

University of Twente
Faculty for Behavioural, Management and Social Science
Drienerlolaan 5
7522 NB Enschede, the Netherlands

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Scharnhorststraße 100
48151 Münster, Germany

Each to their own or all together? - The state of EU Arctic defence policy

Bachelor-Thesis

Word count: 11,970

Felix Klaus Itzen
B.Sc. Public Governance across Borders

First Supervisor: Shawn Donnelly
Second Supervisor: Claudio Matera
Date of submission: 28.06.2023

Abstract

The Arctic is an increasingly important region due to climate change. States are competing for control of new trade routes and resources. Russia, in particular, has increased its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This paper answers the following question: To what extent does the EU act collectively in defence policy in the Arctic? I also answer the question of who is initiating this action and whether there is a specific trigger for starting to act. The hypotheses developed are that either states are the drivers of investment or co-operation with others, or that European Union institutions are the drivers of collective action. Official government documents, scientific studies and the media are used to collect data. The results show that it is mainly states that are acting. They are cooperating in various forms and organisations, and some are investing heavily in their own capabilities. Russia is increasingly isolated, and its activities in Ukraine since 2014 can be identified as the trigger. The European Union keeps trying to take the initiative, but its efforts are mostly unsuccessful or have limited success.

Table of Contents

- List of Tables..... 1
- List of Abbreviations..... 2
- Introduction..... 3
- Theoretical Framework 4
 - Realism 5
 - Neofunctionalism 6
 - Hypothesis..... 7
- Research Design..... 8
 - Method of Data Collection 10
 - Method of Data Analysis 11
- Background on the situation in the Arctic 11
- Analysis 12
 - Initiatives of non-Arctic EU member states..... 12
 - Initiatives of Arctic EU member states 15
 - EU initiatives..... 20
- Discussion 22
- Conclusion 25
- List of references..... 28
- Appendix..... 43

List of Tables

Table 1: Overview: Theoretical Framework.....	7
Table 2: Operationalization.....	9
Table 3: States' position on the engagement of the EU and NATO.....	22
Table 4: States' investment.....	24

List of Abbreviations

A5	Arctic 5 (Canada, Russia, USA, Denmark, Norway)
A8	Arctic 8 (Canada, Russia, USA, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland)
AC	Arctic Council
ASFR	Arctic Security Forces Roundtable
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EDF	European Defence Fund
EU	European Union
FCAS	Future Combat Air System
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency (fr.: frontières extérieures)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIUK	Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom
JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
MAWS	Maritime Airborne Weapon System
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
UK	United Kingdom
USA/US	United States of America

Introduction

The then incumbent US president surprised many people around the world on 16 August 2019. His latest idea was the subject of a report in the Wall Street Journal. Trump proposed buying Greenland (Salama 2019). What many, including the former Danish prime minister, think is a bad joke, has quite serious ulterior motives (Preker 2019). After all, Greenland is in the Arctic, a region that in recent years has increasingly become the focus of geopolitical games played by the major powers (Köhne 2020b). The Arctic has become more geopolitically relevant in recent years as climate change has caused ice areas in the Arctic Ocean to recede. 12.6% is the loss of ice mass in the Arctic per decade, a NASA (2020) study has revealed. The region around the North Pole is not only rich in resources, but the exposed areas will also be of enormous importance for global trade in the future. This is because the Northeast and Northwest Passages have the potential to facilitate trade between Europe, Asia and America, as the new routes can greatly reduce the distance between trading centres (Braune 2020).

While the seriousness and relevance of Trump's proposal may be disputed, it highlights the importance of the Arctic region. This significance extends to Europe as well, but the West has been slow to respond, allowing Russia to take the lead. Russia perceives the changing Arctic landscape as both a security threat and an opportunity for its own development, making early investments in Arctic capabilities and potentially becoming the dominant power in the region. However, recognizing the strategic importance of the Arctic for Europe's security, trade, and prosperity, Europe and the West are now becoming more proactive (Köhne 2020b). Considering Russia's dominant position and its implications, it is crucial to examine the EU's defence stance in the Arctic. Statements from EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (2019), emphasizing the need for Europe to understand "the language of power," suggest a willingness to act. Although debates on joint EU foreign and security policies have persisted, there is still no well-established system or clear competencies in this area, which remain with individual nation states. Furthermore, calls for EU's strategic autonomy contrast with the rise of nationalist movements within member states (Neumann 2018). Despite these challenges, it is relevant to observe how EU member states are working together in a geopolitical arena right at their doorstep, even without a fully integrated framework.

For this reason, I will address the following question in this paper: *To what extent does the EU act collectively in defence policy in the Arctic?* For this purpose, I will examine the actions of nation-states and EU institutions with regard to the changing situation in the Arctic. In addition to collective action in general, there is also the sub-question of *who does the cooperation come from, the EU or the states?* This question makes a big difference, especially in the context of the EU, because it is crucial for the distribution of competences. Another sub-question is *whether there is a specific occasion for the start of cooperation.* This could be, for example, the emergence of a new threat related to the Arctic. My work will be empirical, and I will take data on collective action as the basis of my work. In other words, I'm looking at how much collective action actually happens. To get a conclusive result, I will

conduct a case study. For the collection of the data, I will perform a triangulation. This means that I will look at official documents from governments and the EU, as well as scientific articles and media coverage.

The topic of my work has a great scientific and societal relevance. I focus on the issue of defence and security and to what extent the EU can address this issue together. This topic will be essential for the EU and the member states in the coming years and decades due to the changed situation in world politics caused by Russia's aggression, China's rise, and America's "America First" policy (Jäger 2021). Joint action is necessary for the relatively small European states to stand up to the other major powers, especially if the trend that began under Trump of America focusing on itself and the Pacific region continues to solidify, and Europe is increasingly left to its own devices (Paul 2015). Security is fundamental to the political and social stability of any society. It ensures the framework in which culture, trade and the economy can develop in the first place (IGM 2022).

I will start my work with a theory part, in which I will elaborate a theoretical framework based on the theories of realism and Neofunctionalism. Afterwards, I will present my research design. This will be followed by an analysis that will lead to the presentation of the results and then a discussion of them in terms of the hypotheses and the research questions.

Theoretical Framework

A European foreign and defence policy is a controversial topic. While for many states defence policy is a core part of their own sovereignty and one of the central tasks of the nation state, it is also clear that the small European states, compared to the major powers, cannot keep up on their own. Therefore, if European states want to keep up, joint action is essential (Lorenz 2017). Even though the Common European Foreign and Security Policy is a cooperation mechanism between the EU member states with the aim of gradually achieving a common foreign and security policy (Schubert 2011), the EU has hardly any competencies and there can be no talk of an effective European security and defence identity (Csernatonni 2021). The military situation in the Arctic is a question of security and thus of foreign and defence policy. It is a question of essential interests for the Arctic states, but also for the rest of Europe and especially for the EU, since economic interests are also connected with the Arctic. Therefore, to analyse this situation and examine how much collective action of the EU and its member states happens, I will use the theories of international relations. In particular, I will focus on the realist approach. However, I will also consider a contrarian approach. For this purpose, especially regarding the European context, Neofunctionalism is a good choice.

Realism

One possible theory on the cooperation of states comes from Waltz in his work "Theory of International Politics" (1979). In it, he develops several basic assumptions. The first assumption is that the international system is one in which anarchy reigns. Another assumption is that the units, in this case the states, are functionally equal and face each other as sovereign states on an equal footing. States are rational and unitary actors. The third assumption is that in that context, states act based on self-help. Their actions are designed for their own survival. Anarchy ensures that states focus on self-help strategies. "Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so" (Waltz 1979 p.102). Furthermore, Waltz assumes that the distribution of power among states influences the position of states in the system and the structure of the system. The explanatory variable for the actions of states is the distribution of capacities, respectively, of the different resources. States always try to balance power to increase their chance of survival. The balance can be internal or external. Internal means, for example, investing in the military to balance the power of another state and thus create a balance. The other option is external balancing. In external balancing, states form alliances. If a state A rises, then state B seeks other weaker states to form an alliance and balance the power share. Thus, a state of Balance of Power is formed. According to Waltz's theory, power is only a means to an end, or in other words, a means to security. It is not the absolute gain of power that is decisive, but the relative gain of power. States are thus not power maximisers but security maximisers. Balancing, whether external or internal, happens automatically and there is no need for an explicit trigger. It happens all the time and is not a controlled process but rather a kind of reflex of the states. In the context of the EU, this would mean that states would cooperate if they expected a relative gain in their own security and thus a balance of power could be promoted. The initiative for this comes from the states themselves. This is because cooperation then ensures that the basic interest of the states, namely security, is strengthened. Even though the theory was criticized especially after the end of the Cold War, for example by Richard Ned Lebow with his article "The long peace, the end of the Cold War, and the failure of realism" (1994), Waltz argues that his theory is still highly relevant. This is because the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the system, but the system has not collapsed. Therefore, there is still an anarchic system in international relations.

Stephen Walt argues similarly to Waltz in "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" (1987). Walt, too, explains the emergence of alliances with a balancing theory. According to Waltz, alliances form to stabilize the balance of power in international politics or to prevent the dominance of one country or group of countries. Walt has come to the same conclusion, but according to him, it is not the balance of power that is decisive, but the danger. Unlike Waltz, here an explicit threat is needed as a trigger for balancing. States have different ways of responding to it. One option is what Walt calls bandwagoning. It occurs when a state aligns "with the source of danger" (Walt 1987, p. 17). The other option is to build an alliance with other states. For the European states, this would mean that action would only be taken when a concrete danger exists. Such an increased threat situation can be identi-

fied, for example, in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation made European states aware of Russia's aggressiveness and thus created an awareness of the threat (Eitze 2014). This reassessment of the threat could be an incentive for states to react.

Neofunctionalism

Ernst B. Haas provides a different view. He has taken a critical look at functionalism as it is represented, for example by Mitrany (1966) and deals critically with the shortcomings of functionalism. In doing so, he develops a theory that is new in many parts, namely Neofunctionalism. Haas' Neofunctionalism assumes that European integration can be understood as a process of gradual transfer of political power to supranational institutions. Economic integration and functional cooperation play a central role in this process. Economic integration, Haas argues, leads to mutual dependencies or interdependencies. This fosters the emergence of transnational interest groups, which may then push for further integration, recognizing that their goals can be better achieved through cross-border cooperation. The good experience gained from cooperation in one area leads to the continuation of cooperation in other areas (Haas 1958).

Haas calls this effect spill-over. Haas distinguishes between 3 dimensions of spill-over. First, there is the functional spill-over. Here, the expansion of integration results from factual necessity and technical interdependencies. If it is necessary to gain a transfer of competence from the government in one area, this will lead to further such steps. This solution can then be adopted for other problems in another sector. Thus, the solution jumps along. Another type is political spill-over. Integration spill-over results from learning processes of national elites shifting their activities and expectations to the supranational level. Integration expansion occurs when a government concludes that there are more effective policies through integration. The third type is Cultivated Spill-Over. The expansion of integration results from deliberately controlled initiatives by supranational community institutions. So already existing supranational bodies or institutions want to expand their competences or power. This would mean that the EU or its institutions would take the initiative and try to get the states to act together. The EU tries to convince the states of its own point of view and to show that the transfer of competences to the supranational EU is to the advantage of all, including the individual states. Neofunctionalists argue integration takes place from the small to the large, starting at a technical, non-political contentious level, from this small integration it develops into higher and higher spheres, as more and more people experience that integration is beneficial for them. (Haas 1958). The hypothesis of Neofunctionalism can be summarized as follows. The institutions created by governments are developing their own dynamics and are replacing what are actually state tasks in more and more areas. As a result of the good experiences that then emerge, more and more advocates for supranational solutions are found, including in other sectors. This creates a self-reinforcing process through which sovereign states are gradually absorbed into an international supranational organization (Haas 1964). The integration process is charac-

terized by the interplay of pulling forces and counterforces. This can also be seen in the fact that the integration process often proceeds from problem to problem, and the time in between is not very dynamic. Only when an acute problem causes the pulling forces of the integration process to become greater than the counterforces is progress possible, and this opportunity is then often seized (Eppler 2013). One example is the joint EU credit raising to cushion the economic consequences of the Corona pandemic. For a long time, Germany and other EU countries refused to jointly borrow money on the capital market. It was only when the Corona crisis caused the pulling forces to become great enough that they agreed to take this step. But the external challenge needed to be there first. (Schmutz 2020).

Table 1: Overview: Theoretical Framework

Theory	Cause for action	possible behavioural alternatives
Structural Realism; Waltz	Balance of Power / relative gain in security	internal Balancing external Balancing
Realism; Walt	Concrete threat / Balance of Threats	Bandwagoning Building Alliances
Neofunctionalism; Haas	Pulling forces stronger than counterforces	Action from the EU

Hypothesis

According to these theories, there are various possible courses of action in the event of tensions in the Arctic. Structural realism according to Kenneth Waltz states that states act to increase their own power and to ensure their security and sovereignty and thus their survival. The goal of action must be to increase the chance of their own survival. Therefore, states try to establish a balance of power. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:

H1a: European member states will act collectively in some way if this increases their relative security.

H1b: European member states will act collectively within the European Union if this increases their relative security.

Another option, according to Waltz, is internal balancing. This would involve states investing in their own military capabilities. The second hypothesis is therefore the following:

H2: European states are not acting collectively and instead are increasing their own investments in security.

However, if there is an increase of danger for the European member states, for example due to Russia's actions, then there is also another option for action, according to Walt: bandwagoning. Hence, the third hypothesis:

H3: If the military threat from Russia in the Arctic increases, states at risk will cooperate with Russia.

Haas's Neofunctionalist theory takes a different approach. According to his theory, it is not the states that take the initiative, but rather the EU institutions due to cultivated spill-over. Cultivated spill-over means that institutions develop their own interests and try to gain more competences. States agree to joint action when it is so beneficial in some way that it outweighs the disadvantages of losing control. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is:

H4: As soon as the EU institutions have acquired initial competences in the field of security or defence, they will launch initiatives to expand these competences. States cede their competences to the EU institutions when it is to their own advantage.

Research Design

To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, I will conduct a case study. I will look at the European states as well as the European Union. I focus on the period since 2007. In 2007, Russia placed the Russian flag on the seabed above the North Pole with the help of a submarine. This act can be seen as the beginning of a new era in Arctic cooperation. Whereas before, the Arctic was considered a region free from geopolitical conflicts and characterized by cooperation and collaboration. By placing the flag, Russia made it unmistakably clear that it was laying claim to the North Pole and thus began a period of conflict (Quiring 2007). Therefore, the period from 2007 to the present is an appropriate period to analyse the defence position of the EU in the Arctic.

Actors from whom I include data must meet at least one of two conditions. Either a part of their national territory must be in the Arctic, or they must have an Arctic strategy that includes security aspects and have observer status in the Arctic Council. Sweden, Finland, and Denmark meet the former condition. The second condition is met by Germany, France, and the Netherlands (Appendix I). Spain is an observer in the Arctic Council but has not developed a coherent strategy yet. The same is true for Poland, however Poland is currently working on a strategy (The Arctic Institute 2022). Italy is an observer in the Arctic Council and has also formulated a strategy, but the strategy does not address security aspects. Therefore, Italy is not an active actor in terms of security policy, at least. Demands or isolated initiatives may also emerge from other states, but I assess the lack of engagement in the Arctic Council

and the lack of a coherent strategy as a lack of political interest regarding the region, and for this reason, it is not to be expected that any of the other states will step forward as a leading actor.

To test the hypotheses, it is first necessary to define what confirmation of the hypotheses looks like. This is also important for content validity. The first hypothesis, predicting external balancing, would be confirmed if there is evidence that nation states cooperate, and that the initiative comes from the states themselves. According to Waltz, it doesn't take a particular moment for states to start their activities; they balance continuously. According to Walt, on the other hand, it takes the presence of a concrete danger for states to start acting. The type of cooperation is not defined, so cooperation within the EU (H1b), cooperation in other organizations like NATO, but also bilateral cooperation is possible (H1a). It is crucial that the cooperation is related to the Arctic, especially to military cooperation in the Arctic.

The second hypothesis is confirmed if nation-states increase their defence and military inventories on the one hand and their investments in Arctic capabilities on the other hand. Arctic capabilities can be increased, for example, by investing in infrastructure, but also by investing in military equipment suitable for the Arctic.

H3 is confirmed in a similar way to H1. Again, the initiative must come from the states. In this case, however, the cooperation must relate to the aggressor. It only occurs when there is an increased danger to the states.

To confirm the fourth hypothesis, on the other hand, the initiative must come not from the states but from the institutions of the European Union. The EU actively tries to gain competences and to convince the states that collective action is necessary. These competences do not have to be explicitly related to the Arctic, but in general in the field of security, defence and foreign policy. A clear sign is therefore when the Commission develops goals and strategies and actively campaigns to be granted more competences in the relevant area. Yet, the Commission is not the only institution of the EU, and it is therefore also possible that other EU institutions act.

Table 2: Operationalization

Hypothesis	What to expect	What to find
H1a	States act together in any way	States cooperate in any way and that the initiative comes from the states themselves
H1a	States act together within in the EU	States cooperate within the EU and that the initiative comes from the states themselves
H2	States invest in their own abilities	States invest in military equipment/infrastructure, in exercises or in better training
H3	States will work together with the Aggressor	States cooperate with the Aggressor
H4	EU Institutions will act to get collective action	The EU actively tries to gain competence and to convince the states that collective action is beneficial

Another thing that needs to be operationalized is what cooperation or joint action looks like in the military sphere. In the European Union, cooperation in the military field is understood as "harmonising a combined effort" (EU 2022). This means that the states coordinate their actions, which pursue the same goal, in order to achieve the goal. This goes beyond the mere minimization of inconsistency. To identify cooperation, it must be possible to find common projects. These can be many and range from joint training and exercises to joint capacity building to joint military actions (Council of the European Union 2023).

After the hypotheses have been tested, a picture emerges of the extent to which European states cooperate and the extent to which this cooperation takes place within the EU. The resulting picture can then be used to answer the research question. Since I look at both the initiatives of the states and the EU, I can also answer the first sub-question by testing the hypotheses and explain from whom the cooperation, if any, originates. The testing of the hypotheses also provides an answer to the question whether there is a trigger for the states or the EU to start acting. I can answer this because I do not only look at the current situation, but at a longer period of time. This makes changes and developments visible and reveals whether there is a certain point in time from which action is taken.

Method of Data Collection

For the collection of data in this thesis, I will use triangulation. This means that I will use different data sources to shed light on different perspectives. The sources I will use are on the one hand, official documents of governments or parliaments. I include laws, statements of intent, strategy papers but also official speeches and statements of government members. The second source I refer to are media reports and the third source are scientific studies and analyses, which have been produced, for example by think tanks. Using different sources and different perspectives is necessary on the one hand to make sure that all actions and imitative are covered. On the other hand, it is also necessary to properly classify the information. The strategies that governments articulate are formulated in a cryptic way. They aim at the effect on the recipient. Thus, for example, aggressive strategies could be formulated in such a way that they are received more moderately by the recipient. Goals can also be written to meet the expectation of the global community. This is the case, for example, with environmental protection. When Russia prioritizes environmental protection in its Arctic strategy, its practical actions make it clear that it is not serious (Kluge 2021). Therefore, the assessment of think tanks, scientists and media are of great importance, otherwise the analysis result could be inaccurate. This is also a valid approach to ensure reliability in my study.

Method of Data Analysis

The analysis will be based on the hypotheses that I have already stated earlier in the theory part. I will test the hypotheses while contrasting the importance of the Realist and Neofunctionalist approaches in this case. In doing so, I will observe the development that exists in the defence position of the EU and European states with reference to the situation in the Arctic. For this purpose, I will use the method of process tracing. I will first look at the documents from the official state side and then analyse the scientific analysis and media coverage as a control. The analysis will be done by looking through the documents and texts for indicators that support one of the hypotheses. I have already defined the indicators for each hypothesis in the Research Design section. The testing of the hypotheses is done separately between the hypotheses based on the realist approach and the functionalist approach, because different indicators are important in the respective approaches. While the realist approach focuses on the individual nation states and is the driving force, the functionalist approach focuses more on the EU, or more precisely the EU Commission. Therefore, in the realistic approach, documents at the national level are more important, and in the functionalist approach, documents at the EU level are more important. The fourth hypothesis is an exception. There, the state is also decisive due to the political spill-over. However, it only appears through the demand that the EU take responsibility. Because of these differences in the approaches, a separate analysis makes sense, but in the end, it comes together to form an overall picture that presents the EU's defence position in the Arctic.

Background on the situation in the Arctic

The Arctic is not a clearly defined area, and there are many different definitions. However, there is widespread agreement on which countries are Arctic. The eight Arctic countries are Russia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the United States, and Denmark (through Greenland). These countries also constitute the members of the Arctic Council (Klimenko 2019). The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental organization in Arctic affairs. In addition to the eight Arctic states, indigenous peoples are also represented as permanent members of the Council. Non-Arctic states may participate in the Arctic Council as observers. The Council's task is to strengthen cooperation in areas such as the environment, economy and society. Security issues are not on the agenda (Government of Canada 2018). Traditionally, the Arctic has been perceived as a unique region distinct from geopolitical tensions observed elsewhere, embodying the concept of "Arctic Exceptionalism" (Dolata, 2015). However, the dynamics in the Arctic shifted when Russia symbolically planted its flag on the North Pole, signalling its ambitions in the region (Köhne 2021). This act highlighted that tensions do exist in the Arctic, similar to other parts of the world. The increasing interest in the Arctic is driven by climate change, as rising temperatures lead to the retreat of Arctic ice. Consequently, the High North has become an area of growing human activity, revealing previously inaccessible resources and opening up

new shipping routes like the North-East Passage and the North-West Passage. These developments significantly impact global economies by establishing faster connections between Europe, America, and Asia. Consequently, the Arctic is transitioning from primarily a realm of scientific interest to a focal point of geopolitical interests (Stojkovic, 2021). But climate change also holds great implications in terms of security, especially for Russia. Melting ice is creating a large open flank in Russia's north. In the past, Russia's Arctic coast was protected by the ice. This natural wall is now disappearing more and more. At the same time, Russia's sense of security is also dwindling as a result. Russia is compensating for this with massive investments in its own Arctic capabilities and military, and since 2007 Russia has steadily expanded the scope of its military activities in the region (Boulègue 2019).

Analysis

Based on the situation presented before, I have developed my research question. I will now analyse the collected data to answer this question. I will start with the initiatives coming from the European states. In the first part I will deal with the non-Arctic states (France, Netherlands, Germany), then with the Arctic states (Finland, Sweden, Denmark). After that, I will focus on the initiatives coming from the European Union.

Initiatives of non-Arctic EU member states

Although the Netherlands, France, and Germany all have both observer status in the Arctic Council and a coherent Arctic strategy, the scope of their activities differs greatly. What is apparent in all three, however, is that security aspects have long played only a minor role in the strategy. Instead, interest in the Arctic has long been limited to issues such as sustainability, economics, science and the living conditions of indigenous peoples (Humrich 2021).

This changed from the middle of the 2010s onward. The reason for that is, on the one hand, the situation in the Arctic itself, with Russia increasing its military presence and being more aggressive. But on the other hand, the situation in Ukraine is also contributing to the increased awareness. Russia's annexation of Crimea in violation of international law and the war against Ukraine was a wake-up call. Russia's actions in Ukraine are causing a reassessment of the situation in the Arctic (Humrich 2021 France Government 2022/High Representative 2022). The states reacted similarly: They invested in their own military capabilities and increasingly searched for international cooperation.

First, I look at how the states want to strengthen their own position. Germany wants to develop its capabilities primarily through joint exercises and exchange of experience (Germany 2019). However, investments are also being made. For example, €1.43 billion is to be invested in eight new aircraft that will help close a capability gap in air surveillance. Germany has consistently struggled with key capa-

bilities for the High North, such as maritime reconnaissance aircraft, submarine hunting units and submarines. But work is underway to at least reduce these skills gaps. This is being done with the acquisition of new submarines and a new modern frigate capable of submarine search. Armament projects are also being developed jointly with nations that have experience in the Arctic domain. Examples include the U212 CD submarine, which is a joint project with Norway, and the Franco-German Maritime Airborne Weapon System (MAWS) project (Paul 2021b). In addition, the MKS ("Mehrzweckkampfschiff") 180 is to be equipped with an ice class so that it can navigate in Arctic waters, and snowmobiles are to be purchased (Deutscher Bundestag 2020). Additionally, various initiatives are being launched to increase knowledge of and capabilities to operate in the Arctic. Examples include increasing the research budget for the Arctic to one of the highest in the world and opening an Arctic office in 2017 with the goal of strengthening coordination and exchange. However, there is still no effort from the German side to invest in hard security. Instead, Germany wants to contribute its mediation expertise.

In France's 2016 Arctic strategy, the tone changes. Instead of continuing to insist that the Arctic is independent of geopolitical tensions, France paints a more realistic picture of the situation. France is setting itself the goal of expanding capabilities within its armed forces to operate in the Arctic. (France 2016) Even if the 2016 announcement has not been fully implemented, it is worth noting that France has been able to significantly increase its Arctic capabilities. For example, the French Navy has been manoeuvring regularly in the Norwegian Sea since 2016, and the French Army now participates more often in exercises in Arctic areas. In 2018, the navy managed a fully autonomous crossing of the Northwest Passage, which is another proof of France's Arctic abilities (The Watch 2022b). As a result, France is considered one of the few non-Arctic states besides the A5 "capable of conducting significant military operations in the Arctic" (Depledge et. Al. 2019). From 2015 to 2019, France quadrupled its capabilities (Ministère des Armées 2019). The main focus now is to maintain these capabilities. This is done, for example, with the regular missions in Arctic waters. France has a special focus on anti-submarine warfare. This area is to be strengthened, as it is of enormous importance for the Arctic (France 2022). The already mentioned Franco-German project MAWS (ES&T 2021) also helps in this area. In addition, the procurement of icebreakers is also being considered (France 2022).

While the Netherlands has assured in the Defence White Paper (2022) that it wants to increase the military budget, no concrete measures are implemented or planned as of today. Whether this will strengthen Arctic capabilities remains an open question. Instead, the Netherlands relies strongly on exercises and information exchange with other countries to strengthen its own capabilities. Norway deserves special mention here (Kingdom of the Netherlands).

When it comes to the question of cooperation partners, there are differences among the three EU members. Germany declares in its Arctic Strategy to be an advocate for multilateral cooperation (Germany 2019). In practice, this is reflected by joint multinational exercises such as "Arctic Challenge

2021," which is just one of many examples (Bundeswehr 2021). Northern European states such as Norway, Sweden, and Iceland are particularly in focus (Germany 2020/Paul 2021b). Especially the relationship with Norway is very close (Paul 2021b). Germany always operates in the context of the EU and NATO (Rotter 2021). It advocates and actively calls for a stronger role for both the EU and NATO in the Arctic. For Germany, these two organizations are not opposites, but complement each other. Germany is clearly committed to membership in both organizations and to the responsibilities that come with it (Germany 2019). After playing only a minor role in Germany's first Arctic strategy, the EU is now becoming increasingly important for Germany. The EU is the "Rahmen und Richtung" ("Framework and direction") (Humrich 2021) for German policy. German interests in the Arctic largely coincide with those of the EU. Deepening the CFSP and CSDP have been things on the German agenda for some time. Germany sees the Arctic as an opportunity for the EU to prove itself as a reliable security actor, which is why Germany calls for a stronger role in its strategy paper. This stronger focus on the EU as a security actor also derived in part from Donald Trump's presidency, whose anti-multilateral policies made it obvious that Europe cannot constantly rely on the United States as a security guarantor. After Brexit, it was primarily Germany and France that took the driver's seat in a common European defence. This was done, for example, by enabling a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for defence. (Humrich 2021). Despite the increased focus on the EU, however, it remains to be noted that from a security policy perspective, Germany's interest in the area should be seen primarily in the context of NATO (Paul 2021b). This is also illustrated by the numerous cooperation and exercises in the context of NATO. While NATO is essential for Germany in terms of deterrence, the EU is the place where political power can be generated and exercised. Therefore, from Germany's perspective, it makes sense to continue to advocate for a coexistence of the two organizations and to call for stronger cooperation and engagement in the Arctic context from both (Humrich 2021).

France is striving for cooperation with its European partners, in which the actions of states complement each other to achieve a common goal. Whether this kind of cooperation should happen within the EU remains open. However, France stresses that the development of a common strategy for the Arctic by the EU and the member states is essential. France wants to play an important role in the region, but at the same time sees the responsibility to take care of the security problems in the region first and foremost with the Arctic states themselves (France 2022). This does not mean, however, that the other states are not involved, because France demands and supports at the same time a stronger commitment of the EU (Auffret-Cariou 2022). Together with the European countries Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark as well as Canada and the USA, France is also part of the ASFR (Ministère des Armées 2019). Until 2014, Russia was also part of it, but had to leave due to the annexation of Crimea. Said ASFR is the only military format dealing with hard security, military capabilities, and security architecture in the Arctic region (The Watch 2022a). France also emphasizes its NATO membership and sees it as a responsibility to contribute to the stability of the region. It maintains bilateral relations with several countries, too. The Nordic countries in particular are important

partners. Close cooperation was agreed with Finland in 2018, with Sweden a year later and with Denmark the cooperation already agreed in 2014 will be further deepened. Iceland is also a strategic partner and there is ongoing dialogue with Canada (Ministère des Armées 2019). France has a responsibility for stability in the Arctic because of the role it has in the international system (Auffret-Cariou 2022).

The Netherlands is pursuing a different approach. It aims to strengthen bilateral relations with the Arctic states (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). Once again, it is important to emphasize the relationship with Norway (Kingdom of the Netherlands). The Netherlands is committed to ensuring that all security developments in and around the Arctic are dealt with primarily within the framework of NATO (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). This shows that a strong role of the EU in the Arctic is rejected. NATO is the cornerstone of defence, but at the same time it demands more European cooperation and would like to take a leading role in this development. It is willing to invest financial resources in strengthening European cooperation and "use the current momentum to boost the development of European defence capabilities" (Ministry of Defence 2022). The Netherlands also calls for EU instruments such as PESCO and the EDF to be used to invest more efficiently (Ministry of Defence 2022). In addition to the EU and NATO, the Netherlands also cooperates in the JEF, a UK-led alliance consisting of multiple Nordic and Baltic countries (Ministry of Defence 2022).

Initiatives of Arctic EU member states

Next, I look at the positions and actions of the 3 states that are both members of the European Union and an Arctic state, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Two things can be seen in these states as well: Strengthening their own capabilities and strengthening cooperation.

Denmark, with access to the Arctic through the Faroe Islands and Greenland, recognized the significance of the Arctic early on and has increased its focus on the region since the mid-2000s (Zelt 2018). The Danish government aimed for a low-tension Arctic, but also acknowledged Russia's growing aggressiveness. In response to Russia placing its flag at the North Pole in 2007, Denmark led the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, seeking de-escalation in the region (Mortensgaard 2021).

Its first strategy (2011) recognizes that a strengthening of its own military is necessary to safeguard its sovereignty. Sovereignty will be demonstrated with a stronger presence of Danish troops in Arctic waters (Schulze 2017), surveillance and reconnaissance. The Arctic capabilities of the army are to be expanded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). The announcement to strengthen the own capabilities was followed by actions. 1.5 billion Danish Krone was invested in an Arctic Capabilities Package, which aimed to strengthen surveillance (Jacobsen 2022). As early as 2009, the Danish parliament had approved a plan for a military command and task force for the Arctic, to be established by 2014. Furthermore, an Arctic Response Force, composed of various parts of the Danish Armed Forces, will be

established for operations on Greenland and in other Arctic areas. In addition, F-16 fighters will be sent to the region, new frigates equipped for Arctic operations will continue to be acquired, and other military vessels will be transferred to the region (Wezeman 2012). The Danish intelligence agency PET has also increased its focus on Greenland, placing it on its list of national risks for the first time (Köhne 2020a). Due to "abnormal activities" reported in and around the GIUK Gap¹ (Gjerstad 2021), further investments are needed. To close the gap, Denmark is investing 400 million in an air surveillance radar on the Faroe Islands (Gronholt-Pedersen 2021). Air radars and drones will also be deployed in Greenland. In addition, Denmark plans to invest money in the capacity to analyse the data (Seliger 2021). Another measure is the reactivation of Cold War infrastructure (Rombach 2023). Overall, a tripling of military spending on the Arctic can be seen (Rachold 2022). Danish actions are always in response to Russia. Denmark tries to keep its contribution to a security dilemma as small as possible, but at the same time does not want to end up in a position of weakness (Danish Defence 2022b/ Jacobsen 2022).

Finland is also investing in its military, but it started later. The first Arctic strategies from 2010 and 2013 hardly included any security aspects (Kopra 2021). This changed with Russia's annexation of Crimea. Russia's actions destroyed the previously good relations and trust in Russia (Koivurova et Al. 2022). "Finland's strength lies in capable defence forces, developed to operate in Arctic conditions, and possessing Arctic expertise of a high international level" (Finnish Government 2021). Being able to act independently of others is a core element of Finnish defence. Russia's aggressiveness in Ukraine, combined with the steady increase of Russian military presence in the Arctic, makes it inevitable for Finland to expand and develop the Arctic capabilities of its own army. This is being done with increased training and more financial resources (Koivurova et Al. 2022). One example is the Talvikotka 23 exercise, conducted by the Finnish Special Forces to improve combat tactics in colder climates (Bryant 2023). An example of the increased funding is the acquisition of new Pohjanmaa-class warships, which are capable of operating in Arctic waters (Hägglom 2023). New F-35 jet fighters are also being purchased (Sarkar 2023). In general, Finland's military spending has been very stable in recent years and high compared to other countries. For example, Finland exceeds NATO's 2% target (Bundeswehr n.d.). In 2022, Finland's military spending increased by a further 36%. This is the highest percentage of any country in the world (Sarkar 2023).

Stability and hard security are very much in focus for Finland. Therefore, Finland has built a high defence capability and operability in the Arctic climate (Rachold 2022). What is special about Finland is that they see their whole country as Arctic and therefore the Arctic determines all thinking, planning and acting. As a result, there is no need for extra investment in Arctic capabilities, because everything is designed to function in these conditions (Kuusela 2020). Another proof of the great Arctic capabili-

¹ Area between Greenland, Iceland, and UK where area-wide monitoring is not available.

ties and knowledge is that about two-thirds of the world's icebreakers were built or designed in Finland (Finne 2018).

Sweden's historical reluctance on Arctic security is changing in its 2020 strategy (Rachold 2022). Unlike the previous 2011 strategy, which focused on cooperation (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2011), the new version emphasizes national capability and advance planning (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). Strengthening and better training the armed forces for Arctic operations are crucial components (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). This updated approach marks a departure from the old strategy, discarding the notion of the Arctic as low-tension (Khorrami 2020b). Sweden is reducing its international mission scope to prioritize self-defence. Reactivating the total-defence concept aims to attain greater independence (Khorrami 2020a). The Arctic now receives equal attention to the Baltic region (Khorrami 2021c). To support these objectives, military investment will increase, targeting 2% of GDP for defence by 2026, and a new military base will be established in northern Sweden (Edwardsen 2022). To achieve this, military spending will increase by 40% between 2021 and 2025. The money will be invested in strengthening all branches of the military, including the restoration of five regiments and an air force squadron, as well as the acquisition of more A26 submarines (Mader 2020).

Next, I look at the cooperation of the EU Arctic states. For Denmark, cooperation with the USA is a crucial aspect (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Denmark's security in the Arctic depends on this partnership (The security policy analysis group 2022). The Danish approach emphasises both a closer cooperation with the US and the desire for an Arctic with low tensions. (McGwin 2020). The strategic significance of Greenland strengthens the bond between Denmark and the US, as Greenland's importance to the US prompts significant investment and grants Denmark leverage through the "Greenland Card" (Rahbek-Clemmensen 2018/ Mattern 2021). Initially, Denmark's cooperative stance with the US did not extend to NATO as a whole, as greater NATO involvement in the region was met with scepticism due to the mantra of a low-tension Arctic. However, this stance has shifted, and Denmark now supports a stronger NATO presence due to Russia's actions in the region (Jacobsen 2022). While the 2011 Arctic Strategy only invoked NATO's Article 5, the mutual assistance clause (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011), the new Arctic strategy, which is delayed, is expected to reflect this change (Krog 2023). Although the new Arctic strategy is yet to be released, the Foreign and Security Policy Strategy emphasizes the need for deeper cooperation with NATO and the US, positioning Denmark at the centre of NATO and advocating for increased NATO involvement in the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Denmark's evolving stance underscores the evolving dynamics of Arctic cooperation and security.

Denmark engages in significant cooperative ventures beyond NATO and the US. It maintains close ties with other Arctic nations, particularly Canada, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). Regular exercises, exchanges, and port visits between naval forces and the Coast Guard contribute to this collaboration, as seen with Canada (MacDonald 2015). Denmark also

seeks cooperation with states sharing similar values, such as France and Germany (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Multilateral cooperation, including with Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, is also important (Menn 2015). Denmark supports enhanced cooperation within the A5 framework and actively engages with organizations like JEF and NORDEFECO (Danish Defence 2022b/Menn 2015).

The EU's role for Denmark is complex. While Denmark endorsed a broad partnership with the EU in the Arctic and advocated for EU leadership in 2011, its Arctic territories, including Greenland, are not part of the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). This constitutional relationship creates challenges for effective EU action. Consequently, Denmark gravitates towards NATO and the U.S. in security and defense matters, perceiving the EU as having no role in its security and defence policy (Mortensgaard 2021). However, with the U.S. shifting its focus towards the Pacific, the EU's significance is increasing. Denmark aims to strengthen European security while maintaining a strong transatlantic bond, calling for closer EU-NATO cooperation. However, stronger EU involvement must under no circumstances be at the expense of the United States (Henley 2022). That Denmark is serious about promoting a stronger EU is demonstrated by its recent accession to the EU's Common Defence Policy. (Henley 2022). Previously, Denmark's limited participation in the EU's defence activities kept the EU's role marginal. However, the Russian attack on Ukraine has prompted a reconsideration of this stance. Denmark emphasizes that while NATO remains their most crucial tool, the EU offers an additional avenue for defending their interests (Henley 2022).

Finland relies on a variety of bilateral and multilateral relationships (Finnish Government 2021). The importance of cooperation for Finland was recognized early on (Heininen 2014). The close relations with the United States, between whose armed forces there is an intensive exchange, especially regarding military operations in the Arctic, are important (Bryant 2023). Joint exercises also take place (Phillips 2023). Of particular importance is the connection with Sweden. In 2018, a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation was signed, which ensures that the two neighbours are cooperating more and more closely. Multilaterally, the Nordic countries also play a special role. NORDEFECO is the manifestation of defence cooperation between Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Norway (Copro 2021). Within this Nordic cooperation, Finland aims to make Arctic issues more present (Finnish Government 2021). Particularly close is the cooperation with Norway and Sweden. One example of this is the air combat exercise "Arctic Challenge", which is held every two years jointly by Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Finland is also part of the British-led JEF (Kuusela 2020). Another important institution for cooperation is the Arctic Council. The "Arctic Council is, and should remain as, the main forum on Arctic affairs and policy" (Heininen 2014). No new institutions for cooperation are needed (Finnish Government 2021). Instead, Finland advocates that the Arctic Council be expanded to include issues such as security and defence (Heininen 2014).

Of particular importance to Finland is the EU. Finland advocates a strong role for the EU, which also requires investment from the Union. Finland, together with Denmark and Sweden, would like to be at the forefront of EU Arctic activities and actively influence them (Finnish Government 2021). Finland "strongly supported the European Union's northern and Arctic engagement and Arctic policy since its accession in 1995" (Koivurova et Al. 2022). Finland has in the past and will continue to bring Arctic concerns to the EU agenda and would like to extend this to military areas. Finland sees itself as an attorney for the EU in Arctic matters. On the one hand, this strengthens its own position within the EU as a key state and expert on the Arctic, and on the other hand, it also strengthens the EU's role in the Arctic. Finland sees the EU as a "global Arctic player" (Heininen 2014). The Union is the framework in which Finnish Arctic policy happens (Kopra 2021).

Finland's long-standing commitment to neutrality and independence prevented it from considering NATO membership. Nonetheless, they developed close ties through programs like Partnership for Peace, and since 2014, Finland has been an Enhanced Opportunity Partner, providing logistical support during exercises and crises (Kopra 2021). They actively participated in NATO exercises (Rachold 2022). However, Finland's neutrality stance changed due to the Russian war, leading them to join NATO in April 2023 (Kirby 2023). Finland will promote Arctic issues in NATO and put them on the agenda (Kuusela 2020).

Finland has long been interested in good relations with Russia. This changed fundamentally with the annexation of Crimea, but at the latest with the start of the Russian war in Ukraine. Finland, like many other EU members, broke off relations with Russia almost completely (Humrich 2021/Finnish Government 2021/Koivurova 2022). Even cooperation in the Arctic Council has been suspended until further notice (Paul 2022).

Sweden's security policy is characterized by a strong emphasis on cooperation, with a historical commitment to neutrality (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011/Khorrami 2019). However, Sweden engages extensively in bilateral cooperation, particularly with the United States, which is considered a crucial partner for Swedish defence policy (Khorrami 2019). The cooperation between Sweden and the United States is comprehensive and has a long history, making the US a bulwark for Swedish defence (Khorrami 2021a). Additionally, Sweden maintains close ties with Finland in Arctic affairs, and the two countries collaborate through initiatives such as NORDEFECO and JEF. Other Scandinavian and Nordic countries are also important partners (Khorrami 2019). To give an example, Sweden, Finland and Norway have a well-rehearsed plan for joint exercises and train together on a daily basis (The Watch 2022c). Other states with which there are bilateral agreements are the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). Sweden's goal is to create the most diverse network of defence cooperation possible (Khorrami 2020a).

Traditionally, the EU has played a limited role in Sweden's security policy (Khorrami 2020b). However, Sweden's perspective shifted with concerns over the reliability of the US during the Trump admin-

istration, leading to a more open approach towards a stronger EU role (Khorrami 2020a). Sweden now welcomes a stronger EU role and actively shapes the Union's Arctic policy, considering the EU an important Arctic player (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020). Nevertheless, Sweden recognizes that the EU lacks hard security capabilities, which are addressed through cooperation with NORDEFCO and the US (Khorrami 2019).

Sweden also maintains relations with NATO despite its neutrality, primarily through PfP and participates in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (Thatcher, 2022; The Watch 2022a). While Sweden traditionally adheres to neutrality, it has intensified its relationship with NATO and expresses a preference for NATO-EU cooperation (Khorrami 2021). Recent developments, including the conflict with Russia, have prompted Sweden, like Finland, to express its intention to join NATO (Edvardsen 2022). With the majority of Arctic countries being NATO members, NATO's focus on the Arctic is expected to increase (Khorrami 2022).

EU initiatives

The Lisbon Treaty, in force since 2009, established the CFSP and the CSDP, transferring certain policy aspects to the EU. However, the EU's competences in this inter-governmental area are limited, with the final decision-making authority residing with member states (Algieri 2009).

The EU's engagement in the Arctic began in 2008, leading to the adoption of several documents. Initially focused on observing climate change impacts (EU Commission 2008), the responsibility for action rested with member states (Council of the European Union 2009). Over time, the EU recognized security and stability in the Arctic as a core interest (European Parliament 2011). Consequently, the EU assumed greater responsibility, aiming to collaborate with Arctic states to enhance monitoring and surveillance capabilities, including through the Galileo satellite project (European Commission 2012). The growing importance of the Arctic for global trade highlighted the need for a comprehensive strategy (European Parliament 2014), which was later implemented in 2016. The EU sought dialogue with third countries, investment in soft security, research on Arctic dual-use resources, and the development of effective security capabilities (European Commission 2016). While member states primarily hold responsibility for Arctic affairs, other EU members also have obligations. The EU aims to increase involvement in the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (European Commission 2019). The 2021 strategy emphasizes cooperation with NATO and Western partners, a stronger EU presence in the Arctic, and a shift from observer to an engaged actor (EU Commission 2021).

To stay within the scheme already applied to nation states, I will first look at what measures have been taken to improve the EU's own capabilities. In general, and not explicitly related to the Arctic, the EU wants to strengthen its own capabilities to "contribute to the peace and security of our continent, respond to external conflicts and crises, build the capacities of partners and protect the EU and its citi-

zens" (High Representative 2022). The aim is to respond to the new geopolitical situation, and this process has been underway since 2016. The goal is a stronger EU that can act independently and autonomously. To achieve this, they want to invest money, for example in strategic enablers. However, investments are not only to be made in new material, but also in reforming the structures. The EU should be able to act more quickly, act with foresight, and become more effective and efficient. To achieve this, new institutions are to be established, the actions of the EU and the various member states are to be better coordinated and there is to be more cooperation. With the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, the Union wants to develop an intervention force that can be deployed quickly (High Representative 2022). The EU satellite projects Copernicus and Galileo also play a major role in monitoring and surveillance in the Arctic and can thus provide important data and help close the GIUK Gap (EU Commission 2021). The EU's progress in defence policy in general can also be seen in projects such as FCAS, PESCO, military border protection in the framework of FRONTEX or missions in Mali (Müller 2021). The goal of the strategic compass is to continue this development through 2030 (Kaim 2022).

If you look at cooperation, the EU is primarily looking for close ties with NATO. The desired cooperation goes beyond mere collaboration, sharing of information or joint exercises. Rather, the aim is to develop a joint strategy. In addition to NATO, the EU also wants to work with other Western partners. The UK is also to remain an important partner in security matters post-Brexit (EU Commission 2021/Müller 2021). Despite having to wait over 20 years for observer status in the Arctic Council (Ciolan 2022), the EU is engaged in the AC. Cooperation with the A8 is to be further intensified. There is also a plan to intensify cooperation with Greenland (Aliyev 2020). With Russia, which importance for the European security system was emphasized for many years, the EU stopped any cooperation after the war in Ukraine began in 2022 (Alfred-Wegener-Institute 2022).

However, there is some evidence that there is a discrepancy between what the EU demands or promises and what actually happens. As early as 2010, France and the UK, which were still part of the EU at the time, expressed disappointment with the EU. Due to the lack of progress on the CSDP, they are looking for cooperation outside the EU (Kempin 2010). In addition, it is not clear what exactly the EU wants (Paul 2022). The Commission remains rather vague in its strategy (Kaim 2022/Raspotnik 2021). It only reacts to the situation in the Arctic and what the United States, Russia and China are doing instead of taking the initiative and actively shaping it itself (Raspotnik 2021). The EU promises a lot without showing a strategic priority. There is no concrete path of implementation (Kaim 2022). The common foreign policy also suffers from problems such as "weak leadership, incoherence, disunity and all kinds of rivalries" (Raspotnik 2021). This makes the implementation of any strategy impossible. Another problem is that the structures of the Union do not work (Paul 2022). There is over-institutionalization and diffusion of responsibility. On top of all this, there is a lack of political will (Kaim 2022). The nation-states show no willingness to hand over competences to the EU (Aliyev

2020). The Arctic is also not relevant for all 27 member states and thus there is no common effort to push the EU forward in this area (Raspotnik 2021). The EU policy in the Arctic is mainly dominated by the Arctic states. Germany has also been increasingly active recently. States outside the EU, such as Norway and Iceland, are also seeking influence. Arctic policy is not made in Brussels, but in the nation states, claims Østhagen (2021a).

Discussion

After the analysis of the collected data, the discussion of the data now follows. I will use the information collected to either confirm or falsify the four hypotheses I have formulated. I will do this in the order in which I established them.

The first hypothesis suggests that states cooperate in order to increase their relative security. Hypothesis 1b further suggests that this cooperation takes place within the framework of the EU. The states studied all rely on cooperation to address Arctic-related challenges, with a particular emphasis on partnerships with other Arctic states. Relations with Norway and the Finnish-Swedish alliance stand out. However, the level of engagement with the EU (H1b) varies considerably between the states (Table 3). Finland has consistently supported a strong EU role in the Arctic. France, although a NATO member, also prefers to cooperate with its European partners. Germany, on the other hand, favours a stronger involvement of both organisations, recognising NATO's effectiveness in defence and deterrence, while valuing the EU's potential for political influence. Sweden presents a difficult case, having initially opposed greater EU involvement in the Arctic due to concerns about the impact on its historically significant partnership with the US. However, under Donald Trump's administration, Sweden has moved closer to Finland's position, strengthening the EU's role. Denmark, through its Arctic territory of Greenland, is primarily focused on the region and tends to prioritise cooperation within NATO, given Greenland's non-EU status and geographical proximity to North America. The Netherlands, while generally supportive of a stronger EU in defence matters, sees NATO as the only relevant actor in the Arctic.

Table 3: States' position on the engagement of the EU and NATO

More in favour of the EU	Both working together	More in favour of NATO
Finland	Germany	Denmark
France	Sweden	Netherlands

Sweden's position is particularly surprising since, like Finland, it was not a NATO member for a long time. Nevertheless, Sweden did not push for cooperation within the EU and instead relied on cooperation outside the EU, e.g., in the framework of NORDEFECO. It remains to be seen how Finland's and Sweden's position will change now that both have abandoned their long-standing neutrality and joined NATO. Since Sweden has in the past placed great value on diversity in defence cooperation, it is quite likely that Sweden will even increase its commitment to the EU to have an alternative to NATO. Denmark's future position also remains open, as it only joined the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2022 in response to Russia's war. A more positive attitude towards the EU is therefore definitely imaginable.

An important consideration in the choice between the EU and NATO or the US is the interaction between the two and also the external impact, especially on Russia. An example of this is Sweden, which opposes a stronger role for the EU because it fears that this would lead to a withdrawal of the US and thus a weakening of NATO. Support for NATO can therefore also be seen as a commitment to the US. Externally, NATO tends to stand for a confrontational course. This can be seen, for example, in Denmark's consistent support for the US and NATO. Denmark recognised the danger posed by Russia at an early stage and is trying to do something about it. The EU is focusing less on confrontation and deterrence and more on de-escalation. Thus, until the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the EU tried to stay in contact with Russia. The pro-EU position of Finland can also be partly explained by this de-escalating function that the EU assumes. Finland has a long border with Russia and, just like the EU, has for a long time sought to cooperate with Russia, at least in some areas, in order to maintain a dialogue.

In summary, the data analysed confirmed hypothesis 1a. All states seek cooperation with partners to establish a balance of power. Hypothesis 1b, on the other hand, cannot be fully confirmed. While some countries do seek cooperation with the EU, there is also opposition to greater EU involvement. The nature of the EU's foreign policy prevents progress in such a situation, so countries look for cooperation outside the EU, for example in NATO.

The second hypothesis is that states do not cooperate but invest in their own capabilities, meaning they pursue internal balancing. This hypothesis can be partially confirmed. Although almost all states invest in their Arctic capabilities (Table 4), this is not done instead of cooperation. On the contrary, the states are pursuing a two-track strategy: rearmament and cooperation. The Arctic countries invest the most in their own security, followed by France and Germany. The Netherlands falls slightly behind the other countries in this respect.

Table 4: States' investment

	Investment in equipment	Investment in staff	Increased presence or exercises
France	X		X
Germany	X		X
Netherlands			X
Denmark	X	X	X
Finland	X		X
Sweden	X	X	X

The third hypothesis claims that states engage in bandwagoning and ally themselves with the aggressor, in this case Russia. This hypothesis can be clearly falsified. There is no evidence of any rapprochement with Russia and no movement in this direction. Instead, the opposite is the case. Connections and collaborations with Russia have almost completely stopped after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 or at the latest after the start of the war in 2022. Therefore, one can make the clear statement that the hypothesis is false.

The fourth hypothesis is that the EU institutions are launching initiatives to achieve collective action by the member states and thus expand their own competences. We can indeed see many attempts by the EU to combine the interests of its members and to be a significant actor in the Arctic (Appendix II).

Based on the development within the various initiatives, one can also see that the EU's claim to competences in security policy in the Arctic is growing. However, there is also clear criticism that the EU's claim does not correspond to reality. The EU wants to be an increasingly important player, also geopolitically, but little of this can be seen in implementation. The member states are therefore looking for other partners and other forms of organisation in which more effective cooperation is possible. The EU talks a lot but acts little. I can therefore state that the assumption of the fourth hypothesis, that the EU institutions are trying to expand their competences, can be confirmed, but the conditions under which these attempts succeed are not given. This means that joint action within the EU and the associated transfer of competences from the nation states to the EU institutions is not advantageous for the member states.

Conclusion

At the end of my thesis, I will now use the collected findings to answer my research question: *To what extent does the EU act collectively in defence policy in the Arctic?* First, it can be said that a lot is happening in the Arctic. From the Arctic states and EU's large military forces, we see investments to improve their own abilities to operate in the Arctic. Capability gaps are being addressed and surveillance in the region is being ramped up. Military personnel are being actively trained and there is an increased military presence.

However, this internal balancing does not mean that the European states rely solely on their own strength. Quite the contrary, they are very aware that they alone, despite all their investments, have no chance of balancing out the strength of Russia or even China. That is why the states are pursuing a two-pronged strategy. They are strengthening their own capabilities, but above all they are working together. A rapprochement with Russia to lower tensions is not in sight; instead, Russia is increasingly isolated from the West. Cooperation such as JEF or NORDEFECO show that the states are willing to act collectively. There are also good bilateral relations, for example between Euro-Arctic states.

While there is openness and willingness to cooperate, the role of the EU in the Arctic remains questionable. From the EU's perspective, my research reveals a rather disappointing picture. Despite the EU's aspirations to become a geopolitical actor (von der Leyen 2019), this ambition is not evident in the Arctic. The most recent Arctic Strategy of the EU suggests that it sees itself as a legitimate security actor in the region. However, the Arctic is not a focal point in the Strategic Compass, which was published a year after the Strategy and is intended to shape the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy until 2030. The lack of attention to the Arctic in the Strategic Compass indicates that the 2021 Arctic Strategy does not signify a breakthrough for the EU.

The reasons for the EU's failure to act collectively in the Arctic are multifaceted. On one hand, it stems from a lack of political will among states like Denmark and the Netherlands, which oppose stronger EU involvement. On the other hand, some member states display limited interest. Only nine out of the 27 EU member states participate in the Arctic Council, and only eight have formulated a national Arctic strategy. Additionally, crucial actors in the European Arctic, such as Norway and the UK, are not EU members. Although these countries actively engage in the Arctic, cooperation with them cannot take place within the EU framework. Another setback could be Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO. Once completed, seven out of the eight Arctic states will be NATO members, excluding Russia. Consequently, NATO is well on its way to becoming a central institution for Arctic security and defence, potentially making other organisations such as the ASFR obsolete. It can therefore be assumed that NATO's role in the region will increase. For the EU, such a tendency is not noticeable.

So, to answer the question, one has to say that the relevant EU members act collectively, but outside the framework of the EU. Therefore, the EU's defence position in the Arctic is highly dependent on the

individual members and especially on NATO. This does not mean that the EU is irrelevant, as there are indeed some projects in which it is active, for example via PESCO. The EU is also relevant in the area of soft security, for example with the European satellite projects Copernicus and Galileo.

Regarding the sub-question of who initiates cooperation, both the states and the EU have made repeated attempts to cultivate collaborations. The states have experienced relatively more success in this regard compared to the EU. Therefore, one can conclude that the existing cooperation and agreements are primarily initiated by the states themselves rather than the EU.

Two key events in Ukraine that can be attributed to Russia - the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine - led to the start of cooperation. These events prompted a re-evaluation of the threat posed by Russia and motivated significant efforts from most states. The war fundamentally transformed the security landscape in Europe, leading to Finland and Sweden joining NATO and Denmark joining the CSDP. Thus, a clear threat was necessary for states to act. However, it is not solely Russia that triggers action; the unreliability of one's own allies can also prompt a reassessment of the situation, as seen during the Trump presidency.

These findings align with the conclusions of other studies. For instance, Julian Bergmann and Patrick Müller (2021) assert that the EU's defence policy is often sluggish, and progress is typically driven by crises. Rosa Beckmann and Ronja Kempin (2017) also argue that the success of the Common Security and Defence Policy relies on the willingness of states to transfer competences, and without such cooperation, the EU's ability to act is limited. Regarding the Arctic, Ionela Ciolan (2022) suggests that the EU's engagement in the region has been more rhetoric than practice. My own findings corroborate these observations. By examining Arctic security policy from the European perspective, my work helps shed light on the disparity between the EU's proclaimed geopolitical aspirations and the reality. Furthermore, it provides insights into the diverse defence policy interests of Arctic states, explaining the EU's limited involvement in the region.

The strength of my work lies in its extensive empirical base, incorporating diverse sources to provide a comprehensive understanding and accurate assessment of the situation. A weakness, however, is the lack of statistical data. As a result, an assessment of what the real balance of power is between the actors is relatively difficult. This is an area for future research, but this data is often confidential and difficult to obtain. Further research could focus on the impact of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, Denmark joining the CSDP, and exploring the increasing involvement of emerging Arctic actors like the US and China. These aspects offer potential for inclusion in future studies.

My findings have practical implications, highlighting the need for the EU to invest significantly in hard security to establish itself as a credible security actor. However, progress depends on the political will of member states, and the EU should avoid making grand promises it cannot realistically fulfill. Failure to match words with actions erodes member trust and leads to frustration. At the same time, the

EU must be prepared to respond swiftly in times of crisis if the political will arises. Unfortunately, the EU missed the opportunity to present itself as a reliable security guarantor during the Ukraine conflict, which influenced Sweden and Finland to choose NATO. The EU's future role in the Arctic remains uncertain due to the majority of Arctic states and all EU Arctic states being NATO members. The EU must define its role alongside NATO and establish an institutional framework for military cooperation among its members. Exploiting synergies and pursuing joint projects within the EU framework is crucial for achieving independence and exerting geopolitical influence through collective action.

List of references

- AFP-JIJI. (2023). *How Finland joining boosts NATO defenses against Russia*. The Japan Times.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/03/world/finland-nato-russia/> [26.06.2023].
- Alfred-Wegener-Institute. (2022). *Security Policy in the Arctic - Outline of an Analysis*. German Arctic Office.
- Algieri, F. (2009). Die Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP): Mehr als nur ein Vertragstext. *Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik*.
- Aliyev, N. (2020). *The EU Arctic policy and perspectives of relations with Russia*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Auffer-Cariou, J. (2022). The 2022-First Polar Strategy and the current state of the French Arctic Policy. *Current Developments in Arctic Law, Vol. 10*.
- Baudu, P. (2022). Revitalizing France’s Sight on the High North: Arctic Environmental and Security Elements of the New French. *The Arctic Institute*.
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/revitalizing-france-sight-high-north-arctic-environmental-security-elements-new-french-polar-strategy/> [23.06.2023].
- Beckmann, R. & Kempin, R. (2017). EU-Verteidigungspolitik braucht Strategie. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*.
- Bergmann, J. & Müller, P. (2021). Failing forward in the EU’s common security and defense policy: the integration of EU crisis management. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28(10), 1669–1687.
- Boulègue, M. (2019). *Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a „Low Tension“ Environment*. Chatham House.
- Braune, G. (2020). Geopolitik in der Arktis. *Internationale Politik*.
<https://internationalepolitik.de/de/geopolitik-der-arktis> [28.03.2023].
- Bryant, A. (2023). *Green Berets, Finnish Army special forces train together in Arctic*. www.army.mil.
https://www.army.mil/article/265442/green_berets_finnish_army_special_forces_train_together_in_arctic [19.06.2023].

- Bundesregierung. (2019). *Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik*.
- Bundeswehr. (2021). *Polygone in der Arktis*. *Bundeswehr.de*
<https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/luftwaffe/aktuelles/polygone-in-der-arktis-5090458> [26.06.2023].
- Bundeswehr. (n.d.). *NATO-Beitritt von Schweden und Finnland Bedeutung für die euro-atlantische Sicherheit*. *bundeswehr.de*. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/weitere-bmvg-dienststellen/zentrum-innere-fuehrung/nato-beitritt-von-schweden-und-finnland-bedeutung-fuer-die-euro-atlantische-sicherheit-5504152> [23.06.2023]
- Bye, H. (2020). Sweden Launches New Arctic Strategy. *High North News*.
<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/sweden-launches-new-arctic-strategy> [24.06.2023].
- Bye, H. (2022). Sweden's Chief of Defense Wants to Strengthen Military Presence in Northern Sweden. *High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/swedens-chief-defense-wants-strengthen-military-presence-northern-sweden> [26.06.2023].
- Bye, H. (2023). The High North on the Agenda for Norwegian-Dutch Minister Meeting. *High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/high-north-agenda-norwegian-dutch-minister-meeting> [24.06.2023].
- Cinciripini, L. (2023). From East to North: New Frontiers for the EU-NATO Arctic Defense. *Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 21*(No. 4). <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1186/from-east-to-north-new-frontiers-for-the-eu-nato-arctic-defense> [10.06.2023].
- Ciolan, I. (2022). *The EU's geopolitical awakening in the Arctic*. European Policy Center.
<https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/The-EUs-geopolitical-awakening-in-the-Arctic~47c318>
 [26.06.2023].
- Council of the European Union. (2009). *Council conclusions on Arctic issues*.
- Council of the European Union. (2023). *EU cooperation on security and defence*.
www.consilium.europa.eu. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>
 [28.03.2023].
- Csernaton, R. (2021). *The EU's Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex*.

- Danish Defence. (2022a). *Denmark heads naval force at missile live-fire exercise*. Defence Command Denmark. <https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/news/2022/denmark-heads-naval-force-at-missile-live-fire-exercise/> [26.06.2023].
- Danish Defence. (2022b). *The Danish Armed Forces train crisis management in Denmark's local region together with nine JEF countries*. Defence Command Denmark. <https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/news/2022/the-danish-armed-forces-train-crisis-management-in-denmarks-local-region-together-with-nine-jef-countries/> [26.06.2023].
- Danish Defence. (n.d.). *Joint Arctic Command*. <https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/organisation/joint-arctic-command/> [26.06.2023].
- Denmark. (2011). *Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs*.
- Depledge, D., Boulègue, M., Foxall, A. & Tulupov, D. (2019). *Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct*. Arctic Yearbook. <https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2019/2019-briefing-notes/328-why-we-need-to-talk-about-military-activity-in-the-arctic-towards-an-arctic-military-code-of-conduct> [20.06.2023].
- Deutscher Bundestag. (2022). *Aktivitäten der Bundeswehr in der Arktis. Drucksache 19/19973*.
- Dolata, P. (2015). *Die Arktis Eine facettenreiche und sich wandelnde Region. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*.
- Edwardsen, A. (2022). *Sweden Prepares for Massive Shift Within Security and Defense. High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/sweden-prepares-massive-shift-within-security-and-defense> [26.06.2023].
- Edwardsen, A. (2023). *Finland Explores New Direction for Its Arctic Policy. High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/finland-explores-new-direction-its-arctic-policy> [26.06.2023].
- Eitze, J. & Müller, P. (2014). *Russlands Annexion der Krim*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

- Eppler, A. & Scheller, H. (2013). Zug- und Gegenkräfte im Spiegel der Theorien der europäischen Integration. In: *Zug- und Gegenkräfte im europäischen Integrationsprozess* (p. 45–70). Nomos.
- ES&T. (2021). Systemkonzept für das luftgestützte Kampfsystem MAWS der Marine vorgestellt. *ES&T - Europäische Sicherheit & Technik*.
<https://esut.de/2021/11/meldungen/30886/systemkonzept-fuer-das-luftgestuetzte-kampfsystem-maws-der-marine-vorge-stellt/#:~:text=Mit%20dem%20deutsch%2Dfranz%C3%B6sischen%20Projekt,der%20beiden%20Nationen%20ersetzt%20werden.> [06.06.2023].
- European Commission. (2012). *Developing a European Union Policy towards the Progress since 2008 and next steps*.
- European Commission. (2020). A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic. *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*.
- EU Commission. (2008). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council- The European Union and the Arctic Region*.
- EU Commission. (2021). *A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic*.
- European Commission. (2016). *Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council - An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic*.
- European Commission. (2019). *Council Conclusions on the EU Arctic policy*.
- EU Commission. (o. D.). *Common foreign and security policy*. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.
https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/common-foreign-and-security-policy_en [12.06.2023].
- European Parliament. (2011). *Sustainable EU policy for the High North*.
- European Parliament. (2014). *EU strategy for the Arctic*.
- European Parliament. (2017). *An integrated EU policy for the Arctic*.
- Finnish Government. (2021). *Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy*.
- Finland. (2021). *Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy*. *Finnish Government*.

- Finne, A. (2018). Finland Wants to Break the Ice – For Everyone, Everywhere. *High North News*.
<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/finland-wants-break-ice-everyone-everywhere>
 [26.06.2023].
- France. (2016). The great challenge of the arctic: national roadmap for the arctic. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development*.
- France. (2022). *Equilibrium in extremes*. Ambassador for the Poles and Maritime Issues.
- Forsberg, R. (2022). *Finland's Contributions to NATO: Strengthening the Alliance's Nordic and Arctic Fronts*. Wilson Center. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/finlands-contributions-nato-strengthening-alliances-nordic-and-arctic-fronts> [26.06.2023].
- Germany. (2017). Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik Verantwortung übernehmen, Vertrauen schaffen, Zukunft gestalten. *Auswärtiges Amt*.
- Gjerstad, M. & Rogers, J. (2021). Knowledge is Power: Greenland, Great Powers, and Lessons from the Second World War. *The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies*.
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/knowledge-power-greenland-great-powers-lessons-second-world-war/> [26.06.2023].
- Government Communications Department. (2021). *Prime Minister Marin's speech at Arctic Frontiers conference*. Valtioneuvosto. <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/10616/prime-minister-marin-s-speech-at-arctic-frontiers-conference> [21.06.2023].
- Government of Canada. (2018). *Arctic Council*. Canada.ca. <https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/arctic-council.html>
 [05.06.2023].
- Government Offices of Sweden. (2020). *Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region*.
- Gronholt-Pedersen, J. (2021). Denmark to spend more on Arctic defence as melting sea ice prompts jostle for control. *Reuters.com*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-defence-arctic-idUSKBN2AB1VR> [26.06.2023].
- Haas, E. B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*.
- Haas, E. B. (1964). *Beyond the Nation State*. Stanford University Press.

- Hackett, J. (2022). *Finland, Sweden and NATO: the capability dimension*. IISS.
<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis//military-balance/2022/05/finland-sweden-and-nato-the-capability-dimension> [26.06.2023].
- Hägglom, R. (2023). Update on the status of the Pohjanmaa-class project. *Naval News*.
<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/04/update-on-the-status-of-the-pohjanmaa-class-project/> [26.06.2023].
- Heininen, L. (2014). Foreign policy interests of Finland in the Arctic. *Perceptions and strategies of arcticness in sub-arctic Europe - Latvijas Arpolitikas instituts*.
- Henley, J. (2022). Denmark votes overwhelmingly to join EU's common defence policy. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/01/denmark-votes-on-joining-eus-common-defence-policy> [26.06.2023].
- Herman, A. (2022). Sweden and Finland Will Help NATO Counter Russia in the Arctic. *WSJ*.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-and-finland-will-help-nato-confront-russia-in-the-arctic-ice-submarine-nuclear-11654786841#comments_sector [26.03.2023].
- Higham, I. (2021). Sweden updates its Arctic strategy. *Mundus International*. <https://mundus-international.com/sweden-updates-its-arctic-strategy/> [25.02.2023].
- High North News. (2023). *Arctic Security Forces Roundtable held in Finland*.
<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-security-forces-roundtable-held-finland>
[26.06.2023].
- High Representative/Vice President. (2022). *A Strategic Compass For Security And Defence*. European Commission.
- Hilde, P. S. (2022). *Auf Eis gelegt: Sicherheitspolitik und internationale Beziehungen in*.
<https://www.baks.bund.de/de/arbeitspapiere/2022/auf-eis-gelegt-sicherheitspolitik-und-internationale-beziehungen-in-der-arktis> [20.06.2023].
- Hoffmann, S. (1987). *Janus And Minerva: Essays In The Theory And Practice Of International Politics*. Westview Press.

- Hultqvist, P. (2020). Sweden adjusts to rising tensions in the High North. *Defense News*.
<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/sweden-adjusts-to-rising-tensions-in-the-high-north/> [26.06.2023].
- Humpert, M. (2022). New Finnish Government Report Finds More Complicated Arctic Security Environment. *High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/new-finnish-government-report-finds-more-complicated-arctic-security-environment> [26.06.2023].
- Humrich, C. (2021). More Rhetorical Commitment than Coherence: Germany's Security, Its Arctic Policy and the EU. In *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- IGM. (2022). *Frieden in Europa ist die Grundlage von sozialer Sicherheit und wirtschaftlichem Wohlstand*. <https://www.igmetall-nieder-sachsen-anhalt.de/presse/news-details/frieden-in-europa-ist-die-grundlage-von-sozialer-sicherheit-und-wirtschaftlichem-wohlstand/> [14.04.2023].
- Iso-Markku, T., Innola, E. & Tiilikainen, T. (2018). *A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment*. Prime Minister's Office.
- Jacobsen, M. (2022). Arctic Aspects in Denmark's New Foreign and Security Policy Strategy. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-aspects-denmark-new-foreign-security-policy-strategy/> [23.06.2023].
- Jäger, T. (2021). Europa wird zwischen China, USA und Russland zerrieben. *FOCUS online*.
https://www.focus.de/politik/experten/jaeger/internationale-veraenderungen-zwischen-china-first-america-first-und-russia-first-muss-europa-um-seinen-platz-kaempfen_id_10918979.html
 [20.06.2023].
- Jørgensen, K. J. (2015). *Denmark's military capacities in the Arctic Region*. Danish Joint Arctic Command.
- Kaim, M. & Kempin, R. (2022). Kompass oder Windspiel? *SWP-Aktuell, No. 1*.
- Kempin, R. (2010). Abkehr von der GSVP? *SWP-Aktuell, No. 81*.
- Khorrami, N. (2019). Sweden's Arctic Strategy: An Overview. *The Arctic Institute*.
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/> [15.06.2023].

- Khorrami, N. (2020a). Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden's Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II). *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/small-non-aligned-sweden-strategic-posture-arctic-part-ii/> [15.06.2023].
- Khorrami, N. (2020b). Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden's Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/partnership-healthy-dose-distance-swedens-attitude-eu-arctic-player/> [15.06.2023].
- Khorrami, N. (2021a). EU–Sweden Defence Cooperation in the Arctic: The Future or a Fad? In *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Khorrami, N. (2021b). Finland, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden: A Middle Power Partnership for Enhanced Maritime Capacity in the. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/finland-japan-south-korea-sweden-middle-power-partnership-enhanced-maritime-capacity-arctic/> [15.06.2023].
- Khorrami, N. (2021c). Sweden's New Arctic Strategy: Change and Continuity in the Face of Rising Global Uncertainty. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-new-arctic-strategy-change-continuity-face-rising-global-uncertainty/> [15.06.2023].
- Khorrami, N. (2022). Pending Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership and the Future Relevance of ASFR and CHOD. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/pending-finnish-swedish-nato-membership-future-relevance-asfr-chod/> [15.06.2023].
- Kingdom of the Netherlands. (n.d.). *Defence cooperation*. Netherlandsandyou.nl. <https://www.netherlandsandyou.nl/your-country-and-the-netherlands/norway/defence> [20.06.2023].
- Kirby, P. & Beale, J. (2023). Nato's border with Russia doubles as Finland joins. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65173043> [07.06.2023].
- Klimenko, E. (2019). *The Geopolitics of a Changing Arctic*. SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-background-papers/geopolitics-changing-arctic> [05.06.2023].

- Kluge, J. & Paul, M. J. (2021). Russlands Arktis-Strategie bis 2035 – Große Pläne und ihre Grenzen. *Russland-Analysen*, 405, 6–9. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Köhne, G. (2020a). Dänemarks Militärpräsenz in Grönland. *deutschlandfunk.de*.
<https://www.scribbr.de/zitieren/generator/ordnern/78yT6KmjdgW2wZpVTFQDoy/listen/4Nv9tsPDCKOABIGeeQIpKG/zitieren/online-nachrichten-artikel/> [26.06.2023].
- Köhne, G. (2020b). Kampf um Nordpolregion - Die Arktis als Beute der Großmächte. *Deutschlandfunk*. <https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/kampf-um-nordpolregion-die-arktis-als-beute-der-grossmaechte-100.html> [17.03.2023].
- Köhne, G. (2021). Russland und die Arktis: Der Kampf um Rohstoffe unter dem Eis. *Deutschlandfunk*. <https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/russland-und-die-arktis-der-kampf-um-rohstoffe-unter-dem-eis-100.html> [05.06.2023].
- Koivurova, T., Heikkilä, M., Ikävalko, J., Kirchner, S., Kopra, S., Mikkola, H., Pursiainen, R., Sepponen, S., Moisio, M. & Stepien, A. (2022). *Arctic cooperation in a new situation: Analysis on the impacts of the Russian war of aggression*. Government report.
- Kopra, S. (2021). Finland's Arctic Policy and the European Union. In *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Krog, A. (2023). *Grønlands udenrigsstrategi er lige på trapperne og baner vejen for Kongerigets stærkt forsinkede arktiske strategi*. [altinget.dk](https://www.altinget.dk).
<https://www.altinget.dk/arktis/artikel/groenlands-udenrigsstrategi-er-lige-paa-trapperne-og-baner-vejen-for-kongerigets-staerkt-forsinkede-arktiske-strategi> [07.06.2023].
- Kuusela, J. (2020). A view from Finland: Security and defense in the Arctic. *Defense News*.
<https://www.defensenews.com/smr/frozen-pathways/2020/05/11/a-view-from-finland-security-and-defense-in-the-arctic/> [20.06.2023].
- Lebow, R. N. (1994). The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism. *International Organization*, 48(2), 249–277.
- LETA/TBT. (2022). *The accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO will also strengthen security situation in the Arctic - Kols*. The Baltic Times.

- https://www.baltictimes.com/the_accession_of_finland_and_sweden_into_nato_will_also_strengthen_security_situation_in_the_arctic_-_kols/ [26.06.2023].
- Lohmann, B. (2023). *Klimawandel, Bodenschätze, Tourismus, Geopolitik: Darum interessiert sich Deutschland für die Arktis*. WEB.DE. <https://web.de/magazine/wissen/klima/interessiert-deutschland-arktis-37269806> [26.06.2023].
- Lorenz, C. (2017). EU-Verteidigungspolitik: Durch Druck zu mehr Gemeinsamkeit? *fes.de*. <https://www.fes.de/politik-fuer-europa/detailseite-aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik-in-europa/eu-verteidigungspolitik-durch-druck-zu-mehr-gemeinsamkeit> [28.03.2023].
- MacDonald, A. (2015). The Militarization of the Arctic: Emerging Reality, Exaggeration, and Distraction. *Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 15*(No. 3).
- Mader, G. (2020). *Bis 2025: Schweden erhöht Militäretat um 40 Prozent*. Militär Aktuell. <https://www.militaeraktuell.at/bis-2025-schweden-erhoeht-militaeretat-um-40-prozent/> [25.06.2023].
- Mattern, J. (2021). Dänemarks Einfluss in der Arktis schmilzt. *Telepolis*. <https://www.telepolis.de/features/Daenemarks-Einfluss-in-der-Arktis-schmilzt-6052637.html> [26.06.2023].
- McAllister, D. (2022). *Die EU braucht den „Strategischen Kompass“*. Handelsblatt. <https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/gastkommentar-global-challenges-die-eu-braucht-den-strategischen-kompass/28189492.html> [26.06.2023].
- McGwin, K. (2020). *Denmark should support an Arctic military forum, a Danish think-tank says*. ArcticToday. <https://www.arctictoday.com/denmark-should-support-arctic-military-forum-foreign-ministry-told/> [26.06.2023].
- Menn, A. (2015). *Machtkampf am Nordpol - Warum Putin nach der Arktis greift*. <https://tool.wiwo.de/wiwoapp/3d/Arktis/go.html> [26.06.2023].
- Ministère des Armées. (2019). *France and the new strategic challenges in the Arctic*.
- Ministère des Armées. (2022). *Climate & defence strategy*.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2011). *Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region*. Prime Minister's Office.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2019). *The Government's Statement of Foreign Policy 2019*.

- Ministry of Defence. (2022). *A stronger Netherlands, a safer Europe*.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). *Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020*.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022). *Foreign and security policy strategy*.
- Mitrany, D. (1966). *A Working Peace System*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
- Mitrany, D. (1975). *The Functional Theory of Politics*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Mouritzen, K. (2021). *Analyse: Danmarks køb af droner til Grønland for et milliardbeløb skal berolige USA*. Berlingske.dk. <https://www.berlingske.dk/globalt/analyse-danmarks-kob-af-droner-til-gronland-for-et-milliardbelob-skal> [26.06.2023].
- Morgenthau, H., Thompson, K. & Clinton, D. (2005). *Politics Among Nations*. McGraw-Hill Education.
- Mortensgaard, L. A. (2021). It's Complicated: Denmark, Greenland and the EU in an Arctic Security Perspective. In *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Müller, B. (2021). *Die neue Arktis-Strategie der EU*. Informationsstelle Militarisierung. <https://www.imi-online.de/2021/10/26/die-neue-arktis-strategie-der-eu/> [26.06.2023].
- NASA. (2021). *Arctic Sea Ice Minimum | NASA Global Climate Change*. Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. <https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/> [02.04.2023].
- Neumann, H. (2017). Eine gemeinsame europäische Verteidigungspolitik – die Zukunft der europäischen Sicherheit? *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*.
- Nielsen, T. (2023). Die Sirius-Patrouille – Spezialkräfte für die Arktis. *S&T - Soldat & Technik*. <https://soldat-und-technik.de/2023/03/streitkraefte/33648/die-sirius-patrouille-spezialkraefte-arktis/> [26.06.2023].
- Østhagen, A. (2021a). *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Østhagen, A. (2021b). The Arctic security region: misconceptions and contradictions. *Polar Geography*, Vol. 44, No. 1.

- Over the Circle. (2018). *The Netherlands in the Arctic: Clear Skies and Choppy Waters*.
<https://overthecircle.com/2018/11/18/the-netherlands-in-the-arctic-clear-skies-and-choppy-waters/> [26.03.2023].
- Padrtova, B. (2020). Applying conventional theoretical approaches to the Arctic from: Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security Routledge
- Pashakhanlou, A. H. (2008). *Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/> [14.03.2023].
- Paul, A., Shea, J., Chihai, M., Ciolan, I., Riekeles, G. & Rodríguez, A. (2022). *Will the Strategic Compass be a game-changer for EU security and defence?* European Policy Center.
<https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Will-the-Strategic-Compass-be-a-game-changer-for-EU-security-and-defen~479820> [26.06.2023].
- Paul, M. (2021a). A New Arctic Strategy for the EU. *SWP-Aktuell, No. 17*.
- Paul, M. (2021b). Deutschland im arktisch-nordatlantischen Raum. *SWP-Aktuell, No. 74*.
- Paul, M. (2022). Arktische Implikationen des russischen Angriffskrieges. *SWP-Aktuell, 2022(5)*.
- Paul, M. J. (2015). Die amerikanische Schwerpunktverlagerung nach Asien: die militärische Dimension. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015(5)*.
- Phillips, A. (2023). U.S. Soldiers Train for Arctic Warfare Near Russian Border, Photos Show. *Newsweek*. <https://www.newsweek.com/us-soldiers-train-finland-norway-military-training-exercise-arctic-nato-1782434> [26.06.2023].
- Plenk, S. (2015). *Regionale Integration im sub-saharischen Afrika: Eine Analyse von EAC, SADC und ECOWAS*. Springer-Verlag.
- Preker, A. (2019). *Kann man Grönland einfach kaufen?* DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, Germany.
<https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/donald-trump-angeblich-interessiert-kann-man-groenland-einfach-kaufen-a-1282215.html> [17.03.2023].
- Rachold, V. (2022). *Sicherheitspolitik in der Arktis*. Deutsches Arktisbüro am Alfred-Wegener-Institut.

- Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. (2018). Playing the Greenland Card. *The Arctic Institute*.
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/playing-greenland-card/> [26.06.2023].
- Raspotnik, A. (2020). *A quantum of possibilities*. CEPS. <https://www.ceps.eu/a-quantum-of-possibilities/> [26.06.2023].
- Raspotnik, A. (2021). Find your Niche: The European Union and Arctic Security. In *Looking North: The European Union and Arctic Security from a Nordic and German Perspective*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Raspotnik, A. & Østhagen, A. (2022). The EU must re-think its Arctic relationship with Russia. *www.euractiv.com*. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/arctic-agenda/opinion/the-eu-must-re-think-its-arctic-relationship-with-russia/> [26.06.2023].
- Rombach, A. (2023). *Aufrüstung in der Arktis*. jungle.world.
<https://jungle.world/artikel/2023/01/aufrestung-der-arktis> [26.06.2023].
- Rotter, A. (2021). Sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen in der Arktis. *Argumentation Kompakt*, No. 5.
- Salama, V., Ballhaus, R., Restuccia, A. & Bender, M. C. (2019). President Trump Eyes a New Real-Estate Purchase: Greenland. *WSJ*. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-eyes-a-new-real-estate-purchase-greenland-11565904223> [17.03.2023].
- Sarkar, A. R. (2023). Finland's military spending soars 36% as global defence budgets hit Cold War levels. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/military-spending-finland-cold-war-b2325728.html> [20.06.2023].
- Schmutz, C. G. (2020). Die deutsche Kanzlerin Angela Merkel hat einer einmaligen Kraftanstrengung zugestimmt und dürfte permanente gemeinsame EU-Schulden erhalten | NZZ. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. <https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/die-deutsche-kanzlerin-angela-merkel-hat-einer-einmaligen-kraftanstrengung-zugestimmt-und-duerfte-permanente-gemeinsame-eu-schulden-erhalten-ld.1568577> [04.04.2023].
- Schubert, K. (2013). *Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik*. Springer-Verlag.
- Schubert, K. & Klein, M. (2011). *Das Politiklexikon: Begriffe, Fakten, Zusammenhänge*.

- Schulze, V.-G. (2017). *Arktisstrategien Überblick 2017*. Deutschen Arktisbüros am Alfred-Wegener-Institut.
- Seliger, A. (2021). Dänemarks neue Augen in der Arktis. *polarkreisportal.de*.
<https://polarkreisportal.de/daenemarks-neue-augen-in-der-arktis> [26.06.2023].
- Stephen, K. (2015). German Involvement in the Arctic: Policy Issues and Scientific Research. *The Arctic Institute*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/german-involvement-arctic/> [26.06.2023].
- Stępień, A. & Raspotnik, A. (2021). *Continuity with great confidence*. The Arctic Institute.
- Stojkovic, D. (2021). The Race for the Arctic: A Neorealist Case Study of Russia and the United States. *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/05/17/the-race-for-the-arctic-a-neorealist-case-study-of-russia-and-the-united-states/> [05.06.2023].
- Sweden. (2011). Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region. *Ministry for Foreign Affairs*.
- Szumski, C. (2023). Sweden to conduct largest military exercise in 30 years. *www.euractiv.com*.
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/sweden-to-conduct-largest-military-exercise-in-30-years/> [26.06.2023].
- Thatcher, I. (2022). Seven to one: The impact of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership on Arctic security. *Medium*. <https://medium.com/the-diplomatic-pouch/analysis-seven-to-one-the-impact-of-finnish-and-swedish-nato-membership-on-arctic-security-9f6543e1f1ba> [13.06.2023].
- The Arctic Institute. (2022). Poland. *The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies*.
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/country-backgrounders/poland/> [05.06.2023].
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). *The Netherlands' Polar Strategy 2021-2025*.
- The Netherlands. (2021). The Netherlands' Polar Strategy 2021-2025 Prepared for Change. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*.
- The security policy analysis group. (2022). *Danish Security and Defence towards 2035*.
- The Watch. (2022a). *ASFR – The Watch*. <https://thewatch-magazine.com/asfr/> [06.06.2023].
- The Watch. (2022b). France in the Arctic: First exploring, now committing. *The Watch*.
<https://thewatch-magazine.com/2022/05/03/france-in-the-arctic-first-exploring-now-committing/> [06.06.2023].

- The Watch. (2022c). Sweden adapts to changes in climate, geostrategic conditions. *The Watch*.
<https://thewatch-magazine.com/2022/05/03/sweden-adapts-to-changes-in-climate-geostrategic-conditions/> [06.06.2023].
- The Watch. (2022d). Finnish Arctic policy keys on defense cooperation. *The Watch*. <https://thewatch-magazine.com/2022/05/03/finnish-arctic-policy-keys-on-defense-cooperation/> [09.06.2023].
- Trevithick, J. (2020). Dutch Marines Prepare For Arctic Warfare With New Machine Gun-Armed Sleds. *The Drive*. <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38220/dutch-marines-prepare-for-arctic-warfare-with-new-machine-gun-armed-sleds> [26.03.2023].
- Von der Leyen, U. (2019). *Europe address - Dr Ursula von der Leyen President-elect of the European Commission - Allianz Forum [Speech]*. European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6248 [17.03.2023].
- U.S. European Command Public Affairs. (2022). *International military leaders in Finland for Arctic Security*. United States European Command.
<https://www.eucom.mil/pressrelease/42356/international-military-leaders-in-finland-for-arctic-security> [26.06.2023].
- Wachter, M. (2013). *Grundsatzpapier Sicherheit für das Industrieland Deutschland*. BDI.
- Walt, S. M. (2013). *The Origins of Alliance*. Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill Humanities, Social Sciences & World Languages.
- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5–41.
- Wezeman, S. T. (2012). Military capabilities in the Arctic. *SIPRI Background Paper*, No. 03.
- Zandee, D. (2020). The Netherlands and Arctic security. In *The future of Arctic security*. Clingendael Institute.
- Zelt, T. (2018). Grönland: Dänemarks arktischer Balanceakt. In: *WeltTrends-Das außenpolitische Journal*, No. 140.

Appendix

Appendix I: Overview: EU states and their engagement in the Arctic

	Arctic Council Member	Arctic Council Observer	Arctic Strategy/Policy	Security aspects integrated
Belgium				
Bulgaria				
Denmark	x		x	x
Germany		x	x	x
Estonia				
Finland	x		x	x
France		x	x	x
Greece				
Ireland				
Italy		x	x	
Croatia				
Latvia				
Lithuania				
Luxembourg				
Malta				
Netherlands		x	x	x
Austria				
Poland		x	in work	?
Portugal				
Romania				
Sweden	x		x	x
Slovakia				
Slovenia				
Spain		x		
Czech Republic				
Hungary				
Cyprus				
European Union		Application pending	x	x

= Council Member +
Arctic Policy

= Council Observer +
Arctic Policy

= No Council Member/
Observer but Arctic Policy

Source: Own illustration based on own research

Appendix II: Published EU documents relating to the Arctic since 2008

Year	Initiator	Title
2008	EP	Arctic Governance
2008	Commission	The European Union and the Arctic Region
2009	Council	Arctic Issues
2011	EP	A Sustainable EU Policy for the High North
2012	Commission	Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and Next Steps
2014	EP	EU Strategy for the Arctic
2014	Council	Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region
2016	Commission	An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic
2016	Council	Council Conclusions on the Arctic
2017	EP	An Integrated EU Policy for the Arctic
2019	Council	EU Arctic Policy
2021	Commission	A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic