

Populism in the Netherlands, are there new populist contenders in parliament?

Master Thesis

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Abstract:

This research was done to analyze six new entries into the Dutch legislative chamber since 2017 and find if these parties could be labeled as populist. These conclusions were drawn based on the results from analyses based on three different prominent theoretical lenses of populism. The theoretical lenses used are ideological, discursive and Strategic theoretical lenses. The analysis was done using classical content analysis and holistic text analysis which were used to analyze election manifestos and tweets by party leaders as data sources. Using different theoretical lenses and the results obtained from their matching analyses and data sets, the research was able to create a better understanding of populism, populist theory and levels of populism of the six new political parties. This allowed for more definitive conclusions than if only a single theoretical lens was used. It was concluded that the FvD was definitely populist. BIJ1 and JA21 were almost certainly populist. BBB showed populist tendencies, but further research was necessary. Finally, DENK and Volt were definitely not populist.

Key Words:

Populism; Ideology; Discursive; Strategic; Dutch populism; New political parties Netherlands; Dutch politics;

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1. Introduction.

In this chapter, the research problem will be introduced, and some background information will be given in regard to the historical state of populism in Dutch politics and the six new parties that will be analyzed for the research. Following this, the research question will be further elaborated and sub-research questions will be introduced and explained. Finally, the scientific and societal relevance of the topic will be explained.

1.1. Research problem.

Populism has been a hot topic in the social sciences for the last decades. With recent rises in populist support in Europe and especially Brexit, which is seen as a populist victory, the interest in this topic has only increased (Urbinati, 2019, pp.112). Populism is, not just a European phenomenon but seems to be a more global phenomenon, although its research has been largely focused on western nations and on Latin-American nations (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.1-4). The Netherlands is a prime example for a European country with populist sentiments. It has seen a number of populist parties come and go over the last decades. The term populist has (increasingly) gotten a negative connotation in politics nowadays and is often hurled at political opponents as an insult rather than an accurate description of a politician / party / movement (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.1-2). While most people have an idea of the politics of the mainstream parties in the Netherlands and plenty of populism research has been done on the exciting parties in parliament. The last two elections of 2017 and 2021 saw the addition of six newly elected political parties (verkiezingsuitslag.nl) into the Tweede kamer (Second chamber), the Dutch legislative chamber. These relatively new parties are relatively unknown for the Dutch public and little to no research has been done into these parties both in general and on their levels of populism. This presents an opportunity to look at these parties and to define whether these new additions to the Dutch parliament are truly populist political parties, as some of their opponents claim. Or if these six newly elected parties are simply new institutionalized parties. To do this, the parties will be analyzed through three prominent different theoretical lenses of what populism entails and attempt to merge these different theoretical perspectives. In this way a clearer understanding of whether these parties are populist or not will be obtained. This leads to the following research question: **To what degree can the six new parties in Dutch parliament since the 2017 elections be categorized as populist?**

First one has to look at the history of populism within the Netherlands. Initially populist parties seemed to have little impact on the Dutch political landscape. Populist parties such as The Farmers Party,

Centre party/Centre democrats and Socialist Party (SP) received little to no public support in the Christian democrat dominated Netherlands (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.62). Just after the turn of the millennia this changed. While the SP had seen a rise in support around the year 2000, they had also significantly toned down their left-wing populist rhetoric. On the other hand of the political spectrum the charismatic sociology professor Pim Fortuyn was gaining attention especially because of his populist rhetoric (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.62-65). Fortuyn's political platform List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) was rather eclectic, but at its core, it could be summarized as anti-immigration (Islam), anti-establishment and pro free market (Vossen, 2016, pp. 177-178; Lucardie, 2008, 158-159). While his party was gaining popularity in the polls, Fortuyn himself never got to see the results of the first general election he took part in as he was shot on the 6th of May 2002, nine days before the elections. After the death of their founder, the LPF won an unprecedented 26 seats in their first elections and took part in a coalition government. Internal strife, however, soon destroyed the party from the inside and the coalition fell after it was not even in government for four months. In the election that followed the LPF was shattered from 26 to six seats and in the following elections in 2006 the LPF completely disappeared from the Tweede kamer (Lucardie, 2008, 163).

With the LPF now gone and the SP having toned down its populist messaging, it would seem that populism would once again not play a significant role in Dutch politics. But the same election that saw the removal of the LPF from parliament also saw a new (populist) star rise. This was Former Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Folk Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD) MP Geert Wilders. Wilders who had been kicked from the VVD in 2004, began building his own platform and later founded his own party. The Partij Voor de Vrijheid was founded in February 2006 (Freedom Party, PVV) (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.65-66). The PVV was founded on similar principles as the now defunct LPF, with a focus on anti-immigration (mainly Islam), anti-elitism, nationalism and the free market (Vossen, 2016, pp. 181-185; Coffé & Van Den Berg, 2017, pp. 877-879). The Freedom party first participated in the general elections of November 2006. It managed to secure almost 6% of the votes, which was good for nine seats. In a way it replaced/succeeded the LPF, as the LPF did not manage to secure a single seat and left the second chamber that year. In the elections that followed (2010, 2012, 2017 and 2021) the PVV has steadily scored between 10% and 15% of the votes (verkiezingsuitslagen.nl), making them one of the largest Dutch political parties. While the PVV has been a mainstay of Dutch politics for a while now, the party has seen a number of controversies and has been excluded as a possible coalition party by almost all mainstream parties. It has been excluded for both its anti-Islam rhetoric and populist nature and the hesitancy after the party caused the fall of coalition Rutte 1, after the PVV pulled its support for the minority government in 2012. While the party has not been free from internal struggles and some defections these internal struggles have, it has not resulted in an implosion, as was the case for the LPF.

This is likely because of the strong personal leadership of Wilders, who is not only the founder, face, voice and leader of the party, but also its only member, which gives him virtually unlimited power within the party (Coffé & Van Den Berg, 2017, pp. 877-879). This is opposed to the LPF who lost their central leadership figure right before the election and tore itself apart because their political leader was gone.

1.1. New entries into Dutch parliament after the last two elections.

New parties tend to emerge when there is a gap between voter preference and existing parties. If this gap is big enough new parties tend to emerge to fill that gap. Either because it overlaps with the new parties' leader's ideal preference or because a political actor sees this as an opportunity to get elected. Finally, parties can also emerge as a counter to the status quo (Wardt & Otjes, 2022, pp.194-197). New party emergences is especially relevant for the Netherlands as strategical voting is less common in the Dutch election model. This model has low voter thresholds (one simply has to get enough voters for a seat) and no first past the post/winner takes all elements. However, when an established and a new party are roughly a similar distance from the ideal position, voters usually prefer established parties (Wardt & Otjes,2022, pp.209). The reason why new parties emerge will not be further discussed as it is not relevant for the question at hand, because populist parties could emerge for all three reasons listed above.

For this research the focus will be at the six latest parties, who have joined the Dutch legislative chamber as a result of the general elections in 2017 and 2021. These parties have been selected due to their status as new parties, not a lot of scientific research has been done on them. This allows the research to present new findings and clarify their levels of populism. Furthermore, while populism has become somewhat of a buzzword in the media, scientific research needs to be done to determine if political parties are actually populist. The parties that will be analyzed are (in alphabetical order) BoerBurgerBeweging (Farmer Citizens Movement, BBB) BIJ1 (AS1), DENK, Forum Voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy, FVD), het Juiste Antwoord (the Right Answer, JA21) and Volt (Tweedekamer.nl/fracties; Kiesraad.nl). For this research, MP's who split from their political party after the elections will not be included. Lastly, parties that ran for election but did not receive enough votes to obtain seats in parliament, will also be excluded.

Table 1 New political parties studied

Party	Abbreviation	Party Leader	Election results 2 nd chamber elections 2021	Current seats in parliament (2 nd chamber)
BoerBurgerBeweging	BBB	Caroline van der Plas	1	1
BIJ1	BIJ1	Sylvana Simons	1	1
DENK	DENK	Farid Azarkan	3	3
Forum voor Democratie	FvD	Thierry Baudet	8	5
JA21	JA21	Joost Eerdmans	3	3
Volt	Volt	Laurens Dassen	3	2

BoerBurgerBeweging

The BoerBurgerBeweging was started as a social media initiative called #BoerBurgerTweet (Farm citizen Tweet), which gave farmers, gardeners and fishers a platform to talk about their company and their passion for their craft on a weekly basis (BBB Website). From this they formed and founded their political party in 2019 (Parlement.com/BBB Website). As can be expected from a party with this name, the main focus is on the agrarian sector, which has been under fire recently. The party wants to form a counterbalance to this criticism and portray those from agrarian communities in a positive light once again. Their stances are largely on the political right and conservative side (BBB website). Currently the political leader is Caroline van der Plas who also holds their only seat in the Tweede kamer (Tweedelamer.nl).

BIJ1

The party BIJ1 was founded in 2016 by its current political leader Sylvana Simons after she broke with the DENK party. First the party was called Artikel 1 (article 1), referring to article 1 in the Dutch constitution which ensures equal treatment and forbids discrimination (Dutch constitution, Art 1). In 2017 the party's name was changed to BIJ1 (roughly translated to As one). The party has a strong focus on equality which is also demonstrated by their name (parlement.com; Website BIJ1). Recently there has been some internal conflict within the party because the number two of the party Quinsy Gario's membership was revoked after accusations of creating an unsafe environment (NOS, 22-07-2021). The party's ideology can be classified as (far) left and progressive (parlement.com). While the party failed to

get into the Tweede Kamer during the 2017 general elections, they did secure a single seat in the latest 2021 elections, which is currently being held by their political leader Sylvana Simons.

DENK

The political party DENK was formed after its founders Tunahan Kuzu and Selcuk Öztürk had split from the Partij van de Arbeid (labor party), after internal conflicts regarding an integration debate. They kept their seats in the Tweede Kamer and founded their own political party DENK on 9 February 2015 (Parliament.com). The party strongly supports equality, diversity and social justice (DENK website). Ideologically, the party is seen as a moderately left and progressive party. However, it has not been free of controversies with both internal conflicts regarding leadership/party direction and external conflicts with others accusing them of having ties to the Turkish government/AK party (RTL Nieuws, 02-05-2020; Soetenhorst, 12-02-2020, Parool). The party secured 3 seats in the 2017 and 2021 elections and is currently led by their political leader Farid Azarkan.

Forum voor Democratie

Forum voor Democracy was founded in February 2015 as a political think tank, but changed to a political party on the 25th of September 2016. Ideologically it can be classified as (far) right and conservative, but its stances are somewhat eclectic. Its political leader is Thierry Baudet (Parlement.com). The main stances of the party are a focus on direct democracy, anti-EU, stricter immigration policy and climate-skeptic (FvD Website). The party has seen a number of controversies since it was founded and has seen a number of former members leave with their parliamentary seats. The first instance of this was in April 2019, after accusations of fraud against former treasurer Henk Otten for unrightfully transferring party funds to his own bank account. As a result of this, Otten and two other members of the Eerste Kamer (Dutch Senate) fraction of the FvD split from the party and united under Group Otten (Verbeek, 19-08-2019, EW magazine). On the 26th of November 2020 Joost Eerdmans, then member of the prominent party member, announced his split from the party together with two other prominent members of the party and one senator who together formed the new party JA21. They did so after accusations of antisemitism of the youth organization of the FvD surfaced and FvD party leaders including political leader Baudet refused to distance themselves from the youth organization (Eerdmans, 26-11-2020, Twitter; NOS, 26-11-2020). After this, the FvD fraction from the European parliament and a further seven senators split from the FvD faction and joined JA21, gutting the FvD's representation in politics (NOS, 24-12-2020). Finally, after the elections of the 17th of March, three members of the Tweede Kamer, led by Wybren van Haga, split from the FvD because of differences in opinions on how to conduct politics. This happened after the FvD

released a controversial poster comparing the COVID-19 lockdown to occupation during the Second World War (Den Hartog & Dijkers, 13-05-21, AD). While the party won eight seats during the 2021 general election, the party holds five seats in the second chamber.

JA21

JA21 or het Juiste Antwoord (the right answer), was formed in December 2020 after its founders split from the FvD faction (JA21 website; NOS, 26-11-2020). They quickly obtained a total of eight seats in the senate and three seats in the European parliament after further defections from the FvD (NOS, 24-12-2020). The founding members wanted to offer a right-wing, non-confessional, conservative party as an alternative to the VVD, but felt that the FvD was not the right place for this after alleged antisemitism was not punished in the youth organization (NOS, 26-11-2020). The party is right-wing and conservative, and their core values still resemble those of the FvD to a great deal, although they are somewhat more moderate on points such as immigration and the EU (JA21 website). The current political leader is Joost Eerdmans, the party won three seats in the Tweede Kamer after the general election of 2021.

Volt

Volt is a pan-European political party. The party is split into 29 different national parties and operates under the umbrella of Volt-Europa (Volt Europa website). Each national party has their own agenda's/election programs and has autonomy to mold the core values of the party to a national platform (Volt Nederland website). Volt Nederland was founded in 2018 and politically, it's center progressive (Parlement.com). The party is strongly in favor of the EU and sees further cooperation as the way forward on many issues. It also wants to modernize the government and it is in favor of climate policy (Volt Nederland website). Recently, a member of the Tweede Kamer for Volt Nederland, has been suspended from the party for allegedly creating an unsafe work environment. The party has asked an independent body to look into the matter and will take further action once they have made a report (Nu.nl, 15-02-2022). After the independent body got thirteen notices of unwanted (sexual) advances and abuse of power, they suspended the membership of the MP (Nu.nl, 26-02-2022). After a lawsuit, this suspension was lifted. However after a general members assembly, the MP was disbarred from the party (NOS, 29-03-2022). The current political leader of Volt Nederland is Laurens Dassen. The party participated for the first time in the latest general election of 2021 in which they won three seats in the Tweede Kamer. Of these three seats, only two are remaining (Parlment.com).

1.2. Research Question.

To study which new political parties were populist, a research question was formulated which is supported by four sub research questions. First the main research question will be introduced followed by each of the individual sub-research questions.

Research question: To what degree can the six new parties in Dutch parliament, since the 2017 elections, be categorized as populist?

To address this qualitative descriptive research question in a novel and more comprehensive way, the research will try to combine multiple different theoretical approaches to get a better understanding of whether a party is truly populist. To do this, three dominant theoretical lenses on populism will be used to analyze the political parties. After the individual analysis the results will be compared and combined to see if the approaches differ in what they see as populist if a party is still considered populist.

To answer the main research question, several sub-research questions will have to be addressed first.

Sub research question 1: What is populism, and how do you measure it?

This is a qualitative descriptive research question. To answer the research question, one first has to establish what populism will entail for this research. To do this three of the dominant theoretical lenses on populism will be used as pillars for the theoretical framework of the research. After this framework has been established different ways of measuring populism will be assessed and for each theory the measure which suits the research best will be used. After the correct measurements have been established, they will be used in the following sub-research questions.

Sub research question 2: How populist are the six political parties when using an ideational theoretical lens for populism?

For this qualitative descriptive research question, all the party's manifestos will be studied and the amount of populist paragraphs will be determined. The scores obtained in the analysis shall be analyzed, the results will be debated on the basis of which core concepts for populism they scored highest on and how many populist paragraphs are present. Following this, final conclusions for which parties are considered populist on the basis of the analysis and using the ideational theoretical lens will be drawn.

Sub research question 3: How populist are the six political parties when using a discursive theoretical lens for populism?

This is a Qualitative descriptive research question. For all the parties the tweets of the party leaders will be studied and scored for populism using a 0–2-point scale. Using these scores, conclusions will be drawn for which parties are populist using the discursive scale.

Sub research question 4: How populist are the six political parties when using a strategical theoretical lens for populism?

This is a Qualitative descriptive research question. For this sub-question two analyses will be done using the holistic method. To analyze if party leaders have a direct and personalistic relationship with voters, tweets will be analyzed and graded on a 0-1 scale. This will be done to see/conclude if the tweets contain direct and personalistic language. To analyze whether a party has organized or unorganized support, a strategical theoretical perspective will be used. In this analysis, the manifestos will be analyzed for the presence of ideological crusades on a 0-1 scale. Using these scores, conclusions will be drawn for which parties are populist using the Strategical theoretical lens.

1.3. Scientific & Societal Relevance.

In this sub-chapter, the scientific relevance of the research will first be discussed. This will indicate how the research will add to existing research regarding the subject of populism. After this, the wider societal relevance of both the wider subject of populism and the research specifically will be discussed.

1.3.1. Scientific relevance.

While a lot of research has been done on both the general concept of populism and on how populist European political parties are, most of those studies do not include these newer parties. Furthermore, those studies generally tend to have a wide European focus. In this research a narrower focus will be adopted by just looking at new Dutch parties. These new parties were not included in many of the older indexes and thus will be the focus of the research to gain new insights into the Dutch political landscape and especially its newest additions. This focus on a single nation was adopted due to the national characteristics that populism tends to adopt. While populists tend to have similar broad stroke focusses/policy goals that are the same across borders. National identity will have a significant impact on a more detailed level when comparing populist movements between countries. When comparing views on homosexuality for instance. Geert Wilders (right-wing Dutch populist) argues for the protection of rights and safety of homosexuals, while Victor Orban (Hungarian right-wing populist) sees them as degenerate

and wants to ban any mention of the LGBT community. This study will therefore try to focus on a single nation. This study will try to explore how well the theoretical lenses are applicable to Dutch new political parties, identify if these parties can be classified as populist and if the different theoretical lenses show different results for political parties based on differences in programmatic profiles or party ideology. As a result of identifying whether the new parties are populist, trends for levels of populism in the Dutch legislative chamber can also be expanded. This will give a clearer picture whether populism is on the rise, declining or remaining the same in Dutch national politics. Due to the multiple theoretical lenses used in this research, the results can also be used in many cross country comparative researches, as all the most common theoretical lenses were used. This allows researchers that use any of the three theoretical lenses in their research to use the results obtained in this research. Furthermore, because the research uses multiple different theoretical lenses/approaches towards populism, it hopes to paint a fuller picture of the phenomenon of populism in contrast to most research, which just mainly use one approach.

1.3.2. Societal relevance.

Populism has not only become an increasingly popular and contested topic in scientific research but has also increasingly gained more mainstream attention. At the end of the 20th century, populism was mainly present in Latin America and received small to no support in western nations. This significantly changed after the start of the new Millennium. Where in the Netherlands populist movements received little to no support, suddenly the LPF and SP caused this to change, although the latter had toned down its populist messaging (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.62-65). Later support for the PVV (after the collapse of the LPF) showed that this was not simply a one-off result, but that populist figures in Dutch politics were to become a mainstay. Populism is however different from traditional politics. While traditional politicians and political parties can be placed on the left/right and progressive/conservative axis fairly easily, populist parties are harder to place. Furthermore, while traditional politicians will identify as socialists or liberals fairly accurately, populists almost never identify themselves as populists, but they will claim a more traditional label.

This fact that populists hardly ever identify themselves as populists, the negative connotation of the term populist and often poor understanding of what populism entails, has led to the term populist being weaponized by media actors, politicians or even common voters against political opponents. While the term populist is often used in a negative connotation in science. The topic of populism is still widely contested, discussions about how it should be framed and what its effects are on politics still remain debated. For instance, while there is evidence that populism is anti-democratic and anti-pluralist, not all populist movements seem to result in anti-democratic and anti-pluralist sentiments. Others argue that the rise of populist movements within a country is actually a sign of a vibrant democracy and of democratic

enrichment. They argue that populism allows new voices to be heard in the democratic arena and compare it to the rise of other new political movements, such as the rise of green parties in the 70's and 80's (Crum & Oleart; 2023; pp.1-3). Populist movements also don't just appear for no reason, the existence of these movements might indicate dissatisfaction of citizens with the current political establishment. Populist movements can help to break political cartels or awaken established parties to the needs of their citizens. At the same time populist movements can come with significant dangers, especially for minorities. If they come into power, they can alter the democratic foundations, which can lead to a severe degradation of democracy in a nation.

This research will try to create a theoretical framework that tries to identify what populism is according to leading theories in the field. Moreover, this theoretical framework will be applied to the newest political parties in the Netherlands to analyze whether they are populist or not. It is hoped that by doing this, the research will create a clearer understanding of what populism entails and which parties can be considered populist. It hopes to increase not only the understanding of populism rather than it only being a bad word. Who are the populists and what are their goals and messaging.

After this introduction, a theoretical framework will be established on the three main theories regarding populism and a small section on new and emerging parties. Following this, the three main research methods will be introduced and explained, followed by the data to be analyzed. Then the data will be analyzed in the analysis chapter and conclusions will be drawn for the sub research questions. This will be followed by the discussion chapter where a conclusion will be drawn for the main research question and advice will be given for further research.

2. Theory.

In this chapter the theoretical framework for the research will be established. It is mainly based on three different theoretical lenses for populism that are currently dominant in the field of populism research. Theory in the research is used as a conceptual lens to view populism through. The research does not test causal relationships between variables, but simply uses theoretical conceptualizations, as they are established for the three theoretical lenses. This setup is selected as we are not testing if a theory accurately describes populism. Instead, the focus is on the differences in levels of populism in the results of the three different theoretical lenses. Thus, when theory or theoretical lens is mentioned in the research, it always pertains to the conceptualization of populism by these theoretical lenses and not about causal relations. In the following paragraphs a short introduction will be given for each of the three theoretical lenses. Thereafter, each theoretical lens will be explored in their own section. First, for all theories, a general overview will be given on the nature of the theoretical lenses. Then core concepts to the

theoretical lenses will be listed and explored, and finally, secondary concepts will be explored. Due to the fact that a lot of these theories share core and secondary concepts, explanations of these concepts will be rather concise when it would result in duplication. The sequence of the theories will be ideological first, discursive second and strategical third. The order of the theories will remain consistent throughout the paper but does not reflect preference for any of these theories. After each of the theoretical lenses is elaborated on, a short section will be dedicated to elaborate on the differences between the ideological and discursive theories, as they come from the same basis and some further elaboration is needed on their differences. In the final section of the chapter the research model will be presented and explained.

The theoretical lens that **populism is a (thin) ideology**, is probably the most dominant theoretical lens regarding populism in Europe at the moment. The theoretical lens was first posed by Cas Mudde in 2004 in his heavily cited article 'The populist zeitgeist'. This has been the basis for most recent studies on populism and is applied in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Mudde, 2004). Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as follows: "an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice." (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, pp.3). These are seen as the three core components of populism: "the people", "the elite/dangerous others" and subversion of the general will. They describe the relation between the people and the elite as machinean. The elites/others are a constant threat to the people, are the enemy and are ignoring the general will of the sovereign people (Mudde, 2004, pp.542-544). Mudde and other adherents of the thin ideology theoretical lens argue that this struggle between the people and the elites is not enough to classify it as a full ideology. Thus they use the moniker thin ideology. The idea of a thin ideology and what constitutes a full ideology will be further explored in the next section. Next, the core values of populism according to the ideational theoretical lens will be explored and defined. After this is done, secondary values/phenomena which spring from these core values and phenomena, will be explored and defined. Finally, there will be a section on how the ideational theoretical lens measures populism and what methods it uses for this.

The **discourse-theoretical framework** has also seen heavy use in populism literature. Its conception of core values of populism is almost identical to the ideological approach. However, the theoretical lens uses different methods to analyze populism as it focusses way more on public statements & discourse rather than manifesto's & ideology (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.7-9). The theoretical lens's most significant early authors are the couple Lacau and Mouffe, but their works have been expanded upon by them and other authors (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017, pp.305). There are main subjects of study within the theoretical lens, namely the 'Essex school' and those who focus on classical and quantitative analysis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, pp.385-386). The Essex school sees populist

discourse that simplifies the political space by making categories, such as the people, the elite and the others. By constantly talking about these non-unified/existing categories, the populists are creating categories among their supporters. Essential to this discourse is a focus on anti-establishment and simplified discourse to mobilize support (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017, pp.305; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, pp.385-386). The second group focuses more on applying the theoretical framework for populism as a discourse to empirical research and measuring the level of populism in texts, speeches, party broadcasts and manifesto's (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, pp.385-386). To use the theoretical framework for the analysis, this chapter will further explore the theoretical framework. First, a general overview will be created for what the discursive theoretical lens entails. Secondly, a closer look will be taken at the core values/phenomena for populism as a discourse. Finally secondary values/phenomena will be identified and described.

Populism as a political strategy was coined by Kurt Weyland and focuses more on the organizational side of populism (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, pp.386). Weyland gives the following definition for populism: 'a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers' (Weyland, 2001, pp. 14). From this definition three distinct features can be identified, which are essential to populism as a political strategy. For a party to be fully populist all these three conditions have to be fulfilled. The leader of the party has to be a personalistic/charismatic leader, he should be the central figure and the party should be secondary (Weyland, 2017, pp.56). From this follows the second feature that support should be un-institutionalized. The political parties should not have firm internal structures that can hinder the personal leader or, if they have, there should be ways for the leader to bend these structures without facing backlash (Weyland, 2017, pp.56-57). Finally, support should come from large numbers of unorganized followers, there should be a direct relationship between the personalistic leader and the followers and there should be no intermediaries, which might interfere with the relationship. Populists often prefer to hold large speeches/rallies, adapt a simplistic way of speaking and more recently, use social media to form this direct way of communication between them and their followers (Weyland, 2017, pp.57-58). These three core values will be further explored in the next paragraph. After this, secondary values/phenomena will be listed, finally available research methods for populism as a strategy will be discussed.

2.1. Populism as a (thin) ideology.

In this sub-chapter first the concept of a thin ideology will be explained. After which the core concepts of populism using the ideational theoretical lens will be named and explained. Finally, secondary values will be listed and explained. Then the paper will move on to the discursive theoretical lens.

2.1.1. Differences between a thin and a full ideology.

Ideology has always been at the heart of both politics and political thought. However, what qualifies something as an ideology and when is it just a loose set of ideas or something else? They used the following definition for an ideology: “An ideology is a body of normative ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society. Simply stated, it is a view of how the world is and should be (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017 pp.6)”. Ideologies thus provide a foundation for politics and provide solutions to all major political problems. Whether these solutions are correct is, of course, debatable and internal variance exists within ideologies, but all adherents to ideologies at least have to share the core values of the ideologies. Obvious examples of ideologies are liberalism, socialism and communism to name just a few. What all these ideologies have in common is an internal coherence which might be one of the most important factors for a “full” ideology. For example, a socialist does not simply want wealth redistribution for one sector. They would want nationwide wealth redistribution as it is core to their ideology. Furthermore, full ideologies have key/foundational texts (E.G., *das Kapital* by Marx), they share common history, and they use monikers attributed to the ideology to describe themselves (Aslandis, 2016, pp.88-89).

When taking this into account it would seem strange to group populism under this moniker of ideology. Populists seem to lack this coherence that is so key for ideologies, there are no founding/sacred texts for populism or no populism international. There also seems to be almost no single issue at which you cannot find two populist figures with completely opposing beliefs (Aslandis, 2016, pp.89). Thus, while it is clear that populism is not a full ideology, Mudde & Kaltwasser used the theoretical lens by Freedman of a thin-centered ideology instead to describe populism. Thin-centered ideologies as coined by Freedman, focus not on the full spectrum of socio-political problems, but rather on a subset of problems (Freedman, 2017, pp.2). They adopt this narrow core to fully focus on a single program or because their core is simply not suited to address all socio-political problems. Examples he gives are for instance Green political thought, Feminism or nationalism. They have their own ideas and focusses but will either just focus on their issues or attach themselves to the “grand” theories to flesh out their full program (Freedman, 2017, pp.2-3). Mudde argues that this is all present in populism. They have their core values regarding the people vs the elite, however this core is not sufficient. To fully flesh out their program's populists need to

attach to full ideologies such as socialism/liberalism etc. This is because populism is moralistic, not programmatic. Populism is all about the normative distinction between the elite and the people, not empirical differences in behavior or attitudes (Mudde, 2004, pp.543-544). The populist core can explain disputes between elite and people but would not work for disputes between those who constitute the people. Therefore, Mudde argues that one should see populism as a thin-centered ideology rather than a full one. It also explains why populist parties can be left-wing, right-wing or even centrist, as this political denomination usually derives from the “full” ideology they attach themselves to, rather than populism itself (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.6).

2.1.2. Core concepts of the Ideological theoretical lens.

The literature around the core concepts of populism, as it pertains to populism, is relatively unified in what it considers to be central values for populism. Most authors have adopted the core concepts as proposed by Mudde in his 2004 article ‘The populist zeitgeist’ and further built upon in 2017 in his publication ‘A short introduction to populism’ together with Kaltwasser (Mudde, 2004, pp.543; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9). These three core concepts are: the people, the elite and the general will (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-19; Stockemer, & Glaeser. 2019, pp.2). While these three core concepts are visible in almost all articles, which use the ideational approach, there is some variation in how these concepts are used. Some authors have also used concepts which Mudde & Kaltwasser listed as secondary concepts or as/rather than core concepts. Stanley, for instance, argues that populism is based on four distinct but interrelated concepts: the existence of two homogenous units of analysis, namely “the people” and “the elite”, the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, the idea of popular sovereignty and the positive valorization of “the people” and denigration of “the elite” (Stanley, 2008,pp.102). The four core concepts used by Stanley are more descriptive than those used by Mudde & Kaltwasser but essentially contain the same content, if one takes further explanation by Mudde & Kaltwasser into account. Meanwhile Albertazzi & McDonnell list their own four core principles: the people are one and are inherently ‘good’, the people are sovereign, the people’s culture and way of life are of paramount value and the leader and party/movement are one with the people (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6-7). The core principles used by Albertazzi and McDonnell differ from the others because they don’t explicitly mention the elite and because they explicitly mention the populist leader/party/movement, which is mostly seen as a secondary concept in other literature. For this study it was chosen to use the core concepts as listed by Mudde & Kaltwasser as they provide a “simple” and good foundation to build upon. The monikers “virtuous” and “evil” were added to the concepts of people and elites respectively as these parts are key to the concepts within the theory and make them more descriptive. Furthermore, the concept of “others” was added to the concept of the elite as it has proven to

be essential in especially west European populism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6). The core concepts will be further elaborated on in the coming paragraphs.

The “virtuous” people

In virtually all populist literature there are references to “the people”, but what and who those people are still is heavily contested. Laclau argues that the term is an empty signifier. It does not mean anything in itself (because of its vagueness). The populists, however, will use this concept of the people and frame it in different ways to appeal to different constituencies, which makes it into such a powerful tool (Laclau, 2005, pp.95-98). Mudde & Kaltwasser agree with the idea that “the people” is a constructed term and that there is not such a real thing as “the people”. When seeing it as a construct one can identify the most common three “building blocks” which populists use. These three building blocks are sovereign people, common people and national people. Usually when making references to the people, populists will use at least two of these different building blocks to describe the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-10).

“The people” as sovereign refers to people as a political power. In democracy the people are in charge or as President Lincoln famously put it “a government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Thus, when populists refer to sovereign, they mean that “the people” are/should be in charge because in a democracy they are the rulers of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-10). “The people” as the common or ordinary people refer to the people as a socio-economic group. This interpretation of the people, however, is rather vaguer than the people seen as sovereign, as what one describes as common can differ from person to person. It can include many different things such as socio-economic status, cultural traditions and popular values. Populists can define common people in many ways which might even contradict each other (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-11). Populists often are vague about what they really mean with common people; they rather focus on those who are not part of the common people and ergo the elite. Thus, while you most often cannot describe what a populist means with the ordinary citizen, you will definitely know who not ordinary citizens are (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-11). Finally, there is the national people who at first glance seem simple enough, but they can also have multiple interpretations. National people, for instance, can refer to all people within a nation but also people with national citizenship, which could also reside outside of the nation. Furthermore, national people can be limited to people of a certain national ethnicity or who are part of a national culture and adhere to national traditions (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-11). This category is often used to exclude people from minorities, foreigners or citizens with foreign heritage as they are not really part of the national people (Albertazzi, & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6).

Besides the external dimension of who belongs to “the people” and who does not belong to “the people” there is also an internal dimension to the people. Populists see the people as homogeneous and “pure”. Albertazzi and McDonnell define it as: “the people are one and are inherently good” (Albertazzi,

& McDonnell, 2008, pp.6). First, in the real world, large groups of people are never truly “one” but will consist of many different opinions and ways of seeing politics and the world. These are false divisions according to populist which are created by the elite to divide the people (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6; Mudde, 2004, pp.546). Second is the valorization of the people. They are the real people, the pure people and they know what is best, unlike those evil elites. This almost worshiping of the people by populists is key for driving the antagonistic relation between the elites in their ivory towers and the “ordinary” people, who know what is good for the nation (Stanley, 2008, pp.102-104; Rooduijn, De Lange & Van Der Brug, 2014, pp.564).

The “evil” elite and or “dangerous” others

While the concept of the people is contested and rather vague, there seems to be more consensus in the field when talking about the elite. This might be in part because populists usually have way more defined ideas of who their enemies (elite) are, even though they remain vague on who “the people” are. They will also name and shame the elite/enemies often. But who are those 'evil' elites? Mudde & Kaltwasser defined them simply as those with power. They can be political elites, economic elites, cultural elites, media elites or even judicial elites (Populist backers or allies of course will not be listed among these groups) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.11-13). These diverse groups of elites are accused of subverting the general will being only out for their own goals or to enrich themselves. Populists see the elite as a homogeneous group, just like the people. This shadowy cabal of elites is working against the people and the populist to stay in power (Stanley, 2008, pp.103-104; Rooduijn, De Lange & Van Der Brug, 2014, pp.564). The way that this homogeneity of the elite is presented by populists is for instance, by claiming that the political elites made decisions based on the special interests of economic elites and that the media elite kept this out of the news. A key part of both the elite and the people is that they are two homogenous groups with an antagonistic relationship. Populists will often state that there is not simply a conflict between the people and the elite, but that they are at war (Stanley, 2008, pp.103-104).

Besides the elite, some scholars in the field argue that there is a second group that is also enemies to the people namely the (dangerous) others. Who those “others” are depends on the time and the location. Usually the dangerous “others” are religious or ethnic minorities, most often refugees or migrants, but it can also include criminals, addicts or the extremely poor (Brubaker, 2017, pp. 362-363). Brubaker argues that the people are not only fighting those on top of society (elites) but also those at the bottom of society (others), who are working together to suppress the people. Populists argue that the elite unfairly favor those others above the “good” people in return for their support (Brubaker, 2017, pp. 362-364). Rooduijn contests that these dangerous others should be a core concept of populism. He argues that this concept focuses too much on right wing populism and is not as representative of populism as a whole (Rooduijn, 2014, pp.564). Left-wing populism seems to have a heavier focus on socio-economic issues.

Thus, while dangerous “others” could be considered as typical for right wing populism, as it mainly combines with (ethno)nationalism, it should not be core to populism itself. This of course does not mean that left-wing populists could not adopt the dangerous others framework. However, until now they have not done this nearly as much as right wing populists.

The general will

The third and final core concept of populism according to Mudde & Kaltwasser is the general will. The concept of the general will is closely linked to the Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who distinguished between the general will and the will of all, as two political concepts. He defines the general will as the capacity for people to join together in a community and legislate/enforce their common interests. The will of all denotes the sum of particular interest at a moment in time (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.16-17). The latter concept just describes all interests at a moment while the former describes the capacity for citizens/political actors to actually legislate/enforce their interests. Populists pose that the capacity for the people is heavily limited in representative democracies, as citizens are often treated as passive participants who only need to be mobilized during election periods. They believe that democracy should be “a pure reflection of the will of the people” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, pp.7). Populists argue that the elite ignores the general will because when the elections are over, the power of the citizens effectively ends. Populists see “the people” as sovereign and thus do not agree with this lack of “the people” to influence politics. Therefore, populists will often argue for more direct democracy to enforce the general will of the sovereign people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.16-19). This call for more direct democracy by populists does not only have its basis in the right for people to do so because they are sovereign, but it is also rooted in the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite according to Stanley. Populists will praise the people, denigrate the elite and argue that all would be better if only the voice of the people (general will) would be heard. They will also lambast the elite who are currently making a mess of everything because they refuse to listen to the will of the people (Stanley, 2008, pp.104-105). Populists often cite de-politicization as one of the ways one can identify the subversion of the will of the people. Taking power that previously belonged to the government and transferring it to an independent non-elected body, which the elected politicians sometimes have no influence over, is used as a prime example of this subversion by the elite. Populists see this as further eroding the power of the people and as a means to subvert the will of the people by the elite. Therefore, populists will often argue for re-politicization of technocratic unelected institutions (E.G., the EU, national banks) and giving sovereignty back to the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.17-18). This, however, does not mean that populists are against all technocratic measures. Mudde argues that populists are in favor of the “experts” that do not alter the wishes of the people but just ensure that the wishes of the people are implemented in the best way. Populists mainly distrust the politicians who put these so-called “experts” into power. The

most notable examples he gives for populists in favor of technocratic measures are Fortuyn and Berlusconi, who included technocratic measures into their political platforms (Mudde, 2004, pp.547).

Two key concepts, often related to the general will and populism, are majoritarianism and authenticity. Majoritarianism in its simplest form should be understood as: if a majority of people want something, it should be so. While the majority rule is key for democracy, modern constitutional democracies usually have constitutional clauses which might hinder simple reform through the majority rule (Brubaker, 2017, pp.365). While populists are often in favor of using direct democracy tools to legitimize that their reforms/policy is in line with the general will, direct democracy itself is not an essential part of populism, but just a tool in their belt (Stanley, 2008, pp.104-105). Populists like direct democracy tools for the sake of increasing the authenticity of the populist movement or leader. Majority support for their policies, using polls or referendums, allows them to show that they are “in line” with the common people. It allows populist leaders to demonstrate that they know what “the people” want because they are one of them. This authenticity and understanding of the general will of the people is key for populists as they claim to represent these real and ignored people (Stanley, 2008, pp.104-105). This focus on “authentic” leadership will be further elaborated when discussing the topic of charismatic leadership.

2.1.3. Secondary concepts the ideological theoretical lens.

Charismatic leadership

Charismatic or personalistic leadership may not lie at the heart of what populism is, but it almost always is at the heart of how populism is being executed in a political space. Almost all populist movements are centered around a single “charismatic” leader. This leader usually has their own political “style” or way of doing things which goes against established norms of how to participate in politics (Brubaker, 2017, pp.366-367). Common examples of this are using simple or crude language as opposed to the politically correct language of the traditional politicians. But as in almost everything, populists tend to be diverse in the way they present themselves or lead their movements while using simple language. Identifying with the “common” people might be an often-used tactic (Albertazzi, & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6-7). There are some who go in the complete opposite direction. The leadership of Pim Fortuyn for instance as a flamboyant (gay) dandy could hardly be described as ordinary. Something which he acknowledged himself (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.65; Mudde,2004, pp.560). Populist leaders, however, will always clearly voice their opposition to the elite, as this is a key tenet of populism. They will often lambast other political leaders from traditional parties and emphasize that, unlike them, they are not part of the corrupt political elite (Stanley, 2008, pp.105). Populist parties/movements are almost always structured around their political leader. The reason for this is that populist leaders tend to communicate directly to their followers using mass rallies and, recently, also through social media. Traditional parties on the other hand

are more internally institutionalized through a chain of command and externally institutionalized through reliance on interest groups such as labor organizations. Populist leaders tend to focus on direct contact with unorganized voters, which concentrates almost all the power with the populist leader. Finally populist leaders tend to portray themselves as reluctant leaders. They did not want to enter this filthy political arena but could no longer stand by as the corrupt elites destroyed their country (Stockemer, & Glaeser., 2019, pp.1-6). This emphasis on the reluctance to enter the political arena is used to, once again, distance themselves from the “career politicians” who are part of the political elite. This is further backed up by claims that just like ordinary people, populists do not want any part in the dirty business of politics (Albertazzi, & McDonnell, 2008, pp.6-7). But they could not just stand by as they possess a special talent or charisma. Whether they truly possess charisma or special talent is irrelevant. What is relevant is that their supporters believe that they are special. The charisma that the populist has or is believed to have makes them to be especially fit to lead the people against the elite. It also makes them a political figure worth following according to their supporters (Albertazzi, & McDonnell,2008, pp.6-7).

Crisis

The recent increase in populist support can be attributed to a myriad of reasons but is often related at least partially to the (economic) crises which have happened in the last decades. Just like a plant needs fertile soil to grow bigger, populism needs a suitable political landscape to expand. As populism is centered around antagonism between the elites and the people, populists will find to grow their platforms in times of peace and prosperity as this antagonism between the elite and people is at its lowest. Populism therefore seems to thrive on the disruption that crises provide (Caiani, & Graziano, 2019, pp.1145-1147). These can be political crises which erode trust in the traditional political elites. Economic crises which lead to economic downturn and increases in poverty, are of great importance for public perception. It is important to note that economic crises always have political elements attached as how governments react to economic crises (Caiani, & Graziano, 2019, pp.1148-1149). Research has found that populist support increases both in political and economic crises but that a combination of the two crises leads to the biggest increase in populist support (Pappas, & Kriesi, 2015, pp.303). There are also cultural crises such as the currently changing (social) media landscape which tends to favor charismatic leadership more than the more legal style of the traditional parties (Mudde, 2004, pp.556). Or migration crises which had a profound impact on the European political landscape (Caiani, & Graziano, 2019, pp.1148-1151). Populism also thrives on speed and emotion. Where traditional parties are often slower to respond to crises and in a more neutral (cold) way, populists argue for swift and simple solutions using emotive arguments and playing on the sometimes-visceral emotions of voters towards crises (Freeden, 2017, pp.5-7). This is further illustrated by the way populists treat crises. Populists will often dramatize, exaggerate and distort the nature of crises, creating a more severe perception of the crises that a country faces to

increase the urgency of having to act on these crises. Fortuyn, for instance, portrayed the previous government as terrible and as a political crisis needing to be solved. He described this in his book *the shambles of Eight years purple*, which functioned both as a political program for his political movement, as well as lambasting previous governments as the state of Dutch politics as a whole (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.64). When in power, populists will then show themselves solving these crises in highly public events and through often symbolic measures which do not really solve the crises. Building walls, not paying debts or mass deportations of migrants for instance, give voters the idea that something is being done. However, whether these solutions solve the crisis or are even tenable is often a different question altogether (Brubaker, 2017, pp. 366-367).

2.2. Populism as a discursive theory.

In this sub-chapter the theoretical framework for the discursive theoretical lens will be laid out. First a general introduction into the discursive theoretical lens will be given. Second the core concepts will be laid out. Third and final secondary concepts will be elaborated on after which the sub chapter will end and populism as a political strategy will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.

2.2.1. Introduction to the discursive theoretical lens.

While the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses share a lot of core concepts, the theoretical lenses are rather different in how they operationalize and analyze these concepts. The ideological theoretical lens sees populism as something essential and at the heart of a party/movement and will thus often lead to a binary assessment of whether a party is populist or not. The discursive theoretical lens sees it more as a characteristic of political talk, the lens sees it as a matter of degrees thus a party will have more/less populist characteristics (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.8-9). This also allows for more fluidity within the concept. The amount of populist characteristics a political actor might use can vary over time, while a political actor's ideology is rigid. This is because being fluid with ideology leads to voters to question party/party leader credibility. Seeing populism as another form of politics allows us to open the category so that it is not a stable group of political actors, but part of the fluid practice of identification. This also allows identification of populist behavior of those who might not be seen as populist (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.8-9). One could also argue that politics has become more fluid due to the breakdown of party membership/identification of voters (Caiani, & Graziano, 2019, pp.1147-1148). With the increasingly important role of (social) media, this more fluid approach seems to be appropriate to analyze contemporary populist politics or even politics as a whole.

Definitions given for populism as a discourse are rather similar to those used by the ideological theoretical framework. This becomes clear when looking at a definition by Hawkins who states this about the discursive theoretical lens: “It sees populism as a Manichaeian discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1042). Here, the core three concepts, which were also used for the Ideological framework, also present the people, the elite and the general will. The relations between these concepts are also the same. There is a machinaean relationship between the people and the elite where the people are good, the elite is evil, and the unified will of the people (general will) is also seen as good. The ideological and discursive theories also share understanding that populism is based on a set of ideas. The ideological theoretical lens, however, argues that this set of ideas forms a (thin) ideology. Hawkins argues that the core of populism is discourse in a postmodern sense. This postmodern discourse is partly ideological (latent set of ideas) and partly based on rhetoric (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044-1046). The discursive method is also often used interchangeably or combined with the stylistic method. There is, however, a big difference between discourse and style. Discourse is just about the content of what is being said. Style is about how it’s being said. Thus, for instance emotive speaking is style. Saying the elite is corrupt is content and thus, discourse (Manucci, 2017, pp.472).

2.2.2. Core concepts of the discursive theoretical lens.

As stated before, the core concepts for the discursive theoretical lens overlap with those from the ideological theoretical lens. Therefore, they will not be looked at as in depth as was done in the previous part and only a quick overview will be given if concepts are largely the same between theoretical lenses. There will be special attention given to the core concept of the people as there is a deviation between the theories for these concepts.

“The people”

“The people” were conceptualized by Mudde as a homogenous group. He made this concept by referring to Laclau and his theoretical concept about the people as (empty) signifiers, which were essentially constructed by the populists (Mudde, & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.9-10). Laclau, however, does not see the people as a homogenous group but as a heterogeneous group. He states that the category of “the people” is under constant construction. It is not just an empty signifier but also a floating signifier (Laclau, 2005, pp.155-160). He compares the concept of the people to a frontier. This means the concept is ever changing as a frontier can be pushed forwards or backwards. This allows populists to essentially constantly shift the borders between who is inside (included) the borders of “the people” and who is outside (excluded). This forging and reforging of the category shows that there is no such thing as homogenous people, as populists continually change which groups are considered in and which groups

are considered out (Laclau, 2005, pp.155-160). Thus, while populists might state that the people are homogeneous, unified and unchanging in practice, this is not really the case. What is constant, however, is the populist leader as the “unifier” and the symbol of representation for the people (Laclau, 2005, pp.159-162). While this actual heterogeneity of the people does not really influence the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, it does once again stress the fluidity and ever-changing nature of populism/populists (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013. pp.7-10). Furthermore, discursive theorists usually are less rigid in their framing of “the people” versus elite core concepts. They tend to frame “the people” versus elite core concepts fitting it more to either local variant such as pueblo versus oligarchy. But in essence the concepts seem to be the same. A more fitting narrative for discursive theories would be to frame it as us vs them rather than people versus elite. Where “us” (people / powerless) versus “them” (elite powerful) in a struggle of hegemony over the political (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013. pp.2-3).

Elites/others

Just like in the ideological approach, the concept for elite/them is rather broad but essentially boils down to “us” (“the people”) versus “them” (elites) who have the power. The focus is once again on the antagonistic relationship between these two groups, Laclau describes it as the struggle for political hegemony (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013. pp.7-10). Just like in the ideological approach the elites are not just seen as misguided but as evil. Examples for this are for instance Hugo Chavez who identified his opponents as the devil himself while the people (his supporters) are identified with Christ (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1043). A further illustration of these extreme elite qualifications is that Chavez states that the parties in opposition to him are the “imperial lackeys” of America doing its bidding. Essentially meaning that they are selling out the country to a foreign power (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044). This extreme animosity also leads to an anything goes attitude within populist parties where government funds can easily be used to combat their opposition. This is not seen as a subversion of democracy but as combating evil and thus is acceptable rhetoric (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044).

General will

Finally, the concept of general will. Most discursive theorists base their notion on general will in Rousseau, just like the ideational approach did. This strong emphasis on the general will, however, only seems to be logical when valorizing the people and antagonizing the elite. If the people are good, why shouldn't/won't the politicians do what they want? A problem with this is that Laclau identified that “the people” are not simply homogenous but are heterogeneous (Laclau, 2005, pp.121-125). Following the assumption of the heterogeneous nature of “the people”, one can infer that there is probably no single unified “will of the people”. Just like the concept of “the people” itself is constantly being reframed by populists to include or exclude groups of people. The “will of the people” is also in constant flux to form a seemingly homogeneous “will of the people” for each topic from the many heterogeneous “wills of the

peoples” (Laclau, 2005, pp.150-153). An example of how a populist can frame “the will of the people” is for instance Chavez, as stated in the last paragraph. He closely related the voices of his supporters to that of Christ. Following from this, he relates the voice of the people to that of God, vox populi, vox dei (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1043). A stronger emphasis on “the will of the people” that this might not be possible as one would be foolish to go against God. While this might be an extreme example, one could argue that this is not far off the mark for most populist movements. Most populists truly believe in the “goodness” of the people which one could closely relate to worship and truly hate the “evil” elite. This would place almost holy importance on “the will of the people”.

2.2.3. Secondary concepts of the discursive theoretical lens.

A secondary concept which is used in the discursive theoretical lens is the concept of rupture which was coined by Laclau. The rupture signifies the point of the breakdown of relations between elite and people, which populists can point to as where it all went wrong. Before, politics/politicians were still “pure” or at least less evil and after this rupture, everything went downhill (Laclau, 2005, pp.150-153). Populists want to return to the point before this rupture when the system was still working for the people and not against the people, as they will claim it is now (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044). It is important that populists often refer to broken systems and not bad policies. Bad policies are only symptoms of the broken political system. To return to a government which serves the people, major reforms are needed or even a revolution as some populists claim (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044). These major reforms are needed as minor reforms will allow the forces of evil to regroup and once again poison the government.

2.3. Populism as a political strategy.

Like the previous sub-chapters this sub-chapter will start by giving a general introduction into the theoretical lens. Second the core concepts of the theoretical lens will be laid out and elaborated on. The chapter will end by discussing secondary concepts related to the theoretical lens.

2.3.1. Introduction to the strategical theoretical lens.

The strategical approach to populism is rather different from the ideological and discursive approaches. It is more focused on the organizational side of politics rather than programmatic and moralistic approaches. Some have argued that it is well suited for identifying at a first glance if a party or movement is populist and treat it as a sort of introductory step. Caini and Graziano also stated that because of the different natures of the ideological/discursive theories, the strategical theoretical lens can be used to complement these theories as the strategical theoretical lens is focused on the organizational side, while the other

theories are more focused on the programmatic/moralistic side of populism (Caiani, & Graziano, 2019, pp.143). Weyland has been the most influential academic in support of this theoretical lens. He defines a political strategy as: “the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power” (Weyland, 2001, pp.12). He contrasts political strategy to the political style theoretical lens, which he states focuses on forms of political performance and emphasizes the expressive aspects of populism. He feels, however, that this theoretical lens is too broad and not clearly delineated, while political strategy has a clear focus. It focuses only on the power capability that a political leader uses to obtain their position of power and not just the power capability that a political leader can/will sometimes use (Weyland, 2001, pp.12). For political leaders there are a number of political strategies they can use to obtain power for this research. However, the research will focus on the populist strategy. Weyland defines the populist strategy as follows: “Populism is a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, and noninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.” (Weyland, 2001, pp. 14). This definition contains the key concepts for populism according to Weyland, which will be discussed in the next paragraph namely: Charismatic leadership (personalistic leadership in the definition), direct/indirect communication, political parties institutionalized/non-institutionalized (direct, unmediated and noninstitutionalized support in the definition) and organized/unorganized support (mostly unorganized followers in the definition) (Kenny, 2021, pp.1; Weyland, 2001, p. 14-15).

2.3.2. Core concepts of the strategical theoretical lens.

Charismatic leadership & Principal Power Capability

While charismatic leadership has been addressed earlier in this chapter as a secondary concept, it will be shortly discussed again now. Unlike ideational or discursive theoretical lenses, the strategical theoretical lens places greater emphasis on charismatic leadership and the charismatic leader. Like both ideological and discursive theoretical lenses, the strategical theoretical lens also draws inspiration from Weber's analysis on charisma (Weyland, 2021, pp.185-186). The theoretical lens, however, sees the leader as central; it states that the people are too amorphous and too heterogeneous to act. Weyland states that because of this disunity, the people will always pick a leader who claims to represent the people's will, but instead, will just act how he/she sees fit without being held accountable. Scholars who have studied the work of Weber have stated that charismatic leadership might have much more to do with the ability of the followers to believe in the leader, than the quality of the charismatic leader (Bensman & Givant, 1975, pp. 578). A reason for this is that the leader's identity will get mixed with representing “the people” (“the people is Chavez and Chavez is the people”). This often results in populist leaders being seen as above criticism as they are the embodiment of “the people”. Thus, populist movements that supposedly fight for

democracy usually end up hurting democracy as the leader is “the people” what he or she decides goes resulting in undemocratic rule (Weyland, 2021, pp.185-186).

A second aspect of political strategy is the principal power capability which political actors use to obtain power. Traditionally there are two main ways of obtaining and sustaining political authority, numbers or special weight. Support through numbers is obtained by support from voters/citizens, while special weight usually entails support from major economic powers or military support (Weyland, 2001, pp.128-129). As was referred to in the previous paragraph, for populists, numbers are the main focus of obtaining and sustaining principal power capability. Populists despise political opponents who use special weight for being undemocratic and they strongly support the principle of “one person, one vote” (Weyland, 2017, pp.56-58). Because their claims of political authority are (almost) fully based on numbers, it is essential for populists to remain popular among the people. Populists need to keep obtaining mass support from their citizens/voters, which is why populists place such a great importance on mass rallies, poll numbers and approval rates (Weyland, 2017, pp.56-58). Because of this numbers-based power capacity through charismatic leadership, populists tend to adopt similar core elements for their political strategy to maintain their centralized leadership combined with popular support. This will be further defined in the coming paragraphs.

Direct/indirect communication and personal relation

To obtain support from voters, populists will try to build direct bonds with their voters, and they will try to avoid formal or informal organizations, which have traditionally stood between the leader and the voters. Kenny writes that this absence of intermediation is at the heart of populism as a political strategy (Kenny, 2021, pp.6). They do this through direct identification with “the people”. They are one with the people because they are part of the people. Leaders will then spread this message and other messages constantly through mass communication via rallies, mass media and, nowadays, social media to create a quasi-direct relationship with their voters (Weyland, 2017, pp.58). Maintaining this quasi-personal relationship, however, is a constant balancing act for the leader because the relationship is fickle and unreliable. Unlike direct bonds based on quid pro quo (clientelism), or rigid organizational, programmatic and ideological consistency (institutionalized party), populists have little to fall back on besides being popular with the masses (Weyland, 2017, pp.58). Thus, populist leaders are caught in a constant circle of identification with “the people” and of “the people”. The leader has to continuously show him/herself as the personification of the will of the people to maintain support/popularity. This “personal bond” between the people and the leader leads to an intense bond between the leader and his supporters and gives them a sense of belonging, which they feel is lacking in the sometimes cold and mechanical liberal democracies (Weyland, 2017, pp.58-59).

Political parties institutionalized- institutionalized

Due to the strong focus on personalistic leadership, populist leaders require parties and organizations that fully support their messages and that do not get in the way of their leadership. It is rather difficult to project the image of being a charismatic leader, who is not only able to just lead but is also able to completely transform the country, if one's own party is constraining/working against the populist leader (Weyland, 2001, pp.13). Weyland thus poses that populist leaders thrive most when their political parties have low levels of organization/institutionalization. This best serves the direct relationship between the people and the leader and allows the leader to act and solve all problems by himself. While if their parties become too institutionalized, they become simply another party leader trapped in its own machine (Weyland, 2001, pp.13-14). Kenny poses that this is not entirely true. He argues that parties can be institutionalized as long as they are sufficiently fluid/flexible in their institutionalization as to not hinder their leader. Populist parties, he argues, almost always take the form of leader parties or personal election vehicles where the party is fully subservient to the populist leader and will change, bend and break their internal rules if the leader wants it (Kenny, 2021, pp.6-7). Furthermore, strongly institutionalized political parties can also be de-institutionalized by populists. Kenny gives examples of the FPO and Indian National Congress party who were essentially hollowed out by their new leaders (Kenny, 2021, pp.6-7). Thus, while populist parties can seem like they are strongly institutionalized due to the top-down nature of personalistic leadership, they are essentially non-institutionalized on the inside with the only true rule being listen to the leader (Kenny, 2021, pp6-7).

Organized/unorganized Support

Most traditional political parties can draw their roots or can trace their core support base to other organizations. For example, socialist parties are often closely linked with labor unions, Christian democrats to churches etc. Populists on the other hand avoid these connections as tying themselves to these organized support bases, places limits on their power and freedom of political movement. Labor unions and churches for instance are usually heavily institutionalized themselves. This allows them to steer their support bases, thus closely allying with these sorts of actors can severely hinder the free form top-down politics which populist leaders use (Weyland, 2001, pp.14-16). Populists therefore focus not on specific organized groups but on large unorganized support from “the people”. While this leaves them with more freedom, this also poses its own problems as the masses are heterogeneous in beliefs and their political demands will vary largely (Weyland, 2017, pp.59-60). The most popular way for populists to get around this problem is to rally the masses in a war against their enemies. By going on a heroic quest to reform their country to meet the needs of “the people” and combat those evildoers (elite) who wish to hurt/obstruct them. This narrative gives populist leaders both a rallying call to unite voters and a scapegoat to blame all problems on (Weyland, 2017, pp.58-59). Populists will also use broadly supported

political stances to appeal to the masses. Opposing illegal immigration, political corruption or crime will have broad popular support while only alienating very few. It also provides the populist with widely supported talking points (almost nobody opposes reducing crime). This allows populists to build support at relatively low political costs (Kenny, 2021, pp.10-11).

2.3.3. Secondary concepts of the strategical theoretical lens.

Populism as a transitional form

While Weyland and Kenny see populism as a viable strategy to obtain power, they also see problems with it as a strategy to maintain power. When a populist leader obtains executive power, the leader stops being part of the “people”. This is because national leaders are usually seen as the centre of national power ergo the elite. Populist leaders in power can no longer rage at the ruling elite as they are now (part of) the ruling elite. Weyland and Kenny therefore see populist strategy as a strategy that is often (but not always) used as a transitional form (Weyland, 2001, pp.14). When a populist takes power, they can adopt more traditional forms of political ideology and strategy. In Latin America for instance, populist leaders have transitioned to clientelist structures after they won their election. Populists can also employ a permanent populist strategy (Kenny, 2017, pp.6-7). An example of a permanent populist strategy is the late president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez. Chavez kept campaigning on a platform of social change even after he was in full control of the government. He maintained credibility by claiming that the evil elites were conspiring behind the scenes and preventing his programs from being successful. These references to a “deep state” or foreign intervention serve to distance the populist leader from the elites. It also creates the image that the populist leader wields only fake power while the elites wield true power. This serves to create a scapegoat for when populist policy fails and to keep supporters engaged while removing blame for failures from the populist leader.

2.4. Is the separation of ideational and discursive theoretical lenses artificial?


The ideological and the discursive theoretical lenses are formed from a common base namely: populism as a set of ideas (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1044-1046). The theoretical lenses also share almost the same core concepts with the only major difference being the conceptualization of “the people”. The Ideological theoretical lens sees “the people” as a homogeneous group and the discursive lens sees “the people” as a heterogeneous group (Laclau, 2005, pp.155-160). The theoretical lenses have also used the same/similar analysis methods and have used the same/similar datasets. One might therefore pose that these two theories are “artificially” separated and that they don’t differ enough to be separated. It can be argued that these theories can be used interchangeably and should be combined resulting in a single analysis for both

theories. While it is true that theories have used similar methods/datasets by end large ideological analysis seems to be more focused on party partisan literature while discursive methods seem to focus more on interpretive textual analysis (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.14-15). This can become especially relevant in populist speech when referring to specific in/out groups within “the people”. It might differ per topic or moment depending on whom a populist speaker is talking to or about and might change rapidly due to the fickle nature of populist speech. This difference in the conceptualization of “the people” was deemed to be enough reason to see the theoretical lenses as separate and to analyze them separately using methods most preferred by adherents of the theoretical lenses. The relatively similarity and use of methods would benefit from additional analysis. It was therefore elected to execute two additional analyses where the theoretical lens used was switched between the ideological and discursive theoretical lens. The main difference between these two additional analyses was the conceptualization of the core concept of “the people”. The core concept was switched to a heterogenous interpretation (discursive theoretical lens) for classical content analysis initially done with the homogenous interpretation (ideological theoretical lens). The reverse was done for the holistic text analysis which initially had a heterogenous interpretation (discursive theoretical lens) of “the people” which was switched to a homogenous interpretation (ideological theoretical lens). It was hoped that the switch between theoretical lenses would prove whether the separation really is justified or artificial and which factors impact possible differences.

2.5. Research model

For the research three theories are used to define populism. The theories laid out in sections 2.1 - 2.3 of this chapter are then formed into theoretical lenses to view all six political parties' through and to define their levels of populism. These three theories and accompanying research methods are then used to obtain qualitative data on the six new political parties and then analyzed separately per theoretical lens. After this is done each political party will have three measures for degree of populism, one for each theoretical lens. From this sub conclusions will be drawn both about the political parties and the functioning of the theoretical lenses. Finally, all the sub conclusions will be combined into a conclusion giving each political party a final measure of populism and differences between the results of each theoretical lens will also be discussed. Thus, to sum up, each of the theoretical lenses will be used to analyze data from each political party. The results of each analysis will be discussed and finally combined for a general conclusion.

Figure 1: Research model



3. Methods

In this chapter the research methods used for the research will be explained and elaborated on. Due to the three different theoretical lenses the methods used per lens will vary. Thus, the methods will be discussed separately for each of the three theoretical lenses. The chapter will start by elaborating on the research design, then it will move on to the sampling of the data. After this the operationalization of the different methods and the data collection methods. After this data analysis procedures will be discussed and finally the chapter will end by discussing the limitations both in a general sense of qualitative research and methods specific limitations.

3.1. Research design

This research is a qualitative embedded multiple-case design study, it aims to describe the level of populism of the six new elected parties in Dutch parliament. These six political parties are the units of analysis for the research (Yin, 2014). Each of the different theoretical lenses are treated as a separate “case” of populism through that theoretical lens. The conclusion will be drawn by combining the results of the different case studies into a shared general conclusion regarding the level of populism of the political parties. While the methods all use the case study approach specific differing methods for data collection and analysis are used for the theoretical lenses. This research will use qualitative methods for all the theoretical lenses. While both qualitative and quantitative methods can be used to study populism the current study is more suited for qualitative methods for a number of reasons. First the study is not a large N study as only six political parties are being analyzed. Secondly the research attempts to get a deeper understanding of the parties and their levels of populism based on text interpretation for which qualitative analysis is more suited. Third, the research also tries to define the differences between the different theoretical lenses. This can be done best when similar methods of analysis are used, as the discursive lens uses mainly qualitative methods and the strategical lens has only used qualitative methods qualitative methods of analysis were selected. Finally, to test the reliability of the results obtained a reliability test will be done. As the research only makes use of one coder inter-coder reliability could not be tested and only intra-coder reliability was tested.

3.1.1. Research design ideological theoretical lens

For the ideological lens the data to be analyzed are the party's election manifesto's which are secondary sources in the form of documents. The data will be analyzed using classical content analysis which is a qualitative analysis method.

3.1.2. Research design discursive theoretical lens

For the discursive lens the data used is tweets posted by the party leaders. These are secondary sources in the form of written (online) media posts. The tweets will be analyzed using a holistic analysis which is a qualitative analysis method.

3.1.3. Research design strategical theoretical lens

The Strategical theoretical lens is different in its approach to populism than the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses. Weyland used fuzzy sets as proposed by Ragin as his analysis method (Weyland, 2017, pp.65-67). Ragin argues that a fuzzy set should be seen as a fine-grained continuous measure carefully calibrated using substantive and theoretical knowledge relevant to set membership to analyze causal relationships (Ragin, 2000, p.7). The method was judged to be rather difficult and time-consuming, it was therefore considered to be outside of the scope of the research. Instead, it was elected to use holistic text analysis as the analysis method for the strategical theoretical lens. The Strategical lens focuses on three rather different core concepts which are difficult to study using a single dataset therefore each concept will use its own data. The first concept is **direct and personal relationship**. It will use secondary sources from online media posts and the analysis will be done using the qualitative holistic text analysis method. Using this method, the research will try to analyze whether the party leaders use personalistic leadership to communicate with voters. The second concept is **Institutionalization**. To get the most accurate picture of the institutionalization of a political party a researcher has to study internal communications, observe internal power structures within the parties or collect primary source data from current/former party members/employees. This is essential as institutionalization is a process and parties can appear strongly institutionalized on paper. Parties may even have been strongly institutionalized in the past but can be hollowed out by populist leaders (Kenny, 2021, pp.6-7). If this is not possible researchers can observe a political party over a longer time and try to observe if the party objectives and political leanings change after their political leader changes their political stances or leanings. Alternatively if there are major shifts in political stances after a new political leader gets appointed, this could point to weak institutionalization as the party shifts to meet the policy demands of the new political leader. These all are strong indicators of a top-down focused party which bends to the wishes of its political leader (Kenny, 2021, pp.6-7).

Obtaining primary sources through observations or surveys/interviews, however, is outside the scope of this research. Furthermore, because the study specifically focusses on new parties observing party direction over long timescales is also impossible. Institutionalization therefore will be excluded from the research. The final concept is **organized support**, it will use data from party election manifesto's which are secondary sources. This data will be analyzed using holistic text analysis which is a qualitative text analysis method to study the presence of ideological crusades from the political parties. Ideally the data used would not have been presence of ideological crusades but the presence or frequency of mass rallies to drum up support. Due to covid restrictions, however, mass rallies were not held (with the exception of Forum's Freedom Caravan). Therefore, ideological crusades were selected as a replacement measure. Ideological crusades as explained in the theory section are used by populists as a central message to unite differing groups of un-organized voters under.

3.2. Sampling

Both units of analysis and the data vary for the analyses therefore sampling will be elaborated on per theoretical lens. This was done because of the different data sets used for the different theoretical lenses. The specific sampling methods for the different theoretical lenses will be discussed in their respective paragraphs later in the sub-chapter. The units selected were the 6 new parties (and their political leaders) in Dutch parliament after the 2021 election. These units were selected as the focus of the research was specifically on new parties as there has been relatively little analysis done on them because of their "newness". For the context of the research, it might have been better to include all political parties in parliament. However, this would enlarge the scope of the research to such a degree as to make it unfeasible for it to be done in a timely manner. Furthermore, un-elected parties or parties who were newly elected in the previous election were also excluded as they are not politically relevant in the current parliament. Finally splinter parties that formed after the elections were also not included due to a lack of data available as their parties did not exist during the elections.

3.2.1. Sampling ideological theoretical lens

For the ideological lens the data used are party manifestos which are secondary sources. The units of analysis are the political parties themselves; this is because manifestos are written by party commissions and represent the party as a whole and not just the party leader. The manifestos for the 2021 national elections were collected for all parties and thus entailed six election manifestos. The manifesto's will be analyzed using the classical content analysis method which will be further elaborated on in later paragraphs.

3.2.2. Sampling discursive theoretical lens

For the discursive method the data used are tweets for the party leader and thus the units of analysis are the party leaders themselves. Due to the importance of party leaders within populist literature especially for the discursive method it was elected to use the personal twitter accounts rather than party twitter accounts for the research. Some research also suggests that party leaders' personal twitter accounts and the party twitter account might be managed in such a way to give distinct levels of populist statements to draw in more voters (van Raalte et al, 2021, pp.7-8). Party leaders' twitter accounts also tend to be more popular than the parties' general twitter account and thus their tweets tend to be more impactful as they are seen by more voters. Tweets are secondary sources of data. Due to the large volume of tweets that party leaders produce it was elected to limit the tweets both my time and by total amount to be analyzed. Therefore, a sampling frame was created at a maximum of 100 tweets per party leader in the period between 16-02-2021 and 17-03-2021. This period was roughly a month before the national elections, this time-period was selected as it was expected that even party leaders that tweet less would tweet more during this period and would lead to more data for the analysis. Before the 100 tweets were randomly selected for analysis the complete sample was filtered for relevance, only tweets the party leaders themselves wrote were included so quote tweets and retweets were excluded. Furthermore, tweets in the for of replies were also excluded as these tweets are not visible on the main page but in a separate section, for this research the data used for the analysis is data that followers would see if they were on twitter or scrolled trough the main page of the party leader. Finally tweets need to contain at least a full sentence not just a single or a few loose words or just a single link to external media. After this initial selection the remaining tweets were randomized and a dataset of maximum 100 tweets per party leader was made. The tweets were analyzed using the holistic analysis method which will be further elaborated on in later chapters.

3.2.3. Sampling strategical theoretical lens

For the strategical theoretical lens both the tweets and manifestos were used, the sampling was mostly the same for the data as the ideological and discursive lenses. There were some differences which now be listed. The Strategical lens method, however, uses different selection criteria for the data than the discursive lens for the tweets. As data that was excluded for that method such as replies were included. Furthermore, the analysis method used for the Strategical lens is the holistic method. This differs from the classical content analysis used for the manifestos by the ideological lens.

3.3. Data collection methods

The data that is used for the research all comes from secondary sources which was publicly and freely accessible on the internet. For the ideological lens the data is election manifestos which were obtained from the party websites for free. The discursive lens uses party leader tweets, while these tweets are available freely on the internet. Collecting these tweets however was outsourced to an external party Vicinitas, this made the collection easier and faster. Vicinitas was financially compensated by the researcher for the data collection. For the Strategic method the data used was the same as for the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses and the data collection methods were thus the same.

3.4. Operationalization.

It was elected to split the sub chapter in distinct parts for each of the theoretical lenses as in previous sub-chapters. Although some methods have similar operationalizations minor and major differences are present between the theoretical lenses, therefore splitting them into different sections allows for a better and clearer overview.

3.4.1. Operationalization ideological theoretical lens.

The data used for the ideological lens is election manifestos. Election manifestos were selected because manifestos give the most complete overview of the ideology of a political party. Secondly manifestos are reasonably comparable between parties and thus will give more reliable data for comparison (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011, pp.1273-1274). The units for the ideological lens are the political parties as election manifestos represent the party as a whole and not just the party leader. Because all parties had a single election manifesto, the national election sampling was not necessary, and all election manifestos were analyzed in full for all political parties. The analysis method that will be used is a classical content analysis by the author. Rooduijn and Pauwels found that the classical method was more reliable than the computerized method although they advised using a combination of the two methods for large n-studies (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011, pp.1279-1280). As this study is not a large n-study the classical method will be used as it is more accurate while still being doable in this case. The coder will search for populist arguments containing references to the core concepts of populism listed in the theory section. These are references to “the people”, adversarial/exclusionary arguments against elites/others and arguments pertaining to the general will as markers for populism. The coding units are paragraphs, paragraphs will be marked using codes based on the core concepts listed earlier. Combinations of different types of populist argument were coded using separate codes, the separation was made practical reasons due to the limitations of the analysis program. The coder will make use of a codebook which entails a list of populist

arguments, combinations of the arguments and indications how to recognize each argument. Furthermore, criticism of the elite had to be aimed at the elite in general and not a single party or party leader. The coder carefully assesses the context of the references (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011, pp.1273-1275). The full codebook can be found in Appendix 1.

3.4.2. Operationalization discursive theoretical lens.

For the discursive approach the data that was selected are tweets by the political leaders of the six emerging parties. This was done for two reasons; first social media plays an increasingly important role in public (political) life. The discourse on social media is also of increasing importance and a way for a politician to connect to their (potential) voters at low cost (Gründl, 2020, pp.1482-1484). Research has also proven that populist messages are more common on social media due to the lack of gatekeepers which often exist in traditional media. Empirical evidence suggests that populists are more interested in interacting with their voters online to establish direct connections (Manucci, 2017, pp.483). Secondly due to covid there were significantly fewer public speeches or public debates further increasing the importance of social media. For the research it was thus elected to focus on social media communication rather than traditional speeches as it not as well researched and likely to continue growing in importance. The method selected for analyzing the tweets is the holistic approach, this approach has been used successfully by multiple different research on populist discourse/style although it is usually used to analyze political speeches, text or other long form content instead of short tweets (Gidron, & Bonikowski, 2013, pp.16-18). The coding units are full tweets, the tweets graded using a rubric found in appendix 2 based on core concepts for the discursive theoretical lens listed in the theory section.

Due to the personalistic nature of populism and the “charismatic” leader being central in the populist discourse as established in the theory section. The research elected to focus on party leader accounts rather than official party accounts. There is also research that suggests that populist party twitter platform’s might significantly sanitize their content to attract more moderate voters while their political leaders tweet the more controversial statements van (Raalte et al., 2021, pp.7-8). This, however, is not only more common in parties considered populist but also challenger parties or parties who are on the extreme right/left. While the study which found these findings was based on a stylistic definition it still gives a good indication of the difference between political actors and the difference between traditional and social media behavior (Ernst, et al, 2019, pp.10-12).

3.4.3. Operationalization strategic theoretical lens.

For the strategic lens both the concepts of direct personal communication and organized support need to be studied. For **direct and personal communication** tweets were elected as the data to be analyzed.

Tweets were elected as the data source as it is a direct way for party leaders to communicate to and with potential voters and to create direct relationships with voters (Weyland, 2017, pp.58). The coding units are full tweets, the tweets graded using a rubric found in appendix 3 based on core concept for the Strategic theoretical lens listed in the theory section. Just as the discursive lens it was elected to focus on the party leaders rather than the party as the party leaders is the central figure for a populist party in Strategic populist theoretical lens (Kenny, 2021, pp.6). Personal relationships are more easily formed between individuals than between an individual and a party account. Furthermore, party leaders are increasingly becoming the face of their political parties, thus a personalistic relationship between party accounts and voters is increasingly becoming a personalistic relationship between the voter and the party leader by proxy. It therefore makes more sense to study the party leaders directly. To analyze the data the holistic analysis method was used.

For **Organized support** the presence of ideological crusades as the way to unite un-organized voters is being studied. As ideological crusades should hold major importance for populist parties and not just talking by party leaders/members they should be present in their most important documents listing the stances and views of the political party. The coding units are the full manifesto's, the manifesto's will be graded using a rubric found in appendix 4 based on core concept for the Strategic theoretical lens listed in the theory section. Election manifestos were selected as the data to be studied as these are the most important documents the party releases containing their stances and goals for the coming period. Furthermore, election manifestos are comparable in structure and contents and are released by all political parties making them easy to analyze and compare.

As stated before, ideally organized support would be measured by studying mass rallies as this is often a key demonstrator of a populist strategy. Due to covid this was not possible large gatherings were banned. Therefore, it was elected to focus on ideological crusades. Ideological crusades are used by populists to unite large groups of different and unorganized voters, they are used as a rallying cry for voters to unite behind. While traditional parties seek support through traditional ties with organizations such as churches or labor unions. Populist parties want to remove the middleman and try to unite their voters around a single or multiple political messages. Rather than obtaining support because of their political ideology or ties with other organizations, who could hinder the power and fluidity of the political leader. Popular examples of ideological crusades are centered around anti-(illegal)immigration rhetoric, crime and (political) corruption as these are broadly supported causes. Furthermore, the targets of these

attacks often are either not voters or their voting power in numbers is negligible. A Dutch example for this for instance is anti-Polish rhetoric by the Dutch Populist MP Wilders. Wilders stated that Polish workers were taking jobs from Dutch people, the political elite allowed or even profited from this, he was the only one standing up for the people. He proposed as a solution limiting Polish migration which goes against the EU freedom of goods, services and people and thus utterly impossible on a national level. With this he combined unrest over unemployment, perceived unfair competition by cheap Polish labor a cause which many supported. The group that was targeted was migrants which are not allowed and or not interested to vote in Dutch elections thus the cost for him was low.

3.5. Data analysis procedures.

Due to the different methods and data being used each theoretical lens also has its own methods of analyzing the data obtained. These are once again separated by theoretical lens and further elaborated below.

3.5.1. Data analysis procedures ideological theoretical lens.

The analysis of the manifesto's will be done using the qualitative analysis tool ATLAS.ti, the coding unit are paragraphs which will be assigned codes the coder. Only a single code will be assigned to each quote and will either be marked as non-populist by using code 0 no-populist argument or 1 till 7.2 populist argument. The numbers for the codes are simply used as labels and do not reflect scores. Codes for combinations of populist arguments were coded separately to get an accurate view of the number of paragraphs analyzed. Titles are considered to be part of the following paragraph, (numbered) lists of arguments are seen as a single paragraph. The analysis will lead to a total amount of paragraphs analysis's, number of populist quotes and number of populist quotes per category (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011, pp.1273-1275). From these data percentages can be assigned to populist paragraphs per manifesto and populist arguments most used in specific manifestos. The codebook was based on the codebook made by Rooduijn & Pauwels although it was simplified for the research.

3.5.2. Data analysis procedures discursive theoretical lens.

Holistic grading requires readers to interpret the context of a text instead of just counting/grading words, sentences or parts of a text as is usually done in a content analysis such as the method of ideational approach. Thus, readers assign one grade or score to determine how populist a text is, whole tweets therefore are the coding unit. To do this it requires the researcher to create a rubric which guides the

readers on what is being analyzed and how to determine grades to a text. After which readers need to be trained to use the rubric using example/anchor texts (Hawkins, 2009, pp. 1049). For this research a rubric will be created based on the theoretical framework because the research will be conducted by the same person who created the rubric there should be no need to train using anchor texts and thus this step will be skipped. The rubric was created by using the rubric by Hawkins as a basis and adapting it to the theoretical framework of this research (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1062-1064). All core and secondary concepts listed in the theory section are present in the rubric and will be used to analyze the data. The six codes present in the rubric are based on codes used by Hawkins. The codes were used as proven tools in the analysis of political speech. The codes were slightly altered to fit the analysis of tweets and were translated to Dutch for ease of use. Below the appendix the links between core concepts and codes are detailed.

For the grading a similar method will be used as the research by Hawkins with each tweet being graded on a three-point scale. Changes, however, were made to Hawkins grading scale as it was meant to analyze speeches and tweets are at most 280 characters long, while speeches can fill many pages. It is rather unfeasible for a tweet to contain all elements from the rubric therefore a different grading scale was adopted (Hawkins, 2009, pp. 1050-1051). The scale is as follows, a score of 0 means a tweet is not populist, 1 is mixed where populist elements are not the (main) vocal point of the tweet and 2 is fully populist where populist elements are the only or primary vocal points of the tweets. When all tweets are graded for all party's averages and modi will be determined and compared between the party leaders and conclusions will be drawn.

3.5.3. Data analysis procedures strategical theoretical lens.

To analyze the data for the Strategical lens both concepts are being analyzed using the holistic approach. For the sake of consistency all the appendixes using the holistic method adopted the same lay-out. For **direct and personal relationship**, the same data was analyzed as was done for the discursive theoretical lens. The same selection for inclusion and exclusion was made for the inclusion and exclusion of tweets however the total amount direct replies will be used in the as a reference in sub-conclusions as these tweets are all direct and personal communication between the party leaders and potential voters. The same selection of tweets that was used in the discursive analysis will be used with full tweets as coding units. The tweets will be graded on a scale of 0-1 based on different characteristics listed in a rubric for the analysis found in appendix 3. The codes found in the rubric were constructed based on different elements of direct and personal leadership as listed in the theory chapter. It was elected to use a 0-1 scale rather than a 0-2 scale as there is less grey area whether a tweet is personalistic in nature as opposed to whether it contains a populist message. In the analysis all tweets will be assigned two grades within excel. First

either a 0 (not personalistic) or 1 (personalistic). Secondly if the tweet was judged to be personalistic it will be assigned a second grade or grades, based on which category of personalistic messaging it contains as listed in the rubric. These grades will be collected and together with the number of direct replies to the party leader posted a conclusion will be drawn whether the party leader made use of direct and personalistic communication.

For **organized/unorganized support** election manifestos are analyzed for the presence of ideological crusades. For this analysis the holistic analysis method will be used in its traditional form as done by Hawkins (Hawkins, 2009, pp. 1050-1051). The full election manifestos will be the coding units and will be analyzed and graded based on the whole text as is common with the holistic method (Hawkins, 2009, pp. 1050-1051). The elements that make up ideological crusades drawn from the theoretical framework based on literature were gathered in a rubric (appendix 4) which is to be used during the analysis. Manifestos will be placed in the qualitative analysis tool ATLAS.ti and the sentences containing ideological crusade rhetoric will be marked and assigned a label based on the elements listed in the rubric. This marking will simply be done to mark important elements for later referencing. After the whole document is analyzed and relevant sentences are marked the grader will assign a grade to the entire manifesto on a 0-2 scale. The grade is a zero when the manifest does not contain ideological crusades, one when it contains some elements of an ideological crusade and two if all elements of an ideological crusade or multiple ideological crusades are present. In line with the holistic method all elements of an ideological crusade have to be present for it to be graded as fully present (Hawkins, 2009, pp. 1050-1051). The grader will also list the different ideological crusade elements that were present in the manifestos and the subjects of (partial) ideological crusades if present. After the analysis sub-conclusions will be drawn based on the results of the analysis.

3.5.4. Differences between the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses

To ascertain if the use of the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses truly makes a difference for the results of the analysis an alternative analysis will be done for both theoretical lenses. This means the definition for the people will be changed from a homogenous one to a heterogenous one in the codebook for ideological theoretical lens and from a heterogeneous to homogenous for the discursive theoretical lens. This alternative analysis will be used to conclude whether the separation in literature between the different theoretical lenses really was artificial or if they could have been used as a single theoretical lens for the research. The alternative conceptualization of “the people” will be listed in the appendix and the results will be discussed separately in the data & analysis chapter and in the conclusion. To obtain the highest degree of certainty the datasets were fully analyzed again with the changed interpretation of “the people”. This was done because multiple paragraphs that were analyses and assigned a code in the first

analysis could have their codes changed. Units coded as non-populist, units coded based on a heterogenous interpretation of the people and units containing a heterogenous interpretation could all have their coding changed. While the main change is expected to be in references to “the people” if the definition of “the people” changes the concept of the will of the people now also changes to include smaller groups of “the people”. Finally, for the classical content analysis existing codes could also be changed to codes which contained a combination of multiple codes. Thus, because the change of the core concept of “the people” has cascading effects it was deemed prudent to do the full analyses again in full rather than targeting specific categories of codes. If the use of a different theoretical lens results in a significant number of changes in how units were coded it proves that the theoretical lenses are significantly different and should be used separately in analyses.

3.5.5. Intra-coder reliability analysis method.

To test the reliability of the analyses an intra-coder reliability analysis shall be done to verify the reliability of the results obtained in the analysis. To test intra-coder reliability the percent agreement analysis method was selected. Percent agreement is the most widely used method to test intra-coder reliability as it is simple, intuitive and uses simple calculations (Lombard et al.; 2002, pp. 590-591). While the percentage agreement is the most widely used method it is not without fault. The method is criticized for not accounting for random chance agreements and only accounting for “perfect” agreement, answers being close together scoring the same as completely different answers. It is thus advised to only use percent agreement for nominal variables (Lombard et al.; 2002, pp. 590-591). These limitations do not pose a significant problem to the research as the codes used in the research use nominal levels. While there is some overlap in the codes in core concepts (e.g., partial overlap of core concepts in the rubric in appendix 2 and combination codes of appendix 1), missing a core concept in the analysis should disqualify the result fully as key information was missed. Random chance agreement should also be negligible as there is only a single coder which means the results were obtained using the same level of knowledge and familiarity with the analysis was present. Intra-coder reliability analyses will be done for three out of the four analyses. The method was selected to test intra-coder reliability due to its ease of use and the simple nature of the results did not require complicated statistical methods (one coder and nominal units). The holistic text analysis of the election manifestos was excluded as the analysis graded an election manifesto as a whole which makes it unsuitable for an intra-reliability analysis. For each of the analyses a sample of 10 randomly selected units shall be picked from each party/party leaders and analyzed a second time for the intra-reliability analysis. The results will then be compared and assigned percent agreement reliability scores first on an individual basis (per party/party leader), secondly per analysis method and finally a percent agreement reliability score will be given for the full research.

3.6. Limitations research design

One of the most well-known limitations of qualitative research is the role of the researcher within the research. In qualitative research the researcher has much more influence on the data than in quantitative research and biases can more easily manifest in the analysis (Swanson & Holton, 2005, pp.234 - 236). To reduce the influence of bias on this research grading tools were made based on established literature and strictly adhered to limit the influence of researcher bias as much as possible. Ideally multiple graders would have been used to further eliminate bias however this was outside the scope of the research. When possible random selection was used, similar time scales were used to get data from similar periods to make the data as comparable as possible. Finally, as the holistic analysis method was used for the first time to analyze the strategical theoretical lens for populism the method is still untested, it is unknown if the analysis method is fully suitable. Still the analysis method was selected as it has been successfully used in qualitative populism research and judged to be a good match for the Strategical theoretical lens. The holistic method was also chosen to replace the fuzzy-set analysis as they are similar in nature. Both methods place greater emphasis on the grader interpretation of the data (Weyland, 2017, pp.65-67; Ragin, 2000, p.7; Verkuilen, 2005, pp.470-471). Thus, while the method was not used in earlier research it was at least seen as similar enough to select it to use for the analysis. Further studies using the holistic method could flesh out the suitability of the method for the Strategical theoretical lens on populism.

4. Data & Analysis.

In this chapter first, the data which was collected for each of the theoretical lenses will be discussed. After the data was obtained and vetted analyses were done the results of which are listed in sub-chapters 4.2 till 4.4.. After the results are elaborated on conclusions will also be drawn for the sub-research questions related to each theoretical lens in their respective section. To clarify whether the distinction between the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses is artificial or if the use of the different lenses actually leads to different results sub-chapter 4.5. analyzed the change in results of the methods of analysis if the ideological and discursive lenses were switched in their respective analyses. Finally the last sub-chapter tests intra-coder reliability to obtain reliability scores for the analyses that were executed.

4.1. Data.

Following the methods data was collected for each theoretical lens. This data will be further elaborated on in this sub-chapter. Following this the data will then be used in the coming sub-chapters for the analyses of the different theoretical lenses.

4.1.1. Data manifesto's ideological theoretical lens.

The data used for the ideological theoretical lens analysis were election manifestos for the Dutch national Tweede Kamer elections of March the 17th in 2021. The manifestos were obtained from the party websites of the political parties they belonged to in PDF format and were put into ATLAS.ti for analysis.

Table 2 General information manifesto's ideological approach

General information overview				
Party name	Title of the manifesto	Number of pages	Number of Paragraphs	Number of words
BoerBurgerBeweging	Gezond verstand voor een gezond platteland	54	162	13551
BIJ1	Allemaal anders maar toch gelijkwaardig	118	187	22579
Denk	Denk anders Verkiezingsprogramma Denk 2021-2025	88	163	15647
Forum voor Democratie	Stem Nederland terug verkiezingsprogramma 2021-2025	104	220	15506
JA21	JA21 verkiezingsprogramma 2021-2025	75	218	27877
Volt	Volt verkiezings programma 2021-2025 Toekomst made in Europe	64	208	16527

As can be seen in the table above there is a significant difference in the number of pages in the different manifestos. The difference between paragraphs however is comparatively small from what the number of pages would suggest. BBB had the shortest manifesto; this is because they used short and simple language. Their manifesto was largely done in two styles, the first style they used were numbered bullet points containing their stances for a certain topic such as healthy education, healthy society etc. The second style was taking questions from a voting questionnaire (kieswijzer) relating to the topic of style one and answering those questions using the party stances on the topic. Using this style, it kept the number of pages low and kept the number of paragraphs low as bullet points are seen as a single paragraph.

BIJ1 had the largest number of pages of all the manifestos however just had 25 more quoted paragraph's than BBB. Just like BBB their manifesto used two distinct styles, each chapter starts with a front page with the title of the chapter and a picture followed by an introduction into the topic for the chapter, outlining some of the problems and solutions to the problem. The second part of the chapter is numbered bullet points containing the parties' stances on related to the theme of the chapter. BIJ1 however subdivided the topics in each chapter and thus each set of bullet points is about a specific

subtopic instead of the single set for the whole topic that BBB used. The use of these front pages for each chapter and liberal use of empty space to keep the sets of bullet points together resulted in an increase of pages. While this resulted in a large number of pages the use of numbered bullet points kept the number of paragraphs low. The manifesto also contained an appendix with a word list which was not quoted due to it being irrelevant to their political stances. Additionally the annex contained a list background pieces which gave more detailed stances on issues previously discussed in the manifesto. The background pieces were also excluded to avoid duplication of political stances from the manifesto. The number of pages listed in table two already excluded the appendix. If the appendix was included the total amount of pages was actually 170 and the total amount of words was 36500 leading to a major increase of pages/words without the inclusion of extra paragraphs.

Denk used a similar format as BIJ1 with each chapter having a sort of introduction outlining problems and solutions regarding the topic of the chapter, followed a subdivision into smaller subtopics for each chapter. These subtopics contained a small piece of texts and bullet points for their main stances. The manifesto also made use of multiple front pages containing the main topic of the chapter and with one-liner style sentences for the sub-topics. This style, with each chapter having two or three “front pages”, led to the manifesto having a lot of pages without quotes and thus a lower number of paragraphs than one would expect for the number of pages.

FvD has the manifesto with the largest number of paragraphs and the second largest number of pages. This is largely due to the style the manifesto was written in. The manifesto contains 7 chapters all with several sub chapters which go in dept into specific points relating to the overall chapter. Each chapter and sub-chapter have a “front-page” containing an image and a bullet point list of the main points. After this “front-page” each of the main points of the front page are discussed and the parties' stances listed. However, unlike other parties this is all done in full text generally by using a paragraph per point leading to a larger number of paragraphs than the other manifestos.

JA21 has a fairly simple style, the manifesto has 4 chapters each with a number of sub chapters. Chapters are simply started by using a title and then moved on to the first sub-chapter. In each sub-chapter the topic is introduced, and the party stances are listed. Each sub chapter is then ended by a bullet point list of the stances of JA21 summarized in a bullet point list with a blue background to give it a distinct look. This compact style with a focus on text explanation and lack of imagery led to relatively short manifesto in number of pages but still containing the second highest number of paragraphs.

Finally, the manifesto by Volt was somewhat of a mixed bag, the manifesto has six chapters all containing sub chapters. The manifesto is largely filled with text, but small images are sometimes used throughout the manifesto. Larger full-page images with minimal text are also used at different points in the manifesto. The paragraphs in the manifesto are relatively short and to the point and changes in topics

are clearly divided. This all results in a relatively low number of pages while still having a high number of paragraphs.

4.1.2. Data tweets discursive theoretical lens.

For the discursive method the data collected was tweets from the party leaders. The tweets were collected by the external party Vicinitas. They were financially compensated by the researcher. When looking at the total amount of filtered tweets initial trends can be seen. Both Caroline van der Plas and Sylvana Simons Tweeted by far and away the most out of all the party leaders. Furthermore, both of them also used twitter as a direct communication tool to communicate with supporters and opponents. This can be seen as both have significantly more tweets in the form of replies than other candidates. Thierry Baudet tweeted the third most but kept this to own tweets not replying at all. Farid Azarkan and Laurens Dassen tweeted significantly less but followed the same trend of mainly making their own tweets rather than replying, both having only 1 reply. Finally, Joost Eerdmans hardly ever tweeted mainly using his profile to retweet party tweets which were not included in the dataset only leaving 7 tweets of which only 1 was a reply. From the total amount of tweets, a selection was made, excluding the replies/retweets and tweets that were too short or consisted only of a link were excluded. This resulted in a dataset of filtered tweets. From this set of filtered tweets up to 100 tweets were randomly selected.

Table 3 Party leader tweets (16-02-2021 till 17-03-2021)

Party	Party leader	Twitter handle	Twitter followers	Total tweets & replies (unfiltered)	Total tweets & replies (filtered)	Total tweets excluding replies	Selected Tweets
Boerburgerbeweging	Caroline van der Plas	@lientje1967	122691	1237	1016	290	100
BIJ1	Sylvana Simons	@SylvanaBIJ1	32849	790	544	154	100
DENK	Farid Azarkan	@F_azarkan	41491	89	71	70	70
Forum voor Democratie	Thierry Baudet	@thierrybaudet	273896	473	379	379	100
JA21	Joost Eerdmans	@Eerdmans	44566	9	7	6	6
Volt	Laurens Dassen	@DassenLaurens	34979	56	33	32	32

The following trends can be noted about the party leaders. Almost all party-leaders dedicated a significant amount of their tweets to the coming election simply promoting their party, promoting voting in general or announcing where they were speaking (in person, on traditional media or on social media). But the candidates all had different ways of handling social media which is both reflected in the number of tweets they reply to and the tone of their own tweets. A quick rundown will now be given about the general trends of tweets per party leader. Caroline van de Plas often uses an informal tone in her tweets on occasion using dialect or informal speech. Her tweets however, are almost all related to politics and don't generally touch on her personal life. Sylvana Simons uses a personalistic style when not promoting her party or activities. These tweets can be split in two different styles. First is Sylvana Simons the person, talking about her activities, her feelings and her role as grandma. Secondly Sylvana Simons is the political person. When using this style, she is a lot more combative calling out injustice where she sees it. Farid Azarkan uses both formal and informal language interchangeably between tweets. Furthermore, he also seems to switch between tweeting as a politician and as a person. These two trends however do not necessarily correlate giving personal anecdotes for political statements and using formal language for personal statements and the other way around. Thierry Baudet's tweets can best be described as eclectic. He switches between posting links to what could be perceived as conspiracy theories, promoting his book, political statements sometimes in all caps, music recommendations, calls for democratic revolution and some tweets about his personal life (with political implications). Joost Eerdmans only had 6 selected tweets which were mostly formal promotion of the party or of voting in general with one semi-personal/political statement regarding Pim Fortuyn. Laurens Dassen just used twitter to promote VOLT, their political goals and share articles that were about VOLT or fit their political vision.

All party leaders also used their twitter profile to promote voting, voting for their party or their media/public appearances related to the election. These types of tweets would not be present during regular times, it was therefore elected to also mark these types of tweets. In the analysis a second analysis will be made which excludes these promotional tweets as a more accurate assessment of the party leaders "normal" twitter activity. Tweets were marked as just promotional when they just referred to promoting voting, promoting voting for their party or to a media/public appearance(s) related to the election. Tweets that promoted one of the following messages but also contained political statements or other statements were left in as they were not exclusively election related.

4.1.3. Data manifestos and tweets strategical theoretical lens.

The strategical theoretical lens used the same data for analysis as the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses thus general sentiments about the data will not be listed to avoid duplication. The Strategical theoretical lens was analyzed based on two variables, based on direct/indirect personal communication and on organized/unorganized support. To analyze direct/indirect personalistic communication the tweets that were selected for the discursive analysis including the promotional tweets were used. For organized support the election manifestos used in the ideational theoretical lens were used. The same text selection was applied as for the ideational theoretical lens excluding only the table of content and appendixes. The manifestos, however, were not divided into individually coded paragraphs but were graded using the traditional implementation of the holistic method namely graded on the full texts. Sentences with the most explicit messages related to ideological crusades were marked for later references but the number of marked sentences had no influence on results/conclusions drawn from the analysis.

4.2. Classical content analysis using the ideological theoretical lens.

In this sub-chapter the analyses will be done using the data described in the previous sub-chapter and the results will be discussed and elaborated on. First the results of the Ideological analysis will be discussed in the following section. The second section will give sub-conclusions based on the results of the analysis.

4.2.1. Analysis: classical content analysis using the ideological theoretical lens.

The analysis was done using the Ideological theoretical lens based on the classical content analysis method obtained from previous research by Rooduijn. The method was altered to fit the current research. To give a quick overview the results are summarized in table four bellow. It lists the number of paragraphs analyzed, populist paragraphs and non-populist paragraphs.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics manifesto's

Party	Total paragraphs	Populist paragraphs	Non-populist paragraphs	Populist paragraphs percentage
BBB	162	27	130	16,56%
BIJ1	187	56	131	29,95%
DENK	163	5	158	3,07%
FvD	220	95	125	43,18%
JA21	218	53	165	24,31%
Volt	208	2	206	0,96%

From these results there are three groups of parties that can clearly be identified. BBB, Denk and Volt were the parties that scored lowest for populism with their percentages of populist paragraphs all sitting below 10% of total paragraphs. The second grouping is BIJ1 and JA21 both scoring between 20%-30% of total paragraphs being populist in nature. FvD alone creates the third and final group with 43,18% of all paragraphs being populist in nature. To further understand these numbers the types of populist paragraphs were separated into different categories the results of which can be found in table 5.

Table 5 distribution paragraphs

Parties ▼	Total	0.	1.	2.	2.1	2.2	3.	4	4.1	4.2	5	6	6.1	6.2	7	7.1	7.2	Total Populist
BBB	163	136	5		10	4	4				2	1	1					27
BIJ1	187	131	12		31		5		2		4		1			1		56
Denk	163	158		1	2	2												5
FvD	220	125	10	3	35	21	7	1	4	5	3		4		1	1		95
JA21	218	165	5	2	17	13	8		1		1		2	1		3		53
Volt	208	206	1				1											2

Legend

0. Non populist

1. People

2. Adversarial

2.1 Adversarial Elite

2.2 Adversarial Others

3. General will

4 People + Adversarial

4.1 People + Adversarial Elite

4.2 People + Adversarial others

5 People + General Will

6 Adversarial + General will

6.1 Adversarial elite + General will

6.2 Adversarial elite others + General will

7 People + Adversarial + General will

7.1 People + Adversarial elite + General will

7.2 People + Adversarial others + General will

When looking at what kind of populist paragraphs were present it is especially interesting to compare BIJ1 and JA21, as both parties scored similarly high in populist statements 29,95% and 24,31% respectively. Both parties also lie on complete opposites of the political spectrum, BIJ1 being progressive and left-wing while JA21 is conservative and right wing. While both parties were critical of the elite with 35 and 23 anti-elite paragraphs respectively (including combinations from 4.1, 6.1 and 7.1). BIJ1's agenda was significantly more anti-elite than that of JA21 who instead also focused on "others" with 14 (including combinations) paragraphs containing populist language adversarial to others, while BIJ1 had none. This seems to match classical stances left/progressive and right/conservative parties have taken.

4.2.2. Conclusions: classical content analysis using the ideological theoretical lens.

From the results of the analysis several conclusions can be drawn. First it can be concluded with relatively high certainty that based on the results of classical content analysis BIJ1, JA21 and FvD can be classified as populist. The manifestos of all three parties contained many paragraphs which contained arguments in line with all three populist core concepts. The results also clearly showed the classical differences between left- and right-wing populism. While both left- and right-wing populists used anti-elite, adversarial language against "others" was only present in the manifesto's of FvD and JA21. The results are less clear for BBB. While the manifesto did contain a good number of populist paragraphs and all core concepts for populism were present, the percentage of populist paragraphs in the manifesto was significantly lower than that of BIJ1, FvD and JA21. For now, it can be concluded that BBB is at least partially populist based on the results of the analyses. Volt and DENK on the other hand can clearly be defined as not populist according to the results of the analyses.

All of this allows us to answer sub-research question 2. When using the ideational lens and the classical content analysis method FvD, BIJ1, and JA21 are classified as populist with FvD being the most populist, BIJ1 the second most populist and JA21 as the third most populist. BBB can be seen as an edge case who had significantly fewer populist paragraphs but still met all markers for a populist party just in a lesser degree. This can be partly attributed to the different format that their manifesto used with large lists of numbered bullet points containing their stances which was seen as a single paragraph in the research method. The manifesto also included questions from voting guides, their answers on these questions and a lot of small introductory paragraphs which increased the total amount of paragraphs of the texts but did not contain a lot of populist paragraphs. The large lists, however, sometimes contained populist statements of the same category multiple times; this had no effect on the totals as these lists were all seen as a single paragraph. The manifesto thus was overall ill-suited to the research method and a different method or changes in the method could have led to significantly different results. DENK and Volt were both classified as non-populist with low to almost no populist paragraphs in their manifesto's.

4.3. Holistic text analysis using the discursive theoretical lens.

In this sub-chapter the analysis will be done on the data from the first sub-chapter and will be discussed and elaborated on. To start table six below lists the total amount of tweets gathered and tweets graded as populist are listed to provide an overview. First an analysis was done based on the theoretical interpretation of the discursive theoretical lens. The results of this are listed in the following section. In the second section sub-conclusions will be drawn from both analyses.

4.3.1. Analysis: holistic text analysis using the discursive theoretical lens.

The analysis was done on the selected tweets, results are listed in table six below.

Table 6 Descriptive statistics discursive Theoretical Lens

Party leader	Party	Total tweets	total populist tweets	Tweet populist percentage	total score (0-2)
Plas	BBB	100	18	17,00%	0,25
Simons	BIJ1	100	9	9,00%	0,13
Azarkan	DENK	70	5	7,14%	0,11
Baudet	FvD	100	35	35,00%	0,55
Eerdmans	JA21	9	1	16,67%	0,17
Dassen	Volt	32	0	0,00%	0

To further increase clarity a second table was produced which isolated promotional tweets to give a clearer picture of levels of populism not in election times. As these promotional tweets did not contain any political messages, they were all marked as non-populist tweets explaining the increased percentages and scores for populism.

Table 7 Descriptive statistics 2 discursive Theoretical Lens

Party leader	Party	Promotional tweets	Total tweets excluding promotion	total populist tweets	Tweet populist percentage	total score (0-2)
Plas	BBB	19	81	18	22,22%	0,31
Simons	BIJ1	11	89	9	10,11%	0,15
Azarkan	DENK	14	56	5	8,93%	0,14
Baudet	FvD	19	81	35	43,21%	0,68
Eerdmans	JA21	4	2	1	50,00%	0,50
Dassen	Volt	13	19	0	0,00%	0,00

Based on the low number of tweets posted by Eerdmans in the selected period no valid conclusions can be drawn due to incredibly small sample. After excluding promotional tweets only two tweets remain which

simply makes this too small of a sample to draw any conclusions from. To further elaborate how the total scores were reached the frequency of the scores was also defined and is put in table eight below.

Table 8 Distribution of scores Discursive Theoretical Lens

Party leader	Party	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2
Plas	BBB	63	11	7
Simons	BIJ1	80	5	4
Azarkan	DENK	51	2	3
Baudet	FvD	46	15	20
Eerdmans	JA21	1	1	0
Dassen	Volt	19	0	0

4.3.2. Conclusions: holistic text analysis using the discursive theoretical lens.

From the results of the previous sub chapters, it is clear to see that Baudet from the FvD had both the largest percentage populist tweets (excluding Eerdmans) as well as the highest score of for populism in the tweets of 0,68. Followed by van der Plas with 0,31 and 0,27 Simons with 0,15 Azarkan with 0,14 and finally Dassen with 0. While this 0,68 doesn't seem that high compared to the 0,6 average for campaign speeches Hawkins measured in his research (Hawkins, 2009, pp.1054-1055). The tweets were taken during a time of heavy campaigning. However, differences in units of measurements have to be kept in mind. Hawkins measured whole speeches and assigned a single grade holistically while in this research individual tweets were graded. This resulted in a larger N but also in more diverse measurements as in a speech there might be lots of sentences which are not populist however if the overall speech is seen as populist these sentences are not counted. If all tweets were combined as a single "speech" and graded the results would likely have been more comparable. As this was not the case populism scores were expected to be lower as it likely that not every tweet contains a populist message or even a political message lowering the average scores. Taking this into account one can clearly see that Baudet is significantly more populist than his counterparts, Van der Plas also scores significantly higher however not nearly as high as Baudet while Simons and Azarkan while having some populist tweets score significantly lower, Dassen having no populist tweets and Eerdmans being excluded for the low sample size. Finally, it can be concluded based on the results of the analysis that only Baudet can be considered as being populist based on the tweets that were analyzed. Van der Plas can be considered slightly populist however the difference is in this analysis. Furthermore, while twitter was used to convey political messages, most tweets by party leaders were not politically motivated.

4.4. Holistic text analysis using the strategical theoretical lens.

In this sub-chapter, the results from the analyses of the strategical theoretical lens will be discussed. This is done in three parts. First the analysis of direct/indirect personal communication of the political leaders analyzed using the tweets and the holistic text analysis method. The second part is the analysis of organized/unorganized support based on the analysis of the manifestos for ideological crusades using the holistic text analysis method. Finally, the results of the analyses will be discussed, and sub conclusions given in the final section.

4.4.1. Analysis: holistic text analysis using the strategical theoretical lens, direct/indirect personal communication.

For the analysis of direct/indirect personal communication using the strategical theoretical lens tweets were analyzed using the holistic text analysis method. Tweets were graded 0 if they were not direct and personalistic and 1 if they were direct and personalistic. Grades were assigned based on five categories listed in the rubric which can be found in appendix 3, the results from this analysis will now be listed below in table 9.

Table 9: Results Holistic text analysis direct/indirect personal communication strategical theoretical lens.

Party leader	Party	Total tweets	total direct/personalistic tweets	Total direct/personalistic tweets percentage
Plas	BBB	100	71	71,00%
Simons	Bij1	100	82	82,00%
Azarkan	DENK	70	29	41,43%
Baudet	FvD	100	79	79,00%
Eerdmans	JA21	6	2	33,33%
Dassen	Volt	32	11	34,38%

From these results we can distinguish two distinct groups from the political leaders. Plas, Simons and Baudet mostly use the platform for direct and personal communication with possible voters with 71, 82 and 79 percent of their respective tweets being direct and personal in nature. Azarkan and Dassen scored significantly lower with 41,43 and 34,38 percent respectively. These groupings also coincide with total twitter usage from the party leaders. Party leaders from this first group all tweeted a lot more than those from the second group. Plas tweeted 1237 times, Simons 790 and Baudet had 473 tweets in the selected month. The party leaders of the second group of Azarkan and Dassen both had below 100 tweets with 89 and 56 respectively before selection. The results listed for Eerdmans in Table 13 are not significant as only 6 tweets were eligible for analysis which is far too few. This lack off data however is significant as

the infrequency of tweets at least allows us to state that at least on the social media platform of twitter Eerdmans has little communication with possible voters. Furthermore, both Plas and Simons also made heavy use of the reply function on twitter, both having over three times as many replies as regular tweets using the function to communicate in an individual (but public) manner with voters. From this we can draw the following conclusions. All political leaders included in the analysis use the social media platform Twitter for direct and personal communication with possible voters. While they all used Twitter for direct and personal communication two distinct groups can be defined based on the results of the analysis. Plas, Simons and Baudet all mostly use the platform for personal and direct communication with potential voters' while Azarkan and Dassen Mostly use it for indirect and non-personalistic communication. Eerdmans was excluded as he rarely used Twitter for communication at all. Based on this Plas, Simons and Baudet all qualify as using direct and personalistic communication in the Strategic theoretical lens.

4.4.2. Analysis: holistic text analysis using the strategic theoretical lens, organized/unorganized support.

The results from the holistic text analysis for ideological crusades using election manifesto's will now be described. This is done to define if the party made use of organized or unorganized support as defined by the strategic theoretical lens. The results are summarized in table 10 bellow and will be discussed per political party afterwards.

Table 10: Results holistic text analysis strategic theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Grade	Ideological crusades
Plas	BBB	2	Anti-government/urban rhetoric
Simons	Bij1	2	Fight against all inequality and or fight for Equality
Azarkan	DENK	0	
Baudet	FvD	2	Anti-establishment (het partijkartel)
Eerdmans	JA21	2	Anti-establishment
Dassen	Volt	0	

BBB

The manifesto of the BBB was scored with two points for ideological crusade(s) leading to the conclusion that they used ideological crusade(s) to garner unorganized support. Throughout the whole manifesto there was a constant line of anti-government/elite rhetoric revolving around the distance between urban and rural Netherlands. While it is to be expected that a party specifically aimed at farmers and rural citizens focusses on those groups. There was a strong emphasis on the distance between the groups, BBB further emphasized the antagonistic relationship between the government (also referred to as The Hague

in the manifesto) and rural regions/citizens (especially farmers). While simply representing their target voter base could be seen as party identity the emphasis on antagonism makes this a ideological crusade. BBB criticized the government for being out of touch with these groups and not acting in their best interests while emphasizing that they (BBB) are in touch with these groups and would bring the common sense of the rural population to fight for the interests of the rural citizens. Besides the government they were also critical of cultural elite groups such as animal activists and nature preservation organizations who they felt had too much influence of policy and wasted government funds while making the lives of rural citizens but especially farmers more difficult. This rural centric language was combined with some non-alienating goals such as though on crime language, anti-illegal immigration, solving the housing shortage and increasing welfare for students, care workers and elderly people. Finally, they proposed several major reforms which were questionable in their possibilities for execution such as: demolishing the nature site Oostvaardersplassen and replacing it with a city for 300.000 citizens, free daycare, reviewing all trade deals (EU jurisdiction) and banning products that do not meet Dutch production standards and mandatory education on agriculture for teachers and journalists. The BBB thus met all criteria of an ideological crusade and used this to unite possible unorganized voters with their message.

BIJ1

The manifesto of BIJ1 was scored two points for the use of ideological crusade(s) based the results from the analysis of the party manifesto. Therefore, it was concluded that the party made use of an ideological crusade to garner unorganized support. BIJ1 is a far-left progressive party, it is therefore no surprise that a central theme of the manifesto is the fight against inequality and or their fight for equality. This theme was also identified as the subject of their ideological crusade. Inequality in the manifesto is mostly used in economic and social/cultural contexts. The two forms of inequality are often used to illustrate problems in different sectors such as economy, education and law, but also to more specific problems such as climate change and online privacy. Furthermore, the two forms of inequality are often used together to explain economic hardship through social inequality and or reversed. The most prominent form of social inequality in the manifesto is inequality based on race/country of heritage and this inequality is focused on most. However, BIJ1 has a wide interpretation of social inequality and lists numerous forms of social inequality such as gender, sexual orientation, handicap, combination of multiple forms and more. Because the two forms of inequality are often used in tandem and are often described as interwoven, it was elected to combine them into a single ideological crusade. Throughout the manifesto hostile language is often used against those who are seen as creators of inequality. Those who maintain and who profit from the inequality named by BIJ1. The main targets of combative language are big business and the political establishment. The party, however, also denounces the systems which those targets operate in such as (global) capitalism and western nation-states, who are painted as neo-colonial, imperialistic and only

aimed at profits. Anti-elite messages and attacking political opponents while naming themselves as the agents of change and equality. The party often uses non-alienating goals to start arguments for change such as arguing for better lives for all, addressing tax fraud and better healthcare for all. Throughout the manifesto BIJ1 proposed reforms to create a more equal Netherlands and World. These reforms sometimes can at best be described as unfeasible both due to national support and enormous scope. While some proposed reforms are simply impossible to be implemented anytime soon. Examples of proposed reforms are complete reform of the Dutch economic system through nationalization and collectivizing large corporations. Divvying up shares among employees or nationalizing entire branches. Reforming the military into civil a humanitarian relief organization and deconstructing military hardware into parts to be used for the civilian industry. BIJ1 also proposes major international and EU reforms. While in some cases they simply state that the Netherlands should promote and seek support for these reforms. In other cases they suggest reforms that are simply impossible for the Netherlands to achieve alone and would be in conflict with international/EU law/treaties. This leads to the conclusion that all elements of an ideological crusade are present in the manifesto. The manifesto also specifically addressed the perceived needs of numerous unorganized groups of voters. Combining this with the heavy use of combative language leads to the conclusion that BIJ1 made use of an ideological crusade to obtain unorganized support. Furthermore, the similarity between BIJ1 and DENK in party ideology and central message is unsurprising as Simons was first a member of DENK. Simons split from DENK due to disagreements on ideology, Simons stated that DENK was not progressive and left enough as they were pandering to their conservative voters. It is therefore unsurprising that the party that Simons founded after the split from DENK was more progressive, left wing and more outspoken against what they identify as the causes of inequality.

DENK

The manifesto of Denk was scored zero points for an ideological crusade(s), the analysis leads to the conclusion that the party did not use ideological crusade(s) to obtain unorganized support. Throughout the manifesto there was a special focus on inequality with a special focus on diversity and racism. This is in line with the party identity as they have always presented themselves as a left-wing party with a special focus on diversity and the status of migrants and their offspring. The very party was founded because both founders split from the traditional left-wing labor party over disagreements on integration policy. The importance of the topic is easily demonstrated in the manifesto as the first chapter is about inclusion and acceptance. This focus is also present in all chapters of the manifesto, even in chapters such as foreign affairs, special focus is given to minorities both at home and abroad. This does not mean that the party is only focused on citizens with a migration background. Attention is given to all vulnerable groups related to the chapter but there seems to be a special emphasis on this group. While inequality is a central theme

of the manifesto and criticism is levied at those responsible for this inequality the tone of the manifesto remains relatively free of hostile language. Hostile language was only used when discussing proven cases of discrimination at the tax office, against political opponents for (anti-Muslim) discretionary policing policies and for failure to act sufficiently to climate change. Furthermore, the manifesto did not contain a lot of impossible reforms or non-alienating statements. The best argument for an ideological crusade that could be made regarding the manifesto is that it contains points clearly and specifically aimed at practicing Muslims. This argument falls flat however as Muslims are one of the better organized groups within the Netherlands with mosques functioning as hubs of their communities. Furthermore, these mosques are often linked through overarching organizations. Making the argument void as the analysis is looking specifically at targeting unorganized groups. Denk thus did not meet the criteria for using a organized crusade to target unorganized voters.

FvD

The manifesto of FvD was analyzed and scored two points for ideological crusades. Thus meaning that the party made use of ideological crusade(s) to obtain unorganized support in their election manifesto. The central theme of the manifesto is represented in its title: Vote the Netherlands back. This represents the central theme of the FvD that the country has been steered in the wrong direction for a long time and that the FvD wants to restore it to its former glory. The main culprits for this destruction of the country are the traditional ruling parties of the Netherlands who are referred to as “het partijkartel” (the party cartel). The party cartel consists of influential figures from traditional political parties who divvy up important well-paying public and private sector jobs between themselves. They do this to strengthen the hold on power of the traditional parties and obtain personal wealth. Through this network political, cultural, economic, judicial and European elites cooperate for their own benefits and to push through their ideology. Besides these elites the Netherlands is also being negatively affected by “others”. These “others” consist of two groups, the first group is (Islamic) non-western migrants/refugees and Dutch citizens with (Islamic) non-western heritage. Those who cost the treasury a lot of money to house, through subsidies and are more criminal than average Dutch citizens. The manifesto states that they are given preferential treatment by the government through diversity programs and erode Dutch culture, values and traditions by not integrating into Dutch society. The second group is Eastern Europeans who can work in the Netherlands because of the Schengen treaty and work for low wages. This is seen as unfair competition which causes unemployment for Dutch workers. The government and ruling parties are seen as the facilitator that connects these elites and others to national power and give them preferential treatment to the detriment of their citizens. Throughout the manifesto the political establishment is stated to be the source or part of the problems that the Netherlands and its inhabitants face. Usually, one of the groups of elites and others are stated to be directly involved by helping the establishment or is the main

source who is being helped by the political establishment. After a problem is stated the FvD will state their desired reforms and on numerous occasions embellish themselves as the only actor willing to stand against the establishment. The tone of the manifesto toward political opponents, elites and others is highly antagonistic and hostile. To combat these groups the FvD lists numerous desired reforms throughout the manifesto some of which are highly unfeasible or even impossible to be carried out. Examples of such reform suggestions are constitutional reform, revoking citizenship for criminals with double nationalities, ending Turkey's NATO membership and solving the housing crisis by encouraging migrants to return to their country of heritage. The manifesto also makes use of non-alienating (empty) goals such as work should be more rewarding, denouncing criminality, reducing bureaucracy and preventing welfare fraud. As due to all of this it can be concluded that all elements of an ideological crusade to garner un-organized support are present, the ideological crusade was mainly aimed at the political establishment who are painted as the central element and the main enemy in the crusade.

JA21

The manifesto of JA21 was scored two points for ideological crusade(s). Leading to the conclusion that they used ideological crusade(s) to garner unorganized support. Throughout the whole manifesto there was a heavy emphasis on criticizing current/past governments, supranational governments and cultural elites who influence the government. While one can argue that this is in line with the conservative-liberal ideology they cite as their political ideology, their adherents to conservative/liberal principles seem to be rather eclectic. On several occasions the party makes arguments for smaller, same or bigger size government and government all in the same topic. JA21 mainly argues against the status quo of the Dutch government/politics both national and internationally, the focus of the party manifesto seems to be mainly anti-establishment. Within this overarching crusade one can however also find all elements present for several smaller crusades such as a demand for more national sovereignty, anti-migration, identity politics and anti-bureaucracy. JA21 however frames all these crusades through the failure of Dutch governments and as such they will be treated as a single ideological crusade. Most common in the manifesto were heavy criticism of government, political/cultural elites and elevating themselves stating that they had the solution/would do better. The manifesto also contained a lot of non-alienating goals such as being against crime, terrorism and illegal migration, or only wanting qualified teachers to be able to teach and solving the shortage of available houses for starters. While the manifesto did not contain a lot unfeasible/impossible reforms outright when combined proposed solutions and reforms the totality of suggestions seems to be herculean task or unfeasible at best. JA21 proposes a lot of extra spending while being opposed to extra taxation and even in favor of lower taxation. They propose the following solutions: increase efficiency in government, reduce bureaucracy on all levels, increase economic growth and reduce government wasteful spending. Examples of outright impossible reform suggestions are

complete EU restructuring and building a new city for between 100 to 150 thousand people at an undecided location. JA21 met all the criteria for an ideological crusade. It is important to note the similarities between FvD and JA21. Both parties hold very similar stances, however JA21 is a lot less combative. This is rather logical as JA21 is an offshoot of FvD, while the defectors agreed in general with the party line and policy. The extreme hostility and power of the party leader were the reason they defected and founded JA21 leading to manifestos with similar content but with JA21's manifesto being less extreme in hostility and desired policy reform.

Volt

Volt was scored zero points for ideological crusade(s). Leading to the conclusion that it did not use ideological crusade(s) as a uniting message to attract unorganized support. Volt is a pan-European, Euro federalist party and its political ideology is center progressive. This matches the central theme of the election manifesto as EU cooperation and further EU integration are central themes in the manifesto and are often offered as solutions for problems faced by both the Netherlands and the EU. Even in purely national issues links are often made to successful national policy in other nations (mostly EU but also global) emphasizing the parties' international nature. The manifesto also clearly reflects the party's center progressive nature with a strong emphasis on the importance of capitalism but also on social welfare and progressive taxation. While criticism is levied against both the Dutch national government, the EU and economic elites the language is not overly hostile/antagonistic and emphasizes the need for reform to improve governance and equality based on progressive values. The manifesto also did not contain excessive references to broadly supported causes. While some of the major reforms suggested in the manifesto are unfeasible or even impossible, the manifesto emphasizes that some of these major reforms need further study to prove feasibility before the party would strive to implement these reforms. Furthermore, the party pushes heavily for further EU integration which cannot be achieved on a Dutch national level, this is acknowledged in the manifesto, and it is used as a goal far in the future. The party states that it strives to work towards these goals in small steps, rather than promising major reforms in a single step. Volt was thus judged to not use ideological crusades to garner unorganized support. While there is a strong central message in the manifesto. This strong message is consistent with the party's political ideology, the central message also lacks overt hostility to elites or political opponents and thus does not qualify as an ideological crusade.

4.4.3. Conclusion: holistic text analysis using the strategical theoretical lens,

Finally, to conclude if a party is populist or not according to the strategical theoretical lens all elements of populism according to the Strategical lens need to be present (Weyland, 2017, pp.65-67). Weyland graded parties from 0-1 with intervals of 0,33 for the presence of each of the three elements that make up his

theoretical lens. This leads to the following scale: 0 = not populist, 0,33 = one populist element present, 0,66 multiple populist elements present and 1 = populist. Depending on the elements that are present detracts the nature of a party. A party with a score of 0,33 because it uses direct and personal communication with voters may use charismatic leadership. They are however not populist as according to the score and underlying theory the party leader is kept in check by the party due to institutionalization and by voters due to organized support for the party. In this analysis institutionalization was left out of the equation as it can be hard to measure without inside information. Institutionalization of parties happens over time as the parties learn from past experiences and build relationships. New political parties simply might lack institutionalization due to the newness of the party and might still be building/learning their institutionalization levels. Parties might appear institutionalized from the outside but hollow from the inside to meet the needs of populist politics, this can be observed however this usually requires time as issues need to arise and handled in such a manner which shows the hollow nature of the party.

Scores will now be assigned to each of the party leaders/parties based on the results from the analysis and for each party it will be concluded if they made use of a populist political strategy. Because institutionalization was not measured, the maximum points that can be assigned is 0,66 as institutionalization was not measured. Because of these no definite conclusions shall be drawn all scores shall add an additional 0,33 as a total range for the score.

Table 11 populism scores Strategical lens

Party leader	Party	Score	Conclusion level of populism
Plas	BBB	0,66-1	Multiple Populist elements - Populist
Simons	Bij1	0,66-1	Multiple Populist elements - Populist
Azarkan	DENK	0-0,33	Not populist – Single Populist element
Baudet	FvD	0,66-1	Multiple Populist elements - Populist
Eerdmans	JA21	0,33-1	Single Populist element - Populist
Dassen	Volt	0-0,33	Not populist – Single Populist element

Both DENK & Azarkan and Volt & Dassen are either not populist or political parties with weak institutionalization. JA21 and Eerdmans are confirmed to make use of ideological crusade(s) to gain unorganized support however, no further scores can be assigned with certainty. There was no analysis done for institutionalization and there was not enough data to draw a significant conclusion for direct personal communication. JA21 and Eerdmans thus are confirmed to use at least one element of populist strategy, but they could also use multiple elements or a fully populist strategy. The final three parties and

party leaders BBB & van der Plas, BIJ1 & Simons and FvD & Baudet all scored at least 0,66 as all used direct personal communication with potential voters and ideological crusade(s) to garner unorganized support. They thus at least used multiple elements of populist strategy or use a fully populist strategy.

4.5. Analysis: separation of ideational and discursive theoretical artificial?

To identify whether the distinction between the Ideological and Discursive theoretical lenses is artificial or made a significant difference additional analyses were done where the use of the theoretical lenses was switched. The results from these analyses are listed in the coming sections after which a conclusion's will be drawn for both analyses and their results.

4.5.1. Classical content analysis of election manifestos

After the initial classical content analysis, a second analysis was done largely on the same basis and data but using the discursive theoretical lens instead. This changed the framing of the concept of “the people” from homogenous to heterogenous. The descriptive statistics of the second analysis are listed below in Table 12 followed by table 13 which shows the changes in number of populist paragraphs between the two analyses both in number of paragraphs and percentages.

Table 12: Descriptive statistics election manifesto's classic content analysis discursive theoretical lens

Party	Total paragraphs	Populist paragraphs	Non-populist paragraphs	Populist paragraphs percentage
BBB	163	33	130	20,25%
BIJ1	187	101	92	50,80%
DENK	163	24	139	14,72%
FvD	220	104	116	47,27%
JA21	218	49	142	34,86%
Volt	208	11	197	5,29%

Table 13: Descriptive statistics election manifesto's classic content analysis changes in scores

Party	Populist Paragraphs Ideological	Populist Paragraphs Discursive	Change in populist paragraphs	Change percentages	Change populism total percentages
BBB	27	33	6	22,22%	3,68%
BIJ1	56	101	45	80,36%	20,86%
DENK	5	24	19	380,00%	11,66%
FvD	95	104	9	9,47%	4,09%
JA21	53	76	23	43,40%	10,55%
Volt	2	11	9	450,00%	4,33%

As can be seen in tables 6&7 the total amount of populist paragraphs has increased significantly when the heterogenous interpretation for “the people” was used. BBB, FvD and Volt all had a relatively low increase in total amount of populist paragraphs. DENK and JA21 both saw an increase of just over 10% and BIJ1 saw an increase of 20,86%. The use of the heterogenous interpretation of the core concept “the people” resulted in an overall increase in total amount of populist paragraphs for all parties. This is because a heterogeneous interpretation allows a wider interpretation of “the people” as it allows for small groups to be included and not just references which include almost the whole population. This resulted in especially large increases in percentages for DENK and VOLT with increases of 380% and 450% respectively. This was mainly because in the initial analysis manifesto hardly contained any populist paragraphs thus small changes had a larger impact on the percentages. In total percentages of populist paragraphs this change was a lot lower, although DENK still had the second highest overall increase in populist paragraphs as a percentage of the manifesto from all the six parties. BIJ1 had the overall largest increase both in total amount of populist paragraphs and overall change in total percentage of populist paragraphs. The fact that these two parties saw large increases in paragraphs listed as populist is to be expected as both parties have a strong focus on diversity. It thus falls within reason that their use of the concept of “the people” would include smaller and diverse groups. JA21 had the second highest change in populist paragraphs and had the third highest change in percentages of the total manifesto. BBB, FvD and Volt all had less than ten changes in populist paragraphs and their total percentages of populist paragraphs all remained under 5% and compared to the other three parties had relatively minor changes. This seems especially strange for the BBB as the focus of the party is specifically on farmers who were excluded in the homogeneous interpretation while being included in “the people” in the heterogenous interpretation. To explain this the table below with the codes and the changes between the analyses must be studied.

Table 14: Descriptive statistics election manifesto's classic content analysis changes in scores per coded category

Parties ▼	Total	0.	1.	2.	2.1	2.2	3.	4	4.1	4.2	5	6	6.1	6.2	7	7.1	7.2	Total Populist
BBB	163	136	5	0	10	4	4	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	33
		-6	6	0	-5	0	-2	0	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
BIJ1	187	131	12	0	31	0	5	0	2	0	4	0	1	0	0	1	0	101
		-39	37	0	-4	0	-2	0	9	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	45
Denk	163	158	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24
		-19	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
FvD	220	125	10	3	35	21	7	1	4	5	3	0	4	0	1	1	0	104
		-9	9	0	-7	-2	0	0	7	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
JA21	218	165	5	2	17	13	8	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	3	0	76
		-23	23	0	-1	0	-2	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	23
Volt	208	206	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
		-9	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	9

Legend

0. Non populist

1. People

2. Adversarial

2.1 Adversarial Elite

2.2 Adversarial Others

3. General will

4 People + Adversarial

4.1 People + Adversarial Elite

4.2 People + Adversarial others

5 People + General Will

6 Adversarial + General will

6.1 Adversarial elite + General will

6.2 Adversarial elite others + General will

7 People + Adversarial + General will

7.1 People + Adversarial elite + General will

7.2 People + Adversarial others + General will

As can be seen in the table during the second analysis reference to “the people” were often found in paragraphs that were already marked as populist, this was because they either contained references to adversarial relations (elite/others) or references to the general will. Changing the code of this paragraph to include the reference to “the people” thus did not increase the total amount of populist paragraphs. This is further illustrated in the table 15 below.

Table 15: Increases in reference “the people” and total change in populist paragraphs

Party	Change in populist paragraphs	Total change in references to the people
BBB	6	13
BIJ1	45	51
DENK	19	19
FvD	9	18
JA21	23	26
Volt	9	9

Table 15 clearly illustrates that the differences between the parties are a lot smaller than initially expected. The progressive-conservative divide was even more clear when the discursive theoretical lens was used. Inclusions of smaller groups combined with a focus on social progressivism saw the number of references to “the people”. The progressive parties, BIJ1, DENK, and Volt saw a large percentage increase of populist paragraphs and total increase as opposed to the parties on the conservative spectrum BBB, FvD. JA21, however, was an exception to this rule as it did see a large increase in populist paragraphs. Both BBB and FvD both saw relatively small changes in populist paragraphs as half of the changes caused by interpretation of “the people” occurred in paragraphs already marked as populist. This did not occur at all with Volt and DENK as the parties hardly had any paragraphs marked as populist and thus overlap was unlikely. The overlap for JA21 was also low at three while BIJ1 had six paragraphs with overlap. Overall there was a significant increase in paragraphs, however BBB & FvD had significantly less change in populist paragraphs as the extra references to the people had a lot of overlap with other populist arguments. The large increase in the more progressive parties especially for the parties that focus on diversity such as BIJ1 and to a lesser extend DENK was because these parties included many different groups into their definition of “the people”. Especially their inclusion of refugees and special focus on citizens with a migration background caused a major increase in references to “the people” for these two parties. The increase of the other four parties was mostly on larger groups such as professional-groups or subgroups of the citizen such as: Teachers, farmers, mothers or students.

To summarize, when the discursive theoretical lens was applied in the analysis all parties saw significant increases in references to “the people”. While the numbers changed the only major change was that BIJ1 was more populist than FvD as BIJ1 had a huge amount of increase in overall paragraphs marked as populist and especially in paragraphs previously rated not-populist. FvD had a lower overall increase in references to the people and half of the additional references to “the people” occurred in paragraphs already marked populist for a different category. JA21 also saw a large increase but it did not change their position in comparison to the other parties and BBB saw only a slight increase as just as with FvD a large part of the additional references to the people occurred in paragraphs already marked as populist. Volt saw only a slight increase in populist paragraphs thus remained unaltered. DENK, while they saw a large increase in references to “the people” that was enough to put them at least on the edge of being populist based on number of populist paragraphs. However, while both parties saw a strong increase in populist tweets based on the discursive interpretation of “the people”, neither party manifesto contained all three core concepts for populist. The literature clearly states that all core concepts need to be present to be labeled as populist thus neither party qualified as populist.

Overall it can be concluded that the choice of theoretical lens used in the analysis makes a significant difference. The different interpretations of the concept of “the people” between the ideological and discursive lens made a significant difference in the number of results that were obtained from the analysis. Due to the more inclusive nature of the heterogenous interpretation the analysis which used the discursive lens identified significantly more paragraphs as populist due to references to “the people”. These differences in results signify that the separation of the theoretical lenses by their adherents is not merely artificial. While the theoretical lenses are largely the same/similar on most points the difference in the interpretation of the core concept of “the people” does lead to differences in results for the classical content analysis.

4.5.2. Holistic analysis of party leader tweets

A second analysis was done for the holistic study of the tweets by party leaders using the ideational theoretical lens as a theoretical underpinning of the analysis. This resulted in a different interpretation of the core concept of the people from heterogenous to homogenous. The data was analyzed a second time using this changed theoretical lens and the results are listed in table 16.

Table 16: Results holistic text analysis tweets by party leaders using the ideational theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Total tweets	total populist tweets	Tweet populist percentage	total score (0-2)
Plas	BBB	100	17	17,00%	0,22
Simons	BIJ1	100	9	9,00%	0,13
Azarkan	DENK	70	5	7,14%	0,11
Baudet	FvD	100	35	35,00%	0,55
Eerdmans	JA21	9	1	16,67%	0,17
Dassen	Volt	32	0	0,00%	0

As with the previous analysis, promotional tweets were removed from the data as these were simply informative and to reflect a business-as-usual situation. The results can be seen in table 17 below.

Table 17: Results 2 holistic text analysis tweets by party leaders using the ideational theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Promotional tweets	Total tweets excluding promotion	total populist tweets	Tweet populist percentage	total score (0-2)
Plas	BBB	19	81	17	20,99%	0,27
Simons	BIJ1	11	89	9	10,11%	0,15
Azarkan	DENK	14	56	5	8,93%	0,14
Baudet	FvD	19	81	35	43,21%	0,68
Eerdmans	JA21	4	2	1	50,00%	0,50
Dassen	Volt	13	19	0	0,00%	0,00

As can be seen here, after excluding promotional tweets, the results are almost identical as in the discursive analysis with only the score from Caroline van der Plas changing from 0,31 to 0,27 thus being less populist. This can be explained by the changes in scores which have been listed in the tables below. Table 18 describes the distribution of the total score, table 19 describes the change between the analysis using the discursive and ideational theoretical lens.

Table 18 Distribution of scores holistic text analysis tweets by party leaders using the ideational theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2
Plas	BBB	63	12	5
Simons	BIJ1	80	5	4
Azarkan	DENK	51	2	3
Baudet	FvD	46	15	20
Eerdmans	JA21	1	1	0
Dassen	Volt	19	0	0

Table 19: Distribution of changes in scores holistic text analysis tweets by party leaders using the ideational theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2
Plas	BBB	1	1	-2
Simons	BIJ1	0	0	0
Azarkan	DENK	0	0	0
Baudet	FvD	0	0	0
Eerdmans	JA21	0	0	0
Dassen	Volt	0	0	0

As seen in tables 18-19 the change in theoretical lens only affected Caroline van de Plas from the BBB. This can be explained by the specific platform for her political party. They are the Farmer Citizens Movement, this reflected in the tweets with changed scores. The tweets in question were aimed at farmers, using the discursive theoretical lens these tweets were included into the concept of “the people” while for the ideational theoretical lens this was not the case. The lack of change for the other political leaders was because their parties tried to aim for broader support, they thus mainly referred to the people in as broad terms as possible thus the change in theoretical lens did not matter. This was also because anti-elite/establishment tweets were also way more common than references to the people. A small asterisk however should be placed next to this conclusion, while some tweets were blatantly anti-elite and even conspiratorial. There is likely to be a more anti political-establishment language from political parties during elections as they are competing with the political parties that formed the government and other traditional political parties. To conclude the change in theoretical lens did not make a significant difference for the holistic analysis of the tweets by party leaders in the research and the lenses could have been used interchangeably.

4.5.3. General conclusion analyses using alternative theoretical lenses

Based on the results from the previous sections it can be concluded that there can be a significant difference in results when the theoretical lenses are switched. When the selected data leaves room for party leaders or parties to go in-depth on topics. It leaves room to further flesh out points, stances and arguments which in turn leads to more detailed information. When more information is able to be included more detailed/niece stances can be mentioned which in turn leads to the inclusion of smaller sub-groups of “the people” which leads to differences in the results of the theoretical lenses. Tweets, especially during election time are mostly used to cast a wide net to garner support and references to smaller heterogenous interpretations of “the people” thus are not widely used. Party leaders almost exclusively referred to individuals or different generalizations of all Dutch citizens such as: Citizens,

Dutchmen etc. In turn the results will not significantly change based on the interpretation of the people through an ideational or discursive theoretical lens as almost all references to “the people” were included in both a homogeneous and heterogeneous interpretation. The election manifestos on the other hand were not limited in length and their goal is to communicate a party's goals and stances in detail to possible voters. This allows the party leaders and political parties to go further in depth where the differences in the homogeneous and heterogeneous interpretation of “the people” differ to a large degree. There thus are significant differences between the theoretical lenses in their interpretation of “the people”. This differences however is not present in all data sets, the data set needs to specifically allow for heterogeneous stances on the concept of the people, otherwise the theoretical lenses can be used interchangeably.

4.6. Intra-coder reliability tests.

To test the reliability of the analyses executed an intra-coder reliability analysis was done to verify the reliability scores of the coder for the different analyses. Intra-coder reliability tests were conducted for three out of the four analyses. The timeframe between the first and second analyses was around six months, making it unlikely that the coder remembered the initial code assignments from the analyses but still maintaining good knowledge of the execution and theory surrounding the analysis. For each analysis a randomly selected sample of 10 units of each of the parties or party leaders was drawn. The samples were then analyzed using the matching methods of analysis after which the results were compared to the original scores. Differences between the original scores and the results from the second analysis were compared. The resulting results were then used to assign intra-coder reliability scores. The original theoretical lenses were used when additional analyses were done with a different theoretical lens. The following analyses were used for the intra-coder reliability test: The classical content analysis of the manifesto using the ideational theoretical lens, the holistic analysis of the tweets using the discursive theoretical and for the holistic analysis of the tweets using the Strategic theoretical lens (direct and personal relationship). The holistic analysis of the manifesto (ideological crusade) was excluded as the result was based on the analysis of the whole manifesto and thus drawing a smaller sample would not be representative of the analysis. JA21's tweets were included into the reliability analyses, although the sample size was too low to draw conclusions for other analyses they were scored and thus could be used for the intra-coder reliability tests. In total 172 points of data were analyzed for the intra-coder reliability tests split between classical content analysis ideological theoretical lens (60), Holistic analysis discursive theoretical lens (56), Holistic analysis Strategic theoretical lens direct and personal communication (56). After the analyses were done the results were gathered and total results can be found in the table below.

The total results will first be discussed after which the results of each analysis will be split into separate tables and outliers will be discussed.

Table 20: Total intra-coder reliability scores across all analyses

Party leader	Party	Data analyzed	Total Changes	Total change percentage	Total Reliability
Plas	BBB	30	4	13,33%	86,67%
Simmons	Bij1	30	3	10,00%	90,00%
Azarkan	DENK	30	2	6,67%	93,33%
Baudet	FvD	30	3	10,00%	90,00%
Eerdmans	JA21	22	2	9,09%	90,91%
Dassen	Volt	30	0	0,00%	100,00%
All	All	172	14	8,14%	91,86%

Overall, the total reliability scores of the parties were quite consistent with most parties hovering around 90% reliability, only BBB had a score of under 90% with a score of 86,67% while Volt scored a full 100%. The overall reliability score was 91,86%, which is quite high for a qualitative analysis. This can likely be attributed to the fact that there was only 1 coder who also constructed the analysis methods and thus was very familiar with both the method and the theoretical framework, leading to low variance. In the following paragraphs the results will be discussed separately per analysis.

Table 21: Intra-coder reliability classical content analysis election manifesto's ideological theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Total Paragraphs	Total changed Paragraphs	Total changes populist Paragraphs	total changes percentages	reliability
Plas	BBB	10	3	3	30%	70,00%
Simmons	Bij1	10	1	1	10%	90,00%
Azarkan	DENK	10	0	0	0%	100,00%
Baudet	FvD	10	1	1	10%	90,00%
Eerdmans	JA21	10	2	2	20%	80,00%
Dassen	Volt	10	0	0	0%	100,00%
Total		60	7	7	11,67%	88,33%

The classical content analysis saw the highest variance in reliability scores and the lowest overall reliability score. This likely is because the units of analysis were full paragraphs rather than single tweets, the larger amount of text makes it easier to miss certain elements or to change the interpretation on context in a second analysis. BBB scored lowest in the reliability analysis with only 70% while it is hard to determine the exact reason for this their manifesto stood out for its different style containing both very short paragraphs and very long lists of numbered bullet-points. The long lists of bullet points were seen as a single paragraph in the analysis method, this led to large pieces of text with dense information. This left a lot of room for variance in the second analysis as these long lists sometimes contained arguments which were right on the edge of being labeled as populist or not populist and interpretation could change in a second analysis. The overall score of 88,33% is still high, the analysis also showed that the parties with almost no populist paragraphs were the easiest to test in the intra-reliability analysis with DENK and Volt both scoring 100%. The low amount of populist rhetoric or rhetoric on the edge allowed for easy analysis without variance.

Table 22: Intra-coder reliability holistic text analysis of tweets using the discursive theoretical lens

		Changes						reliability
Party leader	Party	Total Tweets	Changes tweets	non-populist	Changes populist	Changes points	Changes percentages	
Plas	BBB	10	1	0	1	1	10%	90,00%
Simmons	Bij1	10	0	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Azarkan	DENK	10	1	-1	1	2	10%	90,00%
Baudet	FvD	10	2	-1	1	3	20%	80,00%
Eerdmans	JA21	6	0	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Dassen	Volt	10	0	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Total		56	4	2	3	6	6,67%	93,33%

The intra-coder reliability test of the holistic analysis of tweets using the discursive theoretical lens scored a high total reliability score of 93,33%. Overall, more tweets were graded as populist than in the initial analysis, tweets that were graded as non-populist being changed to populist with a score of two for DENK and FvD. The analyses for BBB and FvD also both had a tweet that initially was graded as populist with a score of one too populist with a score of two. There also were some tweets that were graded the same but for which the codes were changed. These changes were not included in the reliability scores as there was an overlap in core concepts for the codes which saw these changes. If there was no overlap in core concepts this would have been negatively graded for reliability. Finally, if multiple codes per tweet were

allowed in the analysis these changes likely would not have occurred as they would have just received multiple codes.

Table 23: Intra-coder reliability holistic text analysis of tweets using the strategic theoretical lens

Party leader	Party	Total Tweets	Changes tweets	Changes non-personalistic	Changes personalistic	Changes percentages	reliability
Plas	BBB	10	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Simmons	Bij1	10	2	0	0	20%	80,00%
Azarkan	DENK	10	1	-1	1	10%	90,00%
Baudet	FvD	10	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Eerdmans	JA21	6	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Dassen	Volt	10	0	0	0	0%	100,00%
Total		56	3	-1	1	5,00%	95,00%

The final intra-coder reliability analysis was the holistic analysis of tweets using the Strategic theoretical lens. This last analysis scored the overall highest reliability percentage of 95%. Furthermore, only the score for Azarkan changed as the changes in scores for Simmons canceled each other out. While these changes were still scored for the reliability scores the overall analysis saw only a 1-point difference to the original scores. The low amount of variance between the original and the second analysis is due to the clarity of especially the non-personalistic tweets. The promotional tweets were included in the intra-coder reliability tests and could clearly be identified and scored as non-personalistic. The divide between personalistic and non-personalistic tweets was also relatively clear for other tweets leading to low variance between the analyses. Overall, it can be concluded that the reliability of the analyses both in total as well as the individual analyses is high, and the results can be classified as internally reliable.

5. Conclusion and Discussion.

Based on the sub-conclusion from the previous chapter final conclusions will now be drawn and the research question will be answered in the first sub-chapter. In the second sub chapter limitations, suggestions for possible future research and societal relevance will be discussed which will conclude the thesis.

5.1. Conclusion

To start off the main research question can be answered based on the results from the results of the analyses. **Research question: To what degree can the six new parties in Dutch parliament since the 2017 elections be categorized as populist?** The summarized results for all theoretical lenses will be listed in table 24 after which conclusions and elaborations for the assigned levels of populism will be given for all the parties.

Table 24: Conclusions theoretical lenses Summarized

Party leader	Party	Ideological theoretical lens	Discursive theoretical lens	Strategical theoretical lens	General Conclusions
Plas	BBB	Possible but inconclusive	Slightly populist	Multiple Populist elements - Populist	Inconclusive but possibly populist
Simmons	Bij1	Populist	Not Populist	Multiple Populist elements - Populist	Most likely populist
Azarkan	DENK	Not Populist	Not Populist	Not populist – Single Populist element	Not Populist
Baudet	FvD	Populist	Populist	Multiple Populist elements - Populist	Populist
Eerdmans	JA21	Populist	Inconclusive	Single Populist element - Populist	Most likely populist
Dassen	Volt	Not Populist	Not Populist	Not populist – Single Populist element	Not Populist

Based on the results of the analyses the FvD can be qualified as right-wing populist, it scored as populist using all three theoretical lenses. BIJ1 & JA21 are scored as most likely populist. Both parties scoring high for populism using the ideational theoretical lens. Both parties also scored high for ideational crusades. These were the only relevant results for JA21 as due to the low number of tweets by the party leader no conclusions could be drawn for the analyses which were based on party leader tweets. BIJ1 scored low on the holistic analysis of tweets using the discursive theoretical lens. When the Strategical theoretical lens was analyzed, the party scored high for both populist elements of a political strategy that

were tested. Furthermore, both parties saw a major increase in scores when the discursive theoretical lens was applied to classical content analysis leading to the conclusion that both parties are most likely populist, but that they were less populist than the FvD. BIJ1 can be classified as left-wing progressive populist while JA21 can be classified as right-wing populist although it is less populist than the FvD. This seems to match statements by party members of JA21 that they split from the FvD due to the extreme stances that the FvD and especially its party leader Baudet took while still maintaining core parts of the FvD identity. The BBB seems to be right on the edge of being populist, while scoring significantly higher than DENK and Volt for the ideational theoretical lens and scoring for all core populist concepts the party also scored significantly lower than BIJ1, FvD and JA21 when using the ideational lens. The party also scored second highest for the discursive theoretical lens, but this score was significantly lower than that of the FvD while being significantly higher than BIJ1. Finally, the party also scored high for a populist political strategy scoring high for both elements that were tested. The party definitely has populist elements, but these elements could also be due to its focus on rural citizens and especially farmers. The current antagonistic relationship between government and farmers due to nitrogen regulations likely flames the antagonism between the party and their opponents. The results of the classical content analysis are also likely not as representative as those for other parties as the manifesto was not well suited for the analysis method and differed greatly from all the other parties both in lay-out and way the paragraphs were structured. All other parties use similar structures for their manifestos with BBB being the only outlier thus it is advised that further analysis is done before a proper conclusion can be given if the BBB is a populist party. As elections are once again looming on the horizon, analysis of their new election manifesto can also reveal if the party maintained their different structure of manifesto's. The differences in structure could also be the result of inexperience as the party was new to politics and its members had relatively little political experience. If the election manifesto shifts more to the norm analysis methods will not have to be changed. Properly categorizing the BBB also becomes increasingly important as it currently the second biggest party in the election polls and because Dutch politics has had a history of populist farmers parties (Van Kessel, 2016, pp.62). Finally, DENK and Volt both can clearly be identified as non-populist parties. While the core message of supporting equality with a special focus on diversity and their main supporters being migrants and children of migrants allows for populist rhetoric. DENK did not engage in antagonistic language except in cases where clear instances of unjustified inequality or racism were proven. This likely stems from the roots of its founders, as they both split from the traditional mainstream labor party. While the founders split from the party, they seem to have kept their more traditional style as far as the results from this analysis showed. The party did not go to the far left or extremely progressive, while at the same time adding a stronger focus on diversity. Volt on the other hand is a center progressive pan-European party. Its core message is solving problems through further European

cooperation or by looking at solutions found in other countries and applying it to the Netherlands. The overall tone in communications both in the tweets and the manifesto is neutral. The party largely poses their perceived (supra)national solutions to existing problems in a neutral manner. Rather than using antagonistic language because further European integration has not already occurred. Finally, it can therefore be concluded with a high degree of certainty that there are at least three new populist parliament since the 2017 elections. BBB could be added to this list, however further research would need to be done before this conclusion can become definitive.

5.2. Discussion & Limitations

To end the research the conclusions will be discussed in the last sub-chapter. First scientific relevance and limitations of the research will be discussed and suggestions for future research will be given. Finally societal relevance will be discussed which will conclude the thesis.

5.2.1. Scientific relevance

A big stride that the research has made was the use of the different theoretical lenses in the analysis of levels of populism rather than only using a single theoretical lens. While the use of the different theoretical lenses was found to strengthen the conclusions of the research there were a number of limitations that could be solved in future research. While the research resulted in conclusions that were internally reliable there are still questions regarding external reliability as there was only a single coder. For future research it is advisable to expand the number of coders for all analyses to increase the validity of the research, especially because all methods used were qualitative analysis methods which can suffer from coder bias the most. To reduce the burden on individual coders datasets can be split into multiple parts and divided among coders to split the workload. Furthermore, the scope of the research was also relatively limited as the research only looked at new political parties and thus only the six new political parties that entered parliament were analyzed. To give context to how populist new parties are compared to already existing parties. Future research can expand the scope of the research by including already existing parties to accurately compare all political parties and to give conclusions regarding a national political landscape. The use of different theoretical lenses to identify levels of populism should be encouraged for future research. While the application of theoretical lenses in the research was not perfect especially the classical content analysis using both the ideational and discursive theoretical lens showed that the use of different lenses could lead to large differences in results. It is thus encouraged that if future research wants to take a descriptive approach to measure levels of populism in a nation or even multiple nations adopts this approach and uses multiple theoretical lenses to create a fuller and clearer picture of

level of populism. This is especially relevant as populism as a theoretical concept is still widely debated and adherents from different theoretical lenses can use these descriptive analyses to draw conclusions rather than just adherents from a single theoretical lens.

The ideological theoretical lens in combination with the classical content analysis gave the clearest results from all the analyses. The combination between theoretical lens, analysis method and data were also the most established in literature out of the three analyses and can be easily replicated. The analysis, however, was the most time-consuming and required the most instruction for the coders. If future research wants to use different theoretical lenses the classical content analysis can also be used to analyze the ideological and discursive theoretical lenses at the same time due to large similarities between the lenses. Clear distinctions and instructions need to be made in the coding scheme to avoid confusing the coders which could lead to mistakes in the results. Parties with manifestos that deviate from the norm in style or lay-out should either be excluded for the analysis, or the method needs to be altered to be able to accurately analyze those manifestos to make the results more comparable.

The discursive theoretical lens in combination with the holistic analysis method is a combination that has been used successfully in the past. While the method can be used to analyze tweets for level of populist discourse, further research needs to be done to increase the accuracy of conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. First a wider spectrum of party leader tweets needs to be analyzed to give a more accurate baseline of levels of populism. Currently scores for populist discourse are only available based on data for populist speeches which are not directly applicable on analysis of individual tweets. Secondly tweets not gathered during an election period should be compared to the current data sample. This should be done to analyze if the current sample represents business as usual or if election season influenced the amount of populist discourse in tweets. Finally, if one simply wants to measure levels of populist discourse sticking to more traditional data sources such as speeches by populist leaders could be more advisable. Tweets were only analyzed due to limitations imposed by Covid restrictions the advice for future research is to either further develop the combination of the holistic analysis method with tweets as data or use a traditional setup to measure populism and not both at the same time.

The Strategical theoretical lens in combination with the holistic text analysis was the first time a combination between the analysis method and theoretical lens was made. The results were quite promising, especially regarding the study of direct and personal communication using tweets. To measure organized/unorganized support the presence of ideological crusades in election manifestos was used, while the analysis was successful it is advice that for future research the use of mass-rallies is included to measure organized/unorganized support. This was not possible in the research due to covid restrictions which banned mass gatherings thus making it impossible to gather data. Furthermore, the core concept of institutionalization which was excluded in the research should be included in future studies.

Institutionalization is a core concept that is especially hard to study for new political party's future researchers either need to identify new datapoints to study, obtain inside access to study the parties or focus on more established parties which have a longer history to study. While populism as a political strategy is well developed as a theoretical concept by Weyland, it's applicability to measure levels of populist strategy is questionable as research methods, types of data used, and analysis of the data is hardly discussed in the literature. Future researchers should spend further efforts to develop these aspects of the theoretical lens before using it in their analysis.

5.2.2. Societal relevance.

For broader society there are also important lessons to take from the research. It gives clear conclusions for most of the new political parties if they are populist or not. The research also provides readers with tools to identify populist movements based on different theoretical frameworks on populism so that they know what to look for and so that they don't have to rely on classifications by others. The research also shows that the total amount of populist parties in the Netherlands is increasing. Mainly because before 2017 there were only two parties qualified as populist in parliament (PVV&SP) while there are now five, possibly even six. The overall level of populist support, however, while fluctuating, seems to remain relatively even. At the start of the millennium there was an explosion from 5 seats (SP) to 35 seats split between the LPF (26) and SP (9), while this can largely be attributed to the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (LPF party leader). There was a big decrease in 2003 to 17 seats after the almost complete collapse of LPF support however after the founding of the PVV it has remained relatively stable between 30 and 39 which was the highest number of seats scored by populist parties in the year 2010. The current number of 38 (39 if counting BBB) while being higher than 36 seats in 2017 (including FvD's two seats) and 30 seats in the 2012 election (Parlement.com/tweedekamerverkiezingen). The increase in seats thus seems to be part of a fluctuations for populist support rather than increase in populist support. The large number of new populist parties, however, does seem to indicate a fracturing of the populist political spectrum. FvD and BIJ1 represent more radical alternatives to the PVV and SP with special focuses on different subjects such as diversity (BIJ1) and stronger anti-establishment rhetoric (FvD). While JA21 seems to be focused on voters who find the FvD too radical especially with regards to references to conspiracy theories of party leader Baudet. They also seem to receive support from voters who are likely disillusioned with the PVV and who do not share the BBB's heavy focus on people living in rural areas. The increased splintering of Dutch politics with new parties entering and winning seats in parliament now also seems to be presents in Populist voter blocks going from just two populist parties to five or six after the 2017 and 2021 elections. It is likely that this splintering will continue both in populist and non-populist circles in the 2023, Omtzigt and Haga both were popular candidates for the CDA and FvD

respectively and are likely to win seats if they decide to run in the general election. While the splintering of the electorate can have negative effects and make coalition forming harder it might have positive effects at combating some of the anti-democratic and anti-pluralist tendencies of populism. Due to the splintering of populist parties it is unlikely that a populist party would become big enough to enforce anti-democratic and anti-pluralist measures. Smaller populist parties however can still have the positive effects that are sometimes attributed to populist parties such as calling out cartel forming and established parties taking their citizens/voters for granted. Finally, while the research has drawn conclusions regarding the new political parties, these conclusions are by no means set in stone. Political parties can and have moved agenda's stances and political strategies, while a political party might be concluded to be populist in this research it is not guaranteed that they will be in the next election or in ten years. Accurately representing political parties, movements or party leaders is work that is never done as they are constantly changing. It is therefore of key importance that both new and established parties are reviewed. Especially with regards to levels of populism to be able to give the voters accurate information on which they can make decisions for whom they support and who they want to vote, for democracy to function and to thrive voters should be well informed and engaged. While as scientists it is hard for us to make voters engage with politics, we can make sure that accurate information is available for everyone to find to support the making of informed decisions.

6. Notes.

1 Thanks to Rooijduin for providing the codebook for his analysis as a reference tool for creating the code book for this research.

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8. Appendix.

8.1. Codebook Ideological Theoretical Lens.

Appendix 1

Codebook Job Delfgou

Populism in the Netherlands, are there new populist contenders in parliament?

Introduction

The research questions the analysis hopes to answer is: Are the six new political parties in the Tweede Kamer since the latest to elections populist and if so to what degree? This classical content analysis is one of the three analyses done to determine if and to what degree these parties are populist. The analysis focusses on the election manifestos of the latest Dutch general election of 17 March 2021 and the parties analyzed are the six newest parties who gained seats in the Tweede Kamer. Before one can determine how populist a party is one first has to list the core concepts of populism. An additional analysis was done to determine the difference in results that for the analysis if it had used the discursive theoretical lens. The altered core concepts and populist arguments will be listed below their ideational equivalent with an asterix before the number.

Core concepts populism

The analysis of the research is centered around the core concepts of populism and their prevalence in election manifesto's. Combinations of these units of analysis will be measured separately.

Populism core concepts

1. Populism emphasizes key importance of the “people”

Populists emphasize that “the people” are the foundation of democracy. Democracies should be run in line with the views of the people. They see the people as a unified, indivisible and homogeneous group, often referring to these groups with vague terms. Populists use terms like the common people to cast a wide net including as many people as possible while only being specific about which people do not belong to this group of them people. Will be labeled as **people** in the codes.

*1. Populism emphasizes key importance of the “people”.

The discursive theoretical lens sees the people as a heterogeneous group. Thus, references to sufficiently broad groups within the larger in-group of the people are treated as references to the people. Will be labeled as **people** in the codes.

2. Populism is “adversarial” and exclusionary.

Populism has a Manichean worldview and mainly identifies elites as the main enemies of the people subverting democracy to meet their own goals. Elites are not necessarily only political in nature but also includes intellectual, cultural, medical, bureaucratic or economic elites. While elites are usually seen as the main enemy, other groups (others) can also be excluded from the people as enemies for varied reasons, usually on grounds of ethnicity, religion, country of birth or criminals. Populists will often link these others and the elite as collaborating to keep the people down. When referring to both groups it will be labeled as **Adversarial** in the codes, when referring to just a single group the sub-labels **adversarial elite** or **adversarial others** will be used in the codes.

3. Populism emphasizes the will of the people or "general will”.

As the people are central in the populist worldview, they feel that the will of the people should always be enacted into policy and some of the limits placed onto this by modern liberal representative democracies are seen as bad. Populists therefore promote majoritarianism, forms of more direct democracy and place foremost importance on “common sense” solutions. They feel too much power has been taken away from the people in bureaucratic and political constructions which should be demolished, leading to more direct and efficient governance. The label **General will** shall be used in the codes.

Besides these core concepts manifestos can also use combinations of two or more of the three main concepts these will be listed separately.

4. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial

4.1. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite)

- 4.2. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others)
- 5. Populist argument made based on combination of People + General Will
- 6. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial + General will
 - 6.1. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (elite) + General will
 - 6.2. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (others) + General will
- 7. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial + General will
 - 7.1. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite) + General will
 - 7.2. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others + General will

For the discursive analysis the categories containing the core concepts people will be listed as follows:

- *4. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial
 - *4.1. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite)
 - *4.2. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others)
- *5. Populist argument made based on combination of People + General Will
- *6. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial + General will
 - *6.1. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (elite) + General will
 - *6.2. Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (others) + General will
- *7. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial + General will
 - *7.1. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite) + General will
 - *7.2. Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others + General will

Overview of parties analyzed

Party	Abbreviation	Party Leader
BoerBurgerBeweging	BBB	Caroline van der Plas
BIJ1	BIJ1	Sylvana Simons
DENK	DENK	Farid Azarkan
Forum voor Democratie	FvD	Thierry Baudet
JA21	JA21	Joost Eerdmans
Volt	Volt	Laurens Dassen

The units of measurement

For the research, the unit of measurement are paragraphs. Paragraphs can be recognized by an indentation of the first line of a new paragraph or by an extra space between the last line of the old paragraph and the first line of a new paragraph. New paragraphs can also be indicated by starting a sentence on a new line. As layouts may differ between manifesto's the coder has to determine how new paragraphs are indicated anew for each manifesto. Titles belong to the following paragraphs and lists of proposals should be seen as a single paragraph.

For each paragraph, the coder must decide if populist arguments are present, these arguments are listed on page X of the document. It is important however that the populist arguments must be made by the author (political party) of the manifesto itself, not a reference to an argument or statement by a third party unless clear support for this argument is stated.

Coding instructions

General information

The coder will provide the following general information regarding the document:

Name of the party

Title of the election manifesto

Number of pages

Number of paragraphs

Paragraph specific information

The coder will analyze the political manifesto's using AtlasTI and will mark the paragraphs in the following way. The numbers are simply used as labels and do not refer to scores.

Codes:

0 = No populist argument present.

1 = Populist argument made based on "the people"

2 = Populist argument made based on adversarial

2.1 Populist argument made based on adversarial (elite)

2.2 Populist argument made based on adversarial (others)

3 = Populist argument made based on general will

4 = Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial

- 4.1 Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite)
- 4.2 Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others)
- 5 = Populist argument made based on combination of People + General Will
- 6 = Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial + General will
- 6.1 Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (elite) + General will
- 6.2 Populist argument made based on combination of Adversarial (others) + General will
- 7 = Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial + General will
- 7.1 Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (elite) + General will
- 7.2 Populist argument made based on combination of People + Adversarial (others + General will

Criteria populist arguments

1 “The people”

Reference to the people this can be made in many different forms but should always be implied to also include the author. Examples are we, fellow countrymen, Dutchmen, the community but can also be more specific such as Amsterdammers (people from the city of Amsterdam) or broader such as westerners. The people cannot refer to a specific sub-group within “the people” so for instance references to migrants, seniors or nurses are too specific to be considered references to the people.

*1 “the people”

The discursive theoretical lens with its heterogeneous interpretation of “the people” sees references to specific sub-groups within the larger group of the people as references to the people. For example: references to specific “common” fields of work such as farmers or construction workers thus can be treated as references to the people. References such as mothers, senior citizens, or Amsterdammers (people who live in Amsterdam) can also be used as references to “the people”.

2 Adversarial

Criticizing or attacking elites/others is central for populists, it is however important that these arguments must be pointed at the groups so elites or others and not at individuals or be criticisms on the system itself. Arguments against a single minister for example do not count unless these ministers are used as a representative for the elite/others, the same goes for specific political parties, companies etc. Unless they are used as representatives of the elites/others. Keep in mind elites are not just political but can come in many different forms such as, media, cultural, legal, economic etc. Furthermore, populists usually exclude certain subgroups from what they see as the people the so called “others.” This group is usually based on identity, number of rights (usually perceived as government support) or simply presence. Important to note however is that criminals should not be included in this group as this group receives criticism and attacks across the whole political spectrum. To improve clarity the term adversarial will be split into three different arguments. 2 adversarial (both anti-elite and others, 2.1 adversarial anti-elite and 2.2 adversarial others.

3 General will

Populists often use general will arguments to support their policy, while it is true that all parties believe their policies are best populists will state it is the will of the people rather than we believe this is best or our voters want this to support their policies. Populists will often use majoritarianism arguments such as a majority of the people want this thus it should be done even if it goes against existing laws or protections. Populists usually support direct democracy measures such as referendums or use poll results to claim support. Furthermore, populists often will use common sense arguments claiming that the common people know best and that simple understandable solutions exist for even the most complex problems. It is up to the coder to determine if proposed solutions to problems are real solutions or simply appeal to the will of the people and not feasible.

4 People + Adversarial

Combinations of reference to the people and exclusion of elite's or others. Example we Dutchmen are tired of corrupt elites ruining our country.

*4 People + Adversarial

Combinations of reference to the people (heterogenous interpretation) and exclusion of elite's or others. Example we Dutchmen are tired of corrupt elites ruining our country.

5 People + General Will

Combinations of reference to the people and the general will. Example we the common citizens know best how to run our country.

*5 People + General Will

Combinations of reference to the people (heterogenous interpretation) and the general will. Example we the common citizens know best how to run our country.

6 Adversarial + General will

Combination of adversarial and general will arguments. Example it is common knowledge how to solve this problem however corrupt elites propose costly bureaucratic solutions to secure their power and the problem lingers.

7 People + Anti-elitism + general will

Combination of all three core concepts. Example we Dutchmen do not want to house and feed migrants who will not integrate into our culture.

*7 People + Anti-elitism + general will

Combination of all three core concepts with a heterogenous interpretation of the people. Example Amsterdammers do not want to house and feed migrants who will not integrate into our culture.

8.2. Rubric Discursive Theoretical Lens.

Appendix 2

Rubric populism discursive method

Score assignment

0 means a tweet does not contain populist elements populist.

1 is mixed where populist elements are not the (main) vocal point of the tweet.

2 is fully populist where populist elements are the only or primary vocal points of the tweets.

Populist Elements

English

1 Manichean worldview meaning there is a struggle between “good” and “evil” and there are no shades of gray. This often leads to the use of highly charged and combative language.

2 Topics of the tweet are of the highest moral importance and influence people everywhere (either nationally or globally). This crisis of today is often linked to a time in the past before the rupture (when everything was good) and to prominent national or religious leaders who are generally revered by the population.

3 Strong focus on majoritarianism and the will of the people as the keystones of democracy. Although populist often see the will of the people as rather static. Together with a romanticized notion of the common people. Leading to the common man know best so if their will has a majority it should be enacted.

4 An elite which is the embodiment of evil and is directly opposed to the good people. This elite can be a number of groups.it can refer to political, economic, social, medical or cultural elites. It can also be an evil minority group which is conspiring with the elite. It can even be used in a supranational context where an evil

Dutch

1 Manicheïsme wereldbeeld, dit betekent dat ze een strijd zien tussen “goed” en “slecht” zonder gradaties er tussenin dus iemand is of goed of slecht. Dit leidt tot strijdlustig taalgebruik omdat het “kwaad” bevochten moet worden.

2 De Onderwerpen van tweets zijn van het hoogste morele belang en beïnvloeden mensen overal (nationaal of internationaal). De crisissen van vandaag worden vaak vergeleken met een tijd in het verleden voor de “scheuring” (rupture) tussen de elite en het volk. Voor deze scheuring was alles goed en beter, Populisten refereren vaak naar prominente nationale of religieuze figuren die gezien worden als helden door het volk en linken zich naar de huidige tijd.

3 Sterke focus op majoritisme en de wil van het volk als hoekstenen van de democratie. De wil van het volk wordt vaak geïnterpreteerd als een statisch in plaats van iets veranderlijks. De wil van het volk wordt vaak samen gebruikt met een romantisering van de “normale” mensen. Dit leidt tot de “normale” burgers weet het best dus de wil van de meerderheid moet uitgevoerd worden zonder uitzonderingen.

4 De elite is de belichaming van het “kwaad” en is in directe oppositie tegenover het volk. De elite kan refereren naar verschillende groepen. Elites kan refereren naar Politieke, economische, sociale, medische en culturele elites. Elites kan ook refereren naar verschillende minderheden die samen met de eerdere genoemde elites samenwerken om het volk te ondermijnen. Een laatste interpretatie

elite can be an imperialist/hostile other nation or supranational institution.

5 The evil elite is or was in charge until recently and has subverted the national system so that it serves its own interests. The people need to overthrow this system by electing the populist leader and his party. Populist leaders often use terms such as “liberation” or “revolution” for their election movements.

6 Because the opposition (the elite) is so vile and evil populist might threaten or even state that non-democratic means are necessary. Data for the evilness of the elite might be exaggerated, abused or even made up to strengthen this point. Political opponents are not treated as equals but as scum and as people that need to be reviled.

van elite is de externe elite zoals andere landen of internationale instituties (bijvoorbeeld externe imperialisten of de Europese Unie).

5 De slechte elite is of was recentelijk aan de macht en heeft het nationale systeem ondermijnd zodat het de elite en haar doelen dient. Het volk moeten dit elitesysteem omwerpen door populisten te verkiezen. Populisten refereren vaak naar hun beweging als bevrijding of revolutie terwijl het democratische bewegingen zijn.

6 Omdat de oppositie (elite) zo door en door slecht is gebruiken populist soms zelfs dreigende taal. Ook kunnen ze zelf aangeven dat non-democratische middelen nodig zijn om de elite te bestrijden. Data over hoe slecht de elites zijn kunnen ook worden overdreven, misbruikt of zelfs vervalst om punten te versterken. Politieke tegenstanders worden niet gezien als gelijke tegenstanders maar als tuig en criminelen die vermeden moeten worden.

*For the additional analysis using the ideational theoretical lens all references to the people will be interpreted using the homogenous interpretation of the people.

Each of the codes is also linked to core concepts of the theory these links will be show below.

1 code one entails the core concepts of reference to the people (good) and anti-elite rhetoric (evil).

2 code two refers to the concept of rupture, before this moment the people and elite were in line. After this moment of rupture, they became adversaries. This is based around the concept of anti-elite rhetoric.

3 code three refers to a combination of references to the “people” and the will of the people

4 code four refers to the adversarial relation between the people and a combination of the elite and others.

5 code five uses a combination of all core concepts.

6 code six refers to anti-elite sentiment.

8.3. Rubric Strategical Theoretical Lens.

Appendix 3

Rubric Strategical lens

Personalistic direct communication
Score assignment

0 Personalistic elements not present

1 Personalistic elements present

Direct and Personalistic Elements

English	Dutch
1 Referencing being one of the people. Sharing personal (relatable) anecdotes to identify themselves as being part of the people to create a personal bond with readers.	1 Aangeven dat ze onderdeel van het volk zijn. Persoonlijke anekdotes delen om aangegeven dat je onderdeel bent van het volk en een persoonlijke band met lezers te creëren.
2 Direct communication with possible voters.	2 Directe communicatie met mogelijke stemmers.
3 Referencing the will of the people and themselves as the personification of the will of the people or as the (only) political leader committed to carry out the will of the people.	3 Refereren naar de wil van het volk en zichzelf als de personificatie van de wil van het volk of als de enige politieke leider die bereid is de wil van het volk uit te voeren.
4 References to polls or other mechanisms to measure support to prove to the people that they are popular with the masses.	4 Referenties naar peilingen of andere mechanismes die politieke steun meten om aan het volk te bewijzen dat ze populair zijn.
5 Communicating they are not part of the detached political machine but that they are free, independent and willing to listen to the people. They are doing it for the people rather than personal/political gain.	5 Communiceren dat ze geen onderdeel zijn van de politieke machine maar dat ze onafhankelijk en vrij zijn om naar het volk te luisteren. Ze zitten in de politiek voor het volk in plaats van voor persoonlijk of politieke winst.

Appendix 4

Organized/unorganized support based on ideological crusades

Score assignment

0 Ideological crusades not present

1 Ideological crusade elements present but not complete

2 Ideological crusade(s) fully present

Ideological crusade Elements

English	Dutch
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1 Heavily incorporating broadly supported causes which have minimal chances of alienating voters into the election manifesto (e.g. reducing crime, (political) corruption or illegal immigration).

2 Anti elite/others sentiments centered around a narrative to unite unorganized masses around the party leader and their political party against political opponents.

3 Proposing major (unreasonable) reforms to change the country/political arena and to unite voters behind.

4 Scapegoating political opponents and placing the party/party leader on a pedestal. They are the only one(s) who are willing and trying to do something, to actually better the country for the people rather than maintaining the status quo.

1 Veel gebruik maken van breed gesteunde doelen met minimale kans op het wegdrijven van mogelijke kiezers in verkiezing 's programma's (bv. Het verminderen van: criminaliteit, (politieke) corruptie of illegale migratie).

2 Anti elite/anderen sentimenten met een centrale verhaallijn om de ongeorganiseerde massa's te verenigen achter de partijleider en zijn politieke partij tegen politieke tegenstanders.

3 Grote (onhaalbare) hervormingen voorstellen om het land en de politieke arena te veranderen en om kiezers achter te scharen.

4 Politieke opposenten zwartmaken en de politieke leider en partij op een voetstuk plaatsen. Zij zijn de enige(n) die bereid en aan het proberen zijn om iets te doen om het land beter te maken voor het volk in plaats van het behouden van de status quo.
