

**Team Europe: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of European Norm
Formation and Integration Theories**

by

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Abstract

The development initiative Team Europe, founded initially as a response to Covid-19, is one of the latest institutions of the European Union. Beyond responding to Covid-19, the EU intends to permanently incorporate TE to coordinate foreign development actions. This thesis explores the complex dynamics of norm formation and the integration process of Team Europe within the theoretical context of European integration. Theoretical constructs such as norms diffusion and three leading European integration theories form the research foundation to form competing hypotheses. By analysing the applicability and explanatory capacity of three European integration theories -Neo-Functionalism, New Intergovernmentalism, and Discursive Institutionalism- this research seeks to further the theoretical understanding of European integration and illuminate Team Europe's norm formation. Based on three exemplary countries -Sweden, Germany and France- discourse analysis was used as the primary research methodology to analyse the countries' normative meaning around fundamental norms and related issue areas. While not finding conclusive evidence to reject or accept one integration theory, the thesis brought to light some interesting findings. The results of this thesis indicate that there is only minimal normative overlap between France's foreign policy, which is centred on connections with its former colonies, and the universalist approach inspired by feminist foreign policy by Germany and Sweden. This corresponds most closely to New Intergovernmentalism. This finding adds to research around European institutions as it adds to the academic discussion of the different European integration theories while also raising questions of whether development aid is driven more by interests or ideas.

Keywords: European Union, Team Europe, norm diffusion, European integration, development aid

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific
AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French context)
AFD	Alternative für Deutschland (German context)
AU	African Union
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union
DAC	Development assistance committee
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
IOs	International organizations
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersexual
MP	Member of Parliament
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
RN	Rassemblement National
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland
TE	Team Europe
TEI	Team Europe Initiatives
TEU	Treaty on Europe
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

Team Europe: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of European Norm Formation and Integration Theories

1. Introduction

1.1 Team Europe: The European Union's New Approach to Official Development Assistance

The Covid-19 pandemic challenged the European Union's (EU) existing institutions and therefore contributed to accelerating the development of new institutions and organizational instruments. The pandemic marks a significant point in global development, extending from an international health emergency to a more significant social, economic, and political disaster (Burni et al., 2022). On January 28, 2020, the Council of Europe activated the integrated political crisis response mechanism, the first coordinated response to Covid-19, which functioned as a short-term tool to coordinate the political reaction to big cross-sectoral and complex crises (Goniewicz et al., 2020). Besides this, another new instrument or approach, "Team Europe" (TE), was developed in this decisive circumstance. TE, which was started in April 2020, is a unified effort to give short-term funding during the epidemic (Keijzer et al., 2021) and was envisioned as an alternative to governments focusing on their countries' pandemic relief above finding a comprehensive European and global solution (Burni et al., 2022). The EU's actions were represented as a unified framework of action, bringing together resources from all internal EU bodies, EU member countries, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Keijzer et al., 2021). Beyond the reaction to the Covid-19 outbreak, the EU plans to permanently integrate the strategy to strengthen the coordination of actions. This development towards being a permanent approach rather than just a Covid-19 response is titled a "moving target" by Keijzer et al. (2021, p.1). TE seeks to improve the effectiveness

and impact of the EU's development assistance by gathering various European parties involved in development cooperation (Team Europe Initiatives, 2022). Titled Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs), 168 large-scale projects are currently executed to provide tangible, transformative effects in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, the European neighbourhood and Africa (Team Europe, n.d.). As the TE development approach is a project targeted to change how European nations conduct development aid together, further research is needed to assess this new player's characteristics in the development assistance world. This new powerful entity aims to promote European norms while protecting its interests (Team Europe, n.d.). As the EU is a "norm community consisting of actors that share expectations about appropriate behaviour as well as norms that define this understanding of appropriateness" (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 83), the focus on norms in development assistance will be the focus of this thesis. Hence, this research will focus on TE's norm formation, specifically, how the national norms are integrated into the broader institutional framework. As TE was founded in 2020, there is no research on that specific topic yet, making it a valuable addition to European Studies and International Relations. In the following section, the research question will be described. Furthermore, the relevance of such research will be highlighted.

1.2 Research Question

In order to comprehend the norm formation process, this thesis utilizes three theories of European integration and applies them to the norm formation of TE. For their popularity and academic recognition the theories of Neo-Functionalism and New Intergovernmentalism were selected. Additionally, Discursive Institutionalism was chosen. For each of these theories, competing hypotheses were formulated to identify patterns in qualitative data. In order to find data, a discourse analysis of national norms was conducted to find normative

overlap between national normative meanings. Further specifications of the research question will be made in the method section of this thesis. For these reasons following research question was formulated:

RQ: To what extent does discourse analysis support the theory of Neo-Functionalism, New Intergovernmentalism, or Discursive Institutionalism and explain the norm integration process of Team Europe?

1.3 Relevance of Research

In explanations of global politics, norms were framed as an alternative to rationalist and materialist factors (Hoffmann, 2010). This is especially true for the EU, which wants to identify itself as a superpower whose impact is based on its ability to develop laws or behavioural norms with a global appeal rather than its forces of arms (Cohen-Tanugi, 2021). Another development program of the EU, the European Neighborhood Policy, was criticized for its hard conditionality for the assistance of European values and norms (Haglund-Morrissey, 2007). Considering such a criticized policy, there would be intrinsic value to conducting research about the norm formation and the promotion of this norm. By analysing their relevance and explanatory power in the context of norm creation and the integration process of TE, this thesis adds to the academic understanding of European integration theories. Understanding the dynamic of norm formation behind TE may assist in understanding TEs, institutional design, and future policy decisions.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Norms in a European Context

The primary variable in this thesis will be normative values or, specifically, *norms*. According to Manners, the EU is a *normative power* that differentiates it from other global powers because its external actions are normative and support normative ideals (Manners, 2008). Due to its unique historical development, hybrid polity, and constitutional arrangements, the EU has a unique fundament for its foreign policy (Manners, 2002). Norms and values are the underlying fabric that makes up a political order. "Any political order depends on social recognition by its citizens, i.e. those who agreed, in principle, to be governed by specific rules, norms and principals" (Wiener, 2008, p.26). The EU has several core norms that make up its institutional identity and which they project on the global order and change how non-members perceive normality (Damro, 2012). According to Manner, the projection techniques that the "Normative Power Europe" uses to exert power are "contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter" (Damro, 2012, p.684). Damro (2012) adds to this by giving instances of how the EU used coercion in addition to the non-coercive methods outlined by Manners to change the behaviour of other actors. In sectors where responsibility is shared, such as the environment, the EU's normative policy was most impactful on a global level (Laïdi, 2008). As a non-state actor, Europe has a genuine interest in ensuring that standards govern international interactions, especially over *realpolitik* (Laïdi, 2008).

In International Relations literature, several definitions of "norms" were developed by different scholars. According to Wiener, the most common definition of norms is "to describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity" (Wiener, 2008 cites Katzenstein 1996, p.5). Another definition given by Laïdi (2008, p. 3) describes norms as a "freely accepted process of harmonization of actors' preferences in order to

advance common interests by strictly adhering to a certain number of rules". This concept can be applied to a normative power such as the EU. Thus, it is an entity with normative authority that advocates for universally applicable norms of interstate conduct and supranational organizations as the foundation of its identity and strategic policy. Laïdi (2008) names three essential characteristics to be defined as a normative power: the norms were negotiated rather than imposed; international bodies equally legitimated them; and they can be invoked and enforced by every member of the international polity irrespective of their position within it.

When reading official documents or any publications of the EU, the concept of "European Values" is a reoccurring formulation. Since this text often features the term "norm", it will be necessary to differentiate between norms and values. According to Wiener (2008), norms are broadly accepted and may be applied to other actors, whereas values are held individually. Norms also have a structural role as they are shared prescriptions and have to be applied to others. Hence, when promoted to other actors, its values may become norms. For example, this may be applied to TE's conditional expectations as a donor organization to their recipient country. The EU may also be perceived as a norm-maker, defined as an agent who has a solid commitment to a certain standard or collection of norms and a desire to advocate for these norms to bring about normative change (Björkdahl, 2012).

In this context, TE is the vehicle for norm advocacy with the ability to influence others' normative beliefs. Norm followers or norm-taker are actors that get norms transferred to them by norm-makers. The norm-taker should not be viewed as a passive participant in the norm-adoption process but rather as influential and accountable for picking the norms and establishing normative compatibility between both the transferred norms and the local normative environment (Björkdahl, 2012). The norm-maker is the focus of norm export, which provides a successful norm-guided governance model that norm-takers can replicate (Börzel & Risse, 2012). The norm-taker can also actively reject a norm (Lenz, 2012). The EU

stipulates that the target countries must accept its norms to get benefits. (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2019). This conditionality makes it hard to call norms "freely accepted," as described by Laïdi (2008) and may even be called cohesive if rejection may cause the blockade of development assistance. A norm-taker who has recovered from a crisis, conflict, or other sorts of shock or systemic change is more receptive to norm dissemination, with norm-maker countries providing material or immaterial incentives (Björkdahl, 2012). As TE was primarily envisioned as a response to the Covid-19 crisis, it seems that norm export to countries devastated by the aftermath of the pandemic might be more accessible.

Another characteristic of norms is their contestation since there is often discussion over fundamental norms such as human rights (Wiener, 2008). The ability to contest norms makes them different from facts. Norms can be disputed between a norm-maker and a norm-taker in negotiation. The extent of the relationship between norms-maker and norm-taker is characterized by Johnston (2001) who considers the purpose of diplomatic negotiations as "the socialization of others to accept in an axiomatic way novel understanding about world politics" (p. 489). The long-term viability of the EU as a normative power or norm-maker in the context of its external global environment remains unclear, as the EU and its internal market's relative economic and demographic weight declines in comparison to the emergence of big developing nations spearheaded by China and India (Cohen-Tanugi, 2021).

Even though the norms of the EU might not be the same as the norms promoted by TE, they have to be considered. According to Wiener (2008), the EU (together with the World Trade Organisation) has benefited from its mature legal framework with evolving core rules, organizing principles, and interaction standards, i.e. norms. The EU-endorsed norms as a collection of normative standards are commonly accepted as universally applicable inside the United Nations complex regime (Manners, 2008). Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, and the entirety of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is the regulatory framework of the EU that

establishes the norms of the EU. The EU "shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

Following the logic of Hall (1993) that norms and paradigms inform broader policy programs and individual policy TE norms can be analysed within the broader European norms as defined before. Team Europe categorizes its policy programs into different priorities (Team Europe, n.d.), which can be related to fundamental norms as described by Wiener (2008).

Looking at the fabric, the underlying paradigms and norms of the different policies, it seems that there is a huge focus on policies that establish fundamental norms closely related to European values such as human rights, democracy, rule of law. There are also initiatives related to migration which are related to the fundamental norm of citizenship. Another large quantity of policy initiative is dedicated to Environmental topics which, through "sustainable development", is also indicated as a European value. However, since environmental topics became more prevalent since the Treaty of Lisbon, they are also much more prevalent as a norm that is promoted through development aid.

2.2 The Conceptualization of Official Development Assistance

Another key concept that has to be explored in order to answer the research questions is *Official Development Assistance* (ODA). To lay the groundwork for defining ODA, it is essential to distinguish it from foreign aid and development assistance, which are related but have different definitions. Foreign aid generally has been defined as "all resources—physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or loans (at concessional rates)—transferred by donors to recipients" (Riddell, 2007, p. 17). The Development

Assistance Committee (DAC), an institution of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), provides a generally accepted framework for defining ODA (Riddell, 2007). Several member states of the EU are members of the DAC. Therefore, the OECD definition of ODA will be utilized for this research. According to the OECD (n.d.) ODA is "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries". The definition and criteria of ODA are established by the donor country providing it, according to Riddell (2007). In relation to norm transfer, it might be assumed that states that provide ODA are usually norm-makers. ODA refers to the flow of assistance to nations, and "multilateral development institutions" give aid that is provided "by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies" and have to be "concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective" OECD (n.d.). Governmental bodies' conditional involvement in providing development assistance makes ODA different from common development assistance. Additionally, other forms of foreign aid, such as Chinese external assistance, do not qualify as ODA, according to Bräutigam (2011). However, the impact of competitive development assistance cannot be overstated since the global competition with states like China, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, has led the EU to adopt a more practical and interest-driven development assistance approach (Burni et al., 2021).

TE is a multilateral approach to ODA which facilitates various advantages over bilateral ODA with the trade-off of less control (Kiratli, 2018). Countries of the EU are the largest provider of ODA, contributing \$81.250 million in 2021, accounting for nearly half of all ODA globally (BMZ, 2022). To link its foreign development policy with international commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals, the EU heavily focused on poverty reduction and human development since the turn of the millennium (Burni et al.,

2021). Due to the increase in migration flow caused by the migration crisis, the focus of ODA shifted towards areas that hosted refugees (Knoll et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the norms entailed in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals remain at the heart of the EU's foreign development action (Burni et al., 2021).

2.3 Norm Formation in the EU

The concept of the terminology of norms was illustrated in the previous section of this thesis. The concept of European values was explored, as which norms the EU has formally declared as their norms in their treaties. In this section leading and competing theories of norm formation by Buzan and Checkel are described and applied to TE to provide a theoretical explanation for norm diffusion.

2.3.1 Barry Buzan on Norm Formation

In his 2004 Book "From International to World Society," Buzan (2004) illustrates how the contemporary English School of International Relations transforms from the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states into a transnational community beyond the nation-state with shared values and norms. According to Buzan (2004), values can arrive through different means: conceive means (imposing values by force), cosmopolitan (development of values on individual levels) and Kantian (development of shared values via states). For the development of international societies, it is essential to know how these values developed and how they are held in place. Although values might arrive and be held through coercive means, Buzan (2004) questions the legitimacy of those values if they are held through duress. Buzan (2004, p. 106) also argues that the Western international society "involved a good deal of coercive imposition of a Western standard". This goes far as self-understanding Western states as the international community and titling Western values as

"universal values". Contrary to this viewpoint, some Western values are contested outside of the Western states. An example is the Western view of Human Rights which are seen as legitimate by a substantial part of international society but might be contested by others. Buzan applies this to conditional loans to recipient states by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This also applies to TE since their loans also function under conditional standards and can be used to transfer norms. While not being seen as cohesive, the withdrawal of ODA might fall under cohesive means.

Buzan (2004) argues that through a historical lens, using classical Greece and modern Europe as an example, a shared culture seems essential for an international society. The feudal system of medieval Europe, for example, was structured by the overarching institution and shared values of Christianity. A void of a shared identity, therefore, can hamper the formation of an international society. Another factor for norm formation and a prerequisite for forming a shared identity is coexistence between states. In pluralistic thinking, states coexist in an environment, and the second stage of cooperation is reached when "a consensus has been reached about a wide range of objectives", which goes beyond mere coexistence (Buzan, 2004, p. 144). Cooperation is possible when countering common threats such as global environmental dangers. In the vain of common global dangers, transnational alliances can be formed. To move to the realm of solidarity, there is, according to Buzan, more necessary than rallying behind a common issue. It needs what he describes as a "we feeling" (p.147). This "we feeling" is associated with a "package of values" that goes beyond associating to the same kind of civilisation but "includes a substantial degree of convergence in the norms, rules, institutions and goals of the states concerned" (p.147). According to Buzan (2004) the result of an exchange of norms, rules, institutions and goals would be a transition of like-minded nations to build a shared identity with each other. The second principle to advance into solidarity is that nations cooperate in joint projects in pursuit of

shared values. This can be applied to TE through the lens of Intergovernmentalism since joint development projects that are value-driven might deepen European integration. This raises the problems of enforcement and the coercion that importing values might bring with it. However, for building a global international community it remains a necessity to focus on building a feeling of global citizenship among individuals.

Norms in the Westphalian system of Nation States were primarily about state action, such as the concept of non-interference that prevents states from meddling in other states' affairs. However, as international relations progressed, norms expanded to encompass individual and community behaviour, such as human rights and environmental protection. There are several norms that are central towards the formation of a world society which Buzan (2004) titles "institutions", such as democracy, the rule of law and increasing environmental protection. These "institutions" are reflected in IOs such as the United Nations but also in non-governmental transnational actors. According to Buzan (2004), the creation of a shared set of norms and values has fostered a sense of community and shared identity among individuals and societies worldwide.

The core element of norm formation, according to Buzan, is forming a shared identity that reflects shared beliefs and norms. TE, as a transnational institution's norm formation, would consist of the shared values of its member states. These norms, which build a shared identity, developed slowly through proximity and through the coexistence of those states, which also include non-EU members. These states were part of and coexisted in the Westphalian system of nation-states. Early on, they cooperated on different values, which nudged them into developing a shared identity. Norm formation for TE would result from an ever-evolving long process of coexistence and cooperation between states that built a shared understanding of shared norms.

2.3.2 Jeffrey Checkel on Norm Formation

The social scientist Jeffrey Checkel holds different views on the EU's norm formation and the EU's normative influence. Checkel (2005) emphasized that the EU stands out from other supranational organizations due to its high level of integration, degree of a democratic community, and power sharing. While Buzan (2004) sees the norm formation of the EU as a process in that nation-states play the main part and develop through coexistence, cooperation and, finally, a collective identity with shared norms, Checkel (2005) prescribes the EU and its institutions itself a much larger and active role in shaping norms. According to Zürn and Checkel (2005), international institutions trigger socialization between states. He defines diffusion of norms as the "transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another" (Checkel, 1999, p. 86) is more likely if the exported norms match with historically constructed and national norms. The EU as an institution shapes (European) norms within the EU's member states and also exerts influence on other nations beyond the EU. As an example, Checkel (1999) explains that after the desolation of the Soviet Union, scholars predicted that the Germans would correspond to aggressive actions of Germany reclaiming their national pride. While not finding sustainable evidence for this notion, Checkel (1999) argues that while Germany is increasingly hesitant to be a "Good European Citizen" (p.108), it might be tamed through membership in the Council of Europe. This argument supports Checkel's notion that national norms are shaped or triggered by IOs. Another example Checkel (2001) brings forward is the case of norm import from the EU to Ukraine and which factors influence compliance with these norms. Here the EU's normative influence outside of the ranks of its member states gets clarified. Naturally, since this text was written in 2001, the example of Ukraine is outdated. The norm transfer might be accelerated due to the recent invasion of Russia and the EU's support. Here he also clarifies how norms get transferred by intergovernmental organizations in the case of

the EU and the "carrot" of EU membership, which could be seen as a cohesive means. An effective socialization process, which he describes as an actor's transition from a logic of consequences to an appropriateness logic, is what leads to the acceptance of norms (Checkel, 2005). While highlighting that the rational argument of norm compliance is somewhat underdeveloped, Checkel (2001) argues that the "Council of Europe" norm compliance is a cost-benefit decision-making process where national agents weigh potential upsides (material or societal) with the fear of penalties. Compliance with the norms, in this case, would be a strategic choice to reach a specific goal. The internalization of norms is not possible as the behaviour which is triggered is due to rational thinking rather than a shift in internal values and identity (Checkel, 2005). This "compliance from a logic of consequences" is changed to "a logic of appropriateness" when the actor is following norms that are seen as legitimate (Checkel, 2005, p.804). Although states act appropriately, Checkel (2005) illustrates that there could be many reasons for appropriate behaviour, which he divides into Type 1 and Type 2 behaviour. Type 1 behaviour describes states playing a role which means that nation-state actors can "act properly" by learning to play a part and gaining the information necessary to do so, regardless of whether they enjoy or agree with the rules they play by (Checkel, 2005). While this act might still be similar to a "logic of consequences" the nation-state would shift to "conscious role-playing". Conscious role-playing leads to the actor's behaviour being less calculating and to be more reflexive, which is the main difference between these two distinctions. According to Checkel (2005), when there is extensive interaction and exchange between small groups that lasts throughout an extended period of time, a shift in the internal belief system is achievable. Type II internalization of norms goes further than just playing a part suggests that nation-states embrace social or institutional standards as "the right thing to do" (Checkel, 2005, p.804). In Type II, the interests and preferences of the actors are open for redefinition if the norm setter can successfully convince

the norm follower, which will lead to the reflective and active internalization of the logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005). Type II internalization might be easier to achieve if (1) the focus of the socialization effort is in a new and uncharted setting, which cognitively motivates them to assess new knowledge, (2) the target has few entrenched views from the past that are at odds with the message of the socializing agency (3) rather than lecturing or making demands, the socializing agent or person instead exemplifies the virtues of serious deliberative reasoning (Checkel, 2015). Both Type I and Type 2 internalization imply a step away from the logic of consequences and encapsulate key facets of the socialization processes seen in modern Europe. This social learning process that Checkel describes might lead to changes in member state candidates' identities as they develop to perceive themselves as part of a greater European community of nations rather than as separate players pursuing their own interests. This highlights the influence of norm diffusion the EU as an IOs has on non-member states.

Overall Checkel's view on norm formation and diffusion suggest that the "social learning" process plays a huge part and leads to changes in a nation-state's identity. Besides Buzan (2004), who maintains that national states' identity grows closer together through proximity, he highlights the importance of IOs in diffusing norms inside its sphere of influence. This socialization process applies to institutions outside of the EU, such as Ukraine and within the EU, such as Germany. He sees that increasingly through the social learning process, states can move from a "logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness" which might change state identity (Checkel, 2005, p.804). States that have successfully socialized and internalized norms might develop to perceive themselves as part of a greater European community instead of as separate players pursuing their interests.

Table 1*Comparative illustration of Buzan`s and Checkel`s theories of norm formation*

	Barry Buzan	Jeffrey Checkel
Role of the EU in norm diffusion	Rather passive	Active pursuit of norm diffusion by the EU
Most prominent mean of norm diffusion	Conceive means (imposing values by force); cosmopolitan (development of values on individual levels); Kantian (development of shared values via states)	Socialization (social learning process), logic of consequences shifts to logic of appropriateness
Duration of norm diffusion	Very long since a shared identity has to be formed	As long as socialization process takes place and the logic of consequences shifts to a logic of appropriateness
When are norms internalized?	When an "we feeling" is reached among the states, ever evolving process	Type II: appropriate behaviour following a norm is natural and "the right thing to do"

2.4 Integration Theory

TE as an institution is an outcome of European integration. Therefore, exploring TE's norms formation process it is necessary to illuminate how the norm integration was achieved. Two "grand theories" in European integration literature explain the process of European integration towards forming the modern EU: Neo-Functionalism and intergovernmentalism (Moga, 2009, p. 802). Additionally, Discursive Institutionalism is an addition to the theories of European integration, which will be elaborated. As TE, as an institution, is an outcome of European Integration exploring TE's norms formation process, it is necessary to illuminate how the norm integration was achieved. In previous sections, it was established that norm transfer is achieved through negotiation; in that context, TE would be the norm-taker. Furthermore, different theories of norm formation were explored. Hence, it is vital to understand how norms are transferred and who the norm-makers are.

2.4.1 *New Intergovernmentalism*

The term *New Intergovernmentalism* refers to a theoretical framework that has evolved in the field of Political Science and International Affairs, specifically in the study of EU integration. The framework of New Intergovernmentalism challenges the traditional concept of supranationalism, where supranational organizations such as the EU can override national governments (Bickerton et al., 2015). Bickerton (2015) describes these actions as "avoiding supranational decision-making". This suggests that the EU is not an independent organization that can act independently of the extensive influence of its member states. National politicians remain the drivers of decision-making on a European level in constant pursuit of consensus and cooperative decision-making, avoiding empowering supranational

actors (Csehi & Puetter, 2021). Bickerton et al. (2015) argue that the concept of New intergovernmentalism arose in the post-Maastricht era, when the EU began to turn toward a more intergovernmental style of governance by the nation-states within the complex framework of decision-making organs of the EU. In comparison to earlier forms of intergovernmentalism, New Intergovernmentalism emphasizes national interests, bargaining and negotiation among member states, and the importance of informal networks and alliances (e.g. local constituents) (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hodson & Puetter, 2019). In these informal networks, high-level lawmakers and technocratic leaders are connected through policy discussion as a working method (Csehi & Puetter, 2021). Another differentiating factor of New Intergovernmentalism is that it sees that integration in Europe has accelerated due to a "persistence state of disequilibrium" and changed substantially rather than stalled during the post-Maastricht period (Hodson & Puetter, 2019, p.1157). While other forms (old forms) of Intergovernmentalism have believed that the Council's interest-based bargaining procedure is all about pursuing authority and the interests of the nation at large New Intergovernmentalists insist that it is necessary to comprehend the Council's decision-making after the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s in terms of member states attempting to reach common agreements through discussion (Schmidt, 2016). The emphasis on commitment is featured in the makeup of the most influential EU institutions rather than just an informal norm (Csehi & Puetter, 2021). Schmidt (2016) cites Merkel's involvement in creating the narrative of excessive public debt and her insistence that, as a consequence, the provisions of the Stability and

Growth Pact had to be bolstered in exchange for any bailout in the Eurozone crisis as an example of common agreements. Other varieties of Intergovernmentalism may focus more on other aspects, such as institutional architecture, legal frameworks, or the involvement of non-state players in decision-making. *Liberal Intergovernmentalism* is one other intergovernmental approach to European integration, which, similar to New Intergovernmentalism, puts national preferences and member countries at the centre of decision-making in the EU (Moravcsik, 1998) but does not emphasize the pursuit of consensus. New intergovernmentalism views state conduct and relations within the EU as more nuanced and multifaceted and highlights the importance of informal networks and bargaining among member countries, and contends that decision-making in the EU is impacted by variables other than state preferences, such as power dynamics and institutional architecture (Hodson & Puetter, 2019).

Since the era after the Maastricht Treaty, the delegation of power has been to de novo entities rather than to traditional supranational institutions (Bickerton et al., 2015). Bickerton et al. (2015) understand de novo institutions as organizations that were established in contemporary times, which frequently have a great deal of autonomy in terms of administrative or legislative authority as well as some degree of control over their own financial resources. De novo institutions carry out tasks that the European Commission could have handled and frequently have methods for member state participation as part of their governance framework.

There is some concern voiced by scholars about New Intergovernmentalism. Schmidt (2016) argues that all new integration theories, such as New Intergovernmentalism, have solely emphasized the EU level and ignored the impact on the national level. National democracy and legitimacy may be threatened by the very nature of EU governance, where decisions that were previously made at the national level are now made at the supranational level, which is especially true in policy areas where people feel powerless to affect EU decisions (Schmidt, 2016). This criticism is relativized by Hodson & Puetter (2019), who argue that challenger parties who generally challenge the legitimacy of the EU, although their number rose, have typically not been empowered by their Euroscepticism and remained in opposition to national governments. Almost all EU administrations, which are predominantly formed by mainstream political parties, are normatively committed to consensus and believe that the departure of crucial voters from the centre to challenger parties can be attributed in large part to the dedication to EU consensus-making (Csehi & Puetter, 2021). Challenger governments such as the Fidesz Party in Hungary have limited their opposition generally on specific fundamental European values and particularly on specific policies while openly supporting their ongoing EU participation.

Overall, applied to TE, this would imply that the creation of the TE approach was shaped by negotiations in which national politicians sought consensus. The national discourse would deviate far from the final normative meaning of TE's policies and would be different among the member states. TE might be seen as a *de novo* institution. To support this notion,

TE should carry out tasks which were predominately the responsibility of supranational institutions such as the Council of Europe, a high degree of autonomy and facilitate nation-states to participate in their internal decision-making.

2.4.2 *Neo-Functionalism*

Neo-Functionalism, another competing theory of European integration, originated as a theoretical framework in the 1950s and 1960s as researchers tried to explain the rapid rate of economic integration occurring through the European Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the EU over time. The original article that laid out the concept of functionalism was by Ernst Haas in 1958, who thought of a contrasting theory of integration to the intergovernmental one, which is, according to him, a more traditional approach (Rosamund, 2000; Niemann, 2020). The premise of Neo-Functionalism is that economic integration (within the EU) leads to a progressive shift of authority and influence from national governments to supranational organisations with Neo-Functionalism (Haas, 1961). This progressive shift is described as a "spill over effect" and includes integration across policy sectors; national and supranational elites with vested interests recognise the benefits of regional policies and their experiences in joint decision-making (Niemann, 2020). Assumptions of the "spill over effect" is that sectors are interdependent, which makes isolated integration impossible and would lead to integration in close sectors (Niemann, 2020). States would lose some of their functional autonomy over time to supranational institutions of the EU when the integration process progressed further (Niemann, 2020). Similarly, to New

Intergovernmentalism, national economic and political elites play their part in integration as they realise that problems cannot be addressed by domestic politics and their subsequent support of further European sectorial integration (Niemann, 2020). These elites may eventually adopt a European perspective on problem-solving, and their allegiance to a national as opposed to a supranational level of administration may change (Cini & Borragán, 2016). These elites could organise in informal transnational networks adding pressure to integration. This high reliance on elites is undermined by the emergence of challenger parties (Cini & Borragán, 2016). Besides elites, Neo-Functionalist perceives that transnational interest groups that have undergone Europeanization will become active members of the European community and press their governments for greater European integration (Cini & Borragán, 2016). Neo-Functionalism was envisioned as the community of nation-states transcending into the procedural system of a single national state, a stage beyond nationhood (Rosamund, 2000).

There are several basic assumptions that reaffirm the concept of Neo-Functionalism. States are not the only predominant actors in the global order and lose part of their autonomy in their integration (Rosamund, 2000). The loss of autonomy, i.e. national sovereignty, is a crucial assumption of a Neo-Functionalist account of European integration since it enables supranational entities to address shared policy issues more effectively and efficiently (Rosamund, 2000). Neo-Functionalism predicts the emergence of supranational organisations with independent agendas, which will eventually lead to the supranational agendas

triumphing over national agendas (Cini & Borragán, 2016). Originally the spillover process and consecutive integration were to be seen automatically, which was revised in later publications and is now seen as the result of both dynamics (driving forces) and opposing forces that take place under specific circumstances (Niemann, 2020). Even Haas brought up the notion of the "spillback", which would disintegrate European sectors (Cini & Borragán, 2016).

Neo-Functionalism has attracted much criticism and alternative theories, such as (Liberal) Intergovernmental (Niemann, 2020). Moravcsik (1998) has provided a critical rebuttal of Neo-Functionalism in his book "The Choice for Europe". According to Moravcsik, Neo-Functionalism ignores the significance of national preferences in the European integration process. Moravcsik (1998) argues that the most significant actors in the European integration process are nation-states, and their actions are primarily motivated by national interests. Neo-Functionalism, according to Moravcsik (1998), also ignores the significance of power politics in the (European) integration process, which is apparent when larger and more powerful states within the EU frequently have more significant influence over the implementation of integration processes.

Applied Neo-Functionalism provides a different explanation of the norm formation process of TE. The spill over effect would indicate that policy area after policy area falls under the influence of European integration. According to Koenig-Archibugi (2002), foreign and security policy areas in that member states were traditionally reluctant to give up power.

Therefore, the creation of TE would symbolise a high degree of internationalisation in Europe if even these policy areas were integrated and had a common outlet. Since its initial objective was to take on the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, TE is the result of spillover since its functional focus has changed to a broad distribution of aid in other development aid areas.

2.4.3 Discursive Institutionalism

Discursive Institutionalism, which was developed by the political scientist Vivian Schmidt, is a theoretical approach that explains European integration and institutional change. According to Schmidt (2008), Institutions are influenced by discourses around different norms and ideas. Other than previous theories of integration, Discursive Institutionalism is a more active perspective on integration, where common ideas and dialogue triumph over barriers of "more equilibrium-focused and static theories" (Schmidt, 2011, p.304). The interactive process of discourse is, in the view of Discursive Institutionalism scholars and "carrier of ideas" and is used within institutional frameworks to legitimize ideas (Schmidt, 2010, p.21). Discourse about policy formulation and the communication of political ideas takes place in the "public sphere" and is central to every kind of democratic governance (Schmidt, 2000).

Discursive Institutionalism offers a framework for understanding how the interaction of national and European discourse is influencing the process of European integration. Schmidt (2000) asserts that in order to respond to issues on a European or global scale, national governments in Europe must continually legitimize institutional and economic

policies. There are four ways (functions) in which institutional change, and therefore integration, can be legitimized along two dimensions: by discourse (1) ideationally, by outlining a policy program that is logically coherent (cognitive function) and that is consistent with national norms (normative function); interactively (2), by providing (policy) elites with the framework for creating a policy program (coordinative function) and convincing the general public of its benefits (communicative function) (Schmidt, 2000).

Political scientists frequently distinguish between the policy sphere and the political sphere.

In the policy sphere, interaction, as part of a "coordinative discourse", between actors that formulate policy happens. In the political sphere, "communicative discourse" between participants of the political community and the general public takes place to create appropriateness for legislation (Schmidt, 2012). As illustrated before, this discourse in the political sphere often takes place between elites and the public. The direction in which ideas transfer is titled "arrows of discursive interaction" by Schmidt (2012, p.8). Ideas are championed by "idea entrepreneurs" who pull from and articulate the ideas of discursive groups and alliances, acting as change agents (Schmidt, 2008). The arrow frequently points downward, signifying that elites "mediate" public discourse by communicating "master discourse" a comprehensive political agenda that offers a "vision" of the status quo of the polity and what is planned for the future (Schmidt, 2012, p.8). The discourse is, in this scenario, often used to achieve the appropriateness of a given policy. The discourse is frequently mediated or even framed through mass media and possibly through social media in

contemporary times. Nevertheless, in the discursive exchanges of advocates for social topics, and conservationists in local, national, and foreign contexts, the arrows can also go from the bottom up (Schmidt, 2012). On the other hand, in coordinative policy, which takes place in the policy sphere, ideas remain in closed debates as the public might not approve them or when the debate is technically too specific and the public may not be understand them, which is according to Schmidt (2013) often the case in the EU. As an example, Schmidt (2013) points out the technical specification of the eurozone crisis response, which would be difficult to communicate to the public.

Discursive Institutionalism provides a perspective on European integration that differs from the others described in this thesis. Discursive conflicts between EU member states, EU agencies, and the public have impacted the creation of EU policies and it's institutions in the framework of European integration. Therefore, TE would also be impacted by the discourse of these institutions. Discourse is also what shapes the underlying norms of institutions in a European context (Schmidt, 2008). Countries that make up TE might have different views of the values that foreign development aid should entail, which might play a role in coordinating policy between European member states. When legitimizing the TE to their constituents (top-down), politicians might focus on national values promoted through ODA to create appropriateness for TE. For example, countries with a strong focus on environmentalism might communicate that TE is primarily involved in preserving nature and green infrastructure to persuade their voters.

Table 2

Comparative illustration of New Intergovernmentalism, Neo-Functionalism and Discursive Institutionalism

	New intergovernmentalism	Neo-Functionalism	Discursive Institutionalism
Main Actor	States, domestic politician (National actors: voters, parties, private – public actors)	International organisations, Domestic and transnational groups, States	(Political and economic) elites, idea entrepreneurs, the public
Motivations	National interests, consensus building	Absolut gains, integration through spill- over, solving transnational problems	Distribution of ideas of economic and political nature
Interaction	Discussion, cooperation, minimum standards	Networks (transnational and supranational)	Framing, policy communication (top down, bottom up or sideways), policy coordination
Power	Nation states, elites	Increasingly supranational, transnational elites	Persuading power

Outcomes	Disequilibrium which leads to novo institution	Supranational institutions, programs, integration thought spill-over	Economic- and political policy, institutional change, values and rules
Applied to Team Europe	Integration of TE is based on bargaining between national politicians seeking consensus, National interests and norms of the member states are very different	Integration of TE as “de novo organisation” has been facilitated by supranational interests. National values are less represented but rather reflect supranational norms	Coordination between political elites to implement national values, communication to public to create appropriateness

3. Method

3.1 Framework

This thesis aimed to analyse the dynamics of norm formation of TE. The framework of this thesis is inspired by Wiener (2008), who analysed different norms "behind the written constitution", which function in the daily practices and interactions of political actors, altering their actions and how power is wielded. These norms and ideals are frequently taken for granted and work on a subliminal level, yet they play a decisive role in influencing the results of political processes. The norms, described in documents and laws, on which European institutions are built upon may then be up to interpretation by the member states. The contestation of the meaning of norms is, as a result, a crucial part of democratic governance while also leading to conflict about legitimacy (Wiener, 2008).

Antje Wiener's technique in "The Invisible Constitution of Politics" is multidisciplinary, drawing on ideas from "sociology, foreign policy analysis, anthropology and ethno-methodology" (p. 71). Wiener (2008) employs discourse analysis as a fundamental analytical technique, which entails evaluating the language and narratives used by political players to understand the underlying norms and values that affect their behaviour. To extract normative meaning from data, Wiener (2008) uses "contemporary produced texts" (p.75) such as "parliamentary debates, the media or interview transcripts". Wiener focuses on interviews with individual members of elites from Germany, Britain and a mixed group of German and British individuals that live and work in Brussels. From structured interviews, she derived meaning from their answers. To extract normative meaning, an inductive selection of keywords was used based on references to specific norms. Interviews with a sufficient number of elites in three countries, such as in Wiener (2008), are out of the scope of this thesis. To assure "consistency in qualitative coding across texts coded, with themes and categories acting as yardsticks against which qualitative codes are scored" (Oleinik,

2011, p. 864), this thesis used (other than interviews) the two sides of triangulation. These two sides of the triangulation are fulfilled by: TE official materials and other national sources and TE news coverage. Press articles were gathered from renowned news sources only. Official documents, the second part of triangulation, includes EU and national publications about norms in foreign aid and other forms of development aid protocols of debates, speeches, press releases, Question & Answers and other types of communications. In the following sections, it will be shown how the Wieners approach will be applied to analyse the Norms of TE.

3.2 Theoretical Approach

To analyse national discourse and then theorise how TE was formed and which norms are promoted, an approach has to be chosen from which normative meaning can be extracted. In the following section, it will be argued that analysing national discourse around specific policies can be utilised to extract national normative discourse around policy programmes and paradigms and, therefore, underlying norms.

According to Peter Hall (1993), there are three types or layers of policy that may be distinguished to study the motivations behind state behaviour: policy concepts, policy programs, and policy paradigms. The first layer includes the particular "policy solutions" or policies put forth by decision-makers (Schmidt, 2008). The second layer of policy programs includes broader initiatives that support a general policy idea. Policy programs work to organise individual public policies into carrying out certain responsibilities within a more comprehensive strategy and to define a coherent logic of action directed at a specified goal (Donnelly, 2023). These goals may be reflected by paradigms which in turn are guided by organising assumptions or concepts that shape policy (Hall, 1993). These paradigms, therefore, also encompass the norms of an organisation (Donnelly, 2023), which should also

be reflected in their policy programs and their policies. Regarding institutional change, policies are the most flexible, while paradigms are the most stable. When a crisis undermines institutions and the underlying assumptions, paradigms can shift abruptly and dramatically or gradually as new understandings and institutions emerge, and older ones are gradually replaced, reshaped, and put aside (Donnelly, 2023).

Considering Hall's (1993) distinction of policy, policy programmes and paradigms, it can be argued that norms would be present at every layer of policy. Therefore, the guiding principles or norms would be present at every stage of the policy output of the EU. The Covid-19 pandemic was a paradigm shift since the importance of a joint initiative to deliver aid more effectively resulted in the development of TE. More broadly, many programs of TE can be attributed to shifts in paradigms which were either gradual or abrupt. Arguably, there have been many shifts in paradigms for European foreign aid spending and foreign policy action in recent history. While the declaration of the European Charter of human rights and the Green Deal represents a more gradual shift of paradigms, the migration crisis prompted a swift paradigm change. Considering that policy programs and individual policies are informed by paradigm and the underlying norms of the national and the supranational agencies that designed them, this thesis argues that looking at individual policies and policy programs should help to get an insight into the norms of TE. Looking at the national discourse regarding specific policies helped to position countries' interpretation of norms in a European integration context.

3.3 Geographical Demarcation

Since TE is active in every geographic region of the world, this thesis focused on just one region as normative meaning around specific issues might differ based on region. There are projects of TE that reach across regions in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle

East, Asia and Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa and global initiatives (Team Europe, n.d.). Those involve many actors that are members of Team Europe. In the Sub-Saharan African region, both European member states Sweden, France and Germany, along with their national development agencies, have projects as of July 2023 (Sweden:11, Swedfund:1, Germany: 17, KfW:3. France:16; AFD: 6) (Team Europe, n.d.). This region also hosts more than half of all regional TEI's as of now (about 53,1%) (Team Europe, n.d.). As focusing on all regions of the world that Team Europe has initiatives in would be out of the scope of this thesis, the focus was on the subjects discourse use around the issue areas (which are connected towards a specific norm). From the analysis of the national discourse, a picture emerged which gave insights into the norms Team Europe promotes.

3.4 Norms and Issue Areas to analyse

Wiener (2008) confronts the subjects of the interviews with fundamental norms, which she describes as norms that made it into international treaties such as "human rights, democracy, the rule of law" (p.83). These norms are part of the Treaty on Europe (TEU) Article 6. The choice for fundamental norms was made due to Wiener's (2008, p.52) "liberal community assumption", which indicates that "all norms form part of the shared normative structure that binds civilized nations in world politics". TE is made up of shared norms, which, even though they are common in the European member states, might be perceived differently individually. The "hybrid policy", as described by Manners (2002) suggests that even though the EU engages both in supranational and each member state's individual national foreign policy. This separation also indicates different understandings of fundamental norms that TE promotes. To find out how TE and, therefore their members position themselves to fundamental norms, three fundamental norms were chosen for the

analysis in this thesis. The three fundamental norms chosen are: Human Rights, Citizenship and Environmentalism. Wiener (2008) chose three issue areas as "discursive interventions" in her interview process. The policy fields, that were chosen, accommodates for interpretations of the meanings of fundamental norms in the data. Therefore, one fundamental norm is connected to one policy field. Issue areas were chosen by association to their related fundamental norms.

3.4.1 Human Rights and Human Rights Promotion

Human rights are a fundamental norm, as described by Wiener (2008) and a key priority of the EU. In its cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, the EC is naming challenges related to human rights as one of their main priorities (European Commission, n.d.). In the EU, there are two major strands of human rights policy and practice: to defend the basic human rights of EU residents and to advance human rights all over the globe (EU, n.d.). Foreign policy can be appropriated by referencing universal human rights and global UN standards (Lerch & Schweltnus, 2006). There are currently (as of April 2023) TEIs that focus on topics which are related to human rights, for example, "Peace and Security in the Great Lakes region – Africa" and "Social protection – Africa". As a policy field which, the national discourse is analysed around the promotion of Human Rights and international law in Sub-Saharan Africa will be used. The notion of human rights promotion in foreign policy accelerated in the 1990s when the EU had a dramatic evolution both in terms of internal constitutionalising and exterior human rights advocacy (Lerch & Schweltnus, 2006). EU foreign aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is self-declared to be a "people-centred approach" (European Commission, n.d.), so promoting their human rights and international law must be

a high priority. To exert normative meaning, Wiener (2008, p. 157) used the following keywords in her discourse analysis: “Symbolic function, Single framework, Identity, Participation, Fundamental rights, Responsibility and Accountability”. These Keywords are intended to provoke reactions to positioning statements about the degree of constitutional integration in the EU at that time. Since this thesis does not focus on the internal EU policy, the keyword list could not be applied in this thesis. One key discussion in Human Rights literature is the conflict between universalism and relativism (Gayim, 2016). Human rights are often centred on the premise that there are specific fundamental ethical principles that all people should adhere to, regardless of their background or current circumstances in terms of culture, society, or history. On the other hand, relativism contends that morality and ethical principles are contingent upon cultural practices and conventions and cannot, therefore, be universally applicable. Especially in foreign policies, these opposing standpoints are prevalent. As Human Rights promotion is one of the most important priorities of TE, it is expected that also their members will subscribe to universalism to varying degrees. Other than analysing the discourse around the universality of human rights, the discourse around the pillars that undergird OHCHR's global efforts will be analysed. These pillars represent one aspect of Human rights promotion the OHCHR focuses on (OHCHR, n.d.). Since all States are members of the UN and should be involved in promoting these aspects. How they focus on each aspect might give insight into how states position themselves around human rights promotion and, therefore, the fundamental norm of Human rights. The following keywords were constructed to analyse the subjects' normative understanding:

Table 3*Keywords for analysing normative meaning of Human Rights*

Keywords	Associative Connotations
Universalism	Human rights are principles that all people should follow, regardless of their background or current circumstances in terms of culture, society, or history
Relativism	Morality and ethical principles are contingent upon cultural practices and conventions and cannot, therefore, be universally applicable
Participation	The participation of individuals i.e. rights to free speech, association, and freedom of assembly is warranted
Accountability	Governmental- and judiciary systems uphold and respect human rights of their citizens
Non-discrimination	All individuals deserve the same human rights and have to be treated equally and without discrimination
Peace and Security	safeguard populations from dangers like violence, conflict, and other dangers and the creation of a stable environment which potentially provides access to all other human rights
Development	Process and right to advance social, economic, and political progresses that leads to the fulfilment of human rights

Note The format of this table is inspired by a similar table in Wiener (2008) on page 157.

3.4.2 *Citizenship and Migration*

Citizenship is a fundamental norm formally constitutionalised in TEU (Art 17;22).

There are three dimensions of citizenship to consider, namely "rights, belonging and access"

(Wiener, 2008, p.90). Thin or thick citizenship approaches are used to categorise citizenship,

with thin citizenship approaches believing citizenship is given by nationality and thick citizenship approaches believing citizenship needs a minimal level of social rights (Wiener, 2008). Following Wiener (2008, p. 93) following keywords: security, civil rights, travel, fortress Europe, border control inefficacy, external border control, asylum migration and cooperation. Since these keywords and their associative connotations are intended to exert normative meaning from interviews around the Schengen area, they have to be adapted to fit the context. The issue area for the fundamental norm of citizenship will be "migration" since it is a critical associated issue area, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the EU commission, is highlighting that an “strong #TeamEurope approach will be crucial to progress on migration” (Borrell, 2021). Especially since the European "migrations crisis", which brought extensive discourse within the EU. In the "migration crisis", EU Member States turned away from common European strategies to follow national interests instead. Slominski and Trauner (2018) even named this behaviour of blatant non-compliance with European and international law standards of returning unwanted migrants "strategic non-usage of Europe". The EU sees migration as one of the priority areas of EU cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, n.d.).

Since "travel" is not relevant in the context of the thesis, it will be replaced by "Illegal migration". Illegal migration and its prevention of it is one of the main issues within the discourse around migration management discourse (Walters, 2010), which significance is expected to have increased since the European migration crisis. "Border control inefficacy" connected to inter-EU border controls will be replaced by "integration". The use of integration in discourse would suggest, on the one hand, an effort to bring migrants closer to the host society on the other hand, it might suggest a demand to give up the migrant's identity to assimilate into the host country's society. The following keywords were applied to analyse the subjects' normative understanding:

Table 4*Keywords for analysing normative meaning of Citizenship*

Keywords	Associative Connotations
Security	“Security matters, standardization, control, police” (Wiener, 2008, p. 93)
Civil Rights	“Civil Rights are to be guarded, importance of the rule of law, fundamental rights, individual rights (to be protected against the state)” (Wiener, 2008, p. 93)
Illegal Migration	Movements of individuals across international borders without following the destination country's laws and procedures for migration
Fortress Europe	“Negative aspect, exclusive, unfair” (Wiener, 2008, p. 93)
Integration	migrants social, economic, and cultural integration into the host society,
External border control	Important to manage the flow of migration into the Union.
Asylum migration (climate migration)	“Visa policy, third country nationals” (Wiener, 2008, p. 93)
Cooperation	“Political cooperation, market cooperation (positive aspect)”, also with third countries which host migration with the destination of Europe (Wiener, 2008, p. 93)

Note The format of this table is inspired by a similar table in Wiener (2008) on page 93. The associative connotations from the keywords are taken from Wiener (2008) as well.

3.4.3 *Environmentalism*

Environmentalism or environmental justice is one of the core pursuits of the EU. These desires manifested in the European Green Deal, a significant commitment entailing goals, programs and strategies to reduce the EU's emissions to net zero until 2050. After the European Green Deal, the EC focused heavily on environmental issues in its (foreign) development plans (Eckert & Kovalevska, 2021). This is made apparent also by looking at the thematic priorities of TE as it is the top priority for both projects on the national level (95 Country TEI's) and regional (14 regional TEIs). According to Buzan (2004), environmentalism is a developing institution involving guardianship or trusteeship over the globe. Due to its importance for European politics and governance, environmentalism will be the third norm analysed in this thesis. As the European Green Deal is one of the core pursuits of the EU green transition is one of the five main priorities of EU cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, n.d.).

From the green deal projects of TE, a list of keywords and their associative connotations was extracted, which will be used to exert normative meaning. Which topics are focused on and are prioritized by the national discourse normative meaning the following keywords can be extracted and are applied.

Table 5

Keywords for analysing normative meaning of Environmentalism

Keywords	Associative Connotations
Sustainable Development	Provision of aid to promote long-term economic, social, and environmental progress
Climate Change Adaptation	Prepare states for the impacts of climate change in their territories

Climate Change Prevention	Provision of development aid to reduce CO ² emissions and mitigate climate change
Biodiversity Conservation	Provision of development aid to preserve the diversity of life, including ecosystems and species
Renewable Energy	Development and use of energy sources that are sustainable and low-carbon dioxide emissions
Green Economy	An economic system that prioritizes sustainability and environmental protection
Climate Migration	Migration caused by extreme climate or extreme climate events caused by climate change

Note The format of this table is inspired by a similar table in Wiener (2008) on page 93.

3.5 Subjects

To find normative value, different perspectives have to be analysed. Since it is out of the scope of this thesis to conduct interviews with elites such as in Winer (2007) the process tracing will be limited to external sources such as the press and official EU and other elitist publications. Following the layer cake assumption developed by Karl Deutsch and utilised by Wiener (2008), the top "layers of society", the elites, are the first that experience norm assimilation in the process of norm integration. This would mean that the diffusion of norms most likely occurs at the elites levels of society. The subjects of this thesis are individuals that wrote and participated in the formation of TE, national government officials and Think Tanks that participate in the national discourse. All these groups are made up of the elites as defined by Wiener (2008) "Elites are the social group most likely to actively access to full participation in a political community, i.e. enjoy rights, access and belonging to political practices in the public sphere." (Wiener, 2008, p.81).

The views of elitists in different countries might differ based on different factors. Even within the EU, there are states with different interests which resulted in European

foreign policy and national foreign policy coexisting for nearly 70 years (Jørgensen, 2015). As previously established, ODA allocation also depends on the countries giving it out, vested interests and pre-existing (colonial) interests (Zanger, 2000). For this reason, this thesis chose three countries from which data will be analysed: Sweden, France and Germany. According to Wiener's liberal community assumption, the more countries share common memberships in IO's, the more likely a shared understanding and appropriateness of fundamental norms hold true. Since all three states are members or closely aligned to NATO, members of the EU and the UN, the liberal community assumption may be applied. Sweden has been described as "the moral superpower" due to its multifaceted internationalism and far-reaching human rights advocacy (Dahl, 2006). Sweden sees its foreign policy engagement as self-assigned duty and a natural role model in the international polity as a guide to other nations. Sweden's foreign policy is guided by internationalist and universalist and, to a lesser extent, particularist nature (Dahl, 2006). Sweden, even though it is a relatively small state, acts as a norm entrepreneur in international society and defines appropriate behaviour and aims to shape the behaviour of other states (Björkdahl, 2013). Sweden's foreign policy is centred around the promotion of universal norms with a strong emphasis on international law, social and economic rights and small-state solidarity (Dahl, 2006). This makes Sweden a good example of a universalist state within the EU. Historically, France has contributed bilaterally only to a small number of countries which are mostly former French colonies (McKinlay, 1979). France, along with other countries, ranks among countries which are described as "egoistic" in their bilateral aid relationships by Berthélemy (2006) as its main recipients are former colonies and countries which they have intense trading relationships with. Since many of their former colonies are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, France be very present there. Although a former colonial power, Germany has a shorter colonial history than France. Unlike Sweden, whose colonial ambition was relatively short lived, Germany is

considered as a colonial power (Ciarlo, 2008). Germany's aid allocation has, in the past, a bias in favour of ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) nations that are Lomé Convention partners with the EU, which may indicate a desire to maintain a "sphere of influence within the EU" or the possibility that aid is given out of obligation (Arvin & Drewes, 2015). For this reason, it may be expected that Germany supports the universalist tendencies of the EU's foreign policy. Germany is still a country with former colonies but may have some universalist tendencies. It will be the third country whose normative discourse is analysed.

3.6 Integration Hypothesis

This thesis not only set out to analyse national discourse around ODA causes but also tried to extract knowledge on the norm formation process of TE. In the theoretical part, three European integration theories were illustrated. In the analysis part, evidence for either hypothesis will be searched for. Following the distinctions between the different hypotheses can be created. From the descriptions and table of the three theoretical approaches to European integration, a scale of normative overlap was derived from the national discourse. To describe the norm formation process as Neo-functional, it would be expected to have the national disorder shaped or dominated by supranational interest rather than having national norms and interest at the centre of it. There would be a tendency to integrate and coordinate ODA programmes into a European framework, and TE would be a quasi "de novo institution". The overlap of normative meaning would be maximal in this case. For describing the norm formation process similar to the theoretical approach of New Intergovernmentalism, the normative overlap between the states would be minimal. The national discourse would be shaped by national interest and national normative meaning. Discursive Institutionalism in the norm integration process of TE would mean a medium overlap in normative meaning. The national discourse would often be used to create appropriateness in public, while national

values might be implemented in the norm formation and be reflected in their ODA allocation. For integration theory, the difference between national interests and national normative meaning could indicate how the integration process could be described. The following hypotheses were derived:

H1: The norm formation process of Team Europe can be described as “Neo-Functional”

H2: The norm formation process of Team Europe can be described as “New Intergovernmentalism”

H3: The norm formation process of Team Europe can be described as “Discursive Institutionalism”

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Civil Rights

4.1.1 *Sweden*

When dealing with a cooperative migration policy, the Swedish is aligned with international law and the rules-based international order. There seems to be a desire towards an approach which is based on clear rules. Sweden's State Secretary Diana Jansen, emphasized strategic communication with African citizens to highlight the impact of the EU-AU (African Union) relationship on their everyday life in order to raise awareness for migration issues (EU-nämndens, 2022). Andres Hall, State Secretary, empathizes close cooperation with transit countries such as the northern African states is important to manage migration. The external border control should be secured by Frontex, the EU's outside border management agency, to ensure the quality of border control. According to Hall, the Swedish government fundamentally believes that Sweden's asylum and migration policy should be based on its international commitments. He highlights the importance of EU cooperation and an orderly approach to immigration (EU-nämndens, 2022). Ludvig Aspling, a member of Parliament (MP) from the Sweden Democrats, is criticizing that even though development aid has value in itself, it is not an effective tool to stop migration despite its usage in that way by the EU. Regarding "security", one of the main concerns seems to be the return of migrants if their asylum application has been rejected or a criminal offence has been committed. In a report of the Swedish parliament, the Riksdagen, about EU activities, the conservative MP submitted a notion that seeks to direct European foreign aid to conclude more readmission agreements with countries of transit and origin. Sweden should engage more with EU development agencies to use its development aid as an incentive for countries of origin to take in their citizens otherwise deportation decisions cannot be enforced. The focus when returning migrants should still be "accordance with basic principles such as non-

refoulement" which indicates a rules-based approach in accordance with international law and human rights to migration policy (EU-nämndens, 2022).

Migration from Africa is also a very prominent topic in the Swedish press. The Swedish news agency Europaportalen is displaying the national discourse on migration. One of the main topics this news site is reporting can be associated with the keyword "border control" and is about the deaths and dangers of migrants on their journey to the EU (Europaportalen, 2023). The keyword "illegal immigration" is also often used or implied since migrants often use routes where they illegally cross borders. The SVT illustrated the parliamentary discourse around a common migration approach in March 2023. Among the mainstream parties, a consensus has been reached to follow a more integrated approach, while right and left-leaning parties reject this policy (Nyheter, 2023). Right parties criticize the common policy as it would force Sweden to take up more illegitimacy migrants, which can be associated with "illegal immigration" while also playing into the keyword of "civil rights" since the Swedish citizens lose the right to make their own policy without EU involvement. The left-leaning parties criticize that the EU approach would institutionalize the abuse of immigrants and accelerate the encampment in dangerous migrant camps. These fears are most closely associated with the exclusive and unfair aspects of "Fortress Europe".

4.1.2 France

The discourse around French-African relationships is influenced by the increasingly close relationship with African countries. In a 2017 speech, French prime minister Emmanuel Macron set out to rebuild the relationship between France and the African continent. Misinformation campaigns would turn African states hostile towards France, which brings into question the French ODA to these countries (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2022b). This losing grip on African countries might also define migration politics. In a

budgetary discussion of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assemble National, one MP brings up the notion that the housing of asylum candidates is not acceptable and should be further enhanced. Here criticism on third countries i.e. transit countries (countries that migrants cross to get to the EU) are dominating the discourse (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2022a). As many transit countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are former French colonies the cooperation with those countries might also be of importance to remain influential there as well. To highlights the importance of this notion he concludes that until 2050 due to the climate crisis the budget in this area needs to be raised (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2022b). While wanting to maintain France`s attractiveness and good status in Africa, Amelia Lakrafi is asking the question of how to balance France's attractiveness while stopping irregulated migration. One possible reason why France fears losing their influence in Sub-Saharan Africa is their connection to their former colonies. Illegal immigration is another topic which is discussed in the budget discussion. Thibaut Francois, a right-wing MP, is highlighting the illegal migration numbers to EU territory, which he compares to the population of Lille to make them seem significant. He comments that this is due to the French lack of promoting their interest on a European institutional level, i.e. not focusing on Frontex and letting the French president of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, go during the French presidency of the EU. This paints a stark contrast to Ersilia Soudais, who not only stated that Frontex is abusing power but is also alleging human rights violations (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2022b).

The discourse in the parliament continues in the media coverage about the migration from Sub-Saharan Africa. The media discourse is influenced by coverage on the dangers of migration routes and the bad conditions of migration camps (Kaval, 2022). The discourse around migration in the EU institution is also part of the media discourse. Contrasting the approaches of the Council of Interior Ministers and especially former Austrian Interior

Minister Herbert Kickl who proposes transit countries as “return platforms” for migrants and with Doctors Without Borders “alarming” accounts of sea deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (Ducourtieux, 2018). Media is also focusing on right politicians that critique a European approach to migration like Marine LePen who criticises a European approach as “undemocratic” and frames migration as an example (Johannès, 2020). This adds to the balancing act the government has to make since right-wing politicians might capitalise on faults in migration policies. There is also a critical approach to French intervention in Africa’s affairs. In an article Vie Publique describes a list of conflicts that tarnishes the French African relationship made by the intellectual Achille Mbembe (Duclos-Grisier, 2021). The tightening of migration policy is named as a major source of French resentment. The influence the French are losing is presumably taken by other powers. Le Monde is titling the insertion of China into Africa “Chinafrique” and describes that China is becoming the first trading partner and the first builder of the continent, as well as the first bilateral donor of many African countries (Vircoulon, 2021). Altogether, it seems that France is trying to rebuild and strengthen the ties to their former colonies and other African states but the migration crisis, dangerous migration routes and camps are hindering French efforts to better relationships.

4.1.3 Germany

In Germany, there is a multipolar discussion about migration, especially from Africa transiting through “transit countries” in North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea into the EU. Migration is a delicate topic since Germany has historically been an immigration country according to the social-democratic party SPD, a governing party (Yüksel, 2022). Since the migration crisis, there has been a strong anti-immigration sentiment. The discourse is centred around who is most impacted by migration and what a human but still orderly approach to

migration is. Hegle Lindh from the SPD is describing the shortfalls of German migration and integration politics. According to her, the "Rechtstaat" (state under the rule of law) applies all laws and principles on their external borders, and therefore, all migrants, illegal or not, are deserving a humane migration approach (Lindh, 2023). The migration policy should be an interplay of "humanity and order" and "humanity and pragmatism" (Lindh, 2023). While Lindh's narrative focuses on the migrants as the centre of migration policy, the opposition focuses on the narratives about security and the integration limitations of German communes. Andrea Lindholz of the Christian-democratic party, CDU, counters that "humanity in migration policy also means order, control and limitation" and highlights that German communes are on their limit of integrating migrants (especially since there are many newly arrived asylums seekers from Ukrainian) (Yüksel, 2022). She calls for more security and external as well as internal border controls (still respecting the Schengen agreement). Furthermore, she calls to lift barriers to return migrants more quickly to save third countries. Strong cooperation with third countries is a proposition which is shared amongst members of parliament. MPs from Die Grünen (the green party, as well a governing party) are calling for more cooperation with third countries according to the framework of international and European law. Integration is a key element of policy. Die Grünen is trying to frame the integration of legal migrants as a positive aspect since they are a necessity to the German workforce. From the EU, the governing coalition is expecting more solidarity and a more integrated approach to migration. While the opposition remarks that the openness towards immigrants would be against solidarity with European partners as it lures migrants to the EU (Yüksel, 2022).

The divide around focusing on orderly immigration and human-centred narrative also takes place within the German press. There is a lot of news coverage around the bureaucratic barriers that legal migrants experience when getting to Germany and other EU countries

(Wetzel, 2023). Germany is framed as an attractive target country for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, which could lead to immigrants' lives being improved by integrating into the German society and Germany benefiting from motivated workers. Illegal immigration also is present in the media narrative. Cooperation with transit countries, dangers of the route to Europe, and the state of migration camps are part of news coverage (Gabriel, 2023). The cooperation with transit countries to deter migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa is especially criticised (Keilberth, 2023). Integration is framed by all parties as something that only can be achieved by finding employment (MDR.de, 2023).

4.1.4 Discussion Civil Rights

National discussion around the norm of civil rights in the issue of migration differs significantly in the three countries that are part of this analysis. In comparison, it seems that the discussion around migration in France is often centred around the relationship with their colonies and other French-speaking countries and the fear of reaching a limit in the capacity of migrants that can be hosted and integrated into the society. Germany and Sweden share a more rules-based approach to migration and in context with international commitments and organisations. Especially Germany seems to be set on respecting the EU's approach to migration, which can be interpreted as a supranational value and calls on other countries to do the same. Germany's interest in migration is also shaped by its desire to integrate migrants and have them as part of its workforce. The German government especially emphasises that migration management, whether legal or not, should be based on the balance between humanity and order. A commonality is that around the term "border control", there is the unanimous agreement that the approach should be human and that the agency Frontex is criticised for their approach. All countries emphasise the significance of collaboration with transit countries for orderly migration to the EU.

4.2 Human Rights

4.2.1 *Sweden*

In relation to the concessional grants and development initiatives made in the aftermath of the Covid-19, which led to the formation of TE, Sweden highlights the importance of countering that in several countries, the pandemic was used as a pretext to restrict human rights and the rule of law (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). Sweden has, before the change in government in 2022, followed a feminist foreign policy approach which highlights that non-discrimination is at the core of its policy output. As highlighted in the theory section of this thesis, Sweden has universalistic tendencies that can empirically be observed in its documentary output. For that reason, they might focus on marginalised or historically discriminated groups such as women and girls, members of the LGBTI community and migrants who are at risk of having their human rights violated (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). Sweden also reinforces their commitment to international organisations like the UNHCR and international commitments regarding human rights (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). Sweden sees itself as a forerunner in moral questions and advocates strongly for the rights of minorities within the international polity (Wallentheim, 2022) which can be summarised with the keyword "non-discrimination". This is evident by a notion brought forward by the Social democrat Anna Wallenstein and supported by the Riksdag, who advocates that Sweden should be a strong voice for LGBTI rights in all UN organs and should perpetuate LGBTI topics in their development aid strategies. The climate is also prominently present in the discourse around human rights, with the Aarhus convention securing the right for every human to live in an environment compatible with health and well-being but also has an obligation to protect the environment both alone and in community with and future generations (Miljö-och jordbruksutskottets, 2023). Sweden also demonstrates their commitment towards "peace and security" and "accountability", especially in the case of

autocratic regimes. In a debate about human rights Margareta Cederfelt, a moderate MP, who is advocating for Sweden to position itself against human rights abuses, to push sanctions within the EU framework and to hold the instigators of the regimes accountable when human rights are violated (Utrikesutskottet, 2023b). Another point she is criticising is the violation of democratic processes and the press, which result in a lack of "participation" (Utrikesutskottet, 2023b). Altogether, it seems that Sweden, positions itself as a moral superpower within the international polity, which is engaged in all pillars of the OHCHR. It seems to be significantly engaged in the "Non-discrimination" aspect of human rights and uses its influence within IOs to promote human rights placed in international treaties and beyond. The governing moderate party, is insisting that aid should not be given to maintain authoritarian and corrupt regimes and that there must be demands for democratic and rule of law reforms in those states (Utrikesutskottet, 2023a).

The Swedish news discourse reflects the focus of universalistic Sweden in following international law and safeguarding human rights. Even beyond the terms of international law, Swedish media is covering companies that engage in business relationships with countries that violate human rights (Al-Moushahidi, 2021). Their focus is also towards the non-discrimination of minorities and women (Esbjörnsson, 2023). The media also extends the discourse around the influence of other countries in Africa, which they see as dangerous. According to the *Afronbladet*, Russia and China are a threat to human rights since they tolerate undemocratic countries with human rights abuses and sent unconditional grants and loans to them (Aftonbladet, 2022).

4.2.2 France

The discourse around human rights is shaped by national pride in being the country in which human rights were first declared. In debate, this is often enforced to initiate action, to fight injustices and to apply human rights universalistic. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the focus of

France's efforts to promote human rights is on their former colonies and French-speaking countries (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2023). Deepening the relationship with French-speaking countries and extending relationships with countries that are open to French influence seems to be a prerequisite for bilateral development assistance. In Rwanda, which is not a former French colony, France is willing to dedicate an AFD (French Development Agency) office there since "the Francophonie is now experiencing a revival in the country" and "the prospects for French companies are interesting." (Union interparlementaire, n.d.). Regarding the pillars of human rights, "Peace and Security" might be a focus of the French government. The motivation seems to be to secure French influence in Africa and especially in French colonies. To establish or safeguard "Peace and Security", France is providing military assistance and operations which as can be observed in the past in Mali (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2023). Laetitia Saint-Paul, an MP of the governing party, is reinforcing that the military presence of France is perceived increasingly negative in the "strategic Sahel region" and leaves room for other states (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2023). Sabrina Sebaihi, in the same debate, emphasises that EU countries should heavily scrutinise military assistance and the delivery of weapons to be consistent with international commitments, human rights and the country's foreign policy objectives (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2023). Other pillars of human rights are also addressed by foreign policy. For example, "non-discrimination" against women and girls is addressed through French engagement in IOs even though it seems that there is harsh criticism on still supporting countries through the concessions of the AFD that rank negative on corruption indexes and human right abuses (Garot, 2023). "Development" is also a keyword that can be associated with French development aid. Food security is a key contributor to political stability, and the development of a resilient agricultural sector in Africa is a priority of the French government and the opposition, which was endangered, especially lately by Ukraine war. The

development of democracy i.e. “participation” and “accountability” is also supported although it seems to be less important than promoting peace and security in the region (Dos Santos & Schlimmer, 2021). Altogether the bilateral aid and interests seem to be centred around "peace and security" and concentrated towards former colonies and French-speaking countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. Similarly, to migration, French foreign policy seems to be targeted towards remaining influential and fending off Russia and China in the region. The aid is concentrated towards creating a relatively stable environment and less towards other human rights topics. It can be said that France's approach to human rights promotion is less universalistic than Sweden's and Germany's feministic approach.

The media discourse around human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa focuses strongly on human right violations. The news organisation LeMonde's coverage of human rights is often centred around conflicts and authoritarian governments that cause human rights abuses. Aid is given by providing military assistance, and to avoid situations like the forced exit out of Mali. The French government is tailoring the military aid towards the needs of the host country (Le Monde Avec, 2023). LeMonde also highlights the effect of food insecurity on France's former colonies and includes an appeal by UNICEF for national governments like France to prioritise food security as this, in addition to conflict, would make it increasingly hard to help local communities. Liberation also focuses on social topics that would fall more under the keyword of "non-discrimination", for example the recognising of forced pregnancies crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Latour, 2023). The French foreign policy is described as *realpolitik* to remain influential and admits competition with China and Russia (Masseguin, 2022).

4.2.3 Germany

Germany's current governing coalition, like Sweden's former coalition, follows a feministic foreign policy approach (Bundesregierung, 2022a), in association with human

rights, indicates that non-discrimination might be a core value promoted through German ODA. One of the key objectives of Germany's foreign and development policy is counter structures of discrimination which prevents states to achieve human rights milestones in other areas (Bundesregierung, 2022c). The humanitarian engagement of Germany's development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa is targeted to help to counter catastrophes (emphasis is on the climate-related crisis) and to secure basic human needs that are the basis for the achievements of human rights, e.g. food security, health, protection, water and sanitation. For the governing coalition, a key part of building accountability and participation is strengthening marginalised groups. The rule of law and access to justice is seen as a prerequisite and catalyst for the achievement of all other development goals and for human rights. The opposition often remains sceptic of foreign aid targeted at establishing human rights. Especially the AFD (right-wing populist party) seems to hold the position that Germany should not interfere in foreign countries politics, which can be summarized by relativism. For example, the AFD brought in a notion to stop foreign aid to Nigeria entirely as, according to them, the effect was too small, and Germany should instead focus on business relationships with the rising African nation, which may lead to self-sufficiency and stop migrant flows (Friedhoff et al., 2020). This notion was heavily criticised by both the governing coalition and the opposition, with the coalition emphasising that the focus on business interests would make Germany equal to China in the region. Generally, the AFD criticises the coalition foreign policy to be not having enough realpolitik and too much "moralpolitik" in which ideology is guiding decisions without evaluating effectivity (Jongen, 2023). Criticised are also military operations in Mali in conjunction to the French troop's retreat. While the right populist AFD and the left party Die Linke advocate for a full retreat, the CDU is highlighting the importance of securing the humanitarian situation in Mali and not creating a power vacuum for Russia or China but criticised the effectiveness (Abraham, 2022).

Regarding the topic of human rights in Africa, German media was focused on a new policy that would make German companies accountable for their supply chains, especially when human rights, environmental and climate protection are violated (Zeit Online, 2023a). Other than this, the focus is also on the discrimination of marginalised groups. For example, Der Tagesspiegel is reporting about the abuses and ban on homosexuality in Uganda which provoked an adverse reaction by the UN and German human rights authorities. The publication also highlights the importance of applying human rights universally but has to be in a way that does not "fuel conspiracy myths in Africa about international forces trying to spread Western values" (Lehming, 2023). The publication Netzpolitik criticises Germanies and the EU's development policies as, ODA, is used in African countries with repressive regimes to invest in surveillance technologies which violate human rights. According to Netzpolitik, 11.5 million euros from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa were given to Niger to purchase surveillance technologies such as drones to monitor their citizens and manage migration movements (Rau, 2022).

4.2.4 Discussion Human Rights

As expected, due to their membership in several international organisations that promote the universality of human rights, there is a great normative overlap concerning the universality of human rights. Exceptions, where relativistic tendencies can be found, are in opposition parties. Sweden's foreign aid and normative meaning in relation to human rights are hard to assess since the government changed and the feminine foreign policy was abandoned. This could indicate a minor focus on "non-discrimination" in the future policy output. Given that Germany follows a feministic approach to foreign policy, there seems to be a normative overlap with Sweden's former policy approach when it comes to the "non-discrimination" of minorities. While Sweden's and Germany's discourse focuses on "non-discrimination" and go beyond the provisions of IO's, France seems to engage more in other

aspects of human rights. Security and the provision of basic humanitarian and crisis aid seem to be the priority of the French political elite, which might be categorised under the keywords "development" and "peace and security" as this represents the basis for humans to enjoy human rights. France is especially militarily engaged in their former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. All countries analysed are concerned about the influence of foreign states that are not interested in improving the humanitarian situation in Sub-Saharan countries. Media discourse focuses on several humanitarian aspects, from "peace and security" to "accountability" of human rights abuses by repressive regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, prevention of "participation" to "non-discrimination" of minorities.

4.3 Environmentalism

4.3.1 *Sweden*

Sweden also sees itself as a driving political force in environment and climate development (Utrikesutskottet, 2021). Through climate diplomacy, Sweden aims to raise other countries' ambitions. This is also achieved by giving out foreign aid. One main focus of Sweden's foreign environmental policy is building up the capacity for climate change resilience and adaptability as well as reduced emissions of greenhouse gases in their partner countries (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). The Swedenfund is investing heavily in renewable energy in Africa, providing access to electricity for 260,000 people in several African countries (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). The moderates want to provide aid in order to increase "sustainable development" by investing in companies and put the burden on the states that receive the aid and, at the same time, avoid competing with private capital (Utrikesutskottet, 2023a). Therefore, Sweden is active in several different regional (Nordic Development Fund), European and international initiatives. Sweden, coordinated with the EU, is aiming according to their climate targets to show leadership and become the world's first fossil-free

welfare state (Sveriges Riksdag, 2019). The Centre Party, a liberal agrarian party, highlights the role of women and girls in climate change since the consequences of climate change have a more significant negative impact on women than men and unequal participation in decision-making processes often leads to women being excluded (Lundgren, 2022). The Centre Party also wants to dedicate development aid to contribute to more "sustainable development" globally in prompting global climate work by promoting access to renewable energy and investing in energy efficiency, moving towards a "green economy" (Lundgren, 2022). The Sweden democrats, who currently are part of the governmental coalition, are more critical of the Swedish role in environmental issues. They doubt that the role that Sweden currently has in taking the leading initiative and deciding on significantly larger emission reductions than other countries is influencing other countries to go in the same direction (Kinnunen, 2022). Foreign policy should bind other countries to international agreements to "prevent climate change" Sweden can invest in climate change mitigation in other countries which emit more emissions. This proposition is also shared by the Christian Democratic Party (Miljö-och jordbruksutskottets, 2019). The topic of "climate migration" is as well a priority for the Sweden Democrats as for them "climate change prevention" In less developed countries will reduce humanitarian aid and climate migration (Utrikesutskottet, 2021).

in the media Sweden's leading role in development aid is highlighted as well. The Dagens Nyheter is covering the struggles within the current government coalition to have a clear line on climate issues and the leading role in environmental protection (Dagens Nyheter, 2022). The Aftonbladet covers the linkage between development aid towards sustainable development and business interests. The new moderate minister has dual roles and portfolios as minister of aid and foreign trade, which he would like to connect. In the Expressen, especially since the conflict in Ukraine is putting European countries under an immense financial burden, there is much coverage on "climate migration". Charlotta Norrby

by, the Secretary-General Swedish Mission Council, is warning about the rising number of climate refugees in doubling until 2050 and therefore, investments in climate, environment, and resilience have to be prioritised (Expressen, 2022).

4.3.2 France

France's present Minister of foreign affairs Catherine Colonna sees climate change as a key priority of their foreign policy strategy (Abomangoli, 2022). To create appropriateness for ODA with a special focus on environmental protection was a strong focus of the government (AFD, 2023). It's integrated in many other areas such as migration and food security as well. Food security has to be achieved by less developed nations against the backdrop of climate change. This can be related to both climate change adaptation and sustainable development. Their contribution related to climate related challenges are concentrated in multilateral and European funds like the Green Climate Fund and the African Development Fund. The focus here is "sustainable development", "green economy", and both climate adaptation and climate change prevention. The right-wing party RN, which is sceptic on development aid in general, objects the notion that climate aid is effective even though they argue that most emissions are emitted by other countries (Abomangoli, 2022). Countries should invest in themselves and act in accordance with the Paris climate agreement to prevent climate change. They demand more conditionality for development aid in general and a control mechanism to audit if investments were successful. The left wing and green parties also advocate for a more effective way to track their investments especially when it comes to corruption that is prevalent in less developed countries (Abomangoli, 2022). There is an overlap in their opinion on food security with the government party which can be achieved by building a sustainable, adaptive, green agricultural economy. This would also reduce the risk of climate events caused by climate change and also reduce the flow of climate migrants to

France. There is agreement to make these investments through international funds and the national development agency AFD. Altogether the ODA dispersed by France is driven by their interest in establishing stability in those countries and to prevent climate migration, climate disasters, and adapt to more extreme weather.

The French media is shaped by the discourse around how to fight climate change in less developed countries and at home. For the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, the news coverage, like with every issue area before, is dominated by security and food stability issues that are the consequence of climate change. Le Monde is reinforcing that for the Sub-Saharan African region climate change is a large contributor to economic and political instability (Caramel, 2019). The effect of climate change according to Le Monde would also contribute to less development aid being deployed as security and political instability in Sub-Saharan Africa leads to difficulties to deploy adaptation and risk mitigation strategies (Grosjean, 2023). This violence, political instability and more extreme weather is also leading to an increase of (climate) migrants that flee to France. There is also a discourse around the possibilities that investments by France and Europe can have in green energy sectors in Africa. Le Point, for example, is reporting on the large opportunities Sub-Saharan African countries have when European countries invest in their sustainable development of alternative energies (Rantrua, 2023).

4.3.3 Germany

Germany's foreign climate policy is like their other policy approaches is guided by the inclusive feministic norms (Bundesregierung, 2022b). In their joint plan to fight climate change internationally the governing coalition of Die Grünen, SPD and FDP highlights that and vulnerable individuals from the Global South, especially women and children, are most at risk of the loss of culture and identity, i.e. non-economic damage - although they have

contributed least to the climate crisis. There is a strong dedication towards international agreements and towards contributing to funds coordinated within the international framework of states that contribute towards solving climate issues. They aim to partner bi- and multilaterally with likeminded and countries that receive those grants. For these reasons supporting the “least developed countries” who are most impacted by climate change is one of the main focuses of the German government. According to the governing coalition the development aid and climate financing should perpetuate (Western) norms and political and economic stability (Bundesregierung, 2022d). This highlights the universalistic foreign policy approach and Germany as an international norm-maker. Climate change policy is framed as an emerging human right by the governing coalition which applies to every human (Bundesregierung, 2022d). Regarding which aspect of Environmentalism is especially highlighted there are several points at focus. One of their main focuses is to build up climate change adaptivity in least developed countries in e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa which can be seen in the regional TE’s “Climate Change Adaptation & Resilience - Africa” which Germany along France and Sweden is part of. Their plan in which the coalition lays down their policy includes all relevant keywords of the table which indicate a broad overlap with the TE framework. The right-wing party AFD seems to be very critical of ODA targeted at climate topics. They criticise that especially climate projects in other countries such as the Sub-Saharan states are targeted while the prices for energy in Germany are surging as a consequence of the war in Ukraine (Frohnmaier, 2023). This follows a general reluctance to legitimize climate topics of any relevance and scepticism of the effectiveness of any climate policies (Wiehle, 2022). For the CDU climate change policy has to be connected to economic and social development (CDU, n.d.) and has priority in the ODA delivered to African countries which could also diminish Russian and Chinese influence (Silberhorn, 2023).

The discourse of the media in Germany focuses on climate events and the need to climate adaptation and climate change prevention. For example, one article by the Spiegel is focusing on climate change caused food shortages in (Sub-Saharan) African countries to which investments in climate change adaptation have to follow. Climate migration also is a topic in German media. There are a lot of articles about the opportunities to establish sustainable development towards a green economy by investing in green energy projects in Africa. Often the investments are made by German companies or subsidised by the German development agency KfW (Lehmann, 2023). An article by the Zeit is reporting on a council of experts on migration advocating for Germany to establish a system to allow people from regions that are impaired most by climate change and extreme climate events to migrate to Germany (Zeit Online, 2023b). The debate of climate migrants' status as not worthy of being qualified to be granted asylum under international asylum law is also focus of this article.

4.3.4 Discussion Environmentalism

Towards the norm of Environmentalism there is a similar divide seen already in the other norm categories. Germany and Sweden follow a very inclusive approach focusing on inclusivity and minority protection. Germany even elevating climate justice as a human right. For France the investment in climate change policy especially climate change adaptation is framed by the governing parties as a way to create stability in the Sub-Saharan African region that is on the one hand fulfilling their responsibility for their former colonies and securing their influence in the region but also deals with other issue areas such as migration and food security. It can be observed is that all right-wing parties in all countries are in varying degrees sceptics of foreign climate aid and call for measures to track the use of the funds. While their approaches are different many countries are active in the same TE initiatives which indicates a normative overlap. Another topic is the demand for countries that receive aid to adapt western values such as democracy and rule of law. While these demands can be described as

universalist this approach reminds of Jeffrey Checkles theory of norm diffusion were countries have logic of consequences to follow norms or the conceive means approach to norm diffusion by Buzan. Altogether, it seems that all parties across all three countries that are governing consider environmentalism as an emerging necessity and therefore implement similar policies to transform Sub-Saharan economies to make them more sustainable and resilient. The interests may be different but it seems to be a more interconnected supranational approach.

4.4 General Discussion

France's special relationship with the "Francophonie" in these regions is shaping the norms across all three norms in their development aid. It can be argued that this relationship and the duty that France sees in aiding their former colonies affect normative meaning. Especially towards the violation of human rights, France might perceive itself to have not the moral authority to follow a universalistic approach. It might be, due to the historical ties, more cautious and meet more resistance due to anti-colonial sentiments in these regions. This might lead France to follow a more relativistic approach in contrast to Sweden and Germany.

What is observable across the three norms and issue areas is that the EU fears losing influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Swedish parliament is highlighting that the Chinese are increasingly using development aid that is not in line with ODA as defined by DAC as a foreign policy tool to exert influence in developing nations. This is clearly seen as a threat to the development aid of TE, the overall European foreign policy and the promoting activities of its norms. Since there are no conditions for aid such as human rights, or democratic institutions, developing countries might prefer this aid. This can lead to the conclusion that a European approach to foreign development aid was not only made to deliver aid more effectively but also to remain or gain influence in developing countries and fend off countries with different normative outputs or different understanding of norms. Similar to Frances's

approach, this might result in a more relativistic approach towards human rights and other norms. As national interests are reflected in the normative meaning of different nations, the question of how far interests influence normative output remains essential. This thesis might raise questions about how influential (European) norms really are or if interests mainly influence foreign policy. Regarding the two theories of norm diffusion, this research reveals that between the European member states, there is agreement on the importance of fundamental norms, but the normative meaning remains varying to a certain degree. This is in line with Buzan (2004), whose theory of norm formation is based on proximity and cooperation. The conditionality of ODA can be seen as both in line with Checkel's theory of norm formation. European countries hope that through ODA, compliance from a “logic of consequences” is changing to compliance due to an “logic of appropriateness” (Checkel, 2005, p.804). The global competition in ODA and foreign investment is demising the effect of penalties and might lead to less conditionality of ODA in future to remain influential in specific regions and promote norms. Right-wing parties, in all three countries, advocate for tightened control on ODA and compliance with norms and generally are more sceptic of norm promotion through ODA than other parties. Their approach is more centred around business ties and can be described relativistic. This indicates that more right-wing parties in European governments would impact TE norm promotion substantially.

Even though on a European level, TE conducts common ODA, the normative meaning and individual interests differ from state to state, which might indicate that overall the (European) norms and their meaning might need to be stronger in terms of coherence. The framework of TE accommodates these differences as a member state is not forced into engaging in an initiative, and therefore partnerships according to shared normative meanings and interests can be built within the TE approach while supranational EU institutions, that are more autonomous can also engage in common initiatives. This results in a framework

allowing states to conduct their ODA according to their normative understanding while not providing a gateway towards norm integration of the EU members.

To the different theories of European integration, there are elements of all three different theories that were discussed in the literature section of this thesis. Least prominent are aspects of Neo-Functionalism as the norms and national interests that countries have are varying, especially between the more feminine universalistic foreign policy approach of Germany and Sweden and the more relativistic approach of France. The normative aspects around Environmentalism seem to overlap as they all engage in similar policy programs and contribute to common funds. Following Hall (1993), there needs to be at least a minimal overlap of norms to pursue a common policy within the European context. The norms that France and arguably other countries promote seem to be motivated partly by interests such as remaining influential in the region, stopping migration and economic interests. There are as well some elements of Discursive Institutionalism as parties, i.e. political elites with the same political ideologies, promote similar norms and interests. They try to establish vertical appropriateness for their foreign aid programs by communicating their norms and interests top-down to their voters in parliamentary debates, public plans and press coverage. Politicians primarily focus on national values and interests when communicating their ODA policy. The most fitting theory based on the data gathered is New Intergovernmentalism. National norms and interests seem to play a considerable part in national ODA policies. While the three countries have fundamentally the same norms, their particular interests in the Sub-Saharan region are quite different from each other. Therefore, there is minimal normative overlap between the states that were part of the analysis. Sweden and Germany. These differences might have facilitated the need for a common approach in order to present the EU to the outside more coherently and promote fundamental (European) norms more effectively. The whole TE approach was based on the notion of providing coordinated aid

against the backdrop of a global pandemic and more efficiency within a common European framework; therefore, it can be described as a *de novo* institution. In TE, nation states interest and normative promotion remain on the nation-state's willingness to participate alongside more integrated European institutions such as the European Development Bank. As anticipated, there is no conclusive answer to the research question as there is no academic consensus around which theory of European integration is coherent. In the research, elements of each integration theory were found, but it can be extracted that the most overlap between theories and findings was discovered in New Intergovernmentalism and the least with Neo-Functionalism.

4.5 Limitations and Acknowledgments

There are several limitations this thesis faces. Due to the scope of the thesis, the normative meanings of all members of TE cannot be accounted for. For this reason, three countries that stand on a theoretical scale of universalistic to relativistic were chosen. Future research might account for every state or use a more comprehensive sample size. Additionally, a detailed picture of the national discourse around normative meaning cannot be displayed. Often these positions are just snapshots of the normative meaning of a party or party member at one point in time. Significantly since the governments in Sweden and Germany changed during the research period, this has to be acknowledged. Also, the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa introduced significant interests by the member states, which might skew the normative meaning of certain norms.

As it is out of the scope of this thesis, the question of stakeholders' (States and private companies) perception both within and outside of TE, its initiatives, and the norms they promote remains open. This would give insights into the overall legitimacy, probability of norm diffusion and policy success of TE. An unfavourable perception might weaken Team

Europe's efficacy and influence collaboration and cooperation with stakeholders (i.e. ODA receiving states). In contrast, positive perceptions can strengthen Team Europe's normative influence and capacity to accomplish its objectives. For former colonial states such as France, this would be beneficial since it could help to overcome post-colonial scepticism, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

5. Conclusion

This thesis set out to research the norm formation of the new development initiative of the EU. In order to give context, the concepts of Norms, ODA and theories of norm diffusion were illuminated. To understand how European institutions, such as TE, develop three competing theories of European integration that were described and applied to the norm diffusion and integration of TE. In order to research the normative meanings that entered the formation process of TE, this thesis orientated itself on Antje Wiener's (2008) book "Invisible Constitution of Politics", where discourse analysis was used to extract normative meaning from European member states. Three EU countries' normative meaning and discourse around three issue areas (Migration, Human Rights Promotion, Environmental action) related to fundamental norms (Human Rights, Citizenship, Environmentalism) were analysed to research the normative overlap exemplary for the whole TE. The time frame for this study was from the establishment of TE until this study was made (June 2023), and for geographic demarcation, the region of Sub-Saharan Africa was chosen since TE is actively involved in this region. The material analysed was, on the one hand, official national documents and, on the other hand, press releases around development aid.

This thesis findings suggest a minimal normative overlap between the universalist approach inspired by the feminist foreign policy approach and France's foreign policy, which focuses on the relationship to their former colonies. Besides the notion that these norms were significant for each country, the normative meaning varied from country to country. While not finding conclusive evidence to accept or reject any hypothesis indefinitely, elements of all three theories were found. It can be extracted from the analysis that the most overlap between theories and findings was found in New Intergovernmentalism and the least in Neo-Functionalism. Along with this finding, other interesting findings were reported. France's relationship with French-speaking countries influences the normative meaning of

development aid. This influence, in contrast with Germany and Sweden and changes their normative meaning towards being more relativistic. Another factor that was found is the influence of other states in this region that shaped normative meaning for all three countries. Since interests have an effect on how norms are promoted and formed foreign aid decisions, raises questions about the importance of norms in foreign policy. This thesis is an addition to the research of European integration and represents an extension to research around European institutions as it adds to the academic discussion of the different European integration theories. Understanding the dynamic of norm formation behind TE within the context of broader integration literature may give scholars of European Studies an explanatory framework to understand better TEs, institutional design, and future policy decisions.

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