Increasing the Citizens’ EU Awareness:
The European Commission as a driving force for Publicity?
Preface

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List of Abbreviations

AIM  - Adequate Information Management
DG   - Directorate-General
EBU   - European Broadcasting Union
EC    - Treaty establishing the European Communities
EMS   - European Media System
EP    - European Parliament
EPS   - European Public Sphere
ERG   - European Regulators Group
EU    - European Union
i2010 - European Information Society 2010
IGC   - Intergovernmental Conference
MEP   - Member of European Parliament
NGO   - Nongovernmental Organization
NRA   - National Regulatory Authority
TEU   - Treaty establishing the European Union
TWF   - Television without Frontiers

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I. Introduction

I.1. Research Motivation

In the year of the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, and the 15th year after the (legal) creation of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht, European Integration slowed down considerably due to certain hindrances such as the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, a low turnout at the last election to the European Parliament, and also the necessary revision of the main ‘future project’, the Lisbon Agenda. However, over the last 15 years we have witnessed a successful process of integration: the creation of the single European market was completed by the introduction of the common currency, the Euro, and the Union has been enlarged to 27 member states. Notwithstanding this successful story of economic integration and peace and security – one of the most important, but today often neglected attainments of the EU – the process of constant integration seems to have been too fast for the citizens of the European Union: although being legally ‘Europeans’ since 1992, the demos of the Union does not seem to feel connected to its newly gained political entity. The most recent Eurobarometer survey at the time of writing - Eurobarometer No. 67, July 2007 – revealed that on average only 57 percent of all Europeans support the membership of their country in the European Union. Also voter participation in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 was below 50 percent in almost all EU member states.

Thus, the Union suffers from considerable democracy, legitimacy and accountability deficits. One reason - and characteristic at the same time - is the low participation and involvement of the Europeans in the political system of the Union. This assumption is the real starting point of this work. People need to participate to a greater extent in order to gain a more democratic political system in the EU and thus lay the basis for further integration, which is needed to cope with the arising challenges of the 21st century.

According to Robert Dahl, citizens need to be aware of and informed about the political system in order to participate in a democracy in an effective way.\(^1\) This is where the democracy-problem for the EU starts: recent Eurobarometer surveys showed that knowledge about the EU, its system and its institutions is on the average quite low. Thus the citizens are not informed and therefore are not aware of the political system of the EU. Among the reasons for this flaw allegedly is the lack of media coverage about European topics.

\(^1\) Dahl, 2000.
The EU mainly attains media attention when there is a big EU event, as one of the most recent and broadest researches about EU media coverage showed. The objective of this ‘Adequate Information Management in Europe’\(^2\) (AIM) project was to investigate - in a comparative study involving ten countries - the impact of mass media on the emergence of (a) European public sphere(s) in empirical, theoretical, and practical dimensions. Although the results – of course – differ between the ten countries, they show that media coverage about the European Union is low, which is seen as a hindrance for the emergence of a European Public Sphere.

Another term used for Public Sphere is *European Publicity*\(^3\) – which is the aiming point of this thesis. But what is meant by it? Within the AIM research European Publicity was limited to media coverage about European topics. This definition of publicity has the advantage that it provides a basis for measurement: the quality and quantity of news about the European Union determines the level of European Publicity. This approach is one of the most common used ones in this field of research. However, as will be explained in detail in Chapter II of this thesis European Publicity must be regarded as a broader concept that also involves for example discourse and communication about European issues. Together they are the sources for European Publicity and allegedly the level of it has an influence on the citizens’ awareness of the European Union.

This interlinkage can also be further supported by the AIM research. Despite its too limited definition, the results still suggest a reason for the low level of citizens’ participation in the EU. If there is a lack of European Publicity with regard to media coverage about European issues; the level of awareness is considerably low. Accordingly people are not informed and cannot participate effectively; the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, and people reject the EU as a whole and show their discomfort for example by voting against the Constitutional Treaty. Therefore the institutions within the EU framework must engage in activities that raise the awareness of the citizens about the EU.

In the institutional framework of the EU there is a variety of actors involved not only in decision making but also in communication processes. The European Parliament is the institution of the citizens and the Councils (both the Council of Ministers and the European Council) represent the interests of the member states. However, the European Commission can be seen as the European institution in the EU framework.

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\(^2\) AIM, 2006.

\(^3\) Both terms are used in the academic literature. In this work publicity is used in most cases, but sometimes public sphere is used with the same meaning, scope and content.
Also called the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’, the Commission is the institution that has the most European perspective in its activities. Furthermore the Commission in Brussels is the head of a decentralised communication body with delegations in all member countries. These delegations are among the main channels of communication between the EU and for example journalists in the member states. Moreover the Commission issues most press releases. Therefore it is chosen as the relevant actor in this thesis. However, raising the awareness of the citizens is not an easy task, but still the Commission has at least two opportunities.

Obviously European Publicity cannot just be created for example by simply regulating media content. Media is a communication device between the Multi-Level-Governance system and the citizens; by top-down and bottom-up communication publicity emerges, which is as explained above a requisite for awareness. However, the relation among media coverage and publicity is difficult to influence by the European Commission. Foremost, because the freedom of the press is one of the most important democratic rights that is always protected by the highest barriers in a democracy. Therefore the Commission – fortunately – has no direct impact on the content of the media. However, it has different impacts on publicity; and therefore on the awareness of the citizens: by its Media Policies and by its Communication Strategy. Why these two examples are chosen will be explained in the following. Later in this opening chapter a presentation of the research related state of the art will further support the argumentation that led to this choice. Finally this discussion will lead to the setting up of the research design of this thesis.

In the first place, Media Policies must be included because television and print media are still the primary sources of information for the Europeans, as recent Eurobarometer data suggests. The European Commission is the main actor in issuing media policies in the European Union. However, media policies basically remain in the hands of the member states. Jurisdiction about media policy is regarded as one of the most important national competences, because it is often regarded as part of cultural policies, and more important, the media system is perceived as part of the cultural identity of a country. Thus, cultural policies and most media policies remain at the member state level. But still the European Commission exercises its market competences for example by controlling monopolies and thus supporting media diversity. Hence, the European Union (and its Commission) sets the framework in which media operate.

4 The approach of analysing the role of media coverage for publicity has been the focus of Cosse, 2005, unpublished.
Media policy by the EU began in the 1980s on the initiative of the European Parliament. The aim was to connect the citizens to the Union. However, this goal was not really reached. First attempts to create a European type of media such as *Europe TV* failed. Still it was the starting point for European media policies. The *Television without Frontiers directive* was the first regulative outcome of European Media Policies. It can still be seen as the most important European media policy instrument and one that also influences media content to a certain extent. The directive was created in order to set up common rules for advertising, the protection of minors and to secure a minimum share of European productions on European screens.

Since this regulative start of media policies the attitude and aims changed. The most recent developments in media policies are related to the buzzword ‘Information Society’. Under this label media policies are redirected to cope with technological innovations and also the convergence of the media. So far the so called media revolution – especially with regard to the developments in information and communication technologies – has not really been taken into account in the research about EU media policies.

The real starting point of the activities related to the information society was the adoption of the i2010 initiative (European Information Society 2010) in June 2005. It is built around three policy priorities: (1) creating an open and competitive single market for information society and media services within the EU, (2) increasing EU investment in research on information and communication technologies (ICT) by 80 percent, (3) promoting an inclusive European information society to close the gap between the information society ‘haves and have-nots’.

After the adoption the responsible Commissioner for ‘Information Society and Media’, Viviane Reding, gave herself 18 months of time to review the current media policies. This period is now over and changes have been made especially with regard to the audiovisual content and telecommunications directives. At the time of writing the directives are either just adopted by the EP or will be adopted soon. The new regulations are the current ‘hot topics’ in media politics.

However, the described field of media policies is too broad for full coverage in this context. Therefore the main focus of this work will be in the first place on the development of media policies in general in order to assess the importance of the Commission’s role. In the second place the elaborations will focus on the Commission’s role in the field of media concentration and pluralism. This focus is chosen because it is the field in which the Commission might have its strongest competences related to the internal market and as pluralism of media is the most obvious impact on democracy, because of the need of plurality of sources of information.
The second field in which the Commission has an influence on publicity is where it creates information, communication and discourse itself: its own Communication Strategy. In the first years of the Commission’s existence the public was basically neglected. Although first attempts to include it into the work of the European Union were already made in the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, communication by the Commission really started for the first time after the Danes had rejected the Maastricht Treaty - so, about 15 years after the first elections for the people’s representation in the Union, the EP, and also after the legal creation of the citizenship in the same treaty that was rejected in Denmark in 1992.

After the first attempts by a single Commissioner Joao Deus Pinheiro, the first Commission with a concise communication strategy was the Santer-Commission (1995-1999). Unfortunately the Commission had to resign due to corruption and fraud incidences, which is of course highly contradicting an open type of communication. The Prodi-Commission (1999-2004) tried to increase communication but also did not really succeed. The responsible commissioner of the current Barroso-Commission for the Communication Strategy, Margot Wallström (Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy), issued a new campaign called “Plan D, for Dialogue, Debate and Democracy” in 2005. The aim of this strategy was to facilitate public debate about the European Union and was supposed to be the contribution of the Commission for the “time of reflection”, as the period of stagnation after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty is called officially.

This strategy is supplemented by a White Paper (calling for a new communication policy) that was released in February 2006. It called for the contributions of different institutions, the public and the civil society. Besides other aims the White Paper has the following priorities: strengthening the role of the citizens for example by an increase in political education; and a combined attempt to work together with media and the usage of new technologies.

Thus Plan D and the related White Paper are the most recent and more general communication strategies and therefore will be the focus of the communication strategy part of this thesis; besides the general development of the role of the Commission.
I.2. State of the Art in Research

Research about European Publicity and the Commission’s role for it can basically be divided into three different aspects and research interests: political science concerned with the democratic aspects of publicity; legal relevance of media policies; and communication studies related to the communication strategy. However, this research will combine all three. This is why there is no literature covering the same topic. The outcome will neither be a different view in contrast to a given author nor the rejection of the view of someone else. Still a lot has been written about the different parts of this research, as will be presented in the following.

Until the late 1990s integration research about the European Union was not concerned with processes about communication, publicity and awareness. However, since the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the citizens of Denmark in 1992 this inaction started to change. Since that time and increasingly at the time of writing of this thesis various works deal with publicity.

However, research about publicity is mainly done from a highly normative angle or in a comparative style, such as the AIM research. But publicity shall be used in this thesis as a broader positive analytical framework as explained in Chapter II of this thesis. Therefore this section will neglect the literature about publicity, but will further explain why different aspects of media policies and the communication strategy are chosen.

Research on the Media Policy

The work of a variety of authors shows that research about media policies mainly focuses on audiovisual broadcasting, media concentration and state aid, because these are the central fields of media policy related action of the European Commission. For example print media are not really within the scope of European media policies, because their scope of distribution most likely remains at a national, regional or even local level - in contrast to TV or radio broadcasts. The European Union was founded as an economic cooperation; competition policies are Europeanized and even legally confirmed in Treaty Articles 81 and 82 EC. Therefore media concentration and state aid must be central to the media policy regulative work of the Commission.

One author working on media policies is Christina Holtz-Bacha. In her book “Medienpolitik für Europa” she shows the chronological development of European media policies and discusses the prospects for the emergence of a European Publicity. Her normative starting point is that the European Union

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5 Holtz-Bacha, 2006.
needs the intermediation function of mass media in order to get the support of its citizens. Media can provide information about the EU and at the same time have a function of control and criticism. Her non-normative argumentation is mainly based on a legal point of view; besides describing the actors of media policy she explains also the basis provided by European Law.

Although pluralism and media concentration are the chief interest for law-related research, also some political scientists such as Gillian Doyle express their views about this topic. She concludes that the Commission’s long standing record of inaction on the question of media concentrations and pluralism is unlikely to change any time soon, due to the inability to enforce initiatives against the rejection of the member states.6

Another example of academic research on media policies is David Ward’s book “The European Union Democratic Deficit and the Public Sphere: An Evaluation of EU Media Policy”.7 His work has a broader political science focus than the ones of Doyle or Holtz-Bacha, because he links media policy and publicity. He argues that in order to be successful the EU must overcome its democratic deficit by using mass media. Because of this, media is a public interest and must therefore be regulated by the nation states and the EU. Ward argues that the European Union is active in three fields of media policies: broadcasting; pluralism and media concentration; and state aid and public service broadcasting. By describing the nature of EU media policies he explains the linkage between democracy, media and citizenship. His main focus is the impact of media policies on the public sphere and the implications for the knowledge deficit of the Europeans.

Besides those legal and political perspectives on media policies, a different research strand is related to economic considerations. For example Alison Harcourt assesses the implication of media policies for the economy in Europe.8 She analyses the prospects for jobs and growth and also related to the competitive power vis-à-vis the United States.

The most recent discussion about European media policy is about media convergence. So far not much has been written about the results of the i2010 initiative and the other activities related to the so called Information Society, because the resulting directives are just in the final stage of adoption. However, the new developments have been discussed by politicians, media representatives and researchers at a variety of events.

Among them is the “Medienforum NRW” that took place between the 18th and 20th of June in Cologne. The responsible Commissioner, Viviane Reding, held a speech at the forum in which she outlined her ideas for the current

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7 Ward, 2002.
8 Harcourt, 2005.
media policies of the Commission. The recent debate can be summarised in the question if media services are an economic or a cultural good and is therefore in the core nothing new. Especially new regulations in the field of frequency distributions have been discussed highly controversial. Some authors and media representatives claim that the Commission treats the media in a biased way: content shall be a cultural good, but broadcasting an economic good. But this debate is not new, as an article by Mark Wheeler about the Television without Frontiers directive shows.9

Research on the Communication Strategy

Academic research in this field mainly aims at the development of the communication strategy. Starting with the so called “Pinheiro-Concept”, at the time of the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, until today, each Commission had its own strategy. Of course a variety of actors are involved and the ‘message’ is received by different recipients. This complex interaction is for example analysed by Kirsten Hoesch by applying the ‘Laswell-Formula’ (Who says what to whom on which channel with what effect?) to the communication strategy of the Commission.10

In most times each new strategy was regarded as panacea against the disinterest of the Europeans. For example Tanja Loitz describes the different reforms and assesses the cleavage between claims and reality.11 However, her research is too old to include new attempts by the Commission such as Plan D. The same applies for a lot of critiques vis-à-vis the Commission’s communication strategy, such as Jürgen Gerhards.12 He claims that the communication orientation of the Commission suffers from a structural deficit, because the Commissioners are not elected, but only need the support of the member states’ governments.

Suggestions how to improve the communication of the EU are manifold; one example is the inclusion of communication policies in the Treaties. Hans Brunmayr assesses the need for a European Information Policy.13 He argues that information is often used only to defend the interests of the institutions and not to satisfy the Europeans. The citizens are left outside of the decision making process and the communication structure is thus perceived as only emitting bureaucratic measures. He demands that communication processes should be better coordinated and increasingly focussed on the citizens. Brunmayr rejects the idea of including communication policies in the Treaties, but he asks for a change in attitude of all actors.

12 Gerhards, 2000.
One of the problems of the Commission’s communication strategy is decentralisation. Each member state of the European Union has an own delegation of the Commission. And although each of them tries to further the same policies, the communicated output often differs according to the national surrounding, as comparative research such as the one by Stephan Große Rüschkamp shows. Therefore the research in this Master Thesis will focus on the work of the Commission as a whole, represented by its headquarter in Brussels.

Another problem is the variety of different issue oriented communication strategies. Not only the work and output of the EU is communicated, but also certain campaigns are tailored towards different issues (for example the Euro introduction campaign analysed by Ingo Rollwagen) or recipients (for example the youth). Therefore it is necessary to focus the research on a certain campaign, which is Plan D and the White Paper in this case, because they are more general approaches towards the Communication Strategy.

Barabara Tham’s research is directed in a similar direction. She criticises that the efforts made in the two campaigns are nothing new and that their implementation is difficult. However, Tham praises the efforts that shall be made for an increase in the level of political education and awareness. Still, this field remains within the competences of the member states. But, Tham neglects that just the discussion about such topics might be able to generate some level of European Publicity. Thus, this is what will be analysed in this thesis – keeping Tham’s criticism in mind.

I.3. Research Question, Methodology, Preliminary Remarks

The aim of this research is to elaborate on the following explanatory main research question

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<td>How can the Commission’s activities related to European Publicity raise the awareness of the citizens about the EU?</td>
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This question is on the one hand aimed at the normative assumption that a higher level of publicity about the EU is needed to integrate the citizens into the Union to a larger extent. On the other hand the question aims at the clearly positive, empirical perspective that analyses the actual activities of the Commission related to European Publicity. As the state of the art presenta-
tion has shown, both analytical angles, normative and empirical, are closely interrelated and therefore cannot be disconnected from each other. Therefore they are both included in this research, but for reasons of clarity separated in different parts of the thesis.

The objectives of the research are (1) Integrate a definition of European Publicity into a framework about the interaction between the Commission, the media and the citizens; (2) Analyse the actual impact of Commission’s media policies on publicity and test them against the framework; (3) Analyse the actual impact of Commission’s communication strategy on publicity and test it against the framework; (4) Summarise the impact of the activities on awareness and draw recommendations how to strengthen European Publicity, and thus citizens’ awareness, from the Commission’s perspective.

The main methodology of this research is an analysis of the developments according to scientific articles and official documents. As the state of the art presentation has shown there is a considerable amount of written articles about the different topics of this work. However, this research is the attempt to combine different approaches in order to draw conclusions with regard to European Publicity. Furthermore directives, official speeches by Commissioner’s and other Commission data will be used for further support in the fields of media policies and the communication strategy.

The analysis will offer the information needed to answer the following sub-questions that derive from the main research question and also from the motivation of the research:

1. What is meant by European Publicity in the context of citizens’ awareness about the EU?

In Chapter II it will be explained what European Publicity means in the context of this research. At first two different sources of European Publicity will be described, before the framework will be developed. The approach towards publicity will be a positive, non-normative one, because the definition is the base for the analytical framework that also will be developed under this heading. The framework will be used in the following sub-questions to analyse the impact of a certain activity on publicity.

2. What is the actual role of the Commission’s media policies (related to media concentration and pluralism) for European Publicity?

Chapter III will at first try to assess whether there is a European Media System or not. After that the development of European media policies starting
with the television directive in 1989 until the most recent Information Society related activities will be analysed. And finally the possible effect on European Publicity will be analysed with special regard to media concentration and pluralism.

3. What is the actual role of the Commission’s communication strategy (related to Plan D and the White Paper) for European Publicity?

The main focus of Chapter IV will be the changing attitude of the Commission towards Communication. Therefore a model will be presented that will help to analyse the change. After that a short summary of the development of the Communication Strategy will be given, followed by a discussion of the role of the most recent activities (Plan D and White Paper) on publicity.

4. How can the citizens’ awareness about the EU be raised by these activities or are other measures needed?

Chapter V will first extend the framework to the aspects about awareness, and then relate the results from the previous chapters to this new part of the framework. Furthermore recommendations based on these results will be given about how to increase the awareness.
II. The Framework

II.1. Fitting ‘European Publicity’ into a Framework

European Publicity (or to be more exact: the level of European Publicity) is the focal point of the analytical framework used in this thesis. Unfortunately there is no simple measurable definition of European Publicity. Some authors even “tended to conclude that a European public sphere neither existed, nor could come into existence for any foreseeable future based on the observation that there is no common European ‘nation’ or common European political community displaying the same trademarks as are commonly associated with the nation: historical connectedness, tangling of the destiny of the individual and the destiny of the nation, cultural homogeneity and not least language uniformity”. However, rejecting the idea of European Publicity based on pillars related to nation states might be a bit short-sighted, because so far there does not exist anything like the European Union anywhere else as a unit of comparison, but still it exists. Therefore it is at least possible - and also necessary for the research - to explain what is meant by publicity in this context.

Because of the vagueness of the term, a variety of different authors have tried to describe publicity. They argue around three different perspectives: publicity as a place for communication of different actors; a normative view on publicity as a requirement for democracy; and a perspective on publicity that is determined by the media. All perspectives share the idea that publicity can be everything that enables communication processes between different actors in a system, which is of course again rather vague. This chapter will be used to narrow the concept of publicity towards a workable definition, thus answer the first sub-question: What is meant by European Publicity in the context of citizens’ awareness about the EU?

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17 Of course, theoretical assumptions about publicity could fill books and a discussion about the meaning of publicity can start with basic assumptions about communication processes between people, or also at the time of the transformation of the old Greek „Agora“ type of democracy to modern mass democracies that require mass communication (Cosse, 2005, unpublished). Such basic aspects of publicity are left aside in this work.

18 Esmark, 2005, p.1. These authors like Esmark are described by Brüggemann as the „Impossibility School“. Representatives of this school try to apply national models of publicity to the multi-level-governance system of the EU. They come to the conclusion that a European Public Sphere or European Publicity cannot exist, because of the lack of a common language, media, civil society, identity, and so on. For more details compare Brüggemann, 2005.

II. Framework

II.1.a. Sources of (European) Publicity

As indicated above (European) Publicity is most often a vague and broad concept: it includes communication, discourse, media coverage, education and so forth. The definition of European publicity that will be used in this thesis is based on two different sources: the European media system and communication with regard to European issues. Why these two are chosen is explained in the following.

II.1.a.1. The Media

“The media filter and frame everyday realities through their singular and multiple representations, producing touchstones, references for the conduct of everyday life, for the production and maintenance of common sense.”

This quotation by Lilie Chouliarki describes why media contributes to the emergence and or existence of publicity. Media is able to distribute information and reproduces news and other types of information. Therefore media is regarded in the model - that will be developed later in this chapter - as the central communication device. By this interaction publicity emerges.

Surveys such as the Eurobarometer show that media has major significance for the citizens in order to gather information about the European Union, although media usage differs considerably. “Seven out of ten Europeans watch television to obtain information about the European Union (70%), just over four out of ten citizens get their information from daily newspapers (41%) and just over three out of ten citizens listen to the radio (31%) when they look for information about the European Union.”

The role of the media for publicity in an EU-context is best examined by academic circles with regard to newspapers. They “produce every day pictures of the political reality, which frame our perception of this political world […] they don’t say what one has to think about the EU, but when and why one has to think about it.” For instance the above mentioned Adequate Informa-

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20 Chouliarki, 2005, p.276. Chouliarki also links the role of the media to the constructivist’s view of language. Constructivists argue that the world as a whole is socially constructed and not given. Media constructs the reality by a certain usage of words and the filtering of news. For more information on the Constructivist theory of International Relations see Baylis & Smith, 2001.

21 As shown in Cosse, 2005, unpublished, media also has a direct impact on legitimacy of a political system. The three dimensions of liberal-democratic legitimacy (legality, normative justifiability and legitimation; identified by Beetham & Lord, 1998) are directly influenced by the media. Either in a minor way, when media is only a source of information, or in a strong way, when media is a precondition for the factors of democracy of effective participation and enlightened understanding (Dahl, 2000). However, because Chapter II and III shall be conducted in a non-normative approach, these considerations about democratic theory are left aside for the moment. Nevertheless, the role for media in this respect shall not be underestimated.


tion Management in Europe (AIM) research project at the Erich-Brost-Haus for European Journalism at the University of Dortmund analysed this interaction. It investigated “the media's impact on the European public sphere with regard to actors (media institutions and organisations on European, national, regional, and local levels, as well as journalists, correspondents and editors, etc.) and mechanisms (EU news management processes)”\(^{24}\).

However, most of these attempts revealed that the EU is not seen as eye-catching information. The Commission is not able to change the media content because of the democratic principle of the ‘freedom of the press’. Nevertheless, it is evident that media is a central source of publicity. How media in each member state and also in the EU operates in a legal framework set by a member state and is increasingly influenced by the European Union will be explained in Chapter III.

**II.1.a.2. The Communication**

The second source of publicity is communication as starting point for European discourse which means the debate about European topics. Before there can be discourse some sort of communication is needed between different actors. Moreover, the final aim of communication by institutional actors is providing information which in the end can lead to policy communication.\(^{25}\) Thus analysing communication processes will lead to conclusions about the impact on publicity; this will be done in Chapter IV.

Prior to further assessment of communication as a source of publicity some terms must be clarified. The terms ‘discourse’, ‘communication’, ‘information’ and ‘public relations’ are used in the literature with similar meanings, sometimes even involving each other as this example by Brüggemann shows:

> “Information policy is comprised of three elements: The first one concerns rights and practical questions of access to information and documents which is basically discussed in the EU under the label of transparency. The second strand is professional public relations: strategic communication efforts on behalf of e.g. the Commission which may partly be outsourced to commercial PR agencies. A third source of public information and opinion are political rhetorics, i.e. the communicative activity of the political management floor of the Commission”\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) This assumption is mainly based on democracy theory elaborated in more detail in Cosse, 2005, unpublished. For the purpose of this paper it is only necessary to know that the level, type and way of communication has a direct influence on the citizens’ EU perception and also involvement and thus on the level of publicity.

\(^{26}\) Brüggemann, 2005, p. 9
Furthermore, communication in this context can mean anything including speeches, policies or even the websites of the Commission. At the time of writing the term “Communication Policy” was introduced into the EU language, before there was a strategy for information and communication; and also the related DG was renamed from DG Press to DG Communication. Thus, in this work the terms will be used in a similar overlapping meaning. But in most cases communication will be regarded as everything that is publicised by the commission, whether it is a speech or a policy. Information is used as a term to describe the content that is provided by the process of communication and also includes online content. But central is the strategy behind both, which will be called “Communication Strategy” in most cases.

Closely related to discourse is what is often described as ‘public sphere’. Generally descriptions and definitions of the public sphere are similar to what is meant in this context by EU-wide publicity. The most important concept of a public sphere was developed by the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas already in 1962 in his influential book “The Structural transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.”

In the tradition of Kant’s Enlightenment he related transformation processes in the French society from the feudal to the bourgeois society to the changes in the public sphere. Habermas considered “the concept [of a public sphere] as an arena within which a set of ideas, opinions and public concerns are discussed and developed through a deliberative process, which should gradually produce consent over time.”

Thus, Habermas ideas can be related to publicity as a place for communication about European issues. “While competing conceptualisations of what constitutes a public sphere exist, one can best describe it as a ‘space’ within which citizens, civil society organisations and political actors publicly debate issues of common concern.” This idea about publicity is closely related to

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28 Habermas’ work about publicity is among the most influential descriptions of publicity/the public sphere – especially since its translation into English in the early 1980s. Habermas also made the connection between publicity and mass media and argued that there is a commercialisation of the public discourse. This is one of the reasons he is also criticised from a variety of other authors. But still a reference to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere can be found in most articles about (European) publicity, or the (European) public sphere, or transnational communication. However, Habermas’ argumentation is largely based on the theoretical insights of social theory (he is also one of the most important thinkers of the Frankfurt School). Therefore his assumptions on the whole are not applicable and too far-reaching for this thesis.
29 Habermas, 1962. Here the title is only translated into English. The book was for the first time translated into English by Thomas Burgen and Frederick Lawrence in 1989.
30 Habermas cited according to Bee, 2006, p.7.
transnational communication, which means communication between different national public spheres.\textsuperscript{32}

Thus, the second source of publicity is communication as a requisite for European discourse.

So, in conclusion European Publicity derives from two sources, media and communication. What their relevance is to the framework will be described in the following.

II.1.b. Developing the Framework

Previously a basic assumption about European publicity was made: publicity can be regarded as link between the EU-Multi-Level-Governance system and the Europeans. This extensive idea is also described by Meyer as “a System of Communication, which is able to synchronise at the same time national, transnational and European Discourses for a Europe wide formation of opinion, control and forming of identity”\textsuperscript{33}.

However, this definition is too broad to be used in this thesis. Still Meyer’s work is helpful - he identified three different sub-systems\textsuperscript{34}: the European Union as political system, the mass media as source of information and orientation, and last but not least the Europeans as audience and respondents. All three sub-systems are interdependent. These assumptions made by Meyer provide the basic idea for the model used here. But because this thesis is aimed at a more narrow idea, the relevance of publicity as a communication device in between is increased, as can be seen in Figure 1. Publicity is not only one sub-system among others; it is the connection device between the Commission and the citizens. This emphasis on publicity underlines the focus of the thesis. This connection can be seen in the figure where the other sub-systems described by Meyer have also been adjusted, as will be explained next.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{Figure1.png}
\caption{Publicity in a Framework}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{32} Brüggemann, 2005.
\textsuperscript{33} Meyer, 2002, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{34} See Annex 1.
II.1.b.1. The Actors

Analysing all possible effects of any activity of the European Union on publicity would be too complex in this context. For this reason, and the relevance of the Commission in the institutional framework of the EU briefly outlined above, the Commission is chosen as one sub-system at one side of the communication process. In fact not the Commission as a whole will be of relevance; mainly, two ‘Directorate-Generals’ (DG) will be in the focus. The first is the DG for ‘Information Society and Media’ currently headed by Viviane Reding, which is central for the media policy chapter of this thesis. The second is relevant for the communication policy chapter: the DG ‘Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy’ at the time of writing headed by Margot Wallström.

Of course there are some limitations to this brief description. In the first place, the distribution and separation of the DGs are changed from Commission to Commission. However, this thesis focuses mainly on the most recent developments, and therefore the up-to-date labels are used. In the second place, and as mentioned before, the Commission is not a homogeneous entity; it is highly fragmented and consists of different institutional layers and a variety of people and is supplemented by the delegations in the member states. Therefore, the term Commission will be used as a broad heading for the activities conducted by the DGs in Brussels.

Normally, a model would require a clear description of all aspects (in this case all sub-systems) involved. But, due to the limited length of this thesis, a closer picture of the Commission will not be given at this point, but where necessary. General knowledge about its role in the EU will be taken for granted.

Likewise applies to the description of the role of the sub-system at the other side of the communication process: the Europeans. Generally, writing about ‘Europeans’ implies a range of inherent problems: ideas about identity, language and culture could be covered, all surrounding the question about who are Europeans.\(^3^5\) Elaborations on this topic most often become highly normative and linked to democratic theory and should therefore be left aside in this thesis.

Instead the term ‘citizen’ will be used. According to Article 17 EU legally all nationals of all member states are citizens of the TEU.\(^3^6\) However, different methods of gaining citizenship and/or nationality of the member states evoke

\(^3^5\) “The term ‘European’ has no official definition and combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which together contribute in forging the European identity, and whose content is likely to subject to review by each succeeding generation […] It is not a sum of parts but a dialectic over time and space.” Brewin, 2000, p. 71.

\(^3^6\) Deards & Hargreaves, 2004.
new problems. Also it can be doubted if the European version of citizenship encloses real attributes and rights normally attached to the status. But still the term “citizen” might be more objective than “Europeans”.

After describing the actors that are related to publicity, in the following finally European Publicity will be defined for the purpose of this work.

II.1.b.2. Types of European Publicity
The starting point for defining publicity is a general distinction between European Publicity on a national scale and EU-wide publicity. The first type describes publicity for or about the EU within the member states. This point of view can be further divided into media coverage and discourse. Media coverage - as explained in the introduction - is aiming at the relevance of European topics in different types of media. This aspect is described by Bijsmans and Altides as the “publicity dimension of communication: the communication from the Commission to European citizens – via national media”\(^{37}\). Thus, media is central for publicity.\(^{38}\)

Furthermore, publicity on a national scale includes a nation state based discourse about European issues. Because this thesis is aimed at the Commission’s perspective in general and not at the delegations in the member states, this angle is neglected. But of course the European level of publicity always impacts the ones within the nation states. Moreover a national discourse about European topics can always be part of a European discourse. A variety of scholars focuses on this dimension. They demand from European publicity (related to publicity on a national scale) “to fulfil the following conditions: communication in different countries about the same topics at the same time with the same frame of reference”\(^{39}\). This is then the transformation to a EU-wide-publicity as explained next. The interrelations show the high complexity of the subject and underline, why a clear definition of all involved aspects is needed.

The more interesting part of publicity for this thesis is what can be called EU-wide publicity – which means publicity on a European level. Firstly, this type can include what can be called EU wide media. All political systems need some kind of mediation device between the political elite and the citizens.\(^{40}\) Media are vital for publicity, because information is filtered and framed by the media. If there is no media coverage, there is no – or considerably lower -

\(^{38}\) Explained in greater detail in Cosse, 2005, unpublished.
\(^{39}\) Brüggemann, 2005, p. 58.
\(^{40}\) Sarcinelli, 1998.
publicity about a subject. However, as explained earlier media content cannot and shall not be influenced by political actors directly. Moreover, besides some small attempts of magazines or online media, there are no real ‘European media types’ in the sense of a Europe wide distribution or broadcasting. Attempts such as ‘Europe TV’ failed, and online media such as ‘EurActiv’ or ‘European Voice’ are not noticed by most of the citizens – also due to problems deriving from the variety of languages. Thus, there is no serious European version of media, except for issue oriented publicities (Teilöffentlichkeiten).41

But media coverage about political issues is not the only connection between the media and the political system: Besides providing information and fulfilling communication functions of the political system, European Media products, no matter if they are TV broadcasters or newspapers, are influenced by and are part of two media systems at the same time. Therefore, publicity in this context will be examined at a broader and more institutionalised level: the European Media System (EMS).

Media does not operate and work in vacuum. Each nation state has its own media system; and they all differ considerably. Still, the setup of the media system is a basis for publicity. “A fundamental element that allows expression and debate within [...] publicity] is the media system in so far as the media distributes information through citizens and creates a flow of communication between the subjects of political processes.”42 It can be noted that media policy types can for example influence media concentration. If media is too concentrated in the hands of few owners, then publicity will be lower than in a highly diversified media system.

Therefore one aspect of this work will be the relation between the Commission, the European media system and the citizens. The media system is on the one hand a communication device between the political level and the citizens. On the other hand it is subject to regulative activities by the Commission. What the actual role of these activities is for European Publicity will be the content of Chapter III. However, the elaboration above leads to three guiding questions (related to the sub-question) that will provide the sub-structure for that particular chapter:

1. What is meant by the European Media System?
2. How does the Commission influence the EMS by its Media Policies?
3. How can the Commission influence publicity by its Media Policies?

II. Framework

The second aspect covered in this thesis is related to *EU-wide publicity* as a place for communication about European issues. This aspect reminds of Meyer's vague definition of publicity given earlier. But obviously, this definition is too broad in this context, because communication can mean everything ranging from people talking about the EU, to political education in schools or universities, to the discussion of European topics in the media. Debate always needs communication between different sides as a starting point. Communication can work in a top-down and bottom-up direction. This means related to the earlier identified actors: from the Commission to the citizens and vice versa. But the approach in this thesis is a more limited one. Of course the citizens influence the outcome of the Commission's work (at least indirectly). But to keep on the track of the research question, only the Commission's top-down perspective is valuable to this research. But following this argumentation the Communication Strategy of the Commission must have an influence on the level of publicity by providing information and creating a space for discourse, and obviously a change in strategy would then imply a change in the impact.

This short explanation again leads to two questions that will structure Chapter IV:

1. How does the way information is released by the Commission follow a certain strategy?
2. How does the Commission's Communication strategy influence the level of publicity?

Thus, within the scope of this research, publicity is limited to *EU-wide publicity* that consist on the one hand of the *European Media System* (consisting of different national systems) and on the other of the *communication by the Commission* (providing a space for discourse). The argumentation above can be summarised in a model, which will be done in the next section.
II.2. Conclusion: The Publicity-Framework

So far only the ‘upper-part’ of the model that can be seen below has been described. The ‘lower-part’ is related to the effects of publicity on awareness and thus will be closer described in Chapter IV in order to separate the positive from the normative aspects of this work.\(^{43}\)

In conclusion and to answer the sub-question "What is meant by European Publicity in the context of citizens’ awareness about the EU?": European Publicity is a system of communication between the European Union and the Citizens, based on the functions of the media system and the status as medium for discourse about European topics. It is directly influenced by activities of the Commission (in this thesis limited to Media Policies and the Communication Strategy). Of course those activities are interrelated and the arrows in the figure only shall emphasise the two aspects covered in this thesis. Needless to say for example the Communication Strategy also influences the media and the citizens influence publicity as well.

The link between the parts of the framework can be summarized as following:

- Media and Communication are sources of European Publicity.
- The Commission can influence both either by its Media Policies or its Communication Strategy.
- The resulting level of European Publicity could impact the citizens.

If this holds true in reality will be analysed in this thesis. The theses developed above will be used to support the line of argumentation.

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\(^{43}\) As will be later explained in more detail some consequences might be related to the functions of publicity described by Meyer. He attaches three different functions to European publicity: “1) to enable citizens to form an informed opinion about how they can connect their own preferences with the political options available, 2) to hold decision-makers accountable for their actions by scrutinising political personnel in-between elections, and 3) to contribute to overall social cohesion and trust within a society by giving a wide range of groups” Partly based on Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2006, pp. 2-3.
III. Media Policy

European Media Policies started with the ‘Television without Frontiers’ (TWF) Directive in 1989. It was created on the one hand because the European Parliament wanted to reconnect the EU with the citizens and on the other hand because technology changed rapidly – at that time by satellite technology - and enabled border-crossing media activities. Until today the technological development aggravates convergence of media and the Media Sector is increasingly recognised as a big and strengthening economic market.

As explained above the Commission can have an impact on publicity by its Media Policies. Therefore this part of the thesis will be used to answer the second sub-question: “What is the actual role of the Commission’s media policies (related to media concentration and pluralism) for European Publicity?” For this aim the questions developed in Chapter II will be used to structure this part:

1. What is meant by the European Media System?
2. How does the Commission influence the EMS by its media policies?
3. How can the Commission influence publicity by its media policies?

At first the framework of the EMS will be described and then the development of European Media Policies starting with the television directive in 1989 will be assessed, before the effect on European Publicity will be analysed with special regard to media concentration and pluralism.

44 “Convergence is the concept used to describe the phenomenon that all forms of communications – written text, statistical data, still and moving images, music and the human voice – now can be coded, stored and relayed in digital form, and made accessible and convertible through the end-user technology of the computer and/or television screen” Slaatta, 2007, p.3.
III. Media Policy

III.1. A European Media System?

Within the European Union currently 27 different media systems exist – obviously one for each member state. They differ with regard to media types, quantity and of course language. They are all subject to country specific regulations – for example executed by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and are shaped by the interaction between private owned media entities and for example public broadcasters.

So far there is no real European media that reaches a broad public – there are no European newspapers, radio or TV channels (beside issue oriented ones such as Euronews or Eurosport) that have a large audience. Furthermore there is no centrally organised independent European regulating authority. For instance the European Regulators Group (ERG) is only a federation of the national authorities. It only acts as a forum for NRAs of both telecommunications and media markets. Also the Council of Europe, the European Audiovisual Observatory and the European Broadcasting Union / Union Européenne de Radio-Télévision (EBU) are among the actors in the media system of the EU. All of them will be of no further consideration in this thesis, because neither of them is central to the Commission’s activities.

If it is difficult to identify media actors that belong to a European Media system, the same problems arise when trying to define European Media Policies.

“If media policy is perceived as the collectivity of all measures of the political-administrative system, which are directly or indirectly aimed at the entire media structure or at the legal status, organisation, and functioning of single media types or corporations, then problems arise to apply such a definition to European activities.”

Even within the Commission the competences about media policies are not really clear. “A coherent policy field about media cannot be spotted in the EU

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45 Because of overlapping language-areas some media types are able to cross borders more easily than others. For example radio broadcasts in France might be heard in parts of Belgium; and German broadcast in Austria; and vice versa.

46 To describe each of the national systems in detail would blast the length of this thesis, therefore this aspect will be neglected. But to give at least one example: the German broadcasting system is comprised of private owned and public broadcasters. The public service broadcasters have a rather strong role in the German television landscape and are protected by the state. Furthermore, the federal organized media authority entities (Landesmedienanstalten) play a strong role in the system, for example when it comes to the distribution of frequencies. However, since the newest proposed directives of the Commission the discussion about the necessity of the Landesmedienanstalten started again, because an economic auction way of distributing frequencies was proposed. Moreover it might be questionable, if each federal state needs its own regulator. (Partly based on Altendorfer, 2004)

47 Harcourt, 2005.

– for this it would not only require corresponding actors with an explicit assignment of competences, but also a clear scope of these competences.”

Over the past decades the competence for media policies shifted between different DGs as is shown in Annex 3. Indeed, at the time of writing the DG for “Information Society and Media” headed by Viviane Reding is the responsible one, and the creation of this separate DG emphasizes the rising relevance that is attributed to media policies.

Also the legal base for European Media Policies is questionably unclear. In general the distribution of competences between the EU and the member states is legally confirmed in the treaties. Furthermore the principle of subsidiarity applies. Media Policies normally fall under the competences of the member states. However, there are two reasons for EU action: competences for media policies can either be related to the cultural provisions included in Article 151, 4 EC: “The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures”; or to rules related to the internal market. However, this ambiguity is source of a lot of confusion as will be explained in the next section.

Thus, at present time it is difficult to define the scope of the European Media System and to answer the question “What is meant by the European Media System?”. Nevertheless the different national media systems in Europe certainly form an EMS. It supplements the national one and is partly regulated by the Commission although it has no clear competences. Notwithstanding it can be noted that the European Media System consists of different layers – both at publishing and broadcasting as well as at the regulative level. Still, European Policies have an influence - not on the non-existing European media - but on the media in the different member states as will be shown in the next sub-chapter about the development of the European Media Policies.

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51 EC Treaty.
III. Media Policy

III.2. Development of European Media Policies

This sub-chapter will use the question “How does the Commission influence the EMS by its media policies?” as a guideline. For concluding that there is even an increasing influence the development of media policies will be shown.

The exact starting point of European Media Policies cannot be identified, but the increasing competences of the EU in media policies certainly had their beginning with the ‘Television without Frontiers’ Directive in 1989. The start of the Commission’s activities is due to at least two different streams of developments. On the one side the European Parliament declared the need to reconnect the citizens to the EU and asked the Commission to come up with a proposal. In the end initiatives such as Europe TV failed and the Commission turned its attention to regulative activities that were necessary because of the technological developments which can be identified as second reason for action.

These technological developments made it possible for media to engage in border crossing activities. At that time these developments were mostly related to satellite technology, and still today this kind of process is a driving force for media policies. Currently the convergence of the media requires regulative action.

However, both forces – the societal need and the technological development - are connected. “Changes in media and communication technology are simultaneously changes in the structuring of the social and cultural spaces for social interaction and integration.” This can also be seen in the simultaneous changes in the usage of media. Over the past years radio and television broadcasts gained increasing importance in comparison to newspapers. These developments certainly also change the mode of political communication.

Closely related to the technological driving force is the economic development of the media market. Especially in the 1980s a variety of private broadcasters emerged and challenged the market dominating position of the public service broadcasters. Since that time in each European country a huge variety of different channels came in existence. Among them tendencies for internationalisation can be noted. Internationalisation in the media sector re-

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52 Holtz-Bacha, 2006.
53 Slaatta, 2007, p.3.
55 Kleinsteuber & Thomaß, 1997. They give a summary of the development of political communication from the Incas and the Roman Empire until the emergence of digital television and the internet.
lates mainly to the formation of internationally active corporations that attempt to standardize their information and entertainment programmes as well as their internal structures on a global or European scale.\textsuperscript{56}

This development is at the same time one of the explanations for the gaining competences of the Commission in media policies. The member states are not anymore capable to regulate internationalised activities of media corporations - on the one hand caused by technological developments and on the other by cross-border economic activities of media corporations.

However, as explained above the Commission’s competences or even its right to assert any influence are often challenged by the member states. The twin-character of the media - between economic and cultural considerations - has been the point of debate and also of rejection all along the development of media policies. Still today in the most recent debate about the distribution of frequencies the cleavage runs between media as cultural or economic good.

“Of the mixture of economic, industrial and cultural elements that makes up media policy, the cultural aspects are most closely tied to traditional values, not least to language, and therefore to a high degree perceived as within the domain of national politics.”\textsuperscript{57} Press and broadcasting have for a long time been considered as a cultural good and a cornerstone of national identities; by the entrance of private corporations a market developed that functions according to economic rules. By this economic development the perspective on media changed more and more towards an economic based angle.

“European regulation in the media field […] is mainly based on economic and industrial policies, set up to create a single market.”\textsuperscript{58}

Driven by these developments the most important instrument of EU Media Policy, the ‘Television without Frontiers’ directive (89/552/EEC), entered into force in 1989. Its prior exercises were common advertising rules, protection of minors and consumers, a minimum share of European productions and to ensure the involvement of independent producers in border-crossing television in Europe.\textsuperscript{59} The directive included the following media policy fields that obviously cannot all be explored into great detail.

\textsuperscript{56} Jarren, 1998.
\textsuperscript{57} Hirsch & Peterson, 2001, p. 207.
\textsuperscript{58} Hirsch & Peterson, 2001, p. 207.
\textsuperscript{59} Hieronymi, 2003.
III. Media Policy

Figure 3: TWF directive 1989 (89/552/EEC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recitals</td>
<td>Broadcasting is a Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>General Provisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>Promotion of distribution and production of television programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Television advertising and sponsorship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>Protection of minors</td>
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<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Right of reply</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>Final provisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TWF directive.

“The 1989 TWF Directive provided a framework for capital mobility within the EU for services which were previously confined to national markets – television and radio signals; the goal was chiefly to encourage (via national de-regulation) the exploitation of new technologies (initially cable and satellite).” By this directive television signals were regarded as services and because of that the internal market rule of free movement (Article 14 EC) could apply.

One of the cornerstones of the TWF directive is the establishment of quotas on European-based productions in TV and film. In article 4 of the TWF directive it is written:

“Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works [...] a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This proportion, having regard to the broadcaster’s informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.”

The member states had two years to implement the directive and two more years to report the quota developments. In general the public broadcasters fulfilled the quota, the private ones did not.

The digitalisation of the electronic media provoked the next development step of European Media Policies in the mid 1990s. The TWF directive was revised in 1997. Before a Green Paper had been launched in order to collect “strategy opinions to strengthen the European programme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union”.

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61 TWF 89/552/EEC
63 Green Papers are communications by the Commission by which public discussion about certain policy areas shall be started. Involved actors can contribute by giving their opinion on the subject. Sometimes they are followed by so called White Papers that include proposals for activities by the community. Explained according to Holtz-Bacha, 2006.
The new directive was adopted in June 1997 (97/36/EC) and included more detailed rules for the protection of minors and introduced new regulations for teleshopping.

**Figure 4: TWF directive revised 1997** (97/36/EC) (newly introduced parts in bold and italic)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recitals</td>
<td>Rapidly changing audiovisual sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>General Provisions</td>
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<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Promotion of distribution and production of television programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>Television advertising, sponsorship and teleshopping</td>
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<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>Protection of minors and public order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
<td>Right of reply</td>
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<td>Chapter Vla</td>
<td>Contact committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>Final provisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TWF directive, revised 1997.

Furthermore the newly introduced Article 3a of the directive secured television transmission of big sports events or of events that are of societal interest on national free TV. The new clause enables national legislators to ban exclusive rights to broadcast such events on pay TV, and it is intended to counter the steep increase in the prices of sports rights in recent years. This applies for example for the Olympic Games that must be free to receive on TV. It was implemented in all member states and thus set a new regulative framework in the audiovisual sector.65

The revised directive represents a new approach to regulation: from pure regulation towards more support. “The 1989 EC directive ‘TWF’, revised in 1997, reflects the new mood by aiming primarily at achieving a large, unified audiovisual market, but it retained at the same time some elements of the old approach, notably the quota provisions.”66

“In times of increasing media convergence the question must be asked about a new legal framework in order to cope with the technological developments in the audiovisual sector67 of the last decade. This means the convergence of transmission types, not of the content. Under current rules, the content is underlying new regulations in each media type; but common sense suggests that convergence of media requires convergence of regulation.

“With the ongoing development of Information and Communication technologies, the spread of online communication and the hope for future markets that could provide new jobs, the EU has shifted its attention towards the so called Information Society.”68 This is one of the cornerstones of the revised

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Lisbon agenda; admittedly the EU is only investing a small share, but is hoping instead for the initiatives of the member states or by the private sector. Jarren argued already in 1998 that the emerging information society changes the economic base of the media system, although the policy framework regulating this sector is lacking further development on member state and also European level. He concluded that nation state based solutions are not sufficient anymore to cope with the high innovation rate of communication technology. The most recent proposals by the Commission finally try to catch up with technological developments such as broadband, digital technology and convergence.

“The modernisation of rules of audiovisual services was launched with the Fourth Communication from the Commission (COM(2002)778final) relating to the application of the ‘Television without Frontiers’ 89/552/EEC directive for the period 2001-2002. In an annex to this communication, the Commission proposed a work programme for the modernisation of rules of audiovisual services and a timetable of future actions.”69 In the year 2002 the revision process of the TWF directive was launched and included discussions about quotas and controls over advertising. After a two-year period of consultation with commercial stakeholders, this policy process ended in the revision of the TWF and led to the Commission’s adoption of the legislative proposal for the new “Audiovisual Media Services without Frontiers” Directive in December 2005.70

“On 24 May 2007 a political agreement has been reached on the new Audiovisual Media Services Directive at common position stage. Both the European Parliament and Council agreed on the main aims of the Commission original proposal to modernise the rules governing the audiovisual services industry. It will offer a comprehensive legal framework that covers all audiovisual media services, less detailed and more flexible regulation and modernised rules on TV advertising to better finance audiovisual content. The Directive should enter into force by the end of 2007. Member States will be given 24 months to transpose the new provisions into national law, so that the modernised legal framework for audiovisual business will fully apply by the end of 2009.”71

Thus, in conclusion European Media Policies acquired a greater share of influence. Jarren argued in 1998: „Although a certain Europeanization of media policies can be noted, for example because supranational actors urge to implement EU policies (TWF directive) or to start sponsorship programs (HDTV), at the moment on a European level nothing more than minimal standards is possible; the normative framework (constitution), and agreement

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70 Wheeler, 2005.
III. Media Policy

Hannah Cosse

on where to head with media policies still are lacking."\(^{72}\) Although there will be no Constitution in the near future, European integration has deepened since the time of Jarren's writing. Also the increasing influence of European Media Policies cannot be denied.

The discussion above merely focused on the TWF directive. Of course simultaneously to the TWF developments the Commission was active in a couple of other media fields. For example at the time when the Commission explored the economic benefits of the media sector, it started a couple of support programmes, such as the MEDIA I and II supports for example for European film projects.\(^{73}\) However, the development of the TWF can be seen as a showcase because it was the first field of media policy and the one in which the Commission has gained the strongest competences. Furthermore, the TWF is an instrument that tries to regulate media content. For example by demanding a certain amount of European productions in broadcasting, European Publicity might be affected. However, the amount of European productions does not say anything about the content, whether it is for example related to information about the EU or not. Therefore this subchapter mainly shows the increasing competence of EU media policies. Another important development in media policies was the attempt to regulate media concentration. This subject will be dealt with in the next section.

III.3. Media Concentration and Pluralism

Another broad field of Media Policies is the surveillance of media concentration and the support of pluralism that is related to the question "How can the Commission influence publicity by its media policies?". As the actual role of the Commission's media policies for publicity shall be analysed in this chapter it begins with a brief summary of the development in this field. After that the effect of these measures on publicity will be assessed.

But before the analysis starts some definitions are necessary: media concentration can be defined as "an increase in the presence of one (monopoly) or few media companies (oligopoly) in any market as a result of acquisitions and mergers or the disappearance of competitors".\(^{74}\) This concentration can either be horizontal (within the same media industry sector) or vertical (a me-


\(^{73}\) Holtz-Bacha, 2006. Although such sponsorship programmes directed at the support for European film projects are critical according to current GATS' provisions, which was also debated at the 1993 WTO Uruguay Round.

\(^{74}\) Meier & Trappel, 2001, p. 40.
dia corporation tries to accumulate all steps of the production process). The results are either an increase in market share or an increase in autonomy. In contrast pluralism can not be defined that easily, but be described as follows:

“Pluralism is about having a number of different and independent voices in the media that offer different opinions and perspectives and that provide a range of representations of culture. A diversity or plurality of sources and voices and diverse ownership of media are generally seen as necessary to the achievement of broader socio-political and cultural goals such as promoting democracy and building social cohesiveness.”

This can be summarised as follows: pluralism means a simultaneous diversity of content and ownership.

The fact that action with regard to concentration might be needed is for example proven by a comparative study by the European Federation of Journalist “Media Power in Europe: The big picture of Ownership” published in 2005. It found out that media concentration in Europe has been on the rise in the last two decades. For example Axel Springer and Bertelsmann engage in cross-media ownership, which means that they control different media products, which even increases their power on opinion (Meinungsmacht). This development can be seen as source of a rising intransparency about ownership.

Furthermore the study revealed that concentration is no longer a national phenomenon, but a transnationalised or European one. “Media firms move into other countries when their home market is saturated or concentrated to a degree where media regulation does not permit further growths or merger, to attain critical mass, to pool resources and to share risks.” The study also analyses the EU efforts to hinder media concentration. What the Commission does in this respect is shown in the following.

The first step by the Commission in the field of media concentration was the Green Paper “Pluralism and Media Concentration in the internal market – an assessment of the need for community action” in December 1992. It was directed at diversity with three different approaches: diversity of content, diversity in the number of programs, and diversity in ownership. Until then approaches used to control concentrations and support pluralism varied from

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76 Axel Springer Verlag is the largest newspaper publisher in Germany. It owns the private TV broadcaster ProSiebenSat1 and the biggest tabloid, the Bild. In 2005 the company had a turnover of 338 million Euros.
77 Bertelsman is one of the largest media corporations in Europe. It controls for example the RTL group and Gruner + Jahr, and BMG. It employs 76,000 people in 63 countries. It had a turnover of 12.3 billion Euros in 2005. European Federation of Journalists, 2005.
one European country to the next - reflecting the specific history and circumstances of each national market.

The origin of the Commission’s activities can be related to the same economical and technological developments that also led to the creation of the TWF directive and increased competition in media markets. Policies trying to regulate this field have mainly two concerns: on the more normative side, effective democracies need a variety of sources of information, and thus different possibilities via which the people can participate. However, because the EC treaty only provides for a clear competence in competition policy\textsuperscript{79} and not in media policy – a different argumentation must be taken as a motivation to act: media concentration in the hands of only few owners is a threat for the market – because prices can rise and labour costs can decrease - and thus its economic and financial performance. Also the Green Paper “emphasised that the main justification for European-level intervention would be completion of the single market (an area where the Commission clearly has competence) rather than pluralism (which, at least officially, is supposed to be a matter for the member states)”\textsuperscript{80}.

Thus, already in the beginning the aim and final destination of media policies in this field were not really clear. Throughout the consultation process even more opinions and doubts were added to the agenda; and the question after the scope of possible EU activities was even left out from the beginning. Finally in 1996 a draft directive (“Concentrations and Pluralism in the internal market”) was adopted. It was mainly concerned with upper limits of media ownership: a maximum of 30 per cent of market share in the hands of one owner.

Similar to “normal” competition policy it was debated about how to define the relevant market. For example in small member states with only few broadcasters the maximum could be easily reached. For that reason the proposed directive was revised. A flexibility clause was introduced with regard to the limits, and the title of the directive was changed into “Media Concentration in the Internal Market”. The member states were allowed to make exceptions from the 30 per cent limit. “These modifications represented an unambiguous withdrawal from the original ambition of imposing a fixed minimum level of diversity of ownership for all European markets.”\textsuperscript{81} Member states could decide for themselves if the rules should apply.

In the end the initiative was abandoned also due to lacking support by the member states. “The fact that the initiative struggled to gain the necessary support from the member states illustrates the difficulties which confront the

\textsuperscript{79} Another expression - mainly used in the American language area - for competition policy is anti-trust policy.

\textsuperscript{80} Doyle, 2007, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{81} Doyle, 2007, p. 149.
European Commission in developing policy instruments in areas where the MS do not recognise the need to develop instruments at the Community level, or the jurisdiction of the European Commission in certain areas is not accepted.\textsuperscript{82} After the failing attempts in the 1990s the Commission remained inactive on the subject for a considerable amount of time. However, also because of the EP’s initiative the Commission issued a new discussion paper on pluralism in July 2005. So far no new policy initiatives have come up as a consequence.

Besides not being able to establish a new policy area concerned with media concentration and pluralism, the Commission keeps its competences in Competition Policy that also are applicable to the media sector.

This brings up the topic what the actual role of these media policies might be for publicity. From the definition of pluralism given above the assumption can be derived that pluralism and publicity can be linked with each other directly: a higher level of pluralism leads to a higher level of publicity. This can be summarized in one thesis: Simultaneous diversity of ownership and content is needed for pluralism that has a direct impact on the level of publicity. This thesis is crucial, because diversity of ownership or content alone are not sufficient, both are interlinked. However, diversity of content is hard to assess and would certainly be beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore it cannot really be influenced by the Commission besides some small attempt like the TWF directive. But the Commission has a direct impact on the diversity of ownership by its Competition Policy.

Articles 81 and 82 EC are the main base for the Commission’s Competition Policy. They regulate monopolies and ban the abuse of dominant market positions. The most important legal instrument with regard to media concentration is the so called merger control. The first Merger Regulation (4064/89) entered into force in 1990 and was replaced by the reviewed version (139/2004) in 2004. “Community merger control applies to mergers, takeovers and some joint ventures (‘concentrations’) which have a Community dimension.”\textsuperscript{83} If this is fulfilled the Commission blocks mergers that hinder competition.

But, unfortunately also Competition Policies are not fully effective in ensuring diversity of media ownership. “Competition law is not particularly effective at national level in some European countries and, at the collective EU-level, it is evident that media mergers and alliances are also ignored by DG Competition because they fall below high revenue thresholds set out in the 1989

\textsuperscript{82} Ward, 2002, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{83} Deards and Hargreaves, 2004, p. 300.
Merger Control regulation. Furthermore the protection of competition and the encouragement of pluralism are different objectives. A highly diversified market does not necessarily provide for a diversity of content and the amount of information provided by a media system does not have to increase when ownership lies in the hands of many.

“The European Commission’s approach to the issue of media pluralism demonstrates a tension in Community policy between attempting to reconcile the common market principles by bringing down national barriers, the need to incorporate a set of homogenous rules across the market and the need to maintain and support, at the Community level, for certain policy objectives.”

Media concentration is no longer a national problem due to technological and economical border crossing activities. Especially mergers and competition in the media sector have accelerated in the last two decades. “Media Pluralism and diversity are being constantly challenged in Europe in what has become a very dynamic market for joint ventures and takeovers.” Furthermore the enlargement to 27 member states even added twelve new media systems, which makes the implementation of measures with regard to media concentration and media pluralism even more complex.

Also the most recent developments with regard to the information society do not increase the hope for an effective EU authority to support media pluralism and thus publicity. For example the i2010 initiative has three main priorities: to create a modern, market oriented regulatory framework for the converging digital economy; to increase the investment in ICT; and to create a more inclusive European Information Society. The initiative is the framework for current media policies. However, in its annual information on the status of implementation it is only said that “the Commission will add further building blocks to European audiovisual policy, advancing the debate on media pluralism and media literacy.” How and when is left out; so also from this side future developments for media pluralism are not foreseeable in the near future.

Another example of recent developments is the compromise on the Constitutional Treaty. A lot of hopes with regard to media pluralism and freedom of the press and of speech have been connected to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the hope was that an inclusion in the Constitution would

85 Ward, 2002, p. 73.
86 Ward, 2002, p. 94 This process also involved the emergence of the Web 2.0 possibilities and the crash of the New Economy. Also some industry greats such as the German Kirch-Group experienced the fast rise and sudden descent, which even ended in insolvency in this case.
87 European Commission, 2007c, p. 4.
have strengthened the rights deriving from this article. But at the Council of the European Union in June 2007 agreed: “The Article on fundamental rights will contain a cross reference to the Charter on fundamental rights, as agreed in the 2004 IGC, giving it legally binding value and setting out the scope of its application.” However, it was excluded from the treaty which is a decrease of importance.

In conclusion it can be said that the Commission certainly tries to influence publicity by controlling media diversity. But its attempts still are in the beginning and thus the same applies for its influence on European Publicity.

**III.4. Conclusion: The actual role of Media Policies**

This Chapter of the thesis has so far split up relevant media policies in two parts: The development of the TWF directive outlined the general strengthening of European Media Policies; and the draft media concentration directive has shown many of the obstacles to European Media Policies. It is evident that the main problem is the question about who has which competences or to rephrase it: if media is a cultural or an economic good.

The attempt to describe the European Media system has shown that there is no European analogy to the national media systems. A variety of actors tries to assert its influence on media products in Europe and also the Commission’s competences are not clearly divided – neither with regard to its mainly responsible DG nor to the legal base for its action. Still it is clear that current economical and technological developments ended the time during which media

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88 Council of the EU, 2007, No. 9.
was purely a national concern. This had led to the emergence of the TWF directive and still is the source of its continuing revision process. The TWF directive can be regarded as an attempt to harmonize European legislation about media. At the same time it can be seen as a small effort to influence the content in a European way.

Still in the end it was clear that European Media Policies in this field are still ‘in their children’s shoes’ despite promotion efforts for the Information Society. The current revisions of audiovisual regulation are not finished yet, but they try to render a lot of the newly emerged problems resulting from technological innovation.

As was described the Media Policy field of concentration and pluralism is even more complicated to regulate. The Commission has even less clear competences and depends partly on the willingness of the member states. The ‘Media Concentration and Pluralism’ directive has shown that media policies clearly have boundaries which are not easy to cross. Although it might be an effective tool for ensuring pluralism, the Commission has to rely on its Competition policies if it wants to regulate media concentration. And regulating competition clearly is something different than supporting pluralism.

In conclusion and to answer the sub-question ‘What is the actual role of the Commission’s media policies (related to media concentration and pluralism) for European Publicity: this chapter has shown that the Commission posses the ability to influence publicity. The TWF directive is an example which shows that Media Policies are still in an on-going process of development; and that the Commission tries to regulate media content. Furthermore the Commission tried to ensure and support pluralism, which influences publicity, but it failed so far in setting up an own policy, and still relies on its competition policy.
IV. Communication Strategy

In the beginning of the European Union communicating the policies was treated stepmotherly. However, this attitude changed tremendously over the past 15 years. Margot Wallström even was appointed as the first sole responsible Commissioner for the ‘Communication Strategy’.

Admittedly the developments have been crisis driven. The first attempt made under the Delors-presidency was the result of the Maastricht rejection by the Danes in 1992; and the current initiatives such as Plan D for Democracy, Dialog and Debate and the White Paper on a European Communication Policy respond to the no-votes against the Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands.

Accordingly the attitude towards communication changed within the Commission and so did the outcome of the related activities and thus allegedly the role of the Commission’s Communication Strategy changed for European Publicity. Therefore this chapter of the thesis will be used in order to answer the following sub-question: ‘What is the actual role of the Commission’s communication strategy (related to Plan D and the White Paper) for European Publicity?’. Similar as in Chapter III the questions developed in Chapter II will provide the structure.

1. How does the way Information is released by the Commission follow a certain strategy?
2. How does the Commission’s Communication strategy influence the level of publicity?

But before the development of the Communication Strategy and its influence on European Publicity is analysed, a tool will be given to assess the Communication strategy.
IV. Communication Strategy

IV.1. The Aims and Ways of Communication

Because communication processes are highly complex, not only in the European Union, a tool or model to analyse them must be developed before the discussion of the Commission’s communication strategy can be elaborated on. Related science offers a variety of approaches. For example Meyer distinguishes the process of communication in issue, procedural and accountability dimensions.\(^{89}\) Along these dimensions he analyses the communication process. A similar approach is the so called ‘Laswell’-Formula\(^{90}\) that was developed in 1948, which is often used in communication science to analyse different variables of communication processes separately from each other.

One example of a scientist using the Laswell-Formula is the German Kirsten Hoesch. She applied the ‘Who says what to whom on which channel with what effect’ categories of the formula to the communication strategy of the Commission. However, although this approach and also Meyer’s dimensions are able to provide in-depth insights into the communication process, the goal of this chapter of the thesis is something else.

The attitude towards communication will be the focus of this elaboration. It has changed from near to non-communication to almost communication at any cost. This change of attitude is more important to European Publicity than the exact way how it is communicated, because it influences each aspect of the different sub-parts of communication.

Therefore the internal structure of the Commission and the different actors\(^{91}\) involved in communicating issues, for example by the press service or the national delegations, are only of minor relevance and will only be summarized very briefly. A small chart about the internal organization of the DG is given in Annex 4 and shows that it is highly complex and fragmented. Different topics are communicated by different actors. There is a variety of levels involved in communication processes. For this reason information given in interviews with involved persons (taken from secondary literature) support the insights to the strategy. Accordingly the focal point of this chapter is not the way how is communicated, but rather the strategy behind it.

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\(^{89}\) The issue dimension: What is being discussed, what arguments are involved and what is about to be decided. The procedural dimension: At what stage of the decision-making process? Means, actors and access points to influence the outcome of process? The accountability dimension: Who is supporting what? Who is responsible? Meyer, 1999, p. 622.

\(^{90}\) “Who says what to whom with which devices under which circumstances with which obstacles in which sequence with what effect with which intention?” It is often used in American Communication Science studies, but since the 1960s also increasingly also in Europe. Rollwagen, 2000.

\(^{91}\) A variety of different sub-units of the Commission tries to communicate Europe nowadays. For example there are Team Europe, 500 documentation centres, info-points in more than 140 cities, three ‘Grand Centres d’Information’, 130 rural information centres and the Europe Direct hotline. (Partly based on Brüggemann, 2005).
A more applicable approach to assess the attitude towards the communication strategy is presented by Michael Brüggemann. From an analysis of policy documents and interviews he distinguishes the Commission’s Communication Strategy and/or Policy into seven different types: propaganda, marketing, justification, dialogue, agenda setting, arcane policy and transparent policy (more details in Annex 5). They differentiate along two dimensions: (1) the degree of persuasiveness of communication - this means the aim which the communication is directed at; if it is used to persuade the citizens or to inform them (the first includes a given opinion, the latter is more value free). (2) The second dimension differs along the symmetry of communication, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric - meaning the way how the recipients are involved.

These different types of communication policy described by Brüggemann will be used in order to describe the change in attitude. As can be seen on the left the different types can be included in the overall model used in this thesis. They influence the most vital part of publicity identified in Chapter II: discourse about European topics.

As briefly explained above different types have diverse characteristics with regard to the aim and way of communication. For example Arcane Policy is a policy made behind closed doors, not involving the citizens; propaganda is used to manipulate the public opinion; and agenda setting shall create awareness for a certain subject. The different types obviously have different impacts for reaching the discourse kind of publicity which will be assessed in Chapter IV.3 “Communicating with the Citizen?”. However, this short section has shown that at this early stage it is already obvious that the Commission has some sort of communication policy. The way in which the attitude towards this release of information changed will be shown next.

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*Brüggemann, 2005.*
IV.2. Development of the Communication Strategy

This section will show that the mode of communication and its underlying strategy changed considerably over the past 15 years; following the question: “How does the way Information is released by the Commission follow a certain strategy?”

In the beginning of the European Union the actions of the Commission cannot really be called driven by a certain communication strategy.93 Also the Commissioner’s themselves were not very keen on being responsible for information and communication. “At least from 1958 to 1999, being responsible for information within the college was always a task that no commissioner wanted […], the portfolio was attributed to either a commissioner from a small member state or to the ‘second’ commissioner from a larger country.”94 Almost nothing was done to communicate EU policies to the citizens. Communication by the Commission mainly meant access to sources and policies, and not the dialogue with the citizens. This did not really change until the Danish Maastricht rejection. But then the perception of the importance of communication started to change rapidly.

The first legal amendments with regard to ‘open information’ were made in the beginning of the 1990s. Already the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ contained provisions about transparency in its annex. Furthermore Council and Commission agreed on creating a “Code of Conduct” about the access to EU documents. Yet, open access and active communication are two different things: the way how active information and thus communication should be dealt with was left aside from a legal point of view. This changed in 1993; the Commission was asked by the Council to create a new approach to communicate the EU. The first important step in this regard was the document “Information, communication and openness” [SEC(93) 916], the so called “Pinheiro-Concept”. It was established by Joao Deus de Pinheiro, the Commissioner responsible for Information Policy (DG X; Information, Communication, Culture, and Audiovisual Media) from 1993 to 1995 under the presidency of Jacques Delors (1985-1995). The concept was a follow-up of two different approaches towards communication policy suggested in two different previous reports: the De-Clercq-Report and the Oostlander-Report.

93 For a detailed overview about the Commission’s Communication Strategy between 1952 and 1995 see Gramberger, 1997. But because before the 1990s there was not really a strategy the time before 1992 will be neglected in this thesis.
The experts around the MEP Willi de Clercq in the ‘Committee of wise men’ had the task to discover the deficits of the communication practises of all EU institutions and to suggest remedies. “This report was supposed to propose a midterm communication and information strategy which would enable the European Institutions and the Member States to take into account the needs, the concerns and the hopes of citizens at a decisive moment for the process of European integration.”95 It suggested among others the establishment of a central authority for communication assigned to the responsible Commissioner; Europe should be marketed as a product.96

The report of the “Committee for Culture, Youth, Education and Media” of the European Parliament, named after the MEP Arie Oostlander, followed a different approach: The information deficit was linked to the democracy deficit.97

In contrast to the De-Clercq Report the picture of the EU given by its own communication should not only be positive, but also the negative sides should be publicised in order to get into discussion with the citizens. Furthermore simultaneously active and passive information were regarded as necessary.

The Pinheiro-Concept followed the suggestions given in this second report. In June 1993 the Commission adopted a new strategy that involved guidelines for Information Policy, which should have changed the structure of the communication; and Information was perceived as linked to the democratic deficit. In the following time the strategy was refined by a variety of strategic papers, all covering four main aspects: (1) transparency of the Commission’s work (2) orientation of the Information Policy at the citizens’ concerns (3) coherence in coordination (4) and recipient friendliness of the information.99

“A systematic implementation of the Pinheiro-reform was doomed to fail because of the lacking support by the Commission’s president Jacques Delors.”100

The Commission of Jacques Santer (1995-1999) tried to implement the Pinheiro-concept. But the responsible commissioner Marcelino Oreja (DG X) did not share the same view about the functions and importance of public rela-

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100 Loitz, 2001, p. 57, translated.
tions as his predecessor Pinheiro. Soon after the start of the Santer-term the European Court of Auditors criticized the new strategy, because a lot of money was wasted. Therefore DG X introduced a division responsible for ‘evaluation’ that should coordinate the attempts of the different DGs.

The final blow to all open-information efforts made by the Santer Commission was of course the corruption affair that in the end led to the resignation of the whole commission. Although president Santer partly attributed even this disaster to the achievements of the new strategy.

“We are somehow the victim of our own policy that is aimed at transparency. It has been us who discovered the fraud; this is the result of our new transparent way of policy making.”

However, it is today commonly accepted that the way the Santer Commission dealt with the accusation of corruption accelerated the crisis because it was the exact opposite of transparency and openness. “The change of the Commission towards a more open and pro-active information policy was halted in 1999 when the Commission tried to deal with its corruption scandal by mobbing critical journalists.” Meyer even concludes that the resignation could have been avoided by a different attitude towards the public and the media.

Meanwhile the Treaty Revision in Amsterdam had introduced the general principle of openness in Article 1 EU:

“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”

Furthermore the newly created Article 255 introduced general rules about the access to information as can be seen in Annex 6. The significance of this article is “to strengthen the transparency of policy-making and the trust of the citizens for in the administration by providing open access to documents.”

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101 Smith, 2004 argues that also the Commissioners themselves did not press the subject of communication in the first years. After the promising start of the Pinheiro reform, Oreja nearly completely turned down the subject, which can also be seen because only one speech about this subject can be related to him. The same accounts for Pinheiro’s forerunner Dondelinger (1989-1992).


103 Brüggemann, 2005, p. 15.


106 Hoesch, 2003, p. 58.
The Prodi-Commission (1999-2004) faced a lot of mistrust by the citizens toward all European institutions and - due to the scandal - in particular towards the Commission.\textsuperscript{107} The main emphasis of the new endeavours was to create an atmosphere of transparency and connectedness to the citizens.

Until that time mainly two actors had the main responsibility for public relations: the ‘speaker group’ dealing with journalists accredited in Brussels and DG X (Information, Communication, Culture, and Audiovisual Media) responsible for the journalists that were not accredited in Brussels and the citizens.

As a consequence of the corruption scandal and the blow of the new transparency approach, the responsible DG X was dissolved in 1999. Again the competences were re-distributed to a variety of different sectoral DGs, but later in Prodi’s term re-concentrated in the newly created DG Press and Information.\textsuperscript{108}

However, the new organizational structure at once was under criticism by the journalists. They claimed that the new speakers lacked knowledge and experience.\textsuperscript{109} Prodi had failed to take the chance to build a modern press service.

The section above has shown that the attitude towards Communication Policy changed from disinterest to a core priority. Brüggemann’s framework explained in Chapter IV.1 can be helpful to emphasize this change in attitude, as shown in some examples in Figure 8.

With regard to the dimension about the way how communication policy is handled, the Commission’s attitude towards communication before 1993 can be regarded as nothing else than ‘Arcane Policy’. Policies were made behind closed doors and the public was left outside of the policy-making process. First noticeable changes were made by the introduction of the principle of open access to documents and policy processes in the Maastricht and Amsterdam revisions. Also alongside the other dimension (aim) developments have emerged towards a more dialogue based communication. Although the Pinheiro-reform had progressing ideas it was never really implemented and later destroyed

\textsuperscript{107} Loitz, 2001.  
\textsuperscript{108} Brüggemann, 2005.  
\textsuperscript{109} Loitz, 2001.
by the Santer-Affair, which was the most negative example. However, especially since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the attitude about the aim of communication is directed increasingly on dialogue.

The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty marked the next crisis that urged the Commission to take new action. The times when Communication and Information Policies were not a portfolio favoured by the college of Commissioners ended. Margot Wallström was appointed as the first solely responsible Commissioner for the Communication Strategy. The creation of a single DG for communication clearly can be explained with the higher value that is attributed to the task.

Until now the most recent steps can be distinguished in three parts: (1) the ‘Action Plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission’ in July 2005 was mainly concerned with internal communication processes; (2) the ‘Commission’s contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ in October 2005 that should have engaged the citizens in the discussion; (3) and the related ‘White Paper on a European Communication Policy’ in February 2006, which started a consultation process about the principles behind communication and questions about a strategy related to democracy issues.

All three initiatives will be further analysed in the next section (although the focus is on Plan D and the White Paper) – especially according to their relevance for publicity.
IV.3. Communicating with the Citizen?

In order to show the actual role of the Commission’s Communication Strategy the most recent initiatives will be related to publicity. By this the last question of this chapter shall be answered: “How does the Commission’s Communication strategy influence the level of publicity?”.

The three initiatives (Action Plan, Plan D, and White Paper) by the Commission can be regarded as a crucial change in the attitude towards communication as this short paragraph taken from the action plan emphasises:

“EU communication must be a two way street: policymakers must listen more carefully to citizens and also explain more clearly what the EU is doing. The European Commission has made communication one of its strategic priorities. [...] ‘Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission’ [...] sets out 50 practical steps the Commission will take, within its own organisation, starting immediately. The Commission’s new approach is based on three strategic principles: 1. listening to citizens; taking their concerns into account; 2. communicating with citizens; telling them, in clear language, about EU policies; 3. connecting with citizens by ‘going local’: addressing people in their national and/or local setting, using their favourite media.”

Among the ‘concrete’ measures included in the plan are the strengthening of the national delegations, the improvement of internal operational procedures and the usage of terminology the citizens are able to understand. However the action plan remains rather vague and the two other initiatives are follow-ups and allegedly improvements and are therefore covered in greater detail.

IV.3.a. ‘Commission’s contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’

The Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (COM(2005) 494 final) published on the 13th of October 2005 by Margot Wallström’s DG was to be the Commission’s contribution to the so called period of reflection.

“The Commission has proposed a Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, not as a rescue operation for the Constitution, but to stimulate a wider debate between the European Union’s democratic institutions and citizens.”

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110 European Commission, 2005.
111 Tham, 2006.
112 European Commission, 2006a.
Thus, the initiative should win over the trust of the citizens for the political system of the European Union. Moreover this plan can be seen as final commitment for a two-way type of communication – not just releasing information, but also discussing issues with the citizens. Therefore 13 actions were included in the plan connected to a financial budget of 6 Million Euros and comprised of visits of the Commissioners in the member states, support of European civil society initiatives, and creation of a European network of ‘Goodwill Ambassadors’, as can be seen in Figure 9 among other measures. The whole structure of Plan D is displayed in Annex 7.

Figure 9: Plan D - Initiatives at the Community Level (13 Actions)

| Stimulating a wider public debate | • Visits by Commissioners to Member States  
| | • Commissioners availability to National Parliaments  
| | • Representations open to the public  
| | • Utilising Europe Direct Centres for regional events  
| | • European Round Table for Democracy  
| | • European Goodwill Ambassadors  
| Promoting citizen’s participation in the democratic process | • Promoting more effective consultation  
| | • Support for European citizen’s projects  
| | • Greater openness  
| | • Increased voter participation  
| Tools to generate a dialogue on European policies | • Specific Eurobarometer on the future of Europe  
| | • Internet  
| | • Target focus groups  

Dialogue with the citizens is the core topic of the initiative. Whereby the most important part of the discussion process should take place in the member states, according to Wallström this way national differences would be taken into account in the best way. However, the need for a connection of national debates – transnational communication – was neglected by the paper. Results were expected until the Europe Day in May 2006 and were published in the Communication from the Commission to the European Council (COM(2006) 212) “The Period of Reflection and Plan D”. It states that the intensity of the national debates varies between the different member states. Issues raised in the debate were attributed to the following headings: the economic and social development of Europe; the European Union and its role; the borders of Europe and its role in the world; the way the Union works. Furthermore, it analyses the achievements and shows the main topics of debate. An example of preliminary results is shown in Annex 8. The results are assessed on a yearly base for the EU as a whole and each member state.

113 Bauer, Metz & Seeger, 2005, p. 3.  
114 European Commission, 2006a.  
115 One example of a national attempt for dialogue with the citizens is the German “Aktion Europa” that is a partnership initiative between the Bundesregierung, the Delegation of the Commission, the Bundespresseamt and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Coordination and planning should be facilitated and activities were among others the creation of a round table to
It turned out that the citizens in general have on the one side a low knowledge about the EU, and on the other side high expectations towards the EU. It was concluded that the dialogue process needed to be taken further, which was then done in the White Paper explained next.

Although, as displayed on the visualisation of Brüggemann’s dimensions shown before, Plan D is the largest step towards actual communication with the citizens in the entire EU communication history, but the obstacles of the strategy can be summarized in one sentence: all the measures will not reach those who do not care about the EU. Still, the actions of Plan D are able to create discourse about European issues and therefore influence the level of publicity. However, as will be explained in greater detail in Chapter V, reaching those who are already aware does not increase the overall EU awareness. Just communicating with the citizens is not enough, a concise communication policy might be an improvement, as analysed next.

IV.3.b. ‘White Paper on a European Communication Policy’

The “White Paper on a European Communication Policy” was launched on the 1st of February 2006. It is a so called partnership approach including the other EU institutions and bodies, the different authorities of the member states, political parties and the civil society.

“The main purpose of this White Paper is to propose a way forward and to invite all these players to contribute their ideas on how best we can work together to close the gap. The result will be a forward-looking agenda for better communication to enhance the public debate in Europe.”

The White Paper consists of two parts as can be seen in the figure below, in which the content is briefly summarised to the main points.

| Part I Putting Communication at the service of Citizens | 1. Communication as a policy in its own right | About the Commission’s ‘vision’ of a communication policy |
| 2. Enhanced debate and dialogue – a European Public Sphere | Citizen shall feel more included |

get into contact with actors from the civil society. However, this attempt kind of failed, because first obstacles came up, when a mode for tendering of projects should be agreed upon. (Tham, 2006)

Part II
Taking work forward

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<tr>
<td>1. Defining common principles</td>
<td>Principles could be laid down in a Charta or code of conduct&lt;sup&gt;117&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Empowering citizens</td>
<td>Improving political education, bring citizens in contact with each other, improve contact between citizens and institutions</td>
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<td>3. Working with the media and new technologies</td>
<td>Cooperate increasingly and for example further ‘Europe by satellite’</td>
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<td>5. Doing the job together</td>
<td>Include member states</td>
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“In contrast to the so called ‘Action Plan’ for improving the Commission’s own communication from July 2005, the White Paper is addressed to the EU as a whole, including other central institutions, member states, European political parties and the civil society.”<sup>118</sup> The consultation process took six months and included a stakeholder forum for NGOs and internet forums for the citizens.<sup>119</sup> An example for a response to the White Paper can be found in Annex 9. Furthermore in the spring edition of the Eurobarometer 2006 (No. 65) questions were included regarding the future of the EU. Moreover stakeholder conferences were held in some European cities. The first results of the consultation process are expected in autumn 2007. Because the whole process is not finished yet, the real effect on publicity cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, some remarks can be made about the possible effects of the White Paper, which will be done in the following.

In general one can say that the White Paper is (just as many other EU first consultations) partly vague but aiming in the right direction, which is well summarized in this statement:

“In reading the White Paper one finds an interesting difference between the rather clear – albeit still diplomatic – analysis of the existing problems on the one hand and the very cloudy language concerning concrete improvements on the other.”<sup>120</sup>

And therefore the list of criticism about the White Paper is rather long and shall be only summarized briefly. Among it are the typical arguments of ‘too

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<sup>117</sup> “A European Charter on Communication would primarily be a tool for citizens to affirm their right to fair and full information on European issues. It would define what citizens can expect and legitimately ask for when it comes to information and communication on the EU. It would be a non-binding instrument that all EU actors (institutions, national, regional and local governments and non-governmental organisations) could commit to.”

http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/charter_code/index_en.htm


<sup>119</sup> For more information see http://europa.eu.int/comm/communication_white_paper

<sup>120</sup> Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2006, p. 3.
less coordination’, ‘insufficient involvement of national, regional and local actors’, ‘too little focus on the citizens’ concerns’ that are left aside in this case. More important for European Publicity are two different areas of interest. Firstly, in its second part the White Paper suggests that a European Charta or Code of Conduct can lay down principles about communicating European issues. However, the way journalists report about the EU should not be influenced because of the freedom of the press. This difficulty touches upon one of the major criticisms directed at the White Paper. It is connected to the debate about how to include the media in a more efficient way. Among the possibilities the creation of a European news agency was proposed, also by the President of the Commission Barroso. This idea evoked immediate uprising by the press association in Brussels, publishing an open letter at Wallström articulating their concerns about EU ‘controlled’ news.\textsuperscript{121}

The influence of this topic on European Publicity is obvious: news cannot be controlled by a political institution in order to gain open and free discourse. However, almost immediately after the criticism, Wallström distanced herself from the idea of an establishment of such a news agency.

Secondly, the task of civic education is interesting for Publicity. The reason can be directly seen in a quote from the White Paper:

“Civic education – which is the responsibility of Member States – is crucial for enabling people to exercise their political and civic rights and to become active in the public sphere. Civic education should not be confined to teaching school pupils about EU institutions and policies. It should help people of all ages to use tools such as the Internet to access information on public policy and to join in the debate. This is particularly important in the case of minorities, disabled citizens or other groups that might otherwise find themselves excluded from the public sphere.”\textsuperscript{122}

But in addition as the White Paper acknowledges, education is a competence in the hand of the member states, and it is (just as media policies) perceived as part of the cultural identity of a country. The recent PISA-studies created an atmosphere of comparison and competition within the different EU educational systems – at the same time it has shown in the aftermath how convinced each member state is that its system is – at least in principle – the best. Therefore a common approach to further EU related education is a difficult task – albeit being very effective for the support of European Publicity.

“However, while the White Paper lacks revolutionary and concrete policy proposals, its text is characterised by a welcome sense of realism and long-term

\textsuperscript{121} Neue Züricher Zeitung, 2006.
\textsuperscript{122} European Commission, 2006, p. 7
term perspective.” If a new Communication Policy/Strategy emerges from the White Paper consultation process the Communication Strategy by the Commission can influence the level of publicity.

IV.4. Conclusion: Communication Strategy

The Commission’s attitude towards communication changed considerably, and so did the role of the Communication Strategy for Publicity. The first years can be best described as Arcane Policy; policies made behind closed doors, which was certainly no contribution to publicity.

The right to access to information was strengthened throughout the 1990s and was a first success for passive information. It could benefit European Publicity in providing more information for those who are searching for it, for example the open access made the work of journalists easier. But providing access to information is not the same as engaging in an active communication policy and thus provoking discourse.

Finally Plan D tried to communicate with the citizens about the future and present role of the European Union. The actions of Plan D are thus able to create discourse about European issues and therefore influence the level of publicity. Still only those who are already ‘in the club’ can be reached.

The White Paper on a European Communication Policy is an attempt to create a coherent way of communication within the EU institutions and with the citizens. First results are expected in autumn 2007, but its success depends on the willingness of the member states, the institutions and also the citizens. So, to answer the sub-question: ‘What is the actual role of the Commission’s communication strategy (related to Plan D and the White Paper) for European Publicity?’ the Communication Strategy is an agenda setter for the way how to deal with communication. A coherent Communication Strategy by the Commission would be able to inform citizens and also to create discourse, but the task is more than difficult.

V. Recommendations

The framework developed in Chapter II mainly focussed on the ‘upper-part’ of the model, which means on the possible influence of the Commission’s activities – with regard to Media Policies and the Communication Strategy - on publicity. This was done in order to separate positive and normative aspects of this research from each other.

However, if the link between publicity and awareness shall be made, normative aspects cannot be left aside anymore. To remain coherent in the argumentation the separation in two building blocks of publicity (media and communication) will be further used to structure the reasoning.

In the following chapter at first the model will be extended to normative ideas about the effect of European publicity on awareness. After that the findings of the previous chapters will be assessed according to these new extensions of the model. Finally, recommendations will be given on what the Commission might do to encourage further support to the awareness of the citizens about the EU.

Overall, this chapter will be used to answer the last sub-question: ‘How can the citizens’ awareness about the EU be raised by these activities or are other measures needed?’

V.1. Completing the Framework

The ‘lower-part’ of the framework can easily be related to the recent hot-topics in integration studies. In order to assess how to further European Integration, a variety of authors agreed already in the late 1990s that the citizens need to be participating to a larger extent in the political system of the EU; at the time of writing these claims are often related to the necessity of creating a European Public Sphere.124

This way of reasoning is most often related to the so called ‘Democratic Deficit’ of the EU, about which a huge variety of authors already have expressed their thoughts and ideas. Among them is the influential German political scientist Fritz Scharpf, who tried to approach the problem from the theoretical starting point of input- versus output-legitimacy.125 His assumptions can also be linked to the two sources of European Publicity used in this thesis as the following quote by Bursens & Baetens shows:

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124 Among others Bijsmans & Altides, Brüggemann, Esmark.
125 Input legitimacy means ‘government by the people’. Political decisions are legitimate, if and because they represent the will of the people. Output legitimacy is aimed at ‘government for the people’. This means legitimacy if the output of government decisions is effective for the people. Scharpf, 1999.
“Mass media can be considered to be a useful instrument to enhance the output legitimacy of the EU. In order to make their political system more legitimate, European authorities should not only deliver policies that can stand the test of acceptance, they also need to make clear to their citizens that their policies deserve to be accepted. They must in other words communicate their policies to make them known and consecutively also accepted by the European public(s). It is obvious that this communication can best flow through mass media in order to reach the broadest possible audience.”

The last sentence of this quotation also shows the interconnectedness between media and communication. As explained in Chapter II the model so far exaggerated the separation between both sources of publicity, because in reality they are interlinked. Effects on one side e.g. media might affect the other side and in the end raise the awareness of the citizens, which then would have a reverse effect on legitimacy as the next example taken from the literature shows.

Beetham & Lord made an argument about three different dimensions of liberal-democratic legitimacy (legality, normative justifiability and legitimation). They make the argument that media could generate more knowledge [information] about the European institutions and policies and could therefore create more recognition [awareness] of the European governance level as a rightful source of authority (normative justifiability) and more acceptance of its policies (legitimation).

However, the concepts by Scharpf and Beetham & Lord aim a bit too much at the relation between publicity and the democratic deficit. Because of the context the democratic lack of the EU does not really need any further consideration, although it is the starting point of this work: in the introduction the lack of democratic participation was followed by the remark that “something must be done about it”, which is the idea behind the assessment of the Commission’s activities. Yet, it is enough to know that there is a democratic deficit and that something must be done about it; and that the assumption was made that the level of publicity is able to influence the level of awareness which will be explained in greater detail in the following.

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126 Scharpf according to Bursens & Baetens, 2004, p.4.
128 Legality is about how power derives from a rightful source of authority (e.g. a constitutional rule of law) and how this source is reflected in the rules of appointment to office. Normative justifiability must be comprised by that political authority, which includes the question if the source of political authority is based upon socially accepted beliefs about what is the rightful source of authority and what are the proper ends and standards of governments. The criteria attributed to legitimation involve a consent subsumed in electoral authorisation, which means that rulers are appointed of deselected by regular elections, as expression of opinion of the sovereign, the people. Based on Cosse, 2005, unpublished, pp. 10-11, and Beetham & Lord according to Bursens & Baetens, 2004, p. 3.
The normative and theoretical assumption that publicity can influence the level of awareness, can be linked to Robert Dahl’s criteria for a democratic process, which are effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of agenda, and inclusion of adults.\textsuperscript{129} Although, some of them even offer measurable concepts, such as voting equality, the ones that can be used for this thesis are vague: effective participation and enlightened understanding. \textit{Effective participation} according to Dahl must comprise effective and equal opportunities for all members for making their views known to the other members as to what the policy should be. \textit{Enlightened understanding} means that within reasonable limits of time, each member must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences. However, both concepts are difficult to measure.

Nevertheless it is evident that awareness and information are necessary to reach both criteria. This argumentation can be further underpinned by Meyer’s three legitimate core functions of publicity:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{"(1) to enable citizens to form an informed opinion about how they can connect their own preferences with the political options available, (2) to hold decision-makers accountable for their actions by scrutinising political personnel in-between elections, and (3) to contribute to overall social cohesion and trust within a society by giving a wide range of groups"}\textsuperscript{130}.
\end{quote}

Especially the first function is related to Dahl’s criteria of enlightened understanding; and the second to effective participation. The third function can be summarized as Europeanization of the public.

Thus, the level of publicity as a whole has the following functions for the citizens:

- to enable enlightened understanding,
- and effective participation;
- and it can lead to Europeanization of the public.

These three together are the basis for the level of awareness. As explained before media and communication are

\textsuperscript{129} Dahl, 2000. These criteria are needed that the members of the democracy are to be politically equal. For further explanation see Dahl, 2000 or Cosse, 2005, unbulblished.

\textsuperscript{130} Meyer, 2002, cited according to Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2006, pp. 2-3.
the building blocks of the definition of European Publicity used in this thesis. Therefore their direct influence is explained next.

Media as source of publicity is in this context concentrated on the European Media System. Modern mass democracies such as the EU and its member states obviously need media as a communication device and also must provide for alternative sources of information.\textsuperscript{131}

The aspect of being a ‘communication device’\textsuperscript{132} can either be linked to assumptions about democratic theory, such as the problem that if there is no communication from the citizen to the government the democratic lack of a ‘democracy without people’ emerges. Or this function can be linked to the necessity of ‘policy communication’, which means that each democratic system needs specific techniques and institutions by which communication takes place between the citizens and the government in order to gain support for its policies. However, this aspect is highly normative and therefore the second opportunity offered by media is more important in this context, as it can be directly linked to the assessment in Chapter III.

The set-up of the media system has a direct influence for example on the ‘plurality of sources of information’. Obviously especially the Commission’s activities related to Pluralism and Media Concentration (Chapter III.3) are important in this regard.

“Media diversity is one of the main preconditions ensuring political and cultural pluralism and effective citizen participation in democratic decision-making processes. Media diversity and media pluralism are prerequisites for effective freedom of expression and information as laid down by article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights”\textsuperscript{133}

The assumption can be made that effective control of pluralism and media concentration is a positive influence on the level of awareness, because there must be alternative sources of information in order to be able to gain enlightened understanding and for effective participation.

The second source of publicity identified earlier is communication as starting point for a European discourse. This can directly be related to the third function of publicity for the citizen: the Europeanization of the public. Moreover an effective communication strategy also contributes to information and thus to enlightened understanding and effective participation.

In order to identify the impact on awareness, discourse needs to be defined further. “What is needed thus is not the creation of a communication space that is detached and in competition with national public spheres, but rather a

\textsuperscript{131} Dahl, 2000.
\textsuperscript{132} For more information see Cosse, 2005, unpublished.
\textsuperscript{133} Meier & Trappel, 2001, p. 38.
Europeanization of national public spheres, accompanied by a closer alignment of national debates with those policy-oriented discussions that have been taking place for years in specialised European fora and media.\textsuperscript{134} The degree of this Europeanization can be a tool to assess the progress of the emergence of awareness. Brüggemann et al. offer a separation that can serve this purpose.

They distinguish four dimensions of Europeanization of discourse: monitoring governance, mutual observation, discursive exchange and collective identification.\textsuperscript{135} The dimensions differ according to their degree of progress of Europeanization from low (monitoring governance) to high (collective identification). On this progress dimension ‘monitoring governance’ is the starting point of the development. It is about the attention of public debate to European institutions and policies; whether the citizens are aware of the activities of the political system of the EU. ‘Mutual observation’ takes into account the awareness of debates and development in other member states.

“Both mutual observation and monitoring governance are segmented forms of Europeanization. They contribute to a de-borderization of public discourse, but do not necessarily involve the emergence of a new, extended communicative space across territorial states.”\textsuperscript{136}

The third dimension thus goes a step further and includes the ‘discursive exchange’ between various public spheres. “Collective identification’ contributes to a more integrated EPS: it defines Europeanization in terms of the emergence of a common transnational ‘community of communication’ […] and measures the sense of belonging to a common European public.”\textsuperscript{137}

Brüggemann et al. conduct a qualitative newspaper study in order to fill their dimensions with content. Thus, the outcome of policies and the way how they are communicated are central to their research. The approach taken in this thesis is different. As the focus of Chapter IV was laid upon the attitude towards communication, the effect of the change in attitude on awareness will be assessed later with the use of the four dimensions, instead of the communicated output.
V.2. Appraisal of Findings

Chapters III and IV were used in order to analyse the actual role of the Commission’s activities on the level of publicity. Now, this section will be used to link these findings to the influence they could have on the level of the citizens’ awareness about the EU.

V.2.a. The Influence of Media Policies on Awareness

Chapter III ‘Media Policies’ has shown that with regard to the effect of Media Policies on publicity two different trends can be outlined. On the one hand the development of the TWF directive showed that European Media Policies gain an increasingly important role – especially due to ongoing technological developments that eventually lead to convergence of media types and sometimes also of media content. On the other hand it is clear that European Media Policies suffer from a variety of problems.

A starting point for a variety of problems is that there is no real, unique European Media System, but one that is assembled by national ones. This aims at the main critical point for the Commission’s actual role for publicity: Media Policies are still most often regarded as national competence, which is at the time of writing entangled in the debate about whether media is a cultural or an economic good. However, one way or the other this is the reason why the Commission easily reaches the limits of what is possible. For instance the Commission is not able to influence media content, besides some small quota regulations included in the TWF directive. But a regulation of content is also not what is intended by this thesis. More important is what is connected to the following second problem.

Related to the struggle for competences is the problem that the Commission still has no effective competences in the field of media concentration and pluralism. The proposed directives failed due to the rejection of the member states. Although the Commission still uses its Competition Policies in order to regulate media concentration, this is not necessarily beneficial for pluralism and thus for the level of awareness; as explained in the following.

Pluralism and media concentration are directly related to the level of awareness as explained in the previous section. Only a plurality of sources is able to provide the opportunity for citizens to gather information from different sources. Further support for the claim for plurality can be gained from the following quotation:

“Market dominant corporations in the mass media have dominant influence over the public’s news, information, public ideas, popular culture, and political attitudes. The same corporations exert influence within government precisely because they influence their audiences’ perceptions of public life, in-
V. Recommendations

Thus, the Commission would need an effective tool to regulate media concentration and pluralism in order to support the plurality of sources and by this enlightened understanding and effective participation. Its competition policy thresholds for media concentration are directed at ‘the abuse of dominant market positions’ (Art. 81 and 82 EC), which is similar to what is meant by media concentration that was defined as:

"An increase in the presence of one (monopoly) or few media companies (oligopoly) in any market as a result of acquisitions and mergers or the disappearance of competitors."

But plurality is aimed at a broader idea and thus includes not only diversity of ownership, but also diversity of content that is admittedly even harder to measure. Therefore the Green Paper ‘Pluralism and Media Concentration in the internal market – an assessment of the need for community action’ in 1992 claimed a threefold diversity of ownership, content and in the number of programs and can be regarded as a good start in this field. Unfortunately despite a variety of attempts of proposals, green and white papers nothing was implemented so far.

In conclusion, although the Commission is theoretically able to influence the level of publicity, the missing competences in the central field of media concentration and pluralism imply that its effects on raising the awareness of the citizens about the EU remain rather humble. Moreover, even a plurality of sources that can be the starting point for enlightened understanding and effective participation, cannot guarantee that the sources are used by the citizens. That is why the Communication Strategy will be assessed as the second source of publicity.

V.2.b. The Influence of the Communication Strategy on Awareness

The third function of publicity for the citizens is the Europeanization of the public, which means the awareness of the citizens that they live in the political system of the European Union. The degree of this process can be described by Brüggemann et al.’s four dimensions of Europeanization. The Commission’s strategy itself can not be related to this approach, but the effects it might have on the citizens.

139 Meier & Trappel, 2001, p. 40.
It has been shown in Chapter IV that the development of the Communication Strategy has been crisis driven. By the separation in two dimensions (way and aim of communication) the shift from non-communication towards the quest for openness and dialogue has been shown. Furthermore it was evident that communicating the European Union is a rather complex task that involves a variety of different actors. This shift in attitude certainly has an impact on the awareness of the citizens. Obviously at the times when the Commission engaged in 'Arcane Policies' the level of publicity and accordingly the awareness was lower, in contrast to the recent claims for openness and dialogue.

Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate was the most recent step in order to get into contact with the citizens of the Union. This initiative can be regarded as the first Communication Strategy that was able to reach the dimension of 'monitoring governance', meaning that it paid attention to the public debate about European institutions and policies. As shown in more detail in Annex 10, the '13 Actions Plan' included measures directed at: stimulating a wider public debate; promoting citizens' participation in the democratic process; and tools to generate a dialogue on European Policies. However, two important aspects were left out in Plan D. Firstly, the connection of the national debates was neglected, which would have led to at least 'mutual observation'. Also the scope and activity of the national debates varies strongly across the EU. Secondly, it failed to reach those who are not interested in the EU. Thus Plan D created publicity and also awareness for the EU, but only at a basic level, because it failed to reach out to those who are not already interested. Therefore it is highly doubtful whether Plan D really increased the overall level of awareness.

In order to reach out to groups that were left out until now and to connect national debates, a common Communication Policy is needed that combines - in a so called partnership approach - the efforts of all institutions of the EU, national actors, the civil society and NGOs. This was tried to be achieved by the White Paper on a European Communication Policy. The outcome is not yet clear because the results are only expected in autumn 2007, yet it might lead to the first coherent Communication Policy of the entire EU – despite its obstacles.

As shown in Annex 10 the White Paper reaches the level of prospectively achieving the dimensions of 'mutual observation' and 'discursive exchange'. Especially two aspects of the Paper are aimed directly at the citizen: Part I, No.2 ‘Enhanced debate and dialogue – a European Public Sphere’ and Part
II, No.2 ‘Empowering citizens’.\textsuperscript{140} By these parts of the paper the views of the citizens on the EU should be taken into account to a greater extent and the role of the citizen should be strengthened. Thus, if coherent policies emerge from the discussion process the White Paper could be the starting point for increasing the awareness of the citizen to a certain extent.

However, already the proposals made in the White Paper remain rather vague: “Unfortunately, however, the White Paper does not provide a clear definition of the ‘European Public Sphere’ it envisages”\textsuperscript{141}. Still it emphasizes that national spheres are constitutive parts of a European Public Sphere. Furthermore, two major criticisms about the White Paper have been revealed in Chapter IV: the aim of regulating media content, and the quest to gain competences in the education field. Especially education can be a central field for creating awareness, because if pupils know from the beginning about the EU, then they might participate effectively later when they grow up. Besides competence related problems this idea might just be a noble hope - because already within the member states the knowledge about the respective political systems is not necessarily high despite being covered in all school curricula.\textsuperscript{142}

It is obvious that the last dimension (collective identification) is not reached yet, which will not change in the near future. If Publicity would be already europeanized to such an extent, then problems such as identity and language would not bother anyone anymore.

In conclusion, the Communication Strategy of the Commission is able to gain a central role in creating awareness and the recent developments are even partly directed at this precise aim.

\textbf{V.2.c. Conclusion of Appraisal}

In summary it is evident that the Commission has at least the power to influence the awareness of the citizens by its Media Policies and its Communication Strategy. The latter is more successful, but has flaws on its own, such as the problem about how to reach those who are not already interested. Therefore these activities of the Commission are not sufficient to raise the awareness of the citizens; other measures in these fields are needed as supplementation, as will be described in the following.

\begin{footnotes}{140} Compare Figure 10: White Paper on a European Information Society.
\end{footnotes}

\begin{footnotes}{141} Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer, 2006, p. 2.
\end{footnotes}

\begin{footnotes}{142} Based on Brüggemann et al., 2006.
\end{footnotes}
V.3. Recommendations

In order to come back to the research question, the recommendations given in this section will again be attached to the fields of Media Policies and Communication Strategy, but in a broader meaning than before. Nevertheless measures in completely different fields than these two can also have an impact on the level of awareness.

V.3.a. ...for Media Policies

One of the main problems of awareness raising in the field of media policies is the lack of a real European Media System, which is among the reasons why the Commission has no clear competences attributed to media policies, especially with regard to media concentration and pluralism. However, this is unlikely to change anytime soon. A change would only happen if the member states were willing to hand over some of their competences, which are today regarded by them as part of their cultural identity.

The Commission can neither influence media content nor media ownership to an extent that is able to impact the level of publicity. Besides recommending to strengthen its competences in the field of concentration and pluralism, the creation of more support programmes can be a next step. For example subsidies can be given to media projects that cover European topics – which is already done to some extent for example by special support programmes for audiovisual media broadcasting about the new member states.

Another starting point can be the support of the creation of real European media types, which is also a difficult task. In this field especially online media and its prospects are recently moving into the focus of scientific research. However, the problem about reaching those who are not interested in the EU at all cannot be tackled by such measures so far. But recent attempts such as the i2010 initiative might be able to change this at least to some extent.

So far the Commission’s Media Policies mainly engaged in attempts that tried to harmonise national legislation. Another way can be encouraging for example open access to media, for instance by online access support initiatives or language programmes that are also part of i2010.

Moreover the Commission could strive to protect the independence of journalists and public broadcasters. Support for objective and free journalism has definitely positive effects on pluralism and diversity.

Even if no policy outcomes are achieved a discussion about the topic might also create public awareness. The same holds true for the whole efforts made for media concentration and pluralism – although no explicit measures have been developed the awareness at least within the Commission must have risen.
V.3.b. ...for the Communication Strategy

Recent developments in the field of the Communication Strategy can certainly be seen as progress in the mission to increase the awareness of the citizens. Yet, coherent policies are still missing, but at least within the Commission the overall awareness of the importance of communicating the EU has changed which will also reflect to the outside. By this the relevance of communication will even increase further.

Some authors such as Brunnmayr even claim that communication shall become a complementary European policy for all new measures, with the objective to describe the measures, their importance, the included steps and the impact on the citizens. He made this claim already in 2000 – today the urge for it might even be stronger.

As the appraisal of the findings has shown, the most important feature of communication still missing is the connection of national debates. Bauer recommends the establishment of transnational discussion panels about the EU similar to examples from Ireland. On the island the New Ireland Forum and the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation were created to support the peace process in Northern Ireland and offered a place for discussion for a variety of different actors (parties, NGOs, and others) from Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

The most important requirement of such panels is continuity of the debate. So far the White Papers only created discussion for a short period of time. Within such panels not only the views of supporters must be taken into account but also the views of opponents.

As mentioned before and also emphasised in the White Paper, education is an influential domain to increase awareness. But the competences to determine what is taught are in the hands of the member states. Nevertheless, the Commission could try to create debate among the member states about how the relevance of the EU as a topic in school can be increased. Furthermore the Commission can encourage debate among education experts and teachers in order to develop a curriculum that emphasises the relevance of the EU in all subjects, such as in politics, history, geography and languages.

143 Brunnmayr, 2000.
V.4. Conclusion: Recommendations

This chapter was intended to answer the sub-question “How can the citizens’ awareness about the EU be raised by these activities or are other measures needed?” It was made clear that the citizens’ level of EU awareness is certainly influenced by the activities of the Commission. Especially the Commission’s communication is able to increase the level of awareness. Yet, it was evident that the Commission is – eminently in the field of media policies - not able to act in a fully effective way due to certain hindrances. Therefore, some recommendations have been given to strengthen the Commission’s role. However, the recommendations showed that the problems encountered by the Commission cannot easily be remedied. This point is stressed in the following table that summarizes the proposed recommendations and is supplemented by possible inherent problems.

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<tr>
<td>…Media Policies</td>
<td>Strengthen competences in the field of concentration and pluralism</td>
<td>Discuss with member states</td>
<td>Effective regulation to offer pluralism of sources</td>
<td>Member States are not willing to give up competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of more support programmes for media projects covering EU topics or to establish European Media types</td>
<td>Financial support programme, e.g. for online media</td>
<td>More EU topics on the Media can increase awareness</td>
<td>How to reach the uninterested?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support online access</td>
<td>I2010 - support to increase the computer per household ratio, language programmes</td>
<td>Easier access to information</td>
<td>Provision of facilities does not necessarily mean that they are used for information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the interdependence of journalists and public broadcasters</td>
<td>Support public broadcasters</td>
<td>Independent journalists are allegedly more objective</td>
<td>Already high standards for free journalism reached in the EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Strategy</td>
<td>Communication shall become a complementary European policy</td>
<td>Enshrinement in the treaties</td>
<td>Aiming at describing the measures, their importance, the included steps and the impact on the citizens</td>
<td>How to reach the uninterested?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of transnational discussion panels</td>
<td>Set up fora for discussion between different actors</td>
<td>Continuity in debate that includes the views of different societal actors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen political education</td>
<td>EU wide curricula</td>
<td>Increase in knowledge</td>
<td>Already difficult at nation state level</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Obviously, the main problem is to reach those citizens who are not interested in the European Union. The best way to tackle this problem is to achieve a **coherent communication strategy** that includes other EU institutions and actors from national levels. Within this strategy the attempts to communicate the EU to the citizens must be coherent from the Commission’s headquarter in Brussels to the smallest European information centre in the countryside. Moreover the strategy should be planned for a longer period of time in order to keep the discussion alive and not only when there is an event (such as elections) or a certain hot topic (such as roaming prices). The European Charter/Code of conduct proposed in the White Paper could be a starting point for such combined efforts, but the actors must commit to binding agreements about the way how to communicate.

Also media representatives must be included in the communication efforts - of course without trying to influence the media content. Allegedly there is demand for information and knowledge about the EU at the side of journalists too. Approaching journalists by offering information customized to their needs might increase the awareness among them about the EU, which then could generate more general awareness by their publications and broadcasts. Of course always respecting their independence; which is the link back to Media Policies.

So, in summary the Commission has some fields of activity which it can approach to become more effective in creating awareness – though it is evident, that communicating the EU to those who are not interested is a difficult task.
VI. Conclusion

The awareness of the citizens about the EU and also European Publicity are concepts that are not easily filled with content and the same difficulty applies to the struggle to find tools to influence or even create them. However - and as asked for in the main research question (How can the Commission’s activities related to European Publicity raise the awareness of the citizens about the EU) - the Commission can use – although maybe in a limited way – the fields of Media Policy and Communication Strategy as such tools. Within those fields especially the Communication Strategy proved to be an effective way of getting into touch with the citizens directly, although it is still a long way to set-up a coherent communication policy. Also Media Policies have an impact on the awareness, although in a more distant and indirect meaning. By regulating the media market the Commission can ensure that the power of information is spread among many hands.

Still it must be emphasised that the Commission’s main motivation behind its activities most likely is something else. Especially regulating the media market in the first place derives from economic considerations and not from ideas about publicity. The Communication Strategy despite being partly aimed at the citizens is also directed at communication as a whole. Still the final results of initiatives in both fields can eventually lead to a creation of European Publicity and by this increase the awareness of the citizens.

This possibility has been assessed in this Master Thesis. It has been argued which effect the activities of the Commission have on European Publicity; and if the measures are sufficient to impact the level of the citizens’ awareness at the same time. It was evident, that especially Media Policies are only a half effective mean to reach this goal. However, just the discussion of matters concerning pluralism and media concentration and also the activities involved in Plan D might trigger off some sort of awareness about the topics. Yet there should be no illusion that discussing European issues and listening to the citizens are sufficient measures to get the citizens really involved and to establish some kind of European discourse.

The citizens do not only need to feel involved and informed, they must actually be involved; their opinion really must make a difference. Only then public participation in the political system can be strengthened. In the end, the major effect of publicity for awareness can be its ability to integrate several individuals into a europeanized community that is active, informed and participating in the political system.

Of course these are highly optimistic hopes to solve a tremendously complex problem. Nevertheless: not even thinking about what might change does not
change anything. Discussion can always be a starting point for action and progress. And this is exactly what the Commission’s role can become: it can engage as an agenda setter in the public debate. Even if the immediate result is not the emergence of a European Publicity, national debates can be a starting point for a Europeanization of the Public. By this in the end publicity and thus also awareness can arise.

The complex problem analysed in this research made clear that a variety of effects need to be taken together in order to get a full picture of the topic, its inherent flaws and also of its possible remedies. Yet this complexity has been at the same time the main problem and difficulty of this research. Media Policies and the Communication Strategy imply a variety of different research interests and problems. Also the way how these subjects are approached can vary – between based on political science, law or economic studies, and also communication studies.

It was tried to find an integrated approach and way of reasoning. But in order to gain the full picture, rather than the details, a broad variety of aspects needed to be neglected in order to keep on the track of the research question. In Media Policies the focus was laid upon the TWF directive and the attempts to regulate media concentration. Of course the Commission also engages in a variety of support programmes for media content, and also is engaged in the new converging audiovisual/online sector.

Especially in the analysis of the Communication Strategy the way how it is communicated was neglected in order to appraise the attitude towards communication. But communicating such a broad topic requires of course also a complex structure of actors. Furthermore the recipients’ side was completely left out. How the citizens regard and accept the communicated output was of no consideration at all.

Eventually some of these neglected aspects could have even been part of an important problem or of a solution. Still, the focus was chosen for clear reasons. Media Policies are directed at the main communication device in a democracy: the media. It is used to communicate issues from the government to the citizens and vice versa. In order to do so in a free and independent way the set-up of the media system is vital. Free journalists and free media can only work effectively and provide all kinds of information in free media systems.

Because the simple existence of sources of information is not enough to create awareness of a subject, the Communication Strategy was chosen as a second pillar of the research. If the citizens do not seem to be interested in the EU, than analysing the role of the citizens as recipients would have made no sense at all. The Commission must be active in order to get the citizens
involved, and the research showed, that it had to learn the importance of communication for itself.

Besides those problems of focussing the research there are of course some flaws inherent in studies about the EU. The history and development of the European Union has shown that it is a fast changing process. For example the rejected Constitutional Treaty is one of the most discussed issues at the time of writing. At the beginning of writing of this thesis it remained in a complete standstill, but already at the European Council in the end of June this inaction changed. Furthermore there are always new developments in policy areas and sometimes the implementation by the member states takes some time so that the effects of European policies and initiatives are not always noticeable on the spot.

The broadness of the subject offers a huge variety of possibilities for future research. Most obvious are the neglected parts of the research mentioned above. With regard to Media Policies especially the field of support programmes needs further research. Obviously with regard to the Communication Strategy the outcome of the White Paper needs to be analysed.

But some follow-up researches can even strengthen the results of this thesis. For example interviews with Commissioners or other responsible persons for the Communication Strategy could provide for in-depth insights in the reasons for change of attitude. Or a comparative study of the member states’ media systems could add knowledge about different approaches to regulate media concentration.

Another strand of research could be concerned with the role and attitude of the citizens towards for example the Communication Strategy, and also about the opinion about the EU as such. Eurobarometer surveys might be a good starting point for research in this field.

As mentioned before, the EU is a ‘study subject in progress’, so new dimension of the research can emerge at any time, which is also one interesting point of European Studies.

Recommendations for such broad fields of research are always hard to give, because the implied problems are manifold and complex. Notwithstanding above recommendations have been given in order to raise the EU awareness of the citizens. It was made clear that these also have flaws on their own. Moreover, the findings of this research also imply some general recommendations for the policy fields concerned with Media and Communication as a whole.

The main problem of Media Policies is the unclear alignment of competences. The scope and especially the goal of Media policies are more than vague and poorly distributed between the member states and the European
Union. Also the recent discussion about the new audiovisual directive shows that the struggle for competences will not be over soon, due to the unwillingness of both sides to give up competences; despite the fact that the technological developments tore down the nation state based borders of economic media activity. Thus the EU needs to gain increasing competences in this field in order to act effectively as a regulator. However, the cultural diversity of the different media systems must be respected. Thus, the work of the Commission might once more be like walking a tightrope.

Communication Policies need to be better coordinated and especially more coherent. In the last years one initiative followed the other. The action plan focussed on internal communication of the Commission, Plan D on the dialogue with the citizens, and the White Paper represented a partnership approach. All of them were, are or will be followed by related actions and activities. The public awareness might even be diminished by this stream of measures and actions.

In conclusion, the Commission can be the driving force for an increasing level of citizens’ awareness – but only if it tries to be.
Literature

**Academic Literature**

- Cosse, Hannah (2005), “European Publicity – A new way to democratise the EU?”, *Ba-Thesis*, University of Twente, unpublished.

Official Documents
Legal Texts

- Charta of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
- Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal C 310 of 16 December 2004
- TWF directive 1989 (89/552/EEC)
- TWF directive revised 1997 (97/36/EC)

Online

- Upson, Ricard (2006), Connecting with Citizens – Does the EU have the will to tackle its information deficit?, European Citizen Action Service, www.ecas.org, visited on the 15th of July.
Glossary

Awareness...
the level of publicity has the following functions for the citizens: to enable enlightened understanding and effective participation; and it can lead to Europeanization of the public. These three together amount for the level of awareness. Or more simple: citizens’ awareness of the EU simply means that the citizens have knowledge about the political system that enables them to participate in it.

Commission’s Communication...
everything that is publicised by the commission.

Communication Strategy...
includes all efforts made by the Commission as a whole to communicate policies and the EU as a whole.

European Publicity...
is limited to EU-wide publicity that consist on the one hand of the European media system (consisting of different national systems) and on the other of the communication by the Commission (providing a space for discourse).

Information...
is used as a term to describe the content that is provided by the process of communication and also includes online content.

Media...
can either mean just one media entity such as a newspaper or TV broadcaster or all the media entities together.

Media System...
includes the different media entities, regulators, political actors and their interaction.

Media Concentration...
can be defined as an increase in the presence of one (monopoly) or few media companies (oligopoly) in any market as a result of acquisitions and mergers or the disappearance of competitors.

Pluralism...
means a simultaneous diversity of content and ownership.
Annexes

Annex 1: Meyer’s system of communication

European Publicity as Communication System


Annex 2: Sources used for Information

Used sources when looking for information about the European Union, its policies, its institutions - % EU

- Television: 70% (E865 Sp. 2006), 55% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Daily newspapers: 41% (E865 Sp. 2006), 42% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Radio: 31% (E865 Sp. 2006), 30% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- The Internet: 23% (E865 Sp. 2006), 22% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues: 22% (E865 Sp. 2006), 24% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Other newspapers, magazines: 15% (E865 Sp. 2006), 13% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Books, brochures, information leaflets: 11% (E865 Sp. 2006), 14% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Attending conferences, talks, meetings: 3% (E865 Sp. 2006), 4% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Telephone (Info lines, Europe Direct, etc.): 1% (E865 Sp. 2006), 1% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Other (SPONTANEOUS): 1% (E865 Sp. 2006), 1% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- DK: 1% (E865 Sp. 2006), 0% (E864 Aut. 2005)
- Never look for such information, not interested (SPONTANEOUS): 12% (E865 Sp. 2006), 11% (E864 Aut. 2005)

Annex 3: Media Policy Competence in Commission

Table 4.1 Directorate Generals and Commissioners holding media portfolios 1989–2004

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<td>President</td>
<td>Delors</td>
<td>Delors</td>
<td>Santer</td>
<td>Prodi</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG I (External relations)</td>
<td>Andresen</td>
<td>van den Broek</td>
<td>Brittan</td>
<td>Lammy</td>
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<td>DG III</td>
<td>Bangemann</td>
<td>Bangemann</td>
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<td>DG IV</td>
<td>Brittan</td>
<td>van Miert</td>
<td>Monti</td>
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<td>DG (Competition)</td>
<td>Dondelinger</td>
<td>Deus de Pinheiro</td>
<td>Oreja</td>
<td>Reding</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG XIII (DG Information Society)</td>
<td>Pandolfi</td>
<td>Bangemann</td>
<td>Bangemann</td>
<td>Liikanen</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG XV</td>
<td>Scrivener</td>
<td>Scrivener</td>
<td>d'Archirafi</td>
<td>Monti</td>
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<td>DG XV (DG Internal Market)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG XIX</td>
<td>Schmidhuber</td>
<td>Schmidhuber</td>
<td>Liikanen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Commissioners responsible for the media ownership portfolio are indicated in italic.

Source: Harcourt, 2005, p. 67

Annex 4: Internal Structure of DG Communication

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm
Annex 5: Seven Strategies for Information Policy

<table>
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<th>Propaganda</th>
<th>Marketing</th>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion ignoring basic communicative norms</td>
<td>Using symbols in order to appeal to emotions</td>
<td>Explaining policies and giving reasons</td>
<td>Discussing politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Raising awareness for issues</td>
<td>Persuasive communication</td>
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<tr>
<th>Arcane Policy</th>
<th>Transparent Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Silencing the public sphere</td>
<td>Direct access to comprehensive information</td>
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<tr>
<th>Asymmetric communication</th>
<th>Symmetric communication</th>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarian governance</td>
<td>Deliberative governance</td>
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</table>

Source: Brüggemann, 2005, p. 10

Annex 6 : Article 255 EC

1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.

2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents.
## Annex 7 Structure of Plan D

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<td><strong>1. Introduction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Restoring public confidence in the EU, Target audiences and modern media, A long term commitment, From listening to further involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Assisting National Debates</strong></td>
<td>Organisation of national debates</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Content</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Europe’s economic and social development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Feeling towards Europe and the Union’s tasks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Europe’s borders and its role in the world:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Initiatives at the Community Level</strong></td>
<td>Stimulating a wider public debate</td>
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<td>Promoting citizens’ participation in the democratic process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tools to generate a dialogue on European policies</td>
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<td>Visits by Commissioners to Member States</td>
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<td>Commissioners availability to National Parliaments</td>
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<td>Representations open to the public</td>
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<td>Utilising Europe Direct Centres for regional events</td>
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<td>European Round Table for Democracy</td>
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<td>European Goodwill Ambassadors</td>
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<td>Promoting more effective consultation</td>
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<td>Support for European citizens’ projects</td>
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<td>Greater openness</td>
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<td>Increased voter participation</td>
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<td>Specific Eurobarometer on the future of Europe</td>
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<td>Internet</td>
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<td>Target focus groups</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Conclusion</strong></td>
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Annex 8: Plan D – comprehensive stocktaking of the actions implemented by the Commission October 2005 – April 2006

In addition to hundreds of visits to Member States, including over 100 visits by the President and Members of the Commission to national parliaments, the Commission has organised a series of special, high profile visits as part of its Plan D programme to engage in real debate with Europe’s citizens. Some of these activities are described below.

1. Examples of actions implemented since October 2005

Stimulating a wider public debate

- Visits by Commissioners to Member States: In addition to the normal range of Commissioner visits, five specially-designed Plan D visits have taken place involving President Barroso, Vice-President Wallström, Vice-President Barrot and Commissioners Špidla, Ferrero-Waldner, Figel and Potočnik. These visits offered a unique mix of meetings, including national and local government, national parliaments, the media, representative organisations and the general public, to allow for an exchange with a genuinely comprehensive cross-section of society.
- The next Plan D visits in Denmark on 18/19 May and in Latvia and Lithuania in June will take the total to eight Plan D visits by the time of the European Council.
- Commissioners’ availability to National Parliaments: In 2005, almost 100 contacts or visits by Commissioners to national parliaments took place. By April 2006, Plan D had added more than 40 Commissioner visits to National Parliaments, covering almost all Member States. Some of these meetings were the first time that national parliaments had received the Commission President or Commissioners in plenary session.
- Representations open to the public & Europe Direct centres: All Commission Representations in Member States organise monthly or weekly “open door days” for conferences, press briefings and thematic presentations.

Promoting citizens’ participation in the democratic process

- Promoting more effective consultation: The White Paper on a European communication policy adopted by the Commission on 1 February 2006 will lead to a more concrete action plan after the six months consultation period, during which all interested European citizens and stakeholders are invited to express their views (over 500 contributions had been registered by the beginning of May 2006).
- Support for European citizens’ projects: On 17 March 2006, the Commission launched a € 2 million call for proposals to provide financial support to projects aiming to organise trans-national citizens’ events (i.e. involving at least 4-5 Member States per project). Projects are currently being selected. This call for proposal aims to encourage European organisations’ initiatives promoting public participation in debates on topics regarding the EU, as described in Plan D.
- Greater openness: The Commission welcomed the Council’s 21 December 2005 conclusions, which committed the Council to an increasing number of public sessions, thus improving openness and transparency. In addition, it has set up a public register of the expert groups that helps the Commission in preparing legislative proposals and policy initiatives, accessible online since November 2005. Also, as part of the European Transparency Initiative launched in November 2005, on 3 May 2006 the Commission adopted a Green Paper to launch a debate on lobbying and on the introduction of legal obligations for Member States to publish information about the beneficiaries of funds under shared management, as well as on the Commission’s consultation practices.

Tools to generate a dialogue on European policies

- Specific Eurobarometer on the Future of Europe: A quantitative and qualitative survey took place in all 25 Member States in February-March 2006.
- Targeted focus groups: “Spring Day Europe 2006”, launched in January 2006 (thus celebrating its 5th anniversary), is an initiative created and organised – with the ac-
tive participation of Commissioners – to stimulate interest and debates about Europe among young people. On 4 May 2006, 7,354 schools had participated in Spring Day.

**Partnership with the European institutions and bodies**
Smooth cooperation and synergies were at the heart of the Inter-institutional Group this partnership into practical and concrete actions. As a result, members and collaborators of EU Institutions and bodies took part in, for example, visits to the Member States, and contributed to the “Debate Europe” on-line forum. They also promoted and participated in activities with schools through the Spring Day initiative. Many 9 May events foreseen in the Member States were organised jointly by the Commission’s Representations and the European Parliament offices, while the inter-parliamentary forum with National Parliaments was organised in Brussels by the European Parliament and the Austrian Parliament. Furthermore, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee have been strong partners in the implementation of Plan D, making full use of their capacity to link at the local/regional level and with the social actors.

**Strengthened relations with the national parliaments**
Further efforts will be made in close co-operation with the European Parliament and the national parliaments, for example in exploring ways for ensuring proper information on the Annual Policy Strategy, as well as the Annual Work and Legislative Programme. The Commission also stands open to receive input from the national parliaments to initiatives at the pre-legislative stage, based on the provisions of the current Treaties.

2. Assessment

Plan D is not a rescue operation for the Constitution
Plan D aims “to encourage a wide-ranging discussion between the EU institutions and citizens”. It intends to set up a method by which citizens can be involved in the European decision-making process. Contents of debates generated within the framework of Plan D can bring on the stage ideas both on policy substance but also on new instruments and tools, some of which are linked to an effective and accountable decision making.

A necessary involvement by Member States
The Commission sees itself mainly as a facilitator. Six months after the adoption of Plan D, it must be pointed out that the involvement of the Member States in the launch of national debates remains uneven.

A long-term exercise
The Plan D activities started to taking off in the first half of 2006, and it is therefore too early to draw any substantial conclusions. Plan D is part of a long-term exercise, using new methods related to the communication with citizens. Setting up a constructive dialogue cannot be done from one day to the other. Furthermore, such a dialogue can not be carried out only at the initiative of the EU Institutions and/or from Brussels. It needs to go local and have the active support and involvement of the Member States.

Multilingualism
From the Commission’s part, Plan D actions are undertaken in all the official languages of the EU (on-line discussion forum; Spring Day Europe), while initiatives carried out at the national, regional and local levels by the Commission’s Representations in Member States are undertaken in the respective language of the country. In this context, it must be stressed that multilingualism is a vital tool for enhancing a true dialogue with citizens. For this reason, the Commission and its institutional partners are striving to provide information on the web aimed at the general public in as many languages as possible.
Annex 9: Response to White Paper on a European Communication Policy

The following quotations from the report show the general attitude towards the white paper. In general, the article claims for a new treaty article to overcome the information gap that is directly linked to the democracy deficit. Furthermore it argues that a huge information campaign is needed.

- “The Commission is concentrating on what it calls the ‘communication gap’, over which it has very little direct influence given the large number of actors involved at all levels, while overlooking both the importance of under-information and the extent to which it can – and should – exercise a major influence in overcoming it.” p. 4
- “The provision of reliable factual information about the EU should be seen as a citizens’ right.” p. 4 It would require an increase in spending.
- “A ‘virtuous circle’ can be envisaged: a more widespread awareness of the facts about current EU issues will stimulate a greater understanding of the range of actions which the EU can take. This will enable people to judge the positions which parties and interest groups take on particular issues. Political debate will be strengthened, and that will attract media coverage, which in turn will help the choices for EU policies to become clearer, thereby providing a stimulus to greater participation in EU.” p. 5


Annex 10: Degree of Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Europeanization</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Measure</th>
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</table>
| Low                      | Monitoring Governance - the attention of public debate to European institutions and policies | Plan D – 13 Actions Plan (see figure 9) | Stimulating a wider public debate by:  
• Visits by Commissioners to Member States  
• Commissioners availability to National Parliaments  
• Representations open to the public  
• Etc.  
Promoting citizens’ participation in the democratic process  
• Promoting more effective consultation  
• Support for European citizens’ projects  
• Greater openness  
• Increased voter participation  
Tools to generate a dialogue on European Policies  
• Specific Eurobarometer on the future of Europe  
• Internet  
• Target focus groups |
|                         | Mutual Observation - awareness of debates and developments in other member states | White Paper | Part I: Putting Communication at the service of Citizens  
• No. 2. Enhanced debate and dialogue – a European Public Sphere  
  o Citizen shall feel more included  
Part II: Taking work forward  
• No. 2. Empowering citizens  
  o Improving political education, bring citizens in contact with each other, improve contact between citizens and institutions |
| High                     | Discursive Exchange – communication between various public spheres | | |
|                          | Collective Identification - emergence of a common transn. ‘community of communication’ | | Not yet achieved |