Global water governance

Conceptual design of global institutional arrangements

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Global water governance: conceptual design of global institutional arrangements

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This study represents Maarten Verkerk's thesis to the MSc degree Water Engineering & Management at the University of Twente, The Netherlands.

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<td>BASR</td>
<td>Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GWP</td>
<td>Global Water Partnership</td>
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<td>ICWE</td>
<td>International Conference on Water and the Environment</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
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<td>IWRM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resources Management</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARWR</td>
<td>Total Actual Renewable Water Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>UNCHE</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on the Human Environment</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>WBCSD</td>
<td>World Business Council on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Water Footprint Permits</td>
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<td>WPP</td>
<td>Water Pricing Protocol</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Preface

My pregnancy is over. For nine months, I had no idea what I had started, I tried to read as much as I could about it, and friends and family asked the same question over and over again,

‘When is it due?’

During my research, I enjoyed a very hospitable academic environment. My fellow MSc students provided for fun, coffee and the social check whether I was still on track. Antoinette Hildering, Joyeeta Gupta, Nicolien van der Grijp, Derk Kuiper, Richard Holland and Hans Bressers, you helped me explore the unknown fields of international law, sustainability labelling and global governance. Special thanks to the members of my committee, Ashok Chapagain and Winnie Gerbens-Leenes, for putting time and effort in a topic that was not familiar to you.

I owe a great deal of gratitude to my young professor, Arjen Hoekstra. Like a professor should, you have a strong opinion and similar interest in both conceptual thoughts and tiny little details. I am very curious about how your research projects, particularly on multi-level and multi-disciplinary water governance, will develop in the years to come. It has been my pleasure.

My student’s life ends here. Panta Rhei. It have been seven beautiful years, though I am not sure whether they were seven meagre years (to Dutch standards, my income was well below the poverty line) or seven fat years (I do have gained 20 % of body weight). What I do know is that my time as a student was everything I hoped for and I would happily live it again. I am thankful for the many laughs I had during this time, particularly with my numerous roommates, the guys from my fraternity, generations of Student Union board members, my football team and my brothers Adriaan and Michiel.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my girl. Mama, you make an art of Being Interested & Hospitable. You are not only my mother, but also one of my best friends. I hope we can keep that relationship up for the decades to come. I am glad you found new love with Jan. Papa, I envy your generosity, flamboyancy and sense of humour. It is very difficult to live my life as intense as you did. All I can do is trying, and I am. Last, but not even close least, I thank the woman of my dreams. Your patience with my ever-changing plans and ideas is remarkable and you are as beautiful as the name given to you: Juliëtte Cornelia Maria.
Summary

This study builds upon the explorative study of Hoekstra (2006), who puts forward an argument for coordination at the global level in ‘water governance’ (the way people deal with water issues). One of the factors that give water governance a global dimension is ‘virtual water trade’ (the virtual trade of water resources by means of water-containing products). Virtual water trade involves advantages as well as disadvantages. The development of institutional arrangements to account for these disadvantages has not kept pace with the globalization of trade in general and virtual water trade in particular.

Global institutional arrangements can improve the ecological sustainability, economic efficiency and social equity of water governance. Institutional arrangements aim to influence change agents in the virtual water chain (the production chain of water-containing products). Behavioural mechanisms bring about behavioural change of other agents in the virtual water chain.

A ‘Water Pricing Protocol’ favours an efficient and sustainable use of water resources. By putting a price on water, conservation becomes economically efficient. The Water Pricing Protocol accounts for issues of social equity. The greatest challenge is to bring the theory of full marginal cost pricing into practice. Practical difficulties involve the flowing character of water, disruption of historical water management systems and the need for national capacity to set up the institutions needed for water pricing.

A ‘Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods’ promotes sustainable and efficient water governance. The Business Agreement merits from the fact that it focuses on so-called ‘channel leaders’ (agents in the production chain capable of imposing their will on other agents). In the Business Agreement, channel leaders agree on a standardized chain-based measuring and reporting method for the sustainable use of water resources. Sustainability reporting is done in corporate responsibility publications. This way, companies can compare the environmental performance of their products over time and with the products of others. This may lead to the conservation of resources. The fact that the Business Agreement is not binding threatens its effectiveness.

The system of Water Footprint Permits favours a fair allocation of global water resources among the people of the Earth. The water footprint of an individual is defined as the total volume of freshwater used to produce the goods and services consumed by that individual. Comparable to the Kyoto Protocol, nations voluntarily participate in the system. The state parties define a global maximum water footprint each six years. This global maximum is allocated to nations, based on the number of inhabitants. When a nation’s water footprint is smaller than its permit, national government can sell part of their permit to countries whose water footprint is bigger than its permit. It can also reduce its water footprint by applying domestic instruments to change the behaviour of stakeholders in the virtual water chain. The transaction costs of the system are the highest of all institutional arrangements investigated. Whether the benefits outweigh the costs remains a topic of further research.

The institutional arrangements are not mutually exclusive. All three institutional arrangements require monitoring efforts, which can be combined. On the other hand, combinations may be less effective than the sum of effects of the separate institutional arrangements. A combination of Water Footprint Permits and the Business Agreement is promising. This way, governments, civil society and business society involve in the equitable and sustainable water governance at the global level.
The study was a first-order exploration of possible institutional arrangements for global water governance. Further research should adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach. Strategic alliances with other institutional arrangements are possible. Water Footprint Permits are much more relevant when combined with Ecological Footprint Permits. A Water Pricing Protocol will be more effective when combined with broader subsidy schemes, particularly the US and EU agricultural subsidy schemes. Designing and implementing global institutions to account for the global dimension of water governance requires forms of communication, information, and trust that are broad and deep beyond precedent, but not beyond possibility.
Samenvatting


Mondiale samenwerkingsverbanden kunnen een ecologisch duurzaam, economisch efficiënt en sociaal rechtvaardig waterbeheer bevorderen. Samenwerkingsverbanden proberen het gedrag te beïnvloeden van veranderingsagenten in de ‘virtuele water keten’ (de productie- en consumptieketen van water-gebruikende goederen). Interactieve processen zorgen voor gedragsverandering van andere actoren in deze virtuele waterketen.


Water Footprint Permits (watervoetafdrukrechten) bevorderen een rechtvaardige verdeling van de mondiale watervoorraden. Een watervoetafdruk van een individu is de hoeveelheid water die nodig is voor de productie van alle goederen en diensten die die persoon consument. Net als bij het Kyoto Protocol, wordt door de participerende landen een plafond ingesteld van de mondiale watervoetafdruk. De verdeling van deze voetafdruk over landen kan gebeuren op basis van een gelijke verdeling over het aantal inwoners of op basis van daadwerkelijke, historisch gegroeide voetafdrukken. Er zal een markt ontstaan waarin watervoetafdrukrechten worden verhandeld. Een systeem van watervoetafdrukrechten vergt kosten voor onderzoek en administratie. Het is de vraag of deze kosten opwegen tegen de opbrengsten van het systeem.

De mondiale samenwerkingsverbanden staan niet op zichzelf. Alle drie de samenwerkingsverbanden vergen een bepaald meetnetwerk. Bundeling van krachten brengt de
relatieve kosten voor dit meetsysteem omlaag. Aan de andere kant, combinaties van de samenwerkingsverbanden zullen minder effectief zijn dan de som van effecten van de samenwerkingsverbanden apart. Een combinatie van de Business Agreement en het systeem van watervoetafdrukrechten is het meest veelbelovend. Met deze combinatie worden zowel overheden als bedrijven en de ‘civil society’ (de verzamelterm voor opinievormende groepen zoals non-gouvernementele organisaties en de media) betrokken in een duurzaam en rechtvaardig mondiaal waterbeheer.

Dit onderzoek is een eerste verkenning naar mogelijke samenwerkingsverbanden om om te gaan met de mondiale dimensie van waterbeheer. Vervolgonderzoek zal multidisciplinair van aard moeten zijn. Daarnaast is het interessant om samenwerkingsverbanden en hun effecten op meerdere schaalniveaus te onderzoeken. Sommige samenwerkingsverbanden kunnen strategische allianties aangaan. Watervoetafdrukrechten worden relevanter wanneer deze gecombineerd worden met ecologische voetafdrukrechten. Het Water Pricing Protocol is effectiever wanneer het wordt gecombineerd met bredere subsidiestelsels, in het bijzonder de landbouwsubsidies van de Verenigde Staten en de Europese Unie.
1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Water governance is generally seen as a local or regional issue. During the International Decade for Action: Water for Life, 2005 – 2015, an international agenda as formulated in the context of the United Nations and the World Water Council (UN-Water, 2003, 2006; Martinez Austia & Van Hofwegen, 2006) promotes local action to cope with local water issues. Where water issues extend beyond the borders of local communities, the river basin is generally seen as the most appropriate unit for analysis, planning and ‘institutional arrangements’ (a structure or mechanism of social order and cooperation) (UNGA, 1997; GWP, 2000).

The international water community, for two reasons, has not recognized the necessity of global coordination in ‘water governance’ (the way people deal with water). First, coordination at the global level seems to be at odds with the subsidiary principle. This principle states that water issues should be handled at the lowest governance level possible. Second, global water resources are not scarce, because aggregate withdrawals are and will remain below renewable water resources at the global level (Gleick, 1993; Postel et al., 1996; Shiklomanov, 2000; Vörösmarty et al., 2000; Zehnder et al., 2003).

Hoekstra (2006) stresses that water governance does have a global dimension. The most important factors that give water governance a global dimension, include (i) climate change, (ii) privatization of drinking water, sanitation and irrigation services, and (iii) increasing ‘virtual water trade’ (the virtual trade of water resources embedded in traded goods and services). The latter factor received little academic attention. Thus far, virtual water trade has been researched either to collect data (Hoekstra & Hung, 2002; Zimmer & Renault, 2003; Oki et al., 2003; Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004), or with a policy focus at the national or regional level (Allan, 1998, 2001; Turton, 2000). Hoekstra (2007) lists the global fora on the topic of virtual water trade.

Institutional responses have not kept pace with the development of climate change, privatization and trade liberalization. These uncontrolled developments have led to water scarcity in many places. People traditionally regard water scarcity as a responsibility of water abstractors, being mainly the producers of agricultural products. Hoekstra & Hung (2002) propose a ‘water footprint’ as an indicator that emphasizes consumer responsibility. The water footprint of an individual is defined as the total volume of freshwater used to produce the goods and services consumed by that individual. The water footprint can be related to a problem of water depletion or pollution in the area of production, for instance in the case of European cotton consumers and the desiccation of the Aral Sea (Micklin, 1988; Chapagain et al., 2006). Figure 1.1 shows that many parts of the world depend on foreign water resources to sustain their lifestyles, making water a global resource.
1.2 Objective

The objective of this study is to design alternative, complementary global institutional arrangements to deal with the global dimension of water governance.

1.3 Scope

1.3.1 Problem-solving institutional design over utilitarian bargaining process

Economists generally assume that rational unitary utility maximizers will reach agreement on mutually beneficial institutional arrangements whenever a zone of agreement exists. In this view, this will lead to a Pareto-optimal institutional arrangement, much like the Smithsonian ‘invisible hand’ of a free market. Thus, the rational process of institutional design (the deliberate formulation of an institutional arrangement) is largely unnecessary and may even invite for interventions that result into suboptimal outcomes. However, Young (1989a) claims that because of large asymmetries of bargaining strength among stakeholders, there is considerable scope for exercising leadership toward coherent and desirable outcomes by means of institutional design. This study adopts the latter view.

1.3.2 Global arrangements over local arrangements

It is well conceivable that cumulative local arrangements may enhance good global water governance more efficiently or effectively than global arrangements would.\(^1\) At this stage of

\(^1\) Ostrom (1990) explores conditions under which local institutions have solved common pool resource problems. The analysis shows that local institutions can be both successful and unsuccessful. Ostrom et al. (1999) emphasize the challenges ahead for humanity to establish global institutions to manage biodiversity, climate change, and other ecosystem services.
research on global water governance, it is premature to evaluate and compare arrangements across levels. Even when such comparison would be possible, the issue of scale would still be subject to people’s preferences and views of the world. Therefore, and because of time limitations, this study is limited to the design of global arrangements.

1.3.3 Conceptual design over contract design

This study provides for the conceptual designs of global institutional arrangements. These conceptual designs form the starting point of the technical design of legal contracts between agents. Without doubt, designing contracts will lead to new difficulties that are unaccounted for in the present study. In this study, the aim is to design institutional arrangements without major conceptual omissions.

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2 This is expressed by the long-lasting debate between neorealists (to whom world politics is represented by a struggle for power between sovereign states) and neoliberalists (who believe in cooperative interaction between many agents across levels) (Baylis & Smith, 2001).
2 Method

2.1 The perspective of sustainable development

The aim to design global institutional arrangements for global water governance (the way people collectively appropriate global water resources), is still broad. To benchmark the design of global institutional arrangements, this study adopts the notion of sustainable development.

2.1.1 Social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency

The Brundtland-report and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro mark the worldwide acceptance of the notion of sustainable development (WCED, 1987; UNCED, 1992). Sustainable development consists of three dimensions: the social, ecological, and economic dimension (Rogers et al., 1998; WSSD, 2002; Hildering, 2004). The business community prefers to refer to these dimensions as people-planet-profit. In order to make these three dimensions more tangible, criteria have been proposed against which policy can be evaluated (Daly, 1996; Rogers et al., 2002). These criteria are ecological sustainability, social equity and economic efficiency. The need for indicators that cover these criteria results in the following overview:

1. Social equity

   The Gini-coefficient is an often-used indicator of social equity. The Gini-coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution of resources (in this case: water resources). The Gini-coefficient is a ratio with values between 0 (uniform distribution) and 1 (fully inequitable distribution). The numerator of this ratio is the area between the Lorentz curve of a distribution and the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the triangle area under the uniform distribution line. The uniform distribution line represents full social equity.

2. Ecological sustainability

   For water governance, ecological sustainability requires human appropriation of water resources to stay within certain environmental limits. The extent of these environmental limits is arbitrary. Raskin et al. (1997) introduced a simplified categorization of ecological sustainability. When the ‘criticality ratio’ (the withdrawal-to-availability ratio) is between 0.2 and 0.4, this is referred to as water stress, while a ratio above 0.4 is referred to as water scarce. Consequently, ecological sustainability occurs when the criticality ratio remains below 0.2.

3. Economic efficiency

   Economic efficiency (or Pareto efficiency) is a state in which no individual can be made better off without another being made worse off.

2.1.2 Present and future situation of the three criteria

A glance at the present and future situation of these criteria shows that without change, global water governance will not reach a condition of full social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency.

With regard to social equity, water footprints differ strongly among countries. While the average American has a water footprint of 2480 m³/cap/yr, China has an average water footprint of only 700 m³/cap/yr (Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004). Many countries have an average per capita water
footprint below the threshold value required for sufficient food, which is about 1000 m³/cap/yr (Zehnder et al., 2003; UN-Water, 2006).

With reference to ecological sustainability, Postel et al. (1996) argue that if average per capita water demand remains the same in 2025 compared to the 1990 level (which is conservative, because withdrawals per capita increased nearly 50% between 1950 and 1990), human appropriation of geographically and temporally accessible runoff will be 70%. Because Postel et al. (1996) do not account for environmental flow requirements; this figure implies a large strain on ecosystems throughout the world. The three main reasons for an increasing human appropriation of water resources are (i) an increasing human population, (ii) increasing standards of living and (iii) the growing need for biomass as an energy carrier.

With respect to economic efficiency, the price of water resources generally does not reflect all costs. Failing pricing structures, perverse subsidies and privatization without sound regulation are common in both developed and developing countries (Van der Zaag & Savenije, 2006; UNDP, 2006). Importing countries therefore often profit to the detriment of vulnerable water users in exporting countries that lack a strong voice, such as small farmers, fishermen, women or local ecosystems.

This study considers the aim to arrive at a quantitatively defined point of a socially equitable, ecologically sustainable and economically efficient use of global water resources too ambitious. Alternatively, the focus is on the change towards or away from these three criteria of sustainable development.

2.2 Selection of institutional arrangements

This study searched for a set of global institutional arrangements that addressed all three criteria of sustainable development. By doing so, this study proposes three alternative, complementary global institutional arrangements.

1. Water Pricing Protocol

The Dublin Conference in 1992 (ICWE, 1992) accepted to regard water as an economic and social good. To date, very little national or local authorities implemented the principle of water as an economic good. Unilateral implementation is expected to be at the cost of the countries moving ahead. An international protocol on water pricing may help to overcome this problem. The Water Pricing Protocol primarily promotes economic efficiency and secondarily ecological sustainability. The main agents in a Water Pricing Protocol are producers of water-intensive products.

2. Business Protocol on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods

Hall (2000) claims that chain dynamics can be triggered when there is a ‘channel leader’ with sufficient power over its suppliers (the extent to which one stakeholder can impose its will on other stakeholders in the supply chain), with technical competencies, and under specific environmental pressure. In global water governance, manufacturers or retailers are candidates to become channel leaders of certain virtual water containing products. Providing them with a

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3 Bressers & Rosenbaum (2003) opposes this view by showing that strong environmental regulation leads to innovation and is thus to the benefit of a country.
standardized method for sustainability reporting may improve the ecologically sustainable development of water resources.

3. Water footprint permits

The limited availability of fresh water resources implies that there is a sustainable maximum to the human water footprint. The question is how large a nation’s or individual’s share of the globe’s fresh water resources should be. An institutional arrangement on this matter is comparable to the Kyoto Protocol on the emission of greenhouse gases. The system of water footprint permits promotes social equity and ecological sustainability. The main agents are consumers.

Figure 2.1 shows to which criteria the institutional arrangements apply.

![Figure 2.1: The institutional arrangements and the criteria they aim to impact on primarily and secondarily.](image)

2.3 Design method

The design method is an iterative process as shown in Figure 2.2. The next sections elaborate on how the study assessed the respective steps in this process.

![Figure 2.2: Design method](image)
2.3.1 **Rationale**

The conceptual designs each start with a rationale. The rationales describe why the arrangement can contribute to social equity, ecological sustainability or economic efficiency in global water governance.

2.3.2 **Institutional set-up**

Although institutions have been in place throughout human history, institutional design has only been a topic of scientific research since the 1990s (Goodin, 1996; Weimer, 1995). In fact, scientific knowledge about already existing global institutional arrangements, or ‘international regimes’ as scholars of regime theory label it, is still limited (Rittberger & Mayer, 1993; Young, 1989, 1999ab).

The fact that regime theory is still evolving, and the fact that it offers no recipe for a successful design of institutional arrangements does not attenuate its legitimate notion of the presence and impact of such arrangements at the global level. Young (1989; 1999ab) acknowledges this view and offer a rather pragmatic approach to institutional design. Following this approach, the institutional set-up defines:

1. who holds rights and duties in the institutional arrangement;
2. what is being arranged in the institutional arrangement;
3. how the behavioural mechanisms work through the ‘virtual water chain’ (the production and consumption chain of water-intensive goods);
4. how the mechanisms that promote compliance with the institutional arrangement work.

The third aspect requires some explanation. Effective institutional arrangements in global water governance aim to influence the behaviour of agents in the virtual water chain. A typical virtual water chain consists of (i) a farmer at the production level, (ii) a consumer at the consumption level and, depending on the commodity at stake, (iii) some intermediaries such as a food processor and a retailer. Causal connections and behavioural mechanisms operate through the virtual water chain after an institutional arrangement imposes external pressures. For example, raising the price of water withdrawal can eventually lead to a higher consumer price for water-intensive products. Figure 2.3 shows the virtual water chain and its basic relation with the institutional arrangements.

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4 International regimes are sets of rules, roles and relationships, or issue-specific institutional arrangements that may or may not be legally binding, may or may not assign some role to UN agencies, and often accord important roles to non-state actors (Young, 1999a).

5 The volume of Rittberger & Mayer (1993) offers a good overview of regime theory by bringing together the European and the American schools of thought. They assign three main tasks to regime analysis: i) investigating the determinants of regime formation and persistence or demise; ii) accounting for regime properties and their change; and iii) determining regime consequences and explaining their variation. These tasks make regime theory appealing to the effort of institutional design.
2.3.3 Assessment of effects
As stated in section 2.1, this study qualitatively evaluates the institutional arrangements on their projected impact on social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency in global water governance. This impact can either be positive or negative:

- Social equity considerations involve the impact institutional arrangements have on economic opportunities in developing countries and on the price of basic food.

- From an economic efficiency perspective, the benefits of the arrangement should outweigh its transaction costs and opportunity costs.

- From an ecological sustainability point of view, the arrangements should be sufficient to arrive at a sustainable level of water use.

2.3.4 Discussion
The previous steps in the design method result into a list of pros and cons. The final step is to address some topics of discussion, particularly on the feasibility of the arrangements:

- This study checks the compatibility of the institutional arrangements with their legal context. Important documents of international environmental law are the Stockholm Declaration (UNCHE, 1972), the Rio Declaration (UNCED, 1992) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (WSSD, 2002). The World Trade Organization (WTO) trade rules represent international trade law.

- Realism is a scholarly tradition in international relations that pictures world politics to be a struggle for power between states, in which every state tries to maximize its own

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The WTO Agreements are available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm.
interests. The opposing tradition is that of institutional liberalism, a tradition that believes in cooperation under conditions of anarchy. The design of institutional arrangements typically falls within the latter tradition. As a result, the political feasibility of the arrangements can be contested from a realist’s point of view.

- Water issues relate to broader issues, both environmental and economic. It may therefore be naïve to design institutional arrangements for water governance alone. The study identifies possible alliances that make the arrangements more feasible or effective.
3 Water Pricing Protocol

3.1 Rationale
Governments around the globe subsidize water provision and wastewater treatment. Thus, incentives to conserve water are small for water users. As a result, people pollute water and use the resource wastefully in numerous areas. This practice is to the detriment of a country’s natural capital and leads to a suboptimal allocation of water resources.

One way to increase economic efficiency is to put a price on water. Governments are reluctant to pricing water for several reasons, of which one is interesting from a global perspective: a country that unilaterally increases water prices affects the international competitiveness of its national producers of water-intensive products. International agreement on water pricing diminishes this disadvantage.

3.2 Institutional set-up

3.2.1 Parties of the Water Pricing Protocol
This study focuses on irrigated agriculture and industry, because its main concern is the water used for export products. Generally, irrigation agencies set prices for irrigated agriculture. Industries extract water directly from the environment, sometimes controlled by a regulating authority. Ideally, irrigation agencies and the regulating authorities are the signatories to a Water Pricing Protocol. However, it is justified to invite state parties to be signatories for the following reasons.

First, the concept of state sovereignty forms the base of the UN treaty system. Thus, states are accountable in international law, particularly with regard to the WTO trade rules. Second, irrigating cash crops is an important part of national economic development and irrigation networks are often under direct supervision of a national governmental department. Third, industries often have the power to arrange individual water abstraction and disposal, with limited governmental involvement. Even in OECD countries, 75% of total water consumption by the industrial sector comes directly from the environment (Jones, 1999). Committing national governments to the Water Pricing Protocol may urge them to force industries to reduce harmful wastes and the depletion of resources.

3.2.2 Selection of a pricing method
Johansson et al. (2002) identify four alternative methods for water pricing in irrigation, the sector that represents the major part of water demand at the global level:

1. **Volumetric pricing methods** charge for water based on the quantities of water consumed. A special case of volumetric pricing is *marginal cost pricing*. Marginal cost pricing equates the price of a unit of water with the marginal cost of supplying the last unit of water. Without transaction costs, marginal cost pricing is the only pricing method able to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation. However, marginal cost pricing requires a system of pricing, metering, billing, fee collection and fund allocation. When these activities involve relatively large overhead costs, other methods may become more efficient.

2. **Non-volumetric pricing methods** charge for water based on output, input, area or land values. Particularly pricing on a per area basis is popular, because this method is easy to
implement and administer. Metering is not necessary, but this pricing method still requires a system of pricing, billing, fee collection and fund allocation.

3. Water markets rely on market pressures to determine the price of water. They are more flexible than centrally controlled allocation mechanisms. Water markets require a system of property rights or water use rights, and both infrastructure and institutions to divert water.

4. Assigning quotas to individual farmers to some extent mitigate equity issues or resource management issues that arise with a water market or marginal cost pricing.

Theoretically, the concept of marginal cost pricing is favourable, because of the prospect to reach Pareto-efficiency. Because the scope of this study is restricted to the global dimension of water governance, large irrigation schemes used for the production of export products are of main interest. This study proposes to limit the scope of the Water Pricing Protocol to large irrigation schemes producing export products. Because such schemes are relatively large and the number of farmers in such schemes is relatively small, this study assumes that overhead costs (pricing, metering, billing, fee collection and fund allocation) are modest. That means that marginal cost pricing is generally favourable in such schemes.

Marginal cost pricing involves the set-up of national institutions to cover the activities of pricing, metering, billing, fee collection and fund allocation. In the Water Pricing Protocol, state parties are free to determine how to arrange the activities of metering, billing and fee collection. However, the Water Pricing Protocol does provide for guidelines for the marginal cost pricing methodology (Section 3.2.3) and fund allocation (Section 3.2.4).

3.2.3 Marginal cost pricing methodology

Marginal cost pricing leaves enough room to tailor systems to situational circumstances. However, it is important to apply the same methodology to put a price on water everywhere when agreeing on a Water Pricing Protocol. Otherwise, the Protocol will suffer from many disputes between parties.

Rogers et al. (1998) provide for a further elaboration on the methodology of marginal cost pricing. Those authors make a distinction between costs, benefits and prices. In a monopolistic market, which is mostly the case in water governance, the government is the sole supplier and determines the price. To promote an efficient allocation, the government should set the price equal to the marginal cost of the supplied quantity where marginal costs and benefits are equal.

The marginal cost consists of five components: (i) capital charges; (ii) operational and maintenance costs; (iii) scarcity rent, (iv) economic externalities and (v) environmental externalities. According to Rogers et al. (1998), there are many ways to calculate each cost component. In the Water Pricing Protocol, the domestic water-pricing agencies are free to determine the methodology to calculate the cost components. However, water-pricing agencies will not always have the capacity to determine a price. Particularly the scarcity rent and environmental externalities are difficult to determine (see Section 3.2.4). The Global Water Partnership could set up a water-pricing toolbox like the IWRM toolbox (see Section 3.4.1) in order to assist water-pricing agencies.

In many cases, setting the ‘right’ price will be a matter of trial and error. In order to arrange that prices are not set unreasonably high, the Water Pricing Protocol allows for an incremental approach. In this approach, a water-pricing agency imposes the rise in price incrementally and
combines the increase with service improvements where possible. The disadvantage is that water-pricing agencies will not be able to cover all costs in the first years.

Marginal cost pricing ignores equity concerns and does not guarantee full cost recovery under all circumstances. Therefore, three adjustments are permissible to account for local or national interests (Tsur & Dinar, 1997):

1. **Two-part tariff pricing methods** extend the marginal cost pricing method with a fixed admission charge. This pricing method is appropriate in situations where a public utility produces with marginal cost below average cost while aiming to cover total costs.

2. With **tiered pricing** or **block pricing**, water rates vary as the amount of water consumed exceeds certain threshold values. It creates incentives for an individual farmer to stay within a certain block and thus, to save water. This pricing method can also level incomes among farmers. Block pricing is widely applied in urban areas as a panacea for the urban poor, but evidence of price perversities is stunning (UNDP, 2006; Van der Zaag & Savenije, 2006). Knowledge about local circumstances and the use of crop water requirements as a starting-point for determining the threshold values are prerequisites for applying block pricing.

3. A **minimum water quota** assures low-income farmers that are prone to be put out of business because of marginal cost pricing.

### 3.2.4 Fund allocation

A triangular relation develops between the beneficiaries of the water used, the harmed, and public agencies that provide for services of delivery and financing. Without institutions for allocation, fee collection makes the government a beneficiary. Therefore, the public agency that collects the fees should allocate the resulting fund to the cost components of the water provided to the beneficiary.

The ease of this allocation depends on whether it is easy to determine (i) the extent of the cost component and (ii) to whom the fund should be allocated.

Public agencies themselves bear the **capital charges** and **operational and maintenance costs**. Compensation is thus relatively easy. In an open democratic society, it is also relatively easy to determine the people subject to **economic externalities**. These people will reveal themselves when they object to major water abstractions. State parties of the Water Pricing Protocol are free to determine the extent of the compensation. One way is by means of litigation, but the costs and risks involved might be a major obstacle for the people harmed. National governments may prefer to determine clear legal procedures for complaints and compensation.

The **scarcity rent** is relevant for non-renewable resources and overexploited renewable resources (e.g. a lake or an aquifer). Future generations can use the scarcity rent to match supply and demand of water resources in spite of the depletion of resources. Restoration of these resources, such as in progress in the Aral Sea, increases supply. Demand management has two features: adaptation to the new circumstances and the search for substitutes. Inherently, water is vital for crops and thus, there are no substitutes in irrigated agriculture. Therefore, the public agency should allocate the scarcity rent to adaptation or restoration options. Because of the time lag between pricing and the financing of adaptation or restoration options, the public agency should put the money in a trust. This is why allocation of the scarcity rent is difficult. It is not clear which particular generation is justified to appropriate this ‘scarcity rent trust’. In addition, it is difficult
to determine the extent of the scarcity rent, because the present generation cannot know how much future generations will value water resources.

Local circumstances require a case-by-case analysis of the environmental impact of water abstraction and pollution. There are many ways to monetize environmental externalities, but all methods suffer from important disadvantages (Tietenberg, 2001). States are free to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies (see Section 5.4). In the Water Pricing Protocol, state parties are free to determine environmental externalities. Optionally, the Water Pricing Protocol can oblige parties to formulate environmental policies to guide the determination of environmental externalities. Table 3.1 shows that allocation is particularly difficult for the scarcity rent and environmental externalities.

### Table 3.1: Identification of the ease to allocate revenues to cost components of water use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is it easy to determine whom to compensate for harm?</th>
<th>Is it easy to quantify the cost component?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital charges</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations &amp; maintenance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcity rent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic externalities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental externalities</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2.5 Compliance mechanisms

The wasteful use of water resources is to the detriment of the natural capital of a country. Implementing the concept of marginal cost pricing will be beneficial to an optimal national allocation of water resources. This is an important incentive for national governments to comply with the Water Pricing Protocol.

The Water Pricing Protocol tries to reduce distortions in international trade. Typically, the Protocol falls within the tradition of WTO trade rules. With regard to compliance issues, the Water Pricing Protocol can learn from these WTO trade rules.

#### 3.3 Assessment of effects

**3.3.1 Trade impacts for irrigated agriculture in developing countries**

Beneficiaries of irrigation are typically a privileged group within the agrarian sector. Where charges are low, they receive water services at the expense of the economy in general (Perry, 2001). Perry (2001) and FAO (2004) conclude that gradually setting prices to recover costs, combined with an increased performance of delivery service, does not negatively influence economic development of irrigated agriculture. Marginal cost pricing, therefore, does not necessarily put farmers in developing countries out of business.

Water pricing only applies to irrigated agriculture, making rain fed agriculture more attractive than irrigated agriculture. Rain fed agriculture is most profitable under temperate climatic conditions, typically prevalent in developed countries. Rain fed agriculture is subsidized, particularly in the European Union and the United States. Compensating this comparative disadvantage for irrigated agriculture thus lies outside the Water Pricing Protocol.
3.3.2 Food still affordable for the poor in developing countries
Applying marginal cost pricing to irrigated agriculture increases the costs of producing food. Producers pass this cost on to consumers, perhaps to the level that irrigated crops become unaffordable for poor households. This is why the scope of the Water Pricing Protocol is limited to large irrigation schemes producing export products. Problems arise when irrigation schemes produce commodities for both domestic and foreign consumption. Targeted subsidies to either the consumer or the producer in the domestic food market will bridge the gap between the marginal cost price and the affordable price. National governments are free to target these subsidies in a transparent way.

3.3.3 Efficient practice is not necessarily sustainable
The economic approach of marginal cost pricing assumes that natural resources and capital are exchangeable. The two flaws that occur here are that 1) water is not fully substitutable because it is a basic need and 2) the present generation cannot know how much future generations will value water resources, because there is no market to define market prices. Appendix 1 shows that an efficient allocation is not necessarily sustainable. To achieve ecological sustainability, the present generation may need to impose stronger rules on themselves. This study proposes to apply the three principles of intergenerational equity put forward by Brown Weiss (1989) to account for such stronger rules. These three principles of intergenerational equity are labelled (i) conservation of options (ii) conservation of quality and (iii) conservation of access. According to these principles, the present generation should (Brown Weiss, 1989):

1. conserve the diversity of the natural (...) resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the options available to future generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own values;
2. maintain the quality of the planet comparable to the one enjoyed by previous generations;
3. provide its members with equitable rights of access to the legacy from past generations and conserve this access for future generations.

3.3.4 Cost recovery and compensating externalities
Due to the generally low price elasticity of demand, increasing prices results into increasing revenues. From an economic point of view, the first priority is to use these increased revenues to cover invested capital and operation and management costs. Cost recovery nullifies subsidies towards the privileged economic activities of industrial production and growing cash crops to the benefit of public funds. This study assumes that in many places there is scope for cost recovery of invested capital and operation and management costs. This is because the focus is on export commodities for which the cost component ‘water’ will remain minor. The findings of FAO (2004) and Perry (2001) support this assumption. In addition, the revenues make it possible to compensate for economic and ecological externalities. This compensation promotes social equity.

3.3.5 Demand management: incentive for more water-efficient practices
Full marginal cost pricing surely increases the producer’s need for water-efficient practices, but the producer must also have access to knowledge, technology and investment capital to implement such techniques. According to Perry (2001), the price of water must be significant in order to curtail demand, but the price structures and levels that are within politically feasible and acceptable range are usually too low to have a significant effect on demand. Contrary to what one might expect, the Water Pricing Protocol will not lower water demand drastically.
Even when a producer manages to apply water-efficient practices, it is not certain that demand will decrease due to the ‘rebound effect’. The idea of a rebound effect (also known as the Khazzoom-Brookes postulate) comes from the energy sector and works as follows. Gains in the physical efficiency of water consumption will result in a per unit price reduction of water. As a result, consumption may increase, partially offsetting the impact of the initial physical gain.

It is hard to predict the extent of the rebound effect in water consumption because research on this topic does not exist. Greening & Greene (1997) and Greening et al. (2000) provide for surveys of literature on the rebound effect in energy consumption. Greening & Greene (1997) identify three types of the rebound effect. The first type is the direct rebound effect: the increased use of energy services caused by lower prices per unit. The second type is the indirect rebound effect: because of lower costs of energy services, the consumer has a little more money to spend on all goods and services. Third, there are general equilibrium effects, which involve both producers and consumers and represent the result of myriad adjustments of supply and demand in all sectors. Generally, researchers only account for the first type of the rebound effect (Herring, 2006).

For water consumption, this study assumes that the extent of the rebound effect depends on whether water is a limiting production factor. If so, a physical efficiency gain enables a farmer just to produce more with the same amount of water and the rebound effect will approach 100%. If not, than water is not scarce. The price of water will probably not be high enough to make water efficiency measures attractive in the first place. Thus, water pricing is not effective for demand management.

3.3.6 Re-allocation from low-value to high-value uses
According to Perry et al. (1997), water is allocated first to municipal and domestic use, second to industrial and commercial use, and third to agriculture (environmental allocations are also growing in volume and priority). This sequence of priorities is generally consistent with social and economic objectives that many would share. This fact, together with the bulkiness of water, does not invite for diversions from low-value (agricultural) use towards high-value (domestic and industrial) uses. Water pricing is only a means to give a higher priority to environmental water use.

Within sectors, producers will try to get ‘more dollars for the drop’. Farmers will choose to grow the crop that maximizes their net benefit. Tsur & Dinar (1997) give an example of how pricing methods can influence a farmer’s choice to grow a certain, more water-efficient, crop.

3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Compatibility with Integrated Water Resources Management
Proposing a Water Pricing Protocol implies that to date, no international agreement accounts for water pricing. However, the process of integrated water resources management (IWRM) does account for economic instruments. The Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 has produced a Plan of Implementation7. By means of paragraph 26, Heads

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of States agreed to develop IWRM plans by the year 2005. Paragraph 26b accounts for economic instruments in general and full marginal cost pricing in specific only conservatively:

“Employ the full range of policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring, voluntary measures, market and information-based tools, land–use management and cost recovery of water services, without cost recovery objectives becoming a barrier to access to safe water by poor people, and adopt an integrated water basin approach.”

The Global Water Partnership provides for tools and good practices in an online IWRM toolbox for specialists and practitioners. According to this toolbox, economic instruments work best in combination with other supporting measures: they are unlikely to be effective acting alone. For successful application, economic instruments need appropriate standards (e.g. for discharges or surface water quality), effective administrative monitoring and enforcement capabilities, institutional co-ordination and economic stability.

The concept of full marginal cost pricing is far from common practice in international water law, due to other governmental objectives, conceptual disagreement and operational limitations. Due to the limited scope of the Water Pricing Protocol, it is well possible to develop both the Protocol and IWRM plans.

3.4.2 Conceptual disagreement about marginal cost pricing method

Different scholars propose different methods to determine the full marginal cost of water. This study leaves one cost component out of the full marginal cost of water: the ‘opportunity cost’.

The interpretation of opportunity costs varies among policy makers and scholars of water governance. Rogers et al. (1998) defines opportunity costs as the total benefit foregone of the best alternative use. This view neglects the costs that would have been made in the best alternative use. In addition, Rogers et al. (1998) accounts for total benefits foregone even if satisfying the best alternative use does not depend on the use under consideration. An alternative definition is the net benefit foregone in the best alternative use, with the reservation that this marginal water amount is demanded by, but not supplied to the alternative user. Section 3.3.6 argued that water provision follows rules of priority. This way, no better alternative use exists and opportunity costs reduce to zero. The third interpretation of opportunity costs assumes that the use of water is at the cost of future opportunities. In this study, the scarcity rent accounts for this type of costs. The scarcity rent is the marginal opportunity cost imposed on future generations by extracting one more unit of a resource today. The scarcity rent is only non-zero in the case of depletion of water stocks.

3.4.3 Alliance with EU and US agricultural subsidy structures

When a substantial amount of countries complies with the Water Pricing Protocol, there are no comparative advantages from the perspective of water governance. However, water is only one production factor. Global trade of commodities is subject to distortions that are far greater than the distortions resulting from for instance American and European agricultural subsidies. Political will to implement the Water Pricing Protocol increases when combined with the resolution of other distorting mechanisms in international trade.

8 The IWRM toolbox is available at www.gwptoolbox.org.
4 Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting

4.1 Rationale
Nowadays, the business society regards its economic performance in conjunction with its social and environmental performances (Steg et al., 2001). Regulatory compliance is not always sufficient to manage the negative environmental or social impacts of business operations effectively. There are two pathways to address sustainability issues in the virtual water chain from a global perspective.

The first pathway is an ‘International Agreement on the Sustainable Production of water-intensive goods’. Governments may not be able to, or may not want to impose stringent rules. The formulation of internationally agreed standards, for example the ISO 14000 series, forces producers to apply sound environmental production standards. While this is straightforward conceptually, it is almost impossible to implement practically. Criteria and data would need to be set at farm level. The interconnectedness of water systems and the large number of farmers make this expensive.

The second pathway is a ‘Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods’. Companies are under pressure when they fail to manage negative environmental impacts. This raises three serious risks: (i) the threat of increased regulatory control by national governments and international organizations, (i) financial risks caused by pollution and large resource use, and (iii) damage to the corporate image (Rondinelli & Berry, 2000). Consequently, companies gain from proactive management of environmental sustainability issues. However, the lack of internationally accepted reporting standards on what, when and where to report makes it difficult to assess sustainability (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2003). The design and development of a measuring and reporting method for environmental sustainability helps companies to compare trends of sustainable corporate performance over time, to compare results with targets and to benchmark companies against others. This study elaborates upon this second pathway in the subsequent sections.

4.2 Institutional set-up

4.2.1 Parties of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting
In deciding on which parties to include in the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting on water-intensive goods (in short: Business Agreement), it is important to note that a chain-based approach is preferable over a company-based approach in order to prevent companies to transfer negative effects of operations to other companies (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2003). The Business Agreement will be most effective when the key agents are involved. Hall (2000) uses the term ‘channel leader’ for a company that has sufficient power over suppliers to change its behaviour in a preferred direction. Hall (2000) claims that a channel leader with technical competencies and under specific environmental pressure can trigger chain dynamics.

This study identifies manufacturers (food processing companies) and large (western) retailers as candidates to be channel leaders in certain virtual water chains. This is supported by the
achievements of the manufacturing company Unilever and the retailing company Sainsbury’s (Hall, 2000) in exercising their channel power in certain product chains. Channel leaders can be organized in the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), an organization that is suitable to host the negotiation, formulation and enforcement of a Business Agreement. The WBCSD is a platform for some 190 companies to explore sustainable development, share knowledge, experiences and best practices, and to advocate business positions on these issues in a variety of forums, working with governments, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. Twenty-nine large multinational companies are organized in the World Business Council on Sustainable Development Water Working Group (WBCSD, 2007) and try to identify the roles businesses can play in collaborative actions for sustainable water management (WBCSD, 2005ab). This voluntary effort shows that large multinational companies recognize the need for sustainable corporate performance in the field of water governance.

4.2.2 Measuring and reporting method

The parties of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting are free to agree on what and where to report. This section describes some general directions on these issues with relevance to global water governance.

When deciding on what to report, it is essential to note that water scarcity is not the only issue in sustainability reporting. Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2003) provide for a literature study about the use of environmental indicators in food production systems. They found that such indicators often focus on events at a local level. The enormous number of indicators found in the literature generates too much data that often provide no additional knowledge on the environmental sustainability of a system. Moreover, although environmental research has addressed many aspects of sustainability, it has often ignored interactions. As a result, the understanding of total environmental implications of food production is poor. Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2003) propose a measuring method that uses three indicators to address global environmental issues: the use of energy (from both fossil and renewable sources), land and water. The systemic approach can calculate trade-offs along supply chains that make up a production system. The method produces three performance indicators: the total land, energy and water requirement per kilogram of available food. In the Business Agreement, obtaining data is the responsibility of the channel leader. It is convenient for the measuring and reporting method proposed by Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2003) that the WBCSD is involved in water, land and energy.

In addition, companies should decide on where to report. There are several ways to communicate the measurements through the supply chain. This study identifies three instruments to communicate measurements through the supply chain: (i) a sustainability label for consumers, (ii) a sustainability certificate for producers and (iii) corporate responsibility publications.

A sustainability label informs consumers about certain characteristics of the product. A sustainability label provides for simple ‘yes-or-no’ distinctions: the production process is either sustainable or unsustainable. However, reality is often more complex than the simple dichotomy of a sustainability label presumes. For water-intensive products, product labelling is not

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* Unilever assesses the water footprint of some of their products along the supply chain, and sets targets to reduce the water footprint of their products over a number of years. See http://www.unilever.com/ourvalues/environmentandsoceity/env_social_report/sustainability/water/ourapproach.asp
appealing because it would be costly to monitor production practices and to preserve the information through the virtual water chain, especially compared to the benefit of such an effort. Only a very small percentage of consumers may choose to buy a less water-intensive product and, although this number is increasing, such people are destined to remain a minority\textsuperscript{10}.

A sustainability certificate does not put the label on products, but on producers. Certification is similar to labelling, because both activities require the definition of criteria at the farm level, a monitoring framework and an authority to give out the label or certificate. Certification is not appealing for producers of water-intensive products because commercial benefits of the system are lacking.

Alternatively, channel leaders may report on sustainability issues in their corporate responsibility publications. Many multinational businesses have such publications already in place. The data generated can be used to regard trends over time, to compare results with targets and to benchmark a product against the product of other companies (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2003). Corporate responsibility publications are the preferable tool to communicate about sustainability issues.

4.2.3 Compliance mechanisms

The Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting is voluntary by nature. In the absence of enforcement procedures, compliance must come from within the channel leaders themselves. The reporting method of the voluntary Business Agreement recognizes not only consumers and NGOs as important drivers of corporate responsibility, but also shareholders and employees.

4.3 Assessment of effects

4.3.1 Trade impacts for small producer firms in developing countries

The Business Agreement intensifies buyer-supplier relations. The Agreement thus reinforces the position of large multinational companies as the channel leader of food production chains. Channel leaders can use their power to force local producers to implement more sustainable practices. On the one hand, this is exactly the aim. On the other hand, some may regard subjecting food producers of the developing world to the Business Agreement as a new form of imperialism\textsuperscript{11}.

Obviously, it is not the aim of designing the Business Agreement to give an opportunity to channel leaders to squeeze small producer firms in developing countries. Case studies on present sustainability labelling and certification schemes such as the Better Sugarcane Initiative will give valuable insights into these buyer-supplier relations in food production chains.

4.3.2 Conservation of resources

Ecological sustainability is the driving criterion of the Business Agreement. Effects on ecological sustainability (e.g. conservation of resources) will only take place when the Business Agreement

\textsuperscript{10} Richard Holland, WWF International Freshwater Programme, personal communication.

\textsuperscript{11} For a comprehensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of closer buyer-supplier relations, consult Lyons et al. (1990), Barringer (1997) and Hall (2000).
alters behaviour of the agents in the virtual water chain. Of these agents, local producers are most capable of environmental innovation because of their direct contact with water resources. Farmers, however, often lack incentives to invest in environmental innovation because it does not directly improve their financial performance. This is the point where channel leaders become important ‘change agents’. While local producers may not be under environmental pressure, they are often under considerable pressure from their customer firms for other issues (Hall, 2000). That means that channel leaders should set targets to reduce the water footprint of their products. In order to reach these targets, the channel leader should exercise its channel power over local producers, who necessarily will adapt to the channel leader’s policy.

The Business Agreement requires a sufficient degree of participation to be effective. In some virtual water chains of water-intensive commodities, many manufacturers or retailers may be active. Even if the degree of participation is sufficient, monitoring and reporting will not lead to more sustainable practices directly. Increasing sustainability requires behavioural change. There are promising signs of such behavioural change in virtual water chains. A good example is the ‘Better Sugarcane Initiative’, a collaboration of progressive sugarcane retailers, investors, traders, producers and NGOs who are committed to developing internationally applicable measures and baselines that define sustainable sugar cane. Implementation of the Business Agreement is much easier when connected with such initiatives.

4.4 Discussion

4.4.1 Adequacy of the standard

One of the most complex issues in the Business Agreement is deciding on an adequate measuring and reporting standard for the ecological or social issue at stake. Certain issues will require tailor-made standards, while this study only suggests a general method, limited to ecological sustainability. This is why channel leaders, in cooperation with their branch of industry, should decide on what standard to use.

Section 4.2 focuses on ecological sustainability because this is the most prevalent issue in global water governance. In reality, businesses regard their overall economic, ecological and social performance. Further development of this institutional arrangement should focus on the interaction with the broader environmental and social context.

4.4.2 Compatibility with international law

It is likely that the Business Agreement will reinforce international social and environmental law. Since the Business Agreement is a voluntary scheme, it may even set higher goals than established in contemporary international law. Therefore, conflicts with international law are most likely to be on the subject of economic efficiency. The legitimate concerns for environmental and social justice may pose an obstacle to international trade.

Three determinants express the extent to which the Business Agreement is compatible with WTO trade rules: (i) the nature of the instruments applied; (ii) whether compliance is mandatory or voluntary; and (iii) the degree of public intervention (Van der Grijp et al., 2004). The instrument proposed is a mere measuring and reporting system, with limited regulation. Participation is

More information on the Better Sugarcane Initiative can be found at http://www.bettersugarcane.org/.
voluntary and the role for governmental agencies is limited. Thus, the Business Agreement is not in conflict with WTO trade rules.

Individual states are very cautious in regulating the market for sustainable products. The fact that many sustainability labelling and certification schemes are subsidized by public funds witness the strategy of governments to hide behind private initiatives in order to avoid formal litigation (Van der Grijp et al., 2004). This study assumes that for this reason public funds are available to subsidize part of the Business Agreement.

4.4.3 Corporate responsibility or public intervention

The Business Agreement is a private undertaking to organize the sustainable development of water resources around the globe. In doing so, it aims to fill the gap provided by national and international regulation as a consequence of conflicting mechanisms at various governance levels, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, or simply remaining silent (Van der Grijp et al., 2004).

There are three ways to think of the relationship between public intervention and the Business Agreement (or sustainability reporting in general). The first way of thought is that the Business Agreement is more effective than public intervention. In this view, the Business Agreement facilitates experiments with educational activities, innovative technologies initiated by channel leaders or local governance structures for which regulatory measures are not flexible enough. Costly enforcement mechanisms are unnecessary, and the organizational continuity and effectiveness is in the hand of strong multinational companies with sufficient funds. The aim for the Business Agreement is then to increase the number of participants.

The second way of thought is that, although public intervention is preferable in the end, the Business Agreement can act as a catalyst for such public intervention. In this view, the Business Agreement triggers the provision of a participatory infrastructure, a monitoring regime, knowledge about sustainability issues at all levels of governance and draft criteria and principles. The aim for the Business Agreement is then to promote an integrated, chain-based approach.

The third way of thought condemns the Business Agreement, for it distracts from the moral obligation of governments to protect natural resources and promote the welfare of the disadvantaged. In this view, governmental subsidies to private schemes are an opportunity cost public intervention, for reasons addressed in section 4.4.2. The aim should be to object to the whole concept of the Business Agreement and to terminate its existence.
5 Water Footprint Permits

5.1 Rationale

The idea of water footprint permits follows from the understanding that every individual has a right to appropriate a certain amount of global fresh water resources (Petrella, 2001; Barlow & Clarke, 2002) and that total appropriation should not exceed the carrying capacity of the Earth. Water footprint permits are tradable to promote not only an equitable, but also an efficient allocation of water footprint permits. As a system, water footprint permits are comparable to the well-known Kyoto Protocol that assigns quotas of carbon dioxide emissions.

5.2 Institutional set-up

5.2.1 Parties of the system of Water Footprint Permits

The controversial nature of the system of Water Footprint Permits requires high-level political attention. Therefore, this study proposes that nations constitute the General Assembly of the system of Water Footprint Permits. Every six years, the General Assembly decides upon the maximum global water footprint permit. This period of six years is convenient, because it enables to flatten year-to-year variability of water supply and demand, it does not demand a great deal of time of the General Assembly, and the proposal to the decision can be prepared by the ministerial conference of the triennial World Water Forum.

The General Assembly allocates Water Footprint Permits to nations, not to individuals. The allocation of permits to individuals would be an important awareness-raising instrument. When people are aware of the consequences of their consumption, they might reconsider their consumption pattern to the benefit of the Earth’s water resources. However, five reasons limit the feasibility of this option. First, many human beings in the developing world are not registered and thus practically unable to exercise their rights. Second, it would be virtually impossible to get a substantial amount of individuals together to participate in the voluntary scheme of water footprint permits. Third, it would be extremely difficult to monitor individual’s water footprints. Fourth, compliance at the individual level will be difficult to achieve. Fifth, individuals are not the natural entities for allocation of water, but rather communities. Thus, this study chooses to elaborate on the mode in which maximum water footprint permits are allocated to nations. This is convenient, because the legal system and monitoring infrastructure is already largely in place at this level. Moreover, the most promising options to match actual water footprints with water footprint permits feature at the national level (see section 5.2.5).

5.2.2 Defining a maximum global water footprint

Though estimates of the annual volume of rainfall over land are available (Shiklomanov, 2000), it is very difficult to give a global figure for a maximum sustainable global water footprint. Various reasons for this include (i) uncertain environmental flow requirements, (ii) disputable level of water use efficiency, (iii) unknown potential for rain fed agriculture (Hoekstra, 2006). Hoekstra (2007) compares two methods to determine the global water footprint: one presented in Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) and one presented in Postel et al. (1996). Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) estimated that human appropriation of ‘green water resources’ (soil moisture) is 8 % and the human appropriation of ‘blue water resources’ (surface and groundwater) 17 %. Because Postel et al. (1996) take a much broader definition of green and blue water use; their estimates are 24 % and 51 % respectively. This appropriation obviously leads to unsustainable conditions in
many places throughout the world, as witnessed by the reported cases of water depletion (UN-Water, 2003; 2006).

Not only is it hard to determine a maximum sustainable global water footprint, it would lead to a suboptimal outcome from both the economic and the environmental perspective. Determining the environment for which to define environmental flow requirements is arbitrary and subject to trade-offs. From an environmental perspective, presuming the existence of a maximum sustainable global water footprint that simply represents the difference between annual renewable water resources and environmental water requirements implies that not using water resources up to this maximum would be a waste of renewable resources. From an economic perspective, the negotiated maximum footprint is not necessarily the most efficient threshold. Appendix 1 explains this relation between efficiency and sustainability for a body of groundwater.

This study proposes the following pragmatic solution to this problem. When parties agree on the rationale of tradable water footprint permits, this system needs to allocate sufficiently low rations in order to be effective. Low rations make water footprint permits scarce, their value becomes higher, and the evolving trade system will strengthen the institutional arrangement. This trade system gives the opportunity to impose an overhead charge needed to operate and maintain the system of water footprint permits. On the other hand, when rations are set too low, non-compliance becomes an attractive option to many and the institutional arrangement will be ineffective. Within these boundaries, it seems feasible to negotiate a maximum global water footprint.

Like many environmental regimes, the system of water footprint permits depends on voluntary cooperation between nations. The actual size of the maximum water footprint will therefore be a political question driven by environmental science, comparable to the procedure followed under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention.

5.2.3 Allocating the maximum global water footprint permit to nations

The maximum global water footprint is to be allocated among the people of the Earth. Either historical use rights or ethical reasoning can guide such allocation.

Typically, historical use rights guide the allocation of natural resources. The Kyoto Protocol, for instance, applies this allocation mechanism. It is thus conceivable that the allocation of water footprint permits is subject to bargaining between agents, where some agents will use their contemporary high water footprints as an argument for a large share of the global maximum water footprint.

Ethical reasoning starts with stating that every human being has a moral right to appropriate the same amount of water resources. However, some people live under unfavourable climatic conditions compared to others, while they rely largely on domestic food production for their nutrition. Because these people are least advantaged, they should receive some compensation in the form of a higher tolerable water footprint. Appendix 2 describes a method to account for climatic compensation. Then, making the permits tradable enables the permits to flow towards high-valued uses, without compromising the basic needs of poor people. Selling part of their water footprint permit even generates income for the poor. The permits should be set for one year or maybe some subsequent years. This recurrent assessment possesses the virtue that people can reconsider how much of their water footprint to keep, so the rationing system will not restrict economic development.
5.2.4 Monitoring water footprints of nations

Hoekstra & Chapagain (2007) provide for an analytical framework for the assessment of virtual water content of commodities, virtual water flows and water footprints.

The virtual water content of a product is the volume of freshwater used to produce the product, which depends on the water use in the various steps of the production chain. The virtual water content of a product breaks down into a green, blue and grey component. These components refer to evaporated rainwater, evaporated ground/surface water and polluted water respectively.

International virtual water flows can be calculated by multiplying commodity trade flows by their associated virtual water content. If the exporting country does not produce a commodity itself, but only imports it for further export, one should take the virtual-water content of the product as in the country of origin.

The water footprint of a nation can be assessed through either a bottom-up or a top-down approach. In the bottom-up approach, the water footprint of a nation is calculated by multiplying all goods and services consumed by the inhabitants of a country by the respective water needs for those goods and services. It is straightforward, although data demanding. For assessing the water footprint of a nation it is easier to use the top-down approach, which takes total water use in a country as a starting-point and then subtracts the part of the water used for making export products and adds the incoming virtual water flow.

This analytical framework forms the base of the monitoring effort needed in the system of water footprint permits. It is comprehensive in the way that it accounts for blue, green and grey water use. The level of detail is sufficient for the permit system. However, the method needs improvement before it is applicable for recurrent monitoring. First, the grey water component should be introduced into the water footprint of nations as defined by Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004). Second, uncertainty analysis should be carried out to be clear about the limitations of the method. Third, all state parties should make transparent monitoring data available recurrently on a year-to-year base.

5.2.5 Five national responses to match footprint to permit

The effectiveness of the system of Water Footprint Permits results from the actions taken by agents to match the national water footprint to their water footprint permit. Five options exist for nations, the primary agents of this institutional arrangement. The first one is to buy part of the permit of another country. The attractiveness of this option depends on the price and available quantity of permits. The second option is to improve water-inefficient practices in the country where major imports come from. Creating incentives for virtual water importing countries will generate funds to invest in efficient and sustainable agricultural practices. The third option is to shift imports towards more water-efficient regions. The fourth option is to appropriate water that is not included in the maximum global water footprint, most notably salt water. When nations invest in desalination they augment the water resource base (to the detriment of their energy resources). It is fair that nations profit from their own effort. The fifth option is to change the total consumption or the consumption pattern of the nation. This option implies to involve the nation’s inhabitants, either by awareness raising instruments (e.g. scaling down the water footprint permit) or by taxes on water-intensive products.

Beforehand, there is no preferred set of options for a country to match their water footprint permit. Particular characteristics and circumstances lead to different sets of preferred actions. It
will remain within national sovereignty to determine this set of actions. Whatever the set of actions, consumer awareness about their water footprint will increase.

5.2.6 Compliance mechanisms
Countries comply with the permit system when their actual water footprint is equal to or smaller than their acquired water footprint permit. Non-compliance occurs when a nation’s actual water footprint is larger than its permit. Three situations may occur. In the first situation, all countries have remained within their ration. There is no compliance problem, but the rations in the next period of six years may be set lower. In the second situation, some countries have consumed more than their permit allows them to, while others have consumed less. In retrospect, countries can trade water footprint permits for the period at hand without further regulatory measures. Third, the majority of countries have a larger water footprint than their permits allow them to. For this situation, a clear penalty system should be in place. The collection of penalties creates a fund that can be used to back the restoration of local systems that have suffered most from depletion and degradation during the period under consideration. In this respect, much can be learned from the Kyoto Protocol process, for which compliance mechanisms must be in place when the emission target deadline of 2012 passes.

A major compliance issue is of methodological nature: the time lag between determining a nation’s water footprint permit and its actual water footprint. The water footprint permit for a certain period (six years, see section 5.2.1) is determined by setting a global maximum beforehand and allocating this permit among nations. The actual water footprint is determined by evaluating climatic parameters, crop parameters, crop product yields, international trade data, and industrial and domestic water withdrawals afterwards. One way to minimize this problem is to predict the actual water footprint. Probably, the water footprint of nations is not very volatile, so trend analysis of national water footprints would provide for a sufficient certainty of prediction.

5.3 Assessment of effects

5.3.1 Poverty alleviation
This study proposes that nations that want to have a larger water footprint than their equitable share allows them to, can buy some of the permit of countries that aim to have a lower water footprint. This trading system leads to cross-subsidies from countries with large water footprints towards countries with low water footprints, virtually to reward them for their higher conservation of global water resources. If high water footprints positively correlate with high incomes, these cross-subsidies lead to poverty alleviation.

Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) found a positive relation between per capita Gross National Income (GNI) and domestic water consumption, as well as between per capita GNI and the virtual water footprint resulting from industrial consumption. They did not find a relation between per capita GNI and the virtual water footprint resulting from the consumption of agricultural commodities. The reason is that other factors – climate, agricultural practice and

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13 These parameters are derived from Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004), but may be extended with parameters to incorporate dilution water (grey water).
consumption pattern – interfere to such extent that these factors should be filtered out first in order to see the individual effect of GNI per capita.

Section 5.2.3 argued that people living under unfavourable climatic conditions and highly dependent on domestic food production should receive compensation in their share of the maximum global water footprint. It is beyond the scope of the present study to adjust the data of Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) to find a positive relation between GNI per capita and the water footprint because of consumption of agricultural commodities. It suffices to say that using the ‘climate compensation factor’ as proposed in Appendix 2 will probably produce a positive relation.

Note that the improvement of poor agricultural practices, funded by donor countries, directly leads to poverty alleviation.

5.3.2 Conservation of water resources
Conservation of water resources occurs when countries shift imports towards water-efficient regions, improve water-inefficient agricultural practices domestically or abroad, lower their total consumption or change towards a more water-extensive consumption pattern.

5.3.3 Transaction costs exceed benefits
It is conceivable that transaction costs will exceed the benefits. Transaction costs consist of costs for information, negotiation, definition and enforcement of a contract (Hazeu, 2000). Further quantification of these transaction costs and benefits delivers further insight on this matter.

5.4 Discussion

5.4.1 Incompatibility with international environmental law
Water footprint permits underscore the environmental limitations to human behaviour. Implementing the concept of water footprint permits is in direct conflict with the influential Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration:

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (UNCHE, 1972).

Geographical spread of water availability becomes less important in the system of Water Footprint Permits. Water-rich countries will try to hang on to their state sovereignty over natural resources. However this important incompatibility with international law, environmental regimes have evolved based on voluntary collective action. The permit system requires a certain degree of participation to have a significant effect, but it does not need a unanimous consensus.

5.4.2 Political unfeasibility
Water footprint permits seem to be largely to the benefit of developing countries with simple consumption patterns. Thus, it is possible that countries with a large water footprint will not participate in a permit system, comparable to the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Obviously, this is a major issue for the permit system. However, this study identifies three aspects that make it more likely that nations will cooperate.
First, such reasoning typically belongs to the tradition of realism and neglects a liberal view to world politics. The permit system is a voluntary system, in which bargaining over the size of the permitted global maximum water footprint leaves room for national interests. Second, the contemporary distribution of water footprints is not morally justifiable\textsuperscript{14}. When all human beings would have a water footprint equal to that of the average American, human appropriation of water resources would double (Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004). This appropriation cannot be considered to remain within environmental limits. Transnational NGOs make governments, producers and consumers aware of that. Third, it is possible to break the seemingly obvious link between economic growth and increased water use, by applying techniques in agriculture that augment the ‘crop per drop’. Self-restraint and economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive aims.

5.4.3 Alliance with an ecological footprint permit

Water is not the only natural resource that suffers from scarcity at the global level. Other important scarce resources that sustain our lifestyles are various types of lands and energy carriers. The water footprint concept has been derived from the ecological footprint concept put forward by Rees & Wackernagel (1996). Where the water footprint determines the amount of water (in m\textsuperscript{3}) that is needed to sustain the consumption pattern of an individual or nation, the ecological footprint does the same for land (in ha). The ecological footprint converts human consumption of food (including fish), energy and forest products to a certain amount of land and adds it to the amount of land needed for the built-up environment.

Though the water footprint and ecological footprint are measured in different units (m\textsuperscript{3}/capita vs. m\textsuperscript{2}/capita), the rationale for a permit system is similar for both concepts. The feasibility and usefulness of a water footprint permit system increases when combined with an ecological footprint permit system. The need for a permit system is even higher for ecological footprints than for water footprints, because the global ecological footprint exceeds the Earth’s biocapacity by 23\% (WWF, 2006) or 39\% (Venetoulis & Talberth, 2006).

\textsuperscript{14} Moral justice is best represented here by Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also want that my maxim should become a universal law.”
6 Results

The preceding chapters describe feasible and conceivable institutional arrangements for global water governance that promote social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency. Table 6.1 presents the rationale for and the key features of the institutional arrangements. Figure 6.1 displays the behavioural mechanisms through the virtual water chain, triggered by the institutional arrangements. Table 6.2 summarizes the assessment of effects and topics of discussion by means of a SWOT-analysis (the analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). It shows differences in the extent to which the institutional arrangements address the three criteria of sustainable development. In addition, the Table gives the opportunity to relate the institutional arrangements to each other.

Table 6.1: Key features of institutional arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Water Pricing Protocol</th>
<th>Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting</th>
<th>Water Footprint Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationale</strong></td>
<td>Full marginal cost pricing increases efficiency. The deadlock of countries unwilling to restrain themselves requires international cooperation.</td>
<td>Companies gain from proactively addressing environmental sustainability issues. The Agreement channels business efforts to increase the environmental sustainability of their activities.</td>
<td>Every individual has a right to appropriate a certain amount of global fresh water resources and total appropriation should not exceed the carrying capacity of the Earth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change agents</strong></td>
<td>National governments</td>
<td>Word Business Council on Sustainable Development</td>
<td>National governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary agents</strong></td>
<td>Producers</td>
<td>Food processors, Retailers</td>
<td>Consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive elements</strong></td>
<td>Full marginal cost pricing method, Fund allocation method</td>
<td>Measuring method, Reporting method</td>
<td>Maximum global water footprint definition, Permit allocation, Monitoring framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioural mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Price increase is passed on, ultimately to consumers</td>
<td>Channel leadership involves the producers, Sustainability reporting involves consumers</td>
<td>Various instruments are available to national governments to involve all agents in the virtual water chain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.1: Behavioural mechanisms triggered by institutional arrangements. WBCSD = World Business Council on Sustainable Development.
Table 6.2: Summarizing analysis of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of the institutional arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water Pricing Protocol</th>
<th>Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting</th>
<th>Water Footprint Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Strengths**          | • Privileged economic sectors less dependent on public funds  
                         • Efficient crop patterns  
                         • Cost recovery  
                         • Compensation externalities  
                         • Restoration of depleted resources  
                         • Optimization comparative advantages  
                         • Awareness of water footprint through business society  
                         • Conservation of resources  
                         • Reduced risk of regulation, environmental degradation and corporate image  
                         • Increased corporate responsibility  
                         • Awareness of water footprint through government & civil society  
                         • Equal right to the global water footprint  
                         • Poverty alleviation  
                         • Conservation of resources  
                         • More efficient allocation of water resources |
| **Weaknesses**         | • Irrigation less competitive than rain-fed agriculture  
                         • Increased food prices  
                         • Ecological sustainability not guaranteed  
                         • High domestic transaction costs (pricing, metering, billing, fee collection, fund allocation)  
                         • Moderate transaction costs (monitoring)  
                         • Reinforced power ‘channel leaders’ over local producers  
                         • Arrangement is a substitute for strong regulation  
                         • Lack of enforcement mechanisms  
                         • Local overexploitation remains possible  
                         • High transaction costs (negotiation, contract design, monitoring, enforcement) |
| **Opportunities**      | • Alliance with reduction farm subsidies in industrialized countries  
                         • Alliance with Ecological Footprint Permits |
| **Threats**            | • Domestic ability to apply marginal cost pricing  
                         • Interference with cultural heritage  
                         • Adequacy of the reporting standard  
                         • States’ adherence to sovereignty over natural resources  
                         • Monitoring method not solid enough as a basis for international law |
7 Discussion

The effectiveness of the institutional arrangements is subject to risks. The main risk of the Water Pricing Protocol is the assumption that national governments, with some assistance, will be able to have domestic institutions in place to arrange the various steps of water pricing. Various reasons may limit the implementation of water pricing: financial capacity, interference with cultural heritage (for instance the warabandi system in Pakistan and India), and physical constraints of metering (the uncontrolled flooding of terraces in South-East Asia).

The main risk of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting is that there is no separation of powers, or *trias politica*. As a result, the Business Agreement is not binding. The platform that will draft the Business Agreement (the World Business Council on Sustainable Development as proposed) should be as autonomous as possible in order to account for effective enforcement mechanisms.

The main risk of Water Footprint Permits is that the transaction costs will outweigh the benefits of the system. Apart from monitoring efforts, the system requires a great deal of political attention. Necessarily, the system should seek strategic cooperation. A system of Ecological Footprint Permits would be a promising partner for the system of Water Footprint Permits.
8 Conclusions

Global water governance is new as a research topic. The institutional arrangements in this study are explorations of ways in which human society can deal with the global dimension of water governance. The design of these arrangements is only a first step towards a multidisciplinary debate on global water governance.

The involvement of other scientific disciplines other than water governance would strongly mature the design and assessment of institutional arrangements. Particularly the fields of economics, law and public administration could provide for greater insight and better quality of the institutional designs. Apart from integration across disciplines, further research should take a multi-level approach. The institutional designs in this study suffer from generalizations and assumptions that will have unanticipated effects at the river basin or local level. The other way around, institutions at the local or river basin level may be more effective in promoting the criteria of sustainable development at the global level.

The institutional arrangements are not mutually exclusive. Table 6.2 helps to identify opportunities and threats of simultaneous implementation of the institutional arrangements. Combinations that reduce negative effects are promising. The Table reads that all three institutional arrangements require monitoring efforts, which could be combined. On the other hand, combinations may be less effective than the sum of effects of the separate institutional arrangements. When a Business Agreement leads to the conservation of resources, fewer opportunities to reduce human water use exist for a system of Water Footprint Permits. A combination of Water Footprint Permits and the Business Agreement is promising, because governments, civil society and business society involve in the equitable and sustainable appropriation of global water resources.

With reference to the individual arrangements, further research could explore strategic alliances. The Water Pricing Protocol would be much more effective when coupled to a global agreement on directing agricultural subsidies. The system of Water Footprint Permits should seek cooperation with the field of Ecological Footprint analysis. In addition, case studies will provide more detailed information on the behavioural mechanisms of the institutional arrangements. For the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting, the search for simple but comprehensive indicators of ecological sustainability is ongoing. In this regard, the effort of the Better Sugarcane Initiative is promising. The Better Sugarcane Initiative is very relevant for this arrangement, because it takes a life-cycle approach, it involves different stakeholders across the virtual water chain and the water-intensive sugarcane is traded worldwide.

The design of institutions that cope with the global dimension of water governance is both exciting and frightening. Ostrom et al. (1999) describe the challenges involved in such an effort. This study concludes with their epilogue:

"Humanity now faces new challenges to establish global institutions to manage biodiversity, climate change, and other ecosystem services. (...) In the end, building from past successes will require forms of communication, information, and trust that are broad and deep beyond precedent, but not beyond possibility." (Ostrom et al., 1999)
References


Appendices

Appendix 1: Relation between efficiency and sustainability for a groundwater body

This Appendix presents two stylized graphs. The first graph presents the linear relation between abstraction effort and natural outflow of a groundwater aquifer. The second graph presents the marginal cost and benefit of the abstraction effort. The abstraction effort is efficient when the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit, which happens at point $S_j$. However, this point has no physical meaning.

One could also look at the relation the other way around. A sustainable abstraction effort happens when the abstraction accounts for the minimum flow requirements. The maximum sustainable abstraction effort occurs in point $S_i$. The graphs show that these two points do not necessarily coincide. An efficient abstraction may be larger or smaller than an arbitrarily defined sustainable abstraction.

Note that the water abstractor directly benefits from the abstraction, while part of the marginal cost comes at the disposal of future generations or contemporary others (externalities). Because water is subsidized, the marginal cost curve for the individual water abstractor may thus be lower than for society.
Appendix 2: Compensation for an unfavourable climate

The introduction of a ‘climate compensation factor’ into the allocation of water footprint permits accounts for differing climatic circumstances among nations. This study proposes the following calculation method for a climate compensation factor:

\[
\text{Climate compensation factor (j)} = 1 + \frac{\sum X_{i,j} \left( VWC_{i,j} - VWC_{\text{world average},i} \right)}{\sum X_{i,j} \cdot VWC_{\text{world average},i}}
\]

in which the subscript j denotes the various countries, and

- \(X_{i,j}\) = domestic consumption of product i
- \(VWC_{i,j}\) = virtual water content of product i, produced in country j
- \(VWC_{\text{world average},i}\) = world averaged virtual water content of product i
- \(IWFP_{\text{agr},j}\) = Internal water footprint for agricultural products in country j
- \(WFP_{\text{agr},j}\) = Total water footprint for agricultural products in country j

Advantages of applying the climate compensation factor:

- It accounts for the inability of poor countries to import products
- It enables subsistence agriculture in countries with unfavourable climates
- The factor can adapt to developments

Disadvantages of applying the climate compensation factor:

- It implicitly promotes the aim of food self-sufficiency in water-inefficient regions to the cost of optimizing comparative advantages.
- The method assumes that nations are free and able to import from either water-efficient or water-inefficient regions. In fact, this may not be the actual case due to for instance transport costs of land-locked countries.