The conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in Central and Eastern European countries in the context of EU enlargement

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Abstract

Recently democratic conditionality, that is the dependable perspective of becoming an EU member after a democratic reform, has become a buzz-word in the study of European Union enlargement, evoking a constantly growing interest in the academic world and the political circles.

Despite the fact that EU democratic conditionality has been acknowledged as one of the most powerful foreign policy tools exercised within the European arena, there is a rapidly growing concern over the effectiveness of conditionality due to diverging record of its impact on policy change in accession countries and policy areas.

In order to address this concern, current master’s research investigates the causal conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the 3 countries of Central and Eastern European region subject to this policy – Latvia, Romania and Ukraine. Being based on the two most widespread models found in the contemporary literature on democratic conditionality – the external incentives model and the social influence model – the research applies the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to investigate the conditions under which governments in Central and Eastern Europe have complied with EU democratic requirements.

The study subsequently discovers that a credible perspective of EU accession combined with low domestic power costs for the target governments have been necessary conditions for compliance. Thus, the investigation corroborates the external incentives model. Additionally, a high commitment to European community has proved to be sufficient condition for compliance even when the costs of the governments were high. Country’s economic interdependence with the EU has been also found necessary for the effective democratic conditionality, unlike the third condition of the social influence model – societal salience – which has appeared to be inessential for compliance.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the, all main European regional organizations, including the European Union (EU), declared human rights and liberal democracy to be the normative foundations of the New Europe and developed support for the democratic transition and democratic consolidation of Central and Eastern Europe as a new core task for themselves (Schimmelfennig 2004: 2) In Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), on their turn, there has been a strong hope that the EU will provide extra protection against totalitarian temptations, fight corruption, and improve the quality of public administration and the system of justice—in other words, that the accession will help to improve and consolidate democracy, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law (Sadurski 2004: 371). Therefore, the enlargement to the East became an official policy objective of the EU. In order to prepare CEE countries for the future integration, complex aid schemes and conditionality frameworks were developed and significant resources were committed (Bailey and de Propris 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobl 2003; Vachudova 2005).

Nowadays the enlargement is often called the most successful foreign policy of the European Union, which has been credited with having contributed significantly to the democratization in the transition countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007). It is significant therefore, that the region’s countries that joined the EU have become the most successful examples of democratic consolidation in the entire postcommunist world.

Thus, it is not of big surprise, that in the contemporary academic literature it is widely argued that the democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries and their integration into the European Union are mutually reinforcing processes. The available evidence indeed shows that the new members and the candidate countries are better off both politically and economically than the other countries of the former Soviet bloc. However, EU enlargement as a form of democracy promotion has still remained strikingly undertheorized and understudied (Ekiert 2006). Additionally, taking into an account the rapidly growing criticism of the effect of EU enlargement on the state of democratic transitions in CEECs (e.g. Moravcsik 2002; Zweifel 2002a; Ekiert 2006; Sedelmeier 2007) it would be extremely fascinating for a researcher to reconsider the relationship between the phenomena of the enlargement and the democratization, that is the “process of the establishment and stabilization of substantive democracy” (Schmitz and Sell, 1999: 25) in the region.

Indeed, at present the study of EU democracy promotion has become the subject of a large number of book-length studies and a vast variety of theories and concepts aimed to explain the role of the EU in the democratization of the CEECs can be found in the literature. Nevertheless, most of these studies agree that democratic conditionality, that is, the dependable perspective of becoming an EU member after a democratic reform, was the most effective among the EU’s strategies and instruments of democracy promotion (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2007). The significant increase in the use of
conditionality by the European Union in the late 1990s and early 2000, has coincided with the outburst of studies investigating its impact on a number of countries, policy areas and institutional settings (e.g. Schmitter 1995; Grabbe 1999, 2001, 2003; Mattli and Plumper 2002; Plumper et al. 2003; Vachudova 2001, 2005). Yet, these studies have depicted conditionality as a relatively flawless and successful promoter of democracy in Eastern Europe. However, there are only few investigations that have systematically analyzed the application and impact of political conditionality towards the CEECs or its evolution over time.

Although the EU conditionality has been acknowledged as one of the most powerful foreign policy instruments for promoting democratic standards in the accession countries, currently there is a growing concern over the effectiveness of EU conditionality due to diverging record of its impact on policy change across the accession countries and target policy areas. Thus, most of the candidate countries have managed to become European consolidated democracies, which are or about to become EU and NATO members. By contrast, other countries of the region, particularly in the Balkans, have not yet achieved democratic stability. Others still, mainly successor states of the Soviet Union, are consolidating autocracies rather than democracies (Schimmelfennig 2004: 2). Hence, I have found it strikingly interesting to examine under which conditions has the EU democratic conditionality policy a positive impact on compliance with human rights and liberal democratic norms in Central Eastern Europe.

The present investigation addresses therefore a number of important questions. The central research question is as follows. What are the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)? In other words, what are the driving factors for candidate countries subject to democratic conditionality? In order to give an answer to the central research question, to conduct more in-depth analysis and further to substantiate its findings, the current study subsequently develops the following research sub-questions: 1) What exactly qualify here under the term ‘effectiveness’? 2) And if the democratic conditionality policy has been effective, how has it influenced the real state of democratization in CEECs? 3) And finally, what lessons can be drawn from conditionality policy exercised in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to enhance the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality?

The study asserts, that in the case of CEECs, the effective democratic conditionality means the compliance with the democratic criteria set by the European Commission. Thus, the effectiveness of conditionality is directly linked to democratic changes in target countries including policy change and successful EU rule transfer. Consequently, the current master’s research is a qualitative comparative study investigating the causal conditions of the compliance for the candidate countries of Central and Eastern European region.
The theoretical starting point of the study is an attempt to embrace the discussion on the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the literature on EU enlargement and the rationalist-constructivist debate in International Relations. Both academic debates have opposed a rationalist external incentives model of the impact of international organizations, which focuses on a crucial importance of credible incentives and political costs of adoption of transposed norms, with constructivist social influence model presupposing the importance of the social factors for compliance (Schimmelfennig 2004). The research thus contrasts the external incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) and a social influence model (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) to test the causal relevance of the explanatory factors suggested by both in a comparative analysis.

**Figure 1. Conditions of compliance in EU democratic conditionality**

Subsequently, on the basis of two competing models the theoretical construct framing current investigation has been built in the form of 5 theoretically developed hypotheses to be tested. These hypotheses have been constructed in the form of the separate assumptions presupposing the relevance of two sets of conditions (the independent variables of the research) for the increased effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality, resulting, correspondingly, in compliance of the target countries (the dependent variable of the investigation).

The first test hypothesis postulates that differences in the credibility of EU accession, or the likelihood that this reward will be granted in the short-term future, increase the effectiveness of EU conditionality:

- **Hypothesis I:** the high credibility of accession of the target country increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

The second factor of the external incentives model assumed to be crucial for compliance is the size of domestic costs of fulfilling EU democracy and human rights conditions for the target government:

- **Hypothesis II:** the low domestic costs of democratic transition for the target government increase the effectiveness of conditionality.
On the contrast to the external incentives model focused exclusively on material bargaining, and in order to explain the different results the conditionality has had in different countries, the present study also takes into account the social influence mechanism (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), which suggests the relevance of several societal factors to the increased effectiveness of conditionality. Consequently, the first alternative hypothesis put forward assumes that the high commitment of target country’s government, that is the identification with the EU community of states (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) matters:

- **Alternative Hypothesis I:** the high commitment of the target government to the EU international community increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

The second alternative hypothesis is based on the assumption that, according to the material bargaining mechanism, the potential losses resulted from non-accession will mobilize societal actors to support EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). By extension, it is expected that this societal mobilization will be higher in the countries with the higher degree of economic interdependence with the EU:

- **Alternative Hypothesis II:** the high economic interdependence between the target country and the EU increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

Finally, Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) point out the importance of such factor as the societal salience, that is the degree to which society defines itself as 'European’ and to which it values liberal political principles” (Ibid.: 500). It is argued that the strong societal opposition within the target country can put pressures on the national government thus inclining it to align its policy with the democratic conditions. I therefore propose the following separate societal salience hypothesis:

- **Alternative Hypothesis III:** the high degree of the societal salience within the target country increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

To test these five expectations, I study three cases where the available evidence expects conditionality to matter: Latvia, Romania and Ukraine. The cases to study on have been selected due to the criterion of the significant conflict with the EU democratic rules, and in order to include a high degree of variation on the independent variables and their combinations. The study has also confirmed that the choice of the other candidate countries wouldn’t have given a substantial variation on the independent variables. Consequently, the findings of the research could be successfully used to draw on the general conclusions for all the accession countries of the Central and Eastern European region.

Moreover, to my deep conviction, the present research goes beyond the borders of the existing theoretical and comparative studies on EU democratic conditionality by extending the number of cases under the study and applying much stronger austerity to their analysis. For instance, the past studies of Kubicek (2003) and Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) utilize a similar theoretical framework, but fail to seize the broad range of the empirical data and to apply adequate and rigorous methods for its
processing and analysis. The research design of these studies doesn’t allow embracing the whole diversity of conditions and outcomes produced, as in each country they vary between time periods and issues. Moreover, the number of the cases is even smaller than the number of variables that causes the research design to be indeterminate. These weaknesses are partially addressed in the work of Schimmelfennig (2004) which investigates the conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in 9 accession candidates. However, the researcher doesn’t provide enough empirical evidence for the values of the variables and distinguish between relatively small numbers of cases for each country that grows concerns about the reliability of the research findings. In addition, there are numerous descriptive single-case studies, which have been even far more distant from the understanding of the whole complexity of EU democratic conditionality and the mechanisms through which it can succeed in the accession countries (e.g. Zielonka and Pravda 2001; Pridham 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007; Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). By contrast, the current investigation covers various issues and time periods across 3 mentioned countries resulting in 32 conditional configurations, and applies the techniques of combinatorial logic in Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

The analytical results show the relevance of the high commitment of target government to the effectiveness of democratic conditionality. When the commitment is high, the EU efforts to induce compliance in norm-violating states usually succeed. However, high commitment has to be combined with other conditions to produce compliance. According to the external incentives model, the second crucial precondition for the success of democratic conditionality is the high credibility of accession for the target country. This assumption was generally corroborated by the results of QCA. In the absence of the credibility of accession, there will be no compliance even when other conditions under the external incentives and social influence models are highly favourable. On the other hand, the credible incentives and high commitment has not appeared to be the only necessary conditions for compliance. The analysis has brought to light the third individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition of compliance found in the third subset of solutions – the low costs of adoption of EU rule. The high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU has shown up to be the fourth and the final necessary condition of compliance. The principal finding emerging from this analysis is that the high degree of the societal salience has proved to be irrelevant for compliance.

Hence, the analysis generally corroborates the external incentives model based on the importance of the high credibility and low costs as a sufficient combination of conditions for compliance and completes it with the two factors from the alternative social influence model – high commitment and high economic interdependence. It has been therefore proved by the study that this ‘mixed model’ works even better then the pure external incentives model for compliance to be achieved.

Ultimately, the findings of this paper, on the one hand, contribute to the relevant scholarly literature by suggesting causal mechanisms linking EU conditionality to national compliance, and on
the other, it has been a policy oriented research intended to elucidate the actual compliance problems faced by several CEECs and therefore being able to serve as a guide for the EU to elaborate a set of measures in order to increase the effectiveness of its democratic conditionality policy.

To my deep conviction, the valuable contribution of my master’s thesis is to the literature on EU conditionality. Through fine-grained analysis of the conditions of EU conditionality, the paper displays the conditions relevant to its success in the Central and Eastern European region, and builds a new, ‘mixed’ model of democracy promotion. The second contribution of current study is to the broader body of work on the effectiveness of international institutions. This literature argues that to elicit state compliance with their norms, international organizations should be designed in a way to enforce such action (e.g. via sanctions, penalties, withholding the accession etc.). My thesis challenges this claim since compliance doesn’t occur in the absence of the credible incentives. Besides, the analysis demonstrates the importance of domestic-level factors such as low costs of adoption and high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU. The third contribution of the paper is to the literature on the separate EU candidates’ compliance with the democratic criteria.

However, I believe that scientific responsibility includes analysis of not only theoretical but also real world policy implications of the findings. Having investigated the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target CEE countries, the current research provides ample support for the development of this enhanced conditionality to ensure compliance of the new accession candidates. Since credible incentives have been proved to be the necessary condition for compliance, the EU should act promptly to establish integration and provide a credible membership perspective with respect to such countries as Ukraine and Georgia where democratic revolutions have been able to remove authoritarian regimes (Schimmelfennig: 2004). This will, hopefully, boost democratic reforms. On the other hand, the studied cases provide us no evidence that that looser political accession criteria and a policy of “integration before consolidation” would help. Instead, taking again into account the relevance of the credible incentives, the European Union and NATO should reinforce their rewards-based strategy by significantly increasing technical and financial assistance aimed directly at promoting democratic reforms in the candidate countries. Also, as the economic interdependence of the target country and the EU has been tested to be relevant for compliance, the EU should apply a wide range of instruments to ensure the development of economic cooperation with the candidate CEECs that can also indirectly facilitate the democratization of the latest. Finally, as the high degree of societal salience proved to be irrelevant condition of compliance this component should be reinforced. Since Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by weak civil societies and poor democratic political cultures, the EU has not been successful in appealing to societal salience as the powerful tool being able to promote democratic policy change. Thus, to build effective conditionality strategy the EU should assist with the expert advice and financial aid to national democratic
movements and NGOs in order to build a mature and democratic civil society in CEECs. This can promote democratic changes and speed up the democratic reforms in the countries of the region.

In order to make the line of the mentioned arguments consistent and subsequent research findings clear the paper has been structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework of the investigation, defines its dependent and independent variables and builds up the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 3 elaborates the research strategy, develops the methodology of the current study, provides conceptualization and operationalization of the variables followed by the operationalization of political democracy, and discusses the research design and the selection of the cases. Chapter 4 provides the narratives on the 3 studied countries, conducts the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and interprets its findings. Chapter 5 concludes this report.
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework: enlargement, conditionality and democratization in Central and Eastern European countries

This section outlines the theoretical framework for the current investigation aimed to examine the causal link between enlargement, particularly between it’s the most developed mechanism – democratic conditionality – and the democratization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to arrive to the choice of the mechanism of democratization under the study, as well as to develop sufficient framework for the further analysis, the typology of the mechanisms of democratization presented in the contemporary academic literature is discussed. The dependent and independent variables of the research are then discerned. The causal relationship between the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality and democratic compliance of the target countries of Central and Eastern European region crucial for answering the research question is discussed. Next to that, the main and the alternative hypotheses based on the two competing models are designed to test the conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality.

2.1. EU enlargement and democratization

This subsection is aimed to elucidate the link between the process of EU enlargement and the democratization of Central and Eastern European countries.

To start with, according to Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007), after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement has been credited with having contributed significantly to the democratization in the transition countries of the region. The Cold War divisions excluded Eastern Europe from the participation in the Community. The collapse of communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe therefore opened for European organizations the opportunity to extend the zone of democracy beyond the former ‘Iron Curtain’ (Ekiert 2006). In Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), on their turn, there has been a hope that the EU will provide extra protection against totalitarian temptations, fight corruption, and improve the quality of public administration and the system of justice— in other words, that EU accession will help to improve and consolidate democracy, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law (Sadurski 2004: 371).

Hence, shortly after 1989, the enlargement to the East became an official policy objective of the EU (Ekiert 2006). In order to prepare CEE countries for the future integration, complex aid schemes and conditionality frameworks were developed and significant resources were committed (Bailey and de Propris 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobl 2003; Vachudova 2005). Dimitrova and Pridham (2004) aptly call this model ‘democracy promotion through integration’.

On his turn, Ekiert (2006) notes that Central and East European countries (CEECs) that joined the EU have been the most successful examples of democratic consolidation in the entire postcommunist...
The enlargement has been called therefore the most effective mechanism of democratization ever developed and applied (Smith 2001; Ekiert 2006).

However, as Raik (2004) notices, during the preaccession period, it was widely taken for granted that preparations for EU membership promoted the democratization of the candidate countries. In this way, EU enlargement as a form of democracy promotion remained strikingly undertheorized and understudied (Ekiert 2006). Ekiert (2006) emphasizes that the assumption about the complementarity between the process of European integration and the requirements of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe has often been challenged. The critics of the enlargement often describe it as a “neo-Byzantine,” “neo-colonial,” or “neo-imperial” project (Borocz 2001, Engelbrekt 2002). According to Ekiert (2006), elite efforts to succeed in membership negotiations distorted a democratic policy making process, and made emerging East European democracies ‘shallow’ and unaccountable.

Although Raik (2004) argues that the European Union has indeed in many ways supported democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, he stresses that it has also put new constraints on the functioning of democracy. Hence, despite the accession requirements may be beneficial in the short run to address challenges of postcommunist transitions, the long-term consequences of accession are less certain and can be potentially harmful to democracy (Ibid.). Thus, nowadays public debate and academic inquiry have increasingly focused on the ‘democratic deficit’ the EU can transfer to Central and Eastern European countries (e.g. Moravcsik 2002; Zweifel 2002a, b).

There is also a growing concern over the depth of democratic norms (Pridham 2005) and quality of democracy (Ekiert 2006) in many CEE countries. Some analysts express pessimism about the follow-up to EU conditionality following accession (Pridham 2005). For instance, looking back at the 2004 accession of eight post-Communist CEECs, Sedelmeier (2006) identified a possible ‘Eastern compliance problem’. Researcher referred to factors that give rise to concerns that the application and enforcement of EU rules after accession will be problematic, including especially the changed incentive structure following accession (Sedelmeier 2006).

Nevertheless, nowadays in the academic literature it is widely argued that the democratization of Central and Eastern European countries and their integration into the European Union are mutually strengthening processes. Available evidence shows that the new members and the candidate countries are better off both politically and economically than the other countries of the former Soviet bloc (Ekiert 2006). However, taking into account the above-mentioned criticism of the effect of EU enlargement on the state of democratic transitions in CEECs, the current study is keen to reconsider the relationship between the phenomena of the enlargement and the democratization in the region.

Consequently, in order to initially frame the research we need to refer to the concepts of democracy and democratization.
As regards political democracy, nowadays in the social sciences a vast variety of its definitions have come into use (Bollen, 1980). As de Schweinitz (1964:13) observed: “Democracy is one of those troublesome words which means all things to all people”. Despite the developed variety of the definitions democracy remains “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1956), since there is not at present, nor there will likely be in future, a full consensus on its definition and content. Thus, according to Mazo, instead of attempting to find a uniform definition, it is useful to picture different interpretations of democracy along a continuum (2005: 1), beginning with the minimalist Dahl’s definition of democracy which entails such elements as free and fair election and freedom to join and form organizations (1971: 2-3). At the other end of this continuum there is a much more complex maximalist conceptualization of democracy, including such its elements as minority rights, ability of public to engage freely within a strong civil society, and a freedom of conscience (Grugel 2002: 5).

Hence, it is not of big surprise that the European Union in general avoids defining the notion 'democracy’ (Landman & Häusermann 2003: 1). For instance, in the revised fourth Lome Convention it opted instead for the phrase ‘democratic principles’ (Article 5, revised fourth Lome Convention). Instead it emphasizes “the universally recognized principles that must underpin the organization of the state and guarantee the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms, while leaving each country and society free to choose and develop its own model” (European Commission 1998, quoted in Landman & Häusermann 2003: 2).

On its turn, democratization is generally defined as “a process of a regime change that is directed towards a specific aim: the establishment and stabilization of substantive democracy” (Schmitz and Sell, 1999: 25). The process of democratization can also be treated as passing through three different stages, including liberalization, transition and consolidation. In the liberalization stage the government establishes new rules of democratic procedure, such as elections and regulations for civic groups (Ibid.). Researchers of post-communist transformations have mostly focused their attention on transition, the phase following liberalization (Pridham 1997: 2). However, in his study Ekiert (2006) pays sufficient attention to the phase of consolidation that has important methodological implications for the selection of cases for this study.

2.2. The mechanisms of democratization

The following subsection is aimed to discuss the mechanisms of democratization described in the contemporary academic literature in order to arrive to the choice of the mechanism for the current research.

To begin, recently the study of EU democracy promotion has become the subject of several book-length studies (Kubicek 2003; Pridham 2005; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Most of these studies agree that the accession conditionality, that is, the dependable perspective of becoming an
EU member after a democratic reform, was the most effective among the EU’s strategies and instruments of democracy promotion (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007).

Political scientists nowadays lively debate on the nature and relative importance of the transmission of democratic and liberal norms to the candidate states: whether it was largely voluntary or involuntary, driven mainly by external or internal forces; whether the most effective measures were those that were carried out through the mechanisms of conditionality with the element of coercion, or it was rather ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘social learning’ by the candidate states (Sadurski 2004: 375).

Consequently, a significant number of theories and concepts, aimed to explain the role of the EU in the democratization of the CEECs, can be found in the literature.

For instance, Pridham (1999; 2000; 2001; 2005) developed the interactive approach for analyzing the role of the EU in promoting democratization in the post-communist CEECs. Pridham used the concepts of ‘convergence’ and ‘conditionality’ to analyze the EU’s influence (2000: 1). Within this framework, the researcher focuses on the different levels influenced by the EU, including the level of regime change and its more complex types of influence on elite attitudes, external policy orientation, economic transformation, civil society, and the general public (Pridham 2001: 74-84).

Also, the concept of Europeanization has gained significant growth in the scientific literature with much of the debate focused on the way in which the current EU member states are being transformed by EU membership (Spenzharova 2003). However, as many researchers note (e.g., Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002; Wiarda 2002), the studies of democratization processes in line with this concept are mainly descriptive, limited to single countries and pay insufficient attention to domestic political culture, values and beliefs.

In order to explain the impact of the enlargement upon democracy promotion Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) summarized various concepts and frameworks to distinguish further between 3 most important mechanisms of democratization: conditionality, modernization and linkage. Following this classification, I discuss the mentioned mechanisms below.

To begin with, it is widely argued that the most powerful instrument of democratization, which has gained prominence during the last enlargements, is conditionality (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). In general, the term ‘conditionality’ is widely used in the development assistance by the international organizations, and it has been defined as allocating aid resources to be used consistently with a set of previously agreed objectives (World Bank 2005). In the European Union the conditionality evolved from a minor policy instrument applied in agreements with third countries, to the most important pillar of EU enlargement and a successful tool of EU foreign policy (Smith 2003). However, it is quite different from the conditionality used by the World Bank, as the benefits which countries receive are not only financial, but are mostly linked to EU membership (e.g. Dimitrova 2005; Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a, b).
Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) define EU enlargement conditionality as an “exchange between the EU and a candidate country in which the EU offers the candidate a (realistic) prospect of EU membership, if the candidate implements a wide range of (EU driven) domestic reforms” (2007:3).

Dimitrova (2004) stresses that in previous enlargements the *acquis* has been considered more or less sufficient to join, whereas, in the process of the East enlargement, the EU has moved from the *acquis* toward a broader set of reform and transformation objectives (Dimitrova, 2004: 8-9).

Indeed, political conditionality has evolved significantly from the time it was first introduced in the 1957 with the Treaty of Rome allowing any European country to apply for EC membership (Art. 237). However, participation in the European institutions has been reserved for the states with solid democratic systems and a steadfast record of respect for political and civil rights that soon became an explicit and indispensable condition for EC/EU accession (Ekiert 2006).

In using political conditionality, the European Union sets the adoption of democratic rules and practices as conditions that the candidate countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards such as financial assistance, contractual association, or - ultimately - membership (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 6). In general, pre-accession relations between the EU and prospective member states is a progression made through a series of stages: policy reorientation towards Brussels leading to membership application, the formalization of links with an Association agreement, numerous pre-negotiation consultation procedures and, finally, negotiations for entry (Pridham, 1999). The stages of the enlargement process of Central and Eastern European accession countries are shown in the Appendix 1 (Table A). The so-called ‘carrot and stick approach’ of the conditionality envisages the withdrawal of the benefits of accession and cessation or slowing down the process, if candidate states’ governments fail to progress with democratic reforms (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 3).

However, the countries unable to meet the democratic criteria are denied assistance, association or membership, and are left behind in the competition for EU funds, generally without some extra punishment (in addition to delaying the conditional reward) on non-compliant governments (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007). However, the EU also does not give extra support to those who fail to meet the conditions. Instead, it regularly convinces the target governments of the fact that it is their own responsibility to create the conditions to be rewarded (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003).

Pridham (2005) notes that regarding Eastern enlargement, the Commission has insisted that its democratic standards are satisfied before accession takes place; and that the original Copenhagen criteria as defined in 1993 are met before membership negotiations are opened. At the same time, the EU developed new tools for advancement of conditionality, such as the Regular Reports (the annual monitoring reports of the Commission on candidate countries), the Phare Democracy Programme and twinning arrangements with individual member states (Pridham 2005). Simultaneously, as Sadurski (2004) notes, political pressures and threats of exclusion from the enlargement process have been used
at any sign of backtracking from commitments to democratic procedures and guaranties of equal political rights. Some countries indeed have made significant political efforts to respond to such criticism, as in the cases of Slovakia or Latvia (Sadurski 2004).

The significant increase in the use of conditionality by the European Union in the late 1990s and early 2000, has coincided with outburst of studies investigating its impact on a number of countries, policy areas and institutional settings (Schmitter, 1995; Grabbe, 1999, 2001, 2003; Mattli and Plumper, 2002; Plumper et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a, b; Vachudova, 2001, 2005). As regards the recent research in the area of EU conditionality, it has moved on to trying to explore the causal link between conditionality and successful rule transfer in particular issue-areas, to understand how does its mechanism work and under which conditions is it effective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a). In the academic literature there exists a large quantity of explanations for the mechanism underlying the success of conditionality based mostly on rationalist concepts and frameworks, some of which can be utilized to outline the theoretical framework for the current investigation.

For instance, Vachudova (2001) and Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003: 44) have referred to Keohane and Nye’s (1977) asymmetric interdependence theory to explain the impact of conditionality as a form of concession in the bargaining of enlargement negotiations. According to theory they developed, the applicant countries have accepted the costs of adjustment acknowledging them being lower compared to the costs of exclusion from the EU and its benefits, and, therefore, continuing further membership negotiations. According to Plumper et al. (2003), this also means that only national governments, which distinctly realize the expected benefits from enlargement, apply for membership and enter into negotiations with the EU.

On their turn, Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 496) develop further a bargaining framework based on the idea of reinforcement by reward. Researchers suggest that the strategy of reinforcement by reward compels the EU to withhold rewards in the form of institutional links and financial assistance if a target government fails to fulfill democratic conditions (Ibid.). Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) argue that, in line with the reinforcement by reward strategy, political actors comply because they realize that the rewards are higher than the domestic costs of adoption.

Likewise, Mattli and Plumper (2002) and Plumper et al. (2003) focus on the incentives within the domestic political arena of the applicant country to explain the effectiveness of conditionality. Mattli and Plumper (2002) conclude that the ‘demand’ for EU membership is linked to a country’s regime type and its readiness to carry out economic reforms. By extension, if a country has a more democratic regime, the national political elites have a bigger incentive to push for reforms and to align their country with the rules and institutions of the EU (Mattli and Plumper 2002, Plumper et al. 2003).
Plumper et al’s (2003) investigation of interplay between an applicant country and the EU is based on an incomplete information model which assumes that the time needed to agree on reforms domestically is taken as an important indicator of compliance. Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007), however, point out the limitations of Plumper et al’s (2003) research, which concentrates on domestic reform speed, and therefore neglects EU conditionality, intended to help candidate countries to transform their economies and politics – a process which does take some time (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 4).

On their turn, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a: 10-17) offer an external incentives model and explain the effects of the conditionality by suggesting that target governments would adopt EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards surpass the domestic adoption costs. Researchers’ explanatory framework rests on four sets of factors the cost-benefit balance depends on: the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises and the size of adoption costs (2005a: 12-3). The empirical findings of the research show the credibility of conditionality and the size of adoption costs to be the key variables of compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a). Authors conclude also that in terms of credibility the opening of negotiations with some states increases the credibility of rewards for all the candidates showing the EU’s willingness to negotiate (2005b: 215). Likewise, according to Dimitrova (2005), the credibility of the threat of exclusion from membership decreases as accession progresses (Dimitrova 2005).

Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) investigate whether the conditionality is equally effective or have an 'expiration date' by applying game theoretical analysis to various stages of accession negotiations. They assume that there are incentives for cheating in this bargaining process, while the government of the candidate country faced with the costs of reforms, might be tempted to postpone them or comply only symbolically with the EU conditions (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 14). The empirical part of the research confirms that, regardless of domestic circumstances, the effects of conditionality vary in time, depending on how close a state may be to accession, that can decrease credibility of EU incentives and slow down democratic reforms in the candidate countries (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007).

Alternatively to democratic conditionality mechanism, the modernization theory developed by Lipset (1960) views democracy as a function of the level of social and economic development of a country. In his pioneering work Lipset studied the 'social conditions’ or 'requisites’ that support democracy and identified 'economic development', particularly a syndrome of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education (Lipset 1960). According to Lipset (1960), economic development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a middle-class, feeding a belief in tolerance and reducing commitment to extremest ideologies. To quote Lipset: “The more well-to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960: 31).
Several scholars proved the relationship between economic prosperity and democracy using variety of indicators, approaches and in comparison with numerous alternative factors (e.g. Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994). More recent analysts (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003) also have tested the correlation between economic development and democracy. To sum up, modernization as a mechanism that emphasizes domestic, societal, and bottom-up factors of democratization provides the strongest contrast to conditionality as an international, political, and top-down mechanism (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007).

Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) also argue that democracy-promoting influences may also originate from transnational relations, that is, cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least one side is non-governmental. Such transnational influences were generally defined under the term ‘linkage’ (Levitsky and Way 2005). The linkage model views the impact of an external democratizing actor in improving the societal conditions and encouraging bottom-up initiatives, for example by supporting civil society (Junemann 2002; Raik 2004).

Channels and instruments of linkage can vary from economic exchanges such as trade and investment to personal interactions through tourism, academic exchanges, or cultural and information influences (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007). The effects of these exchanges on democratization can range from direct and immediate impact on political struggle between pro- and anti-democratic forces in the country (e.g. broadcasts from abroad, financial and technical support) to effects which work indirectly and in the long term. The examples here could be the intensification of trade, which can induce societal groups to demand civil liberties and political rights, or non-economic interactions such as cultural and academic exchanges increasing the level of education as a social requisite of democracy (Ibid.).

All in all, after the discussion of the most widespread in the academic literature mechanisms of democratization, for the completeness of the theoretical background of the investigation several alternative explanations provided by the contemporary scientists need to be mentioned.

2.3. Alternative explanations of democratization

This subsection briefly discusses some alternative explanations of democratization in the CEECs, which, as it is initially assumed, could also exert influence upon the state of the democratization of the target countries.

As recent studies show, there is a growing division between two parts of the former Soviet Bloc and deepening of sub-regional split in the Central and Eastern Europe (Ekiert 2006). Researcher notes, that the new member-states and the candidate countries possess faster growing economies, have lower level of poverty and consolidated democratic systems, whereas the majority of the CIS countries are poorer, more unequal, suffer from massive corruption, and are increasingly authoritarian (Ibid: 6).
These different models of transformations are lively debated among the scholars (e.g. Bunce 2003, Ekiert & Hanson 2003) which, despite some consensus on many important issues, list different alternative explanations, including historical legacies, starting political and economic conditions, types of democratic breakthroughs as well as the impact of international actors in support of democratic consolidation.

First, according to Sadurski (2004) there were the number of outside sources, other than the EU that were influential upon the state of democracy in CEECs, namely the Council of Europe and its agencies (including the Parliamentary Assembly and very active Venice Commission), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, which made entrance subject to the same conditions as the EU, and various NGOs like Open Society Institute, the Helsinki Committee etc. (Sadurski 2004: 377). Sadurski (2004) argues that the impact of these external sources was the strongest when there was a high degree of consistency among those influences. Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) similarly list the example of the case in Latvia’s law and practice regarding its Russian-speaking minority, where the EU had followed the policy of the OSCE and its High Commissioner on National Minorities. As a result of combined pressures, Latvia gradually changed its naturalization and state language laws, initially judged unsatisfactory by the EU, thus opening the way to accession negotiations (Ibid).

Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) argue that those international organizations, which do not offer substantial economic or political incentives to the CEECs (such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE), have not been effective in promoting democracy against domestic obstacles. Besides, researchers emphasize that the EU and NATO conditionality have been working in parallel, using the same conditions and incentives, so that their effects are difficult to distinguish. They note, that NATO conditionality has generally been less strict than, and often followed the lead of EU conditionality (Ibid: 19). Under this reasoning, I assume that the EU political conditionality has outweighed the influence of other outside sources on democratization of the CEECs, and therefore the current research is not explicitly focused on the impact of other than the EU international organizations. The influence of the outside sources, however, will be mentioned in the in the analytical part.

Ekiert (2006) suggest that one possible way of testing the alternative explanations would be to look at the cases where the outcomes of democratic changes were uncertain. Likewise, some scholars (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2003a, Vachudova 2005) note that it is difficult to detect the impact of EU democratic conditionality upon consistently pro-Western and inclined to liberal and democratic reforms countries. Ekiert (2006) follows this assumption and argue that, for instance, in countries like Poland and Hungary, EU conditionality simply reinforced the existing trajectory of liberal democratic and economic transitions. By extension, the EU has had minor impact on the countries ruled by nationalist and authoritarian political forces such as Belarus, whereas in countries with both pro and anti-reformist
parties, like Slovakia, EU conditionality had more observable effects (Ekiert 2006). Similarly, Vachudova (2005) argues that in countries with favourable starting conditions where adaptation costs are low, ethnic homogeneity is significant and accompanied with traditions of liberal democracy, conditionality works much faster and effectively than in countries with unfavourable and insecure environment, apparent ethnic cleavages and lack of democratic traditions (Ibid.).

Schimmelfennig et al. (2002) in their investigation of conditions lying behind the success of EU democratic conditionality also provide a list of alternative explanations asserting that international and societal factors do make a difference for the effectiveness of conditionality. As Schimmelfennig et al. (2002) note, for some CEE countries, particularly the CIS members, membership prospects are so distant that they have no observable effect upon their cost-benefit calculations therefore decreasing the effectiveness of conditionality (2002: 11). Consequently, as the researchers argue, the more distant is the perspective of membership, the less likely conditionality will be effective (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002). Also, according to bargaining mechanism, material benefits are the most effective in mobilizing actors in favor of meeting democratic conditions, so that the higher is the economic exchange between the target country and the EU, the more effective is the conditionality (Ibid.). Developing further Vachudova’s (2001) and Pridham’s (2001) explanations, Schimmelfennig et. al. (2003) point to the relevance of the major prerequisite of effective transnational social influence, the so-called ‘societal salience’, that is “the degree to which society defines itself as ‘European’ and to which it values liberal political principles” (2003:12).

Likewise, one of the important mechanisms of democratization is the influence of the EU on civil society. The concept of ‘civil society’ itself is rather ambiguous. In general, organizations with functions in the areas “between the state and the individual” are considered to be civil society (Grugel, 2002: 93). However, as Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) argue, the domestic structure of the CEECs is characterized by the weakness of civil society as compared to the state. This is evident for presidential systems of government that prevail in the former Soviet republics but also applies to the advanced parliamentary democracies of Central Europe (Birch 2000). The evaluation studies, which are conducted for the Commission and analyze programs aimed at strengthening of civil society, are focused mostly on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Pridham (2005) claims that such an approach of the EU, restricted to NGO activity only and implemented mostly through PHARE program, is of limited scope compared with the task of democratic consolidation in the CEECs. Despite some scholars have discussed the importance of NGOs in supporting democratization (e.g. Kubicek 2000; D’Anieri 2001; Hillenbrand 2005), civil society in the CEECs still faces many challenges, including excessive bureaucracy and limited financial resources. By extension, as Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) argue, since societal strength is a necessary prerequisite of transnational reinforcement, this mechanism is unlikely to be effective in EU democratic conditionality. In view of
the above I deliberately do not focus on civil society in my research, however, using social influence mechanism to develop the second set of independent variables of the current investigation.

All in all, before the final selection of the mechanism of democratization for the current study and the subsequent selection of the variables of the research it is extremely important to elucidate the causal link between the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality as the most developed instrument of democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood and compliance/non-compliance of the candidate countries with democratic criteria of the EU.

2.4. The link between the effectiveness of democratic conditionality and compliance

This subsection aims to explain the causal relationship between the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality the research is focused on, and the democratic compliance of the target countries of Central and Eastern European region.

The democratization process in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is an extremely interesting study to investigate the causal link between the state of democracy in the target country and the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality as the major EU policy aimed at promotion of democracy in the region.

Since the end of the Cold War the European Union has been engaged in promoting the core principles of the emerging pan-European liberal international community such as liberal democracy and human rights in Central Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig 2004: 1). Moreover, the EU defined support for political change as a new principal task for itself providing expertise and training to the countries in transition, granting financial support to the emerging civil societies and parties, monitoring the establishment and functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law. However, the EU has made financial assistance for these countries and their integration and membership dependent upon compliance with its political norms (Ibid.).

The main instrument to promote democratic changes in the applicant countries have therefore become the democratic conditionality policy (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). Technically, conditionality simply means that political and economic integration and membership prospective of the CEECs depend on the fulfillment of a series of the conditions and criteria set out by the European Commission, particularly the requirements in the field of political democracy.

It is generally acknowledged in the academic literature, that EU democratic conditionality is one of the most powerful foreign policy tools exercised within the European arena, and the enlargement negotiations have been a major inducement for the democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, Ekiert 2006). However, the use of democratic conditionality in the enlargement has had far from uniform effect on the candidates and target policy areas (Saatcioglu 2007). Therefore, there is a growing concern over the effectiveness of EU conditionality.
due to diverging record of its impact on policy change in accession countries and policy areas (Siraj 2005).

Consequently, a number of questions arise, particularly of the causal pathways between compliance or non-compliance and democratic conditionality (Ibid.). So what are the driving factors for candidate countries? Despite they are subject to the same formal democratic entry criteria posed by the European Commission why do some candidate countries manage to comply faster and better than the others? Consequently, under what conditions was the policy of the EU conditionality effective and what exactly qualify here under the term 'effectiveness'? And, finally, what lessons can be drawn from the conditionality exercised in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

In general, effectiveness mean choosing the 'right' means to achieve an overall goal or effect. For instance, under the terminology of DAC/OECD, the effectiveness of policy relates to effects of policy vis-à-vis the objectives set (DAC/OECD 1986). Put differently, the policy is effective to the extent that the objectives are achieved (Siraj 2005). In the case of CEECs, the compliance with the democratic criteria set by the European Commission is seen by the EU as this overall goal of democratic conditionality and the most effective way from the EU’s point of view to cause policy changes in the accession countries. Consequently, the effectiveness of the conditionality is directly linked to the democratic changes in the target countries including the policy change and successful rule transfer. In another words 'being effective' here means ability to provide favourable for the EU outcome – achievement of its democratic criteria.

Nowadays a number of studies in the area of EU conditionality have been focused on the efforts to elucidate how exactly EU democratic conditionality makes the target governments to change their national policies in correspondence with the democratic criteria (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a). By and large, the conditionality has evolved over time into a dynamic tool used to ensure that new member states are enough prepared for accession (Saatcioglu 2007). After the Copenhagen summit of 1993, the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” – the formalized conditions for membership demanding 'the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ have been set up (Council of the European Union 1993). In 1997 the European Union announced a reinforced pre-accession strategy which meant a hardened political conditionality with the political membership conditions given more clarity and essence. In order to satisfy the loosely defined Copenhagen criteria the candidate countries were gradually demanded to make specific democratic changes ranging from ensuring political participation and opposition to strengthening civil society and the independence of the media and the judiciary (Saatcioglu 2007). Additionally, the EU developed the tools for monitoring (annual reports) and enforcing the conditions. These tools were obviously aimed to increase the effectiveness of the conditionality policy and credibly link compliance to rewards, ranging from candidacy status and start
of accession negotiations to full membership, and noncompliance to denial of rewards (Ibid.). However, as it was mentioned this hardened EU conditionality has been met by the various policy responses on the part of the Central and Eastern European countries and has therefore caused different effects in these countries, that constitutes a significant scientific interest and therefore determines the choice of the topic for current master’s research.

2.5. The models of the effectiveness of EU conditionality, the variables and the hypotheses of the research

Having analyzed different explanatory frameworks and mechanisms of democratization, in my investigation I have focused on the mechanism of democratic conditionality as the most developed and consistent policy instrument of the democratization in Central and Eastern European region. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to elucidate the conditions that lie behind success of EU democratic conditionality resulting in the compliance of the target countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, the dependent variable of the current analysis is defined as ‘compliance with EU democratic norms’, since compliance can serve as a proper measure of success of EU democratic conditionality policy.

I am deeply convinced that when it comes to the topic of national compliance with the EU’s democratizing pressure, such a study needs to assess both the effectiveness of the EU’s policy of conditionality and the domestic political conditions that interact with it (Saatcioglu 2007). Thus, to answer the central research question as to under which conditions the policy of EU democratic conditionality has been effective in promoting democratization of CEECs, the investigation combines two most prominent models of international influence on domestic democratic policy change – the external incentives model and the social influence model – which identify different set of conditions crucial for compliance. Whereas the external incentives model is the test model of this study, the social learning model is considered to be the most relevant alternative explanation of democratization which the present investigation controls.

The external incentives model is a rationalist bargaining model. It is assumed that the actors involved are strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare. In a bargaining process, they exchange information, threats and promises; and its outcome depends on their relative bargaining power (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 a: 671). According to the external incentives model, the relevant strategy of the EU is political conditionality: the organization sets its liberal democratic norms as conditions that the CEECs have to fulfill in order to receive rewards specified in advance. These rewards consist of assistance and institutional ties ranging from trade and cooperation agreements via association agreements to full membership. The EU pays the reward if the target government complies with the conditions and withholds the reward if it fails to comply. The EU, does not, however, intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost-
benefit assessment and subsequent behavior of the target government by inflicting extra costs (‘reinforcement by punishment’) or offering extra benefits (‘reinforcement by support’) (Ibid: 671-672).

The analytical starting point of the bargaining process is a domestic status quo, which differs to some extent from an EU rule. This status quo is conceived as a ‘domestic equilibrium’ reflecting the current distribution of preferences and bargaining power in domestic society. Consequently, EU conditionality upsets this domestic equilibrium by introducing (additional) incentives for compliance with EU rules into the game (Schimmelfennig 2004: 4). The most general proposition of the external incentives model is therefore that a state complies with the norms of the organization if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. More specifically, this cost-benefit balance depends on: a) the size of international rewards and the credibility of threats and promises, and 2) the size of domestic adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 672). Thus, bearing in mind the relevance of these two factors, we can derive theoretical expectations (hypotheses) about the varying effectiveness of EU influence on domestic policy change.

First, as to the size of international rewards, it is presupposed that tangible, material incentives – those which enhance the welfare, security or power of the target government – are most likely to have a sufficiently strong impact to bring about compliance (Schimmelfennig 2004: 5). Thus, the offer of EU membership – the ultimate reward in the case of EU enlargement – is assumed to be the most effective instrument able to cause compliance of the accession countries. Secondly, the EU’s credibility threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance and, conversely, its promise to deliver the reward in case of rule adoption is crucial. Schimmelfennig (2004: 5-6) assumes that, due to the highly asymmetrical interdependence between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the EU, the last possesses superior bargaining power. The CEECs are only of marginal importance to the economy and security of the EU member states (Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997; Moravesik and Vachudova 2003: 46-52), and therefore the credibility of threats in Eastern enlargement is high. Hence, the main issue accounted by this research, is the credibility of the promises, from which the most important is the promise of accession as the ultimate reward. On the base of this reasoning I propose the first test hypothesis, which postulates that differences in the credibility of accession (or the likelihood that this reward will be granted in the short-term future) change the effectiveness of conditionality:

**Hypothesis I:** the high credibility of accession of the target country increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

The second factor of the external incentives model crucial for the compliance is the size of the domestic costs of fulfilling EU democracy and human rights conditions. According to the external incentives model, if domestic government is influenced with credible conditionality, and offered
equally beneficial rewards, it is the size of domestic adoption costs which determines whether it accepts or declines the conditions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a). Also, in the CEECs the number of societal veto players is considered to be small due to the top-down organization of political parties, their dependence on the state and the absence of the developed and active civil society (Birch 2000: 15; Sitter 2001: 87; Dimitrova 2002: 176). Hence, this study is going to focus on the domestic political or power costs of government. The liberal democratic norms brought about by political conditionality often limit autonomy and power of governments by forbidding undemocratic measures it can count on to preserve its power, e.g. suppressing opposition, restraining the freedom of the press or rigging elections. Besides, in the case of minority protection, these new norms can empower certain social and ethnic groups and erode the social power base of governments (Schimmelfennig 2004: 7).

The second test hypothesis proposed is therefore as follows:

\[ \text{Hypothesis II: the low domestic costs of democratic transition for the target government increase the effectiveness of conditionality.} \]

As an alternative to rationalist external incentives model, and in order to explain the different results the conditionality may have in different countries, I take into account the social influence model (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) which suggests the importance of the impact of the societal factors on the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality. The social influence model follows core tenets of social constructivism (Schimmelfennig 2004: 8) being the most prominent counterpart to rationalist explanations of conditionality (Checkel 2000; Kahler 1992) and Europeanization (Borzel and Risse 2003). In contrast with the rationalist model of conditionality, the social influence model presupposes the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989: 160-161). According to this logic, the actors involved are motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms. By extension, Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) assume that these internalized societal factors are important for the increased effectiveness of conditionality, being able to affect the process of EU rule transfer and rule adoption.

Thus, in contrast to the main hypotheses, the research uses three independent (control) variables related to the social influence model to build the assumptions on, namely, 'commitment to Europe', 'economic interdependence' and 'societal salience'.

First, non-member states are more likely to be convinced to accept the rules of international organizations if they identify themselves with the community of states represented by this organization (Checkel 2001: 563; Johnston 2001: 499). Consequently, the first alternative hypothesis put forward assumes that the commitment of target country’s government, that is the identification with the EU community of states (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 497-498), matters:

\[ \text{Alternative Hypothesis I: the high commitment of the target government to the EU international community increases the effectiveness of conditionality.} \]
The second alternative hypothesis is based on the assumption that, according to the material bargaining mechanism, the potential losses resulted from non-accession will mobilize societal actors to support EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). Thus, it is expected that this societal mobilization will be higher in the countries with the higher degree of economic interdependence with the EU:

- **Alternative Hypothesis II:** the high economic interdependence between the target country and the EU increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

Finally, Schimmelfennig et al. point out the importance of such factor as the societal salience, that is “the degree to which society defines itself as ‘European’ and to which it values liberal political principles” (2003: 500). It is argued that the strong societal opposition within the target country can put pressures on the national government thus inclining it to align its policy with the democratic conditions. I therefore propose the following separate societal salience hypothesis:

- **Alternative Hypothesis III:** the high degree of the societal salience within the target country increases the effectiveness of conditionality.

Combining in my research the external incentives (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) and the social influence models (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) to include a more full set of the factors which can affect the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality, I argue that exclusively the external incentives model is crucial for explaining the various effectiveness of democratic conditionality. Thus, it is assumed that the effectiveness of EU conditionality can be explained without taking into account the commitment, the economic interdependence and the societal salience within the studied country (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003).

The operationalization of the dependent and the independent variables is conducted in the following section, which also explains my selection of the research strategy, the method of analysis and the choice of the research design, whereas in the empirical part the analysis is conducted and the hypotheses are tested, providing better understanding for the conditions of success of democratic conditionality policy.
Chapter 3. Methodology: research method, research design, operationalization, and measurement

The following section is designed to elaborate the research strategy and to develop the methodology of the current study in order to connect the research questions to methods, discovering what tools and procedures will be used in answering these questions. The conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables of the research are presented followed by the subsection on the operationalization of political democracy. Next to that the elaboration of the research design and brief description of the cases are introduced. The section ends with the discussion of the potential strengths and limitations of the chosen research method followed by the limitations of the measurements.

3.1. Research strategy and research method

The following subsection discusses the choice of the strategy for the current investigation, arrives to the choice of the method for current study and develops its research design.

To start with, the democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is a surprisingly interesting investigation due to the fact that EU enlargement has had from far uniform effect on these countries and their states of democratic transitions. Some of the candidate countries have already managed to become European consolidated democracies whereas the others still remained the laggards of democratic transformations or even autocratic regimes. Therefore, in the academic world and the political circles has appeared a rapidly growing concern on the effectiveness of EU conditionality as the main policy aimed at the promotion of democracy in the region. Consequently, the present study raises a number of important questions to be answered. To remind, they are as follows. What are the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target countries of Central and Eastern Europe? In other words, what are the driving factors for candidate countries subject to democratic conditionality? What exactly qualify here under the term ‘effectiveness’? And if the democratic conditionality policy has been effective, how does it influence the real state of democratization in CEECs? And finally, what lessons can be drawn from conditionality policy exercised in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe to enhance the effectiveness of conditionality?

Thus, the current investigation is a qualitative exploratory study aimed to elucidate the conditions that lie behind the success of EU democratic conditionality resulting in the compliance of the target countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to investigate these conditions and to answer the central question of the current research the relevance of two different sets of factors, which are assumed to be influential upon the effectiveness of democratic conditionality, are tested. These assumptions provide a basis for the development of two sets of theoretically derived hypotheses.
It is important to go back a while and to remind that main (test) hypotheses of the research are based on the external incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) which presupposes the importance of the credibility of accession and the domestic costs of democratic transition for the increased effectiveness of conditionality in the target country.

On the other hand, the alternative (control) hypotheses of the current investigation rest on the social influence model (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) which suggests the importance of impact of the set of societal factors ('commitment to Europe', 'economic interdependence' and 'societal salience') on the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality.

Apparently, the theoretical framing of the research suits the combinatorial style, particularly its theoretically derived hypotheses assume that different values of the variables result in different outcomes (i.e. compliance or non-compliance). To facilitate this framing and taking into account the research objective, the relatively small number of cases as well as the type of collected data, the present study utilizes the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) developed by Charles Ragin (1987, 1994, 2000) as the most suitable data analytical strategy. This method is able to examine complex patterns of interplay between variables and includes procedures based on Boolean algebra, also known as the algebra of sets and logics, to minimize these patterns and to simplify the research (Ragin 1987: 121-123).

To present this technique I will briefly outline the basic assumptions and objectives of QCA followed by the explanation of the selection of units of current analysis and the choice of the cases.

To start with, the method of QCA is suitable for the small-N studies and it has been widely used in comparative-historical and political research (Brown & Boswell 1995; Janoski & Hicks 1994).

The aptitude of this method for the present study is based on the following features of QCA. First, its “holistic” nature is consistent with the purpose of this research. Under QCA social scientists look at and compare “cases as wholes” (Ragin 1987: 3). In this way, each case is understood “as a combination of causal conditions linked to a particular outcome” (Ragin 1994: 119). Consequently, a clear advantage of Ragin’s method is that it allows to test complex models while addressing a major issue in social science research – that it is hardly ever a case when one or several factors independently provide an adequate answer to the research question (Rizova 2006: 3). Second, as this method is multilevel by its nature providing for data analysis at two levels simultaneously – the system and within the system (Ibid.), it therefore allows better understanding of the mechanism of democratic conditionality. Third, data in the final analysis are presented in the binary codes (e.g. a condition is present or absent) and thus it involves data reduction. Hence, it allows exhaustively use the collected qualitative and quantitative data, since we can collapse existing categories and develop new ones if the analysis dictates so (Ragin 1987: 52). Finally, the method stimulates “a rich dialogue between ideas and evidence,” which will allow the investigator to constantly check and re-check the validity of the
constructs and the identified causal conditions (Ibid: 52). Ragin (2000) argues that, unlike conventional statistical analysis, qualitative comparative analysis encourages the investigator to consider the context in which specific causal relationships will hold. QCA intuitively recognizes that “life is lumpy” (Britt 1997) and cannot be explained through traditional additive analyses upon which most quantitative statistical approaches are based. To be sure, Ragin asserts that “causes rarely operate in a simple additive fashion; rather, they usually combine and intersect to produce change” (1993: 306).

Taking into account the complexity of the procedures and data analytical techniques of Boolean algebra the QCA is based upon, the research utilizes the software package, QCA 3.1, developed by Ragin and Drass (1992-1998), as a data processing tool\(^1\).

Subsequently, the investigation is also intended to check the results obtained from the QCA minimization procedure against the narratives that were developed out of the qualitative and quantitative data. Hence, for a better visualization of the study, provision of evidence to the factors and reader’s convenience, in the empirical part I will provide brief summaries for each country. These narratives list the main conflicts with the EU democratic norms and in detail describe the values of the conditions used to code subsequently the independent variables for QCA. Hereinafter they briefly discuss the instruments of conditionality applied by the EU, and evaluate its effectiveness in terms of compliance/non-compliance of the target countries.

The analysis of the present research in line with the QCA method will be conducted in several steps. Coverdill and Finlay assert that “one cannot use QCA until quite a bit of thought and analysis has been completed” (1995: 5). They maintain that QCA requires a pre-QCA stage that “leans heavily on either theoretical deductions or more standard forms of qualitative data analysis” (Ibid: 20). Consequently, the first step refers to the selection of the outcome(s) and the causal conditions (Coverdill & Finlay 1995). According to the theoretically derived hypotheses, the current investigation deals with two different sets of conditions: the factors relevant to the external incentives applied by the European Union, and the domestic factors of democratization. Hence, the outcome associated with the causal conditions in the present study is the compliance/non-compliance of the target country directly linked to effectiveness of conditionality. The quantitative data relevant to the factors affecting the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality will be therefore entered into data file, checked for consistency and congruency, and ’cleaned’ (Ragin et al. 2006: 99-103).

Second step involves preliminary coding of all the variables implicated in the analysis (Ragin et al. 2006: 41-46). Since Boolean algebra permits only two values (0 and 1), qualitative comparative analysis requires that all variables (conditions) and all outcomes be dichotomous. Despite advanced “fuzzy-set” QCA (Ragin 2000) also works with values between 0 and 1 and thus allows to conduct a

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\(^1\) The programme can be downloaded from [http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml](http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml)
more fine-grained and information-rich analysis, in order to simplify and clarify the interpretation, current investigation omits less relevant data and uses binary coding. The coding of the variables applied in this research is further explained in the subsection on the operationalization of the variables.

*Third*, according to Ragin (1987: 85-103) in order to use Boolean algebra as a technique of qualitative comparison, the categorized data pertaining to conditions associated with the conditionality outcomes should be entered into a raw data matrix called “truth table”. Each conditional configuration – the combination of values of the independent variables present in the data set – is represented as one row together with the associated (‘truth’) value of the dependent variable. Consequently, each row is not a single case but a summary of all the cases with a certain combination of independent variables (Ragin 1987: 88).

These combinations are then compared with each other and logically simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison. The logic of the simplification is described best in this way: “If two combinations are identical in value for every attribute but one, then the two combinations can be combined into one configuration with that variable deleted” (Ragin 2000: 122). The final result of this simplification process is a logical equation (Ragin, 1987: 89-91). This equation is a shorthand representation summarizing the data in the truth table using only the logically essential prime implicants (Ragin, 1987: 95-98), which provides a powerful basis for interfacing with theoretical ideas (Coverdill & Finlay 1995). The equation describes parsimoniously the different combinations of conditions associated with a certain outcome and allows testing of logically derived theories about the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. The truth table is next analyzed with procedures of combinatorial logic to arrive at a solution specifying a combination of necessary and sufficient causes (Ragin 1987: 86-99).

The empirical cases are matched to the logically existing and mutually exclusive combinations of the five independent variables of the present study and those that do conform are thoroughly examined. “By examining the cases that conform to each configuration, represented as a row of the table, it is possible for the investigator to evaluate whether the best set of attributes has been identified. For each configuration, the researcher asks, Do these cases go together? Are they comparable instances, in the context of the present investigation?” (Ragin 2000: 123)

Therefore, qualitative comparative analysis strives to be parsimonious by discovering the smallest number of combinations of conditions that produce the outcome to be explained (Becker 1998; Ragin 1987, 1989, 1993). With such parsimony in mind, it should not be surprising that qualitative comparative analysis employs a discourse of necessary and sufficient conditions (Amenta & Poulsen 1994). ‘Necessary’ means that a condition must be present, or the outcome will not happen; it may, however, have that effect only in the context of other, supporting conditions. ‘Sufficient’ means that the occurrence of this condition alone will produce the outcome in question; this does not “impede
the existence of other conditions, or sets of conditions, that might also be sufficient” (Wickham-Crowley 1991: 87). However, “if there are instances of the causal combination not followed by the outcome then the test of the sufficiency of the causal combination fails” (Ragin 2000: 100).

The results of the analysis conducted in the following part constitute the findings of the comparison detecting necessary and sufficient causes of the compliance of the countries of Central and Eastern European region. By finding these causes (technically, different values of the variables or combination of variables) the research is intended to test (or reject) the hypotheses of the study which, actually, postulate the importance of the presence of these conditions for the varying effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality. By doing this the answer to the central research question will be obtained.

3.2. Case selection and research design

The present research is intended to go beyond the existing studies of international promotion of democratic norms in Central and Eastern Europe. While nowadays there are numerous case studies in this field (e.g. Linden 2000; 2002; Pridham 2001; 2002; Zielonka and Pravda 2001), systematic theoretical and comparative research is only just emerging (e.g. Kubicek 2003; Kelley 2004). However, usually these studies are focused at the country level, which is problematic because conditions vary between issue-areas and are subject to change over time (Schimmelfennig 2004: 3). Moreover, the design of their comparison does not allow a thorough analysis of the explanatory power of the independent variables (Ibid.). Therefore, to overcome the limits of these studies my master’s project covers various issues relevant to the state of democracy (e.g. fighting corruption, freedom of elections, minority conflict) across different time periods in 3 different countries.

The number of countries under study is intentionally limited, since it is impossible for the individual researcher to conduct analysis in the large number of cases as well as to check the reliability and validity of the concepts, indicators and data as carefully as in their small number. Moreover, knowledge of the cases is of great importance, as well as reliance on qualitative data for checking the validity of the constructs and the narratives (Rizova 2006: 3).

One of the criteria for the choice of cases is a ’conflict’ between EU conditions and the state of democracy in the target countries. This has important methodological implications. Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 501) argue that the choice of so-called ’problematic cases’ will better help to investigate the causal link between the democratic conditionality and the compliance as well as the conditions of the success of the conditionality, which have triggered democratic changes than in ’easy cases’. Besides, the more debatable cases are more easily traced and analyzed due to the larger attention of political institutions and better media coverage (Ibid.).

The compliance of the country is directly connected to the degree of democratic consolidation in the target country, since it is the quality of country’s democracy that should determine if it qualifies for EU membership. Ekiert (2006), for instance, uses Freedom House Index of Political and Civil Rights
to assess the depth of democratic consolidation in the studied countries. By extension, by using a widely available comparative data we can have a rapid look at the state of democracies in CEECs.

Graph 1. The State of Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern European Countries in 2008

[Freedom House 2008]
* 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic consolidation

Thus, under the reasoning that 'hard cases' provide more opportunities to study the conditions of compliance, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia were excluded from the list of countries, since they had achieved high degree of democratic consolidation before EU democratic conditionality was applied (Ekiert 2006: 6). The opposite concerns the autocratic regimes, such as Belarus under Lukashenka and Slovakia under Meciar, since these cases have not resulted in compliance and are therefore are of limited value for the analysis.

The subsequent choice of the countries was determined by an attempt to include a high degree of variation on the independent variables and their combinations. However, as it is difficult to assess in advance all the values of the independent variables, the selection of Latvia, Romania, and Ukraine for my master’s research includes countries from different parts of the region with various conflicts and domestic conditions that aims to ensure high variation on the independent variables, both longitudinally for the democratic changes in the country and horizontally across countries. Besides, the chosen countries represent easily distinguished clusters of countries with respect to the degree of
democratic consolidation, with Latvia representing the consolidated democracies, Romania – semi-consolidated democracies, and Ukraine – transitional regimes respectively (Freedom House 2008).

The selection of cases is a crucial choice which can affect the further analysis. However, since there are always trade-offs in a research, we have to check, whether having made different choices of the countries under study would make a difference for the results obtained. I argue that the choice of the other candidate countries wouldn’t give a substantial variation on the independent variables. To confirm this assumption, we can rapidly pre-check the values of the conditions inherent to other candidate countries subject to EU conditionality. The operationalization of the variables for this verification is provided in the corresponding subsection.

Table 1. Preliminary check of the values of the independent variables for the candidate countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High credibility</th>
<th>Low costs</th>
<th>High commitment</th>
<th>High economic interdependence</th>
<th>High societal salience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* signs ‘+’, ‘-’ and ‘-/+’ denote the absence, the presence of the condition or its variation in time respectively.

Apparently, the choice of the other countries wouldn’t enrich the analysis with the variations on the independent variables. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania have all or most of
the conditions favourable for compliance that disvalues their selection in respect of finding the necessary conditions. By contrast, authoritarian European regimes like Belarus under Lukashenka and Slovakia under Meciar have these conditions unfavourable. Instead, the choice of Latvia, Romania and Ukraine indeed ensures high variation on the independent variables. Again the other groups of countries have similar conditions as the selected ones, that allows to justify my choice of cases and to proceed further with the research.

The analytical starting (zero) point of the current investigation is a domestic status quo (or equilibrium), which differs to some extent from EU rule. It is argued that EU conditionality upsets this domestic equilibrium by offering incentives for compliance with EU democratic rules into the game (Schimmelfennig 2004: 4). The research considers the domestic equilibrium to be upset by democratic conditionality since the application for EU membership by the studied countries that constitutes the zero-point of the study. The ending point of the research is, respectively, the accession of the studied countries into the EU, since after its occurrence the changed incentives structure doesn’t allow adequate testing the factors of the success of democratic conditionality.

The research design of the current study is longitudinal, as the data are collected for each variable for different time periods and the subjects of cases are comparable (Menard 1991: 4). This type of research design is the most appropriate for my investigation, since longitudinal data allow the measurement of differences or change in a variable from one period to another; and can be used to locate the causes of social phenomena – democratization in this case (Menard 1991; Hakim 1987). However, although dynamic data have the potential to provide its better understanding, their use poses theoretical and methodological problems making analysis more complicated and time-costly simultaneously raising the concern of the validity and quality of data. Owing to the nature of QCA, the research utilizes both qualitative and quantitative data, consisting mainly of primary data from official sources (i.e. Annual Reports of the European Commission, data of polls and survey, statistics of international organizations) that, hopefully, to some extent addresses the problem of its reliability. More in-depth description of the data used in the research and ways of its collection are provided in the subsection on the operationalization of the variables.

In the methodology section of the paper, I provide only a very brief description of the cases. The more extended narratives, explaining how the interaction of the variables has led to the compliance or non-compliance, are provided in the empirical part. These descriptions, for reasons of space, will not render data and provide evidence for the values of the variables. Instead, the goal of the short descriptions given hereinafter is merely to introduce the main conflicts and list the factors inherent to the cases.

Thus, in Latvia the state policy toward Russian-speaking national minority did not meet the standards of the EU on minority rights (Plakans 1997; Pabriks 1999). Moreover, the government set
high conditions for any additional naturalization. According to Pabriks (1999) such a policy made 30 per cent of the population stateless and deprived them of their political rights. In 1999 the government enacted additional laws on the use of the Latvian language which indirectly discriminated the non-Latvian population (Ibid: 151). Strongly related issues of the granting of citizenship to the stateless children and ratification of Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities were also subject to democratic conditionality. The degree of the societal salience in Latvia was generally low as well as the power costs for the major government parties of complying with Western demands for minority protection, citizenship for children and public language use. At the same time, both the commitment of all the Latvian governments and country’s economic interdependence with the EU were high in the period of investigation.

**Romania** has had one of the most disputed and complicated democratic transformations in the entire region since the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu in 1999, being commonly regarded in Europe as the “laggard” of the post-Communist enlargement process (Pridham 2007). The European Commission’s regular reports on Romania have tracked numerous democratic gaps and deficiencies in the country’s political system during the accession process. While some of them were cross-nationally common among the other CEE candidates, notably problems with minority protection, need in judicial and public administration reform and fighting corruption, other ones, including the special issue of institutionalized children were inherent to Romania only (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). The conditions of conditionality, however, improved over time: first, when the post-communist Iliescu government developed an unambiguously Western commitment in the first half of the 1990s; then with a credible membership perspective and a change in government societal salience grew up significantly. Even when Iliescu returned to power in 2000 and societal salience again decreased, the Romanian government continued to comply (Schimmelfennig 2004: 13). The costs of adopting the democratic rules on above-mentioned problematic issues initially were rather high for Romanian political elites. However, they decreased over time with the pressure of EU conditionality (Pridham 2007). As regards economic interdependence, the economic importance of the EU for Romania has exceeded this margin after the mid-1990s.

On its turn, **Ukraine** was one of the first former Soviet Union countries to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1994, aimed at consolidation of the country’s democracy, which however was ratified by the EU in 1998 only. Nevertheless, the PCA was almost unconditional since a membership perspective was excluded (Shumylo 2006: 1). Ukraine was criticized for non-compliance in numerous areas, including need in free and fair election, constitutional, judiciary and civil service reforms and fighting corruption. Given the Ukraine’s ruling elites orientation towards Russia Ukraine’s compliance with EU requirements bore also sufficient costs (Kobzar 2006). However, all Ukrainian governments displayed commitment to European community, proclaiming in
the major policy documents the EU accession as the most important foreign policy priority. The famous events known as the Orange Revolution changed the profile of Ukraine in late 2004 decreasing the costs of the compliance for the new Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, the external incentives of the membership prospect haven’t still been proposed, instead the EU has applied the instrument of European Neighbourhood Policy and ‘light’ conditionality attached to bilateral ENP Action Plans (Shumylo 2006). During the period of the investigation Ukraine has remained below the 50% threshold of the foreign trade with the EU. The level of the societal salience was rather high and decreased only after 2005 due to growing ‘euro-skepticism’ of the population (Shumylo 2006: 6-8).

Thus, having briefly described the main conflicts and conditions in the studied countries, the investigation can define the values of both the dependent and independent variables with the help of the extended narratives provided in the analytical part. This will permit to code the variables dichotomously (either (1) or (0)). The rules for this coding are explained below.

As under the QCA method the units of analysis in this qualitative comparative study are not countries at the aggregate level but time- and issue-specific conditional configurations, the countries’ cases are subdivided according to time periods and issues, if the value of at least one independent variable changes from one time period to another or from one issue-area to another (Ragin 1994: 114-118). Temporal subdivisions most frequently occur from shifts in the credibility of the membership prospective and modifications in government (including changes in commitment and costs). Issue subdivisions, respectively, include diverging accents on involved democratic norms and minority rights entailing variation in costs and societal salience (Ragin 1987; 2000). Subsequently, the conditional configurations (values of independent variables associated with the corresponding value of the dependent variable) will be aggregated in the following ‘truth table’, indicating also the number of the cases and case identifiers.

Table 2. The truth table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credibility (CRED)</th>
<th>Costs (CS)</th>
<th>Commitment (COM)</th>
<th>Economic Interdependence (EI)</th>
<th>Societal Salience (SOS)</th>
<th>Compliance (COMP)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

It can be also foreseen that some conditional configurations would be contradictory, that is the same conditions can lead to different outcome that is to result in compliance or non-compliance. However, the problem of contradictory outcomes cannot simply be dismissed (Abell 1989; Coverdill & Finlay 1995; Ragin 1987) rather they must be logically accounted for or rationalized. One way of resolving of the problem is to include frequencies and significance to exclude either the positive or negative cases (Ragin 1987:117-118). We can, for example, exclude the less frequent outcomes in the contradictory rows. However, this solution would not only “violate the spirit of case-oriented qualitative research” (Ragin 1987: 118) but, taking into an account the nature of the units of present
analysis (conditional configurations), also bias the analysis in favor of the countries with higher within-country variation (Schimmelfennig 2004: 16). Another approach to solving the problem of contradictory outcomes is to go back to the data and rethink the coding process (Abell 1989; Coverdill & Finlay 1995). Consequently, all contradictory outcomes can be recoded as either (0) or (1) or to be handled as absent or missing. This way the number of analyzed conditional configurations will, probably, decrease. Schimmelfennig (2004) argues, that coding the outcomes as “false” (0) is the conservative option, which produces certain causal patterns but might exclude further or simpler causally relevant conditional configurations (type II error). On the other hand, coding them as “true” (1) is more inclusive but might overstate the causal effect of some conditional configurations (type I error) (Ibid: 16). Therefore, in the following analysis all the three possibilities are used to cover the whole range of interpretations of outcomes.

As it was mentioned above, by using the truth table represented below the investigation applies the Boolean analysis to arrive at the solution specifying a combination of necessary and sufficient causes (Ragin 1987: 99), or in other words, the factors that have produced solely or in their combinations the success of democratic conditionality. Still, before analyzing different conditional configurations of the independent variables it is necessary to decide how exactly to qualify and measure these variables.

3.3. Conceptualization and operationalization of the variables

Next to the choice of the research design and research strategy accompanied by selection of cases the conceptualization and operationalization of the variables is explicated.

To begin with, according to Ragin (1987: 116-118), one of the first tasks in qualitative comparative analysis is the preliminary coding of all the variables implicated in the analysis.

On the whole, the present investigation is designed as the hypotheses-testing qualitative study of the conditions under which the EU has had an effective impact on the democratic changes in Central and Eastern European countries. After reviewing the democratization and the democratic conditionality literature and taking into consideration the insights from the external incentives and the social influence models, two set of measures which the prior research has showed to be relevant to conditionality success have been developed.

Consequently, the variables based on the competing models are coded dichotomously in accordance with two hypothetically relevant qualitative states, particularly a positive value of (1) shows that the quality of the independent variable will enable or further compliance. A value of (0) indicates that compliance will be halted or hindered.

Since a considerable amount of thought has been paid to the preliminary analysis of cases and data, the dichotomous coding of the variables is relatively simplified.

To start with, the dependent variable of the study is target state’s ‘compliance with the EU democratic norms’ (further in the analysis denoted as ‘COMP’). The indicator for compliance is rule-
consistent behavior of the target governments as it has been assessed by the EU itself and reflected in the European Commission’s Opinions and Annual Reports (for Ukraine these are also Regular Progress Reports on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy). To discern between compliance and non-compliance, the main indicator utilized by the present study is the legal rule adoption (Schimmelfennig 2004: 9). A state is considered to be in compliance (value (1) is assigned to the variable) if it has signed a treaty and/or passed a law on the basis of the norm promoted by the EU and the EC itself declared that the condition is met. However, compliance goes beyond political declarations of acceptance (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) and merely formal and discursive recognition of EU democratic requirements by the target government is not taken into account in this research. In this case a value of (0) is assigned.

The independent variables under the external incentives model the research is based on are the credibility of accession and the costs of democratic transition for target countries.

Credibility (CRED)

Eastern enlargement is expensive to the EU and its costs are likely to exceed the benefits of the member-states (Schimmelfennig 2003a: 37). On the other hand, by contrast to assistance which requires relatively small investments and can be easily halted, the enlargement involves costly long term negotiations and preparations. It means that the further the accession process advances, the larger investments would be lost in case of its abortion or postponement (Ibid.). Thus, the credibility of promises increases over time, whereas the credibility of threats decreases.

Consequently, the main meaning of this variable involves the credibility of the promises. Schimmelfennig (2004: 4-5) assumes that the credible perspective of EU membership is the only benefit sufficient to induce compliance in norm-violating governments. Consequently, present research takes into account the official position of the EU, particularly whether it has recognized the country as the potential candidate for accession and started the accession negotiations (in this case the value of (1) is assigned). If the accession negotiations have not been started or have been halted due to significant norm-violations by the target government the value of (0) is assigned.

Costs (COST)

According to the external incentives model, if domestic government is influenced with credible conditionality, and offered equally beneficial rewards, it is the size of domestic adoption costs which determines whether it accepts or declines the conditions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a).

Also, in the CEECs the number of societal veto players is considered to be small due to the top-down organization of political parties, their dependence on the state and absence of the developed and active civil society (Dimitrova 2002: 176; Birch 2000: 15). Hence, this study is focused on the domestic political or power costs of government. The liberal democratic norms brought about by political conditionality often limit autonomy and power of governments by forbidding undemocratic
measures it can count on to preserve its power, e.g. suppressing opposition, restraining the freedom of
the press or rigging elections. Besides, in the case of minority protection, these new norms can
empower certain social and ethnic groups and erode the social power base of governments
(Schimmelfennig 2004).

Therefore, to find out what value should be assigned to the variable of costs, the research examines
thoroughly the political situation in the country, the nature of country’s governing regime (i.e.
authoritarian, democratic etc.), the existence of the political forces which have stakes in the conflict
issue in the coalition at power in the different time periods. Hence, for the present study, the costs are
considered to be low (1) if the adoption of EU democratic norms jeopardizes no or minor power costs
for the target government, i.e. compliance is not perceived as a menace to the dominance of the ethnic
core group, integrity and security of the state, or can lead to a collapse of the government or a
disruption of parliamentary coalition. Otherwise, the domestic costs are considered to impede
compliance (0).

To sum up, according to the external incentives model, high credible incentives and low domestic
power costs are assumed to constitute individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for
compliance. Subsequently, this assumption and the two main hypotheses relevant to it should be tested
by the analysis.

However, international rewards and domestic costs cannot be viewed in isolation. For the
alternative social influence model the research is based upon the independent variables are the commitment, the economic interdependence and the societal salience.

Commitment (COM)

Non-member states are more likely to be convinced to accept the rules of international
organizations if they identify themselves with the community of states represented by this organization

To distinguish whether commitment of the target government exists (value (1) is assigned to the
variable) the research will search for a positive identification of a government with the EU, i.e. when
the government consistently presents and describes itself and its state as ‘Western’ and/or ‘European’,
sharing the fundamental values and norms of the Western or European community and is aspired to
belong to the EU (Schimmelfennig 2004: 10). These intentions should be pronounced in accession
strategies, Action plans and National Programmes for the Adoption of Acquis or similar political
documents elaborated on the EU accession issue. In the case of the absence of such claims for the
government at power or even domination in the public self-descriptions of the government of
nationalist or other non-EU commitment the variable is coded as (0).

Economic interdependence (ECIN)
According to the material bargaining mechanism, the potential losses resulted from non-accession will mobilize societal actors to support EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). Consequently, it is expected that this societal mobilization will be higher in the countries with the higher degree of economic interdependence with the EU (Ibid: 501).

To distinguish between the two values of this variable the current investigation uses a threshold of 50% in the EU share of a country’s foreign trade. This statistical data have been obtained from the Eurostat web-site\(^2\) and from the official governmental statistics of studied countries issued by the corresponding ministries and national statistical agencies. In the case of exceeding this threshold the variable is coded as (1), in the other case it is assigned the value of (0).

**Societal salience (SOS)**

In 1972 Tajfel defined social identity as “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” (1972: 292). Social identity theory presupposes that in situations involving high in-group salience individuals act like the “in-group stereotype” in terms of attitudes, beliefs, norms, affective reactions, and behaviours (Turner 1982). Vachudova (2001) therefore argues that societal identity salience has been crucial for the effectiveness of conditionality. In her opinion, “the conduits for international influence on domestic politics were the electorate and the opposition, not the government” (2001: 5). In turn, the responsiveness of the electorate depended on whether societal opposition against illiberal regimes had been strong or not and, consequently, whether transition to democracy was characterized by a liberal or nationalist pattern of change (Vachudova 2001: 3–4; Pridham 2001: 18-21). Schimmelfennig et. al. (2003) also point to the relevance of societal salience, that is “the degree to which society defines itself as 'European’ and to which it values liberal political principles” (2003: 500). Consequently, to juxtapose in the 'societal salience’ variable the positions of countries’ populations towards the EU and the importance of democratic changes, the data of Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys\(^3\) on the attitudes of country’s population towards the membership in the EU and liberal democracy are utilized. If there has been an agreement in society of the studied country on both accounts (more than 50 % of positive attitudes) this independent variable is assigned the value of (1), otherwise the value of (0) is assigned.

All in all, having conceptualized and operationalized all the variables, we have to answer one of the research sub-questions of the relevance of the effective democratic conditionality to the real state of democratization of accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we need to arrive to the choice of an appropriate measure of political democracy to assess the progress that the accession CEECs have made on their road to political democracy.

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\(^2\) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu

\(^3\) available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cccb_en.htm
3.4. Operationalization of political democracy

The following subsection discusses the contemporary measurement tools developed to assess the state of democracy in the countries under the study, and subsequently arrives to the choice of the index used in the current investigation to assess the progress in this direction. By doing this it aims to support the created theoretical construct by linking the EU conditionality to the democratic changes in the accession countries subject to this policy and not merely to the compliance, which is quite a subjective judgement of the European Commission itself, and therefore can differ from the real state of democracy. The possible influences of the other factors which could have also provoked the democratic changes and have been discussed in the theoretical part are intentionally neglected.

First of all, a crucial precondition for an adequate assessment of the democratic changes across countries is the selection of appropriate measurement tools and indicators which would be clear, cross-national and time-series (Landman & Häusermann 2003). For years, political democracy has been a very important variable in quantitative, cross-national research (e.g. Lerner 1958; Neubauer 1967; Stack 1978). Modern social science attempts at measuring democracy began in the post World War II period. For instance, between 1954 and 1965, there were 2,080 different indices of democracy of which only 28 percent had been used more than once (Barsh 1993: 91). The Table C in the Appendix 3 provides a brief description and evaluation of the main contemporary initiatives measuring democracy.

Hence, because of the enormous variety of indicators the central problem is the controversy surrounding the measurement of political democracy (Cutright, 1968; Neubauer, 1967).

Nowadays five major traditions in the measurement of political democracy can be distinguished (Landman & Häusermann 2003). The first tradition establishes standards-based scales of different dimensions of democracy. These scales are usually assembled into a single performance index (Ibid). The major influence in this tradition came from Robert Dahl, who provided measures of ‘polyarchy’ for 114 countries circa 1969. Later on, this have inspired four of the most dominant and durable indicators of democracy that use scales: 1) the Gastil’s (1990) and Freedom House’s 7-point scales of political and civil liberties, which have been produced on an annual basis since 1972 and cover all the independent nation states in the world⁴; also Coppedge and Reinicke (1988, 1990, 1991); 2) the ‘Polity’ data series (Polity I, II, III, and IV) that contain 11-point scales of autocracy and democracy (0-10) for all the independent nation states in the world since the 1850s (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and Jaggers 2000); 3) Banks’s (1994, 1997) institutional scales of democracy for 115 countries between 1850 and 1997 (also in Foweraker and Landman 1997, Appendix B, pages 251-252), and 4) Bollen’s (1998) global index of liberal democracy for 1950-1990.

The second tradition in the measurement of democracy draws on analysis of good and corrupt forms of rule which categorized regime types using the city-states of the time as the empirical base

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⁴ www.freedomhouse.org

The third tradition in measuring democracy attempts to establish objective indicators that measure Dahl’s two dimensions of a polyarchy: contestation and participation represented solely by Tatu Vanhanen. The contestation indicator is the smallest parties’ share of the vote (i.e. 100 minus the largest party share) and the participation indicator is the voter turnout (i.e. percentage of voters that vote in an election). Vanhanen multiplies the two indicators together and divides the product by 100 to produce an ‘index of democratization’. Nowadays his global data set includes measures of democracy for 187 countries from 1810 to 1998 (Vanhanen 2000).

The fourth tradition, which begun most notably in the Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963), utilizes survey-based indicators of mass public perception of democracy and the quality of democratic institutions (Landman & Häusermann 2003). Two sources produce regularly updated mass data on a variety of countries: 1) the Global Barometer Surveys and 2) the World Values Surveys, which now contain data on more than 40 countries (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997).

The fifth tradition creates so-called ‘image indices’, which poll expert opinion on the quality of democracy at a given time and place (Landman & Häusermann 2003). For example, rather than poll mass publics, Fitzgibbon sought to measure the quality of democracy in Latin America using a systematic survey instrument that probed the views of country specialists on a series of social and political scales ranging from 1 to 5, that they felt represented both the preconditions and manifestations of democracy (Fitzgibbon 1967: 135). This tradition in polling expert opinion continues today with the index produced every five years.

All in all, from the variety of indexes represented above current study has to choose an indicator which would be a cross-national, time serious, have the data available and suffer from the smallest number of measurement problems, and at the same provide an objective reflection of the state of democracy in the countries under study.

However, these requirements are not so easy to be satisfied. Besides, there are always inevitable trade-offs between the different types of indicators. For instance, those indicators that achieve global coverage tend to have a high level of abstraction and those ones that provide highly detailed event counts are difficult to generate across a large global sample of countries (Landman & Häusermann 2003: 6). Similarly, dichotomous classification of regimes into either democracies or non-

3 www.globalbarometer.org
democracies rests on the conceptual assumption that democracy is an 'all or nothing affair' that can have exceptions and therefore undercount the number of democracies. On their turn, despite their representativeness due to random-sampling techniques, survey-based measures of democracy are not measures of democracy per se, but merely reflections of mass or expert opinion on the quality of democracy and democratic institutions (Ibid). For example, secondary analysis of Eurobarometer surveys shows a steady 60% support for democracy in the post war period, but says very little about the quality of democracy itself (Kaase and Newton 1995).

Taking into account the requirements of wide geographical and temporal coverage the current study could take a look at the ‘index of democratization’ developed by Tatu Vanhanen (1984, 1993, 2000). This index is quite simple since it relies on minimalist indicators of Dahl's dimensions of participation and contestation that are the directly measurable result of an election: voter turnout and party share. The index is easy to comprehend and the dataset for 192 countries within 1810-2000 is available. However, the index has some significant limitations (Landman & Häusermann 2003: 10). First, it further reduces Dahl's concept of democracy in its operationalisation, leading to doubt whether turnout is a valid measure of participation. Besides, turnout figures are suspect since for many areas the count of voters is often fraught. Additionally, the party share indicator does not reflect the nature of the party system or the electoral system (Ibid). Also, the simple multiplication procedure for aggregating the two components into the index has been widely criticized, since there is no clarification on weighting either component, and a low score on one component cannot be compensated by a high score on the other component (Munck and Verkuilen 2000: 36). Finally, the dataset provides data only till 2000 that will not allow using this index to assess the most recent democratic changes in the countries of this study.

Hence, the current research has to look for another alternative. In order to assess the progress or the setback in the democratization of the studied countries this investigation will utilize the standard-based scale “Nations in Transit” developed by Freedom House\(^6\). These ratings numerically assess 7 indicators of democratization for 29 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and additionally provide overall democracy score for each country within a long period of time that is appropriate for the needs of this study. Besides, the most recent data on the countries scores is readily available as Freedom House provides annual assessments. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress, and follow a quarter-point scale. The values of the 'Nations in Transit’ index for Central and Eastern European countries in 2008 and the corresponding sub-indexes it has been made of are shown in the Table B of the Appendix 2.

Yet, this index is also criticized for a number of methodological problems (Munck 2002), including validity (it is technically a measure of freedom not democracy), possible ideological biases against

\(^6\) www.freedomhouse.org
former communist states, and aggregation problems (the overall index is simply an average score of sub-indexes) (Landman & Häusermann 2003). Nevertheless, its wide geographical and temporal coverage combined with the availability of the most recent data will hopefully help to assess the progress made on the road towards democracy in the studied countries subject to democratic conditionality.

This assessment will be conducted in the end of the above-mentioned narratives while discussing the effectiveness of the conditionality applied, i.e. in the form of the values of Freedom House ratings associated with the corresponding years. However, this evaluation is not intended to investigate whether democratic changes have been caused by democratic conditionality policy, because of the potential significant influence of the other factors, and merely attempts to provide a reader with the general picture of the progress made by the studied countries in this direction and to ‘anchor’ the effectiveness of conditionality and the relevant changes made on the road towards democracy.

3.5. Potential strengths and limitations of the research method and the limitations of the measurements

This subsection discusses the potential strengths and the limitations of the current research method and measurements accompanied by the several possible solutions designed to eliminate or reduce these deficiencies.

Using Boolean algebra, QCA can enhance traditional qualitative analysis being able to handle a larger number of cases than typically analyzed in qualitative research without need in the large $N$ of statistical analyses (Ragin 2000). In addition, QCA offers a more systematic replicable approach to data analysis (Coverdill, Finlay, & Martin 1994) as well as it compels “a consideration of theoretical stories that may have been overlooked by the shifting-through-the-data approach” (Ibid: 78) common to most qualitative analyses. By formalizing the logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring the logic and empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases – research situations that normally call for the use of variable-oriented, quantitative methods (Ragin 1987, 2000). Hence, QCA brings some of the methodological discipline and the rigor of quantitative analysis to qualitative analysis and some of the causal complexity and inductive sensitivity of qualitative analysis to quantitative analysis (Coverdill et al. 1994), essentially being able to travel the middle road between generality and complexity (Ragin & Zaret 1983; Ragin et al. 2003).

Secondly, with its combinatorial logic, qualitative comparative analysis opens the possibility to new ways of thinking (Soulliere 2005: 424). Coverdill et al. argue that QCA forces a social scientist to “think very hard about cases, measurement of variables and the meaning of particular case attributes in a way that is not required by either traditional qualitative or quantitative analysis” (1994: 78). In this way, QCA offers the possibility of both better data analysis and better theory (Ibid.) that is crucial for enhancing the quality of the current investigation.
However, one should keep in mind that there are several potential pitfalls that could bias study results obtained through the application of the method of QCA. The most significant of them are: the precise categorization of the dependent variable, the selection of the independent variables, and the selection of the cases. In addition, with a small $N$ the generalizability of the findings is restricted and the possibility of random error appearance increases (Ragin 2000: 115). The other limitation to the generalizability of the findings, which is partially a result of the small $N$ but also a reflection of the nature of the social world, addresses the issue of limited diversity. The latter comes to light due to the foreseen absence of the empirical cases which match to some of the possible combinations of the causal conditions under investigation in the truth table. The danger of limited diversity is that the necessary conditions may be overlooked (Ragin 2000: 115). In order to overcome this limitation current study thoroughly examines the qualitative data pertinent to each case and excludes less relevant explanatory factors from the research. By doing this, each case is embedded in its context.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the advantages to be gained from the application of the QCA method to democratic conditionality research, as well as the relevance of the findings to the literature on enlargement and the democratization processes are doubtless. The QCA allows us to analyze the conditions and conditional configurations of the factors theoretically influential on the effectiveness of EU conditionality policy. Despite current research examines relatively small number of cases the analysis is rather intensive – addressing various aspects of cases, and integrative – investigating how the different factors of case fit together, both contextually and historically. However, Ragin (2000) warns against over-reliance on this methodology alone. “Viewing cases as configurations is not a panacea,” Ragin states, as “there is no substitute for insight or for in-depth knowledge of the research subjects” (Ibid: 87). Indeed, QCA does not give us the visual acuity of the real political processes of conditionality. To address this potential weakness of the analysis, we have to further substantiate the results by finding the evidence for the causal link of presence/absence of the credibility, the costs, the commitment, the economic interdependence and the societal salience for the success/failure of conditionality, and investigating how exactly these factors have affected the democratization of CEECs.

Besides, the current research has been aware of the limitations of the measurements conducted. Apart from the measurement problems with the index of the Freedom House used to assess the progress of the country on the road towards democracy (i.e. threats to validity, possible biases, aggregation problems), there are also limitations of this kind for the variables of the present investigation. For instance, validity (that is if the variable measures what it purports to measure) is a concern for the variable of economic interdependence. The variable doesn’t fully cover all the scope of economic links of the target country with the EU and is merely a share of country’s foreign trade with the EU. It is also a case for the variable of societal salience, which instead reflecting the society’s
attitude on problematic issue that would be too hard to evaluate due to the absence of data, assesses the population’s attitude towards country’s EU membership and political democracy in general. Nevertheless, this indicator less suffers from problems of representativeness due to the usage of random sample techniques by the opinion polls. Besides, the fact that the variables are operationalized and further coded according to relatively simple and straightforward rules, developed in the methodology chapter, solves the problem of reliability. To my deep conviction, the indicators which are used for the variables can be easily produced by other researchers using the same coding rules and source material. The problem of information bias is addressed by the usage of the data mostly from the official sources (e.g. reports of the European Commission, statistical data of the governmental agencies etc.).

With the view of the above-mentioned caveats and limitations, the following section starts with the short narratives on the studied countries to check thoroughly the values of the variables. As it has been mentioned, these narratives are designed to introduce the conflicts (i.e. non-compliance with the EU democratic requirements), provide empirical evidence for the conditions, describe the instruments of the conditionality applied, and its effectiveness by viewing what democratic changes have been made in the studied countries. Additionally, these changes will be assessed over time by using the chosen index of democratization in order to link EU democratic conditionality and the progress made by the subject countries on their road to political democracy.

The narratives are followed by the analysis subsection conducted in line with the QCA method. With its application the investigation empirically tests the theoretically derived main and alternative hypotheses put forward to discover the causal relevance of two sets of explanatory factors suggested by competing external incentives and social influence models, and the success of EU democratic conditionality. The various combinations of the independent variables (conditions) and the dependent variable (outcome) are aggregated in the raw data matrix (truth table) and subsequently processed with the application of Boolean reduction technique described above. After running the QCA minimization procedure on all the possible combinations for which there has been empirical evidence (Ragin 2000: 103-105), the final solution which embraces the necessary and/or the sufficient conditions of the compliance of the countries of Central and Eastern European region will be detected.

Finding of the necessary and the sufficient causes, or in other words different values of independent variables or their combinations resulting in compliance will allow to test or reject the hypotheses presupposing the importance of these conditions, and thus will provide answer to the central research question.
Chapter 4. Analysis

This section is aimed to detect the conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality policy in the target countries of Central and Eastern European region. With this aim the present study investigates 3 countries subject to this policy: Latvia, Romania and Ukraine. First, the narratives on each country are presented entailing introduction of the main conflicts with EU democratic criteria and the presentation of the conditions, followed by the description of the conditionality applied, and the subsequent discussion of its effectiveness in terms of the compliance. Additionally, the progress in the democratization in the studied countries is assessed along the chosen index in order to connect EU conditionality policy and the relevant democratic changes. Next to that the analysis of all the causal configurations for which there has been empirical evidence is conducted, in line with the QCA method discussed in the previous chapter. By finding the necessary and the sufficient causes the analysis subsequently tests the relevance of the theoretically derived hypotheses, thus bringing to light the conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality policy and answering the central research question. The section ends with the discussion of the limits of the research findings.

4.1. Latvia

The following subsection provides a brief narrative on the Latvia’s case, listing the conflicts with EU democratic requirements, providing evidence for the values of the variables, describing the conditionality and assessing its effectiveness and simultaneously evaluating democratic changes along the chosen indicator of democratization.

The main conflict with the EU democratic requirements was that the policy of Latvia toward Russian-speaking national minority did not meet the standards of the EU on minority rights. Latvia has the largest share of Russian-speaking population of all the Baltic States. But, after obtaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, national citizenship was automatically granted only to the citizens of the inter-war Latvian Republic and their descendants (Plakans 1997; Pabriks 1999). Moreover, the government set steep demands for naturalization. According to Pabriks (1999) such a policy made around 30 per cent of the population stateless and deprived them of their political rights. Within two years, the government enacted additional laws on the use of the Latvian language, education and economic rights, which indirectly discriminated the non-Latvian population (Ibid: 151).

As regards the values of the conditions theoretically relevant to the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality, they were mostly favourable both for external incentives and alternative social influence models. The domestic power costs for accepting the EU conditions were generally low for Latvian governments. EU democratic requirements affected only a separate policy issue and didn’t threaten the security or integrity of the state as well as the usual political practices of the government at power (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). Besides, after some starting fear, the Latvian political elite realized that a liberalized minority policy would not cause mass naturalization or undermine its
political positions. Additionally, the Latvian political elite viewed EU accession as the only guarantee of the state’s security and independence from Russia (Jubulis 1996).

The conditions for the social influence model were slightly less favourable. Since Latvia’s independence and the first post-Soviet elections its governments were mostly centre-right with a strong Latvian nationalism among all the parties. Consequently, the Latvian policy was shaped in line with the belief that the Latvian state had to ensure the survival and revival of the Latvian nation and language after the decades of ‘Russification’ (Ibid: 69). At the same time, however, the centre parties were strongly pro-European. They considered Latvia to be the part of the ‘west’ and were committed to Latvia’s integration in western organizations and ‘Europeanization’ of its politics and economy (Plakans 1997: 285; Smith et al. 1998: 108). However, according to the Eurobarometer’s surveys, the support for EU membership has steadily been weak in Latvian society. Besides, it was accompanied by strong nationalist and anti-Russian orientations of the majority of Latvian population (Jubulis 1996). Therefore, the societal silence was consistently absent and no societal pressure on minority and language issues was put on the government. Additionally, the Latvian economy was significantly dependent on the EU. According to the data of the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia the share of Latvia’s foreign trade with the EU countries had exceeded the margin of 50 per cent in 1995 – that is from the year of Latvia’s application for membership – and remained above it for the rest period of the investigation.

Initially, the EU did not develop its own conditionality policy toward Latvia, but followed the course of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and aligned itself with the recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who demanded that the naturalization process and the non-official use of language be regulated as liberally as possible (Zaagman 1999). In its Copenhagen criteria of 1993, the EU established respect for minority rights as a political accession requirement. In July 1997, in its opinions on the applicant countries, the European Commission judged Latvia to be fulfilling the political criteria for admission in general, but officially mirrored the concerns of the HCNM on the situation with the Russian speaking minority (European Commission, 1997). Secondly, the Commission realized that the new laws did not produce the expected rise in the naturalization numbers (European Commission 1997: 20), and demanded further changes, particularly granting the citizenship to the stateless children. Thirdly, the EU opposed the Latvian Language Law, which was adopted in July 1999. This law prescribed the obligatory use of the Latvian language in public and was therefore judged to constitute a breach of international and Community norms (European Commission 1999: 19). The fourth, final issue subject to EU conditionality was the case of the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).

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7 http://www.csb.gov.lv/?lng=en
Thus, having determined the values of all the variables and having chosen 4 issues subject to democratic conditionality – 1) the issue with the Russian-speaking national minority (Min) 2) the issue with the granting of the citizenship to the stateless children (Ch); 3) the issue with the Latvian Language Law (Lan); 4) the issue with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) – we can define the time-issue specific cases to be further analyzed by applying the QCA method.

The case identifiers (Case ID) of each case – technically, the time period with the same values of the conditions, the same issue and the same outcome – containing abbreviations of the conflict issues and the time period with the constant values of the variables are used for the conveniences of the further treatment. To put differently, the analysis ‘switches’ to the new conditional configuration on the problematic issue each time, when the value of at least one of the variables - either conditions or outcome, or both – change (Ragin 2000). This is expressed in the different time spans for the cases within the same issue. For instance, on the issue with the Latvian Language Law the values of simultaneously two variables changed in 1999: with the adoption of the new amended law in 1999 and subsequent monitoring report of the European Commission Latvia became in the compliance (1) on this issue that followed by the high credibility (1) of accession due to the start of the accession negotiations with the EU. This resulted in a new conditional configuration for Latvia on that issue after 1999. The other issue-time-specific cases are obtained according to the same rules. Additional evidence for the values of the variables is provided below in the discussion of conditionality and its effectiveness.

Consequently, for Latvia the cases were marked as follows:
- LatMin-1997 – the issue of granting of the citizenship to the national minority before 1997;
- LatMin+1997 – the issue of granting of the citizenship to the national minority after 1997;
- LatLan-1999 – the issue with the public use of Russian language before 1999;
- LatLan+1999 – the issue with the public use of Russian language after 1999;
- LatCh-1998 – the issue with the granting of the citizenship to stateless children before 1998;
- LatCh+1998 – the issue with the granting of the citizenship to stateless children after 1998;

The cases can be summarized in the following table which also provides the values of the independent (conditions) and the dependent variables (outcome) relevant to each case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case ID</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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Assessing the effectiveness of EU conditionality, it is crucial to admit that the efforts of the HCNM were effective only when they were linked to Latvia’s accession in the European Union, which forced the Latvian government and the parliament to accept the democratic conditions (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). The Latvian parliament initially ignored the HCNM’s suggestions on naturalization and made it dependent on the annual quota. However, after a pressure from the Council of Europe, the President had vetoed the law. Subsequently it was revised and adopted by the Parliament that resulted in Latvia’s accession to the CE in early 1995 (Jubulis 1996). Nevertheless, the implementation of the new law didn’t meet the requirements of the EU due to the extreme complexity of the naturalization procedures. Hence, the HCNM recommended Latvia to reduce naturalization fees, simplify the tests required of new citizens and, above all, grant the citizenship to stateless children (Kelley 2004). At the same time the European Commission published its opinion on Latvia mirroring this demands. Consequently, the Latvian government and parliament had to comply with the OSCE recommendations that furthered Latvia’s integration into European and transatlantic structures (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 and 24 June 1998).

As regards the language issue, although Latvia was warned that the language law could violate Latvian chances of joining the EU, the Parliament initially voted in its favour. However, the Latvian President refused to sign the law and returned it to the parliament. In this way, a new law that was officially considered to be “essentially in conformity with Latvia’s international obligations” (European Commission 2000: 23) had been adopted in December 1999, shortly before the EU decided to start accession negotiations with Latvia (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 48).

On its turn, the issue with the granting of the citizenship to stateless children was resolved in 1998 when the naturalization rules were amended again, and Latvia complied with the EU demands (European Commission 1998: 12).

Nevertheless, the EU was not successful during the conditionality phase with its attempts to induce Latvia to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) – upon accession Latvia remained the only new member state that had signed, but not ratified the Convention. In March 2001 ratification had failed in parliament, after which the following Commission report

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Credibility (CRED)</th>
<th>Costs (COST)</th>
<th>Commitment (COM)</th>
<th>Economic interdependence (ECIN)</th>
<th>Societal salience (SOS)</th>
<th>Compliance (COMP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LatMin-1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>LatCh+1998</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>LatLan-1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>LatLan+1999</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>LatFCNM-2004</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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‘urged’ Latvia to ratify the document (European Commission 2002: 31). This did not, however, prevent Latvia from being granted membership in May 2004. Only a few days after accession, ratification was rejected again, but in May 2005 the Convention was finally ratified – over a year after EU conditionality in the field of minority protection had ended (Schimmelfennig & Schwellnus 2006).

To sum up, the effects of EU conditionality policy in Latvia were rather substantial. Thus, the progress made by Latvia on its road towards democracy can be assessed along the Freedom House’s index of democratization utilized by the present study.

Table 4. ’Nations in Transit’ ratings and averaged scores for Latvia

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<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local democratic governance</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial framework and independence</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy score</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freedom House 2008]

Apparently, the observable changes in the areas subject to democratic conditionality can be seen, particularly in the relevant indexes on civil society and overall democracy score, according to which Latvia is very close to consolidated democracy according to Freedom’s House classification (Freedom House 2008).
4.2. Romania

The following subsection provides a short narrative on the Romania’s case, listing the conflicts with the EU democratic requirements, providing evidence for the values of the variables, describing conditionality and assessing its effectiveness, and simultaneously evaluating democratic changes along the chosen indicator of democratization.

Romania has had one of the most disputed and complicated democratic transformations in the entire region since the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989, presenting a ‘hard’ case in comparative terms (Pridham 2007). The European Commission’s Regular Reports on Romania have tracked numerous democratic gaps and deficiencies in the country’s political system during the accession process. While some of them were cross-nationally common among other CEE candidates, notably problems with minority protection, need in judicial reform and fighting corruption, other ones, including the special issue of institutionalized children were inherent to Romania only (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008).

During the decades of communist rule the administrative apparatus was the key instrument in the hands of ruling elites (Schoenfelder 2005). The public administration needed reform since it was considered a transmission belt for the implementation of the party-state’s policies from the top down to the grassroots level (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). Romanian administration suffered from a culture of nepotism and informality providing well-paid, secure, and prestigious employment to people connected to the party leadership at different levels, including familial ties (Ibid.). Local magistrates were dependent on the political leadership for their appointment and career progress, which further undermined any notion of governance and hence the rule of law (Schoenfelder 2005). The Communist period had been also characterized by the direct control of political elites over the judiciaries that still remained a case after partial liberalization of the regime with the infamous principle of ‘telephone justice’ being nothing exceptional (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). Corruption was even more difficult issue to combat effectively because it affected different layers of public life (Pridham 2007). Romania was repeatedly rated the worst country for corruption in Europe by Transparency International8. EU demands were concentrated also on the issues of the institutionalized children, the legacy of the Ceausescu’s regime, and minority rights for the Hungarian and Roma national minority. An estimated 100,000 children were found warehoused in extreme poverty and deprivation in hundreds of institutions nationwide (Pridham 2007). Though Romania signed and ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) already in 1995 and concluded the bilateral agreement including the corresponding provisions with Hungary in the 1996, hardly any substantial domestic measures followed these international commitments (Schimmelfennig & Schwellnus 2006: 17). A minority law – strongly demanded by both the EU and the minorities

8 www.transparency.org
themselves – was not passed (Kelley 2004: 443). Moreover, the government adopted more restrictive regulations regarding the use of and education in the minority languages (Ibid.).

As regards the conditions relevant to democratic conditionality, Romanian domestic transformation has been impeded by the multiple endogenous factors such as the difficult institutional legacies, the choices made during the early stages of democratization, and the entrenched power of veto actors (Noutcheva & Bechev 2008: 117). The factors relevant to the external incentives model were less favourable than in Latvia’s case. Although the credible membership incentives had been offered to Romania in 2000 with the start of the accession negotiations, the European Commission was rather harsh in its criticisms of Romania’s record on political conditions and several times has made revisionist moves for suspending negotiations (Pridham 2007). The costs of adopting the democratic rules on the above-mentioned problematic issues initially were rather high for Romanian political elites. However, they decreased over time with the pressure of EU conditionality (Pridham 2007). On the Hungarian issue they decreased after 1996, when the coalition including radical nationalist xenophobes lost its power in the parliament. Resistance was evident over political conditions of fighting corruption, reform of civil service and judiciary on the part of the Nastase’s government that held office through almost the whole period of the negotiations from 2000 to 2004, not least because the ruling party’s own patronage interests were at stake (Pridham 2007). Also, the reform of the judiciary, especially the ‘three-law package’ bore sufficient costs for the government. Nevertheless, the EU’s pressure reduced the costs of adoption to Romanian political elites due to the threat of non-accession and thus made impossible the political survival of non-reformist governments.

Romanian political elites developed clear European commitment immediately after the toppling of Nicolae Ceausescu which was expressed in the concept of ‘Returning to Europe’ (Pridham 2007). The governments have shown a fairly strong dependency culture in looking to the EU for assistance and policy initiative to a degree greater than in other CEECs. At the same time, the country has often been accused by EU officials of a marked disparity between rhetoric and action in its accession process paralleled by a clear tendency to produce impressive paperwork which often remained as such – the so-called ’yes, yes, yes’ response (Ibid: 5). With a credible membership perspective and a change in government societal salience grew up significantly according to the data of Eurobarometer9. Even when ex-communist government of Iliescu returned to power in 2000 and societal salience again decreased, the Romanian government continued to comply (Schimmelfennig 2004). The economic importance of the EU for Romania has exceeded 50 per cent margin of total foreign trade turnover in the period of investigation, particularly according to the data of the National Institute of Statistics, by

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9 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion
the mid-1990s, the EU became Romania’s main trading partner, accounting for more than half of both imports and exports\(^\text{10}\).

Thus, having determined the values of all the variables and having chosen issues subject to democratic conditionality we can obtain the time \textit{issue-time-specific cases}. In line with the QCA approach, a new case is accounted by the analysis each time the value of at least one variable for the same issue changes. This is reflected in the time span used for the case. Consequently, we have the following conditional configurations with the same values of the independent variables over a certain period of time for Romania:

- \textbf{RomMin-1993} – issue with the rights to national \textit{minorities} before 1993;
- \textbf{RomMin-1996} – issue with the rights to national \textit{minorities} before 1996;
- \textbf{RomMin-2000} – issue with the rights to national \textit{minorities} before 2000;
- \textbf{RomMin+2000} – issue with the rights to national \textit{minorities} after 2000.
- \textbf{RomCh-2004} – issue with the institutionalized \textit{children} before 2004;
- \textbf{RomMin+2004} – issue with the institutionalized \textit{children} after 2004;
- \textbf{RomPA-1999} – issue with the reform of \textit{public administration} before 1999;
- \textbf{RomPA-2002} – issue with the reform of \textit{public administration} before 2002;
- \textbf{RomPA+2002} – issue with the reform of \textit{public administration} after 2002;
- \textbf{RomJud-2003} – issue with the reform of the \textit{judiciary} before 2003;
- \textbf{RomJud-2005} – issue with the reform of the \textit{judiciary} before 2005;
- \textbf{RomJud+2005} – issue with the reform of the \textit{judiciary} after 2005;
- \textbf{RomCor-2000} – issue with the fighting \textit{corruption} before 2000;
- \textbf{RomCor-2005} – issue with the fighting \textit{corruption} before 2005;
- \textbf{RomCor+2005} – issue with the fighting \textit{corruption} after 2005.

The table below aggregates all these cases and provides the corresponding values of the relevant independent (conditions) and dependent variables (outcome):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case ID</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credibility (CRED)</td>
<td>Costs (COST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RomMin-1993</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RomMin-1996</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RomMin-2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RomMin+2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RomCh-2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) \url{http://www.insse.ro}
While developing EU democratic conditionality in respect of Romania, the Commission has tended to be particularly interventionist over the political conditions with regard to this country, and increasingly so as Romania’s likely membership drew nearer (Pridham 2007). In February 1993, the EU and Romania signed Association Agreement introducing a special clause on respect for human rights and democratic principles (Article 6). Romania officially submitted a membership application in June 1995. But, by and large, the EU did not measure the Romania’s aptitude to fulfill the democracy criteria before July 1997, when the European Commission (EC) issued its opinion on Romania’s application for membership (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008).

In the period of 1997-2004 the EC gradually specified and tightened its conditions, since it was not impressed by the commitments on paper and the adoption of new laws (Ibid.). For instance, the particular issue, loudly emphasized by the European Parliament (EP), was that of the miserable state of institutionalized children, a legacy of the Ceausescu regime (Pridham 2007). The EU’s commitment to the issue was such that in 2001 it raised the question of interrupting the negotiations. In February 2004, the European Parliament’s report was harsh in its criticisms of Romania’s record on political conditions (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). Various measures were listed as necessary, including fighting corruption at the political level, implementing the independence of the judiciary, reinforcing the freedom of the media, and action on the moratorium on adoptions. The result was the “To Do List” of some thirty items with a short deadline in July 2004 (Ibid).

Although the Accession Treaty with Romania was signed on 25 April 2005, the European Council explicitly linked the continuation of the reforms of the judiciary with the accession date of 2007 and envisaged a delay of one year in case of failure to implement the prescriptions (Treaty of Accession, 2005). In its official policy document the EU was quite strict with regard to Romania. For instance, in October 2005, the Comprehensive Monitoring Report rather explicitly stated that the EC would not hesitate to postpone the accession if there were serious concerns about Romania’s readiness by January 2007 (European Commission 2005). In September 2006, the EC set the accession date for Romania but preserved the right to continue its monitoring of the judicial systems and the fight against corruption even after accession (European Commission 2006). Romania therefore became the EU member on January 1, 2007.
While assessing the *effectiveness* of EU conditionality, it becomes clear that the EU moved toward more rigorous conditionality applied with regard to Romania’s case, since the last accelerated reforms only when it felt the “stick” of this policy (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008).

The situation in *minority protection* problematic issue changed fundamentally after the 1996 elections which brought about a government change towards a democratic pro-Western coalition that included the Hungarian party (Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus 2006). Consequently, already the Commission opinion in July 1997 recognized that the Hungarian minority issue had improved significantly and the restrictive regulations adopted by the previous government had been cancelled (European Commission 1997: 18). However, in the following years, the progress reports began to emphasize the necessity of the fight against Roma discrimination. This caused a rapid legislative reaction when already in 2000 the Romanian government issued a special Ordinance on the Prevention and Punishment of All Forms of Discrimination, which was approved by the parliament in 2002 (Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus 2006).

As refers the *issue with the institutionalized children*, Brussels demanded Romania to regulate this chaotic and often mismanaged sphere where international adoptions often resulted in child trafficking. In 2004 Romanian politicians came into action by issuing Law 272 which forbade international adoptions (Rosenthal 2005) that resulted in Romania’s compliance on that issue.

In 1995 the EC also formulated the requirement of an independent, efficient, and functional civil service as part of the Copenhagen political criteria. In 1998 official Commission’s reports, this condition was discerned as a prerequisite for launching membership negotiations (European Commission 1998). However, legislative changes were initially blocked by the opposition which saw *civil service reform* as an attempt of the government to strengthen its appointees. Romania’s legislature ratified the Civil Service Law at the beginning of December 1999, several days prior to the fateful Helsinki Summit (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). In 2002, the government of Nastase introduced further legislation on civil service (*Ibid.*).

The EU additionally pressed Romania to *reform the judicial branch* making it fully independent from the executive one (Open Society Institute 2002). Romania adopted a new constitution in October 2003, which guaranteed magistrates’ tenure. In 2004 Romania also adopted a new Criminal Code (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). In June 2004, the so-called ‘three-law package’ followed, dealing with the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM), the organization of the judiciary, and the status of the magistrates. In June-July 2005, Romania went through a scaled political crisis. Revisions in the three-law package were adopted by the parliament with a risk to Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu’s government, which faced a no-confidence vote. The critical factor here was the upcoming Monitoring Report of the European Commission and the strong pressure coming from Brussels and signaling possible accession delay in the case of slowing down judiciary reform (*Ibid.*).
Finally, Romania was put considerable pressure on to fight corruption. The Commission’s regular reports and top EU civil servants constantly criticized ineffectiveness of the state bogged down in corruption at various levels. Coming under serious EU criticism, it adopted an anticorruption law in May 2000, followed by a strategy in 2001 containing a set of measures, benchmarks, and target dates (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). In 2002 the Anticorruption Prosecution Office was created to investigate cases of corruption involving government officials. At the same time, the government established the Independent Protection and Anticorruption Service, formally within the Ministry of Justice but reporting to the Parliament. With the victory of the centre-right opposition in April 2005, the new government reformed institutions and assigned more clearly their tasks (Ibid.). Yet, the EC officially concluded in its final report in September 2006 that corruption remained a problem and would be subject to the further monitoring (European Commission 2006).

To sum up, the reforms in Romania forced by the democratic conditionality helped the recognized laggard to “move out of the postcommunist limbo and ultimately qualify for the EU membership” (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 140). However, the question of the depth of these reforms still remains open as well as how far they push Romania towards achieving consolidated democracy. At least, the general picture of the state of democracy in the country can be obtained by using the easily accessible comparative data of the chosen index of democratization:

**Table 6. 'Nations in Transit’ ratings and averaged scores for Romania [Freedom House 2008]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent media</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National democratic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local democratic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial framework</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>and independence</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, the Freedom House’s index utilized by current investigation displays a trend of gradual improvement of the state of democracy in the last years, particularly regarding the development of the civil society, the independence of judiciary and the state of corruption (Freedom House 2008). However, judging on the overall democracy score, Romania has remained between semi-consolidated democracy and transitional regime according to the terminology of Freedom House.
4.3. Ukraine

The following subsection provides a short narrative on Ukraine’s case, listing the conflicts with the EU democratic requirements, providing evidence for the values of the variables, describing conditionality and assessing its effectiveness simultaneously evaluating democratic changes along the chosen indicator of democratization.

Ukraine is the former country of the Soviet Union which gained its independence in 1991 and since then has faced numerous problems of the post-communist legacy, including inefficient and corrupt system of public administration, serving to interests of the political elites, judiciary directly controlled by influential authorities, restricted freedom of mass media with murders of journalists being nothing uncommon, and forged elections. The country was criticized for non-compliance in many areas. European Commission demanded the country to meet the requirements of free and fair election, to fight corruption, to ensure the independence of the judiciary, to carry out the constitutional reform and the reform of public administration etc. (European Commission 2008).

As regards the conditions of the factors relevant to democratic conditionality, Ukraine developed an unambiguous western commitment in the mid-1990s that is from the very beginning of the period of the investigation. By 1996 the European ‘vector’ was declared as being among the primary foreign policy priorities by the Ukrainian government (Kubicek 2000: 156). The Presidential Administration of Ukraine proclaimed its ‘European choice’ by arguing that the concept was inseparable from Ukrainian identity. The government employed the policy of the ‘return to Europe’ to counterbalance Russian pressure, as well as to consolidate power in the domestic arena. A declared intent to integrate with the EU served as a ‘legitimizing and discursive resource’ (Wolczuk 2004: 11). By the end of the 1990s, the issue of membership was raised by the Ukrainian government. In June 1998, President Kuchma adopted a Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration to the European Union that outlined the objectives of the government while asserting that the “national interests of Ukraine require the identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, fullfledged EU member” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998: 1).

Given the Ukraine’s ruling elites orientation – at least until recent years – towards Russia, Ukraine’s compliance with EU requirements bore also sufficient costs (Shumylo 2006). The famous events known as the Orange Revolution changed the profile of Ukraine in late 2004, decreasing the costs of compliance for the new Ukrainian government of Tymoshenko. They remained low even when pro-Russian government of Yanukovych returned to power. However, the external incentives of the membership prospect haven’t still been proposed, instead the EU applies the instrument of European Neighbourhood Policy and ‘light’ conditionality attached to bilateral ENP Action Plans (Shumylo 2006). Important, that according to the data of the National Committee of Statistics, during the period of the investigation Ukraine remained less economically interdependent with the EU than
Latvia and Romania. For instance, in 2006 the share of the EU in the total export volumes equaled to 26.9 per cent, whereas in the total volumes of import – to 32.9 per cent\textsuperscript{11}. As regards the level of the societal salience, initially it was rather high and decreased only after 2005 due to the growing ‘euro-skepticism’ and ‘euro-indifference’ of the population (Shumylo 2006). The results of the opinion polls of the National Institute for Strategic Studies\textsuperscript{12} show that the support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU decreased from 55% in 2001, to 47% in 2005, and 43% in 2006. The majority of the Ukrainian population perceives the EU as a distant partner with alien problems (Kobzar 2006).

Thus, having determined the values of all the variables and having chosen freedom of elections, constitutional reform, reform of judiciary, fighting corruption and civil service reform as the issues subject to democratic conditionality, the time-issue specific cases can be defined and subsequently analyzed by applying the QCA method. To remind, each time at least one of the values of the conditions changes within a certain issue, a new case is incorporated in the research (Ragin 2000). Therefore, the cases are technically the time spans with the same conditions on the same problematic issue. The case identifiers containing abbreviations of the conflict issues and the time period with the constant values of the variables are used for the conveniences of the further analytical operations. Consequently, for Ukraine the cases have been marked as follows:

- UkrElec-2004 – issue with the freedom of elections before 2004;
- UkrConst-2004 – issue with the constitutional reform before 2004;
- UkrJud-2004 – issue with the reform of the judiciary before 2004;
- UkrCor-2004 – issue of the fighting corruption before 2004;
- UkrCiv-2004 – issue with the civil service reform before 2004;

The table below summarizes all these cases together with the associated values on the dependent and independent variables.

Table 7. The conditional configurations for Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case ID</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credibility (CRED)</td>
<td>Costs (COST)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{11} www.ukrstat.gov.ua
\textsuperscript{12} www.niss.gov.ua

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As regards the evolution of EU political conditionality, Ukraine was one of the first former Soviet Union countries to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1994, aimed at the consolidation of the country’s democracy, which however came into force only in 1998 (Shumylo 2006). Nevertheless, the PCA was almost unconditional since a membership perspective was excluded (Kobzar 2006). Numerous reports highlighting democratic infringements by the Ukrainian authorities made membership an unrealistic prospect (Ibid.). In the early 2000s EU officials continued to stress the importance of democratization. After the Gongadze scandal, for instance, EU leaders voiced their concerns about the operation of the media and the general plight of journalists and members of the opposition. The Joint Statement issued by Ukraine and the EU after the 2001 Yalta Summit specifically addressed issues pertaining to democracy, including the rule of law, freedom of speech and civil society (Joint Statement 2001: 1). These issues were also discussed during the 2002 Copenhagen Summit (Joint Statement 2002: 1-4). Plans for the ‘new instrument’ - the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) - were disclosed in late 2002 (Shumylo 2006). Subsequently, EU-Ukraine Action Plan attached to the ENP was adopted in February 2005 for a period of three years. Since then, implementation has been guided and monitored on the basis of the annual implementation tools, which set out comprehensive yearly sets of objectives and timelines, based on the priorities agreed jointly by the EU and Ukraine (Ibid.). However, the issue of association or any possibilities of Ukraine’s inclusion to the EU enlargement have not been stipulated.

The first progress report was issued in December 2006. In addition, the overall evaluations have been carried out in November 2005, March 2006, May 2007 and April 2008. Intense cooperation through the EU-Ukraine Summit, the EU–Ukraine Cooperation Council, the EU–Ukraine Cooperation Committee, and seven sub-committees, has enabled both sides to progress with the implementation of the Action Plan. Negotiations on a New Enhanced Agreement (NEA) supposed to replace the PCA started in Brussels in March 2007 (European Commission 2008).

Evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality, the European Commission (EC) itself notes that Ukraine has continued to make progress in most areas, although its pace stalled somewhat compared to the previous years due to the political instability which characterized most of 2007 (European Commission 2008).

| UkrElec-2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| UkrElec+2004 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| UkrConst-2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| UkrConst+2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UkrJud-2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| UkrJud+2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UkrCor-2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Ukr-Cor+2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UkrCiv-2004 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| UkrCiv+2004 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
The September 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections in Ukraine were observed by the International Observer Mission headed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The mission concluded that the elections “were conducted mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE) commitments and other international standards for democratic elections”. The international observers found that the elections took place in the open and competitive environment. European Commission has also confirmed Ukraine’s positive record in the conduct of democratic elections of 2006. However, certain shortcomings were registered (European Commission 2008), such as the poor quality of voter lists, possible disenfranchisement of voters who crossed the borders, and the lack of possibilities for absentee voting. In February 2007, the Parliament issued a law on the State Voters’ Register providing an establishment of computerized nation-wide register. The law entered into force in October 2007, too late to play a role in the parliamentary elections, which however were again assessed as fair (Ibid.).

In the area of constitutional reform the EU demanded carry out, the Parliament adopted the law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine after having overcome the presidential veto in January 2007 (European Commission 2008). The law was criticized by the Venice Commission for introducing through an ordinary law changes that amount to constitutional amendments, as well as for jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers (Ibid.). Besides, the Venice Commission pointed out that the constitution lacks an efficient system of checks and balances. At present the two centres of power currently compete in the executive branch that impedes the reforms – the Constitutional Court, which has failed to interpret the constitutional provisions related to the powers of the President, and the National Constitutional Council established in December 2007 by the President. The European Commission has officially expressed concerns regarding the inclusiveness and transparency of this process (European Commission 2008). The Venice Commission has also recommended reforming and limiting the excessive powers of the prosecution service, which would require relevant amendments to the Ukraine’s constitution (Ibid).

A number of draft laws on the judiciary, including a draft law on the status and the recruitment of judges and a new code of criminal procedure, were introduced to the Parliament by the President in November 2007. Amendments to the law on the bar were adopted in November 2006. Nevertheless, European Commission demands further efforts to improve the court reform and to ensure the independence of the judiciary remains, as well as to reform law enforcement bodies (European Commission 2008).

By the end of 2006, some efforts were made to change the anti-corruption legislation. The OECD pointed in the report of December 2006 to a number of deficiencies in Ukraine’s fight against corruption, particularly the need to reform the criminal legislation to meet the international standards and to close the gaps which allow corrupt persons to avoid jurisdiction, to strengthen prosecution of
corruption and to address the problem of immunity of senior officials (OECD, 2006). The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) adopted its peer review report on Ukraine in March 2007. However, the adoption of anti-corruption legislation was impeded by the political crisis following the April 2007 presidential decree on early elections and dissolution of the Parliament. An anticorruption action plan was adopted in August 2007 to address a number of international recommendations. However, it has not been endorsed by GRECO by now, since not all the recommendations from the CoE’s experts have been taken into account. The UN Convention on Anti-Corruption remains to be ratified alongside the CoE’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. To sum up, according to the EC’s evaluation, although the corruption problem has been publicly addressed as a policy priority, no real progress has been made (European Commission 2008).

Besides, the EC requires Ukraine to continue efforts in reforming its civil service in line with the EU’s and the OECD’s demands. A new draft law on civil service is presently under consideration by the Parliament. Its main objective is to create a professional, politically impartial civil service in accordance with European standards (European Commission 2008). Two more draft laws dealing with the accountability of civil servants were the object of regional public consultations during September – November 2007 (Ibid.).

To sum up, Ukraine’s progress on its path towards achieving the consolidated democracy is somewhat impeded in the recent years by the general political instability in the country. The Freedom House’s rating the present study use to assess the progress in democratic transformation in Ukraine, shows a slight progress on the several directions which have been subject to democratic conditionality (Freedom House 2008).

Table 8. ’Nations in Transit’ ratings and averaged scores for Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent media</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National democratic governance</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local democratic governance</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial framework and independence</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy score</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freedom House 2008]

This is especially observable for the sub-scores on electoral process, independent media and civil society. However, the remaining sub-scores show either very slow progress towards democracy, as in the case of national democratic governance and corruption scores, or even a setback as regards the independence of judiciary. According to the overall democracy score, Ukraine remains at present a transitional/hybrid regime in line with the terminology of Freedom House.
4.4. Qualitative comparative analysis

The following subsection analyzes all the conditional configurations, for which there has been empirical evidence, according to the method of qualitative comparative analysis and finds out the conditions of compliance in the studied countries.

Having confirmed the values of all the variables with empirical evidence provided in the narratives, the investigation obtains issue-time-specific conditional configurations which constitute the cases of the current study. Subsequently, under the QCA method all the conditional configurations presented with the data are listed in the 'truth table' (Ragin 1987: 93). In each row of the table the combination of values of independent variables (causes) is associated with the corresponding positive or negative value of the dependent variable (outcome). The cases with the same configurations of conditions are put in the same row, even when they are contradictory, that is have the same outcome. In this way, we obtain a revised truth table, which is a bit simplified. The table also indicates the number of cases and case identifiers. The contradictions are marked with the italic type.

Table 9. The revised truth table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credibility (CRED)</th>
<th>Cost (COST)</th>
<th>Commitment (COM)</th>
<th>Economic Interdependence (ECIN)</th>
<th>Societal Salience (SOS)</th>
<th>Compliance (COMP)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LatCh-1998; LatLan-1999; LatFCNM-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RomCor-2000 LatFCNM-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RomPA-1999; RomJud-2005; LatMin-1997; RomMin-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UkrElec-2004; UkrCiv+2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>UkrElec-2004; UkrConst-2004; UkrJud-2004; UkrCor-2004; UkrCiv-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66
Subsequently, the table is processed with the application of procedures of Boolean minimization described in the methodological part. A crucial aspect of QCA which allows finding an answer to the central question of the present investigation is the possibility of the Boolean approach to define the relation between the results of Boolean minimization and necessary and sufficient causes in social research (Ragin et al. 2006: 52). As it has been explained in the methodology, a cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur. A cause is defined as sufficient if by itself it can produce a certain outcome (Ragin 1987: 99). Important, that this distinction is meaningful only in the context of theoretical perspectives. Neither necessity nor sufficiency exists independently of theories that propose causes (Ragin et al. 2006: 53). Thus, the hypotheses developed in this study serve as a theoretical constructs, which specify presence/absence or high/low degree of certain condition as a necessary and/or sufficient cause for conditionality to cause compliance, or in other words to be effective.

In contrast to the results of most types of statistical analysis, the results of Boolean analysis are easy to interpret in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Necessity and sufficiency are usually considered jointly because all combinations of the two are meaningful (Ragin et al. 2006: 53). Hence, a cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an outcome and it is singular, that is, not a combination of causes. Consequently, a cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability. On its turn, a cause is necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of producing an outcome in combination with other causes and appears in all such combinations. Finally, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce an outcome (Ibid: 53).

Having aggregated all the conditional configurations in the truth table, we can start their minimization which has been described in the methodology part. Although, the restrictive character of combinatorial logic seems to indicate that the Boolean approach simply compounds complexity on top of complexity, as Ragin et al. (2006) argue that it is not the case (Ibid: 48). There are simple and straightforward rules for simplifying complexity, the most fundamental of which is the following: if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition and still produce the same outcome, then the distinguishing one can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression (Ibid: 48).

Before presenting the results of the QCA, it is important to point out several important observations. First, the truth table represents 12 of 32 (=2^5) of logically possible conditional configurations. Consequently, the number of cases is not only higher than the number of countries (32
cases for the 3 countries) but also varies among the countries – between 7 (for Latvia, with the smallest changes in conditions over time and among issue-areas) and 15 (for Romania with 5 separate issues and up to 4 time periods). Second, 8 configurations are contradictory (rows 1 and 9 in the truth table) because the same configurations of conditions result in compliance in some cases and non-compliance in the others (rows in the truth table with '0/1' or '1/0' outcomes). The three possible ways of treating the contradictory outcomes the current research applies have been in-detail elaborated in the methodology part. To remind, they can be treated positively, negatively or excluded. Third, the combination of 'low costs' and 'low commitment' is systematically missing in the table. In other words, there are now empirical cases in which low commitment of the target government is combined with the low costs of EU legal rule adoption for these governments. Indeed, according to Schimmelfennig (2004: 20) the target governments with a weak or absent European identity always incur high costs of adoption. And the other way round, target governments with the low costs of adoption of EU legal rules always identify themselves strongly with the European community. By contrast, the presence of the strong commitment of the government doesn’t exclude the possibility of the presence of the high costs of legal rule adoption. The last observation has important methodological implications discussed below. Finally there is only one case with the low commitment of the target government, particularly the case on the protection on minorities in Romania before 1993, when the European identity was not simply elaborated yet. In general, it is a hard task to find cases with low commitment in Europe after the end of the Cold War, since most of the governments clearly identify themselves with the European international community. These can be the case for the autocratic or authoritarian regimes in Europe, such as the Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus or Milosevic’s regime in Yugoslavia (Schimmelfennig 2004). However, the inclusion of these examples in the analysis wouldn’t enrich it with the conditional configurations which have the resulted in the compliance. Consequently, on these cases we cannot study the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality.

Subsequently, in the result of Boolean minimization obtained with the application of the software package QCA 3.1 used to simplify the computations, the following solutions for compliance have been found.

Table 10. The solutions of the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Contradictory configuration</th>
<th>QCA solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMP (1)</td>
<td>Treated as compliance</td>
<td>CRED AND COST AND COM AND ECIN OR CRED AND COM AND ECIN AND SOS OR COST AND COM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minimization has resulted in 3 solutions, when contradictions are treated as compliance (true). When contradictions are treated as non-compliance (false) or non-existent (excluded), both minimizations have resulted in 2 solutions.

Preliminary analysis of the QCA solutions for compliance with respect to the definitions of necessary and sufficient causes described above show that none of the causes appears to be both sufficient and necessary, since there is not single and unique cause which results in compliance. Instead, the analysis has displayed the necessary but not sufficient causes, or in other words the causes which are capable of producing an outcome (compliance) in combination with other causes and appears in all such combinations. When contradictions are treated as compliance the 'high commitment' of the target government has been proved to be necessary but not sufficient condition of compliance. When the contradictions are treated as non-compliance, the combination of 'high credibility', 'high commitment', and 'high economic interdependence' for the target country proved to necessary and jointly sufficient. Finally, when contradictions are excluded, compliance can be achieved when 'high credibility', 'low costs' and 'high economic interdependence' are all simultaneously present. The condition of the high degree of societal salience is neither necessary nor sufficient, since it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that result in compliance.

### 4.5. Interpretation of the results and the limitations of the analysis

This subsection describes what could be learnt from the qualitative comparative analysis of the conditions of effectiveness of democratic conditionality and how could the findings be interpreted theoretically.

In a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 12 different combinations of causal conditions having resulted in compliance or non-compliance in the three studied countries (Latvia, Romania and Ukraine) we have investigated 5 theoretically plausible conditions of effective democratic conditionality in the light of EU enlargement. First, the preliminary analytical results show that one of the crucial factors of effectiveness of conditionality, which have triggered the democratic changes in target Central and Eastern European countries, is the high commitment of target government to Europe. When the commitment is high the EU efforts to induce compliance in norm-violating states usually succeed. But this is only a case when we treat contradictory outcomes as compliance or non-compliance. Second, despite high commitment is necessary condition of compliance in two of the three
sub-sets of solutions alone it doesn’t produce democratic changes in target countries that it’s not sufficient. Instead, it has to be combined with other conditions.

According to the external incentives model, the second crucial precondition for the success of democratic conditionality is the high credibility of accession for the target country. This assumption was generally corroborated by the results of QCA, when outcomes were treated as false (non-compliance) or treated as non-existent, and empirical evidence. Thus, in the absence of the credibility of accession, there will be no compliance, even when other conditions under the external incentives and social influence models are highly favourable. For instance, this has been observable on the example of the issues of the granting of citizenship to stateless children in Latvia (before 1998) and for fighting corruption in Romania (before 2005), when the government have not taken measures to resolve this issues in the absence of the credible membership prospective, even though the domestic power costs of adoption of the corresponding rules were relatively low for this governments. On the other hand, the credible incentives and high commitment has not appeared to be the only necessary conditions for compliance. The analysis has brought to light the third individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition of compliance found in the third subset of solutions – the low costs of adoption of EU rule.

Finally, the analysis displays the importance of the fourth condition of compliance – high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU. Thus, the high credibility, high commitment and high economic interdependence have appeared to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of effectiveness of conditionality. This combination is capable to result in compliance if contradictory configurations are treated as false. But these three conditions have not been confirmed to be jointly sufficient if contradictory outcomes are excluded. In this case the solution displays the other combination: high credibility, low costs and high economic interdependence. On its turn, high degree of the societal salience has proved to be irrelevant for compliance whatever way outcomes have been treated, since it has not been found in any of the three subsets of solutions.

Therefore, only by viewing all the subsets of solutions, we can assert that all but one of the hypotheses have been corroborated. Instead, the separate hypothesis on the importance of the presence of the high degree of the societal salience for the effectiveness of conditionality has been rejected.

However, for the hypotheses to be tested we have to explain the presence of contradictions. We can for instance assert that the assessment of European Commission on compliance could have been biased by the political considerations, whereas the compliance has been indeed achieved, or vice versa, that the democratic standards have not been reached, but the issue is assessed as compliance. It can be also presupposed that one or even few variables have been coded incorrectly, or the outcome has been affected by other (alternative) factors, which were not taken into account. The last problem can be addressed by the development of one or even few additional variables to further incorporate them in
the analysis. It is important, that the general idea of the QCA method and the research design allow this option. Besides, we have to bear in mind the possible limitations of the findings resulting from the limited number of cases, which don’t fully cover all theoretically possible conditional configurations, or the limitations resulting from the validity of the variables discussed in the methodology. Partially these problems have been addressed by the development of the simple and straightforward operationalization, which could be easily used to replicate and check the results of this analysis. Also, since we have studied on 3 countries only, it could have become a concern, if it is possible to draw on the basis of these results the conclusions for the whole Central and Eastern European region. However, as it has been discussed in the subsection on the selection of cases, the inclusion of other candidate countries wouldn’t give us the larger variation on the independent variable. Indeed, in the traditional liberal democracies like Lithuania, Poland and Hungary democratic conditionality works in all cases and simply reinforces the democratic transformations, whereas in autocratic countries like Belarus, Slovakia under Meciar conditionality has been unsuccessful. Thus, it is argued that the findings of the analysis constitute the conditions of compliance for all Central and Eastern European countries.

Hence, the answer for the central research question as to what are the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target countries of the Central and Eastern Europe is as follows: high credibility of accession, low costs of adoption of EU democratic norms for the target government, its high commitment to EU international community and high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU.

To conclude, the analysis generally corroborates the external incentives model based on the importance of high credibility and low costs as a sufficient combination of conditions for compliance and completes it with the two factors from the alternative social influence model – high commitment and high economic interdependence. It has been therefore tested that this ’mixed model’ works best for compliance to be achieved.
Chapter 5. Conclusion

The following chapter sums up the research in general, including the description of the research’s main steps, followed by summary of its arguments and findings. The answers to the research questions posed at the beginning are given, the findings are related to the academic literature on democratic conditionality. The chapter also critically assesses the limits of the present study and discusses policy implications.

To summarize, recently democratic conditionality, that is the dependable perspective of becoming an EU member after a democratic reform, has become a buzz-word in the study of the European Union enlargement evoking a constantly growing interest in the academic world and the political circles.

Despite the fact that EU democratic conditionality has been acknowledged as one of the most powerful foreign policy tools exercised within the European arena, there is a growing concern over the effectiveness of EU conditionality due to diverging record of its impact on policy change across the accession countries and target policy areas. Some of the candidate countries have managed to become European consolidated democracies whereas the others still remained the laggards of democratic transformations or even autocratic regimes.

To address these concerns and check the results of the studies on the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality, the present investigation raises and successfully answers a number of important questions. The central research question is as follows. What are the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs)? In other words, what are the driving factors for candidate countries subject to democratic conditionality? In order to give an answer to the central research question, to conduct more in-depth analysis and further substantiate its findings, the current study subsequently develops the following research sub-questions: 1) What exactly qualify here under the term ‘effectiveness’? 2) And if the democratic conditionality policy has been effective, how has it influenced the real state of democratization in CEECs? 3) And finally, what lessons can be drawn from conditionality policy exercised in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to enhance the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality?

In this way, current master’s research is a qualitative comparative study investigating the causal conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in Central and Eastern European region. The theoretical starting point of the investigation is an attempt to embrace the discussion on the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the literature on EU enlargement and the rationalist-constructivist debate in International Relations. Both academic debates have opposed a rationalist external incentives model of the impact of international organizations, which focuses on a crucial importance of credible incentives and political costs of adoption of transposed norms, with
constructivist social influence model presupposing the importance of such factors as commitment to norms and values of the international organization, economic interdependence and societal salience.

In this thesis, I contrast an external incentives and a social influence model and test the causal relevance of the explanatory factors suggested by both in a comparative analysis. To fulfill this uneasy task the literature on the democratic conditionality has been studied, systemized and incorporated. On its basis the theoretical construct was built in the form of the theoretically developed hypothesis to be tested. The hypotheses of this study have been constructed as the separate assumptions arguing the relevance of two sets of factors for the varying effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality. These factors are the high credibility of EU accession, the low domestic costs of EU legal rule adoption, the high commitment of the target government to the norms and values of European community, the high economic interdependence of the EU and the target country, and the high degree of the societal salience within it. These 5 factors therefore constitute independent variables of the investigation, whereas their theoretically plausible outcome is the compliance of the target country – the dependent variable of the study.

The research also elucidates what is actually the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality. In the case of CEECs, it is the compliance with the democratic criteria set by the European Commission which is seen by the EU as this overall goal of democratic conditionality and the most effective way from the EU’s point of view to cause changes in these countries. By extension, the effectiveness of conditionality is directly linked to democratic changes in the target countries including policy change and successful rule transfer.

To my deep conviction, the present research goes beyond the borders of the existing theoretical and comparative studies by extending the number of cases under the study and applying much stronger austerity to their analysis. For instance, the past studies of Kubicek (2003) and Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) utilize a similar theoretical framework, but fail to seize the broad range of the empirical data, and to apply adequate and rigorous methods for its processing and analysis. The researchers compare the international impact on several ’democratic laggards’, but treat each of them as a single case. Thus, the research design of these studies doesn’t allow embracing the whole diversity of conditions and outcomes produced, as in each country they vary between time periods and issues. Moreover, the number of the cases is even smaller than the number of variables that causes the research design to be indeterminate. These weaknesses are partially addressed in the work of Schimmelfennig (2004) which investigates the conditions of the effectiveness of democratic conditionality in 9 accession candidates. However, the researcher doesn’t provide enough empirical evidence for the values of the variables and distinguish between relatively small numbers of cases for each country that grows concerns about the reliability of the research findings.
By contrast, present investigation covers various issues and time periods across 3 countries in the last two waves of enlargement – while dealing with Latvia and Romania respectively - and even going beyond them when examining Ukraine. The selection of cases has been made due to the criteria of significant conflict with the EU democratic rules and the high variation on the independent variable. In order to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions, the study successfully utilizes the techniques of combinatorial logic in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to investigate 32 conditional configurations or, technically, time-issue-specific cases. By doing this it aims to find out the necessary and/or sufficient causes (Ragin 1987: 99) of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the Central and Eastern European countries.

Ultimately, the findings of this paper, on the one hand, contribute to the relevant scholarly literature by suggesting causal mechanisms linking EU conditionality to national compliance, and on the other, it has been a policy oriented research intended to elucidate the actual compliance problems faced by several CEECs and therefore being able to serve as a guide for the EU to elaborate a set of measures in order to increase the effectiveness of its democratic conditionality policy.

To conduct the analysis the quantitative and quantitative data relevant to the factors affecting the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality has been checked against the narratives on each of the three countries. The narratives constitute a pre-QCA stage of the analysis, listing the main conflicts with the EU democratic requirements, describing the main conditions of conditionality in these countries providing empirical evidence for the values of the variables and assessing the effectiveness of conditionality. Additionally, in order to answer the research’s sub-question as to what have been real policy changes made achieves the research assesses the democratic progress in Latvia, Romania and Ukraine along the chosen index of democratization. The study utilizes the index ‘Nations in Transit’ developed by Freedom House. This index, despite some methodological problems, is able to assess the democratic changes in these countries and obtain a general picture of their state of democratic consolidation. The study arrives at the conclusion that, if other factors of democratization are not taken into account, the conditionality has been more effective in Latvia and Romania, with the observable gradual improvement of the state of democracy in the target policy areas. At the same time, in Ukraine conditionality was less effective, and, although considerable improvements in some areas, the other changes are minor or even a negative trend of setback has been observed.

Next using the values of the variables checked against the narratives the variables are coded dichotomously (either (1) or (0)) alongside the clear and operationalization rules, that indicates their positive or negative effect on the compliance. Next to that, the independent variables associated with the corresponding outcome (compliance or non-compliance) have been entered in the raw data matrix called 'truth table' and subsequently processed in line with QCA method with the application of Boolean minimization procedures. Depending on the way we treat contradictory configurations, or in
In other words, the same conditional configurations which result, however, in the different outcomes, we receive three subsets of solutions. These solutions constitute the results of the conducted analysis and reveal necessary and sufficient causes of compliance in the studied countries, thus being able to test the main and alternative hypotheses of the research.

The analytical results show the relevance of the high commitment of target government to the effectiveness of democratic conditionality. When the commitment is high the EU efforts to induce compliance in norm-violating states usually succeed. Second, despite high commitment is necessary condition of compliance in two of the three sub-sets of solutions alone it doesn’t produce democratic changes in target countries that it’s not sufficient. Instead, it has to be combined with other conditions. According to the external incentives model the second crucial precondition for the success of democratic conditionality is the high credibility of accession for the target country. This assumption has been generally corroborated by the results of QCA, when outcomes were treated as false (non-compliance) or treated as non-existent. In the absence of the credibility of accession, there will be no compliance, even when other conditions under the external incentives and social influence models are highly favourable. On the other hand, thecredible incentives and high commitment has not appeared to be the only necessary conditions for compliance. The analysis has brought to light the third individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition of compliance found in the third subset of solutions – the low costs of adoption of EU rule. The fourth and the final necessary condition of compliance is the high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU. Thus, the high credibility, high commitment and high economic interdependence have appeared to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of effectiveness of conditionality capable to result in compliance if the contradictory configurations are treated as false. If the contradictory outcomes are excluded the solution displays the other combination: high credibility, low costs and high economic interdependence. On its turn, high degree of the societal salience has proved to be irrelevant for compliance whatever way outcomes have been treated, since it has not been found necessary for any of the three subsets of solutions.

Therefore, by viewing all subsets of solutions, we can assert that all but one of the hypotheses have been corroborated. Instead, the separate hypothesis on the importance of the presence of the high degree of the societal salience for the effectiveness of conditionality has been rejected. Hence, the answer for the central research question as to what are the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target countries of the Central and Eastern Europe is as follows: high credibility of accession, low costs of adoption of EU democratic norms for the target government, its high commitment to EU international community and high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU. To conclude, the analysis generally corroborates the external incentives model based on the importance of high credibility and low costs as a sufficient combination of conditions for
compliance, and completes it with the two factors from the alternative social influence model – high commitment and high economic interdependence. It has been tested that this ‘mixed model’ works best for compliance to be achieved.

As regards the scientific value of the current study, to my deep conviction, the valuable contribution of my master’s thesis is to the literature on EU conditionality. Through fine-grained analysis of the conditions of EU conditionality, the paper displays the conditions relevant to its success in the Central and Eastern European region, and builds a new, ‘mixed’ model of democracy promotion. The second contribution of current study is to the broader body of work on the effectiveness of international institutions. This literature argues that to elicit state compliance with their norms, international organizations should be designed in a way to enforce such action (e.g. via sanctions, penalties, withholding the accession etc.). My thesis challenges this claim since compliance doesn’t occur in the absence of the credible incentives. Besides, the analytical results demonstrate the importance of domestic-level factors such as low costs of adoption and high economic interdependence of the target country and the EU. The third contribution of the paper is to the literature on the separate EU candidates’ compliance with the democratic criteria. The narratives provide scrupulous analysis of compliance/non-compliance trends and the factors pertinent to it in the countries that have not been discussed in-detail in the academic literature on compliance of Latvia, Romania and Ukraine.

Nevertheless, being successful at answering the research questions, current study also has a number of limitations. First of all, one of the biggest is that the study is confined in time, since the political conditionality is limited temporally to the period of accession only, which amounted to less than a decade in the case of the 2004 enlargement as regards Latvia, though slightly longer for the Romania joining in 2007. But still, the democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries in most cases had begun earlier than these states applied for EU membership and become subject to EU democratic conditionality, and continues at present when the other factors of democratization are at play.

Current analysis is also aware of the possible problems with the validity of the variables discussed in the methodology. Partially these problems are addressed by the development of the simple and straightforward operationalization, which could be easily used to replicate and check the results of this analysis. The problems with the reliability are addressed by using the data mostly from official sources, such as the reports of the European Commission, statistics of the international and governmental agencies and results of pan-European Eurobarometer survey.

The other potential caveat of the research is hidden in the very selection of the cases, since their number is rather limited to draw the general conclusions for the conditions of the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in all non-member countries of Central and Eastern European region.

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However, the discussion in the methodology part shows that the inclusion of the other countries wouldn’t greatly enrich the analysis with the variations on the independent variables and their combinations. Since the number of the countries under study was intentionally limited the values of all the variables have been consistently checked against the variables. Besides, the limitations of the study can spring from the very nature of the method of the present study. Indeed, QCA does not give us the clear vision of the real political processes of conditionality. To address this potential weakness of the analysis we have to further substantiate the results by finding the evidence for the causal link of presence/absence of the credibility, the costs, the commitment, the economic interdependence and the societal salience for the success/failure of conditionality and investigating how exactly these factors have affected the democratization of CEECs. This task to some extent has been addressed in narratives. Besides, as Caren & Panofsky (2005) argue, the QCA is surprisingly unable to account the temporal sequence in which the events – subsequently transformed by the method into the variables – take place within the cases. The scholars therefore develop the method of temporal qualitative comparative analysis (TQCA), which allows to cope with this problem (Ibid: 157). However, the method requires researcher to know the exact sequence in which the events are unfolded, that would have been rather hard to check against the narratives.

All in all, having discussed the potential limits of the study and the ways they are or can be addressed, the findings could be successfully applied ‘on the ground’. The results of the current analysis can have important policy implications, provided below. The following also constitute the answer to the research sub-question as to what lessons can be drawn from conditionality policy exercised in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe to enhance EU conditionality.

Although the EU cannot create and consolidate democratic systems in the Central and Eastern Europe on its own, it can make it through democratic conditionality. To make this policy more effective in promoting democratic changes in the target countries, the EU can induce or punish accession candidates by offering certain rewards or withholding them. These international rewards appear in the form of credible conditional incentives, from which the most ultimate is EU membership.

As Schimmelfennig (2007) argue, an open invitation to all European countries to become European Union and NATO members once human rights and democratic institutions are firmly established has the strong potential to lock in democratic reforms and consolidate democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe. However it is argued that this policy has its limits since the ‘easy’ accession candidates, the countries which became consolidated European democracies even before they were subject to conditionality have become members already. Here the internal mechanisms of monitoring and judicial enforcement are likely to be sufficient to secure continued respect for democratic norms (Schimmelfennig 2007: 138). It also becomes apparent that with time, the EU moved toward stricter and more rigorous conditionality and learned to better apply its leverage on the agendas of the
candidate countries to change their policies in line with its demands (Pridham 2007). However, taking into account the diverging record of conditionality with respect to its impact on the different groups of countries, including the ‘laggards’ of democratic transformation with less favourable domestic conditions, countries of the former Soviet Union with difficult communist legacies or even European consolidated autocracies, a new, more effective strategy of EU conditionality should be developed.

Having investigated the conditions of effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality in the target CEE countries, the current research provides ample support for the development of this enhanced conditionality policy to ensure compliance of the new accession candidates. Since credible incentives proved to be the necessary condition for compliance, the EU should act promptly to establish first steps of integration and provide a credible membership perspective with respect to such countries as Ukraine and Georgia where democratic revolutions have been able to remove authoritarian regimes. This will, hopefully, provide a boost to further reforms, induce national reformist political forces to unite, and make authoritarian reversals less likely (Schimmelfennig 2007). Besides the credible membership perspective should be kept stable for a long period to ensure the certainty of democratic consolidation, which is a process that do take significant time. The recent ambivalence and reticence of the EU about full membership to Turkey, absence of a membership perspective to Ukraine, and protracted enlargement in the western Balkans is harmful to democratic consolidation in these countries (Ibid.: 138). Thus, the EU has to be consistent in its political conditionality and overcome the present ‘crisis of credibility’. On the other hand, the studied cases provide us no evidence that that looser political accession criteria and a policy of “integration before consolidation” would help. Instead, taking again into account the relevance of the credible incentives, the European Union and NATO should reinforce their rewards-based strategy by significantly increasing technical and financial assistance aimed directly at promoting democratic reforms in the candidate countries. Also, as the economic interdependence of the target country and the EU has been tested to be relevant for compliance, the EU should apply a wide range of instruments to ensure the development of economic cooperation, including the liberalization of trade with potential candidates and establishment of free trade areas. These steps can also indirectly facilitate the democratization.

Finally, as the high degree of societal salience proved to be irrelevant condition of compliance this component should be reinforced. Since the Eastern European countries are characterized by weak civil societies and poor democratic political cultures, the EU has not been successful in appealing to societal salience as the powerful tool being able to promote democratic policy change. Hence, to build effective conditionality strategy the EU should assist with the expert advice and financial aid to national democratic movements and NGOs in order to build a mature and democratic civil society in CEECs. This can promote democratic changes and thus speed up the democratic reforms in the countries of the region.
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### Appendix 1

**Table A. Stages of the enlargement process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Association Agreements</th>
<th>Application</th>
<th>EC opinion</th>
<th>Status of negotiations</th>
<th>End of negotiations</th>
<th>Signing of Accession Treaty</th>
<th>Accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>October 2001*</td>
<td>21 February 2003</td>
<td>20 April 2004</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>12 September 1963 Additional Protocol from 23 November 1970</td>
<td>June 1987</td>
<td>20 December 1989</td>
<td>Candidate Status December 1999, Projected start 3 October 2005</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Stabilization and Association Agreement
** Planned for the 17th of March 2005, but delayed by the European Council decision from the 16th of March 2005 ([http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGEUR640012005](http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGEUR640012005))
[Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 20]
## Appendix 2

### Table B. The Freedom House Nations in Transit Index for CEECs in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>IM</th>
<th>NGOV</th>
<th>LGOV</th>
<th>JFI</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>DS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The 2008 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2007. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and Corruption (CO).

[Freedom House 2008]
### Appendix 3

#### Table C. Description and evaluation of the main contemporary initiatives measuring democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Geographical coverage</th>
<th>Temporal range</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>Scale-based - 5-point scales of political and civil liberties</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1972-present, updated annually</td>
<td>Global coverage; long time-series (since 1972); widely used; updated annually</td>
<td>Lack of transparency in units; ideological biases; aggregation problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Scale-based - 11-point scales of autonomy and democracy</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1800-2000, updated periodically</td>
<td>Global coverage; long time-series (since 1800s); widely used</td>
<td>Narrow institutional focus; largely bi-modal distribution of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Scale-based - 17-point scales of democratic institutions</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1850-1997, updated periodically</td>
<td>Global coverage; long time-series (since 1850s)</td>
<td>Narrow institutional focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przeworski, et al. (2000)</td>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1956-1990</td>
<td>Global coverage; long time series (since 1950);</td>
<td>Dichotomous categories of democracy and non-democracy; minimum threshold coding difficult to keep consistent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen (1984, 1996, 1997, 2001)</td>
<td>Objective indicators: Party share &amp; turnout</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1910-1998, updated by election year</td>
<td>Global coverage; long time-series (since 1910); objective indicators</td>
<td>Party share does not reflect electoral system or party system; funtions inherently problematic to estimate; data not always available by election year; restricted definition of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inroductor</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>European Union countries</td>
<td>1960-present</td>
<td>Representative nation-wide samples; history of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per se; 'dualism'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Year/Period</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Europe Barometer</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>Europe (16 post-Communist countries to date)</td>
<td>1991 to present updated periodically</td>
<td>Representative random samples; battery of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per sex; 'doorstep' opinion; value bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinobarometer</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>Latin America (17 countries to date)</td>
<td>1995 to present updated annually</td>
<td>Representative random samples; battery of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per sex; 'doorstep' opinion; value bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrobarometer</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>Africa (15 countries to date)</td>
<td>1999 to present</td>
<td>Representative random samples; battery of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per sex; 'doorstep' opinion; value bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia Barometer</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>East Asia (8 countries to date)</td>
<td>2001 to present</td>
<td>Representative random samples; battery of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per sex; 'doorstep' opinion; value bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Values Surveys</td>
<td>Mass public opinion</td>
<td>World (20 countries) 45 Countries</td>
<td>1990 1997 updated periodically</td>
<td>Increasing global coverage; representative random samples; battery of standard questions</td>
<td>Limited geographical coverage; public opinion data not measure democracy per sex; 'doorstep' opinion; value bias</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Landman & Häusermann 2003: 12]