The Entrant’s Advantage & The Establishment’s Dilemma

A Study Of Dutch Established Political Parties’ Reaction Towards New Entrants From a Discontinuous Innovation Point Of View

Adrián Kovács
“The Secret of Getting Things Done is to Act” – Dante Alighieri
Abstract

This research adopted a discontinuous innovation perspective to study political competition. The focus thereby was on the reactions of six established Dutch national political parties – PVDA, VVD, CDA, D66, SP & GroenLinks – towards two cases of successful new entrant parties – the LPF and the PVV. The question central to this research has been formulated as follows; How did the established Dutch national political parties deal with the challenges of discontinuous innovation, in reaction to the electoral successes of the LPF and the PVV? In order to answer this question, both new entrants were treated as discontinuities and discontinuous innovation concepts were linked to the classic spatial theory of voting in order to develop a typology of response strategies. This typology was applied in order to typify the reactions of the established parties according to three a priori defined strategies – ignorance, attack and imitation. The reactions of the established parties were assessed by conducting a content analysis of more than four thousand statements made by the political leaders of the established parties in five Dutch national newspapers – De Volkskrant, Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, Trouw and Het Parool.

The results clearly show that all established parties have primarily reacted to both the LPF and the PVV by attacking. Although the attack strategy was found to be the dominant strategy for all parties, important differences between parties regarding the objects of their attacks were observed. While the attacks of the CDA were primarily focused on the policies of the new entrants, the attacks of GroenLinks and especially D66 involved primarily personal attacks. The attacks of the remaining parties – PVDA, VVD and SP – were in balance with attacks being evenly distributed across policy-focused and personal attacks. The ignorance strategy was found to be only marginally represented across the sample of established parties and the representation of the imitation strategy can best be described as idiosyncratic. Next to the three a priori defined strategies, three additional strategies emerged during the course of data analysis which typify the reactions of established parties towards new entrants – isolation, neutral and attacking others. Interestingly, of these emergent strategies, the attacking others strategy, which entails that established parties attacked each other regarding their reactions towards new entrants, was found to be the second most prominent strategy behind attack. Lastly, the analysis has clearly illustrated that established parties’ motivation and ability to respond to new entrants could not be explained by their ideological distance to these new entrants.

The application of the discontinuous innovation perspective yielded important insights with implications for both discontinuous innovation literature and Public Choice literature. With regard to discontinuous innovation literature, the research suggests the need for an elaborate, contingent and dynamic typology of response strategies and the need for possible other or additional determinants of these response strategies. With regard to Public Choice literature the research suggests the need for a dynamic multi-party conceptualization of political competition and the need for such conceptualizations to go beyond classic spatial theory. Overall, the application of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere has highlighted the strengths and limitations of drawing analogies between the business world and the political world thereby referring to the possible validity issues that arise from drawing such analogies. Instead of ignoring these validity issues and assuming the applicability of concepts from one field to the other, future research should take the applicability of these concepts as the object of study itself.
Acknowledgements

Highly Respected Reader,

The pile of paper lying in front of you right now comprises my last step towards the completion of the Masters Degree at the University of Twente. I have devoted nine months of my life to studying political competition from a discontinuous innovation point of view and during these nine months I have seen the good side of bad, the down side of up and everything in between. Above all, I have been introduced to ‘the practice of social research’, which in my case involved long days of searching for and selecting newspaper articles, longer days of coding those articles and even longer days of trying to interpret the results. In fact, Capitool room D-201 had become my second home to an extent that people were getting worried about me when I didn’t show up at the office. But the long and repetitive days were all worth it as throughout the research process I received many enthusiastic reactions from people regarding my research. After an initial ‘what the heck is he talking about’ and ‘why on earth would someone do something like this’ – reaction, people seemed genuinely interested in my research, which inspired me to work towards a high quality research.

During the course of the research process I received valuable input from several people and I am grateful to all of them. First and foremost I would like to thank my first supervisor, Dr. Dries Faems, for providing me with the opportunity to design and conduct my own research project while steering me into the right direction whenever necessary. I considered the extensive freedom of choice provided to me not as a burden, but on the contrary, as an ideal opportunity to bring out the social researcher in me. I would also like to thank my second supervisor professor Kees Aarts, for his valuable comments regarding the political part of the research. Although I always had an interest in politics, as a Business Administration student I had never thought of politics in a scientific way prior to my research. Therefore professor Aarts’ contribution has been essential.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my roommates – Tim, Gijs, Koos and especially Sara (one of the brightest persons I know), Sean (one of the funniest persons I know) and Marleen (one of the kindest and sweetest persons I know) – for their ideas, views and remarks and most of all for putting up with me for nine months. You are all talented people in your own right but above all you are very enjoyable persons. With your help we were able to create a pleasant working environment in a room without proper windows and ventilation and I enjoyed working with all of you. I wish you all the best with the completion of your own research projects and I am looking forward to reading your end products in the future. Success and nothing less!

Lastly I would like to thank my parents and family for always supporting me unconditionally. I dedicate this thesis to my father, who is currently suffering from serious illness. I can only hope that he will find the strength to recover and I’m going to do everything within my power to support him during that process. I would also like to thank my family in Hungary, I’ll never forget my Hungarian origins and part of where I’m going will always be based on knowing where I’m coming from.

To conclude, I will always look back on the past nine months with a smile on my face and if there is one thing I’ve learned during the past nine months is that dedication is the key to success. The secret of getting things done is to act! With the same dedication and devotion I’ll move into the future with confidence, in search for further glories.

Adrián Kovács

Enschede, June 2010
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen Democratisch Appèl</td>
<td>the Christian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democraten 66</td>
<td>the Progressive Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>GroenLinks</td>
<td>the Green Left Ecologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>the List Pim Fortuyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Partij Van De Arbeid</td>
<td>the Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij Van De Vrijheid</td>
<td>the Party for Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij</td>
<td>the Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid &amp; Democratie</td>
<td>the Conservative Liberals</td>
</tr>
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1. Introduction

1.1. Research Background

In a business world characterized by high-paced environmental changes, shortening product life cycles and changing customer needs, firms need to constantly reinvent themselves to ensure long term survival and growth. Nowadays, the challenge is not just to introduce new products and new ways to produce them, but about doing this faster than competitors do. Whilst competitive advantage can come from size, resources, etc., the pattern is increasingly coming to favor those organizations which can mobilize knowledge, technological skills and experience to create new products, processes and services (Tidd et. al., 1997, pp.4.). Since innovation and new product development are considered to be crucial sources of competitive advantage it’s not surprising that managing innovation has enjoyed an increasing amount of attention in the scientific world and Innovation Management has become a substantial research domain of its own. Much of the focus within this research domain was and still is centered around the importance and management of innovation that is essentially about ‘doing what we do but better’, termed incremental –, steady state – or continuous innovation. However, another type of innovation is quickly capturing the attention of more and more scholars – discontinuous innovation.

Some innovations change the entire order of doing things, making obsolete the old ways, and it’s exactly these innovations that are labeled discontinuous. ‘Discontinuous innovations are breakthroughs that help companies to rewrite the rules of the game and have the potential to create new markets and even a new industry’ (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002, pp. 352.). In a more specific meaning discontinuous innovations can be defined as ‘...major products / services and technological developments based on significant innovation...’ (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002, pp. 353.) with significant innovation referring to innovation that has the potential to create new or expand existing markets. Discontinuous innovations are an important source of competitive advantage, developing the so-called dominant design is a recipe for success for every firm. On the contrary firms that are not able to manage discontinuous innovations put their long term survival at stake, even industry leaders will fall in case they mismanage discontinuous innovation. Usually the problem ‘...lies less in the absolute scale of novelty or dislocation but, rather, in the firm’s experience of these conditions as something which takes it beyond its normal operating envelope...’ (Bessant, 2005, pp. 1368.).

While discontinuous innovations can be an important source of competitive advantage, they present firms with unique challenges. Therefore academic literature tends to focus on describing the unique challenges of discontinuous innovation and prescribing how to overcome them. One of the key topics thereby is describing, analyzing and explaining the disability (reasons for failure) that incumbent organizations have when managing discontinuous innovation in contrast to new entrants, which appear to have more success in managing discontinuous innovation. Perhaps the most prominent publication focusing on this topic is Christensen’s book entitled ‘The Innovator’s Dilemma – When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail’ (1997), which is filled with cases illustrating that even industry leaders have failed in the past to manage discontinuous innovations which caused them to lose their leadership and in the worst case scenario caused them to go out of business. In another prominent publication by Foster (1986), the concepts of Defenders Dilemma and Attackers Advantage are introduced to explain the failure of incumbents (the defenders) and the success of new entrants (the attackers) in managing discontinuous innovation. The central stance of Foster is
that incumbent firms are often unable to change fundamentally who they are, what they do and how they do it in the face of discontinuous conditions because of organizational constraints (e.g. a strong organizational culture). New entrants on the other hand do not have to deal with these kinds of constraints and as such have an advantage over incumbent firms when dealing with discontinuous conditions.

Until now, the literature regarding discontinuous innovation has been focused on private sector firms and public sector organizations, but the concepts as developed in these literature sources might be applicable to other spheres as well. Recent developments in the Dutch national political sphere may indicate that the occurrence of the Defenders Dilemma and the Attackers Advantage is not limited to the private and public sectors as several new entrant parties have entered the Dutch national political landscape successfully and ‘...the success of these parties underlines the vulnerable position of established parties...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2002, pp. 4.). Furthermore the entrance of these parties might have changed the rules of the game, as they have ‘...transformed the Dutch party system into an open battlefield in which winners and losers come and go and in which established party positions are becoming non-existent anymore...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2003, pp. 52.). While political studies have focused on explaining the success of new entrant parties by focusing on the effects of media attention, party campaigns, candidate personality and candidate behavior, the success of these parties cannot be explained by studies in which these parties are the only objects of study. Instead, those who want to understand the success of these new entrant parties, need to study their victims; the establishment as well. Therefore the focus in this study will be on the established Dutch national political parties and particularly on describing the reactions of these parties towards the successful new entrant parties. The question that will be central in this research is the following; How did these established parties react to the new entrants?

This question will be addressed from a discontinuous innovation point of view, meaning that the research is essentially about studying political competition from a discontinuous innovation perspective. As discontinuous innovation literature is focused on private sector firms and public sector organizations, the study is inherently analogical and the key challenge of the study will be to draw analogies between political competition and economic competition. Several scholars (Wohlgemuth, 1995; Stigler, 1972) have argued that drawing such analogies is dubious. Central to their critique is that while the political market can be depicted as a ‘...an unmediated, bilateral exchange among voters and politicians...’ (Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 78) both voters and political parties are not rational actors. ‘In political “markets” the very fact of political participation and information is itself in need of explanation since they are conflicting with standard percepts of homo oeconomicus’ (Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 76.). Therefore, instead of bluntly assuming the applicability of discontinuous innovation concepts to the Dutch national political sphere, the applicability of these concepts is the object of study itself. In other words, addressing the extent to which discontinuous innovation concepts are applicable to the Dutch national political sphere is one of the central aims of the research.

In order to assess the applicability of discontinuous innovation concepts to the Dutch national political sphere, one needs to apply these concepts. Therefore the central aim of the research is to typify the strategies that the established political parties pursued as a response towards new entrant parties. Such an exploration might be valuable as it may lead to a better understanding of the strategies that established political parties have pursued in towards new entrants in the past and
might lead to new insights regarding potentially different strategies that these political parties could pursue in the future. In a political climate in which competition is intensifying as the national election campaigns are running for the national elections of June 2010, responding to new entrant parties appropriately might be the recipe for success.

1.2. Research Goals
From a scientific point of view, the central goal of the research is to explore whether and to what extent concepts originating from the discontinuous innovation literature are applicable to the national political sphere in the Netherlands. From a more practical point of view, the goal is to apply concepts originating from the discontinuous innovation literature in order to determine how established Dutch political parties have responded towards new entrant parties that have entered the Dutch national political arena successfully. In order to attain this goal one needs to select cases of such new entrants. As research by Krouwel & Lucardie has shown, only 10 out of the 63 recent newcomers [to the Dutch national political arena] succeeded in winning any seats in Dutch parliament (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 279.). Out of these ten cases of successful newcomers, two cases were selected for the purposes of this research, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Party for Freedom (PVV). The choice for multiple cases has been made in order to facilitate cross-case analysis in order to determine the similarities and differences between established parties reactions towards different new entrants. The choice for the LPF and the PVV in particular has been made because of all newcomer parties, these parties have been the most successful in terms of secured seats in Dutch parliament. Therefore, arguably of all newcomer parties their effects on the establishment have been the greatest.

Especially the rise and success of the LPF has been covered extensively by political scholars and there is a luminous agreement among them regarding the impact of the LPF. A statement of Van Holsteyn et. al. is representative of the way in which these scholars have expressed the impact of the LPF. According to Van Holsteyn et. al. ‘... no other party in the post-war period has challenged the established parties to a degree that the LPF did, in fact shaking the very foundations of the Dutch political system to the extent that politicians and observer began speaking of ‘new politics’ (Van Holsteyn et. al., 2003, pp. 71.). These ‘new politics’ imply a degree of innovativeness on the part of the LPF and its important to consider the factors to which the success of the LPF has been ascribed by political scholars in order to determine what has been innovative regarding the LPF. According to Van Holsteyn et. al. (2003) the LPF has been so successful because it succeeded to move into a gap in the electoral market. According to Bélanger & Aarts there is agreement among scholars that both structural and personal factors could explain the LPF’s ability to move into the unfilled gap in the political market. First of all ‘... the LPF brought a distinct issue profile to the electoral arena, which made it attractive for voters with similar policy views’... ‘among the issue priorities put forward by Fortuyn during the campaign, his radical positions on multi-culturalism, asylum seekers, and crime seem to explain in good part why a significant portion of the Dutch electorate was attracted to this new competitor...’ (Bélanger & Aarts, 2006, pp. 5.). Second, the person Fortuyn ‘... dominated the media and determined the content and style of the campaign...’ (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003, pp. 42 cited in Bélanger & Aarts, 2006, pp. 5.).

In essence the innovativeness of the LPF lies in its ability to bring a distinct issue profile to the electoral arena and the ability of its political leader to determine the content and style of the campaign. Although the PVV received less attention from political scholars than the LPF as it rose to
the political scene relatively recently, it has been the second most successful new entrant party behind the LPF in terms of secured seats in Dutch parliament. Furthermore it is plausible to suggest that the same innovative qualities ascribed to the LPF bear resemblance to the innovative qualities of the PVV. The PVV has also been able to present a distinct issue profile and its political leader Geert Wilders has certainly been able to dominate the media, perhaps even to a greater extent than Fortuyn in the past. Furthermore some scholars mention the PVV in one breath with the LPF regarding its impact. For example Pennings & Keman claim that the LPF and PVV have ‘...transformed the party system into an open battlefield in which winners and losers come and go and in which established positions are becoming non-existent anymore...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2002, pp. 1.). Importantly Pennings & Keman also consider the Socialist Party (SP) to be one of the parties that have transformed the party system. So on theoretical grounds one could decide to incorporate the SP as a third case. However, the SP is not taken into account as a third case of a successful new entrant party because of a practical reason as the conduction of the Master’s Assignment is bound to certain limitation regarding time and scope. The SP, however is taken into account as one of the established parties.

1.3. Research Questions
The central research question that will be addressed in this research study is the following;

How did the established Dutch national political parties deal with the challenges of discontinuous innovation, in reaction to the electoral successes of the LPF and the PVV?

The definitions of the core concepts that will be used in this research study are presented in the table below.

Table 1.1. Definitions of Core Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Discontinuous Innovation</td>
<td>‘Discontinuous innovations are major changes or innovations in basic products, services offered or markets changed, or the creation of new major product / service programs leading to new or expansion of current markets’ (DeTienne &amp; Koberg, 2002, pp. 353.) ‘...With regard to discontinuous innovation the problem lies less in the absolute scale of novelty or dislocation but, rather, in the firm’s experience of these conditions as something that takes it beyond its normal operating envelope.’ (Bessant, 2005, pp. 1368.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established Dutch National Political Parties</td>
<td>The following Dutch political parties are to be regarded as established; the Christian – Democrats (CDA), the Labor Party (PVDA), the Conservative Liberals (VVD), the Progressive Liberals (D66), the Green Left Ecologists (Groen Links), the Socialist Party (SP) (Pennings &amp; Keman, 2002, pp. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>The List Pim Fortuyn, a right-wing populist party, established by Pim Fortuyn on February 14, 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>The Party for Freedom, a right-wing populist party established by Geert Wilders on February 22, 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central research question can be split up based on the central research goal. As stated above, the central research goal is to explore whether and to what extent concepts following from the
discontinuous innovation literature are applicable to the national political sphere in the Netherlands. Obviously, in order to determine the applicability of the concepts following from discontinuous innovation literature, the first step is to identify relevant concepts. As discontinuous innovation literature is focused on describing the challenges of discontinuous innovation and prescribing the strategies to overcome these challenges the most logical first sub-research question is the following:

1. **What are the challenges of discontinuous innovation as described by discontinuous innovation literature and what are the strategies prescribed by discontinuous innovation literature to overcome these challenges?**

After identifying and selecting relevant concepts the next logical step is to determine how these concepts can be applied to the political sphere. As the focus of this study is on typifying the reactions of the established parties towards new entrant parties, it is necessary to make these strategies applicable to the political sphere. Therefore the second sub-research question is formulated as follows;

2. **How can the strategies for dealing with discontinuous innovation as prescribed by discontinuous innovation literature be applied to the political sphere?**

After determining the response strategies prescribed by discontinuous innovation literature and making them applicable to the political sphere, the last logical step is to conduct the analysis itself and determine which of these strategies were applied by the Dutch national political parties towards the LPF and the PVV. In order to get a profound understanding of parties reaction strategies towards new entrants the analysis will assess parties reactions towards both new entrants over a certain time period. Therefore the last sub-research question can be formulated as follows;

3. **Which strategies for managing discontinuous innovation did the established Dutch national political parties adopt as a response towards the LPF and PVV, how did these strategies change during the course of time and how did these strategies evolve from one case to the other?**

### 1.4. Relevance of the Research

As stated above, this research study aims to explore the applicability of concepts following from discontinuous innovation literature to the national political sphere in the Netherlands. From a scientific point of view, such an exploration could lead to valuable knowledge with regard to the opportunities and limits of the applicability of discontinuous innovation terminology to fields other than the private and public sector. Vice versa this research study might also provide insights from the Dutch national political sphere that might be applicable to the private sector and public sector as well, thereby potentially contributing to or even enriching the existing insights provided within discontinuous innovation literature.

From a more practical point of view an exploration of the applicability of discontinuous innovation terminology could lead to a better understanding of the strategies that the established Dutch national political parties have pursued towards new entrant parties and even provide these parties with a rationale for pursuing other strategies.

### 1.5. Research Strategy

The first stage of the research involved the conduction of a literature analysis in order to get an overview of relevant discontinuous innovation concepts. The focus of this literature analysis has been
on identifying the challenges of discontinuous innovation for established organizations and the strategies for dealing with these strategies successfully. The aim was to select those challenges and strategies that could be operationalized in a way that made it possible to explore the reactions of established Dutch national political parties in both the LPF-case and the PVV-case.

The reactions of the established Dutch national political parties towards the LPF and the PVV were assessed by collecting statements made by political leaders of these established parties. The rationale is that political leaders are pre-eminently the ones who represent and express the issue positions of their parties. The statements were collected from Dutch national newspapers, by entering search criteria within the Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. In total, more than eleven thousand newspaper articles were collected and nearly four thousand statements were retrieved from these articles. This extensive amount of data regarding the two cases of new entrant parties indicates why it was infeasible to take into account others cases of new entrants for the purposes of this research as adding more cases would be beyond the scope of the Master’s Assignment. Of the four thousand articles, nine hundred were found to be related to the case objects (LPF / PVV respectively). These nine hundred statements were then coded according to three a priori defined theory-related themes and three emergent themes, resulting in an overview of the strategies (following from discontinuous innovation literature) that the established Dutch national political parties pursued as a reaction towards the LPF and PVV respectively. The content analysis was carried out by entering the data collection into QSR’s NVIVO 8.0 – a software package which facilitates the qualitative analysis of large pools of data.

1.6. Outline of the Study Report
The next chapter presents the theoretical overview, where the focus is on generating an overview of the challenges of discontinuous innovation and the solution strategies for successfully dealing with these challenges following from the discontinuous innovation literature – and linking this overview with literature originating from political science in order to present a comprehensive framework for analyzing the reactions of the established Dutch national political parties towards the LPF and the PVV respectively. The third chapter outlines the research design – which is a two-case design – as well as providing rationales for every aspect of the research design and data analysis process in particular. The fourth and fifth chapters are the case study reports for the LPF and the PVV respectively and are essentially about presenting the results of the within-case analyses. The sixth chapter is centered around describing cross-case similarities and differences and involves cross-case analysis. The seventh chapter is the discussion section, the section in which the theoretical level is assessed and explanations for and implications of the findings are presented by linking them to extant literature. Lastly, the eight and last chapter is the conclusion chapter which will summarize the main findings of the research, address the limitations of the research and provide recommendations for further research.
2. Theoretical Overview

2.1. Innovation
All organizations face the challenge of innovation, their survival and growth depends upon their capacity to renew what they offer the world and the ways in which they create and deliver that offering (Tidd. et. al., 2001). Innovation represents the core renewal process in any organization and as such it inherently implies some degree of change. A basic categorization of innovation is made by considering the object of change, which can either involve the products/services that an organization offers – *product innovation* – or the ways in which these products are created and delivered, *process innovation*.

Another important dichotomous distinction can be made based on scope or novelty of the change. Although there is an ongoing debate with regard to innovation typology and innovativeness terminology (Garcia & Calantone, 2002) the dichotomous distinction between continuous (or incremental, steady – state) innovation and discontinuous (or breakthrough, disruptive, radical) innovation is widely applied in innovation literature. Continuous innovation generally refers to step-wise improvements based on established technologies, while discontinuous innovation refers to the development or application of new technologies, concepts or ideas (Magnusson et. al., 2003). Essentially, continuous innovation involves activity in product and process design which is about ‘doing what we do but better’, while discontinuous innovation refers to ‘doing something in a different way’. While continuous innovations build on knowledge that is already ‘out there’, discontinuous innovations have to be built around knowledge that is not yet out there.

Innovation is important as it can be a crucial source of competitive advantage. As Tushman & Anderson indicate ‘...after all the cost cutting, downsizing and re – engineering, innovation and product development are levers through which firms can reinvent themselves.’ (Tushman & Anderson, 1997, pp. 3.). Continuous innovation is advantageous as it initiates a continuous movement of the cost/performance frontier, while multiple studies have shown the power of discontinuous innovation in creating and transforming whole industries. The importance of developing something no one else can as a source of competitive advantage is increasingly being recognized by scholars (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002).

2.2. Discontinuous Innovation

2.2.1. The Concept of ‘Discontinuous Innovation’
The nowadays taken for granted notion that different types of innovation exist has been an important topic in innovation literature since Schumpeter (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Schumpeter’s well-known concept of creative destruction can be considered to be the foundation for the concept of discontinuous innovation (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002; Henderson & Clark, 1990). According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurs are the drivers of economic change and these entrepreneurs creatively destroy markets by pursuing so – called entrepreneurial opportunities. DeTienne & Koberg claim that these entrepreneurial opportunities are in essence what is nowadays defined as discontinuous innovation, as both entrepreneurial opportunities and discontinuous innovations involve a break away from existing systems, structures and rules of the game. Both creative destruction and
Discontinuous innovation are away-shifts from the steady-state or equilibrium and transcend existing boundaries.

A more elaborated understanding of discontinuous innovation transcending boundaries and changing the rules of the game is provided by Morris & Miller (1999) who claim that discontinuous innovation occurs outside of existing markets and market segments. Therefore discontinuous innovation requires divergent thinking and looking beyond existing boundaries to discover new knowledge related to both market need and technological capability. The essential difference with continuous innovation is that continuous innovation is innovation that occurs within the boundaries of the known world meaning that requirements of customers can be met within existing industry structures. Therefore continuous innovation involves convergent thinking, an increased focus and increased specialization. So in essence discontinuous innovation is about thinking out of the box while continuous innovation is about thinking within the boundaries of the box.

Discontinuous innovation is a fuzzy concept, as it is used interchangeably with the concepts of disruptive innovation, breakthrough innovation and radical innovation and is defined differently by different authors. As Garcia & Calantone (2001) show, in their critical evaluation of innovation typology, in the most extreme case the same innovation that has been described by one author as radical, is described by another author as incremental (Garcia & Calantone, 2001). Therefore it is important to explicitly state the definition of discontinuous innovation that is most relevant for the purposes of this research study. The definition that is central in this research study is the definition as proposed by DeTienne & Koberg, in this definition discontinuous innovations are major changes or innovations in basic products, services offered or markets changed, or the creation of new major product/service programs leading to new or expansion of current markets (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002, pp. 353.). This definition is the most applicable because it leaves some room for interpretation, when applying the definition to the political sphere. It would be much more difficult, if not impossible, to apply a more stricter definition of discontinuous innovation – such as the definition of Rice et. al., (who define quantitative criteria for an innovation to be considered as being discontinuous) – to the political sphere.

It’s important to note that the definition of DeTienne & Koberg describes discontinuous innovations as somewhat less ‘revolutionary’ than other scholars do. According to them, discontinuous innovations don’t necessarily involve a creation of new markets but can involve expansions of existing ones as well. Also from the definition of DeTienne & Koberg it follows that discontinuous innovations do not necessarily involve the creation of something entirely new, it can also involve major changes or innovations. So essentially discontinuous innovations are not necessarily a matter of magnitude, or as Bessant states; ‘...with regard to discontinuous innovation the problem lies less in the absolute scale of novelty or dislocation but, rather, in the firm’s experience of these conditions as something that takes it beyond its normal operating envelope.’ (Bessant, 2005, pp. 1368.). This means that an innovation can be considered as discontinuous, when it is considered as discontinuous by the research object in question.

2.2.2. The LPF and PVV as Discontinuities

The important question that arises at this point is, whether and to what extent one can consider the LPF and the PVV as discontinuous innovations. While the introduction part listed some of the innovative qualities associated with the LPF and the PVV, the ‘discontinuousness’ of these innovative
qualities was not addressed at that point. Assessing the degree of discontinuousness of both new entrant parties is a challenging undertaking as discontinuous innovation literature itself remains vague about the meaning of the label ‘discontinuous’. However, such an assessment is required as for a meaningful application of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere, one needs to at least assume that the LPF and the PVV have discontinuous characteristics.

From the definition of discontinuous innovation of DeTienne & Koberg – central to this research – it follows that discontinuous innovations are related to the outputs of an organization, being products and/or services. This implies that only the outputs of political parties can be considered as discontinuous innovations. However, in their definition of discontinuous innovation, Birkinshaw et. al. also consider to be a discontinuous innovation a ‘...new business model that represents a dramatic departure from the current state of art in the industry...’ (Birkinshaw et. al., 2007, pp. 67). This implies that also new business models, or more general, new ways of doing business can be considered as discontinuous innovations. However, the bottom line remains that one can’t label a political party as a discontinuous innovation in the same fashion that one can’t label a private-sector organization as a discontinuous innovation.

Therefore, instead of labeling the LPF and PVV as discontinuous innovations, for the purposes of this study both parties are labeled as ‘discontinuities’ within the Dutch national political sphere. The question at this point remains however, what it is about these parties that justifies attaching the label of ‘discontinuity’ to them. As already mentioned in the introduction chapter the first sticking out feature of both new entrant parties, especially the LPF, is their unprecedented impact. For example, Pennings & Keman claim that ‘... this development [new parties entering the political scene; the LPF in 2002 and PVV after 2006] steered the type of game away from accommodation in the direction of polarization...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2008, pp. 43.)

And what’s especially unique about the LPF and the PVV is that they have shown that ‘...there is a large group of voters willing to support a populist and polarizing position...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2008, pp. 43.).

However, while the impacts of both new entrant parties may be unprecedented, one can’t label them as discontinuities on the basis of their effects. Instead one should consider potential features of both parties which may have contributed to these unprecedented effects. As briefly discussed in the introduction part, the effects of the LPF are ascribed to both structural factors and personal factors. On the structural side, the impact of the LPF is ascribed to its ability to fill a gap in the electoral market by bringing ‘... a distinct issue profile to the electoral arena, which made it attractive for voters with similar policy views...’ (Bélanger & Aarts, 2006, pp. 5.). On the personal side, the impact of the LPF is ascribed to the ability of its leader, Pim Fortuyn, to dominate the media and determine the content and style of the campaign (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). While these features are not ascribed by political literature with regard to the PVV – presumable due to the fairly recent rise of the PVV to the national political scene – it is plausible to suggest that these features could also be ascribed to the PVV. The PVV has also been able to bring a distinct issue profile to the electoral arena and there is no doubt that its political leader – Geert Wilders – has been able to dominate the media.

Next to the LPF and PVV, Pennings & Keman also consider the Socialist Party (SP) to be one the parties which have steered the type of game away from accommodation in the direction of polarization. However as explained in the introduction part the SP is not considered as a new entrant within this research because of practical reasons. Instead the SP considered to be one of the established parties.
So what is essentially innovative about both the LPF and the PVV is their ability to bring a populist issue profile to the political arena and the ability of their political leader to draw the attention for these populist ideas from the media. It is on the basis of these ‘innovative features’ that the LPF and the PVV are labeled as discontinuities for the purposes of this research. It should be emphasized though that labeling the innovative features of the LPF and the PVV as ‘discontinuous’ is assumptive as it is impossible to determine the exact ‘discontinuousness’ of these innovative qualities. Therefore the label ‘discontinuity’ serves at best as a heuristic tool that is applied in this research study in order to refer to new entrant parties whose unique features have enabled them to enter the Dutch national political arena successfully and challenge the established parties in unprecedented fashion.

2.3. The Challenge of Discontinuous Innovation

Discontinuous innovations are challenging, even industry leaders are not immune to failure when it comes to managing discontinuous innovation; new technologies can cause great firms to fail (Christensen, 1997). Discontinuous innovation is challenging because it involves a high degree of both instability and uncertainty. Discontinuous conditions create instability as they change existing rules of the game and initiate the emergence of new ones. And this emergence of new rules of the game is inherently surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty, as it is not clear from the onset what the new rules of the game – the dominant design – will be. Bessant in this sense refers to discontinuous innovation as being a fluid zone or fluid phase which is precipitated by discontinuous conditions (Bessant, 2005: 2008). And these conditions may come from multiple directions.

2.3.1. The Unpredictable Nature of Discontinuities

Dealing with discontinuities is becoming more and more challenging as several authors note that the number of discontinuities is increasing (Foster, 1986; Bessant, 2005; Tushman & Anderson, 1997). Already in 1986, Foster denoted the beginning of the ‘Age of Discontinuity’, as he argued that ‘discontinuities do occur more often than most of us realize, and if anything their frequency is on the rise’ (Foster, 1986, pp.48). Bessant notes that dealing with discontinuous innovation is becoming more complex as changes along several core environmental dimensions, which are increasingly interacting, mean that the incidence of discontinuities is only likely to rise (Bessant, 2008). These discontinuities can be triggered by different sources, for example the emergence of new markets, the emergence of a new technology and changes in market sentiment or behavior. In essence then, dealing with discontinuous innovation is difficult because of the unpredictability of discontinuous conditions and factors outside the control of the firm – external environmental conditions – make discontinuous innovation challenging.

2.3.2. Organizational Capabilities Limiting Discontinuous Innovations

However, environmental conditions are not the only conditions which make dealing with discontinuous innovation difficult. A burgeoning amount of literature exists, which is devoted around the central premise that internal organizational characteristics make it difficult for organizations to deal with discontinuities effectively. The central stance herein is that a firm’s capabilities determine what it can do and what it can’t do, a notion which is comprised by Christensen into the concept of the Innovator’s Dilemma (1997), meaning that the logical competent decisions of management that are critical to the success of their companies are also the reason that they lose their positions of leadership. When discontinuous conditions are changing the existing rules of the game, core capabilities can become core rigidities, this is what Tushman and Anderson (1997) have labeled as the Success Paradox.
The notion that a firm’s capabilities determine what it can do and what it can’t do is further elaborated by bringing the distinction between continuous innovation and discontinuous innovation into the picture. The central claim then, is that firms that are able to deal sufficiently with continuous innovations are not able to deal effectively with discontinuous innovations. Because discontinuous innovation differs substantially from continuous innovation, as explained in the above sections, it requires very different organizational routines for managing it. Bessant uses the concept of organizational archetype (Bessant, 2005, pp. 1371 – 1372.)—being an ideal type organizational model— to indicate that managing what he calls steady-state innovations requires ‘…a different bundle of ‘good practice’ routines than managing discontinuous innovations...’ (Bessant, 2005, pp. 1371).

Instead of organizational archetypes, Christensen & Overdorf (2002) speak of organizational capabilities which determine what an organization can do and what it can’t do. According to them organizations themselves, independent of the people and other resources in them have capabilities, labeled as ‘organizational capabilities’. And as organizations mature these organizational capabilities will institutionalize to an extent when it doesn’t matter anymore to which person a certain function is allocated, because values can attain for consistency of actions of all people within the organization. As organizational capabilities for dealing with continuous innovation become institutionalized as an organization matures, it will be more and more difficult to ‘unlearn’ these institutionalized routines and build capabilities that enable the organization to deal with discontinuities. This creation of capabilities that enables organizations to deal with discontinuous innovation, is what Bessant considers to be the real challenge of discontinuous innovation.

2.3.3. Challenges of Discontinuous Innovations for Established Organizations

Several scholars emphasize that it’s especially the established organizations which are experiencing great difficulty in dealing with discontinuous innovations (Foster, 1986; Christensen, 1997; Tidd et. al.; 1997). While these established organizations have a resource – base that can carry them through fluid phases, their internal systems often militate against changing the rules of the game. In his publication entitled ‘Innovation – The Attacker’s Advantage’ (1986), Foster describes why established firms have such difficulty in dealing with discontinuous innovations. In Foster’s view, established firms which are under attack from new technologies often attempt to play two games at once – they attempt to be defenders of the old technology while they also attempt to be effective attackers with new technologies. This is what Foster considers to be the Defender’s Dilemma. Furthermore, he argues that established incumbents are tempted to make characteristic mistakes – hubristic errors – when dealing with discontinuous innovation. He distinguishes five hubristic errors, which are depicted in figure 2.1. on the next page. Basically, what Foster’s hubristic errors entail is that established organizations fail to manage discontinuities successfully, because they make the mistakes as presented above. The core in all of Foster’s hubristic errors is that established organizations make wrong assumptions by being overconfident with regard to their own approach to technology while simultaneously underestimating the potential effects of discontinuities.
The established organization believes that an evolutionary approach to technology will be good enough.

Hubristic Error # 2

The established organization assumes that it will have an ample warning about the discontinuity when it understands present technology, customer needs and competition.

Hubristic Error # 3

The established organization is convinced that it understands what its customers want.

Hubristic Error # 4

The established organization defines the market wrongly.

Hubristic Error # 5

The established organization is convinced that it understands its competitors.

While Foster speaks of established firms making errors, Ahuja & Lampert (2001) argue that established organizations tend to fall into so-called learning traps, which inhibit them to create breakthroughs. While the focus is on breakthrough inventions – a concept that should not be used interchangeably with the concept of innovation – the learning traps that Ahuja & Lampert describe are useful for understanding why established organizations are often unsuccessful in dealing with discontinuities. Ahuja & Lampert describe the ‘learning traps’ depicted in figure 2.2 below.

The Familiarity Trap

Established corporations tend to use familiar, well–understood technologies with great competence.

The Maturity Trap

Organizations favor technologies that are mature (in later phases of a technological trajectory). Mature technologies are technologies that have been in existence for some time and are relatively well known and understood in the industry.

The Propinquity Trap

Organizations favor the search for solutions that are near to existing solutions. So they favor technologies that are located on the same technological trajectory rather than on a different technological trajectory. In ambiguous and uncertain environments, reliance upon historical experience is often the norm.

It’s important to note the difference between the hubristic errors that Foster describes and the learning traps as proposed by Ahuja & Lampert. The term ‘error’ as used by Foster implies that established firms tend to make mistakes, which inhibit them from being able to deal successfully with discontinuities. Thereby the label ‘error’ implies some degree of freedom of choice, meaning that the established organization could have chosen differently, but has made the wrong choices and
therefore isn’t successful in dealing with discontinuities. However, the term ‘trap’ is used by Ahuja & Lampert to indicate that established firms fall into pathologies which inhibit them from being able to deal successfully with discontinuities. Thereby the label ‘trap’ implies a low degree of freedom of choice, meaning that the established organization in question has not deliberately made the wrong choices, but that these choices are path dependent and can be rational in the eyes of the established firm. Conclusively, the frameworks of Foster and Ahuja & Lampert are different, but complementary. As Foster’s hubristic errors describe the mistakes that cause established firms to fail when dealing with discontinuities, Ahuja & Lampert’s learning traps provide an explanation for the mistakes that cause these established firms to fail.

But if established organizations make the hubristic errors that Foster describes because they fall into pathologies, then what causes these organizations to fall into these pathologies? This question can be answered by referring back to the framework of Christensen & Overdorf. As already stated in the previous sub-paragraph, the central premise of Christensen & Overdorf’s framework is that organizational capabilities determine what an organization can do and what it can’t do — and as an organization matures these organizational capabilities become institutionalized to an extent which makes it difficult to unlearn them. In order to fully understand organizational capabilities, one needs to understand the sources of organizational capabilities. According to Christensen & Overdorf organizational capabilities can reside in three sources, and these sources are depicted in figure 2.3. below.

**Figure 2.3. Christensen & Overdorf’s RPV – Framework (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000)**

- **Resources**
  - Resources can be categorized into tangible and less tangible resources. Tangible resources involve people, equipment, technologies and cash while less tangible resources involve product designs, information, brands and relationships with stakeholders.

- **Processes**
  - ‘Processes are the patterns of interaction, coordination, communication and decision making that employees use to transform resources into products and services of greater worth’ (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000, pp. 68.). Processes can be formal – explicitly defined and documented – or informal – routines or ways of working that evolve over time. Importantly, a process that creates the capability to execute one task, concurrently defines disabilities in defining other tasks.

- **Values**
  - Values; An organization’s values are standards by which; (1) employees set priorities that enable them to judge whether an order is attractive or unattractive, (2) whether a customer is more important or less important, (3) whether an idea for a new product is attractive or marginal and so on. Essentially then, values determine what gets priority in the organization and what doesn’t.

The most obvious source of organizational capability are the resources, it’s evident that an organization’s access to resources determines what an organization can do and what it can’t do. Therefore there is a tendency among practitioners to consider resources as the most important source of organizational capabilities (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). However, organizational capabilities do also reside in other sources than resources alone, as processes and values are also and arguably even more important sources of organizational capabilities. As Christensen and Overdorf argue, over time
processes and values become institutionalized within an organization to an extent where they can account for the consistency of action of all people within the organization – in other words processes and values become routines. However, once institutionalized it’s difficult to change these processes and values in the light of discontinuities.

Another important challenge of dealing with discontinuities for established organizations is pointed out by Birkinshaw et al who argue that ‘...the forces of inertia [regarding discontinuous innovation] extend to the firm’s networks and systems of relationships...’ (Birkinshaw et. al., 2007, pp. 68.). The core of the argumentation is that while it is recognized that the existing web of strong relationships of a firm are powerful positive resources for incremental innovation, this same web of relationships can also be an obstacle when it comes to dealing with discontinuities or even change in general. 'The ties that bind may become the ties that blind' (Birkinshaw et. al., 2007, pp. 68.). In this sense, established organizations may not be able to deal with discontinuities successfully, because existing ties are inhibiting them. New entrants on the other hand, do not have a strong and existing web of relationships yet, so they do not face such inhibitions.

2.3.4. Conclusion Regarding the Challenges of Discontinuous Innovation

The major challenge of established firms in dealing with discontinuities is to develop specific capabilities or routines that enable them to be able to deal with discontinuities in a successful manner. While established firms have developed capabilities / routines that enable them to deal successfully with continuous innovation, they lack the capabilities to deal successfully with discontinuous innovation. As the established organizations have matured, the routines for dealing with continuous innovation have institutionalized to a degree that makes it difficult to ‘unlearn’ them. Furthermore the inertia of dealing with discontinuities is not limited to the established organization itself, but extends to the firm’s networks and systems of relationships. The essential and most striking point however is that established organizations may not be able to deal with discontinuities successfully because it is not rational for them to do so in the first place. These organizations have developed the capabilities/routines to manage continuous innovations successfully and this has proven to be a recipe for success in the past. It is not rational to give up this recipe for success and focus on developing capabilities/routines for something that is surrounded by as much uncertainty as discontinuities.

The frameworks presented in the previous sub – paragraph are potentially useful for analyzing the challenges that established Dutch national political parties face, when dealing with discontinuities, because they are complementary and they allow for a layered analysis. As the data collection involves newspaper articles it is not clear from the onset to which level of depth it is possible to identify the challenges of discontinuous innovation. At the most basic level, by applying Fosters hubristic errors one can determine which potential errors political parties make when being confronted by new entrants. Also by applying Ahuja & Lampert’s learning traps one can determine why the established Dutch national political parties have difficulty in dealing with the challenges they face when dealing with discontinuities. At a more advanced level, an application of Christensen & Overdorff’s framework is useful for determining which sources of organizational capability limit an established political party’s ability to deal with discontinuities successfully. In essence then, as Foster’s hubristic errors describe the mistakes that cause established firms to fail when dealing with discontinuities, Ahuja & Lampert’s learning traps, Christensen & Overdorff’s sources of organizational capabilities and Birkinshaw et. al.’s notion of the inhibiting role that networks and systems of
relationships can play provide a possible explanation for the established Dutch political parties’ response towards the LPF and PVV respectively. However, the depth of analysis is determinant on the data collection of newspaper articles, the statements that can be derived from these articles and the information that these statements contain. For example, in order to apply Christensen & Overdorff’s RPV-framework, at least some of the statements made by political leaders of the established Dutch national political parties need to contain information about resources and/or processes and/or values of these parties possibly restricting their reactions towards new entrants. Since the exact possibility of application of all frameworks is dependent on the data collection and is therefore not clear from the onset, a framework with a considerable degree of flexibility is desired. The layered approach meets this desire for flexibility as its allows for varying depths of analysis.

2.4. Strategies for Successfully Managing Discontinuities

As the discussion in the previous paragraph shows, dealing with discontinuities is challenging to the establishment and its more challenging for some incumbents than to others. As illustrated throughout paragraph 2.3. established organizations are often unsuccessful in dealing with discontinuities because they lack the capabilities to deal with them and may not even rational for them to develop these capabilities in the first place. These organizations have developed capabilities or routines that enable them to manage continuous innovation, and these capabilities are rooted in organizational resources, processes and values, which makes it difficult to unlearn them. The challenge then is to develop capabilities that enable established firms to be able to deal with discontinuities. This is important as dealing with discontinuities successfully is becoming more and more important as a source of competitive advantage. ‘Companies need to enter a fourth era, call it the management of discontinuities’ (Foster, 1986, pp. 57.).

As one part of the discontinuous innovation literature is focused on describing the unique challenges of dealing with discontinuities, the other extensive part of the literature is concerned with prescribing solutions for overcoming these challenges. Established organizations can bear upon certain ‘solution strategies’ which enable them to deal with discontinuities in a more successful manner, at least that is what is claimed by the scholars prescribing them. The solution strategies that are prescribed for established organizations, might also prove to be applicable to the Dutch national political parties – as they might provide a rationale with regard to what political parties have done in reaction to discontinuities in the past and also might provide insights on how political parties should deal with future discontinuities. So applying the solution strategies as prescribed for established private sector organizations to the national political sphere can be of both descriptive value – describing what political parties do and have done – and prescriptive value – describing what political parties could and / or even should do in the future.

2.4.1. Developing Capabilities for the Successful Management of Discontinuities

As the key challenge for established organizations in dealing with discontinuous innovation is developing capabilities or routines, it’s not surprising, that solution strategies for dealing with discontinuous innovation are focused on prescribing which capabilities to develop and how to develop them. In most instances the scholars that describe the unique challenges of managing discontinuities, also provide solutions to overcome these challenges. Therefore the discussion of solution strategies will follow the similar path as the discussion of the challenges of managing discontinuities in paragraph 2.3, meaning that it will be discussed which solutions Ahuja & Lampert offer for avoiding learning traps, which solutions Christensen & Overdorff offer for creating
organizational capabilities and the solutions that Birkinshaw et. al. offer to create new networks that facilitate the successful management of discontinuities. One might notice that no solution strategy of Foster (for avoiding the hubristic errors) is mentioned in the previous outline of solution strategies. The reason for this is that Foster’s framework is much more focused on providing insights with regard to why incumbents fail in the light of discontinuities and less on providing solution strategies. The only strategy that Foster briefly describes is the counter attack strategy, in which ‘... smart defenders find ways of thwarting their attackers, at least for a while...’ (Foster, 1986, pp. 187.). However Foster does not describe why counter attack is the best solution strategy and why this particular solution strategy is the best option under all circumstances – and these lacking argumentations are the major weaknesses in Foster’s ‘Attackers Advantage’ – framework.

Instead of adopting Foster’s counter attack strategy as the only viable solution strategy for dealing with discontinuities successfully, the typology of response strategies to disruptive innovation of Charitou and Markides (2003) will be taken into account, as it provides a much more comprehensive and contingent framework than Foster’s. Charitou & Markides, distinguish five response strategies, including the counter attack strategy of Foster and they relate the application of these strategies to the specific circumstances that an established organization faces. Another key aspect of Charitou & Markides’ typology of response strategies is that it also describes the circumstances under which an established organization’s best strategy is to ignore the discontinuity altogether – something that is lacking in the frameworks of Ahuja & Lampert, Christensen & Overdorf and Birkinshaw et. al.

2.4.2. Solution Strategies for Managing Discontinuities for Established Organizations
Ahuja & Lampert offer solutions of which they claim that they can prevent established firms from falling into the learning traps. They specify solutions that relate to avoiding the familiarity trap, the learning trap and the propinquity trap respectively. These solutions are presented in presented in figure 2.4. below.

*Figure 2.4. Ahuja & Lampert’s Solutions for Avoiding Learning Traps (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001)*

- **Experimenting With Novel Technologies**
  - Novel technologies are technologies that are new to the organization even though they may have been in existence earlier. Novel technologies are an important mechanism by which firms can avoid familiarity traps.

- **Experimenting With Emerging Technologies**
  - Emerging technologies are technologies that are new in chronological terms. They represent the leading edge of technology and have only recently been developed.

- **Experimenting With Pioneering Technologies**
  - Pioneering technologies are technologies that build on no existing technologies but focus completely on de novo solutions.
Experimenting with novel technologies leads to an enhanced repertoire and a deeper understanding of new technologies that can provide the basis for breakthrough inventions. Experimenting with nascent or emerging technologies can function as a mechanism by which firms can increase the likelihood of creating breakthrough inventions because emerging technologies can lighten a new perspective on unsolved problems and can lead to the recombination of old and new knowledge into solutions. Pioneering technologies provide a basis for breakthrough inventions as they are an attempt to jump to a distinct technological trajectory. Basically the solutions offered by Ahuja & Lampert outline which capabilities organizations should develop to be able to deal with discontinuities successfully. An organization capable of experimenting with novel, emerging and pioneering technologies should be able to deal with discontinuities.

More elaborately, Christensen & Overdorf focus on prescribing how to develop organizational capabilities and the core of their argumentation is that managers of established organizations must create a new organizational space where new organizational capabilities can be created. Christensen & Overdorf outline three options in which new capabilities can be developed and importantly they also prescribe when to apply a certain option, why to apply it and how to apply it. The three options together with their dimensions of application are shown in figure 2.5. below.

*Figure 2.5. Three Ways for Developing Organizational Capabilities (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When?</th>
<th>Why?</th>
<th>How?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating New Capabilities Internally</td>
<td>If Capabilities Reside in Processes and New Processes are Required</td>
<td>Because Existing Processes Impede the Creation of New Ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Capabilities Through A Spinout Organization</td>
<td>If Values of the Organization Make it Impossible to Allocate Resources to an Innovation Project</td>
<td>Existing Organizational Values Limit Possibilities to Compete in Small Emerging markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Capabilities Through Acquisitions</td>
<td>If the Capabilities Required Cannot be Developed Within the Organization</td>
<td>Sometimes It’s More Beneficial to Acquire Capabilities than to Develop Them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If processes are limiting the possibilities to deal with discontinuities then an organization should choose to create new capabilities internally. However if it’s the values that limit these possibilities then creating capabilities through a spinout organization is a more viable option. In the event that the capabilities required cannot be developed within the organization, acquiring capabilities is the only option left.

One important feature of the abovementioned solution strategies is that they assume that established organizations need to apply some kind of strategy to deal with discontinuities successfully. In other words, these solution strategies are imperatives for action. However, as Charitou and Markides illustrate, there are situations thinkable in which a discontinuity does occur, but when the best solution strategy for an established organization is to ignore the discontinuity all
together. What Charitou & Markides claim, is that under certain circumstances, established organizations should not come into action when a discontinuity occurs. According to them two factors determine the solution strategy that an organization should adopt when confronted with a discontinuity;

➢ **The Organization’s Motivation to Respond:** The established firm’s motivation to respond is determined by the degree to which the firm considers the new business to be threatening to its existing business. In essence the relatedness of the new business to the existing business.

➢ **The Organization’s Ability to Respond:** The established firm’s ability to respond is determined by the degree of conflict between the traditional business and the new business. The greater this degree of conflict is, the lower these ability to respond will be.

The organization’s motivation to respond is related to the extent to which the established organization considers the discontinuity as a threat to its own business. What Charitou and Markides claim is that an established organization will consider itself to be more threatened by a discontinuity that is related to its business than by a discontinuity that is not related to its business – this is the concept of ‘relatedness’; the greater the relatedness between the discontinuity and the business of the established organization, the greater this organization’s motivation to respond will be. Based on the dimension of motivation to respond, the established organization can make a choice whether to respond to the discontinuity or not. If the motivation to respond is low, then the organization should not react actively to the discontinuity. In this case the organization should ignore the innovation, since the new business is not considered to be threatening to the organization’s business. Instead the established organization should focus on its own business, thereby capitalizing on large investments already made in the past. In the event that an organization’s motivation to respond is high, the organization should respond and its response is determined by its ability to respond.

The organization’s ability to respond is determined by the degree of conflict between the traditional business and the new business. In Charitou & Markides’ view a discontinuity will lead to ‘...a way of playing the game that is both different from and in conflict with the traditional way...’ (Charitou & Markides, 2003, pp. 56.). And the greater the extent of conflict between the traditional business and the new business, the more difficult it will be for the traditional organization to respond adequately to the discontinuity. If the organization’s motivation to respond is high but its ability to respond is low, then the organization has two possible, though very different, options;

- **Attack Back – Disrupt the Innovation:** The attack back or counter attack strategy is also prescribed by Foster as a possible solution strategy for managing discontinuities, in fact it’s the only solution strategy that Foster describes. Charitou & Markides state that ‘...the innovators do not attack by trying to become better at providing the product attributes that the established competitors were emphasizing... instead, they focus on different product attributes...’ (Charitou & Markides, 2003, pp. 60.). Instead of adopting this new way of playing the game, an established firm could choose to focus on different product attributes itself, and thereby attempt to disrupt the disruption.

- **Embrace the Innovation Completely and Scale it Up:** The rationale for this response is that ‘...established companies have the skills and competences to embrace a disruptive innovation introduced by another company and grow it into a mass market (Charitou & Markides, 2003. pp.
62 – 63.). In essence, established firms have an advantage over new entrants as they possess ‘commercialization capability’. As Alvarez & Barney (2001) illustrate, it’s especially the large established firms that are able to embrace the inventions of smaller entrepreneurial firms and commercialize them on a large scale.

If the organization’s motivation to respond is high and the ability to respond is high as well, then the organization has three options;

- **Adopt and Keep Internal;** Basically if an established organization makes the decision to adopt to the new business, then the key challenge is to find ways in which it can play two conflicting games at once. The first option that an established organization has is to compete in the new business through its existing organizational structure and divisions. An organization choosing to opt this solution strategy doesn’t deny the fact that there is considerable conflict between its traditional business and the new business, but it considers this risk to be manageable. In essence the option of ‘adopt and keep internal’ is very similar to the ‘developing capabilities internally strategy’ of Overdorf and & Christensen in that is assumes that organizations can simultaneously develop both capabilities to deal with continuous innovation and discontinuous innovation internally. This assumption reflects the concept of ambidexterity which has its outings in the ideal – type ambidextrous organization.

- **Adopt or Separate;** The second option the established organization can opt for when it decides to adopt the new business is to compete in the new business by establishing a separate unit either from the start or at a later moment in time. So this option matches the ‘spin-out strategy’ of Christensen & Overdorf. As Chriritou & Markides conclude the spin-out option is a popular one, they state that ‘... clearly, embracing the disruptive innovation through a separate organizational unit was popular...’ (Charitou & Markides, 2003, pp. 61.).

- **Attack Back and Disrupt the Innovation;** This particular option is already mentioned as a viable option when the motivation to respond is high and the ability to respond is low. However this option is also a viable option when the ability to respond is high, because even if the degree of conflict is considered to be manageable and the established organization can adopt the new business, it can still choose to pursue a new way of playing the game itself, thereby disrupting the disruption.

By plotting the response strategies of Charitou & Markides into a matrix a useful typology of response strategies comes into existence. This typology is presented in figure 2.6. on the next page, where each quadrant presents a particular combination of motivation to respond and ability to respond together with the corresponding response strategies.
Both Charitou & Markides and Christensen & Overdorf prescribe internal and spin-out solution strategies for dealing with discontinuities with the latter duo of scholars also prescribing an acquisition strategy. What both groups of scholars do not consider is the possibility of dealing with discontinuities through developing and creating networks, although developing and creating those networks can be a viable option for established organizations when dealing with discontinuities. As already pointed out during the discussion of the challenges of dealing with discontinuities, Birkinshaw et. al. argue that the ‘forces of inertia’ extend to the established firm’s networks and systems of relationships. In other words, an established organization’s networks and systems of relationships can prove to be an obstacle in the light of discontinuities. However this is only one side of the medal, as Birkinshaw et. al. also argue that firms can create new networks in order to increase their ‘capacity for discontinuous innovation’ (Birkinshaw et. al., 2007, pp. 67.). In asserting why networks increase this capacity for discontinuous innovation the central argument is that ‘...such networks can be an important source of new insights, competencies and relationships for the firm as it attempts to make sense of the changes affecting its industry...’ (Birkinshaw et. al, 2007, pp. 69.).

Within the framework that Birkinshaw et. al. propose, building new networks is comprised of two activities; (1) identifying relevant new partners and (2) learning how to work with them. The process of developing new networks is about finding and forming and both sub-activities can be hindered by barriers. Finding refers to how easy it is to identify the right organizations with whom or which the established organization wants to interact. Forming refers to how keen these individuals or organizations are to work with the established organization. Combining these two dimensions results in the typology of approaches to network building as presented in figure 2.7. on the next page. However Birkinshaw et. al. also describe when and how to pursue a certain approach to network building, see figure 2.8. on the next page for an overview.
**Figure 2.7. Generic Approaches to Network Building (Birkinshaw et. al.)**

- **Reluctant to Engage With You**
- **Easy to Find**
- **Moving Into Uncharted Territory**
- **How Easy is it to Form a Relationship With the Potential Partner?**
- **Hard to Find**
- **Keen to Engage With You**

**Figure 2.8. Generic Approaches to Network Building Specified (Birkinshaw et. al.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>How</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Creating New Networks in Proximate Areas | Potential partners are both easy to find and happy to do business. | - Approach the potential new partners directly.  
- Structure the relationship carefully to overcome the institutional or demographic differences that separate you.  
- Build personal relationships at the interfaces with partners to ensure that knowledge transfer occurs. |
| Seeking Out Networks in Distinct Areas  | Potential partners are hard to find but they are happy to do business. | - Approach new potential partners through boundary spanners or scouts who specialize in building and maintaining relationships with many people.  
- Be prepared to accept redundancy or duplication in the networks that you create.  
- Do not underestimate the difficulty of absorbing the insights gained from the distant networks. |
| Building Relationships With Unusual Partners | Potential partners are easy to find but reluctant to do business. | - Focus on the higher-order purpose or issue that transcends your differences.  
- Be prepared for a lengthy dialogue to take place before the new partners begin to trust you.  
- Try to identify cross-over individuals who have switched allegiance from the world of the prospective partner to your world. |
| Moving into Uncharted Territory | Potential partners are hard to find and reluctant to do business. | - Birkinshaw et. al. do not specify any guidelines regarding finding potential partners that are both hard to find and reluctant to do business. |
2.4.3. Conclusion Regarding the Solution Strategies for the Managing Discontinuities for Established Organizations

From the previous discussion of the solution strategies—which comprise the available options for established organizations in the face of discontinuities—it follows that the primary step in determining which solution strategy to apply is determining the threat that a discontinuity poses to the established organization. If the relatedness of the new business to the traditional business is high, then the discontinuity should be considered as a threat for the traditional business of the established organization. However not every discontinuity is a threat, as Foster notes ‘...not every attacker wins...’ (Foster, 1986, pp. 190), or as Bessant notes ‘... disruption is not always a ‘changing of the guard’ between existing incumbents and new entrants’. Therefore if a discontinuity is not a threat, then ignoring it and focusing on the traditional business is the best strategy to opt for.

If the discontinuity is to be considered as a threat to the traditional business of the established organization then its ability to respond acts as the determinant of the solution strategies that it should opt for. The established organization’s ability to respond is determined by the degree of conflict between the new business and the traditional business, the higher this degree, the lower the ability to respond will be. If the established organization considers a discontinuity to be a threat but its ability to respond is low, then it can either embrace the new business completely by dropping the traditional business, or it can decide to attack back by creating a new business of its own. In these instances there is no possibility to play both games at once, since the degree of conflict between the new business and the existing business is considered to be ‘unmanageable’.

If the discontinuity is considered to be a threat and the ability to respond is high, then the established organization can still choose to attack back and create a new business of its own which disrupts the business of the new entrant. However the more logical reaction would be to adopt the new business either by keeping it internally or by spinning it out. When keeping the new business internal, the organization considers playing two games at once manageable and existing processes and values are not impeding the creation of new ones. However in some instances existing processes and values can impede the creation of new processes and values, in that case setting up a spin-out unit for the new business is a way to manage two games at once. Another way to manage two games at once is by acquiring the capabilities to play the new game from outside the organization. Lastly, in some instances an organization might be willing to adopt the new business, but may be limited to do so because of its network of relationships with partners. In this case the established organization should aim to create new networks for discontinuous innovation and the exact development of such networks is determined by the ease with which potential partners can be found and their willingness to co-operate. Based on the above discussion it can be concluded that established organizations have four strategies they can opt for when being confronted with a discontinuity;

- Ignoring the New Business and Focusing on the Own Business Instead
- Attacking Back and Attempting to Disrupt the Disruption
- Adopting the New Business by Either
  - Keeping it Internal
  - Spinning it Out
  - Acquiring Capabilities
  - Creating Networks for Discontinuous Innovation
- Embracing the New Business Completely and Scaling it Up
Essentially, these four strategies can be thought of as referring to three broader themes, being ‘ignorance’, ‘attack’ and ‘imitation’. Hereby the label ‘ignorance’ refers to the first strategy, the label ‘attack’ refers to the second strategy and the label ‘imitation’ refers to the third and fourth strategies. In essence, ignorance involves no active reaction towards the discontinuity at all, attack refers to a direct offensive reaction towards the new entrant and imitation refers to a direct reaction towards the new entrant which is accommodative. With regard to imitation, one could state that adaptation (the third strategy in the above list) and embracement (the fourth strategy in the above list) relate to different types of imitation. Thereby adoption involves incorporating the new way of doing things while maintaining the existent way of doing things, while embracement involves the incorporation of the new way of doing things while abandoning the existing way of doing things.

Labeling the response strategies as ignorance, attack or imitation makes them more easily applicable to the political sphere than the strategies as defined by Charitou & Markides. For example it makes a lot more sense to search for outings of the imitation strategy within the data collection of newspaper articles than searching for outings of ‘embracing the business and scaling it up’. In essence, labeling the three strategies as ignorance, attack or imitation the connotations with business terminology are diminished. This does not mean however that the strategies’ meanings have changed, which is important to note, as the aim of the analysis is to analyze reactions of political parties towards new entrants from a discontinuous innovation point of view. Therefore it is very important to define what is meant by the labels ‘ignorance’, ‘attack’ and ‘imitation’. However, in order to this, one needs to determine at first what typical outings of the three strategies within the political sphere are, and to this one needs to determine which outings of the strategies are present within the data pool of newspaper articles. Therefore definitions and operationalizations of the three strategies are presented in the following chapter – ‘Research Design’ – where all constructs will be defined and operationalized.

Following the reasoning of sub-paragraph 2.4.2. (see also figure 2.3.), the ignorance strategy is only viable when the motivation to respond is low, regardless of the ability to respond. The rationale behind the ignorance strategy is; ‘why waste resources to respond when there’s no need to respond at all?’. The attack strategy is viable when the motivation to respond is high, regardless of the ability to respond. Simply stated, if there’s a motivation to respond and imitation is not possible / feasible than the attack strategy is the only option left. Lastly, the imitation strategy is only viable when the motivation to respond is high and the ability to respond is high as well. Imitation is not possible when the ability to respond is low as a low ability to respond indicates a high degree of conflict between the existing way of doing things and the new entrant’s way of doing things, which makes imitation virtually impossible. Therefore in these instances the attack strategy is the only viable response strategy. In instances where both the motivation to respond and ability to respond are high, both imitation and attack are viable options. Based on the above discussion the typology of solution strategies, as presented in figure 2.9. on the next page, comes into existence.
This paragraph and the previous paragraph presented the concepts following from discontinuous innovation literature which were identified as being potentially applicable to the political sphere. However, as these concepts were ‘designed’ for the business world, before applying them to the political world, one needs to have a sufficient understanding of the political world, especially the similarities and differences between the political world and the business world. Therefore the following paragraph will focus on relevant literature following from political science, with the aim of determining which challenges new entrant parties pose upon established parties and which strategies these established parties could pursue in reaction to the new entrants. Insights regarding the effect of new entrant parties on established parties and the reactions of these established parties towards new entrants can be found in literature sources focusing on party competition. As party competition is a phenomenon that is central within the so-called Public Choice stream of thought, the following paragraph will present concepts following from this stream of thought.

2.5. New Entrant Parties Challenging the Establishment – Insights Following From the Public Choice Stream of Thought

Traditionally, discontinuous innovation research focuses on business entities, in particular private – sector firms and the way they act and react in the market – place. However the aim of this study is to explore how and to what extent discontinuous innovation terminology can be applied to the national political sphere in the Netherlands. So in essence, the aim is to apply business concepts to a non-business field – politics. Fortunately, applying business concepts to politics is not a novel undertaking, as the economic study of politics is the central topic of interest within the research domain of ‘Public Choice’. In its most basic form, the Public Choice stream of thought can be described as ‘... the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science...’. (Mueller, 2003, pp. 1.). Public Choice can be considered as a stream of political philosophy
that ‘... employs the analytic tools of economics...’ (Mueller, 2003, pp. 2.). So actually, Public Choice adapts a rational choice approach to theorizing and modeling about political phenomena. According to Van Der Brug (2007), this rational choice perspective is the most promising analytic framework for analyzing and understanding political processes on the macro-level.

Applying the rational choice approach to politics entails that actors, such as voters and political parties, will chose the alternative behavior out of a pool of possible behaviors which maximizes their benefits while minimizing their costs (Van Der Brug, 2007, pp. 9.). Contingency factors are important within the rational choice approach as the environment determines the opportunities and restrictions of the behaviors of different actors and thereby determines to a large extent the alternative behaviors which actors can choose from in the first place (Van Der Brug, 2007, pp.9.). This line of reasoning is also visible within the discontinuous innovation concepts as discussed in the previous paragraphs. For example the typology of response strategies, as developed in the previous paragraph, assumes that incumbent firms can choose from three strategies (alternative behaviors) when dealing with the new entrant. And the strategy to opt for is determined by the motivation to respond and the ability to respond (contingency factors). As the Public Choice stream of thought studies politics from an economic point of view, it is not surprising that it is this stream of thought which covers the topic of party competition extensively. Therefore the remainder of this paragraph will present insights regarding party competition thereby focusing on the competition between new entrants and established parties, which stem from the Public Choice stream of thought. The first three sub-paragraphs will focus on (1) explaining why new entrant parties are interesting research objects from a political point of view, (2) why the Netherlands is an especially interesting case when studying new entrant parties and (3) the factors explaining the success of new entrants that are described in political literature. Subsequently sub-paragraph four will introduce classical spatial theory as a useful way of theorizing about party competition. Finally, the last sub-paragraphs will illustrate the dynamics of party competition and derive challenges that new entrant parties pose upon established – sub-paragraph five – and the strategies that these parties could apply when dealing with new entrant parties – sub-paragraph six.

2.5.1. New Entrant Parties as the Object of Study
New entrant parties receive extensive attention in political literature as they ‘...play a potentially more significant role...’ [as] ‘...traditional parties seem to fragment in the era of post-modern politics...’(Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 279.). From the scientific perspective new entrant parties denote an important research topic because ‘...the rise of these new challenger parties marked some of the largest changes in party systems in the postwar era...’ [and] ‘...brought about a shock to the ruling elites and particularly to mainstream parties...’ (Van Der Brug et. al., 2005, pp. 538.). ‘Given the serious consequences resulting from the electoral advancement of a new party, it is critical to understand who loses, when and how much, when a new party enters the electoral arena...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 49.). Conclusively, new entrant parties are interesting objects of research because of their potentially significant impact on established parties and even entire party systems.

2.5.2. New Entrant Parties in the Netherlands
While studies of new entrant parties focus on democracies in several countries, and many studies involve comparative studies across countries, the Netherlands is an especially interesting case when it comes to studying new entrants. After reviewing several studies of new party emergence across democracies, Krouwel & Lucardie conclude that ‘... particularly Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy
appear to be fertile soil for new party emergence, followed by France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Ireland and Finland, whereas party systems in Scandinavia and in the United Kingdom seem less prone to the emergence of new political competitors...’ (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 280.). The important question at this point remains, why the Netherlands appears to be such a fertile soil for new party emergence? The answer is provided by Blais & Massicotte, according to whom ‘...in terms of studying new party emergence, the Netherlands is a crucial case as the Dutch electoral system is one of the most open and inclusive systems, without an electoral threshold, a nation-wide single electoral district of 150 seats, making it possible to enter parliament with 0.67% of the national vote...’ (Blais and Massicotte, 2002, pp. 45.).

While the Dutch electoral system can be defined as one of the most open electoral systems, a study by Krouwel & Lucardie (2008) regarding new parties in the Netherlands illustrates that this doesn’t automatically ensure electoral success for new entrant parties. Their results indicate that since 1989, only 10 of 63 new entrant parties passed what they call ‘the threshold of representation’ (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 289). In other words, only a few new entrants gained seats in Dutch parliament while the majority failed to secure even one seat. Even when new parties succeed in passing the threshold of representation ‘...their impact on policy is often minor and they disappear into political oblivion after one parliamentary term...’ (pp. 299.). These results amplify the discussion in sub-paragraph 2.2.2. where the LPF and the PVV are labeled as ‘discontinuities’ within the Dutch national political arena, as these parties did not only pass the threshold of representation, they secured more parliament seats than any other entrant since 1989, by far. Furthermore the LPF did also pass what Krouwel & Lucardie call ‘the threshold of relevance’ (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 289), meaning that it entered Dutch government in 2002. So in essence, the results of Krouwel & Lucardie illustrate that the LPF and the PVV can be considered as discontinuities because their effects are discontinuous in comparison with other new entrant parties.

2.5.3. Factors Determining the Success of New Entrants

While an extensive body of research regarding discontinuous innovation is devoted to explaining the success of new entrants by the failure of incumbents, such an extensive body of research is not present within political literature. Instead the electoral success of new entrant parties tends to be explained from different perspectives and most of these perspectives focus on the new entrant parties themselves. According to Krouwel & Lucardie at least three kinds of factors are described by political scholars as being important for the electoral success of new parties (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, pp. 288 – 289.);

- **Structural and Institutional Conditions;** The electoral system and party funding rules, the political culture (dominant and latent values or ideologies), the configuration of the existing party system and the media.
- **The Economic and Political Conjuncture of Opportunity Structure;** Specifically salient issues that may have escaped the control of established parties.
- **Internal Party Resources;** Such as money, brainpower and active members, effective (and preferably charismatic) leadership and a political project that deals with urgent needs without offending fundamental values of society.

In the political literature, these three kinds of factors are analyzed by different disciplinary approaches; (1) the socio-structural model with its focus on socioeconomic variables, (2) the policy-
preference model with its focus on policy variables, (3) the political opportunity model with its focus on institutional variables and (4) the protest-vote model (Van Der Brug et. al. 2005, pp. 539.). Socio-structural models tend to focus on the macro-level and explain the support for new entrants from aggregate-level data. Van Der Brug et. al. provide three examples of such data, being; economic conditions, level of immigration and the level of support for the political systems (Van Der Brug et. al., 2005, pp. 540.). Policy-preference models focus on the micro level and claim that the support for new entrant parties depends on their ideological positions. Political opportunity models explain the success of new entrants by focusing on the competition that these parties face from other parties. Lastly, advocates of the protest vote assume that some voters vote for new entrant parties for reasons that have more to do with the deficiencies of established parties than with the attractions of the new entrants.

Of the four disciplinary approaches as described by Van Der Brug et. al., the last two approaches seem to be the most useful for the purposes of this study as these approaches indicate that at least some part of the success of new entrants can be explained by the actions of established parties. However, as research by Van Der Brug et. al. illustrates, the socio-structural model and the protest-vote model cannot explain the success of new entrant parties. Within their research sample only 3% of the electoral success of new entrant parties can be explained by the socio-structural model (Van Der Brug et. al., 2005, pp. 567.). Furthermore Van Der Brug et. al. claim that ‘... the large anti-immigrant parties attract support largely on the basis of ideological considerations...’ (Van Der Brug et. al., 2005, pp. 568) which renders the protest-vote model as implausible. Instead the answer to explaining the success of new entrants lies in a combination of the policy-preference model and the political opportunity model. The end conclusion of Van Der Brug et. al. therefore is that when attempting to explain the success of new entrant parties ‘...we ought to focus on party competition...’ (Van Der Brug et. al., 2005, pp. 563.).

2.5.4. Party Competition – Theorizing About the Political Marketplace

Within the Public Choice stream of thought party competition is theorized from a rational choice perspective. The most basic outing of this can be found within ‘classical spatial theory’ (Downs, 1957) also termed as ‘the spatial theory of voting’ (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). The core premise of classical spatial theory is that it assumes ‘... that voters make decisions through a comparison of their own preferences on issues or policies and the positions of parties on the same issues ... sincere, fully informed, and rational voters will always support the party with issue positions closest to their own preferences.’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 50.) In essence the key assumption of classical spatial theory is that the voter is a rational actor – ‘...he/she recognizes his/her self-interest, evaluates alternative policies or candidates on the basis of which will best serve his/her self-interest, and casts his/her vote for the policy or candidate most favorably evaluated..’ (Enelow & Hinich, 1984, pp. 3.). Similarly, candidates and political parties as whole entities are considered to be rational actors as well by classical spatial theory. In the words of Enelow & Hinich, ‘... each candidate sees a direct connection between the “package” he/she offers the voters and the votes he/she receives [and] this package consists of the policy statements he/she makes, his/her own characteristics as a candidate, his/her past record or that of his/her party – in short any of the myriad factors that voters might use as a guide to the candidate’s future behavior if he/she is elected.’ (Enelow & Hinich, 1984, pp. 3.). As the rational voter votes for the party which he/she favors the most based on his/her own self-interest, the rational party will position itself on the issue space with the goal of maximizing its voter share.
Essentially, advocates of spatial theory theorize about party competition by assuming the existence of a political market which is very similar to the basic economical conceptualization of a market. On this political market, political parties are suppliers who offer ‘packages’ to voters positioned on the demand side of the market in exchange for votes. Hereby the market space can be thought of as a multi-dimensional issue space, upon which political parties position themselves with the goal of maximizing their voter share. The most traditional conceptualization of the multi-dimensional issue space is a two-dimensional one, whereby party positions are simultaneously placed on a left-right and progressive-conservative continuum. However, an influential group of scholars led by Hanspeter Kriesi argue that contradictions along these continua have become less and less important (Kriesi et. al., 2006). Central to this claim is the assumption that ‘...the current process of globalization or denationalization leads to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, opposing those who benefit from this process against those who tend to lose in the course of events...’ (Kriesi et. al., 2006, pp. 921.).

In essence, Kriesi et. al. claim that there is a structural opposition between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization and that this opposition has given new meaning to the two-dimensional national political spaces. Based on an empirical study of the supply side of six Western European countries (one of them being the Netherlands), Kriesi et. al. conclude that ‘... the new cleavage [winners versus losers of globalization] has become embedded into existing two-dimensional national political spaces [and] that the meaning of the original dimensions has been transformed...’(Kriesi et. al., 2006, pp. 921.). So instead of the traditional left-right and progressive-conservative continua Kriesi et. al. suggest a typology of party positions along an economic dimension and a cultural dimension with continua ranging between demarcation and integration poles (see figure 2.10. on the next page). Hereby the economic dimension refers to the traditional opposition between pro-state and pro-market positions, with the meaning of this opposition having changed because of globalization. As Kriesi et. al. put it, ‘... the pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protectionist, while the pro-market position is likely to become more assertive in favor of the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets...’ (Kriesi et. al., 2006, pp. 924.). The pro-market position marks the integration pole of the economic dimension while the pro-state position marks the demarcation pole of the economic dimension. In the light of globalization, the central issues within the cultural dimension are issues related to European integration and immigration. The integration pole of the cultural dimension is characterized by a positive stance regarding the process of European integration and by a positive stance regarding immigration. The demarcation pole of the cultural dimension is characterized by an opposition towards European integration and immigration.

Importantly, Kriesi and his companions believe that voters position themselves along the same dimensions as candidates and parties. Based on the above figure a typical ‘loser of globalization’ can be described as a person who because of globalization has lost his/her job as production is relocated to low-cost countries in Asia and who faces competition for the remaining jobs in his/her country from cheap workers from Eastern Europe, made possible by the open internal European market. This person is likely to be against further European unification, against immigration and in favor of protectionist policy. On the other hand a typical ‘winner of globalization’ is someone who benefits from globalization, he/she considers globalization as a process enhancing his/her career opportunities and favors the open European market as he/she is able to hire a construction worker from Poland, who can fix the roof for a much lower price than domestic construction workers.
Opposed to the typical loser of globalization, this person is much in favor of further European unification, in favor of immigration and opposed to protectionist policy.

*Figure 2.10. Typology of Party Positions Along Ideological Lines (Kriesi et. al., 2006, pp.926.)*

To summarize, in this sub-paragraph, classical spatial theory was introduced as a way of theorizing about party competition. Based on classical spatial theory the political market place was conceptualized as a multi-dimensional issue space on which political parties (or political party families in figure 2.10.) position themselves. A representation of the multi-dimensional issue space was presented along the ideological lines as developed by Kriesi et. al.. While this sub-paragraph presents a basic understanding of party competition, this understanding cannot explain the challenges that established parties face when dealing with new entrants and the ways in which these parties could react to new entrants. The answer to understanding these challenges and potential reactions lies in understanding the dynamics of party competition, which is the topic of interest of the next two sub-paragraphs.

In order to illustrate the dynamics of party competition and link classic spatial theory with insights following from discontinuous innovation literature, it is more useful to refer to an adapted version of the figure as depicted in figure 2.10. Therefore the typology of party positions as depicted in figure 2.11. on the next page, will be referred to when illustrating the dynamics of party competition. The typology presented in this figure is developed by Van Der Brug (2007) and is a slight adaptation of Kriesi et. al.’s typology of party positions. In this figure the vertical axis is placed into the middle of the horizontal axis, meaning that it is now possible to distinguish four quadrants in which political parties can position themselves. By referring to the typology below, one can simply refer to the quadrants instead of having to refer to a specific combination of dimensions.
2.5.5. *The Dynamics of Party Competition – New Entrants Challenging the Establishment*

In the previous paragraph the aim was to provide a basic understanding of spatial theory as a useful way of theorizing about political competition. In this discussion political parties were presented as static entities which offer a package to voters in exchange for votes. However, political parties can afford to be static entities as political competition is a dynamic process. This means that ‘... voters continually review party support and switch parties to increase their expectations and parties continually readapt policy positions to the shifting affiliations of voters...’ (Laver, 2005, pp. 263.). Hereby the results of previous elections ‘... function as cues about the distribution of voters and about the potential location of winning spatial locations...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 50.). As established parties position themselves based on their assessment of the distribution of votes, their positions become clear. This means that new entrant parties can enter the political arena and ‘... choose position in the unoccupied but viable positions...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 50.). In this regard, the popular claim in the literature is that new entrant parties can enter the political arena in the first place, because mainstream parties have positioned themselves closer to the centre of the multi-dimensional issue space and closer to each other, leaving space for entry at the wings of the multi-dimensional issue space. Van Der Brug (2007) goes even as far as to conclude that most established parties tend be positioned in quadrants II and III of figure 2.8. while space in quadrants I and IV is nearly unoccupied. According to Van Der Brug it is especially remarkable that quadrant the space in quadrant I is largely unoccupied as in most Western-European countries the majority of the voters position themselves as left on the socio-economic continuum and right on the socio-cultural continuum.

If successful, such a new entry leads to a reallocation of votes, either because the new entrant is able to attract new voters, attract voters from established parties, or a combination of both. According to Tavits this reallocation of votes is not at random, instead ‘... parties closest to the new entrant should suffer the vote loss at the expense of the votes gained by the new entrant...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 50.). Put
more precisely, ‘... successful new party entrance should be related to the vote loss of its neighboring parties, and this vote loss should be more significant on issues that are more important to the new entrant...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 52.) Van Der Brug et. al. (2005) turn reverse this notion and claim that the electoral success of a new entrant depends upon the size of its mainstream competitor and the positioning of its mainstream competitor. However, the bottom line is that the established party being the closest to the new entrant on the multi-dimensional issue space is the party that is likely to experience the fiercest competition from this new entrant.

From the above discussion it follows that at the time of entrance, new entrants have an advantage over established parties because they have information about the positions that these parties occupy within the multi-dimensional party space. Furthermore new entrant parties know which position the established parties have occupied in the past and how these have evolved during the course of time. While new entrant parties can choose their spatial positioning deliberately based on their observation of the existing political landscape, the established parties are uncertain about the behavior of new entrants. Conclusively, new entrants have an advantage over established parties because they have sufficient information about the behavior of the established parties, while the established parties have no sufficient information about the behavior of the new entrant. So actually, the initial challenge of dealing with new entrants for established parties is overcoming this information asymmetry.

The key point is that it is difficult for established parties to adapt to new entrants because of uncertainty about the (future) behavior of these new entrant parties. However, even if the established parties have clear expectations about the positioning of the new entrant, they may still be limited in their options to react. This is illustrated by the dynamic model of party completion as developed by Laver (2005). According to Laver the adaptive ability of a party facing competition is determined by what he calls ‘the adaptive decision rules’ which are dominant within that party. Laver distinguishes the four decision rules presented in figure 2.12 below.

*Figure 2.12. Laver’s Adaptive Decision Rules [Laver, 2005, pp. 268.]*

| Aggregator | • Go to mean position of current party supporters on each dimension. |
| Hunter     | • Was previous move followed by increased party support? If yes, repeat move. If no, turn 180° from direction of last move, make unit move in direction randomly selected from arc 90° either side of direction now faced. |
| Predator   | • Observe party sizes. If you are the largest party, stand still. If not the largest party, set heading towards largest party, make unit move. |
| Sticker    | • Never change policy position. |
From Laver’s typology of adaptive decision rules one can derive that a party cannot adopt multiple decision rules at the same time, e.g. a party cannot be a ‘sticker’ and a ‘hunter’ at the same time. Furthermore from the above typology it follows that an established parties’ reaction towards a new entrant is determined by the importance it attaches to its current party supporters. Obviously, an established party that adopts the ‘hunter’ or ‘predator’ position is more likely to lose the support of at least some portion of its supporters, than an established party adopting the ‘aggregator’ or ‘sticker’ position. The key point here is that every established party has its own ranks to which it tends to be committed and this commitment limits its possibilities to react towards a new entrant. This restriction is very similar to factors restricting incumbent firms to deal successfully with new entrants. Consider the example of an established party of which the majority of voters is very opposing towards abortion. This party cannot suddenly adopt the position in favor of abortion without losing a share of its supporters. A new entrant on the other hand, is not bounded in its position in favor of or against abortion.

The situation gets even more difficult for the established party if a new entrant enters the political arena by emphasizing a salient issue – something which Tavits describes as ‘exploiting issue importance’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 52.). Suppose that a new entrant emphasizes the problems arising from immigration and takes the position in favor of an immigration-stop. This positioning becomes especially challenging for an established party if its pool of current supporters is divided in a 50-50 manner regarding the newly emphasized issue of an immigration stop. What should the established party do then, since every positioning regarding the newly emphasized issue is accompanied by the risk of losing a large share of current supporters. This example illustrates the dilemma that established parties face towards new entrants, these parties’ reactions are highly determined by their current supporter’s positions. However, this seems to be more the case for established parties characterized by an extensive rank-and-file than for parties with a modest rank-and-file. This is illustrated in Shepsle’s (2003) paper entitled ‘Losers in Politics - And How They Sometimes Become Winners’ were Shepsle reconstructs the work of William Riker in order to show that losers in politics (the parties with a modest rank-and-file) may be more able to be change their position in the multi-dimensional party space than winner in politics (parties with an extensive rank-and file) simply because they have nothing to lose.

To conclude, the fact that new entrant parties are challenging to established parties is caused by their lack of information regarding the positioning of the new entrant and their current supporters limiting their options to react towards the new entrants. This pool of current supporters limits the reactive options of the established parties in similar fashion as the resources, processes and values described by Christensen & Overdorf limit the reactive options of incumbents firms. Obviously, political parties have resources, processes and values as well, which to a large part determine their options when reacting towards new entrants. However, while new entrants are challenging to established parties, they are more challenging towards some parties than towards others, as parties closest to the new entrant should suffer the vote loss at the expense of the votes gained by the new entrant. This is an important notice, as this entails that some parties may be more motivated to respond than others and motivation to respond is one of the dimensions in the typology of response.

2 An example of such a 50-50 distribution of the ranks of a party is the VVD during the elections of their political leader in 2006. The voting between Mark Rutte – perceived as moderately right – and Rita Verdonk – perceived as conservative right ended in a victory for Rutte by the slightest of margins. This dichotomy within the VVD is illustrated further by the 2006 national election where Verdonk – second on the VVD-list – received more votes than Rutte – first on the list.
strategies as presented in figure 2.9. So essentially, classical spatial theory can be linked with the typology of response strategies that follow from discontinuous innovation literature. However, before this linking is illustrated, the next paragraph will discuss the potential response strategies that political parties can opt for when facing competition from new entrants, following from political literature.

2.5.6. The Dynamics of Party Competition – Response Strategies of Established Parties Towards New Entrants

In the previous sub-paragraph insights from literature focusing on party competition were presented in order to explain why new entrants have an advantage over established parties, why these new entrants pose challenges upon established parties and why it is often difficult for the established parties to react towards the new entrants. However, the literature presented in the previous sub-paragraph does not focus directly on the entrants vs. establishment debate. This is simply because the focus in political literature explaining the electoral success of new entrants tends to be on the entrants themselves and less on the established parties they challenge. However, there is one much cited research that focuses directly on the entrants vs. establishment debate and this research is presented in Meguid’s (2005) paper entitled ‘Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success’. Based on an analysis of green and radical right party vote in 17 Western European countries from 1970 to 2000, Meguid concludes that mainstream party strategies do matter when explaining the electoral success of new entrants (labeled as ‘niche – parties by Meguid.) In essence, Meguid argues that mainstream parties can react towards new entrant parties by pursuing three strategies;

-Figure 2.13. Strategies Which Established Parties Can Adopt Towards New Entrants (Meguid, 2005)

The main reason for discussing Meguid’s research is that the three strategies as listed above, may seem very similar to the three response strategies – ignorance, attack and imitation – that were derived from discontinuous innovation literature. One could consider the dismissive strategy as being synonymous with the ignorance, the adversarial strategy with attack and the accommodative strategy with imitation. However, there are some important differences largely relating to the fact that the strategies that follow from discontinuous innovation literature leave much room for interpretation, while this room for interpretation is much more limited with regard to the strategies as distinguished by Meguid. Firstly, Meguid’s accommodation strategy limits itself to the imitation of the new entrant’s political program, while the imitation strategy as defined by Chariou & Markides
can be applied to take into account other ways of imitation as well, e.g. the imitation of the style of the new entrant. Second, the ignorance strategy as defined by Charitou & Markides does not imply that the established party ignores the existence of the new entrant and deems it as irrelevant, it simply implies that in the perception of the established party, the new entrant does not pose a threat and therefore the established party concludes that it does not have to react towards the new entrant but should focus on its own way of doing things instead. Lastly, the attack strategy as defined by Charitou and Markides is much more broadly defined than the adversarial strategy of Meguid, as it doesn’t limit attack to emphasizing own issues while downplaying issues associated with the new entrant. This entails for example that the attack strategy as defined by Charitou & Markides can also involve personal attacks on the political leader of the new entrant by the political leaders of established parties.

In order to provide clarity with regard to the exact meanings of the three response strategies as derived from discontinuous innovation literature when applied to political parties, the definitions of the three response strategies are as follows;

- **Ignorance Strategy:** The established political party ignores the new entrant and focuses on its own way of doing things instead.
- **Attack Strategy:** The established political party attacks the new entrant’s way of doing things.
- **Imitation Strategy:** The established political party imitates the new entrant’s way of doing things.

In essence the definitions as proposed by Charitou & Markides are applied to political parties. The definitions are deliberately broadly formulated in order to leave some room for interpretation. As it is not clear from the onset which information can be derived from the data collection of newspaper articles, definitions that allow for some interpretation are required.

### 2.6. Conclusion Regarding the Theoretical Framework – A Synthesis Between Insights From Discontinuous Innovation Literature and Political Literature

In this final paragraph of the theoretical framework the game comes full circle as a comprehensive framework will be derived by linking the typology of response strategies following from discontinuous innovation literature to classical spatial theory following from political literature. In order to explain the linkage between the typology of response strategies – ignorance, attack and imitation – and the classical spatial theory – presented as a two dimensional issue space – a figure is developed which has the exact same dimensions as figure 2.11., four imaginary parties were included within the figure (see figure 2.14. on the next page. By referring to these imaginary parties – more precisely the distance between these parties – the usefulness of combining the typology of response strategies with classic spatial theory will be illustrated.
Figure 2.14. Imaginary Party Positions Along Ideological Lines

To recall, the typology of response strategies following from discontinuous innovation literature consists of three response strategies and two dimensions which determine the response strategy to opt for; the motivation to respond and the ability to respond. Classic spatial theory assumes that voters are rational actors and that they will vote for the party they consider as the most attractive option, based upon their own self-interest. This entails that even if voters consider multiple parties as attractive they will vote for the party which they consider slightly more attractive over other parties. The critical part of classic spatial theory is however the notion that if voters switch between parties, they are more likely to vote for a party that is close to their current party within the multi-dimensional issue space. This notion led Tavits to conclude that ‘... parties closest to the new entrant should suffer the vote loss at the expense of the votes gained by the new entrant...’ (Tavits, 2008, pp. 50.). This has some important implications for the motivation of parties to respond to new entrants.

The straightforward implication is that the parties that are closest to the new entrant within the multi-dimensional issue space are the parties which should have the highest motivation to respond. This can be illustrated by referring to figure 2.14. Suppose that party A is an established party that is confronted by a new entrant. Clearly, if the new entrant positions itself at position B, party A’s motivation to respond should be higher than if the new entrant positions itself at position’s C, D, or E. Conclusively, by linking the typology of response strategies with classical spatial theory, the expectation is that the motivation to respond of an established party depends on the positioning of the new entrant on the multi-dimensional issue space, with the motivation to respond being higher as the distance between the new entrant and the established party is shorter. From the typology of response strategies one can derive that in case of a low motivation to respond the response strategy to opt for is the ignorance strategy regardless of the ability to respond. Therefore it can be expected that as the distance between the new entrant and the established party on the multi-dimensional...
issue space becomes longer, the tendency of the established party to ignore the new entrant becomes greater.

If the distance between the new entrant and the established party is short and thus the motivation to respond is high, the ability to respond determines what the best strategy to opt for is – attack or imitation. With regard to imitation one can state that for an established party it is easier to imitate a new entrant that positions itself on a short distance on the multi-dimensional issue space than it is to imitate a new entrant that positions itself on a longer distance on the multi-dimensional issue space. For example, an established party in favor of abortion can imitate the policy of a new entrant suggesting more abortion clinics much easier than an established party that is strongly opposed to abortion. Therefore it can be expected that as the distance between the new entrant and the established party on the multi-dimensional issue space becomes shorter, the tendency of the established party to imitate the new entrant becomes greater. In contrast, with regard to the attack strategy, one can state that for an established party it is easier to attack a new entrant that positions itself on a long distance on the multi-dimensional issue space than it is to attack a new entrant that positions itself on a shorter distance on the multi-dimensional issue space. For example, an established party favoring abortion can attack a new entrant that opposes abortion much easier than a new entrant favoring abortion as well, simply because there is ‘something’ to attack – the bigger the difference between parties, the more there is to attack. Therefore it can be expected that as the distance between the new entrant and the established party on the multi-dimensional issue space becomes longer, the tendency of the established party to attack becomes greater.

From the above discussion it can be concluded that the shorter the distance between the new entrant and the established party on the multi-dimensional issue space, the greater the motivation to respond of the established party will be. If this motivation to respond is low, the response strategy the established party should opt for is the ignorance strategy, regardless of the ability to respond. However, if the motivation to respond is high the response strategy the established party should opt for is determined by the ability to respond. According to discontinuous innovation literature, the ability to respond is higher as the difference between the new entrant’s way of doing things and an incumbent organization’s way of doing things is smaller, because of the lower level of conflict. Linking this notion with classic spatial theory would imply that as the distance between the new entrant and the established party on the multi-dimensional issue space is shorter the ability to respond should be higher. However, this is not the case, instead the distance between the two parties on the multi-dimensional issue space determines the type of response strategy that established parties should opt for. If the distance between the new entrant and the established party is high, imitation is difficult and the attack strategy seems to be the most viable option. However, if the distance is low, attacking is difficult and the imitation strategy seems to be the more viable option. Conclusively, the following paradox can be derived; the established party with the lowest motivation to respond, may actually be the party with the highest ability to attack, while the established party with the highest motivation to respond may actually be the party with the lowest ability to attack.

To conclude, in this final paragraph of the theoretical framework, the typology of response strategies following from discontinuous innovation literature was linked to the classic spatial theory in order to derive a comprehensive framework. This framework will be applied to analyze data – being statements of political leaders of the established Dutch national political parties. This means that the
statements of these political leaders will be coded for the three response strategies – ignorance, attack and imitation – and that the positions of the established Dutch national political parties on the multi-dimensional issue space will be determined in order to determine the possible rationales for the response strategies that these established parties apply as a reaction towards the LPF and the PVV respectively. The research design outlining the exact methods of data collection, data analysis and operationalization of constructs is presented in the following chapter.
3. Research Design

In this third chapter the focus will be on outlining the methodological part of conducting the research, the research design. The focus will be on explaining (1) the purpose of the study from a methodological point of view, (2) the applied research strategy, (3) the data collection process, (4) the data analysis process and (5) the expected outcomes of the research. It’s important to describe the analytical steps of conducting the research in order to ‘...provide others with instructions as to what to do in order to replicate the results...’ (Krippendorff, 1980, pp. 49.). Furthermore it is essential to explicitly provide the rationale for every step of the research process, so that readers can judge the applied procedures and evidence provided according to their own standards (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Essentially this chapter is devoted to explaining how the research is conducted and providing a rationale for why the research is conducted in that way – from the general methodological purpose of the study to the ways of collecting and analyzing data. The first paragraph explains the explorative nature of the research, its fit with the research goal and its implications for the research strategy. Paragraph two outlines the research strategy – a multiple case study approach – and provides arguments for opting this particular research strategy. The third paragraph describes is centered around the data collection process, as it covers issues regarding units of observation and units of analysis, the sources of data and the ways of collecting data. The fourth and last paragraph depicts the method of data analysis – a content analysis technique. The focus in this paragraph will be on the data analysis process or the codification of data to be more precise.

3.1. Exploration as the General Purpose of Research

The central goal of the research, as stated in chapter one, is to explore whether and how theories, strategies and concepts following from the discontinuous innovation literature are applicable to the Dutch national political sphere. More precisely, the aim of the research is to explore how the established Dutch national political parties deal with the challenges posed upon them by new entrant parties from a discontinuous innovation point of view. In accordance with the research goal the central research question is formulated as a “how” – question and the desired outcomes of the research are initial insights regarding the applicability of discontinuous innovation theories, strategies and concepts to the Dutch national political sphere.

From the above section it should be clear that the research as presented in this study report is on an explorative nature. This explorative approach fits the central research goal as applying discontinuous innovation concepts, theories and strategies to explain political competition in the face of new entrants is a novel research interest, which is explored in this particular research. Clearly studying the challenges of discontinuous innovation and the solution strategies to overcome them, or studying the reactions of political parties towards new entrants are not new research interests. Furthermore, applying a business perspective or more generally an economic perspective to study political phenomena is covered in a large body of research within Public Choice Theory – where the analytical tools of economics are applied to study political phenomena. So in essence, what’s really explorative about the research is the application of discontinuous innovation theory for explaining political competition in the face of new entrants as the research is an initial attempt to explain political competition from a discontinuous innovation point of view.
Explorative studies are suitable when the research goal is to; (1) satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study and (3) to develop methods to be employed in any subsequent study (Babbie, 2004, pp. 88). This research is conducted primarily for the first reason, as the research is initiated by the researcher’s curiosity and interest, there was no immediate practical reason for carrying out the research. Furthermore the goal of the research is to provide – not necessarily a better understanding of political competition in the face of new entrants – but to provide a different understanding of the phenomenon by considering it from a discontinuous point of view. An explorative study is well suited to meet this research goal as ‘.. it almost always yields new insights into a topic for research...’ (Babbie, 2004, pp.89.). Additionally, the research is likely provide insights with regard to the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study with or without the methods as applied in the research.

However, in practice explorative studies have an important limitation, and it’s important to consider this limitation in the light of this research. According to Babbie, explorative studies have the tendency that ‘... they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions’ (Babbie, 2004, pp. 89.). This limitation of explorative studies is mostly causes by the problem of representativeness (Babbie, 2004), which refers to misfit between the population studied and the population of interest.

With regard to the present research the issue of representativeness is not much of an issue with regard to the objects of study – the established Dutch national political parties. The population of these parties is rather limited and easily identifiable. Instead, the issue of representativeness in this research is related to the theoretical labeling of the two cases of interest – the LPF and the PVV – as discontinuities. The reader should refer back to paragraph 2.2.2. for a discussion about this important issue.

3.2. Research Strategy – The Multiple Case Study Approach

In this research a case study approach is applied as encompassing research strategy, as for the purposes of this research it has clear advantages over other research strategies. A case study approach is especially advantageous when ‘... a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little control (Yin, 2003, pp. 9). Furthermore, ‘... the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated’ (Yin, 2003, pp.7). The case study approach fits well with the aims of the research as the goal is to examine contemporary events – how Dutch national political parties deal with new entrant parties that only recently entered the political arena. Clearly, it is not possible to manipulate relevant behaviors – the reactions of the established parties towards these new entrants.

With regard to the case study approach, a crucial aspect is the selection of cases to include, which depends on the purpose of the research. Eisenhardt (1989) makes a distinction between hypothesis-testing case study research and theory-building case study research. Since the purpose of this research is not to test hypotheses but to provide different understanding of political competition in the face of new entrants by generating initial insights, the purpose of this research lies closer to theory-building than to hypothesis-testing. According to Eisenhardt, ‘...the sampling of cases from the chosen population is unusual when building theory from case studies...’ instead ‘...such research relies on theoretical sampling...’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 537.). This logic is applied in this research and based on the theoretical criteria, as explained outlined in paragraph 2.2.2., two cases of discontinuities occurring in the Dutch national political landscape were identified – the LPF and the PVV. It cannot
be emphasized enough that the label ‘discontinuity’ should not be considered as a taken-for-granted one, instead the label is used as a heuristic tool to refer to new entrant parties that have been and/or still are successful in attacking the establishment by doing things differently and which have ‘...transformed the party system into an open battlefield in which winners and losers come and go and in which established positions are becoming non-existent anymore...’.

The selection of two cases of ‘political discontinuities’ has some essential advantages. First and foremost, selecting two cases makes it possible to compare cases of discontinuities within the Dutch national political landscape, especially the reactions of the established political parties in dealing with these discontinuities. In essence, next to within-case analysis the two-case approach facilitates cross-case analysis which ‘...improves the likelihood of accurate and reliable theory...’ and ‘...enhances the probability of [capturing] the novel findings which may exist in the data...’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 541.). Furthermore, multiple case studies should be preferred because they provide the researcher with ‘...the possibility of direct replication...’ and ‘...expands the generalizability of findings...’ (Yin, 2003, pp. 53.).

3.3. Data Collection

3.3.1. Units of Analysis and Units of Observation

The research focuses on established Dutch national political parties and how these parties deal with the challenges of discontinuities – the LPF and the PVV respectively. So not surprisingly, the established Dutch national political parties are the units of analysis. In order to facilitate cross-case analysis it is evident that the parties to be considered as established had to be active on the national level before the election of the LPF until at least the election of the PVV. An objective measure of such ‘national activity’ is determining whether a party secured deputy seats in Dutch parliament before the 2002 national elections and during the 2006 national elections. So for a party to be considered as “established” it must have secured deputy seats in Dutch parliament both before the 2002 national elections and during the 2006 national elections. Based on this criterion the following parties were eligible to be considered as established;

- The Labor Party; Partij Van De Arbeid; (PVDA)
- The Conservative Liberals; Volkspartij Voor Vrijheid en Democratie; (VVD)
- The Christian – Democrats; Christen-Democratisch Appèl; (CDA)
- The Progressive Liberals; Democraten ‘66; (D66)
- The Green Left Ecologists; GroenLinks; (GL)
- The Socialist Party; Socialistische Partij; (SP)
- The Conservative Christians; ChristenUnie (CU) & Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)

Of these parties the Conservative Christians were not taken into account due to a practical reason. An initial search for data has indicated that in relation to the other parties that are considered to be “established”, only a very limited amount of data could be obtained regarding the reactions of the Conservative Christians regarding especially the LPF. As this apparent lack of data has forgoing limitation for both within-case and cross-case analysis, the Conservative Christians are not taken into account in the research, although they meet the criterion to be considered as established.
While established Dutch national political parties are the units of analysis they are not the units of observation as the reactions of these parties towards the LPF and the PVV respectively will be explored by analyzing statements made by political leaders of these parties regarding the LPF and the PVV respectively. Political leaders of the established parties are the primary entities carrying out the ideology of their party and the standpoints of their party regarding key conflict issues. Therefore these political leaders are well suited as units of observation as they can give insights with regard to how their parties have reacted towards the LPF and the PVV respectively. Figure 3.1. below, presents the established political parties in combination with their party leaders during both the LPF-period and the PVV-period. As the figure shows, in four instances, the political leaders of the established political parties differ in the PVV-period as compared to the LPF – period. Furthermore, it shows that the SP had two political leaders during the LPF-period, as Agnes Kant had taken over the leadership from her predecessor Jan Marijnissen on June 20, 2008.

Figure 3.1. The Established Dutch National Political Parties and Their Political Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established Dutch National Political Parties</th>
<th>Political Leaders During the LPF-Period</th>
<th>Political Leaders During the PVV-Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Ad Melkert</td>
<td>Wouter Bos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Hans Dijkstra</td>
<td>Mark Rutte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan-Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>Jan-Peter Balkenende</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Thom De Graaf</td>
<td>Alexander Peichold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen / Agnes Kant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GroenLinks</td>
<td>Paul Rosenmøller</td>
<td>Femke Halsema</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.2. The Distribution of Data Over Time

As outlined in the above section, political party leaders are the units of analysis as statements of these leaders about the LPF and the PVV respectively will be analyzed in order to determine their parties’ reactions towards these discontinuities. In essence, the aim is to make inferences from statements of political party leaders. In order to do draw valid and reliable inferences, it’s necessary to collect a considerable amount of such statements and as it is not likely that political party leaders make such an amount of statements at any fixed point in time, it is rather straightforward to collect statements that these party leaders made during a given period of time. That is why the above section (and figure) mentions the terms ‘LPF-period’ and ‘PVV-period’. Collecting statements made
during a given period of time does not only enhance the likelihood of collecting a considerable amount of statements, but also enriches within-case analysis with a time dimension, meaning that it is possible to determine whether the reactions of the established political parties towards one particular discontinuity have changed during the course of time.

When selecting time periods to collect data about, it’s essential to select periods for both cases (the LPF and the PVV) which are comparable in order to facilitate cross-case analysis. Therefore for both cases the same events emulate the starting – and end points of the respective periods. The foundation dates of the new entrants was taken as a starting point, while the election dates on which both parties had achieved their most successful results, in terms of voter percentage, were taken as end points of the time period. These particular starting points and end points were taken because they could be determined objectively for both cases. An additional advantage of taking the time period as described above is that it adds the dimension of ‘success’ to within-case analysis, as it is possible to determine whether the reactions of established parties towards the new entrants changed as these new entrants became more successful. The data distribution periods for both cases are shown in figure 3.2. below.

Figure 3.2. Data Distribution Periods For Both the LPF and the PVV

Two important issues need to be stressed out, as they become apparent from the above figure. First of all, the end point to collect data regarding the PVV-case is actually the date of the European Elections in the Netherlands. While these elections were not the most successful for the PVV in terms of secured deputy seats, these elections were the most successful for the PVV in terms of voter percentage secured. Also, while European elections are centered around other issues than national elections, it is plausible to assume that national political issues determined the results at least to some extent. This claim is supported by the PVV being at the top of the national election polls during the time that the national elections were held. So essentially, the reason for selecting the day of the European Elections in the Netherlands as the end date of the PVV – period is that it denotes the most successful result of the PVV during elections up to this date.
Second, the period over which data is collected is considerably shorter for the LPF as it is for the PVV. This is mainly due to the fact that the period of time in which the LPF had reached the heights of its success is substantially shorter than the time period in which the PVV had reached the heights of its success. In fact, the assessed time period for the LPF is more than ten times shorter than the time period for the PVV. However this doesn’t imply that the data collection – consisting of statements made by political leaders – is ten times more extensive for the PVV as it is for the LPF, as will be showed in following sections. Essentially, the difference regarding data distribution periods between the two cases is a direct consequence of selecting starting – and end points that can be assessed objectively for both cases and is therefore taken for granted.

3.3.3. Data Sources

As the political leaders are the units of analysis and it’s the statements that they made during the aforementioned periods that will be analyzed, it’s obvious that such statements need to be collected first to facilitate such analysis. According to Eisenhardt ‘…case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations…’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 534.) Combining data collection methods has an important advantage as ‘… the triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses…’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 538.) However, in this particular research the freedom of choice regarding the methods of data collection is rather limited. A direct observation of the events being studied is not an option since the events being studied occurred in the past, which means that the research involves the analysis of retrospective data. Also, interviewing the persons involved in the events would be a difficult task at hand as it would involve interviews with eleven political party leaders who are difficult to access, especially as some of them retired completely from the political scene. Furthermore interviewing would involve conducting interviews with some of the political leaders about events that took place more than seven years ago (in case of the LPF), which would inherently lead to respondent bias.

The bottom line of the above section is that it would be nearly impossible to collect statements directly from the source (the politicians themselves), instead other sources of the statements made by political leaders regarding the LPF and PVV respectively, need to be considered. In essence, the present research will not combine the kinds of data collection methods as suggested by Eisenhardt, although it will combine data from different data sources of the statements made by political party leaders. The following three sources of such statements have been selected;

1. **Newspaper Articles**

   Newspaper articles were selected as the primary sources of statements made by political leaders as political leaders receive extensive attention on the national press. As research by Kleinnijenhuis et. al. (2003) has shown, since the 2002 national elections there is an ever increasing amount of attention in the national media on political individuals in relation to political parties. Kleinnijenhuis et. al. go even as far as to conclude that the 2002 national elections were the first elections at which the individual politicians instead of political parties had become the centre of attention (Kleinnijnenhuis et al, 2003). However, as the graph in figure 3.3. on the next page shows, the attention for parties in the media remains extensive, although party leaders are clearly the ones receiving the most attention from the press when it comes to political individuals. It appears that party leaders of opposition parties get more attention in the press than the party leaders of the
reigning parties. However, this picture is biased as the political leaders of the reigning parties are very often members of government.

As there’s an increasing amount of attention for political party leaders in the national press it is likely that statements of these party leaders are widely available in national newspapers. This is the main reason for selecting newspaper articles as the primary source of such statements. Newspaper articles were derived from the Lexis-Nexis Academic Database which contains up-to-date articles of five Dutch national newspapers; De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen Dagblad and Het Parool.

With regard to newspaper articles it’s important to recognize the potential occurrence of bias due the interpretation of statements by the journalists of papers or due to the possible tendency of papers to publicize statements of some politicians more often than statements of others. These potential biases can have a substantial effect on the data collection and should therefore not be neglected. Fortunately it is possible to decrease the likelihood of such bias from occurring or to control for such bias. The ways for doing that as applied in this study are explained in the section covering data analysis.

**Figure 3.3. Attention For Political Parties and their Politicians Before the 2002 National Elections**

![Graph showing attention for political parties and their politicians]

*Source: Adapted from Kleinnijenhuis et. al., 2002, pp. 81.*

*The Conservative Christians Were Left out of This Graph*

2. **Transcripts of Speeches**

Transcripts of political speeches of party leaders are inherently full of statements made by these leaders and are therefore potential sources of statements about the cases of interest. Speeches of political leaders collected from the official websites of the established political parties. To create some uniformity across political speeches, only official speeches held during party congresses were taken into account. While these speeches of party leaders are a useful source of data, they will only be used as a secondary source of data, because important statements made during these speeches are very likely to be present in newspaper articles. So in practice, the speech transcripts will be used to control whether the statements as presented in the newspapers are quoted correctly and/or to
provide contextual information that complements the statement as presented in the newspaper articles.

3. **Film Footage of Electoral Debates**

Film footage of electoral debates are particularly useful sources of statements made by political leaders since during these debates there’s a direct interaction between the political party leaders. Film footage of electoral debates was collected from the Uitzendinggemist – database of the Dutch national broadcasting association. Like transcripts of political speeches, film footage of electoral debates is used only as a secondary source of data, since the most important statements made during these debates are likely to be present in the newspaper articles already. So instead of transcribing all debates, the debates are used to control whether politicians are quoted correctly in the newspaper articles and to provide background information about the statements made during these debates. Furthermore, video clips of electoral debates provide an excellent opportunity to illustrate certain claims during the presentation of this study report.

3.3.4. **Data Collection**

Since newspaper articles are the primary source of data, the procedure applied to collect newspaper articles deserves some attention. The retrieval of newspaper articles from the Lexis – Nexis Academic Database is based on the method applied by Kleinnijenhuis et. al. during their analyses of political news in advance of both the National Elections of 2002 and 2006. This method comprises that newspapers sources were identified on the basis of defining so – called ‘kenobjecten’ (in the proceedings of this report the term ‘key objects’ will be used to refer to ‘kenobjecten’) which is an umbrella term referring to political parties, politicians, interest groups and issues which are constantly in the news. As the established political parties are the units of analysis and their political leaders are the units of observation they are to be considered as key objects in this research. Not surprisingly the two new entrant parties – the cases of interest – are key objects as well. Lastly the party leaders of these new entrants – Fortuyn and Wilders – are considered as key objects as these leaders received extensive attention in the press. As the graph in figure 3.3. shows, Fortuyn received far more attention in the press than his party and this effect is also to be expected with regard to Wilders and the PVV. Therefore, considering the political leaders of the cases of interest as key objects is necessary in order to capture relevant statements. Figure 3.4. presents the key objects that were used to collect newspaper articles.

*Figure 3.4. Key Objects Used for Retrieving Newspaper Articles*
In order to retrieve newspaper articles containing statements of the political leaders of the established parties, combination of key objects were used as search queries. This search strategy was applied as it is likely that newspaper articles containing relevant statements contain both the names of the political leader of the established party and either the name of the entrant party or the name of its party leader. For example, if one is searching for a statement that Ad Melkert (the political leader of the PVDA during the LPF – period) made with regard to the LPF, it is logical to search for newspaper articles which contain the query “Melkert” in combination with either the search queries “LPF” or “Fortuyn”. This example illustrates the procedure that is followed, as combinations of abbreviations of political parties and surnames of political party leaders were used as search queries. These search queries were entered within the BOOLEAN search option of the Lexis – Nexis Academic Database, as this search option facilitates combination searches given an entered time period (in this case the LPF – period and the PVV – period respectively as depicted in figure 3.2.). Figure 3.5. below presents the combinations of search queries entered including the number of hits per combination.

Figure 3.5. Combinations of Search Queries for both Cases

As figure 3.5. shows, the 26 combinations of search queries listed a total of 11,421 hits, 2,642 hits for the LPF – case and 8,779 for the PVV – case. The number of hits for the PVV is just about three times the number of hits for the LPF – case, which indicates the extensive attention that the LPF – case received from the press as the data distribution period for the LPF was more ten times shorter than the data distribution period for the PVV. However, this effect may be due to the fact that the LPF –
period was fully staged in the period right before the 2002 National Elections, while the PVV – period combines multiple election times with long periods of non-election time. Expectedly, the press attention for political parties and their leaders is more extensive in right before, during an right after election times than it is during non – election times.

Crucially, the number of hits should not be confused with the number of unique sources as different combinations of search queries could lead to the retrieval of the same source, because it is possible that a single source contains statements of several political leaders. It is even likely that there are numerous sources containing statements from multiple political leaders within a sample of 11,421 hits. So the number of unique sources is expectedly considerably lower than the number of hits. However, there is no need to determine the unique sources at this stage, instead the unique sources will be determined during data analysis phase of the research, described in the following paragraph. For now it should be clear that the 11,421 hits that result from entering the search queries in the Lexis – Nexis Academic Database function as the input of the data analysis process. These hits will be referred to as eligible sources in the proceedings of this report, to indicate that these are the sources that are eligible for further analysis. The exact data analysis procedure will be explained in the following paragraph.

3.4. Data Analysis

3.4.1. Data Analysis Method – The Content Analysis Tool

The data collection will be analyzed by conducting a content analysis. In the context of this research, by content analysis is meant ‘… a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context...’ (Krippendorff, 1980, pp. 21.). So, content analysis as applied throughout this research is used as a tool for processing scientific data and not as an encompassing research design. Content analysis as a tool for data analysis fits within the research design as the aim as the data collection consist of content, content from newspaper articles to be more precise. In essence content analysis as used in this research is a tool for data coding as the primary goal is to code the statements made by the political leaders of established Dutch national parties into the three categories of strategies following from the developed theoretical framework – ignorance, attack and imitation. In order to make such conceptual coding possible, multiple stages of data analysis need to be absolved in a systematically. This data analysis procedure is at the center of attention in the following sub – paragraphs.

3.4.2. The Data Analysis Procedure

In paragraph 3.3.4. it was mentioned that the data collection consists of 11,421 eligible sources, which are by no means unique sources. As the aim is to analyze statements made by political leaders of established political parties regarding the LPF and the PVV respectively, the first objective of data analysis is to retrieve such statements out of the 11,421 eligible sources. This part of the data analysis process involves dismantling the data collection into ever smaller chunks of data, until relevant statements are retrieved. Therefore, this part of the data analysis process can be thought of as a funnel, consisting of four phases where every gap between the phases functions as a filter which can only be passed by chunks of data meeting pre-established criteria. Figure 3.6. on the next page represents the first stage of the data analysis process.
Procedure; Entering Search Queries in the Lexis-Nexis Academic Search Interface

Procedure; Selecting Only Sources in Which Political Party Leaders Are Cited

Result; Lists of All Eligible Sources

Result; Lists of All Sources Containing Statements of Political Party Leaders

Procedure; Selecting and Collecting All Statements Made by Political Leaders

Result; Lists of All Statements Made by Political Leaders

Procedure; Selecting and Collecting All Statements Made by Political Leaders With Regard to LPF-Fortuyn or PVV-Wilders Respectively

Results; Lists of all Statements Made By Political Leaders With Regard to LPF-Fortuyn or PVV-Wilders

**Stage 1: The Pre-Coding Stage**

The top layer of the funnel presented in figure 3.6. comprises the 11,421 eligible sources. Out of these eligible sources only the sources containing statements of political leaders of established parties make it to the second layer of the funnel, the pool of relevant statements. Hereby, for a section to be considered as a statement at least some part of this section needs to be paraphrased as an indication that a politician is quoted. Only those sections where political leaders of established parties are quoted are considered as statements, in case of doubt the section is not considered as a statement and the source containing the section is not eligible for further analysis (unless it contains other statements made by political leaders of the established parties of course). The logic behind the application of paraphrasing as criterion for selecting statements is that it limits the potential bias that could occur by the interpretation of the journalist as paraphrased sections are presumably referring to statements directly quoted by the political leaders of the established parties. The number of relevant sources per query combination and per case are presented in tables 3.1. and 3.2. below. As the tables show, a total of 661 sources were found to be relevant for the LPF – case, while a total of 2,385 sources were found to be relevant for the PVV case, while the relevant sources as a percentage of eligible sources are very similar for both cases.

**Table 3.1. Relevant Sources Per Query Combination for the LPF – Case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Search Query Combination</th>
<th>Eligible Sources</th>
<th>Relevant Sources</th>
<th>Percentage of Relevant Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Ad Melkert</td>
<td>LPF &amp; Melkert</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; Melkert</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>19.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Hans Dijkstra</td>
<td>LPF &amp; Dijkstra</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; Dijkstra</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>25.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>25.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan – Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>LPF &amp; Balkenende</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; Balkenende</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Thom De Graaf</td>
<td>LPF &amp; De Graaf</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; De Graaf</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>29.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>LPF &amp; Marijnissen</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; Marijnissen</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Paul Rosenmöller</td>
<td>LPF &amp; Rosenmöller</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortuyn &amp; Rosenmöller</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Case Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2642</strong></td>
<td><strong>661</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.0 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.2. Relevant Sources Per Query Combination for the PVV – Case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Search Query Combination</th>
<th>Eligible Sources</th>
<th>Relevant Sources</th>
<th>Percentage of Relevant Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Wouter Bos</td>
<td>PVV &amp; Bos</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>24.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wilders &amp; Bos</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>16.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>1722</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>18.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Mark Rutte</td>
<td>PVV &amp; Rutte</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>41.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wilders &amp; Rutte</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>31.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Total</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>34.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After selecting the relevant newspaper sources out of the pool of eligible sources, the next stage is to select the statements from the source in order to get a list of statements eligible for further analysis. Since the total pool of relevant sources consists of 3.046 sources, the manual selection of statements would be a time-consuming task, therefore it is more feasible to use a software package which facilitates qualitative data analysis. In this research the QSR NViVo 8.0 software package is used to conduct the qualitative data analysis. In order to select statements from the relevant sources, the relevant sources need to be entered within the NViVo project. However, in the pool of relevant sources, some sources are presented multiple times, as some sources contain statements made by multiple politicians, this is the issue of unique sources as discussed at the end of the data collection section described in the previous paragraph. In order to prevent sources from being entered multiple times into the NViVo project, before entering relevant sources into the project a check was made to identify the unique sources, by copying all relevant sources into one folder thereby deleting all multiple occurrences of sources. This check for unique sources led to the identification of 360 unique relevant sources for the LPF case and 1.134 unique relevant sources for the PVV case, which makes a total of 1.494 newspaper articles being entered into the NViVo project. Importantly, the sources were entered within the same NViVo project, but per case, meaning that the sources of the LPF case were clearly distinguishable from the sources of the PVV case.

Before the unique relevant sources were implemented within the NViVo project these sources were categorized based on newspaper source in order to provide an initial arrangement of data sources eligible for further analysis. The categorization of unique sources based on newspaper source is presented in Table 3.3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Source</th>
<th>LPF - Case</th>
<th>PVV - Case</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>De Volkskrant</strong></td>
<td>77 (21.4 %)</td>
<td>316 (27.9 %)</td>
<td>393 (26.3 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trouw</strong></td>
<td>81 (22.5 %)</td>
<td>221 (19.5 %)</td>
<td>302 (20.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NRC Handelsblad</strong></td>
<td>101 (28.1 %)</td>
<td>330 (29.1 %)</td>
<td>431 (28.8 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stage 2: The Descriptive Coding Stage

The successful implementation of all unique relevant sources within the NViVo – project marks the beginning of the data codification process. Put simply, data codification is the process by which the data pool consisting of unique sources is sorted in a systematic and standardized way. In practice this means that data is sorted into a set of codes which should be thought of as ‘... tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study...’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994), pp. 56.). While Miles and Huberman talk about codes, other grounded theorists talk about ‘categories’ (Glaser & Straus, 1967), ‘labels’ (Dey, 1993) or ‘themes’ (Ryan & Russell Bernard, 2003). For the purposes of this research these terms are interchangeable. This is also the case regarding the different label’s that are attached to the objects of coding as these are called ‘expression’ (Ryan and Russel Bernard, 2003), ‘incidents’ (Glaser & Straus, 1967), ‘segments’ (Tesch, 1990), thematic units (Krippendorff, 1980), ‘data-bits’ (Dey, 1993) and ‘chunks’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Coding data is important as ‘... without categories, investigators have nothing to describe, nothing to compare and nothing to explain...’ (Ryan & Russell Bernard, 2003, pp. 86.). Data codification is a highly iterative process, ‘... there are as many ways of seeing data as one can invent’ (Dey, pp. 110-111.), and therefore data codification is very reliant on judgments made by the researcher. However, as Ryan & Russell Bernard (2003) denote, descriptions of how researchers come to discover the themes they report in their articles are rarely seen, therefore there is no clarity regarding the judgments made by these researchers, which is a weakness in terms of validity and reliability of constructs. Although ‘...there is no ultimate demonstrations of validity..., if judgments are made explicit and clear, then readers can argue with the researcher’s conclusions... which makes validity more, rather than less likely...’ (Ryan & Russell Bernard, 2003), pp. 103 – 104.). Making judgments explicit and clear is exactly what is the aim of this section and is even more important in the following section, which covers the interpretive coding stage, as more reliant on judgments of the researcher than descriptive coding.

After implementing all unique relevant sources into the NViVo – project, the next stage of the data – analysis process involves the selection of statements present in the sources. This is essentially a process that Ryan and Russell Bernard describe as cutting and sorting which ‘...involves identifying quotes or expressions that seem somehow important and then arranging the quotes/expressions into piles of things that go together...’ (Ryan & Russell Bernard, 2003, pp. 94.). In case of the present research, it’s the statements made by political leaders of the established Dutch political parties that will be cut out of the newspaper articles. As explained earlier, only chunks of text of which at least some part is paraphrased and which are undoubtedly quoted statements of political leaders of established parties are considered as statements. In order to prevent loss of meaning due to cutting statements out of their context, the statement are cut out of their original source with their direct context attached to them. For every statement, the amount of context attached is dependent upon the clarity of meaning of the statement. In other words, if the meaning of the statement is not clear from the statement itself, then it should become clear from the ‘amount’ of context attached to it.
With this approach there is no need to go back-and-forth between statement and source in order to determine the meanings of statements.

In the limited number of events, in which newspaper articles contain semi-structured interviews with political leaders, transcripts of two-party conversations between political leaders or send-in letters of political leaders, chunks of text are selected based on natural shifts occurring in the text. For interviews this means, that every interruption of the interviewer marks the end of a statement. So the answers to unique interview questions are considered as separate statements. For transcripts of two-party conversations, every shift regarding the speaker marks the end of a statement. Lastly, send-in letters of political leaders are considered as one statements, as these letters are devoted to one particular topic. These three principles are applied systematically throughout the complete sample of unique relevant sources.

With the NVivo software package it’s possible to cut and sort statements simultaneously. This sorting of statements involves grouping statements into piles. At this stage of data analysis the statements were coded into the following three categories;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Source</td>
<td>This category indicates in which newspaper the statements have been publicized. This category belongs to the higher-level category of sources, which has been created to allow eventual future analyses of other sources than newspaper sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication Date</td>
<td>This category indicates on which date the statements have been publicized, this data should not be confused with the date on which the statements were actually made. This category is coded on three different levels; year, month and day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement Source</td>
<td>This category indicates which political leader made the statement. This category is coded on two different levels; the party-level and the level of individual politicians. This way of coding allows for eventual additions of other politicians per party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coding of statements into the above three categories involves what Miles & Huberman (1994) call ‘descriptive coding’, referring to a type of coding that requires little interpretation. Clearly, newspaper source, publication date and statement source can be determined with little interpretation. The result of the cutting and sorting of statements are lists of statements made by political leaders, which can be linked to newspaper source and publication date, which makes it possible to make a chronological mapping of statements made by political leaders of the established Dutch national political parties. However, the statements as selected at this stage of data analysis are not necessarily statements regarding the case objects. Therefore the next step of data analysis involves coding for statement relevance, which involves the selection of those statements made by the political leaders which are made regarding the cases of interest – the LPF / Fortuyn – case and PVV / Wilders – case respectively.

Coding for relevance is a process that involves a higher degree of interpretation than coding for newspaper source, publication date and statement source. The coding procedure involves going
through the lists of statements as coded per political leader and determining whether the statements bear any relevance to either the LPF and Fortuyn or the PVV and Wilders. This involves some interpretation as sometimes the statements themselves do not indicate their relevance to the cases of interest while the context surrounding the statement does. Essentially, only those statements were considered as relevant, which were either about the cases of interest or a direct reaction to the cases of interest. For example, for the LPF – case, only those statements were considered to be relevant which stated something about either the LPF or Fortuyn or which stated something in reaction of what either the LPF did or its political leader Fortuyn said.

The actual coding within the NVivo – project is conducted through creating so-called tree nodes, which provide the opportunity to allow further sub-categorization in latter stages of data-analysis. In effect, three head-categories of nodes were made for each case and these head categories were subdivided into sub-categories. In figure 3.7. the coding scheme of the LPF – case is presented in order to illustrate the process of tree coding. In the figure every node with a ‘+’ attached to it, can be subdivided into sub-categories. For example the months can be subdivided into days, and all nodes representing political parties can be subdivided in the same way as the PVDA. The coding scheme for the PVV – case is similar but more extensive as the coding scheme presented below, as the PVV – case involves a longer time span and one more political leader in the person of Agnes Kant of the SP.

*Figure 3.7. Data Analysis – Stages Before Conceptual Coding*
The outcome of the descriptive coding stage is a pool of relevant statements, in other words, statements regarding the cases of interest. The distribution of the retrieved pool of relevant statements across established political parties and political leaders are presented in tables 3.4. and 3.5. As the tables show, 328 statements were coded as relevant for the LPF – case and 575 statements were coded as relevant for the PVV – case, which brings the total of relevant statements at 903. These 903 statements are the input of the next stage of data analysis, the interpretive coding stage, described in the following section.

Table 3.4. Distribution of Relevant Statements Across Established Political Parties and Their Political Leaders for the LPF-Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Total Statements</th>
<th>Relevant Statements</th>
<th>Percentage of Relevant Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Ad Melkert</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Hans Dijkstra</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>28,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan – Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Tom de Graaf</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Paul Rosenmoller</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1051</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,2%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5. Distribution of Relevant Statements Across Established Political Parties and Their Political Leaders for the PVV-Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Total Statements</th>
<th>Relevant Statements</th>
<th>Percentage of Relevant Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Wouter Bos</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Mark Rutte</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan – Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>22,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Alexander Pechtold</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>28,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agnes Kant</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Femke Halsema</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>23,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2953</strong></td>
<td><strong>575</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,5%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage 3: The Interpretive Coding Stage

The third stage of data analysis is the final coding stage and the stage where the data are being linked to theory. More precisely, the aim at this stage is to identify themes from the pool of relevant statements, as these statements themselves have no meaning without some reference to themes. In this research three themes have already been identified a priori. These themes are the three strategies that follow from the theoretical framework – ignorance, attack and imitation. Clearly, looking for the three a priori defined strategies is in essence a search for what Ryan and Russel Bernard (2003) call ‘theory-related material’. Identifying such theory – related material involves what Miles and Huberman (1994) call ‘interpretive coding’, Ryan and Russell Bernard (2003) call ‘meta-coding’ and Krippendorff (1980) calls ‘latent coding’. All these labels refer to a coding procedure that is highly determined by the interpretation of the researcher. Therefore for such interpretive coding, making the judgments of the researcher explicit and clear is even more important than in case of descriptive coding and this section will outline the interpretive coding procedure, thereby explaining constructs, categories and criteria for category membership.
Before going into greater depth regarding the interpretive coding procedure one important remark needs to be made with regard to the identification of themes. While the main goal is to identify the three a priori developed theory-based themes in the pool of relevant statements, the interpretive coding process is an open one, meaning that possible not a priori defined themes that emerge from the pool of relevant statements are taken into consideration for further analysis. Recalling the relevance of the research as stated in the introduction part of this report illustrates why it’s important to not only look for a priori defined themes. There it is stated that the research is relevant because an exploration of the application of discontinuous innovation concepts could lead to valuable knowledge with regard to the opportunities and limits of the applicability of discontinuous innovation terminology to other fields than the private and public sector. This exploration is undertaken by identifying the three strategies within the pool of relevant statements. However, in the introduction part it is also stated that vice versa this research study might also provide insights from the Dutch national political sphere that might be applicable to the private sector and public sector as well, thereby potentially contributing to or even enriching the existing insights within discontinuous innovation literature. In order to make this possible, the coding process needs to be open for themes emerging from the data pool. Furthermore, an open coding procedure counteracts the tendency of researchers to find only what they are looking for, a tendency that is especially common when researchers are looking for theory-related material only (Ryan & Russell Bernard, 2003).

### Coding for A Priori Theory-related Themes

The first step in coding statements into a fixed set of a priori themes is to define the constructs. In table 3.6., on the next page, the definitions as stated within the theoretical framework are provided in the second column. In order to assign statements to these strategies, they need to be operationalized in a way that makes them identifiable within the pool of relevant sources. The operational definitions of the strategies are provided in column three of table 3.6.. As this column shows, the ignorance strategy is operationalized as a rather passive strategy where the established political party believes it doesn’t have to react in order to deal with the new entrant successfully. The attack strategy on the other hand is operationalized as a highly reactive strategy, where the established political party believes it needs to differentiate itself from the new entrant by making negative judgments about the new entrant. Lastly, the imitation strategy is also operationalized as a reactive strategy, where the established political party believes that imitation of the new entrant is the way to deal with the new entrant successfully.

A key characteristic of political statements is that they tend to involve a great deal of metaphors and analogies. Therefore it’s nearly impossible to code statements into the theory-related themes, based on semantic characteristics of the statements. Instead subthemes were identified per strategy in order to facilitate coding of statements into these strategies. The identified subthemes are listed in column four of table 3.6. and examples of typical outings of these subthemes are presented in column five of the table. An important question with regard to the identification of sub-themes is when to stop adding sub-themes? The concept of ‘theoretical saturation’ helps to answer this question. Eisenhardt defines theoretical saturation as ‘... the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before...’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 545.). So when coding data into sub-themes, one should answer the question; Is the statement something seen before or is it something fundamentally different? Once it is determined that the statement is something fundamentally different, one still needs to determine whether the statement
qualifies as a subtheme of the a priori defined theory – related themes or whether it is a ‘new’ theme which emerges out of the data pool.

In essence, the process of coding data into the three a priori themes is a process of determining to which subtheme or outings of subthemes a statement is analogous. Put simply, coding statements into themes involves answering the question; What is this expression an example of? This is not to say that the coding procedure is straightforward and immune to debate. However table 3.6.. at least makes explicit the judgments which are the foundation of the coding procedure, thereby clarifying the coding procedure. In this way, readers can at least argue with the conclusions of the researcher, thereby encouraging a debate.

Table 3.6. Operationalization of A Priori Defined Theory – Related Themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Theoretical Definition</th>
<th>Operational Definition</th>
<th>Subthemes Identified Within Data Pool of Relevant Statements</th>
<th>Examples of Outings of Subthemes Identified Within Data Pool of Relevant Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Ignorance Strategy** | The established national political party ignores the new entrant and focuses on its own way of doing things. | Every statement in which the political leader of an established party ignores the new entrant. | • Believe in Own Capabilities | • ‘We can deal with the new entrant if we focus on our own party’.  
(‘Peilingen moet je relateren. En gewoon je eigen koers houden houden zegt hij ferm, ook ten opzichte van Wilders’ – Wouter Bos in Het Parool) |
|                    |                        |                        | • Believe in Failure of the New Entrant                     | • ‘The new entrant will shoot itself in the foot eventually’.  
(‘Maar Fortuyn heeft nu twee maanden om zichzelf in de voet te schieten’ – Jan Marijnissen in De Volkskrant) |
|                    |                        |                        | • Having faith in the Voter                                | • ‘The voter will choose us when it really matters’.  
(Maar men geeft aan dat men niet is uitgekeken op de gevestigde politiek. Laat staan dat men ‘de samenleving van Wim Kok’ wil inruilen voor die van Pim Fortuyn. De PVDA moet dus meer ‘naar de mensen toe’ – Ad Melkert in NRC Handelsblad) |
| **Attack Strategy** | The established national political party develops a new way of doing things that differs from the entrant’s way of doing things in order to disrupt the entrant’s way of doing things. | Every statement in which the political leader of an established party makes negative judgments about the new entrant party, its leader or other party members. | • Personal Attack; All kinds of blaming, accusing, reprimanding and discrediting the party leader and / or other party members of the new entrants. | • ‘The party leader of the new entrant is a political charlatan’.  
(‘GroenLinks-leider Femke Halsema noemt haar PVV-collega Geert Wilders een politieke kwakzalver en een charlatan’ – Femke Halsema in De Volkskrant) |
### Identifying and Coding For Emergent Themes

There are several ways to identify emergent themes from a pool of data. According to Ryan and Russell Bernard research tend to look for; (1) repetitions, (2) indigenous typologies or categories, (3) metaphors and analogies, (4) transitions, (5) similarities and differences, (6) linguistic connectors, (7) missing data and (8) theory – related material (Ryan & Russell Bernard, pp. 88 – 94.). A combination of these techniques is applied to identify themes emerging from the data pool. First of all, searching for similarities and differences between statements makes it possible to identify themes that do not fit within the a priori defined themes. If a statement does not fit into one of these three themes, meaning that is not analogous with one of the sub-themes of these overarching themes and it can’t be added as a new sub-theme of the overarching themes, then it possibly indicates the presence of a new theme. Possibly, because not every statement that doesn’t fit into the a priori defined themes represents an emergent theme. This is where the search for repetitions comes into the picture, meaning that the same type of statement need to occur multiple times in the data pool in order to qualify as a new theme, and the more often it occurs throughout the data pool, the more likely it is a theme. However, determining a minimum number of repetitions of a type of statement to qualify as a new theme would be an arbitrary act. Also repetitions of a type of statement made by a political party leader by other party leaders is not a reliable criterion to for identifying new themes, as themes idiosyncratic for one party can be a theme of its own. In other words, a strategy that apparently only one party applies, can still be a valid strategy and an important piece of information.

Conclusively, the identification of new themes that emerge from the pool of relevant statements is a highly iterative process, determined by the judgment of the researcher. Table 3.7. on the next page presents the three themes that have been identified out of the data pool – isolation, the neutral stance and attacking others. An important issue that should receive attention is how it is determined that these themes are overarching themes rather than sub-themes of the a priori defined themes, which they might appear to be at first sight. To start, the ‘isolation – theme’ may seem to be a type of ignorance – because the established political party rules out future cooperation with the new
entrant, it can simply ignore it. However, that is not the case, as isolation is a reactive strategy — ruling out future cooperation with a new entrant party is clearly a reaction towards this new entrant party — while ignorance as defined a priori is a passive strategy. Furthermore, while isolation may seem a type of attack strategy, it isn’t as the isolation strategy is not a negative reaction towards the new entrant per se. Established parties simply rule out future collaboration because they assume that the differences between their party and the new entrant are irreconcilable.

The ‘attacking others’ theme may at first glance seem like a type of attack strategy, as criticizing involves making negative judgments about others. However, the attack strategy as a priori define, involves attack towards the new entrant, while the attacking others theme involves an attack towards other established parties. So the attacking others theme is distinguished as a separate theme because the object of attack differs from the a priori defined attack strategy. Lastly, the neutral stance theme is distinguished as a theme because it clearly doesn’t fit into the a priori defined themes. It is not ignorance, as it is an active stance, it is nor attack, as it doesn’t have a negative connotation and it is not imitation of the new entrant.

Table 3.7. An Overview of Themes That Emerged During the Course of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples Outings of Emergent Themes Within the Data Pool of Relevant Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>The established national political party rules out future cooperation with the new entrant party.</td>
<td>‘We cannot cooperate with the new entrant party as the differences between our parties are to fundamental’. ('Een regering met de PVV is voor ons geen optie. Daarvoor zijn ze veel te liberaal en bovendien willen ze een discriminatorend beleid. Daar werken wij niet aan mee – Agnes Kant in De Volkskrant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Stance</td>
<td>The established national political party is non-committal and is not willing to rule out cooperation with the new entrant party.</td>
<td>‘We are not ruling out any possible coalition parties’. ('Maar het is gek om partijen uit te sluiten voordat de kiezer heeft gesproken.' – Jan Peter Balkenende in NRC Handelsblad).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacking Others</td>
<td>The established national political party criticizes reactions of other established parties towards the new entrant.</td>
<td>‘U, as the leader of an established party, should know better than to cooperate with a new entrant party’. ('Balkenende heeft de onvrede van Pim Fortuyn zijn onvrede genoemd. Daarmee zit hij aan de verkeerde kant van de lijn, aldus Melkert. De CDA-leider zou meer naar de huidige problemen en minder naar de toekomst moeten kijken' – Ad Melkert in Trouw).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the themes emerging from the data pool are distinguished as overarching themes, that doesn’t mean that they are not related to the a priori defined themes. One can derive a typology of all themes by means of the chart as presented in figure 3.8. on the next page. In this typology the first step is to determine whether there is an active reaction or not. If there is no reaction from the established party at all, then that should be considered as an outing of the ignorance strategy. If there is a reaction towards the new entrant than the second step is to determine whether this reaction is aimed (directly) at the new entrant only or not. If the reaction of the established party is not aimed directly at the new entrant than the reaction is either an outing of the neutral stance or
the attacking others strategy. The neutral stance is not directly aimed at the new entrant as it involves leaving open all options regarding collaboration with all parties. The attacking others strategy on the other hand is not directly aimed at the new entrant but at one or more of the established parties. If the reaction is directed towards the new entrant only, than the final step is to determine whether this reaction is accommodative or not – simply stated, is the reaction towards the new entrant seemingly positive or not? Obviously, the attack strategy and the isolation strategy represent reaction strategies of established parties which are not accommodative. The imitation strategy on the other hand can be qualified as an accommodative strategy.

The dotted arrows between some of the themes represent possible relationships between the themes. Attack, for example could lead to isolation, after attacking the new entrant the established party might have come to the conclusion that it should not waste any time or resources anymore on attacking the new entrant. Instead it could make a strong statement by ruling out future collaboration with the new entrant. Isolation on the other hand could lead to ignorance, if an established party rules out future collaboration with the new entrant anyway, than why would it react towards to new entrant at all? The attack strategy could also lead to the attacking others strategy, if the direct attack of the new entrant doesn’t seem to work an established party can attempt to attack other established parties with regard to their reaction towards the new entrant. However, this logic can also be reversed, as the attacking others strategy might lead to the attack strategy. If attacking others doesn’t work, the established party could attempt to attack the new entrant directly. Lastly, the neutral stance might lead to ignorance, if the established party is not shutting out any possible collaboration partners beforehand, then why should it bother to react to new entrants beforehand?

*Figure 3.8. A Typology of all Themes*
To recap on the coding procedure, the pool of relevant statements is coded into the three a priori defined themes and the three themes that emerged during the course of analysis. So statements made by political leaders are cut and sorted into six piles of themes. This means that it is possible to analyze how the statements of a politician are distributed across these themes. However some statements were made regarding the case objects but could not be coded into the a priori defined themes nor the emergent themes. The proportion of the relevant statements that could be coded into the six themes for both the LPF and the PVV respectively are presented in tables 3.8. and 3.9. below. From these tables it follows that regarding the LPF – case, a total of 253 statements were coded into one of the six themes, while regarding the PVV – case a total of 420 statements were coded into one of the six themes. This brings the total of statements coded into themes to 673 statements. These total of statements does not represent the number of unique relevant statements as some statements are published in multiple newspapers, on multiple points in time or a combination of both. However no correction for unique statements was made, instead it was assumed that statements occurring multiple times in the newspapers are more important than statements occurring only once in the newspapers. Therefore statements occurring multiple times were assigned a weight-factor, which corresponds with the frequency of their occurrence.

Table 3.8. Distribution of Coded Statements Across Established Political Parties and Their Political Leaders for the LPF-Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Relevant Statements</th>
<th>Coded Statements</th>
<th>Percentage of Coded Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Ad Melkert</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>81.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Hans Dijkstal</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan – Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Tom de Graaf</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Paul Rosenmöller</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>90.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
<td><strong>253</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.2 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9. Distribution of Coded Statements Across Established Political Parties and Their Political Leaders for the PVV-Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>Relevant Statements</th>
<th>Coded Statements</th>
<th>Percentage of Coded Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVDA</td>
<td>Wouter Bos</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Mark Rutte</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Jan – Peter Balkenende</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>59.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Alexander Pechtold</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>78.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Jan Marijnissen</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>83.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Agnes Kant</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Femke Halsema</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>575</strong></td>
<td><strong>420</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.0 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stage 4: Within – Case Analysis

By making combinations between descriptive coding results and interpretive coding results one can determine when a political leader made a statement, in which newspaper and to which theme this statement belongs. This makes it possible to analyze the similarities and differences in strategy that the established political parties pursued in reaction to the new entrant parties, per new entrant party. Furthermore it is possible to determine whether similarities and differences between established parties might be related to similarities and differences in these established parties’ motivation to respond and/or ability to respond. This, in essence is a process of within – case analysis, meaning that at this stage of data – analysis the LPF – case and the PVV – case are treated as stand-alone entities. The core importance of within-case analysis is that ‘... it allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to generalize patterns across cases...’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 540.). The outcome of within – case analysis involves two case study reports representing the findings per case.

Stage 5: Cross – Case Analysis

Cross – case analysis is the stage directly coupled to within – case analysis and involves looking for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences. Cross – case analysis is essential as it ‘... improves the likelihood of accurate and reliable theory... and ... enhances the probability that investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data...' (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 541.). The aim of cross-case analysis is to address the similarities and differences between the two cases of interest with regard to how the established parties reacted towards the LPF and the PVV respectively and possible explanations for their reactions. For example, cross-case analysis makes it possible to determine whether D66 reacted similarly or differently towards the LPF than it did towards the PVV. Furthermore cross-case analysis makes it possible to determine possible theoretical explanations for the similarity of difference in reaction. Suppose that D66 reacted differently regarding the PVV than it did towards the LPF, than this possible difference in reaction might be explained by difference in D66’s motivation to respond and/or ability to respond. The outcome of cross-case analysis involves one case-study report presenting cross-case findings.

Stage 6: Addressing the Theoretical Implications of Findings

From the within-case analysis and cross-case analysis overall impressions and results and possible even relationships between concepts emerge. In other words the theoretical implications of findings become clear and its possible to address the research questions. With regard to the research this entails that at this stage, one can address the applicability of discontinuous innovation concepts, theories and strategies to the Dutch national political sphere. A key feature of addressing the theoretical implications of findings is to compare the emergent concepts and possible relationships with existing literature. Comparing the emergent concepts and possible relationships to existing literature is important as ‘... it enhances the internal validity, generalizability and theoretical level of theory-building from case study research...’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 545.). Essentially this stage of data analysis represents the final step towards the theoretical level, the outcomes of this stage are presented in the discussion section of this report.

To recap this paragraph, figure 3.9. on the following page presents an overview of the complete data-analysis process.
Figure 3.9. The Data Analysis Process
4. Case Study Report – LPF

In this chapter the results regarding the LPF – case will be presented. The structure of the chapter is rather straightforward. In the first paragraph the distribution of statements across time is presented in order to illustrate how the statements made by political leaders of the established parties which made the newspapers are distributed across the total time period between the 14th of February and the 15th of May 2002. The second paragraph illustrates how the statements made by these political leaders are distributed across the three a priori defined and three emergent themes. In the third paragraph the time dimension is linked to the distribution across themes, thereby assessing whether and how the strategies parties applied towards the LPF have changed during the course of time. In essence, the first paragraph focuses on the outcomes of the descriptive coding process, the second paragraph focuses on the outcomes of the interpretive coding process, while the third paragraph links these outcomes together. While the first three paragraph describe how the established political parties have reacted towards the LPF, in the fourth paragraph it will be assessed why these parties may have reacted in the way they reacted. Bringing the motivation to respond and ability to respond into the equation makes it possible to determine whether parties reacted in the way one should would have expected based on their positioning in the multi-dimensional issue space. The chapter will conclude with paragraph five, which presents a within-case conclusion highlighting the most noteworthy findings.

4.1. The Distribution of Statements Across Time

Graph 4.1. below presents the distribution of statements for all parties for the total period between February 14 2002 and May 15 2002. In the following section where the distribution of statements will be discussed, frequent references to graph 4.1. will be made to illustrate claims.
When considering the distribution of statements per month starting with February 2002, the first observation that follows from graph 4.1. is that the number of statements in the month of February is rather limited in comparison with other months. In fact, only 5.1% of the total sample of statements were present in the newspapers in February 2002. For the CDA (2.1%) and the PVDA (1.8%) this percentage is even lower, while no statements of the SP and GroenLinks were published in the newspapers in the month of February. D66 and the PVDA were the most ‘active’ in terms of the number of statements made in February, with 9.1% of all statements of D66 and 13.9% of all statements of the PVDA being made in the month of February. It should be remarked that February may be the month in which the least number of statements were made, because it is only taken into account from the 14th and onwards.

In contrast to February 2002, March 2002 is the month in which the most statements of the political leaders of the established parties were made. The most likely reason for this is that March was the month in which the municipal elections in the Netherlands were held. Especially the political leaders of the PVDA and the VVD were ‘present’ in the press in March as 49.2% of all statements of the PVDA and 63.2% of all statements of the VVD occurred in the newspapers in this month. At the 2006 municipal elections these two parties were among the biggest losers in the city of Rotterdam and it may be due to this loss and its aftermath that Ad Melkert and Hans Dijkstal reacted so extensively to Fortuyn in the month of March. For the SP the percentage of statements made in March (92.9%) was even greater than for the VVD and PVDA, although this result may be attributable to the relatively limited number of total statements made by the SP in comparison to other parties. On the 23rd of March an interview with Jan Marijnissen was published in Trouw, and the statements made in this interview account for the far majority of statements made by the SP in the total period.

Compared to March 2002, April 2002 can be denoted as a relatively quite month with regard to statements made by political leaders occurring in the press as only 13.8% of all statements were published in the newspapers in this month. The number of statements made by the respective political leaders of all parties declined in April 2002 compared to March 2002 and this decline has been greater for the parties experiencing their peaks in the number of statements in March than for the parties experiencing their peak in the May. A remarkable case in this sense is the VVD, for which the number of statements made by Dijkstal declined from 36 in March to only 2 in April. In general, April 2002 can be considered as the calm before the storm arising in May 2002.

Although May 2002 is only taken into account until the date of the national elections in the Netherlands on the 15th, a considerable share of 35.2% of all statement were published in the newspapers in this month. This percentage could have been even higher had the parties not agreed to suspend their campaign activities after the murder of Fortuyn on the 6th of May 2002. Three parties – the CDA, GroenLinks and D66 – were the most active in the month of May in terms of the number statements occurring in the press. In this month Balkenende made 44.7% of all statements of the CDA, De Graaf made 59.1% of all statements of D66 and Rosenmöller made 50.0% of all statements of GroenLinks. For all parties, with the exception of the SP, the number of statements made in May increased in comparison to the number of statements made in April and this increase was greater for the parties experiencing their peaks regarding the number of statements in May 2002 than for the parties experiencing their peaks in March 2002.
Conclusively, with regard to the distribution of statements across time, two common patterns can be observed. Firstly, three parties reach their peak regarding the number of codable statements present in the newspapers in March 2002 – the PVDA, the VVD and the SP. Second, three parties reach their peak regarding the number of codable statements present in the newspapers in May 2002 – the CDA, GroenLinks and D66. Not surprisingly, most statements were made by political leaders of the established parties during election time – the periods just before and after elections. An interesting finding hereby is that for the PVDA and the VVD – the two largest former coalition parties of the Purple Government – the municipal elections marked the time period in which the most of their statements regarding the LPF made the press.

4.2. The Distribution of Statements Across Themes
Graph 4.2. below presents the distribution of statements across themes for all parties for the time period between the 14th of February and the 15th of May 2002. This is the graph that will be referred to throughout the following section.

The first and perhaps most striking finding represented in graph 4.2. is the observation of the attack-theme as the dominant theme for all parties. For the PVDA, the VVD, the CDA and GroenLinks the percentage of statements assigned to the attack-theme lies between 75-80% range. For the SP this percentage is slightly higher, but as already explained in the previous section, this result may be due to the limited number of statements of the SP in comparison to other parties. The only exception to the rule is D66, were the attack-theme is the dominant theme, but the percentage of statements attributed to the attack-theme(59,1%) lies at least 15% lower than the same percentage for other parties.
When considering the number of strategies applied by parties, one can observe differences with regard to the number of identified themes (and hence strategies applied by the established parties towards the LPF) per party. While the statements of the PVDA and the VVD were assigned to four different themes, the statements of the CDA and D66 were assigned to three themes and the statements of the SP and GroenLinks were assigned to two themes only. There is no party of which the statements were coded into one theme only, which means that one could state that the statements of all parties were coded into a portfolio of themes, with this portfolio of themes differing for parties in terms of the number of themes and the type of themes. The differences regarding the portfolios between parties can be illustrated further by assessing the results presented in graph 4.3. While graph 4.2. shows the distribution of statements across themes per party, graph 4.3. shows the distribution of themes across parties.

As visible in graph 4.3., only statements of the PVDA, VVD and SP were assigned to the ignorance-theme with more than half of the ignorant statements stemming from the VVD. Statements of all parties were assigned to the attack theme, with most statements coded into this theme being attributable to the PVDA. A remarkable finding with regard to the distribution of themes is that no statement was assigned to the imitation-theme, which is interesting as the imitation-theme is one of the a priori defined theory-related themes. This finding is important as it may indicate that the established parties did not apply the imitation strategy towards the LPF. This section does not demark the right place to make such claims though, so for this moment the absence of the imitation-theme means that no statements made by political leaders of the established parties were found which matched the narrative structures defined for the imitation-theme in table 3.6.. The possible implications of this finding will be addressed in the discussion part of this report.
absence of statements assigned to the imitation-theme. This is an interesting result as the imitation-theme is one of the a priori defined theory-related themes. While this observation might seem surprising at first, it is important to interpret the results in a nuanced fashion as first and foremost the results indicate that no statements made by political leaders of the established parties which were published in the newspapers in the relevant time period matched the narrative structures regarding the imitation-theme which were derived in table 3.6. presented in the previous chapter. So in essence, the fact of the matter is that no statements were found to represent the imitation-theme as defined in the light of the present research. Possible explanations for and implications of this finding will be provided in the discussion section of this report. Statements of D66 were assigned the most frequently to the isolation-theme followed by the PVDA and the VVD while only statements of the CDA and VVD were coded into the neutral theme, with three-quarters of these statements originating from the CDA. Lastly, statements of four parties – the PVDA, CDA, D66 and GroenLinks – were assigned to the attacking-others theme, meaning that after attack it is the strategy applied the most by the established parties towards the LPF. Nearly half of these attacking others statements were made by Paul Rosenmöller of GroenLinks.

Overall, the most important observation with regard to the distribution of statements across themes is the prominence of the attack-theme throughout the sample, with 76.3% of all statements being coded into the attack-theme. The second theme on the list on considerable distance from the attack-theme is the attacking others-theme with 10.3% of all statements being assigned to that theme. The ignorance-theme and neutral-theme both account for 4.7% of the sample, while the isolation-theme account for 4.0%. The imitation-theme is the least prominent theme across the sample as of the 253 statements made in total regarding the LPF, none was coded assigned to the imitation-theme.

4.3. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time

In the previous two paragraphs the focus has been on the distribution of statements across time and the distribution of statements across themes. In this paragraph these two dimensions will be combined in order to assess how the distribution of statements across themes per party evolved over time – per month to be more precise. This linking of the time dimension with the distribution of statements across themes is conform the second sub-research question which poses the question whether and how the strategies applied by the established parties towards the new entrant have changed during the course of time. While in the previous paragraphs, graphs encompassing all parties were depicted to illustrate key findings, with regard to the distribution of statements across themes across time, it is infeasible to present an encompassing graph covering all parties as that would involve an overly complex graph. Therefore, the distribution of statements across themes across time is presented per party in six separate graphs, graphs 4.4. – 4.9. presented on the next page. Based on these graphs, in the following sections, the distribution of statements across themes across time will be assessed per party, concluded by a section in which the results per party will be compared to derive possible common trends.
4.3.1. PVDA

As visible in graph 4.4., for February 2002 the statements of the PVDA were assigned to two themes – ignorance and attack. While the attack-theme is the dominant theme in February, the percentage assigned to the ignorance-theme is considerable. In fact, it is the highest percentage of statements assigned to the ignorance-category throughout the sample. This illustrates that the PVDA may have ignored the LPF in the month of February to a greater extent than other parties did. A typical statement of Ad Melkert assigned coded into the ignorance-theme made in February is the following.

“\textit{I only compete against parties which make clear choices within their election programs and which take part in the electoral debate}”

“\textit{Ik strijd tegen partijen die duidelijke keuzes maken in hun programma, die deelnemen aan het ‘verkiezingsdebat’}.” – Ad Melkert in Trouw, Feb 18 2002

This statement illustrates that Melkert did not consider the LPF as a genuine party in February and therefore reckoned that the PVDA did not have to compete with it. Interestingly though, the most cited statement of Melkert is a statement which was first published two days earlier and is assigned to the attack-theme, this statement may illustrate that while the PVDA may have been more ignorant towards the LPF in the month of February than other parties, attack has been the most prominent strategy in that month.

\textit{‘Netherlands wake up!’}

“\textit{Nederland word wakker!’}” – Ad Melkert in Trouw, Feb 16 2002

In March 2002, the attack-theme remained dominant, the ignorance-theme lost ground and the attacking others-theme and isolation-theme came into the picture. The isolation-theme refers to two quotes where Melkert rules out any future cooperation with the LPF, while the attacking others-theme refers to Melkert calling up the CDA to stop what he called ‘flirting’ with the LPF. In fact all attacking others statements were fully aimed at the CDA in March 2002.

In April 2002, statements assigned to the ignorance-theme had disappeared, the attack theme remained dominant and the isolation-theme and attacking-others theme remained represented. While the number of quotes in April had decreased substantially compared to the number of quotes in March, there is one interesting quote by Melkert, made in April. This statement is particularly interesting because it illustrates the shift towards a more personal attack by the PVDA in comparison to the statements made in February and the beginning of March. In the statement below Melkert compares the person Fortuyn to well-known French extremist politician Jean-Marie Le Pen.

\textit{Melkert makes a comparison between Le Pen and Fortuyn. ‘They are different persons with different programs, but they appeal to the same feeling’}

\textit{Melkert maakte een vergelijking tussen Le Pen en Fortuyn. ‘Het zijn andere mensen met andere programma’s, maar ze appellen aan hetzelfde gevoel’}.

– Ad Melkert in De Volkskrant, Apr 25 2002

Lastly, in May 2002 all statements were assigned to the attack-theme, but these statements are mostly statements made by Melkert in earlier stages re-occurring in the newspapers after Fortuyn’s murder on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May.
4.3.2. VVD

As illustrated by graph 4.5., in February 2002 all statements of the VVD were assigned to the attack-theme, although this refers to the only statement being made by Dijkstal in February. The more definite first reaction of the VVD towards the LPF came in the month of March in which Dijkstal made a mix of neutral, attacking and ignorant statements. The ignorant statements mainly relate to Dijkstal openly considering the LPF as a ‘hype which will pass’. The neutral statements refer to Dijkstal not ruling out any possible collaboration partners in March. The attacking statements are dominant in March and focus on criticizing Fortuyn’s policy plans and do not involve personal attacks. The most cited attacking statements of Dijkstal in this month refers to the LPF either lacking policy plans or having ‘bizarre’ and ‘insane’ policy plans. The statement below is a typical example of the attacking statements made by Dijkstal in March.

But he had also identified ‘bizarre and ridiculous plans’. An example is Fortuyn’s proposition to discharge the entire land force and air force, while reinstating the military service. Dijkstal: ‘In that case, the boats of the navy will be full to the brim with poor military servants’.


While the attacking statements made by Dijkstal were policy oriented in March 2002, this changes in April and May 2002 where the attack-theme remains the dominant theme. In May 2002 Dijkstal personally attacks Fortuyn by classifying Fortuyn’s politics as ‘megaphone – politics’. He also called Fortuyn an ‘irresponsible statesman’ and denoted him as ‘a combination between Janmaat and Dewinter’, both considered to be extreme-right politicians. The connotation of this statements is very similar to the connotation of Melkert’s statement cited above, which can also be said about the timing of Dijkstal’s statement.

4.3.3. CDA

Similar to the VVD, the first serious reaction of the CDA regarding the LPF came in March 2002. As illustrated by graph 4.6., in every month from February to May 2002, the attack-theme is the dominant theme. There is one key difference between the attacking statements of Balkenende compared to the attacking statements of Melkert and Dijkstal though. While Melkert and Dijkstal focused their attacking statement more and more on the person Fortuyn in the period starting after the municipal elections in the Netherlands, the attacking statements of Balkenende regarding the LPF are policy-oriented throughout the total time period. While Balkenende refers to the person Fortuyn in most of his statements characteristics of the person Fortuyn are never the object of his critique. In fact one could claim that compared to Melkert and Dijkstal, Balkenende’s statements are very pliant. The statement below is a typical illustration of the policy-oriented and pliant statements that Balkenende made throughout the total time period.

In his opinion, it’s disappointing that Fortuyn’s solutions tend to reflect the market-oriented thinking of the Purple Government. ‘He [Fortuyn] has chosen to adopt the governmental renewal plans of D66, the interventionist approach of the PVDA and the market-oriented thinking of the VVD.’
Hij vindt het teleurstellend dat de oplossingen van Fortuyn vooral het paarse marktdenken weerspiegelen. ‘Hij kiest voor de bestuurlijke vernieuwing van D66, het overheidsingrijpen van de PVDA en het marktdenken van de VVD,’ aldus Balkenende. – Jan-Peter Balkenende in Het Parool, Mar 14 2002

What differentiates the CDA from all other parties regarding their respective reactions towards the LPF is Balkenende’s relatively frequent proclamation of neutral statements, especially in March and April 2002. An illustration of the type of neutral statements that Balkenende made in those months is the statement below, in which Balkenende clearly states that he is not ruling out future cooperation with the LPF.

Balkenende emphasized that he doesn’t agree with Fortuyn regarding a lot of issues, for example Fortuyn’s unwillingness to invest in education and healthcare. “That is the method of the blunt axe. But it is silly to rule out parties before the voter has spoken”.

Balkenende benadrukte dat hij het op veel punten met Fortuyn oneens is, zoals het nalaten van investeringen in onderwijs en zorg. “Dat is de methode van de botte bijl. Maar het is gek om partijen uit te sluiten voordat de kiezer heeft gesproken”.

– Balkenende in NRC Handelsblad, Apr 25 2002

Lastly, the most notable observation in May 2002, is the appearance of the attacking others-theme, which refers to one statement made by Balkenende in which he accuses the PVDA making invalid claims with regard to the policy plans of Fortuyn. This statement could be interpreted as a counter-attack towards the PVDA’s accusations of Balkenende ‘flirting’ with Fortuyn too much.

4.3.4. D66

The most sticking observation that follows from graph 4.7. is the observation that the months of February and April 2002 are completely dominated by the attacking others-theme. This is interesting because for all other parties, in all months that their respective political leaders made statements, the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy. For D66 however, the month of May is the only month in which the attack-theme has been the most dominant theme. While the attacking others statements of Melkert were aimed at Balkenende, the attacking-others statements of De Graaf are aimed at both Balkenende and Dijkstal. A qualitative analysis of De Graaf’s statements indicate that during the course of time his attacking others statements shift from being aimed at Balkenende to being aimed at Dijkstal. In February 2002, all attacking others statements of De Graaf were aimed at Balkenende while in April 2002, all of these statements were aimed at Dijkstal.

Considering of De Graaf which were assigned to the isolation-theme illustrates that the isolative statements of De Graaf are more definite than the isolative statements of Melkert and Dijkstal. While Melkert and Dijkstal’s isolative statements are mainly about them not seeing more barriers than possibilities to cooperate with Fortuyn, De Graaf’s repeteedly that there is no chance of his party cooperating with Fortuyn. Interestingly, De Graaf was the first political leader to rule out future cooperation with Fortuyn, as he made the following isolative statements in as early as March.

De Graaf cannot imagine to be part of a government in which Fortuyn is taking part as well. “No way”.

(De Graaf kan zich niet voorstellen ooit een kabinet met Fortuyn te zullen delen. “Met geen mogelijkheid”) – Thom De Graaf in De Volkskrant, Mar 14 2002
While the attack-theme has not been the dominant theme for D66 in three of the four months, it has been the dominant theme over the total time period. With regard to the attacking statements made by De Graaf it’s important to note that throughout the whole time period these statements are primarily focused on the person Fortuyn and although De Graaf did not compare Fortuyn with extreme-right politicians as Melkert and Dijkstal did, he certainly did not shy away from using other strong qualifications (e.g. calling Fortuyn a ‘potential pioneer of ethnic and religious hate’).

4.3.5. SP
As stated before, of all parties the SP represents the smallest percentage of the total statements of statements and only statements in March and April 2002 were found to be codable into the a priori defined and emergent themes. In the two months that codable statements of Marijnissen made the newspapers, the attack-theme was the dominant-theme and most of the attacking statements of Marijnissen in these months were aimed at the policy plans of Fortuyn. The most noteworthy statements of Marijnissen were the ignorant statements he made in March 2002. These statements are interesting as Marijnissen’s ignorant statements are the most outspoken of all political leaders. The statement below illustrates that Marijnissen doesn’t seemingly doesn’t consider the LPF to be serious threat to his party in March. This stance may have changed in April 2002 though as no statement of Marijnissen was coded into the ignorant-theme in that particular month.

“"The larger Fortuyn gets, the sooner it will become clear that it [the LPF] does not mean anything”

("Hoe groter Fortuyn wordt, hoe eerder duidelijk wordt dat het niets is.")
– Jan Marijnissen in NRC Handelsblad, Mar 7 2002

4.3.6. GroenLinks
The first statements of GroenLinks regarding the LPF were made by Paul Rosenmöller in March 2002. All statements of Rosenmöller were coded into two themes only – the attack-theme and the attacking others-theme – with the attack-theme being dominant in every month in which Rosenmöller made a statement. The attacking statements of Rosenmöller consist of mainly personal attacks towards Fortuyn. After looking at all attacking statements made by Rosenmöller, one can state that Rosenmöller is the political leader who is the most unmistakable about classifying Fortuyn as a populistic, nationalistic and extreme-right politician. A typical statement illustrating one of the qualifications repeatedly used by Rosenmöller regarding Fortuyn is the statement below.

“"This is not just right-wing anymore. This is extreme-right wing”.

("Dit is niet meer gewoon rechts. Dit is extreme rechts")
– Paul Rosenmöller in Het Parool, May 7 2002

The most notable finding regarding GroenLinks however, is the large percentage of statements assigned to the attacking-others strategy throughout the whole time period in general and in April 2002 in particular. The attacking others statements of Rosenmöller are primarily aimed at Balkenende, which as described above was also the case for Melkert and Dijkstal. However, next to Balkenende Rosenmöller also makes attacking statements aimed at Dijkstal and Melkert. Especially his attacking statements towards Dijkstal are outspoken compared to the attacking others statements of other parties. In the statement below, Rosenmöller encourages Dijkstal to take on Fortuyn, as in his opinion Fortuyn poses the greatest threat to the VVD.
4.3.7. Trends Regarding the Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time

The above analysis has illustrated the prominence of the attack-theme throughout the total time period. For all parties except D66 the attack-theme has been the dominant-theme in every month in which their political leader has made statements in the newspapers. The month of May is the month in which the attack-strategy has been the most dominant, representing 83.2% of all statements made in that month. The month of May is also the only month in which the attack-theme has been dominant for all parties. While the attack-theme has been dominant for most parties in every month, there are noteworthy differences between the parties regarding the object of their attacking statements. While the attacking statements made by Balkenende and Marijnissen were primarily focused on the LPF’s policy plans, statements of De Graaf and Rosenmöller were primarily aimed at the person Fortuyn throughout the total time period. Melkert and Dijkstal are interesting cases in this respect as the object of their attacking statements changed during the course of time from being primarily policy-focused in the beginning of the time period to being primarily focused on the person Fortuyn at latter stages of the time period. The municipal elections in March, seem to demarcate the point in time after which this transition took place.

Next to the dominance of the attack-theme throughout the complete time period, the second trend that can be observed from comparing graphs 4.4. – 4.9. is with regard to the ignorance-theme as the political leaders of the parties of which statements were assigned to the ignorance-theme made these statements at the beginning of the time period, either in February or the beginning of March. This is an important observation as it may indicate that while some parties may have ignored the LPF shortly after it was established, they were not ignoring the LPF anymore in latter periods. Regarding the other themes, seemingly no trends can be observed from the graphs. With regard to the attacking others theme though, the analysis has shown that the parties applying the attacking others strategy have aimed these attacks primarily at Jan-Peter Balkenende of the CDA, although there are differences between parties regarding the object of their attacking others statements. Obviously, as no statements were assigned to the imitation-theme in the total time period, the imitation-theme is not represented in graphs 4.4. – 4.9..

4.4. The Established Parties’ Motivation and Ability To Respond

Having presented the results of the descriptive and interpretive coding processes in the first two paragraphs and having linked these results in the third paragraph, the aim of this paragraph is to analyze whether and to what extent the behavior of the established parties towards the LPF can be explained by these parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond. As outlined in the theoretical framework in chapter 3, parties’ positioning on the multi-dimensional issue space will be used to assess parties’ motivation and ability to respond. The two-dimensional issue space as depicted in figure 4.1. on the next page will be used to assess party positions and assess the respective parties’ ability and motivation to respond. The typology presented in the figure is derived from Aarts & Thomassen (2008). The choice for this typology is made simply because Aarts & Thomassen developed estimated common party spaces for both the 2002 and 2006 along the same
dimensions, which makes it possible to compare party positions between 2002 and 2006 – a precondition for cross-case analysis.

While originally Aarts & Thomassen depict the party space along three dimensions – the religious dimension, authoritarian-libertarian dimension and the left-right dimension – the party space as presented in figure 4.1. is two-dimensional in order to not make matters unnecessarily complicated. The sole aim of placing parties on the multi-dimensional issue space is to illustrate that parties are placed on different positions and that these differences in positioning might indicate differences regarding these parties' motivation and ability to respond. Depicting the issue-space in a two-dimensional way suits the cause in that sense. It was decided to present the issue space along the authoritarian-libertarian and left-right dimensions thereby leaving out the religious dimension, as Aarts & Thomassen themselves acknowledge that the religious dimension has been ‘… the most important evaluation dimensions from 1989 until 1998, but of lesser relative importance in more recent years…’ (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008, pp. 220.). In order to simplify future references to parties’ positioning on the two-dimensional issue-space throughout the following section, the four quadrants of figure 4.1. have been highlighted with different colors.

*Figure 4.1. Estimated Common Party Spaces in 2002 (Adapted From Aarts & Thomassen, 2008, pp.223.)*

In the following sections the expectations as derived from the linking of the typology of innovation strategies with classic spatial theory, discussed in chapter 3, will be applied. To recap, the following three expectations were derived within the theoretical framework;

1. **The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant, the lower the motivation to respond of the established party towards the new entrant will be.**
2. **The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant, the lower the ability of the established party to imitate the new entrant will be.**
3. The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant, the greater the ability of the established party to attack the new entrant will be.

For each of these three expectations, different indicators can be assessed in order to determine whether the results match the expectations. With regard to the motivation to respond, the percentage of total statements represented by a party can function as an indicator. One would expect that the political leader of a party with a high motivation to respond would make relatively more statements regarding the LPF, than the political leader of a party with a lower motivation to respond. The percentage of total statements represented by a party in relation to the same percentage of other parties may be biased though as some parties may represent more statements than other parties simply because the statements of their political leaders were picked up more by the press that the statement of political leaders of other parties. In other words, the percentage of total statements represented by a party in relation to other parties alone may not be a sufficient indicator of parties’ motivation to respond. Therefore a second indicator will be used to assess parties’ motivation to respond and this indicator is the percentage of statements made by the political leader of a party which is assigned to the ignorance-theme. One would expect that this percentage is higher for a party with a low motivation to respond that for a party with a high motivation to respond.

For the assessment of the ability to imitate, the only possible indicator that can be used is the percentage of statements made by the political leader of a party which is assigned to the imitation-theme, as one would expect that a party with a high ability to imitate makes more imitative statements than a party with a low ability to imitate. Similarly, the assessment of the ability to attack will be assessed by considering the percentage of statements made by a political leader which is assigned to the attack-theme. One would expect that this percentage is higher for a party with a high ability to attack than for a party with a lower ability to attack. Table 4.1. below summarizes the expectations, related indicators and the expected values of these indicators.

**Table 4.1. Summary of Expectations, Indicators and Their Linkages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Indicator(s)</th>
<th>Expected Value of Indicator(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant on the two-dimensional issue space, the lower the established parties’ motivation to respond will be.</td>
<td>• Percentage of statements made by the political leader of the respective party out of the total sample of statements. • Percentage of statements made by the political leader of the respective party which is assigned to the ignorance-theme.</td>
<td>• The greater the distance, the lower the expected percentage. • The greater the distance, the higher the expected percentage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant on the two-dimensional issue space, the lower the established parties’ ability to imitate will be.</td>
<td>• Percentage of statements made by the political leader of the respective party which is assigned to the imitation-theme.</td>
<td>• The greater the distance the lower the expected percentage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The greater the distance between the established party and the new entrant on the two-dimensional issue space, the greater the established parties’ ability to attack will be.</td>
<td>• Percentage of statements made by the respective political leader which is assigned to the attack-theme.</td>
<td>• The greater the distance, the higher the expected percentage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1. PVDA

The PVDA is positioned in the quadrant opposed to the quadrant in which the LPF is positioned, as it is depicted as a left-libertarian party while the LPF is depicted as a right-authoritarian party. Behind GroenLinks the PVDA is the party located on the furthest distance from the LPF. This entails that on the basis of the expectations, depicted in table 4.1., one would expect a relatively low motivation to respond, a relatively low ability to imitate and a relatively high ability to attack. The results do not confirm these expectations though. First, of all parties the PVDA represents the highest percentage of all statements with 25.7% of the total sample. Second, the percentage of statements assigned to the ignorance-theme (4.6%) is considerably lower than the percentage assigned to this theme for the VVD (12.3%) and SP (14.3%). One would expect the percentage of ignorant statements made by Melkert to be higher than for these parties, especially higher than for the VVD as the VVD is positioned much closer to the LPF than the PVDA. The results with regard to the attack-theme are also not as expected as the results indicate that the percentage of attacking statements made by Melkert (78.5%) does not significantly differ from the same percentage for other parties – e.g. the VVD (77.2%) – which are positioned closer to the LPF.

It should be noted at this point that with regard to imitative statements there are no differences to observe between parties, simply because no statement was coded into the imitation-theme overall. Therefore in the following sub-paragraphs the percentage of statements made by the political leader of a respective party which is assigned to the imitation-theme is not assessed, as this is doesn’t enrich the analysis.

4.4.2. VVD

The VVD is positioned in the green quadrant, the same quadrant in which the LPF is positioned. Although the VVD is portrayed as ‘less authoritarian’ and ‘less right’ than the LPF, of all parties taken into account in this research, it is the party positioned the closest to the LPF. Therefore one would expect it to be the party with the highest motivation to respond, the highest ability to imitate and the lowest ability to attack. None of the indicators confirms these expectations though. Regarding the percentage of total statements, with 22.5% the VVD represent the largest percentage of statements in the complete sample behind the PVDA (25.7%). The PVDA however, is located much further away from the LPF than the VVD on both dimensions. The low ability to attack is also not reflected in the results as the percentage of statements made by Dijkstal which is assigned to the attack-theme (77.2%) does not significantly differ from for example the PVDA (78.5%), a party with an expectedly much higher ability to attack.

4.4.3. CDA

Of all parties taken into account, the CDA is located the closest to the centre of both dimensions. Although it is located in the same quadrant as the LPF and the VVD, the distance between the CDA and the LPF is greater than the distance between the LPF and the VVD, particularly on the left-right dimension. Based on the expectations this would entail that the CDA’s motivation to respond should be lower than the VVD’s, that its ability to imitate should be lower than the VVD’s, while its ability to attack should be higher than the VVD’s. A consideration of the percentage of statements that the CDA represents, confirms that with 18.6% the CDA represents a lower percentage of the whole sample of statements than the PVDA (25.7%) while the PVDA is located further away from the LPF on both dimensions, and therefore should represent a lower percentage of total statements than the LPF, according to the expectation. Interestingly none of the statements made by Balkenende were
coded into the ignorance-theme which and as the CDA is less ignorant than the PVDA, which is as expected. However, it is also less ignorant than the VVD which is not expected and therefore the results with regard to the motivation to respond are inconclusive. Lastly, the percentage of statements made of the CDA assigned to the attack-theme does not significantly differ from the same percentage for the VVD (78,7%) or parties positioned much further away from the LPF, such as the PVDA (78,5%) and GL (75,0%).

4.4.4. D66
D66 is the only party which is positioned in the blue quadrant, the right-libertarian quadrant. On both the authoritarian-libertarian dimension it is positioned relatively close to the PVDA, SP and GroenLinks. Based on D66’s positioning on the two-dimensional issue space one would expects its motivation to respond to be higher than that of the PVDA and GroenLinks and lower than that of the VVD and CDA. The results show a different picture though as D66(8,7%) represents a smaller portion of the whole sample of statements than the PVDA(25,7%) and GroenLinks (19,0%), which is not as expected. But it does represent a smaller portion of the sample than the CDA(18,6%) and VVD(22,3%), which is as expected. As De Graaf made no statement which was assigned to the ignorance-theme, it is not more ignorant than the VVD and less ignorant than the PVDA, which one would expect as D66 is positioned on a distance from the LPF which lies between the distance on which those two parties are positioned. Lastly, based on the positioning of D66 one would expect its ability to attack to be higher than that of the VVD and CDA while being lower that of the PVDA and GroenLinks. However, the percentage of attacking statements made by De Graaf (59,1%) is the lowest of all parties, so obviously, this percentage does not lie between the percentages for the VVD and CDA on the one hand and the percentages of the PVDA and GroenLinks on the other hand.

4.4.5. SP
The SP is positioned in the same quadrant as the PVDA and GroenLinks, the red quadrant, although the distance between the SP and the LPF is smaller on both dimensions than the distance between the PVDA and the LPF and especially the distance between GroenLinks and the LPF. Based on the SP’s location within the two-dimensional issue space one would expect its motivation to respond to be similar or slightly higher than that of the PVDA and GroenLinks, and substantially lower than that of the VVD and CDA. Similarly one would expect its ability to imitate to be similar or slightly higher that of the PVDA and GroenLinks and considerably lower than that of the VVD and CDA. Lastly one would expect the SP’s ability to attack to be similar or slightly lower than the ability to attack of the PVDA and GroenLinks but considerably higher than the ability to attack of the VVD and CDA. In essence, the expectations entail that the SP has an intermediate position regarding the motivation to respond, ability to imitate and ability to attack. This is disconfirmed by the results though, which instead depict the SP as a party of extremes as it represents the lowest percentage of total statements (5,5%) and is the party with the highest percentage of statements assigned to both the ignorance-theme (14,29%) and the attack-theme (85,71%). So instead of the indicators showing intermediate values for the SP, the results show extreme values, which is not as one would expect.

4.4.6. GroenLinks
GroenLinks is positioned in the red quadrant, the same quadrant in which the PVDA en de SP are positioned. A quick look at figure 4.1. shows that GroenLinks is located further away from the LPF than the PVDA and SP on both the authoritarian-libertarian dimension and the left-right dimension. This means that GroenLinks is the party located the furthest away from the LPF on both dimensions.
Therefore one would expect its motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be the lowest of all parties, while one would simultaneously expect its ability to attack to be the highest of all parties. Considering the percentage of total statements represented by GroenLinks does not indicate that that of all parties GroenLinks is the most ignorant party. With 19,0% the percentage representing statements of GroenLinks lies substantially higher than the percentage representing statements of the SP (5,5%) and D66 (8,7%). The percentage of statements assigned does demark GroenLinks as an ignorant party as no statement of Rosenmölle was coded into the ignorance-theme. However this doesn’t make GroenLinks more ignorant than the CDA and D66, as also no statement of these parties was assigned to the ignorance-theme. The results regarding the percentage of attacking statements do not confirm GroenLinks as the most attacking party as the percentage of statements assigned to the attack-theme for GroenLinks (75,0%) is similar to the percentages of the PVDA (78,5%), VVD (77,2%) and CDA (78,7%) – all parties located closer to the LPF on the two-dimensional issue-space than GroenLinks.

4.4.7. The Explanatory Value of Established Parties Motivation and Ability to Respond

If there is one thing the analysis in the previous sub-paragraphs has shown, it is that the strategies that established parties applied towards the LPF were not as one would expect based on the assessment of their motivation and ability to respond. In not a single case did the results fully confirm the expectations of party reactions based on the assessment of their motivation and ability to respond. Therefore he only conclusion that one can make at this point is that parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond cannot explain the similarities and differences between these parties’ reactions towards the LPF. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the failing predictive and explanatory value of the motivation and ability to respond is that these two factors cannot explain why the percentage of statements assigned to the attack-theme lie in such close range for parties with such different positions on the two-dimensional issue space as the PVDA, VVD, CDA and GroenLinks.

4.5. Within-Case Conclusion

Regarding the distribution of statements across time the most notable finding is that the majority of statements made by political leaders of the established parties were made in the months in which elections took place. Some parties reached their peak in the number of statements published in the newspapers in March 2002, the month in which the municipal elections were held in the Netherlands. Other parties reached their peak in May 2002, the month in which the national elections were held.

Looking at the distribution of statements across themes shows a clear picture, the attack strategy has been the strategy applied the most by all established parties in their reaction towards the LPF. Out of the total sample of statements, 76,3% has been assigned to the attack-theme. The percentage of attacking statements lie within a five percent range of this value, with the exception of the SP – which represents an erratic value in the positive direction – and D66 which represents an erratic value in the negative direction. Although the attack-theme has been the most prominent theme for all parties, differences between parties regarding the object of their attacks were observed. While Balkenende and Marijnissen primarily focused their attacks on the LPF’s policy plans, De Graaf and especially Rosenmölle focused their attacks primarily on the person Fortuyn. Melkert’s and Dijkstra’s attacks are more in balance over the total time period, representing both policy-focused attacks and personal attacks.
On considerable distance behind the attack strategy a non a priori defined theory related strategy – the attacking others strategy – was applied the most by the established parties towards the LPF. Four parties – the PVDA, CDA, D66 and especially GroenLinks – applied the attacking others-strategy and although the object of the attacks may differ per party, most attacks were aimed at Jan-Peter Balkenende of the CDA. The imitation strategy, which is one of the a priori defined theory related themes, is not represented in the sample, as not a single statement made by the political leader of any of the established parties was assigned to the ignorance-theme. The remaining strategies – ignorance, neutral and isolation – are represented in the sample but present a relatively low share of the sample.

Linking the distribution of statements across themes to the time dimension has illustrated the prominence of the attack strategy even further as the attack-theme has been the dominant theme throughout the complete time period for all parties, except D66. An important finding is that for the PVDA and VVD the object of attack has changed from being focused on the policies of the LPF at the beginning of the time period to being aimed at the person Fortuyn at latter stages of the time period.

The municipal elections in March 2002 seem to demarcate the turning point in this sense. The second trend that could be observed from linking the distribution of statements across themes to the time dimension is that all political leaders making ignorant statements made these statements at the early stages of the time period, in the period before the municipal elections in March 2002 to be more precise.

Lastly, linking results to expectations based on the parties’ motivation and ability to respond, has illustrated that the portfolio of the strategies that the established parties applied towards the LPF cannot be explained by their motivation and ability to respond. In most extreme instances, parties of which one would expect to have reacted the least to the LPF reacted more than parties that of which one would expected to have reacted the most to the LPF. Even more importantly, all parties reacted differently to the LPF than one would expect on the basis of their motivation and ability to respond.
5. Case Study Report – PVV

After presenting the results of the LPF-case in the previous chapter, this chapter will present the results of the PVV-case in similar fashion. The structuring of this chapter is identical to the structuring of the previous chapter, meaning that paragraph one presents the distribution of statements across time, paragraph two presents the distribution of statements across themes and paragraph three presents the distribution of statements across themes across time. The fourth paragraph focuses on linking the outcomes of the previous three paragraphs to the positioning of parties on the multi-dimensional issue space. The chapter will be concluded by the within-case conclusion in the fifth and last paragraph.

5.1. The Distribution of Statements Across Time

Graph 5.1. below presents the distribution of statements across time for the total time period between the 22\textsuperscript{th} of February 2006 and the 4\textsuperscript{th} of June 2009 with ‘years’ as the units of measurement. While this graph illustrates how the statements made by the political leaders of the established parties are distributed across years it does not illustrate how these statements are distributed across months within years. As the analysis of the distribution of statements in the LPF-case has shown, taking months as the unit of measurement made it possible to highlight certain events around which most statements were made. It is unlikely that such events regarding the PVV-case can be highlighted by taking years as the unit of analysis. Therefore the distribution of statements across months for each of the four years is illustrated in graphs 5.2. – 5.5..

As graph 5.1. shows, all parties had their peaks regarding the number of statements that made the press in either the year 2007 or the year 2008. Considering the total sample of statements illustrates that the year 2006 is the least ‘active’ year in terms of statements being made by the political leaders.
as only 9.5% off all statements were made in 2006. The percentages of all parties fluctuate around this value, with D66 being the only exception as 16.4% of the statements of this party were made in 2006. Examining the distribution of statements within 2006 shows two peaks, the first one being observable around the time the PVV was established in February and the second one being observable just before and after the national election in November.

The year 2007 denotes a much more prominent year regarding the number of statements being made by political leaders, as 38.5% off all statements were made in that year. The percentages of all parties fluctuate within a 10%-range of this, with the PVDA representing an erratic case, as only 6.5% off all statements of Wouter Bos were made in 2007. Peaks in the distribution of statements on the month-level differ per party in 2007. As no major election was held in 2007, the peaks in 2007 are attributable to either statements made by Wilders on which other political leaders reacted, or interviews given by these political leaders to the press. The peaks in March 2007 of D66 and GroenLinks for example are largely attributable to these parties’ reactions to remarks made by Wilders regarding member of parliament Khadija Arib and Wilder’s outspoken critique on a Dutch woman who was raped by members of the Taliban in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the peak of the SP in September 2007, is mainly attributable to Marijnissen giving an extensive interview to journalists of Het Parool in that particular month.

Behind 2007, 2008 has been the most active year in terms of statements being made by the political leaders of the established parties, with 36.0% of all statements being made in this particular year. For the PVDA, CDA, and SP nearly half of their statements were being made in 2008. For the VVD, D66 and GroenLinks the percentage of statements made in 2008 lies between the 27-30%. Taking a close look at the distribution of statements within 2008 shows a clear peak in the early months of the year which is mainly attributable to one event – the release of Wilder’s movie Fitna on the 27th of March. This movie received extensive attention from the press before and after its release, with all political leaders frequently stating their opinions regarding the movie in the newspapers. The government even issued a statement which was read out by Balkenende during an organized press-conference and was published in all newspapers on the following day. A second smaller peak can be observed in September, as in that month Wilders stated during a political debate that the Koran should be forbidden in the Netherlands, a statement to which the political leaders of all other parties reacted.

The year 2009 is only taken into account until the 4th of June, the date of the European elections in the Netherlands. Still, 16.0% of all statements were made in 2009, with the percentage for each party fluctuating between 9.5% for the CDA and 35.5% for the PVDA. The distribution of statements within 2009 shows a clear peak for all parties in the month of May, the month in which all parties were on the campaign trail for the European elections. The relatively high peak for GroenLinks in March 2009 is attributable to interviews given by Femke Halsema to multiple newspapers during that month.

Conclusively, with regard to the distribution of statements across time the general observable trend for all parties is that the smallest portion of the statements made by their political leaders in the newspapers lay in 2006, with the number of statements increasing and reaching their peak in either 2007 and 2008 and decreasing again in the year of 2009. The peaks within years either indicate election periods (e.g. the peak in November 2006), events that were extensively captured by the press (e.g. the peak around March 2008 due to Wilder’s film Fitna), or simply interviews with the political leaders published in the newspapers (e.g. the peak in March 2009 for GroenLinks).
5.2. The Distribution of Statements Across Themes

The distribution of statements across themes is presented by graph 5.6. below. The graph covers the total time period between the 26th of February 2006 and the 4th of June 2009. The discussion of findings in the following section will be based on the results presented in this graph.

The most sticking out feature of the above graph is the prominence of the red color indicating the dominance of the attack strategy for all parties, except the PVDA. Of all statements, 77.1% was assigned to the attack-theme, and the percentages of attacking statements for the VVD(76.4%), D66(75.9%), SP(80.0%) and GroenLinks(80.6%) lie within a 5%-range of this value. The CDA represents an erratic case in the positive direction, with 94.6% of its statements being coded as attacking, while the PVDA represents an erratic case in the negative direction as only 29.0% of its statements were coded as attacking.

On considerable distance behind the attack strategy the attacking others strategy is the second most prominent strategy, with 13.6% of all statements being coded into the attacking others-theme. Furthermore all parties applied the attacking others strategy towards the PVV. This can also be said with regard to the ignorance strategy, as the ignorance-theme is the third most prominent theme representing 4.3% of all statements. The isolation strategy is the next strategy on the list with the isolation-theme accounting for 3.1% of all statements, thereby only covering statements of the PVDA, CDA, D66 and the SP. Lastly, the imitation-theme accounts for 1.2% of the sample and only relates to statements of D66, while the neutral-theme represents only 0.7% of the sample and covers only statements of the CDA and VVD.

From graph 5.6. it follows that the number of strategies that each party applied towards the PVV lies between 3-5 strategies, with three parties – the PVDA, VVD, and SP – applying four strategies. The
CDA and D66 are the parties with the largest variety of strategies within its portfolio while GroenLinks is the party with the lowest variety of strategies within its portfolio. Interestingly, the statements of all parties were assigned to at least three themes, the attack-theme, the attacking others-theme and the ignorance theme. This means that the portfolio of strategies applied by all parties towards the PVV consisted of at least three of the same strategies – attack, attacking others and ignorance. This does not mean however that these strategies are distributed evenly across parties. As graph 5.7. below illustrates, there are clear differences regarding the distribution of themes across parties with perhaps the most noteworthy observation being the relatively low percentage of attacking statements represented by the PVDA (2.8%).

5.3. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time
In this paragraph the distribution of statements across themes will be combined with the time dimension. As such the structuring of the paragraph is similar to the structuring of paragraph 4.3. with the only difference being that the unit of analysis on the time dimension is years instead of the months used in paragraph 4.3.. As the total time period of the PVV-case consists of 39 months, presenting graphs for each of these months for each party would not be practical nor feasible. Therefore the distribution of statements across themes across time is presented for each party with years as the unit of measurement. These results are presented in graphs 5.8 – 5.13 on the next page. Although by looking at the results presented in these graphs it is impossible to observe the distribution of statements across themes within years, in the events in which a particular month demarks an interesting result, that will be mentioned explicitly during the analysis. The analysis of the most notable findings per party is presented in the following six sub-paragraphs. The seventh sub-paragraph will compare the results in order to derive possible trends across parties.
Graph 5.8. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - PVDA

Graph 5.9. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - VVD

Graph 5.10. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - CDA

Graph 5.11. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - D66

Graph 5.12. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - SP

Graph 5.13. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Total Period - GL

Results PVW-Case
5.3.1. PVDA

The year 2006 is the only year in which the attack-theme has been the prominent theme for the PVDA, in fact all statements made by Wouter Bos during that year were coded as attacking statements. It should be noted however, that only three statements of Bos were published in the press in 2006. Importantly, all attacking statements made by Bos in 2006 and all following years were policy-focused and did not involve personal attacks on the person Wilders.

In 2007 the number of statements made by Bos was less as only two statements made the newspapers. One of these statements was assigned to the attack-theme while the other was assigned to the attacking-others theme, which is represented by the 50-50% score for these themes in 2007 in graph 5.8. While 2006 and 2007 demarked relatively quiet years for the PVDA, this all changed in 2008 as with 15 statements the number of statements made by Bos in that year was substantially higher than in previous years. Interestingly of the statements made in 2008 only one statements was coded as an attacking statement, meaning that only 6,7% of all statements made in 2008 was assigned to the attack-theme. Also interesting with regard to 2008 is the 26,7% of statements made in that year being assigned to the ignorance-theme, which is the highest percentage for any party for any year. Bos can be considered as the most outspokenly ignorant political leader of all, the statement below is an illustration of a typical ignorant statement made by Bos in 2008. The statement is the clearest outing of the original ‘ignore the innovation and focus on the own business instead’ – strategy of Charitou & Markides.

“One needs to tone down polling results." And one needs to keep one’s course, also with regard to Geert Wilders.


The last noteworthy observation with regard to the year 2008 is the prominence of the attacking others strategy, with 90% of all attacking others statements of Bos being made in that year. Bos’ attacking others statements were primarily aimed at two other political leaders; Mark Rutte of the VVD and Bas Van Der Vlies of the SGP (a party not taken into analysis) in this research. Regarding 2009, the most interesting result is the emergence of the isolation strategy as dominant strategy. The 54,6% of statements assigned to the isolation-theme all relate to one particular statements made by Bos on the 12th of May in a television broadcast, which was published by all newspapers on the next day. This statement is the following;

*Bos called it “absolutely unthinkable” that the PVDA would take part in a government with the PVV. According to him Wilders stands for a completely different Netherlands than he does. “I feel no need at all to nuance this; the PVDA will not engage in a coalition with the PVV,”.*

(Bos noemde het “volstrekt ondenkbaar” dat de PVDA in een regering met de PVV zou stappen. Volgens hem staat Wilders voor een heel ander Nederland dan hij. “Ik heb dus geen enkele behoefte dit te nuanceren: de PVDA gaat niet in een coalitie zitten met de PVV) – Wouter Bos in Algemeen Dagblad, May 12 2009

5.3.2. VVD

Similar to the PVDA, all statements of Mark Rutte in 2006 were assigned to the attack-theme. The most cited statement made by Rutte in 2006 was a statement in which he accused Wilders of playing the role of the victim too much by constantly referring to a cordon sanitaire being forced upon him
by other parties. During the television debate following the national election in of November 22
Rutte replied by stating;

"We are not going to give you the chance to induce that we are isolating you"

"Wij gaan u niet de kans geven om de indruk te wekken dat wij u isoleren.”

– Mark Rutte in NRC Handelsblad, Nov 23 2006

Considering the non-presence of the isolation-theme in graph 5.9., Rutte certainly kept his word by not once openly isolating the PVV throughout the total time-period.

While some of the statements made in 2007 were being coded into the ignorance-theme and neutral-theme, the majority of statements was assigned to the attack-theme. Most of these attacking statements stem from a column written by Rutte and fellow VVD-member Joshua Livestro in which they criticize so-called ‘new political movements’ thereby referring to the PVV and Trots Op Nederland. The central critique thereby is that these parties promise things to their voters which are lawfully impossible. While the attack strategy remain the dominant strategy in 2008 and 2009, the attacking others strategy emerges to the scene. The attacking others statements made by Rutte are interesting as the far majority of these statements are statements in which Rutte defends Wilders against other parties, particularly the parties in office. For example Rutte criticized these parties’ premature reaction towards the movie Fitna.

Overall, the majority of statements of Rutte were coded as attacking for each year of the time period. These attacking statements were aimed at both the policy plans of the PVV and the person Wilders with no clear transition being observable across the time period. However, while some of the other political leaders did not shy away from using harsh qualification towards Wilders (as will be illustrated in the following sections), Rutte used mainly metaphorical languages in his personal attacks on Wilders. The statements below is a typical example of such metaphorical language applied by Rutte.

“Mister Wilders, you are a political pyromaniac: you keep on lighting the fire and running away afterwards. Subsequently you’ll even get mad if the owner of the building calls the fire-brigade.”

“Meneer Wilders, u bent een politieke pyromaan: u steekst steeds het vuur aan en daarna rent u weg. Vervolgens wordt u nog boos ook als de eigenaar van de woning de brandweerbelt.” – Mark Rutte in De Volkskrant, April 2 2008

5.3.3. CDA
The first interesting results that is observable in graph 5.10. is that the no statements of the CDA were coded into the attack-theme in 2006. This means that Jan-Peter Balkenende is the only politician not making an attacking statement in a particular year. What is also interesting about the year 2006 is that Balkenende made an isolating statement in as early as 2006, far before other parties such statements. In fact it is the only isolating statement made by Balkenende during the whole time period. This is also the case for the only attacking others statement made by Balkenende in 2006, which was aimed at Mark Rutte of the VVD. The fact that both the isolation-theme and attacking others-theme present only 1,4% of all statements being made by Balkenende illustrates might indicate that these statements are incidental cases.
In the years after 2006, the attack strategy has clearly been the most prominent strategy applied by the CDA towards the PVV. In fact, only two statements were coded into other themes in the period between January 1st 2007 and June 4th 2009, with one of these statements being coded into the ignorance theme in 2007 and the other being coded into the neutral theme in 2009. As such, these two statements both represent only 1.4% of the sample which might indicate that these statements are incidental cases as well. Overall, nearly all statements of Balkenende were assigned to the attack-theme throughout the total timer period. A qualitative analysis of Balkenende’s statements indicates that three factors might be responsible for the relatively high representation of attacking statements in the CDA-sample. As Balkenende has been the prime-minister his statements might have been (1) cited more often in the newspapers than statements of other political leaders, (2) republishes more often than statements of other political leaders and (3) published more often in multiple newspapers than statements of other political leaders. The illustrate these factors as these statements made by Balkenende were published in multiple newspapers at different moments in time. In fact, of the entire sample, these two statements were cited the most in the newspapers. The first statement is a statement in which Balkenende reacts to Wilder’s critique on the Queen’s Christmas Message, while the second statement is a reaction of Balkenende towards Wilder’s movie Fitna.

Primeminister Balkenende fully supports the statements made by the Queen, he said in a reaction. “Wilders claims to be attempting to defend the interest of the Netherlands, but breaks down exactly that which makes the Netherlands the Netherlands as it is: our dynasty, our tolerance and the solidarity with others across borders”.


“We do not see any other goal served by this movie other than hurting people’s feelings”.

“We zien niet welk doel deze film dient, anders dan het kwetsen van gevoelens”. – Jan-Peter Balkenende in NRC Handelsblad, March 18 2008

Importantly the attacking statements of Balkenende were both policy-focused and focused on the person Wilders, with the majority of attacking statements being policy-focused. As the first statement depicted above shows, even in instances in which Balkenende attacked Wilders personally, his choice of words remained pliable.

5.3.4. D66

For D66 the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy in all years, especially in 2006 and 2008. As already mentioned during the analysis of the distribution of statements across themes, in 2006 much more statements of Alexander Pechtold were published in the newspapers than statement of other politicians. And as graph 5.11 shows the great majority of these statements was assigned involved attacking statements. Throughout the total time period, the attacking statements of Pechtold are both policy-oriented and personally oriented, with the majority of statements being directed at the person Wilders. Of all political leaders the personal attacks of Pechtold can be described as the most outspoken as he does not shy away from referring to Wilders as a ‘xenophobe’ (in Trouw on Dec 13 2007), an ‘extremist who alienates an entire segment of the population in racist
fashion’ (in NRC Handelsblad May 16 2009). Interestingly, in the following statement Pechtold himself acknowledges that personally attacking Wilders by using such qualifications is similar to the style of Wilders.

According to the D66-leader the ranks of the PVV are difficult to reach with nuance, and therefore politicians need to apply a different method to debate with Wilders. “The traditional techniques are not working. Wilders attacks persons. In that case we should not shy away from that either and illustrate the inconsistency of his way of acting”.

Volgens de D66-leider is de PVV-achterban moeilijk te bereiken met nuance, en moet de politiek daarom een andere methode kiezen om met Wilders in debat te gaan. “De traditionele technieken werken niet. Wilders speelt op de persoon. Dan moeten wij dat ook niet schuwen, en de inconsequenties van zijn handelen aan de orde stellen. – Alexander Pechtold in De Volkskrant, March 21 2007

Importantly the above statements show that Pechtold is deliberately imitated the style of Wilders, as such the above statement is an outing of the imitation strategy and was assigned to the imitation theme. Interestingly the above statement is only one of five statements which were assigned to the imitation-theme out of the total sample of statements and all of these statements were made by Pechtold. This may indicate that Pechtold was the only political leader openly admitting to having adopted at least some part of the PVV’s way of doing things.

Another is the presence of the attacking others-theme during all years of the total time period. These attacking others statements were primarily aimed at the VVD, with Pechtold repeatedly accusing Rutte of tailgating Wilders. The most interesting attacking others statement made by Pechtold however, was a statement in which he accuses Jan Marijnissen of the SP as being a ‘ populist’ just like Wilders and Verdonk. The final noteworthy finding with regard to D66 is the emergence of the isolation-theme in 2009 which is mainly due to one statement made by Pechtold – cited below – which can be considered as the most outspoken isolative statement of the whole sample.

"Wilders as prime-minister is a horror-scenario for me, in that case I’ll become a refugee”, he said. And: “I don’t want to make Wilders socially acceptable ... It’s a disaster for the country if we believe that that’s the solution ... I don’t want to be in the same government with a xenophobe and extremist”.

"Wilders als premier is voor mij een horrorscenario, dan word ik asielzoeker”, zei hij. En: “Ik wil Wilders niet salonfähig maken ... Het is een ramp voor het land als we geloven dat daar de oplossing zit ... Ik wil niet met een xenofoob en extremist in een kabinet zitten.” – Alexander Pechtold in NRC Handelsblad, April 10 2009

5.3.5. SP
The SP is the only party of which the political leader had been replaced during the time period as on the 20th of June 2008, Agnes Kant took over the scepter from Jan Marijnissen. This change of the guard has had an influence on the type of statements being made. While statements by Marijnissen until the 20th of June 2008 were assigned to three themes – ignorance, attack and attacking others – the statements made by Kant after that day were assigned to the attack-theme and the isolation theme. This means that all ignorant statements and attacking others statements of the SP were made by Marijnissen, all isolative statements were made by Kant while both political leaders made attacking statements.
During the Marijnissen-period the attack strategy had been the dominant strategy with Marijnissen’s attacking statements being aimed at Wilder’s policy-plans throughout 2006 and 2007. However, at the beginning of 2008, in his reaction to Wilder’s movie Fitna Marijnissen attacked Wilders personally by calling him ‘extremely right’ and ‘dangerous’. The attacking-others statements of Marijnissen were aimed at one the VVD only, as Marijnissen criticized a politician of the VVD – Hans Van Baalen – for unreasonably attacking Wilders during a debate regarding the continuation of the Dutch military operation on Afghanistan.

Of the statements made by Kant, the isolative statements are the most noteworthy and especially the timing of these statements is interesting. On the 12th of May Kant made the following statement during a radio interview, which was captured in the newspapers;

“Being in the same government with the PVV is no option for us. For that they [the PVV] are too liberal and above all they want discriminatory policies. We will not co-operate with that”.

“Een regering met de PVV is voor ons geen optie. Daarvoor zijn ze veel te liberaal en bovendien willen ze discriminerend beleid. Daar werken wij niet aan mee’.
– Agnes Kant in De Volkskrant, May 13 2009

Interestingly the above statement was made right before Wouter Bos of the PVDA made his isolative statements, which may indicate that Kant’s isolative statements may have stimulated Bos to make his isolative remarks on the same day as well.

5.3.6. GroenLinks

As illustrated by graph 5.13., the statements of Halsema were coded only into the attack-theme and the attacking others-theme throughout the time period, with one exception – 2008 – in which one statements was coded as ignorant. In the year 2006, the attacking-others strategy has been the dominant strategy for GroenLinks which is entirely attributable to one statement of Femke Halsema being published in multiple newspapers. The statement cited below is special, as of the whole sample it is the only attacking others statement which was aimed at D66. In the statement, Halsema warns Pechtold not to fall into the trap of Wilders.

According to Halsema Pechtold was walking right into the trap of Wilders: “

Wilders said this to provoke this reaction. ‘Do not fall for that, Mister Pechtold.’

Halsema vond dat Pechtold in de val van Wilders trapte: “Wilders zegt dit omdat hij deze reactie wil uitlokken. Trap er niet in, meneer Pechtold”.

– Femke Halsema in Het Parool, October 30 2006.

In the years after 2006, the attacking-others strategy remained present, although it was not the most prominent strategy anymore and was aimed at other parties. In 2007 the attacking others statements of Halsema were primarily aimed at the PVDA, in 2008 at the SP and in 2009 at the VVD. As the dominance of the attacking others strategy has vanished in the years after 2006, the attack strategy had become the most prominent strategy applied towards the PVV by GroenLinks in 2007, 2008 and 2009. As the attacking statements of all other political leaders discussed in the previous sections, the attacking statements of Halsema were both aimed at policy plans of Wilders and Wilders personally. The following statements is the most cited attacking statement of Halsema, and is a typical example of a personal attack of Halsema towards Wilders;
GroenLinks-leader Femke Halsema called her PVV-colleague Geert Wilders ‘a political quack’ and ‘a charlatan’.

GroenLinks-leider Femke Halsema noemt haar PVV-collega Geert Wilders ‘een politieke kwakzalver’ en een ‘charlatan’.

– Femke Halsema in De Volkskrant, Mar 9 2009

As the above statements shows, while Halsema was not shy of using harsh qualifications towards Wilders, she did not use the type of qualifications used by Pechtold.

5.3.7. Trends Regarding the Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time

The main trend that the above analysis has shown is that the attack strategy has been the most dominant strategy for the established parties in most if not all four years that comprise the total time period. The only exception to this trend is the PVDA, for which the attack-theme has only been the most prominent theme in 2006. With regard to the objects of the attacking statements made by political leaders it can be stated that all parties attacking statements were aimed both at the policy plans of the PVV and the person Wilders. However, there are differences regarding the balance between policy-focused and personally-focused attacking statements. While statements of the CDA were primarily policy-focused, statements of D66 were mostly aimed at Wilders as a person.

A second trend that follows from the above analysis and is visible in graphs 5.8.–5.13. is the isolation strategy being present almost exclusively in the year 2009, with 92,3% of all isolative statements being made during that year. In fact 84,6% of all isolative statement were made in one particular month – May 2009 – which is the month in which the campaign for the European elections in the Netherlands was in full progress. The political leaders of the PVDA and the SP made their isolative statements on particular day, the 12th of May 2009, with Agnes Kant being the first one of the two declaring that her party would not engage in one coalition with the PVV of Geert Wilders. This declaration may have inspired Wouter Bos of the PVDA to declare something similar on the same day.

With regard to the remaining themes the above analysis has not indicated the existence of trends across parties. Regarding the ignorance-theme the most interesting finding is that no ignorant statements were made in 2006 and that the majority of ignorant statements was made in 2008. This indicates that parties were not ignoring the PVV after its establishment but they came to ignore in latter stages of the time period. The most of such ignorant statements were made at the beginning of 2008, the time period in which Wilder’s movie Fitna dominated the news. With regard to the attacking-others theme there are differences between parties both regarding the timing of their attacking others statements and the object of these statements. As the graphs 5.8.–5.13. show, the attack strategy is applied by some parties during all years of the time period, while it is applied by other parties in only some years of the time period. There is no clear ‘victim’ of the attacking others statements across parties as the object of these statements is different for all parties, with most parties aiming their attacks on multiple parties instead of one particular party.

Lastly, no trends in the timing of the neutral strategy and imitation strategy are observable from the above analysis and the graphs. The neutral strategy was only applied by two parties – the VVD and CDA – at very different points in time while the imitation strategy was applied by D66 at only one particular moment in time.
5.4. The Established Parties’ Motivation and Ability To Respond

Having presented the results of the descriptive and interpretive coding process in the first two paragraphs and having linked these results in the third paragraph, in this paragraph parties’ motivation and ability to respond will be brought into the equation in order to assess why the established parties may have reacted towards the PVV in the manner they have done. The assessment of these parties’ motivation and ability to respond will be based on tier positioning on the multi-dimensional issue space. The same two-dimensional issue space – developed by Aarts & Thomassen – is used to portray party positions which was used in the previous chapter. In essence the typology depicted in figure 5.1. is the 2006-version of the typology presented in figure 4.1.. The expectations, indicators and expected values of the indicators – presented in table 4.1. – which were applied to analyze parties’ motivation and ability to respond in the LPF-case are the ones that will be applied in the following sub-paragraphs.

*Figure 5.1. Estimated Common Party Spaces in 2006 (Adapted From Aarts & Thomassen, 2008, pp.223.)*

5.4.1. PVDA

In figure 5.1. the PVDA is positioned in the red quadrant, which is the quadrant opposed to the quadrant in which the PVV is positioned. Behind GroenLinks the PVDA is the party on the largest distance of the PVV. Therefore based on the expectations presented in table 4.1. with regard to the PVDA, one would expect a relatively low motivation to respond, a relatively low ability to imitate and a relatively high ability to attack. With regard to the motivation to respond the results confirm the expectations. Of all parties the PVDA represents the smallest percentage of statements by far, with only 7,4% of all statements belonging to the PVDA. Furthermore, with 16,1% of its statements being coded into the ignorant-theme, the PVDA has relatively been the most ignorant party towards the
PVV. Regarding the ability to attack the results are not at all as expected as only 29.0% of all statements made by Wouter Bos were coded as attacking. This percentage is significantly lower than the same percentage for the VVD(76.4%), CDA(94.6%), D66(75.9%), SP(80.0%) and GroenLinks (80.6%). So, instead of being one of the most attacking parties the PVDA is the least attacking party. 

It should be noted that there is no use in assessing the PVDA’s ability to imitate as no statements of the PVDA were assigned to the imitation-theme. In fact, across the sample only statements of D66 were coded into the imitation-theme. Therefore in the following sections, the difference between parties regarding the ability to imitate will not be assessed as there is one overarching difference; a share of the statements of D66 were coded into the imitation-theme while no statements of other parties were coded into that theme. This observation already entails that expectations regarding the ability to imitate are disconfirmed by the results, as parties such as the VVD and CDA of which the ability to imitate is expectedly higher than that of D66, were not making imitative statements at all.

5.4.2. VVD
The VVD is placed in the green quadrant, which is the quadrant in which the PVV is located. The distance between the VVD and the PVV on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension is minimal, but the VVD is portrayed as a ‘less right’ party on the left-right dimension and is placed more towards the centre of this dimension than the PVV. As the VVD is positioned the closest to the PVV one would expect its motivation to respond to be the highest of all parties, its ability to imitate to be the highest of all parties and its ability to attack to be the lowest of all parties. The results show a different picture though with regard to all indicators. First off all, with 17.1% the VVD does not represent the largest share of statements, D66’s share of total statements is more than 10.0% higher. With 6.9% of its statements being assigned to the ignorance-theme, behind the PVDA the VVD is the most ignorant, while one would expect it to be the least ignorant party based on its motivation to respond. Lastly, the results do not indicate that the VVD is a less attacking party than other parties being positioned on further distance from the PVV. With 76.4% the percentage of VVD-statements coded as attacking is in close range with the percentages of the SP(80.0%), GroenLinks(80.6%) and D66(75.9%).

5.4.3. CDA
The CDA is positioned in the green quadrant together with the PVV and the VVD, although the distance between the CDA and the PVV is greater than the distance between the VVD and the PVV on both dimensions. Based on the CDA’s location in the same quadrant as the PVV one would expect its motivation to respond to be relatively high, its ability to imitate to be relatively high and its ability to attack to be relatively low. The results disconfirm all three of these expectations. The percentage of total statements represented by the CDA(17.6%) does not differ substantially from the same percentage for GroenLinks(17.1%) for example, while one would expect the percentage for the CDA to be much higher based on its expectedly high motivation to respond. This also accounts for the percentage of CDA-statements being coded as ignorant(1.4%), which also does not differ substantially from the same percentage for GroenLinks (1.4%). Finally, instead of being one of the least attacking parties the percentage of CDA-statements assigned to the attack-theme(94.6%) is the highest of all parties.
5.4.4. D66

D66 is portrayed in figure 5.1. as a right-libertarian party and is therefore positioned in the blue quadrant. D66’s positioning on the left-right dimension lies between the positioning of the VVD and the CDA. And although it is portrayed as a libertarian party it is portrayed as being less libertarian than the PVDA, SP and GroenLinks. Base on D66’s position on the two-dimensional issue space one would expect its motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be higher than the PVDA’s, SP’s and GroenLinks’ while being lower than the VVD’s and CDA’s. The results regarding the percentage of total statements represented by D66, the results do not indicate an expected intermediate value for D66, as with 27,6% of all statements being represented by D66, of all parties D66 represents the largest share of all statements. Considering the percentage of D66-statements being coded as ignorant(2,6%) does indicate an intermediate value as this percentage is higher than the same percentage for GroenLinks(1,4%) and lower than the same percentage for the VVD(6,9%). However, this result is in a different direction as expected.

Based on its positioning one would expect D66’s ability to attack to be lower than the PVDA’s, SP’s and GroenLinks’ while being higher than the VVD’s and CDA’s. The expected intermediate value of the percentage of D66-statements assigned to the attack-theme is confirmed by the results. However, once again point to a different direction than what one would expect as the percentage assigned to the attack-theme for D66 (75,9%) is much higher than the same percentage for the PVDA (29,0%) and lower than the same percentage for the CDA (94,6%). Furthermore this percentage lies within a 5%-range of the same percentage for all other parties.

5.4.5. SP

The SP is positioned in the blue quadrant with its position being close to the PVDA, D66 and GroenLinks. Based on its position one would expect the SP’s motivation to respond to be relatively low, its ability to imitate to be low as well while simultaneously expecting its ability to attack to be relatively high. The percentage of total statements represented by the SP(13,1%) does indicate that behind the PVDA the SP has been the most ignorant party towards the PVV. Considering the percentage of SP-statements being coded is ignorant(5,5%) also confirms the expectation of the SP being one of the most ignorant parties towards the SP. However, it should be noted that the SP is being portrayed as less ignorant than the VVD(6,9%) while being more ignorant than GroenLinks(1,4%), and this result should be the other way around as the VVD is located much closer to the PVV while GroenLinks is located further away from the PVV. The percentage of SP-statements coded as attack shows that the SP is slightly more attacking than the VVD and D66, which is as expected, but that it is more attacking than GroenLinks and the PVDA, which is not as expected. In essence, the result regarding the SP are inconclusive.

5.4.6. GroenLinks

In figure 5.1. GroenLinks is portrayed as the party being located on the furthest distance from the PVV on both dimensions. Therefore, according to the expectations, GroenLinks’ motivation to respond and ability to imitate should be the lowest of all parties, while its ability to attack should be the highest of all parties. According to the results GroenLinks is certainly not the most ignorant of all parties, as it represent 17,1% of all statements, which is a much higher percentage than the percentage represented by the PVDA(7,4%) and is similar to the percentages of the VVD (17,1%) and the CDA(17,6%). Furthermore only 1,4% of GroenLinks-statements were coded as ignorant which is
the lowest percentage of all parties. The expectation regarding the ability to attack is also disconfirmed by the results as the percentage of GroenLinks-statements assigned to the attack-theme (80.6%) does not differ from the percentage being assigned to the attack-theme for the VVD (76.4%), D66 (75.9%) – both parties with an expectedly lower ability to attack.

5.4.7. The Explanatory Value of Established Parties Motivation and Ability to Respond

The analysis in the previous sub-paragraphs has shown that the strategies that the established parties applied towards the PVV were not as one would expect based on the expectation as derived in the theoretical framework. In other words, parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond cannot explain the similarities and difference between parties’ reactions towards the PVV. The analysis per party has shown that at best the results were inconclusive, while in a lot of cases the result were contradictory to the expectations. Overall, assessing parties’ motivation and ability to respond could not explain the prominence of the attack strategy for parties being positioned on such varying distance from the PVV as the VVD, SP, D66 and GroenLinks. Apparently, the variance in these parties’ motivation and ability to respond did not have the expected effect on their application of the attack strategy towards the PVV.

5.5. Within- Case Conclusion

With regard to the distribution of statements across years the findings indicate that the majority of statements made by the political leaders of the established parties were made either in 2007 or 2008. When considering the distribution of statements across months peaks of all parties are located either around election periods, around events that were extensively captured by the newspapers or simply in months in which the respective political leaders gave interviews in the newspapers. Overall the period around the release of Wilder’s film Fitna on the 27th of March 2008 represents the most active period in terms of statements made by political leaders as a reaction towards the PVV.

The results regarding the distribution of statements across themes across the total time period has shown that the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy applied by most political parties towards the PVV. The PVDA is an erratic exception to this rule as only 29.0% of statements made by Wouter Bos were assigned to the attack-theme, which is significantly lower than the 77.1% assigned to the attack-theme across the whole sample. While the attack strategy has undoubtedly been the most dominant strategy for all parties, except the PVDA, there are notable differences between parties regarding the object of their attacking statements. While the attacking statements of some parties – e.g. the CDA – were aimed primarily at the policy plans of the PVV, the attacking statements of others – e.g. GroenLinks and D66 – were primarily aimed at the person Wilders. The attacking statements of other parties were more evenly balanced.

Far behind the attack strategy, the attacking others strategy has been identified as the second most prominent strategy applied by the established parties towards the LPF. The attacking others-theme represents 13.6% off all statements and statements of all parties have been assigned to this theme. The political leaders of the established parties did not aim their attacking others statements towards one party in particular. While there are differences between parties with regard to the focus of their attacking others statements, all parties focused their attacks on multiple parties. The ignorance strategy is the third strategy which has been applied by all parties towards the PVV, although across the total sample only 4.3% of all statements were coded into the ignorance-theme. Behind the ignorance-theme the isolation-theme is the fourth most prominent strategy across the sample, with
only statements of four parties – the PVDA, CDA, D66 and SP – being assigned to it. The imitation-strategy’s presence within the sample is completely due to D66, as all imitative statements were made by Alexander Pechtold of D66. Lastly, the neutral strategy was only applied by the CDA and VVD, and represents only 0.7% of the total sample.

By putting the distribution of statements across themes on a time dimension, the analysis has shown the dominance of the attack strategy throughout the total time period. The results indicate that the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy for most parties in the majority of years. A second noteworthy finding that rose to the surface during the analysis is that the great majority of isolative statements were made in one particular month, May 2009, which is the month directly before the European elections in the Netherlands were held.

Last but not least, bringing parties’ motivation and ability to respond into the picture, the analysis has clearly shown that these two factors cannot explain the reactions of the established political parties towards the PVV in the past. At best the results were inconclusive, while in a lot of cases the result were contradictory to the expectations.
6. Cross-Case Analysis

The previous two chapters have presented the results for the LPF-case and the PVV-case respectively, thereby focusing on the strategies that the established parties have applied towards the LPF and PVV respectively. The focus in this chapter will be on comparing the results of both cases in order to determine whether and to what extent the strategies applied by the parties towards the PVV differ from the strategies previously applied by them towards the LPF. The chapter is structured in the exact same way as the previous two chapters, meaning that the focus in the paragraphs will be on the exact same aspects which were analyzed in the within-case reports. The first paragraph will describe the similarities and differences between both cases regarding the distribution of statements across time. The second paragraph will do the same for the distribution of statements across themes with the third paragraph combining both dimensions to describe the similarities and differences regarding the distribution of statements across themes across time. In the fourth paragraph parties’ motivation and ability to respond will enter the analysis, as it will be analyzed whether and to what extent parties’ strategies towards the PVV differ from their strategies towards the LPF due to possible changes regarding their position on the multi-dimensional issue space. The chapter will be concluded by the cross-case conclusion, presented in the fifth paragraph, which will summarize the main findings following from the comparison of both cases.

It should be noted that not all four aspects will be analyzed into the same depth. As the aim of this study is not to conduct a media-analysis, it’s not necessary to compare the distribution of statements across time for each party. Furthermore, it would be rather difficult to compare but cases with regard to this aspect, as comprising 39 months, the time-period of the PVV-case is almost ten times the time period of the LPF-case. Therefore the first paragraph will compare the general findings regarding the distribution of statements across time, rather than assessing this distribution per party. The comparison of the distribution of statements across themes is essential in order to determine whether and to what extent the established parties’ strategies have ‘evolved’ from one case to the other. Therefore the analysis in paragraph two will be conducted per party, which means that rather than focusing on similarities and differences between different parties – as in the within-case reports – the focus will be on the similarities and differences between the two cases for the same party. As it is difficult to compare the LPF-period with the PVV-periods because of the difference in the length of both periods, the comparison of the distribution of statements across themes across time will compare general the general findings of both cases in paragraph three. Lastly, parties’ motivation and ability to respond and their effects on parties’ reaction strategies will be analyzed per party in the fourth paragraph, as these two factors are comparable across both cases, as the same dimensions were used for assessing party positions in both cases.

6.1. Distribution of Statements Across Time

While the total time period of the PVV-case differs substantially in length compared to the total time period of the LPF-case – with the time period of the PVV-case being almost ten times the time period of the LPF-case – the number of total statements in the PVV-case lies only 66,0% higher than the number of statements in the LPF-case. This finding may indicate that political leaders of the established parties may have felt a greater need to react towards the LPF than they have felt towards the PVV, as with regard to the LPF they made more than half the number of statements made during the PVV-period in only four months of time. However, it should be noted that while the time period of the LPF-case entails only four months, during these four months two elections were held. And as
the analysis in both cases has shown, the time periods just before and after election dates were the periods in which political leaders’ statements were published the most in the newspapers.

Other moments in time in which peaks in the number of statements could be observed in both cases were periods in which one particular event attributable to the new entrants, or statement made by the political leader of the new entrants was widely captured by the press. A key example in this regard is Wilder’s movie Fitna which received extensive attention from the press in the early months of 2008. Still other moments in time in which peaks in the number of statements could be observed in both cases were moments in time at which interviews of the political leaders were published in the newspapers. Obviously, as the time period of the PVV-case is longer, more interviews were given by the political leaders of the established parties during this period than during the LPF-period. This logic also applies to the number of elections and number of captured events and statements attributable to the new entrant. In essence, while more peaks regarding the number of statements are observable in the PVV-period compared to the LPF-period the peaks in both cases indicate to three possible things; (1) elections, (2) actions of the new entrant party or its leader which is captured extensively by the press or (3) interviews with political leaders published in one or more newspapers.

6.2. Distribution of Statements Across Themes

Analyzing the similarities and differences regarding the distribution of statements across both cases is crucial, as it is the primary assessment of whether and to what extent the strategies applied by the established parties towards the LPF and PVV respectively have changed from one case to the other. As the distribution of statements across themes has been assessed in percentages for both cases, similarities and differences regarding this distribution can be easily observed. Tables 6.1. on the next page shows the percentages for both cases regarding the distribution of statements across themes, while table 6.2. shows the percentages for both cases of the distribution of themes across parties. By comparing these percentages it is possible to determine for each party whether and how the number of strategies applied, the type of strategies applied and the prominence of the strategies applied differs between the cases. In other words, it is possible to assess whether and how each parties’ portfolio of applied strategies has changed from one case to the other. The analysis for each of the established parties is presented in the following six sub-paragraphs.

6.2.1. PVDA

Interestingly, of all parties taken into account, the PVDA is the only party of which the absolute number of statements is greater in the LPF-case than in the PVV-case, with the number of statements being 52,3% lower in the PVV-case than in the LPF-case. Concretely, this means that in four years time Wouter Bos made less than half the number of statements that Ad Melkert made in four months. This may indicate that the PVDA felt less need (and hence was less motivated) to react to the PVV than it felt to react to the LPF. In both cases the PVDA applied the exact same strategies – ignorance, attack, isolation and attacking others – towards the new entrant party in question. The relative distribution of statements across these themes differs substantially for both cases though, with the most notable difference being observable with regard to the attack-theme. The percentage of attacking statements in the PVV-case is 49,5% lower compared to the LPF-case. Not surprisingly as the attack strategy is less prominent in the PVV-case all other applied strategies – ignorance, isolation and attacking others – are more prominent compared to the LPF-case. Interestingly, the
Table 6.1. Distribution of Statements Across Themes in Both Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PVDA</th>
<th>VVD</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>D66</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>GL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ignorance</strong></td>
<td>4.6% (5)</td>
<td>16.1% (5)</td>
<td>12.3% (7)</td>
<td>6.9% (5)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>1.4% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack</strong></td>
<td>79.5% (51)</td>
<td>29.9% (9)</td>
<td>77.2% (44)</td>
<td>75.4% (55)</td>
<td>72.8% (37)</td>
<td>44.6% (70)</td>
<td>59.1% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imitation</strong></td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Isolation</strong></td>
<td>4.6% (5)</td>
<td>19.3% (6)</td>
<td>3.3% (3)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>2.4% (1)</td>
<td>18.2% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral</strong></td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>5.3% (3)</td>
<td>2.8% (2)</td>
<td>19.2% (9)</td>
<td>1.4% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attacking Others</strong></td>
<td>12.3% (8)</td>
<td>35.5% (11)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>19.9% (10)</td>
<td>2.1% (1)</td>
<td>1.4% (1)</td>
<td>22.7% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (65)</td>
<td>100% (31)</td>
<td>100% (57)</td>
<td>100% (72)</td>
<td>100% (47)</td>
<td>100% (74)</td>
<td>100% (22)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 6.2. Distribution of Themes Across Parties in Both Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ignorance</th>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>Imitation</th>
<th>Isolation</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Attacking Others</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
<td>PVV-Case</td>
<td>LPF-Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PVDA</strong></td>
<td>25.0% (3)</td>
<td>27.8% (5)</td>
<td>26.4% (31)</td>
<td>2.8% (9)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>30.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VVD</strong></td>
<td>53.3% (7)</td>
<td>27.8% (5)</td>
<td>22.8% (44)</td>
<td>17.0% (55)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>30.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDA</strong></td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>5.6% (1)</td>
<td>19.2% (37)</td>
<td>21.6% (70)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D66</strong></td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>16.7% (3)</td>
<td>6.7% (13)</td>
<td>27.2% (88)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
<td>40.0% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SP</strong></td>
<td>16.7% (2)</td>
<td>16.7% (3)</td>
<td>6.2% (12)</td>
<td>15.8% (44)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GL</strong></td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>5.6% (1)</td>
<td>18.7% (35)</td>
<td>17.9% (58)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (12)</td>
<td>100% (18)</td>
<td>100% (192)</td>
<td>100% (320)</td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
<td>100% (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the attacking others strategy has been the most prominent strategy applied by the PVDA towards the LPF. Across both cases this is the only instance in which the attack strategy has not been the dominant strategy for a party over the total time period. While Wouter Bos made relatively less attacking statements than Ad Melkert, there is also a notable difference with regard to the object of the attacking statements. While the attacking statements of Melkert became more personally oriented towards the latter stages of the LPF-period, the attacking statements of Bos were primarily policy-oriented throughout the entire time period. There is also a notable difference between the attacking others statements made by Melkert and those made by Bos. While the majority of Melkert’s attacking others statements were aimed at the CDA, the attacking others statements of Bos were aimed at multiple parties.

6.2.2. VVD

For the VVD the number of statements made by its political leader regarding the new entrant in question was 26.3% higher in the PVV-case than the number of statements made in the LPF-case, although the VVD represents a lower percentage of total statements for the PVV-case compared to the LPF-case. The VVD applied the same number of strategies towards both the LPF and the PVV, but the portfolio of strategies it applied towards both cases differs. The isolation-theme is present for the LPF-case but not for the PVV-case, while the attacking others-theme is present for the PVV-case but not for the LPF-case. The attack strategy is dominant in both cases and the percentage of statements assigned to the attack-theme lies in the 76-78% range for both cases. An qualitative analysis of the attacking statements of Dijkstal and Rutte indicates that in both cases the attacking statements of the VVD were partially policy-focused and partially personal attacks. The most noteworthy difference between the two cases regarding the portfolio of strategies applied is the emergence of the attacking others-theme as the second most prominent theme in the PVV-case, while no statements of the VVD were assigned to this theme for the LPF-case. Lastly looking at the percentage of statements assigned to the ignorance-theme in both cases shows that the VVD has been one of the most ignorant parties in both cases. Regarding the LPF it has been the most ignorant party, while regarding the PVV it has been the most ignorant party behind the PVDA.

6.2.3. CDA

The CDA is an interesting case to compare across both cases, as it had the same political leader during both time periods. There is one important difference regarding this political leader between both cases though. While Balkenende has been the prime-minister throughout the PVV-period, he was not yet prime-minister throughout the LPF-period. Balkenende’s installment as prime-minister may account for some of the differences between both cases regarding the CDA. The first of these differences is the difference in the number of statements made by Balkenende in both cases, with this number being 57.4% higher in the PVV-case. In both cases the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy for the CDA, with it being more prominent during in the PVV-case than in the LPF-case. While all of Balkenende’s attacking statements towards the LPF were policy-focused, his statements also included personal attacks towards Wilders in the PVV-case. It should be noted though that the majority of Balkenende’s attacking statements during remained policy-focused in the PVV-case. In the LPF-case the attack strategy and the neutral strategy were the most prominent strategies with the attack strategy being the dominant theme. The only notable difference with regard to the application of other strategies is the lost prominence of the neutral strategy in the PVV-case. While the neutral strategy was the second most prominent strategy of the CDA towards the LPF, not much was left of this prominence in the PVV-case. Across both cases, the number of
statements assigned to the ignorance-theme, isolation-theme and attacking others-theme – is so limited that the statements assigned to those themes might indicate incidental statements of Balkenende.

6.2.4. D66

D66 is the party with the largest difference between the number of statements made in the LPF-case and the PVV-case. While Thom De Graaf made only 22 statements regarding LPF-case, thereby representing only 8,7% of the total sample, Alexander Pechtold made 116 statements regarding the PVV-case, thereby representing 27,6% of the total sample. This increase in the number of statements represents an increase of 427,3%. In both cases the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy applied by D66, with its prominence being greater in the PVV-case. Pechtold did not only make relatively more attacking statements than De Graaf, his attacking statements also qualitatively differ from those made by De Graaf as Pechtold’s attacking statements were more personally aimed and more outspoken than De Graaf’s statements. The increased prominence of the attack strategy in the PVV-case seems to have been at the cost of mainly the isolation strategy. While 18,2% of all statements made by De Graaf were assigned to the isolation-theme only 1,7% of the statements made by Pechtold were assigned to the isolation-theme. Conclusively one could state that while the relative distribution of statements between both cases – the great majority of statements was coded into the three non-accommodative strategies – attack, isolation and attacking others – in both cases.

6.2.5. SP

For the SP, the number of statements made in the PVV-case, is 252,9% higher than the number of statements made in the LPF-case. In both cases though, the SP present a relatively small percentage of the total sample of statements. The first noteworthy difference between the two cases for the SP is observable with regard to the number of strategies applied. While the SP applied only two strategies – ignorance and attack – towards the LPF, it applied two additional strategies – isolation and attacking others – towards the PVV. The attack strategy has been the dominant strategy in both cases. The majority of attacking statements made by Marijnissen were aimed at the policy plans of the LPF and PVV respectively, although the personal attacks towards Wilders were more outspoken than the personal attacks towards Fortuyn. All isolative statements of the SP across both cases were made by Agnes Kant, while all attacking others statements across both cases were made by Jan Marijnissen.

6.2.6. GroenLinks

The number of statements made by Femke Halsema during the PVV-period is 50,0% higher that the number of statements made by Paul Rosenmöller in the LPF-period. Looking at the relative distribution of statements across themes shows that this distribution for GroenLinks is roughly the same in both cases. The attack strategy is the dominant strategy in both cases, followed by the attacking others strategy. While the attacking statements of Rosenmöller towards the LPF were primarily aimed at Fortuyn, the attacking statements of Halsema towards the PVV were more in balance, partially policy-focused and partially aimed at the person Wilders. Halsema’s personal attacks are similar to the personal attacks of Rosenmöller and in some instances involve the same choice of words. For example, of all politicians Rosenmöller and Halsema are the only politicians to have used the word ‘charlatan’ while referring to Fortuyn and Wilders respectively. With regard to the attacking others statements, in both cases there is not one particular party at which the attacking
others statements of GroenLinks were aimed. In both cases these statements were aimed at multiple parties.

6.3. Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time
As already explained in the first paragraph it is difficult to compare the time periods of both cases with each other as the time period for the PVV-case is much longer than the time period of the LPF-case. However it is possible to determine the similarities and differences between both the general trends regarding the distribution of strategies across time which were observed in both cases. Such cross-case comparison of the evolution of the established parties’ strategies throughout both time periods confirms one recurring finding; the dominance of the attack strategy. While the attack-strategy has been by far the most prominent strategy in both cases over the total time period, the analysis in the previous two chapters has shown that the attack strategy has been the most prominent strategy throughout both time periods for most parties. This entails that most established parties have timed their attacking statements throughout both time periods, meaning that their political leader have made attacking statements on an ongoing basis.

With regard to the timing of the other strategies no trends across both cases can be observed. While in the LPF-case it was determined that the ignorance strategy was mostly applied by parties in the early stages of the time period this trend could not be observed in the PVV-case. In fact in the PVV-case the beginning stages of the time period were the only stages at which no ignorant statements were being made. While in the PVV-case it was determined that the isolative statements were timed primarily at the end of the time period for all parties applying the isolation strategy, no such trends was observable regarding the timing of isolative statements. The political leaders making isolative statements, did not make them at one particular moment in time, but made them at very different moments in time. With regard to the distribution of other strategies across time no trends were observed in both cases, which entails that no such trends could be observed across the cases. Essentially there are no observable patterns across both cases with regard to the distribution of strategies across time other than the attack strategy being the most prominent strategy throughout time in both cases.

6.4. The Established Parties’ Motivation and Ability to Respond
During the within-case analyses in chapter four and five, the established parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond were assessed in order to determine whether and to what extent these parties’ portfolio of strategies applied towards the new entrants could be explained by their motivation and ability to respond. The results in both cases indicated that these were crystal clear, the parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond could not explain these portfolio’s of strategies. In other words, the motivation and ability to respond could not explain the similarities and differences between the strategies applied by different parties. In the analysis presented in the following six sub-paragraphs the focus will be on determining whether and to what extent the motivation of parties to respond and the ability of parties to respond can explain the difference between the two cases for the same parties. The two-dimensional issue space of Aarts & Thomassen will be used to assess differences in parties’ motivation and ability to respond between the two cases. Figure 6.1., on the next page, presents the two-dimensional issue space for both cases. On the basis of this figure one can assess whether and in which direction party positions have changed between the two cases. By comparing the expected values of the indicators as presented in table 4.1. it is possible to assess whether and to what extent differences in parties positioning in the two-
Figure 6.1. Common Party Spaces in 2002 and 2006
dimensional issue space can explain differences in the values of the indicators. This analysis for each party is presented in the following six sub-paragraphs.

**6.4.1. PVDA**

In the two issue spaces depicted in figure 6.1, the distance between the PVDA and the LPF seems to be approximately equal to the distance between the PVDA and the PVV. Therefore one would expect the PVDA’s motivation to respond, ability to imitate and ability to attack to be approximately equal in both cases. This entails that all indicators should have similar values in both cases. A quick look at tables 6.1 and 6.2 shows an entirely different picture though as all indicators differ between both cases. The most striking difference is with regard to the percentage of statements being coded as attacking, with the difference being 49.5% between the two cases. This difference cannot be explained by differences regarding the PVDA’s positioning towards the LPF and PVV respectively, as there is no observable difference in that regard.

**6.4.2. VVD**

The VVD is positioned closer to the LPF in the issue space of 2002 than to the PVV in the issue space of 2006. Therefore one would either expect the percentages regarding the indicators to be approximately the same or one would expect the VVD’s motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be lower and ability to attack to be higher in the PVV-case compared to the LPF-case. The results are inconclusive. With regard to the motivation to respond the percentage of total statements represented by the VVD is lower for the PVV-case as expected. However, the other indicator, the percentage of VVD-statements coded as ignorant is higher for the LPF-case, which is not as expected. So the indicators of the motivation to respond show contradictory results. The indicator for the ability to attack – the percentage of attacking statements – has nearly equal values for both cases, with 77.2% of VVD-statements codes as attacking in the VVD-case and 76.4% of VVD-statements coded as attacking in the PVV-case. While the difference between the two values is less than a percent, it is not in the expected direction. One would have expected the percentage of attacking statements to be higher in the PVV-case as the VVD is positioned further away from the PVV than it is from the LPF, meaning that its ability to attack is expectedly higher.

**6.4.3. CDA**

The CDA is also positioned closer towards the LPF in the issue space of 2002 than towards the PVV in the issue space of 2006. Therefore compared to the LPF-case one would expect the CDA’s motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be slightly lower and its ability to attack to be slightly higher in the PVV-case. The results with regard to the CDA are in the expected directions. The CDA has been more ignorant towards the PVV than it has been towards the LPF, although the differences between both cases regarding both indicators of the motivation to respond are minimal, 1.4% and 1% respectively. The results also indicate that the CDA has been more attacking towards the PVV than it has been towards the LPF, however in this case the difference between both cases is substantial, 15.9% to be precise. So while the differences between both cases are in the expected directions, it is doubtful whether the difference in the positioning of the CDA in both cases can explain the simultaneous relatively modest differences regarding the motivation to respond and the more substantial difference with regard to the ability to attack.

**6.4.4. D66**

Of all parties the greatest observable difference regarding the distance to the LPF and the PVV respectively can be observed for D66 as it is positioned much closer to the PVV in the issue space of
2006 than to the LPF in the issue space of 2002. This means that compared to the LPF-case, one would expect D66’s motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be higher while its ability to attack to be lower in the PVV-case. The results in table 6.2. show that D66 represents 27.6% of all statements in the PVV-case, while it represents only 8.7% of all statements in the LPF-case. This indicates that D66’s motivation to respond has indeed been higher towards the PVV than it has been towards the LPF. However, the other indicator of the motivation to respond – the percentage of statements assigned to the ignorance-theme – portrays D66 as being more ignorant towards the PVV than towards the LPF, although the difference between both cases is only 2.6%. The difference between both cases regarding the percentage of attacking statements is also not in the expected direction, with the difference between both cases being a substantial 16.8%.

Interestingly D66 is the only party of which differences regarding the ability to imitate can be observed, with the only imitative statements across both cases being represented by D66 in the PVV-case. This results is in the expected direction, however as D66 is the only party of which imitative statements were found, it is difficult to interpret this result. As some differences regarding the indicators are as expected, while other are not as expected, the results regarding the D66 are inconclusive, meaning that it’s unlikely that the difference regarding its positioning towards the LPF and PVV respectively can explain all the differences in the percentages between both cases.

6.4.5. SP
The SP’s distance towards the LPF on the issue space of 2002 is similar to its distance to the PVV on the issue space of 2006. Based on the SP’s positioning in both cases, one would expect all indicators regarding the motivation to respond, the ability to imitate and the ability to attack to have approximately equal values. However, as the percentages in table 6.1. and 6.2. illustrate there are differences between both cases regarding both the indicators of the motivation to respond and the indicators of the ability to attack. First of all the percentage of statements represented by the SP is higher for the PVV-case(13.1%) than it is for the LPF-case(5.5%). The percentage of ignorant statements is higher in the LPF-case(14.3%) than it is in the PVV-case however (5.5%). Lastly, the percentage of attacking statements is higher in the LPF-case(85.7%) than it is for the PVV-case(80.0%). All these differences between both cases regarding the percentages cannot be explained by the difference regarding the distance between the SP and the LPF and the SP and the PVV as the there is no observable difference in that regard.

6.4.6. GroenLinks
GroenLinks is positioned marginally closer to the PVV than to the LPF, which entails that compared to the LPF-case one would expect its motivation to respond and ability to imitate to be nearly equal or slightly higher while simultaneously expecting its ability to attack to be nearly equal or slightly lower in the PVV-case. As the expectation regarding GroenLinks are twofold, the results regarding GroenLinks can be interpreted in two ways. First of all one could state that while there are difference to regarding all indicators between both cases, these differences are not significant. In fact, of all parties the differences regarding the distribution of statements across themes between the two cases are the smallest for GroenLinks. Therefore one could state the results regarding GroenLinks are as expected.

The second interpretation of the results may be that while the differences between both cases regarding the indicators are marginal, the difference are not in the expected directions. The
percentage of statements represented by GroenLinks is higher for the LPF-case (19,0%) than it is for the PVV-case (17,1%). The percentage of GroenLinks-statements being coded as ignorant is higher for the PVV-case (1,4%) than for the LPF-case (0,0%). These marginal differences indicate that GroenLinks has been more ignorant towards the PVV than it has been towards the LPF, while it is positioned closer to the PVV than it is to the LPF. Also instead of being less attacking towards the PVV, GroenLinks has been more attacking towards the PVV, which is also not as one would expect. In essence the marginally closer positioning of GroenLinks to the PVV cannot explain the differences in the percentages. Although the difference in these percentages may not seem to be significant, the differences are not in the expected directions.

6.5. Cross-Case Conclusion

The most important findings that resulted from the cross-case analysis are summarized in the below sections. The findings are categorized along the four aspects on which the within-case analyses in the two previous chapters and the cross-case analysis in this chapter has focused.

(1) The Distribution of Statements Across Time

- While it is difficult to compare the time periods of both cases, regarding the distribution of statements across time the cross-case analysis has shown that most statements made by political leaders towards new entrants have been made either in;
  - time periods just before and after elections,
  - at moments in time in which the new entrant’s political leader made a statement which was captured extensively by the press and lastly
  - at moments in time in which interviews with the political leaders of the established parties were published in one or multiple newspapers.

(2) The Distribution of Statements Across Themes

- Across the sample, the attack strategy has been the dominant strategy in both cases for all parties, with one exception – the PVDA in the PVV-case.

- Far behind the attack strategy, the attacking others strategy – which is a non a priori defined theme – has been applied the most by the established parties’ in both cases. This means that attacking other parties with regard to their reaction towards the new entrant has been a popular strategy for both cases.

- The imitation strategy – which is one of the three a priori defined theory-related themes, was found to be the least applied strategy across both cases, with only statements of D66 in the PVV-case being coded into the imitation-theme.

- With regard to other strategies the cross-case analysis has shown that the ignorance strategy is applied by all parties in at least one of the cases, the isolation strategy has been applied by all parties except GroenLinks in at least one of the cases, while the neutral strategy has been applied only by the VVD and the CDA, with the majority of the statements stemming from the CDA in the LPF-case.
The cross-case analysis has shown that the distribution of statements across themes differs between cases for each party, although the differences are greater for some parties than for others.

- The PVDA is the only party which applied exactly the same strategies towards both the LPF and the PVV. All other parties applied roughly the same strategies towards the PVV as towards the LPF plus one or more other strategies not applied before. The VVD represents the only party of which a strategy – the isolation strategy – applied towards the LPF was not applied towards the PVV.

- While the difference in percentages can be substantial, in general a negative difference regarding one strategy is compensated by a positive difference in another closely related strategy.

(3) **The Distribution of Statements Across Themes Across Time**

Across both cases there are no observable patterns with regard to the distribution of strategies across time other than the attack strategy being the most prominent strategy throughout time in both cases.

(4) **Explanatory Value of Established Parties’ Motivation and Ability To Respond**

The cross-case analysis has illustrated that established parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond cannot explain differences in the strategies that a party applied towards the PVV opposed to the strategies the same party used towards the LPF. In the within-case analyses it was already illustrated that parties’ motivation and ability to respond could not explain differences in the strategies applied between different parties. As the motivation to respond and ability to respond could not explain differences between different parties within a case, nor differences between the same party between cases, its explanatory value is either negligible or has not been observed.
7. Discussion

After presenting the most noteworthy, interesting and important findings in the previous three chapters, it is time to put these findings into perspective. That is exactly what this chapter is all about, as it addresses the possible explanations for the findings and the potential implications of these findings for both extant discontinuous innovation literature and extant political literature. The central interest thereby is addressing the applicability of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere. In order to assess this applicability, the first step is to relate findings to the central research question, this is the aim of the first paragraph. The second paragraph will relate the findings to extant discontinuous innovation literature and will address the potential implications of these findings for discontinuous innovation research. In similar fashion, the third paragraph will link the findings to extant Public Choice literature and address the potential implications for conceptualizing political competition. The chapter will be concluded by paragraph four with a final ‘judgment’ regarding the applicability of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere.

7.1. Linking Results to the Central Research Question

The most evident and recurring finding of the research is related to the distribution of the strategies that the Dutch national political parties applied towards new entrant parties. The results have clearly shown that these parties have reacted attackingly both towards the LPF and the PVV. While all parties pursued a portfolio of strategies towards both new entrants, the attack strategy was found to be the prominent strategy both within and across cases. Importantly, the analysis of the statements made by the political leaders of the established parties has shown that there are observable differences between parties regarding the objects of their attacks – the balance between policy-focused and personal attacks to be more precise. The remaining two a priori defined strategies – ignorance and imitation were found to be represented only marginally across the sample, surprisingly the representation of the imitation strategy was found to be idiosyncratic. Interestingly, the attacking others strategy – which is one of the three strategies that emerged during the data analysis process – was found to be the second most prominent strategy behind attack. Apparently the established parties did not only attack the new entrant parties, but they attacked each other regarding their respective reactions towards those new entrants as well. In essence the key finding regarding the reactions of established parties towards new entrants is that all parties applied mostly non-accommodative strategies towards both towards the LPF and the PVV.

The second key finding of the research is related to the possible explanations for the response strategies applied by the established parties towards the new entrants – their motivation to respond and their ability to respond. The analysis has clearly illustrated that the applied strategies cannot be explained by assessing established parties’ motivation to respond in terms of the ‘degree of relatedness’ to the new entrant and assessing their ability to respond in terms of the ‘degree of conflict’ with the new entrant. Differences between established parties’ reactions could either not be observed or the observed differences were not as one would have expected based on an assessment of the degree of relatedness and the degree of conflict on the basis of established parties’ positioning on the two-dimensional issue space.
7.2. Implications for Discontinuous Innovation Literature

7.2.1. Relating the Findings
Since the typology of response strategies as developed by Charitou & Markides serves as the foundation of the theoretical framework it is relevant to relate the findings of this research to the findings of Charitou & Markides. In short, comparing the findings shows that the findings of the research are not in line with the findings of Charitou & Markides, both with regard to the relative applications of response strategies across the research samples and the factors explaining the applications of these response strategies. First of all, Charitou & Markides’ found that two-thirds of their sample of established organizations responded to what they labeled as ‘disruptive innovations’ by adopting it in some form. In contrast, the results of this research indicate that established political parties responded to new entrants not by pursuing adoptive strategies – labeled as ‘imitation’ for the purposes of this research – but by attacking them. In fact, as mentioned before, the imitation strategy’s representation across the sample of established parties was found to be idiosyncratic.

Furthermore, while Charitou & Markides claim that the responses of the established organizations within their sample can be explained by assessing these organizations’ motivation to respond – in terms of the degree of relatedness between the existing business and the new business – and ability to respond – in terms of the degree of conflict between the existing business and the new business, the findings of this research clearly illustrate that such an assessment of established parties’ motivation and ability to respond cannot explain the responses of these parties towards new entrants.

In essence, the results not being in line with the findings of Charitou & Markides point to a twofold conclusion; not only did the established political parties taken into account in this research react differently towards new entrants than the established organizations taken into account in Charitou & Markides’ research, but also the reactions of these established parties could not be explained by the factors found to be explaining the reactions of established organizations. There may be several explanations for the conflicting findings and the results not being in line with the findings of Charitou & Markides may have several implications for discontinuous innovation literature. These explanations and implications will be outlined in the following sections.

7.2.2. Towards a Contingent Typology of Response Strategies
The idiosyncratic representation of the imitation strategy across the sample of established political parties might indicate that established organizations are more able to imitate new entrant organizations than established political parties are able to imitate new entrant parties. One could even argue that it is relatively easier for an established organization to imitate a new entrant’s product or process than it is for an established party to imitate the political ideas or issue positions of a new entrant party. Arguably, it doesn’t matter to most customers of an established organization whether the product idea originates from this organization itself or from another organization. However, it is most likely that it does matter to voters from which party a certain political idea originates. The data provide evidence to believe that a party that even appears to be imitating another party, immediately becomes vulnerable to attacks from the public, its own ranks and other parties. For example, whenever Mark Rutte of the VVD made a statement about immigration issues in general and the Islam in particular, he was accused by other parties of tailgating Wilders. In similar fashion, whenever Ad Melkert of the PVDA made a statement about public safety, he was accused of copying the ideas of Fortuyn, even by his own ranks. In essence this might indicate that once a new
entrant party is associated with a certain issue dimension or issue position, it is nearly impossible for an established party to publicly imitate the new entrant. And this may explain the marginal representation of the imitation strategy within the sample of established political parties compared to the prominent representation of the imitation strategy within the sample of established organizations in Charitou & Markides’ research. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that political outcomes are mutually exclusive. While established organizations can produce multiple different products and multiple types of the same product simultaneously, it is not possible for an established party to occupy multiple positions on a certain issue dimension. For example, a political party is either in favor of or against abortion, it cannot occupy both positions simultaneously. Inherently, the mutual exclusiveness of political “products” makes imitation difficult. Sticking with the example of abortion, a party which has been against abortion for years, cannot suddenly take the position in favor of abortion if a new entrant proves to be successful with occupying such a position, without risking losing the support of its own ranks.

The prominence of the attack strategy across the sample of established political parties might indicate that these parties are more attacking than their peers in the business world. Importantly though, the prominent application of the attack strategy in the political world compared to the business world might be explained by the unique characteristics of the political market compared to the economic market. As competition between political parties in the Netherlands is in essence a zero-sum game (hence the gains of some parties are exactly balanced by the loss of others) between a relatively limited number of players, which takes place on a relatively open market (hence there is no electoral threshold), established parties might perceive every new entrant as a threat, regardless of the degree of relatedness to the new entrant and the degree of conflict with the new entrant. Essentially, the successful entrance of a new political party concerns every established party.

The abovementioned notion is important as it indicates that the type of market might influence the type of response strategies applied. This raises the question whether the typology of Charitou & Markides is applicable to all types of markets. Are the response strategies of established organizations towards new entrants in a market characterized by a large number of relatively small players the same as the response strategies of established organizations in a market characterized by a small number of powerful players? Probably not. As such there is a need for a contingent typology of response strategies, which specifies the parameters of its applicability. Instead of presenting the typology of response strategies as a universal typology, the typology would be more useful if it would outline the conditions under which it is likely to be applicable. Future applications of the typology in different types of markets could denote an important step towards determining its parameters.

7.2.3. Towards an Elaborate and Dynamic Typology of Response Strategies

While Charitou & Markides acknowledge that an established organization can apply different response strategies towards different disruptive innovations, they do not take into account the option of an established organization applying different response strategies towards one and the same innovation. One of the findings of this research though is that established political parties applied different strategies towards one and the same new entrant. Importantly such a portfolio view of response strategies might be applicable to the business world as well, as it is relatively easy to think of situations in which an established organization might apply multiple strategies in reaction to a new entrant firm. For example, an established organization could decide to ignore the new entrant at first, but as time passes and the new entrant becomes more and more successful come to
the realization that it can no longer ignore the new entrant. Similarly, an established organization opting the “attack back and disrupt the disruption strategy” might come to the realization that the new entrant’s way of doing things has become the dominant design and therefore opt for an imitation strategy. Both examples point to the fact that established organizations could apply multiple strategies towards one and the same new entrant and that the application of strategies might evolve as time passes. Therefore incorporating a portfolio or evolutionary view into the typology of response strategies might be an interesting addition to the existing typology. In this sense, future research should focus on how the response strategies applied by established organizations in reaction to new entrants evolved over time.

The findings also indicate that the response strategies as defined by Charitou & Markides might not be the only strategies which established organizations can apply towards new entrants as three strategies emerged during the data analysis process which might typify the reactions of established organizations towards new entrants as well – the neutral strategy, the isolation strategy and the attacking others strategy. In the business context, the neutral strategy could involve an established organization playing a waiting game, keeping a close eye on developments regarding the new entrant while simultaneously exploring possible future reactions towards the new entrant without excluding a certain strategy in advance. It’s important to note that the neutral strategy differs from all a priori defined strategies as it is neither a deliberate decision not to react (ignorance) nor a deliberate decision to react (imitation / attack). Instead it should be thought of as a deliberate suspension of the decision to react. Although it is somewhat more difficult to envision the isolation strategy in the business context in the exact same application as in the political context, it is possible if one considers isolation as an extreme or aggressive type of the attack strategy. In that sense the isolation strategy could involve an established organization attempting to deny a new entrant firm access to the market or attempting to force the new entrant out of business once it has entered the market.

While both the neutral strategy and the isolation strategy could be interesting additions to the existing typology of response strategies, it’s the attacking others strategy that should be considered as the most promising addition to the typology. The attacking others strategy refers to a situation in which the established parties, while attacking a new entrant party, simultaneously attacked each other. In some instances, the reaction of an established party towards a new entrant induced a reaction of other established parties towards this established party. This indicates that political competition is a much more complicated and dynamic phenomenon than the application of the developed typology of response strategies would suggest. In similar fashion, economic competition is arguably more complicated and dynamic than suggested by the typology of Charitou & Markides. Arguably, the attacking others strategy is not only present in economic markets, but it is more rule than exception on most of those markets.

The recent confrontations between Apple en Google with regard to their respective smart-phones, the Apple iPhone and Google’s Nexus One present an excellent example of the ‘presence’ of the attacking others strategy in the business world. In their constant search of applications to add to their respective smart-phones both Apple and Google decided to incorporate a digital advertising network into their mobile phones. Instead of developing the capabilities (read technologies) required for mobile advertising themselves, both Apple and Google decided to adopt these capabilities from new companies specialized in mobile advertising. In their efforts to adopt the necessary capabilities, both companies targeted one and the same mobile advertising company, AdMob. After a struggle
Google succeeded in acquiring AdMob and Apple was forced to acquire another company, Quattro Wireless to launch its iAd – application. Interestingly, this initial confrontation between Apple and Google was the beginning of a series of confrontations between both companies not just on the mobile phone market but on other markets as well, with both companies ultimately accusing the other of defiling each other’s patents. The key point of this example is that it illustrates that the competition between Apple and Google may have influenced their strategy towards AdMob, while their strategy towards AdMob may have influenced their competitive strategy towards each other. So in essence, the attacking others strategy might be an important addition to the existing typology of response strategies as the strategies that established organizations apply towards each other might influence the strategies they apply towards new entrants and vice versa. The picture gets even more complicated if one considers that organizations like Apple and Google face competition from both new entrants and other established organizations on multiple markets.

To recap, the central argument in the above sections has been that there is a need for a more elaborate typology of response strategies which comprises the option of applying multiple strategies towards one and the same new entrant and which comprises response strategies, which are lacking from the existing typology of response strategies as developed by Charitou & Markides. So in essence the above discussion has highlighted a number of limitations of the existing typology and suggested a number of additions. One final limitation which has not been addressed in the above sections is that the typology does not does not specify the preconditions for its application. By preconditions is not meant the circumstances under which the typology is applicable (already addressed in sub-paragraph 7.2.2.), but the ‘input’ needed to apply the typology in practice. The whole application of the typology relies on the established organization in question having sufficient information about the new entrant’s business. This information is necessary in order to determine this organization’s motivation and ability to respond, factors which in turn determine the response strategy to opt for. While Charitou & Markides bluntly assume that an established organization is able to gather sufficient information about the new entrant’s business, this assumption may be unfounded, as the central claim of scholars describing the challenges of discontinuous innovation (Foster, 1986; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Christensen & Overdorff, 2000) is that established organizations lack the capabilities to even identify discontinuous innovations, let alone react adequately to these kinds of innovations. Therefore future research should focus on prescribing which exact information is needed about the new entrant’s business in order to determine the degree of relatedness and degree of conflict and even more importantly, how to derive this information.

7.2.4. Possible Other or Additional Determinants of Response Strategies.

The finding that the degree of relatedness and conflict between the established parties and the new entrant parties could not explain established parties’ reactions towards new entrants, indicates that the degree of relatedness and the degree of conflict might not be sufficient indicators of parties’ motivation to respond and ability to respond. With regard to parties’ motivation to respond, the results point to the importance of the success of the new entrant. For example, the analysis of the distribution of statements across themes across time in the LPF-case has shown that while some of the established parties were somewhat ignorant towards the LPF right after its foundation, this posture changed after the LPF’s success at the municipal elections on the 6th of March 2002. The possible effect of the success of the new entrant on incumbent firm’s reactions towards new entrants is acknowledged in the business context as well. For example, one of Foster’s central claims is that in most cases incumbent firms react to new entrants only after these new entrants have
become successful (Foster, 1986). He describes a four stage process in which the new entrant enters a niche market and slowly moves up to the mainstream market, and it is exactly at that point that established organizations become motivated to react. Importantly, while the success of new entrants might signify the point at which incumbent firms react to new entrants in practice, it might not induce the most successful reactions towards new entrants as one of the central elements of Foster’s hubristic errors (depicted in figure 2.1. on page 12) is that incumbent firms should react before the new entrant has become successful.

The indications with regard to the factors potentially determining the ability to respond are less obvious. However, two findings may hint that factors other than the degree of conflict might influence the reactions of this incumbents towards the new entrants. First of all, the analysis has shown that most established Dutch national political parties reacted in similar fashion to both the LPF and the PVV. This suggests that the reactions of incumbents towards new entrants might be path-dependent. In this regard, linking established organization’s ability to respond to Christensen & Overdorf’s RPV-framework demarks an interesting avenue for future research. Second, the findings may hint that ties and relations between parties might have influenced some parties’ reactions towards new entrants. Of all parties, the most substantial differences regarding the reactions towards the LPF and PVV respectively, could be observed for the PVDA, a party which has been part of the government during the PVV-period but not during the LPF-period. Therefore, considering the extent to which all kinds of ties, relationships and networks are determining incumbent’s ability to respond is an interesting avenue for future research as well.

7.3. Implications for Public Choice Literature

7.3.1. Relating the Findings

It is difficult to draw a direct comparison between the findings and the findings of other studies devoted to studying political competition from a Public Choice perspective. While this research has focused on studying the application of certain response strategies, the studies described in the theoretical part of this report have focused on the success of certain types of strategies. Nonetheless, it is possible to relate the findings of this research to the expectations and conclusions brought forward by those studies. It is especially useful to relate the findings to the studies of Meguid and Laver, as the conceptualizations of these studies come closest to the conceptualization of political competition in this research. Furthermore it’s relevant and rather straightforward to relate the findings to classic spatial theory, as classic spatial theory has been the foundation of the political part of the research.

Relating the findings to the expectations and conclusions of Meguid and Laver shows a clear picture, the results are mostly not in line with those expectations and conclusions. First of all, the finding that the imitation strategy is represented idiosyncratically across the sample in this research is not in line with the findings of both Meguid’s (2005) study regarding the role of mainstream party strategies in niche party success and Laver’s (2005) study regarding the dynamics of political competition. Meguid did find sufficient outings of the imitation strategy – labeled by her as ‘accommodative’ – in her research sample and Laver did identify two adaptation mechanisms – the hunter algorithm and predator algorithm – which involve at least some degree of imitation of other parties. Second, the observed prominence of the attack strategy across the sample of established Dutch political parties is not as one would have expected on the basis of one of Meguid’s most important conclusions.
According to Meguid ‘...even though mainstream party electoral success typically depends on the party’s attractiveness on multiple policy dimensions, such single-issue adversarial [read attacking] tactics have been responsible for the loss of mainstream party legislative seats and even governmental turnover...at the extreme, adversarial strategies could result in party system realignment through the elimination of the mainstream opponent and its replacement with the niche party...’ (Meguid, 2005, pp. 357-358.). Clearly, on the basis of this conclusion one would have not expected all parties to react attackingly towards new entrants.

In general, the findings are not in line with classic spatial theory as the results indicate that the differences between the established parties regarding their ‘ideological’ distance to the LFP and the PVV could not explain the differences or lack of differences regarding the strategies that these parties have pursued towards both new entrants. In other words, the findings provide no reason to believe that established parties’ responses to the new entrants were influenced by their positioning relative to the new entrants on the multi-dimensional issue space. The most illustrative finding in this regard is that the observed differences in party positions did not lead to the expected differences between parties’ application of the attack strategy. This is an important finding as it entails that even if other and/or additional issue dimensions would have been used to assess party issue positions, differences in party positions on those dimensions could still not have explained the lack of significant differences between parties’ application of the attack strategy. So in essence, it doesn’t matter which issue dimensions one considers for assessing established parties’ issue positions, these issue positions cannot provide a rationale for the application of response strategies by those established parties.

7.3.2. Towards a Dynamic Multi-Party Conceptualization of Political Competition

The three a priori defined response strategies bear close resemblance to the three strategies distinguished by Meguid. Although Meguid’s definitions of strategies differ from the definitions of response strategies as developed for the purposes of this research, Meguid’s typology of strategies does entail an ignorant component (dismissive strategy), an imitative component (the accommodative strategy) and an attacking component (the adversarial strategy). As already stated above, the findings are not as one would have expected on the basis of Meguid’s expectations and conclusions and especially the found prominence of the attack strategy coupled with the marginal representation of the imitation strategy is surprising. However, two factors might explain why the dominance of the attack strategy may not be such a surprising result after all. First of all, the Dutch party system is a relatively open system compared to party systems in other European countries. Mair for example, acknowledges the “exceptional” character of the Dutch party system and notes that ‘...one of the major factors accounting for the current high levels of volatility is the relative openness of the party system...’ [the effect of which kicked in] ‘...only when depillarization was more or less complete...’ (Mair, 2008, pp. 235.). Due to the openness of the party system and the fact that there is no electoral threshold in place, Dutch established parties might perceive every new entrant as a threat, regardless of their positioning relative to the new entrant on the multi-dimensional issue space. As ignorance is not an option and imitation might be difficult (for reasons addressed in the previous paragraph), established parties’ possible reactions towards the new entrant might be limited to attack.

The dominance of the attack strategy could also be explained by the changes of the Dutch political landscape in recent decades. Pennings & Keman’s comparative exploration of the Dutch national...
political landscape for example indicates that ‘...Dutch politics has indeed become less consensus driven and party behavior in particular tends to a more adversarial modus...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2008, pp. 154.). Importantly, Pennings & Keman claim that ‘...the direction of change [in most political systems] has been mainly towards less adversarial politics, whereas the Netherlands moved in an opposite direction...’ (Pennings & Keman, 2008, pp. 154.). The described changes are well-known in public speech under the heading of ‘polarization’, which refers to a climate in which political parties emphasize the differences between themselves by referring to extremes. Obviously, non-accommodative strategies fit better into the trend of polarization than accommodative strategies. In fact the attack strategy as defined for the purposes of this research involves in essence an act of an established party which is aimed at clarifying the differences between itself and the new entrant by referring to the deficiencies of the new entrant’s way of doing things. Indeed one could argue that the attack strategy as defined in this research has become common practice in Dutch politics nowadays, to an extent that one could wonder whether it isn’t the only viable option available to Dutch political parties in order to distinguish themselves from other parties, either established or new entrant.

The findings also suggest that the mainstream party strategies as distinguished by Meguid might not be the only strategies which established parties could apply towards new entrants. The three strategies that emerged during the data-analysis process – the isolation strategy, neutral strategy and the attacking others strategy – might be useful additions to the strategies distinguished by Meguid. Isolation is already a well-known strategy within politics, when applied by multiple parties towards one party, under the heading of ‘cordon sanitaire’. An example of the cordon sanitaire is the exception of Het Vlaams Belang by other parties in Belgium. The application of the isolation strategy by a single party is something that is not described, although the results of this research suggest that it is possible for a single party to isolate another party. In fact, the isolation strategy could be observed in the most recent election campaign, as some parties distinctively isolated the PVV by ruling out collaboration after the elections. Although the neutral strategy was found to be applied by two parties only – it could be an interesting addition to the existing typology of strategies as it is a deliberate strategy (the deliberate suspension of the decision to react) which is different from the other strategies.

The remaining emergent strategy – the attacking others strategy – implies that political competition is a complicated and dynamic process. While established parties faced competition from new entrants, they simultaneously faced competition from other established parties. The way in which the established parties reacted towards the new entrants developed into a competitive dimension of its own. While a large share of studies regarding political competition conceptualize competition between two parties, it is important to conceptualize political competition in a multi-party environment, as the reaction of a political party towards another party might influence its reaction towards yet another party. Although theorizing about the dynamics of political competition in multi-party environments is a challenging task at hand, applying game theory principles might be the best way to start. In fact both Meguid and Laver applied game theory principles in order to theorize about political competition in a multi-party environment. Interestingly, although several scholars (Van Der Brug, 2005; Tavits, 2008 int. al.) acknowledge that mainstream party behavior can affect the success of new entrants parties, none of these studies has taken mainstream parties as the central object of study. Therefore an interesting avenue for future research would be to develop a dynamic model of
political competition in a multi-party environment, which does take mainstream parties as the central object of study.

7.3.3. Towards Conceptualizations Beyond Classic Spatial Theory

The finding that classic spatial theory could not explain the reactions of established parties towards new entrants is in line with Meguid’s general conclusion that ‘... it follows that competition is not restricted to interaction between ideological neighbors as the standard spatial theory claims...’ (Meguid, 2005, pp. 357.). The general implication of the finding is that political competition cannot be understood on the basis of party issue positions alone, which indicates that the conceptualizations of political competition within classic spatial theory might be too simplistic. This view is widely acknowledged within Public Choice as several scholars (Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2008; Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008 int. al.) argue that issue salience and ownership of issues are important factors that must be taken into account when theorizing about political competition. The importance of issue salience and issue ownership can be illustrated by referring to the most recent election campaign. During this campaign the VVD has been on top of the election polls for most of the campaign. One of the popular explanations for the VVD’s leading position is that because of the current financial crisis the elections were primarily centered around the socio-economic dimension and the VVD has been able to profile itself as the ‘economizing party’ in the past.

Instead of assessing established parties’ motivation to respond by the degree of relatedness with the new entrant party, the findings indicate that the success of the new entrant might be a more reliable indicator of parties’ motivation to respond. As already explained in the previous paragraph, because of the unique characteristics of the political market – especially the fact that it’s a zero-sum game – even the mere entrance of a new party might motivate all parties to respond, regardless of these parties’ relative positioning to the new entrant on the multi-dimensional issue space. Expectedly, the more successful a new entrant becomes, the more it is likely to become the ‘victim’ of attacks by other parties. This expectation was met in the LPF-case in which some of the established parties were ignorant towards the LPF at first, but could not afford to ignore it anymore after the 2002 municipal elections. This trend has also been visible during the most recent election campaign in which the VVD has been the centre of attack ever since it had been on top of the election polls.

Although less convincing than the indications with regard to the motivation to respond, the findings suggest that factors other than the degree of conflict might determine parties’ ability to respond towards new entrants. As mentioned before, most established parties reacted in similar fashion to both the LPF and the PVV. Therefore, the path-dependence ascribed by discontinuous innovation literature as determining established organization’s reactions towards discontinuous innovations, might also be determinants of established parties’ reactions towards new entrants. Although political studies already acknowledge that political parties ‘...must take into account the ideological preferences of their members, activists and contributors, which are relevant for succeeding on “political factor markets” and for avoiding internal conflicts...’ (Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 79.), future studies should focus on analyzing which exact resources, processes and / or values affect established parties’ reaction towards new entrants. The application of Christensen & Overdorff’s RPV-framework provides an excellent means to do just that. Another interesting avenue for future research involves studying the possible effects of ties and relations between established parties on their reactions towards new entrants. As stated before, the reaction of the PVDA towards the PVV was different from its reaction to the LPF, and this might be due to the fact that the PVDA was part of the
government during the PVV-period, but not during the LPF-period. Studying the effects of ties and relations on political competition in the Netherlands is especially interesting as the parties that attack each other before the elections, might also be the parties that need to cooperate with each other after the elections.

### 7.4. The Applicability of the Discontinuous Innovation Perspective to the Political Sphere

On the basis of the discussion in the previous paragraphs it can be concluded that the application of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere has undoubtedly produced interesting insights for both discontinuous innovation literature and Public Choice literature. With regard to discontinuous innovation, the application has highlighted the need for a more elaborate, contingent and dynamic typology of response strategies. With regard to Public Choice the application has highlighted the need for a dynamic multi-party conceptualization of political competition, for conceptualizations to go beyond classic spatial theory and for future research to focus more on the role of mainstream partie. Furthermore the application of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere has illustrated that concepts originally developed for the business world, could be applied to the political world. In essence the analysis has shown that the typology of response strategies as developed by Charitou & Markides can be used to typify the reactions of established parties towards new entrants. Vice versa it was argued that it is plausible to suggest that the three strategies that emerged from the analysis of political competition can be applied to established organizations as well. Overall, considering the explorative nature of the research, the application of the discontinuous innovation perspective to the political sphere has proven to be useful, as breaking new ground and yielding new insights is all that one could expect from an explorative study. However, a key question that needs to be addressed is with regard to the value of these new insights. In other words, how valid are the findings that resulted from the application of the discontinuous innovation perspective to the political sphere?

While the research was based to a large part on drawing analogies between the business world and the political world, the analysis has also illustrated the fundamental differences between both worlds. For example characterizing the ‘outputs’ of the LPF and the PVV as discontinuous in the same way in which the products and services of organizations are characterized as discontinuous in the business world has proven to be a challenging undertaking. In fact labeling the LPF and the PVV as ‘discontinuities’ was the first major obstacle encountered. And it’s a serious obstacle, because without sufficient reason to believe that both the LPF and the PVV are discontinuous in some ways, applying a discontinuous innovation perspective would have been of no significance. Although it was challenging to label the LPF and PVV as discontinuous, the label ‘discontinuity’ was attached to both the LPF and the PVV as it was argued that both parties possessed ‘innovative qualities’ which can be considered as discontinuous within the Dutch national political arena. However, one could still wonder whether the LPF and the PVV are discontinuous in the same way as what is originally meant by DeTienne & Koberg. This notion also applies to the application of the typology of response strategies of Charitou & Markides as one could wonder to what extent the constructs – as operationalized for the purposes of this research – represent the same meaning as initially intended by Charitou & Markides. Although both the definition of discontinuous innovation of DeTienne & Koberg and the typology of response strategies of Charitou & Markides were selected because they left some room for interpretation (which should be perceived as beneficial in an interdisciplinary research such as the present one), the application of the concepts has left some room for interpretation regarding the results as well, which makes it difficult to interpret these results.
Although the discussion section has illustrated that some findings might be explained by the way in which concepts were operationalized and applied, concerns regarding the validity of results remain an issue which cannot be assessed on the basis of this research. Only future studies can assess the validity of results and perhaps the best starting point thereby would be to verify to what extent the response strategies as applied in this research to typify established parties’ reactions towards new entrants denote deliberate acts of political parties.

To recap, the application of discontinuous innovation concepts has illustrated both the fields of application and the limitations of these concepts. By theorizing about political competition in a unique way the research has broken new ground and yielded interesting new insights. However, a key concern can be posed with regard to the validity of the results. Applying essentially business concepts to the political sphere inherently implied a degree of ‘alteration’ of these concepts and these alterations might have changed the meaning of the concepts as well. To conclude, while the application of discontinuous innovation concepts to the political sphere has been useful, validity concerns regarding the results of the current application and future applications will always be an issue worth considering. The same can be concluded with regard to the usefulness and validity of drawing analogies between the business world and the political world, which is essentially what Public Choice is all about. In this regard, Wohlgemuth concluded that;

‘...in their endeavor to reinterpret the behavior of political actors and patterns of political interaction, public choice or the economic theory of politics has opened the world of politics to economics and has enriched political theory with a rich body of economic wisdom ...[however]... such application raises serious doubts regarding the validity of far-reaching analogies between economic and political competition...’ (Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 87-88.)

Addressing such doubts regarding the validity of analogies between economic competition and political competition is something which is neglected in a large share of Public Choice literature. Therefore, instead of ignoring the validity of issues and assuming the applicability of concepts from one field to the other, the applicability of concepts should be the object of study itself. Understanding the potential limitations of drawing analogies between the business world and the political world is the first step towards potentially more valid results in the future.
8. Conclusion

8.1. Answering the Central Research Question
This research applied a discontinuous innovation perspective in order to study the reactions of established Dutch national political parties towards two cases of new entrant parties – the LPF and the PVV respectively. The research question that has been central in this research has been formulated as follows;

How did the established Dutch national political parties deal with the challenges of discontinuous innovation, in reaction to the electoral successes of the LPF and the PVV?

The findings clearly illustrate that established parties applied a portfolio of response strategies towards both new entrant parties with one particular strategy sticking out as the dominant strategy; the attack strategy. The dominance of the attack strategy is illustrated both by its prominence across parties in both cases and its prominence across time in both cases. Importantly, differences between parties could be observed with regard to the objects of their attacks. While the attacks of the CDA were primarily policy-focused, the attacks of GroenLinks and especially D66 involved primarily personal attacks. The attacks of the remaining parties – PVDA, VVD and SP – were found to be more evenly distributed across policy-focused and personal attacks. Obviously a key implication of the dominance of the attack strategy across the sample is the relatively finite representation of the other a priori-defined theory-related strategies – ignorance and imitation. In fact one of the strategies that emerged during the data analysis process – the attacking others strategy – was found to be the second most prominent strategy behind attack. Although differences between parties regarding the objects of their attacks on other established parties could be observed, most attacking others statements were aimed at parties willing to cooperate with the new entrants. Conclusively, the findings illustrate that established Dutch national political parties’ reactions towards new entrants can best be typified as consisting of primarily non-accommodative strategies.

By linking the typology of response strategies derived from discontinuous innovation literature to classic spatial theory, the findings clearly show that assessing established parties’ motivation to respond by the ‘degree of relatedness’ to the new entrant and assessing their ability to respond by ‘the degree of conflict’ with the new entrant cannot explain the reactions of these parties towards new entrants. Differences between established parties’ reactions could either not be observed or the observed differences were not as one would have expected on the basis of classic spatial theory. So while the developed typology of response strategies could be applied to typify the reactions of established parties towards new entrants, it’s application could not explain these reactions.

8.2. Limitations of the Research
Apart from the possible theoretical limitations of drawing analogies between the business world and the political world, as discussed in the discussion section of this study report, two major limitations of the research should be noted, with the first being related to the scope of the research and the second being related to the method of data analysis. With regard to the scope of the research the important limitation lies in the selection of the cases, as both cases of new entrants involve right-
wing parties. This limits the generalizability of findings, as it is questionable whether the findings would have been the equivalent if left-wing parties would have been taken into analysis.

With regard to the method of data analysis the major limitation lies in the fact that the content analysis technique applied, the type of content analyzed and the source of the content might have influenced the results of the research. First of all, the type of content which has been analyzed – statements made by political leaders of the established parties – might have biased the results. For example, it is plausible to assume that political leaders are more likely to make explicit attacking statements than explicit imitative statements. The idiosyncratic representation of the imitation strategy might be due to the difficulty of identifying outings of this particular strategy in statements of political party leaders. There are indications that analyzing different types of content may lead to different results. For example, Meguid (2005) drew on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project to assess the success of mainstream parties’ responses to niche parties and did find a significantly higher representation of the imitation strategy across her sample of mainstream political parties.

Lastly, the source of the content – newspaper articles – may also have influenced the results, as ultimately the editors of the newspapers decide which statements make the newspapers. It is plausible to suggest that these editors are more likely to publish outspoken attacking statements than neutral, ignorant or imitative statements. This in turn may have an influence on the type of statements that politicians make, as politicians themselves may be well aware of this tendency of the press. Importantly, while it was decided to only take into account published statements of political leaders which were paraphrased, differences regarding the interpretation of these statements between newspapers could still be observed.

8.3. Avenues for Future Research

One of the primary reasons for opting for an explorative research design is to identify avenues for future research. This research has identified several of these avenues for both discontinuous innovation research and Public Choice research. Because these avenues were already addressed in the discussion section, this section suffices itself to outlining the main premises of these avenues. Starting with discontinuous innovation, the research stresses the need for future developments towards a more elaborate, contingent and dynamic typology of response strategies with defined preconditions, parameters and with potentially additional strategies and explaining factors. With regard to Public Choice, the research stresses the need for dynamic multi-party conceptualizations of political competition and conceptualizations which take into account issue salience and issue ownership and as such go beyond classic spatial theory. Lastly, on the interdisciplinary level the research stresses the importance of assessing the validity of analogies between the business world and the political world in future studies. Instead of taking the applicability of concepts from one field to the other for granted, the applicability of these concepts should itself be the object of future studies.
References


