welfare programs that were also available to non-nationals (Doomernik & Callejo, 2016). Hence, it can be implied that EU member states overspend on welfare states created for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

2000: rise in unemployment
Related to welfare dependency, another frameshift occurred in which immigrants were increasingly associated with a lack of participation in the labour market: *"Due to high benefit dependency and over-representation in work with low status, the social prestige of non-Western immigrants as a group is low. This stands in the way of their acceptance as equal citizens. It also hinders their participation in the full breadth of the society" (20:47 p 11 in Note Integration Policy, 2007-2008)*. An outstanding feature is that on the one hand, the statement reflects the problem of non-western immigrants being over-represented in low-status jobs, on the other hand, the argument is used to blame non-Western immigrants for their low social prestige. This indicates a contradiction as non-Western immigrants are blamed for their exclusion while ignoring structural causes. Furthermore, the reference indicates that non-Western immigrants are responsible for their integration and full involvement in society, rather than addressing the role of Dutch society and institutions in establishing hurdles to integration. This individualistic approach to integration ignores how systematic racism, discrimination, and unequal access to resources and opportunities impede non-Western immigrants' ability to fully engage in Dutch society.

Recent trend: the renewed need for migrant workers
Despite the negative stance towards immigrants and policymakers advocating for more restrictive policies, the discourse seems to experience a renewed emphasis on the economic framing of immigrants. As previously mentioned, the economic framing of immigrants unlike the other frames, does not seem to increase over time. This can be explained by the current labour shortage in the Netherlands (Benefit &

Migrants, 2022). Since 2021, there has been an increase in the labour shortage in the Netherlands, which leads to a higher workload for personnel in almost all sectors (CBS, 2022). For instance, consider the many job vacancies in the long-term care sector, and their number is expected to increase between now and 2050 (Benefit & Migrants, 2022). Together, this implies that there is an increased need for new migrant workers (Rademaker, 2022). The fact that policymakers advocate for restrictive policies, but also emphasise the need for more migrant workers is paradoxical. An integration policy that starts from 'our' needs rather than a policy that simply responds to migration movements reflects the core of contemporary right-wing, in which the needs and interests of the native population are prioritised over those of immigrants.

5.1 Concluding Remarks

When it comes to the construction and representations of immigrant identities in the period 1960 until 2022, it appears that the 1980s and 1990s mark a critical period in which most of the populist framing of immigrants gained ground. Regarding the increased use of cultural and religious arguments to depict immigrants as a threat, the worldwide changing events surrounding Islam in the Middle East resulted in a negative perception of Islam, in which Islamism is linked with all immigrants. At the same time, the criminality frame entailed the replacement of guest workers with allochthones. Importantly, linked to the rise of political Islam, criminal allochthones were associated with a specific ethnic group of colour, which were mostly Moroccans. The oil crisis, which led to high unemployment rates for immigrants, is another critical event which led to the portrayal of immigrants as an economic burden because of their dependence on government aid and the associated costs of integration. Similarly, the construction of Fortress Europe as a response to a large number of asylum requests reflects another shift in the representation of immigrants as a security issue.

The year 2000 marked another significant shift in the portrayal and construction of immigrant identities. Following the events of 9/11, subsequent terrorist attacks and the rise of radical rights, allochthones were increasingly associated with violence and terrorism. And blaming them for the lack of safety of Dutch citizens as well as high crime rates. Their customs and practices, such as the headscarf, were portrayed as a clash with democracy. The migration crisis in 2015 led to the portrayal of refugees as a catastrophe and a heightened focus on closing borders.

The last decade reflects the urge to protect Dutch culture and identity against immigrants, in which policymakers emphasise the declining acceptance of Muslim immigrants. The housing shortage emphasises the need for further restrictions and border control for refugees. However, there seems to be an increased need for migrant workers, because of labour shortages in the Netherlands.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

The main research question is addressed in this chapter by merging the results of two sub-questions. After all, the relevant answers to the sub-questions offered insights into the various populist frames and how the populist frames were utilised to represent and construct immigrant identities. Moreover, this section also provides a discussion of the results and the interpretations in light of the social and scientific framework. In addition, attention will also be paid to the methodological choices and future recommendations for further research.

6.1 Conclusion

The research question addressed in this study is: *In what ways has the populist framing of immigrants in Dutch integration policy changed over time in the period 1960 until 2022?* This query was addressed by employing a discourse analysis. Considering the discursive side of populism underlying this thesis, discourse analysis aids in the interpretation of ideology communicated through discursive patterns by detecting the relationship between the text, ideologies and power relations (Wodak, 2015b; Wodak, 2009). The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) created by Ruth Wodak, which allows for the examination of immigrants as out-groups (Wodak, 2015b; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009), served as the primary inspiration for this research.

From the results, it was found that between 1960 and 2022, there were significant shifts in the populist framing of immigrants in Dutch integration policy. Initially, policymakers used the cultural/religious framing, highlighting the perceived threat posed by immigrants, to advocate for policies aimed at assimilation and integration into Dutch culture. They justified these restrictions by tying culture and religion to democratic norms and claimed that immigrants with undemocratic and immoral ideas damaged Dutch identity. This framing gained ground in the 1980s and 1990s, owing to events such as the Salman Rushdie case and Middle Eastern wars, which depicted Islam as incompatible with Western ideals and made it into a political issue in the Netherlands.

However, after 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, as well as the growth of radical right-wing politicians, allochthons (immigrants) were increasingly associated with violence and terrorism. The presentation of immigrants as a cultural and religious threat predominantly targeted Muslim migration, with Islamism being linked to all forms of immigration. Within this frame, Islam is often used to portray immigrants as backward and uncivilised and reinforces the idea that Western civilisation is superior to all others. This criminalisation of immigration mostly targeted Muslim immigrants rather than all immigrants.

Concerning the economic framing of immigrants, before the 1960s, immigration was promoted as an economic gain, notably with the arrival of guest workers. This changed in the 1970s, after the oil crisis, which led to unemployment and shifted the general impression of immigrants as an economic benefit to becoming a burden. In addition, the increase in refugees and associated costs for housing, education and

other social services are attributed to the perception of a group abusing the welfare state. Outstanding is that in the past ten years (2012-2022), it may be suggested that the labour shortage has heightened the need for migrant workers again.

However, this does not apply to refugees and asylum seekers, as they remain to be portrayed as threatening economic stability. Indeed the last decade indicates a shift in emphasis to migration restriction and the implementation of measures to prevent immigrants from entering the country. The securitisation frame rose to popularity in the 1990s, motivated by the establishment of Fortress Europe as a response to technological advancements, resulting in the adoption of significant security measures to regulate migration. The 2015 migration crisis heightened the focus on securitising migration, resulting in a more restricted approach to border control. Policymakers tend to indicate the chaos and destruction of the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. Particularly the last decade (2012 – 2022) notes a significant shift in frames on migration policies, particularly in reaction to the housing crisis. This shift reflects an increasing emphasis on controlling migration and minimising the influx of asylum seekers, whose large numbers are viewed as a burden on Dutch society.

Thus, the definition of populism used in this study, which emphasises the formation of a distinct out-group, seems to be consistent with the established frames of immigrants. These frames attribute blame to immigrant groups for a variety of societal concerns such as unemployment, social injustice, housing insecurity, and crime. This alignment shows that the populist discourse surrounding immigrants supports an exclusionary perspective.

6.2 Discussion

This research intends to contribute to scientific knowledge on the populist framing of immigrants in integration policy, a subject of inquiry that has received little attention despite the growing presence of populism in politics and society. This study fills a gap in the existing literature by examining the shifting nature of populist frames in integration policy over the last six decades. It has provided the possibility to identify major trends and turning points in the evolution of Dutch integration policy by evaluating changes in the framing of immigrants in these policies.

The present study offers the possibility to evaluate the thesis about the existing scientific literature. According to Scholten (2011), the Netherlands has been recognised for its multicultural approach to integrating immigrants, which is characterised by an inclination to establish cultural diversity as a formal system in the conviction that the cultural liberation of immigrants is essential to their assimilation into Dutch society. Given the goal of this thesis, it is difficult to wholeheartedly concur with this assertion, because it appears that multiculturalism has never existed. The so-called Dutch multicultural model refers to a set of measures developed in the 1980s with the stated goal of safeguarding cultural differences between the host

community and newly arrived individuals (Scholten, 2013). This strategy included offering dual citizenship programs and financial aid to support the initiatives of minority organizations (Ossewaarde, 2014). However, integrating with maintaining cultural identity was opposed early on, as policymakers advocate for their assimilation by emphasising the incapability of immigrants' culture and religion to the Dutch norms and values. Policy periods as early as the 1980s even indicate notions of Islamist-centred threat nexus, in which the family customs and practices, including family dynamics, are heavily contested. This observation also makes it challenging to concur with Scholten's assertion that the portrayal of a multicultural society will also appeal to principles like cultural equality and fairness, which in practice reinforces ethnic cleavages and segregation.

Furthermore, Brubaker's (2001) research on migration discourse in France, with which this thesis is considerably aligned, highlights the renewed focus on assimilation. After all, this thesis led to the discovery that migration policies in the Netherlands experienced a shift from promoting cultural diversity to the perseverance and strengthening of national culture and a shared national identity. However, there is one important contrast to be made between the Netherlands and France. Brubaker contends that France has been associated with a stronger assimilationist tradition because of its historical practice of transforming immigrants into French citizens through a melting pot metaphor. This trend of the integration model has taken centre stage after 2007, in which this framing switched the attention to discussions about the wearing of burqas, creating a state-sponsored debate about national identity. One notable development was banning religious symbols in public spaces, such as the controversial prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf in schools, which some regarded as a reflection of the perceived failure of assimilation

Lastly, similar to this thesis, Slootman's (2018) research on the evolving discourse on integration in the Netherlands investigates the culturalist approach. This viewpoint entails the combination of imposing assimilation demands on immigrants and the perspective that portrays Islam as incompatible with Dutch citizenship. Slootman (2018) also indicates that this development parallels the rise of the populist radical right, in which the Moroccan Dutch, who have Muslim ancestors, have been the principal target. However, this thesis goes a bit further by demonstrating not only the culturalist tone of immigrant discourse but also the economic, security and criminal discourse.

6.3 Implications and Recommendations

Second, this study aids in the understanding of the larger phenomena of populist framing of immigration and integration policies, which has become increasingly common in many European countries in recent years. Examining the policies helps in understanding the overall effect of right-wing populism on integration policy as well as the significant variance within the integration policy sector. The findings support the notion that diverse political events influence integration policies as well as the success of radical right populism.

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Since this study contributes to the understanding of populism and its impact on policy-making, the decisions made by policymakers will influence how immigrants are perceived. In other words, this assumption suggests that the more power populists gain, the more similar view of immigrants prevails in society. Moreover, as these parties gain more power and promote an ethnic homogenous society through their policies, could lead to the exclusion of foreigners from society and a restriction of their freedom and rights. This phenomenon has the potential to undermine the basic foundations of today's liberal democracies (Wodak et al., 2013, p.268).

This study's findings emphasise the significance of policymakers being aware of the effect of populist framing, and why exclusionary policies may result in social exclusion and marginalisation. It is therefore suggested that policymakers may need to prioritize inclusive policies that facilitate immigrants' full involvement in Dutch society. In addition, it may also be worthwhile to incorporate immigrants' opinions and perspectives throughout the policymaking process. This can result in more responsive and effective policies that address the true requirements and concerns of immigrants.

Finally, this study enables new directions of research. First, future research could focus on a comparative analysis, which may provide insights into how policies are implemented in various countries and contexts. This enables researchers to find patterns, trends and evaluate policies in a variety of contexts by comparing and contrasting different policies. Another proposal for future research is to explore how political leaders, media coverage and public opinion interact. This study may entail a combination of methods of qualitative and quantitative data to investigate how political leaders can change public opinion through populist framing and how media coverage impacts the spread and adoption of populist communication.

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