Interest and Power Analysis according to Waltz’s Structural Realism exemplified in ‘Theory of International Politics’ of the EU’s Engagement in Central Asia

In how far can Waltz’s structural realism explain why the EU narrows its security strategy by abandoning human rights and democracy promotion in its Common Foreign Security Policy towards the Central Asian states?
List of Acronyms

BOMCA        EU Boarder Management Programme for Central Asia
BTI          Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CADAP        Central Asia Drug Action Programme
CA SP        The EU and Central Asia – Strategy for a new Partnership
CFSP         Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP         Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTO         Collective Security Treaty Organisation
ESS          European Security Strategy
EUCAM        EU-Central Asia Monitoring
FSB          Federal Security Service in Russia
KGB          Committee for State Security
PCA          Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
TEU          Treaty on the European Union (after Lisbon)
TFEU         Treaty on the functioning of the EU

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Abstract

The Thesis focuses on the EU’s security strategy towards the Central Asian states – as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy towards the post-soviet realm. It shall answer the question ‘in how far Waltz’s structural realism can explain why the EU is narrowing its security strategy by abandoning human rights and democracy promotion in its Common Foreign Security Policy towards the Central Asian states? The thesis takes a top-down view on the EU as an international actor and concentrates on its interests and its relative power position compared to Russia in the Central Asian region. The comparison with Russia as the regional hegemon shall deliver fruitful insights in the explanations Waltz’s structural realism provides. Its possible limits to explain the EU’s role in the Central Asian region are considered in the conclusion.
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1 Introduction

“The West may need to become more realistic in order for its traditions and values to survive the twenty-first century.” (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 179).

The twenty-first century can be thought of as a realist century. The EU is “as divided by the member states’ national interests as it is united by a common good” (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 179). The developments of shared norms and values in Western societies as human rights, democracy and the rule of law are increasingly seen as nothing more than Western ideas backed up by US dollar and military divisions (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005) and are “likely to come undone as challengers like China gain strength.” (Wohlfforth, 2010: 16).

This thesis is going to elaborate the EU’s security strategy towards the Central Asian states of the EU - often referred to as a normative actor in international relations – from a structural realist perspective as set out by Waltz. Therefore in the Introduction the EU’s foreign policies towards the Central Asian states are described and the research question is elaborated. Drawing on the research question the reasons why this particular topic has been chosen and why structural realism is applied shall be outlined. After setting the theoretical framework, explaining the methodology used and the operationalization an interest analysis and a power analysis are conducted.

1.1 The EU in Central Asia

The EU has widened the scope of its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) towards the post-soviet realm. Next to the policy towards the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy it has extended its policies towards the Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. The framework of the EU relations towards the Central Asian states builds the Central Asia Paper – Strategy for a new Partnership (hereafter CA SP) which is based upon the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (hereafter PCA) with the five states and the Commission’s Indicative Program (2007-2013) towards the region (Schmitz, 2007; Sadyrbeck, 2009; Jacobsen and Machowski, 2007). The Central Asian states have since their independence played a subordinated role in the EU’s foreign policy (Sadyrbek, 2009). But the inclusion of South Caucasus in the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereafter ENP), its enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and the EU’s Black Sea Synergy let the Central Asian region and the EU move closer together. And therewith the security within the EU is declared as directly and indirectly
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dependent on the security in Central Asia (CA SP, 2007:1, 3). Already at the planning stage of
the CA SP a controversy occurred about an interest-based approach focusing on energy and
security on the one side and a value-based approach focussing on human rights and
democratization on the other side (Margott, 2008 and Graubner, 2008). The ‘realists’ around
Germany have asserted themselves against proponents of the value-based approach led by the
UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden stressing democracy and human rights (Graubner,
2008). This resulted in a CA SP that represents the minimal consensus among member states
relinquishing benchmarks. This makes the monitoring of human rights and democracy
promotion in particular difficult if not to say impossible (Graubner, 2008: 1). Despite this
minimal consensus the doubling in funding to 750 million Euro for the time frame of 2007 to
2013 shows that the EU’s interest in the region is going beyond rhetoric statements of will

1.2 Defining the Research Question

“Today, in spite of rhetoric, it has become clearer that in the implementation stage of the
strategy the proponents of Realpolitik have prevailed.” (Graubner, 2008: 1). The EU declares
in its policies towards the Central Asian states – namely in the Treaty on the European Union
specifications on CFSP, the European Security Strategy, the Commission’s indicative
Program 2007-2010; 2011-2013 and the Central Asia Paper – Strategy towards a new
Partnership - security to its focal priority (Warkotsch, 2008; Schmitz, 2007). The EU has ever
since tried to promote an extensive security strategy (Schmitz, 2007) build on norms and
values, linking possible cooperation in the field of security to human rights and democracy
standards (Warkotsch, 2008; Sadyrbek, 2009). But it has been detected that human rights and
democracy promotion are marginalised not only in the EU’s policy discourse. The EU’s
rhetoric in the CA SP and in the EUCAM Final Report 2010 restricts itself to the enumeration
of already held human rights dialogues with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It further
mentions possible continuing initiatives but the qualitative measurement of the progress lacks
completely (Sadyrbek, 2009; EUCAM Final Report, 2010) also due to the non-existence of
benchmarks. The lack becomes especially apparent if one considers that observers of these
political dialogues relate that the Uzbek delegates in Ashgabat were not interested in
“conducting a serious dialogue on the issue”. (Graubner, 2008:1). Statements of EU official
Pierre Morel in contrary allow conclusions on the position of human rights and democracy
promotion in the EU’s policy towards the Central Asian states. He – Special Representative
for Central Asia – argued in a Kazakh Newspaper that terrorism and extremism among others
are the most pressing issues. He did not talk about human rights and democracy promotion until the journalists “pressed on and asked directly, Pierre Morel acknowledged that free speech and other human rights were also important.”¹ (Graubner, 2008: 1). In its policy actions the EU concentrates on border management, migration policy, combating organized crime and international terrorism (CA SP, 2007; Commission’s Indicative program 2007-2010: 14) through programs as BOMCA and CADAP that are concretely aiming at administrative and organizational training of employees trying to establish a police like security executive replacing the ever since militarized border management and at combating drugs and drug trafficking (CA SP, 2007; Sadyrbek, 2009). In its concerns on energy security the most concrete action of the EU is the planning and implementation of the Nabucco project, building a Nabucco gas pipeline for diversifying its energy imports and increasing its independence from Russian imports².

The external interest by the EU in the Central Asian region is mostly driven by the region’s geographic location (border to Afghanistan - European military contingents support the mission ‘Enduring Freedom’), its energy resources and the EU’s aim of establishing a ‘secure neighbourhood’ (Schmitz, 2007:327; European Security Strategy, 2003; CA SP, 2007; Warkotsch, 2008; Hyde-Price 2008) in regard to the mentioned aims and concrete projects the security interest corresponds with the concept of traditional state security (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005, Brauch, 2008). The EU is therewith investing in stabilizing the region by keeping the status quo (Graubner, 2008) through supporting the regimes in protecting the territorial integrity and to control migration flows. The EU’s approach can therewith be interpreted as an interest-driven foreign policy in realist terms concentrating on state security and not a value-driven foreign policy focussing on human rights and democracy (Graubner, 2008; Warkotsch, 2008; Schmitz, 2007). The main research question therefore is: Why the EU is narrowing its security strategy towards the Central Asian states? Narrowing is understood as the abandoning of human rights and democracy promotion.

The EU wants to become a security actor in the region and takes a keen interest in working with Central Asian states on the basis of joint security interests (Boonstra, 2009). The Central Asia states have established themselves as independent with reasonably strong security forces and a multi-vectoral foreign policy. But in terms of security issues they are still highly dependent on external actors also because of the non-existence of “homegrown Central Asian security cooperation” (Boonstra, 2009: 1; Jackson, 2008). Central Asian security is foremost promoted through security cooperation like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which is dominated by Russia. Russia as the regional hegemon in the case at hand –
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The structural realist theory as formulated by Waltz seems to be an adequate theory to explain the EU’s behaviour and this is for two reasons: First of all structural realism - and the realist tradition as a whole - emphasizes the role of interests and power (Keohane, 1986). The subsystem under consideration could therewith be identified as unipolar system with Russia still being the regional hegemon. It moreover enables to identify interests and to understand changes in units’ behaviour which are based on incentives and impediments deriving from the system’s structure. Structural realism is a deductive top-down theory and fits therewith the thesis’ attempt of taking a top-down point of view on the EU as an international actor and not a bottom-up, member state perspective. Structural realism therefore should be able to deliver explanations to the main research question: Why the EU is narrowing its security strategy – by abandoning human rights and democracy promotion – towards the Central Asian states?

1.3 State of the art

Central Asia somehow cyclical receives public recognition and interest. Especially in relation to specific developments or ‘events’- for example because of the deployment of military contingents in the framework of the military mission ‘Enduring Freedom’, the brutal massacres in the Uzbek city Andischan or this year due to the overthrowing of president Maxim Bakiyev and the conflicts in the South of Kyrgyzstan. By and large also the scientific coping with the region in the German and Anglo-Saxon realm is still in its beginning. Especially lacking is a systematic dealing with the EU’s policy towards the region. The known and therefore mostly used scholars in this field are Alexander Warkotsch, Anna Matveeva, Andrea Schmitz and Gernot Erler. Their work mainly focuses on the structural situation within the countries or on the geostrategic position of the region. Therewith a lot of the Thesis is drawn upon official documents of the EU, documents of its Think Tanks as well as Reports and Publications of political scientific institutes (Centre of European Studies (CEPS), EU-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM), die Stiftung für Politik und Wissenschaft (SWP), Central Asia and Caucasus Institute Analyst (CACI), International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch). All these have been considered in Sadyrbeck’s efforts to develop a unique political profile for the EU in Central Asia. In relation to these attempts the thesis at hand tries to incorporate backlashes of the international system on the EU, which until now as far as known have mostly dealt with the institutional characteristics of the actors in play, its
intentions and interests. This thesis is going to elaborate which structural possibilities and impediments the EU is facing concerning its extensive security strategy towards the Central Asian states and in how far this can explain the often detected narrowing of its security agenda. For this purpose the structural realist perspective (as developed by Kenneth Waltz) shall be engaged. A structural realist perspective and critiques on the feasibility of trying to establish itself as a normative power in a world dominated by US military power have been discussed by Manners (2002), Kagan (2002) and Hyde Price (2006, 2007, 2008). The structural realist perspective in particular on security in Central Asia and the role of Russia has been discussed by Kubrick (1997) and Menon and Spruyt (1999).

2 Theory

This chapter sets up the theoretical framework of the thesis. The key assumptions of Realism are considered at the first section and build the framework in which the second section coping with Waltz’s structural realism has to be understood.

2.1 Key assumptions in Realist tradition – statism, survival, self-help and the balance of power

The realist tradition is characterized by many different approaches and theories and is therewith not one coherent theory. There are however three key elements all subscribe to (Keohane, 1986, Dunne and Schmidt, 2005) (1) statism, (2) survival and (3) self-help that constitute an interpretative framework for International Relation scholars (Keohane, 1986). (1) Statism refers to the assumption that states are the key actors in International Relations. (2) Survival is concerned with the power-seeking behaviour of states either as an end in itself or as a means towards other ends (as Waltz argues towards the end of security) (Tim Dunne, 2005, Keohane, 1986 and Waltz, 1979). As states behave in a (3) self-help system due to the anarchic structure of the international system (“international anarchy always refers to a system with two or more governments” (Buzan et.al., 1993:38) without a central authority) they are perceived as rationale actors insofar as their actions are comprehensible for other actors because of self-help being the “principle of action” (Tim Dunne, 2005: 16). (Keohane, 1986; Dunne, 2005). “[States] will devise policies that would protect their own society by amassing or maintaining sufficient power, alone or in coalitions, to maintain their essential security interests.” (Keohane, 1986:8). While most of the OECD countries experienced a widening in the notion of security at least in its discourses other countries (like the USA, Russia or the Central Asian states) still emphasize the narrow political-military concept of
security. In the ‘European Security Discourses’ (Brauch, 2008) for example the security concept has been extended (i.e. Möller: national, societal, human, environmental security). Therefore the “traditional understanding of security as the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from another state” (Müller, 2002:369) has not only been challenged regarding the key subject (the state) but also with regard to the “physical-political dimension of security of territorial entities” (Brauch, 2008: 29).

Security concepts can be defined according to the referent object (security of whom?), the value at risk (security of what?) and the sources of threat (security from whom/what?). State security’s referent object is the state and the values at risks are then sovereignty, territorial integrity, values and norms the society is built upon. Sources of threat are traditionally military threats occurring from other states but can be expanded to guerrillas, terrorists and other sub state actors. This concept refers to a political-military dimension. The concept of human security in contrary refers to individuals and humankind as referent object; the values at risk would then be survival and quality of life and the sources of threat could be identified as states, globalization, terrorism, nature etc. The different security concepts and its dimensions can therefore be distinguished by asking for the referent object, the values at risk and the sources of threat. (Möller, 2001,2003).

Realists Theories are “specific theories about the fundamental constraints and incentives that shape behaviour and outcomes in international politics.” (Wohlforth, 2010:15). Political realism is not idealistic or normative it instead emphasizes power and interests. If spokesmen or politicians try to argue in ethical or normative terms they “smuggle their ethics into the ambiguous and elastic concept of ‘the national interest’ […].” (Keohane, 1986:9). The national interest in itself serves as a moral standard as the state allows an ethical, political and social community to grow and flourish. These assumptions refer to the ‘double moral standard’ (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:163) implying that “[p]reserving the life of the state and the ethical community it envelops becomes a moral duty [in itself] […].” (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:163).

### 2.2 Waltz’s Structural Realism

In the 1960’s and 1970’s criticism on the realist tradition reached its peak in the Cold War period. Kenneth Waltz has contributed to the reassurance of the realist school by translating “some core realist ideas into a deductive, top-down theoretical framework” (Wohlforth, 2010:11) to which can be referred as neo or structural realism. This still has to be understood in the above set framework constituted by the key assumptions in realist theory. In this reassurance of the realist tradition Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics” (Waltz, 1979) can be
regarded as the exemplar of structural realism (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005). Waltz’s structural realism (Waltz, 1979) refers to the structure of the international system to explain international outcomes whereby it has to be elaborated to what extent structure conditions outcomes as “it is not the only cause in play.” (Waltz, 1979: 78). Summing up the internal attributes of units or their foreign policy actions to understand the setting or state of affairs of international relations is neither feasible nor sufficient according to Waltz. In fact what is needed is to have a look on the actor’s position to one another. To analyze variations in the external behaviour of states Waltz focuses on continuities in the international system shaping units behaviour (Waltz, 1979). System is defined as the category that incorporates structure and units. The system level therewith offers two levels of analysis: the system level of analysis (referring to the structure) and the unit level of analysis. Waltz defines system level as “the arrangement of the system’s parts and by the principle of that arrangement.” (Waltz, 1979:80). The organizing principle and functional differentiation are the first two elements in terms of which Waltz identifies structure. (Buzan et.al., 1993: 34 and Waltz, 1979:chap. 5: especially 100-101). These two elements of structure definition – the organizing principle and the functional differentiation of units – refer to the “deep structure” (Buzan et.al., 1993: 37-47), in other words they refer to patterns that are basic, durable over time (historically) and self-reproducing. The organizing principle can either be hierarchic (central authority over all the units) or anarchic (no central, supranational authority over the units in the system) and units can either be different or similar. The units of the system at hand are states “whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems. They will long remain so. The death rate among states is remarkably low[.]” (Waltz, 1986:90) making them the key actors in international relations. In Waltz’s Theory states are functional like units. having to fulfil the same tasks. “States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function.” (Waltz, 1986:91).

2.2.1 Functional differentiation of units, the organizing principle and the process of socialization and competition

The organizing principle of anarchy generates like-units through competition and socialization as all states are striving for survival in a self-help system. Simultaneously states by pursuing their sovereignty generate anarchy (Buzan, 1993) making similar units and anarchy “opposite sites of the same coin” (Buzan, 1993: 39).
In Waltz theory the organizing principle and the functional differentiation of units are strongly interacting and influencing each other in both directions. According to this logic cell 1 and 4 in figure 1 are “virtually empty” (Buzan et.al. 1993: 39). The anarchic organization of the international system makes units - due to the logic of survival - all subjects to the incentives and pressures of the process of socialization and competition (Waltz, 1979: 76). Those units most successful in the anarchic system have a “demonstration effect” (Buzan et.al., 1993: 40) on other units starting to imitate these more successful strategies respectively copying the more successful unit itself. In the units’ attempt of survival and security they will tend towards type 2 as this has proven to be most successful: Sovereign units thereby creating a system of anarchy and vice versa (Buzan et.al., 1993)9.

2.2.2 The distribution of capabilities and the process of socialization and competition

The process of socialization and competition also affects the ruling for or against a policy strategy as the behaviour of units is indirectly affected by the structure. This is due to structure rewarding or punishing certain actions. Structure does not directly lead to an outcome and is moreover just a part of the explanation of units’ behaviour. The effects structure has on units are interfered through competition and socialization among units (Waltz, 1979). Whereby “socialization and competition are two aspects of one process by which [moreover] the variety of behaviour and of outcomes is reduced.” (Waltz, 1986:66). To explain both aspects Waltz draws analogies to the micro-economic theory stating that in a market firms compete for profit and have to ensure their survival. If a firm is facing possible bankruptcy it will adapt to more successful strategies/behaviours imitating a profitable firm. Competition therewith leads to imitation. The socialization aspect is slightly touched by this
example drawn. Waltz draws analogies to human behaviour that is different in group constellations\textsuperscript{10}. Concerning states imitation as the process of socialization can also occur due to an attractiveness of another strategy or mode of fulfilling certain tasks.\textsuperscript{11} As states are living in a self-help system and their assumed aim is their survival (Waltz, 1986: 85f) competition and socialization as described above occurs among them\textsuperscript{12} influenced by the system level element distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979).

“The placement of units in relation to one another is not fully defined by a system’s ordering principle and by the formal differentiation of its parts. The standing of the units also changes with changes in their relative capabilities.” (Waltz, 1986: 74).

The third element in terms of which Waltz identifies structure is concerned with the distributional structure of the international system: the principle of distribution. It is perceived as “a fruitful source of insights into how structural continuities condition the behaviour of units.” (Buzan et.al., 1993:53). As explained above units in an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated and are therewith primarily distinguishable by the distribution of capabilities within the structure, meaning their “greater or lesser capability for performing the same tasks.” (Waltz, 1979:54). It can be assumed that the pattern of distribution is uneven\textsuperscript{13} (Buzan et.al., 1993). It has to be acknowledged that there is a huge difference if behaviour is explained in terms of possession of a capability by a unit or trying to explain behaviour according to the distribution of capabilities within the system (Buzan et.al. 1993) meaning the relative power of units: Relative power of units is a “system-wide concept” (Waltz, 1986:93) and not a unit attribute. Units are therewith differently placed in the international system due to their capabilities, their power to perform similar tasks (Waltz, 1979).

Structure affects behaviour by rewarding or punishing certain actions and is vice versa shaped by the relative power of its units. In the case of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Central Asian region a subsystem of the international system is the object of inquiry. This subsystem is characterized through unipolarity with Russia being the regional hegemon (due to Russia’s relative power position). According to Waltz his theory shall be applied to the great and super powers of the system and for further inquiry can be applied to smaller states (Waltz, 1979). Therefore concerning the power analysis deriving from Waltz structural realism the distribution of capabilities between the EU and Russia are considered to elaborate the changes in EU behaviour according to the described process of socialization and competition. In
Waltz’s theory the following capabilities have to be relatively measured and can be aggregated in the single concept of power:\(^4\):

“States, because they are in a self-help system, have to use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests. The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. They rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” (Waltz1979: 131; italic by the author).

The traditional view on power has been military capacity, those states with the most effective military means controlled international politics. But the resources that produce power capabilities have become more complex (Keohane and Nye, 1989) as indicated above drawing on the political realm, the economic realm and the military realm. “Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor).” (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 11). Moreover initial power resources referring to a potential ability (power as control over resources) can be under consideration as well as an actor’s actual influence on other’s behaviour (Keohane and Nye, 1984). It further has to be distinguished to what ends power is used to increase security as it can be distinguished between “possession goals” and “milieu goals”. The first one refers to an entity’s aim to increase or maintain its possession of things to “which it attaches value.” (Wolfers, 1962: 91). This could be territory, membership in important and influential international organizations or tariff preferences. Entities “pursuing [milieu-goals] are out not to defend or increase possession they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their […] boundaries.” (Wolfers, 1962: 91). Entities have a reason to be concerned with their milieu and not exclusively with their possession as a friendly, reliable and an even in its constituting characteristics similar ‘milieu’ of action serves also the promotion of primary interests – namely the creation of a secure environment (Wolfers, 1962).

The above outlined definition of structure comprehending three elements only describes what is needed to show the units’ arrangement in relation to one another in the international system (Waltz, 1986) with structure being the “concept that makes it possible to say what the expected organizational effects are and how structures and units interact and affect each other.” (Waltz, 1986;95).
1. “Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered [and second] by the specification of functions of differentiated units [and third] by the distribution of capabilities across units.” (Waltz, 1986:96).

Structures are not static but dynamic as they influence the behaviour of actors “and affect outcomes of their interactions.” (Waltz, 1986:58). What can structural realism tell us about the behaviour of states and changes within that behaviour? It can explain pressures and possibilities arising from the system states have to face and therewith can tell us to which forces, incentives, impediments states in a system are subject to. From these one can infer how states have to compete and adjust to one another if their aim is to survive; “To the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable” (Waltz, 1986: 60). For the case at hand the following behaviour of the EU could be predicted: Due to its relative powerlessness in comparison with Russia it is less able to promote its primary interest which is security in structural realist terms and is therefore going to adapt a more successful strategy – which in this case would mean to narrow the security strategy by abandoning human rights and democracy promotion as Russia does not use conditionality on possible cooperation in any field.

3 Methodology - Interest and Power Analysis

Next to the structural realist perspective a foreign policy perspective will be adopted drawing on the realist method of interest analysis. This expands the scope of the thesis slightly as interests will be considered in more detail as the general assumptions of structural realism (states = security seeker). It shall enable to distinguish more soundly between primary and secondary interests (Robinson, 1967; Wilhelm, 2006). As the method of interest analysis in its very nature suffers from arbitrariness \(^\text{15}\) and draws on the assumption that the interests of an entity are mentioned interests it shall be complemented by discourse analysis. Discourse analysis shall further enable to elaborate the security notion of the EU in its CFSP towards the Central Asian states. As it shall complement interest analysis it will be broadly considered referring to a compromise position assumed by Schmidt (Schmidt 2002, 2005): Discourse is used to frame and to legitimate political action \(^\text{16}\). This assumption is in line with arguments from realist theory that if politicians or spokesmen try to legitimate actions in normative terms they actually try to mask their interest through normative rhetoric (Keohane, 1986) referring to the ethical community they try to protect and preserve or under the ‘universal’ values these
communities are built upon. Realist theories enable to unmask intentions and interests behind rhetoric (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005). Discourse Analysis is a broad label and subsumes sociological, linguistic and political approaches. There is not the Discourse Analysis but the term rather defines a research program. From the political scientific perspective discourses are understood as explanations for events, the legitimating of political action and the prerequisite for political action. It shall not be considered from a constructivist position but rather as a framing of political action. Therefore the relation between speech act and audience, signs used and realities constructed are not of interest. The aim of this Thesis is to see what the EU declares as its external security interest and what implications these declarations have on its political actions. These declarations shall be analysed according to the determinants of the referent object, the values at risk and identified threats. Therefore the Thesis is based on a literature study and uses official documents of the EU as sources, especially results from the EU Council Meetings, the Central Asia Paper-Strategy for a new partnership (CA SP), the European Security Strategy (ESS), the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as well as the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and upon official documents of the EU’s Think Tanks. Reports and Publications of political scientific institutes: Centre of European Studies (CEPS), EU-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM), die Stiftung für Politik und Wissenschaft (SWP), Central Asia and Caucasus Institute Analyst (CACI), International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch as well as the secondary literature as outlined in chapter 1.3 The State of the Art are considered.

The interest analysis defines not only roles actors can play but also enables researchers to consider the implication opportunities of certain foreign policy actions and constitutes an indispensable category in the analysis of foreign policy (Wilhelm, 2006). Interests are an abstraction (Kindermann, 1977) and can be differentiated from aims. Strategic interests derive from long-term aims of a political community. To realize these overall goals, strategies can be set out directly (legal documents) or indirectly (speeches of representatives, decision makers) and can be comprehended indirectly through the interpretation of certain behaviour or actions (Feichtinger, 2010). The interest analysis aims at analysing the EU’s interests according to the definition set out in the theoretical framework and in distinguishing interests in different categories according to their ‘importance’. Concerning the ranking of interests it is drawn on the results of the Venus Group that identifies three categories according to which interests are distinguishable. The Venusberg Group (a high-level group of security and defence experts from across Europe brought together by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in early 1999) differentiates between vital interests, essential interests and general or milieu interests. Vital refers to
interests that are immediately crucial for survival; essential refers to interests that are indirectly of vital importance and general or milieu interests – interests not correlating with the survival of the EU. These categories are distinguishable according to the structural realist assumption that there is a vital/essential interest\(^\text{17}\) (primary interest) namely security and general interests (secondary interests) that will not be promoted at the expense of primary interests.

The declaration of foreign policy according to formulated interests has to consider the backlashes from the international system\(^{18,19}\) that therewith circumscribes interests (Wilhem, 2006; Waltz, 1979). This external respectively structural parameter can be considered as the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities among states. Especially from the viewpoint of Waltz’s structural realism there is a guideline which binds all states: The ensuring of security as central survival strategy (Waltz, 1979; Dunne and Schmidt, 2005; Wilhelm, 2006). In terms of seeking external security more aspects than the integrity of a territorial entity can be considered, like ensured accesses to energy resources as well as the protection of values (Wilhelm, 2006). This refers to the interest of states as well as their power to protect what they depend on (Waltz, 1979). The analysis of interests not only needs to look at backlashes from the system but further on the means, the power an entity has to promote its interests. Because declaration of aims and interests are abstractions they do not automatically cause actions. The possibility of acting according to these interests has to be given. This possibility depends on the relative power of the respective state (Kindermann, 1977; Feichtinger, 2010). In succession of the security interest - in the sake for which the strengthening of the own position in a system in terms of relative power in comparison to other actors becomes important – a power analysis has to be conducted (Keohane, 1986; Kindermann, 1977; Waltz, 1979; Feichtinger, 2010). Power is a relative figure and therefore can only be detected in the relation between two or more states (Kindermann, 1977; Waltz, 1979) according to the determinants identified by Waltz: Political stability, economic capacity and military strength and is defined as the possibility to influence actors’ behaviour (Keohane, 1989). Not only shall the potential power be under consideration as Waltz implicitly argues by comparing capabilities of states but moreover the actual influence on actors behaviour is elaborated. The capabilities as defined by Waltz are furthermore adapted to the subsystem at hand as in the international realm the EU and Russia would score differently in their relative potential power than as considered in the Central Asian region.

The first steps therewith will be: Analyzing the EU’s discourse on its CFSP in terms of aims and interests especially concerning the EU’s security interest which is going to be elaborated
according to the distinctions made above: the referent object, the values at risks and the identified threats as well as according to vital, essential and general or milieu interests. The findings of the discourse analysis concentrating on mentioned aims and interests shall underpin a reconsideration of the EU’s security interest in Central Asia\textsuperscript{20}. The overall methodology derives from the theoretical framework delivering indicators for the measurement of relative power and enabling to conclude deductively according to the above outlined theoretical key assumptions.

4 Operationalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Question/Topic</th>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defining the EU’s security concept in its external relations</td>
<td>What is declared as referent object?</td>
<td>Individuals? &lt;br&gt;This would indicate that the security concept refers to human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>States? &lt;br&gt;This would indicate that the security concept at hand refers to state security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which values are at risk?</td>
<td>Quality of life? &lt;br&gt;This would indicate a human security concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty, territorial integrity? &lt;br&gt;This would indicate a state security concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which threats are identified?</td>
<td>Military threats, terrorism, organized crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism, states, natural disasters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the interests of the EU?</td>
<td>Primary interests?</td>
<td>Vital to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary interests?</td>
<td>Not vital to the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### What kind of security strategy is followed by the EU in Central Asia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is it an extensive security strategy?</td>
<td>The linking of possible cooperation with human rights and democracy promotion would indicate an extensive security strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it a narrow security strategy?</td>
<td>Does the promotion of human rights and democracy serve primary interests? If it does not it will be abandoned: The abandoning of human rights and democracy promotion would indicate a narrow security strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The relative power of the EU compared with Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic capabilities</th>
<th>Investment structure, geography, trade relations, work migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>Stateness, institutional stability, checks and balances, transparency and effective power to govern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strength</td>
<td>defence spending, equipment and the defence industrial basement as well as military doctrine and military bases in Central Asia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Figure 2: Operationalization, drawn by the author**

[note: Concerning the identified threats indicators it has to be acknowledged that these do not allow a sharp distinction between human security and state security but one can draw on them to explain the role democracy and human rights can play in promoting security if substate actors (individuals) are identified as sources of threat.]

[note: The determinants of power identified by Waltz are adapted towards the Central Asian region as a subsystem. The scoring on the capabilities would look different if the whole international system would be under consideration.]

[note: The answer to the question which security strategy the EU promotes in Central Asia will draw on the findings to the questions posed above: The EU’s security notion and its interests]

[note: “Conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions), to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions.” (Smith, 1999: 198).]

[note: The capacity named as political stability can be circumscribed as the extent of acceptance or opposition within the state and from external governments of other states (Kinderman, 1977). Dependent on the first indicators the effective power to govern can be elaborated which serves reliant on the definition above as the indicator for political stability]

[note: The problem with estimating Russian investment in the Central Asian states is that data is seldom available and its reliability is questionable, it is contradicting or incomplete or lacking completely (Reznikova and Zhukov, 2007). Furthermore many cross border investment flows are not visible in the statistics as Russian corporations are used to shadow and offshore mechanism (Libman, 2006a; Libman, 2007; Dikkaya, M. and Keles, I. 2006; Reznikova and Zhukov, 2007).]
5 The EU’s security interests as an international actor and in the Central Asian States

This chapter is going to elaborate the EU as an international actor from a structural realist perspective, especially emphasizing its policy tools to shape its milieu and the functions it fulfills for the member states, as states are the key actors in structural realism. Furthermore the EU’s security discourse shall be analyzed to more soundly differentiate the EU’s security interest in the Central Asian states.

5.1 The EU as an international actor

States as argued above seek power to the end of security (Waltz, 1979). If the primary interests are not at stake states may pursue a variety of other interests (ideology, religion, values etc.). But moreover states will try to use their power to shape their external milieus. Waltz has argued that this will foremost be done by “Great Powers” as they have the capacities to take on special responsibilities which the EU is willing to take as declared in the ESS. Moreover concerning its political and economic strength as well as its efforts building military contingents all serve the consideration of the EU as major power in international politics.

In a structural realist perspective the EU therewith fulfills three primary functions for its member states that are (1) finding a strong position in world economy to enable the
member states to assert their interests, this enforcement of the collective interest of the member states is the traditional purpose of the EU’s foreign policy (Hyde-Price, 2008). Another function the EU fulfils for its member states (2) is the collective milieu shaping which importance has increased after the end of the Cold War. The EU uses its assertiveness deriving from its economic power as the fear of exclusion from its markets or the promise of future membership – these are “all very tangible sources of hard power”. (Hyde-Price, 2008:31). The EU has already proved its capacity in milieu shaping by making its near abroad resemble the liberal-democracy model of the EU itself (Charillon, 2005). Finally after the promotion of these first order interests the EU (3) serves as the “institutional repository of the second-order normative concerns of EU member states” (Hyde-Price, 2008:31; Hyde-Price, 2007 13-107) for example the abolition of the death penalty, democracy promotion, environmental protection and tackling poverty in the South (Hyde-Price, 2006, 2007). These are used in its discourses about CFSP and security to frame its political actions and legitimize external activity.

### 5.2 The security discourse of the EU – state or human security

For being able to argue that democracy and human rights promotion are secondary interests of the EU its security notion has to be developed. If the EU understands security in terms of human security, democracy and human rights promotion will belong to its security dimension as prerequisites to security. If the EU in contrary refers to state security in its discourses human rights and democracy will be supplementing the security notion. Moreover if the EU’s external security notion is differentiated the EU’s security interest in Central Asia can be identified.

The case at hand – the security strategy towards the Central Asian states – has certain implications on how to elaborate the EU’s security notion. Generally the security notion of the EU from which derive the characteristics of its security interest, can be identified through the specifications of the CFSP in the Treaty on the European Union (hereafter TEU), the European Security Strategy (hereafter ESS), the results of the Venusberg Group and the Copenhagen Criteria whereby the latter one can be ruled out due to the context to which they apply. The Copenhagen Criteria are standards that condition the accession of future member states and imply human rights and democracy – the core values of the EU (European Union on policy areas, 2010). The EU understandably is not going to import insecurity by enlargement but rather exports security (Joffé 2007). In this specific context human security becomes an increasing topic in the EU. Especially EU citizens are more often identified as
referent objects whereby the term ‘human security’ is literally seldom used (Hintermeier, 2008). As the Central Asian states are not accession countries and will not be in foreseeable future, the Copenhagen Criteria are not applicable to the security strategy the EU promotes towards these states. Therefore the EU’s security notion as defined by the TEU specifications on the CFSP and as defined in detail by the ESS, the Venusberg Group and the CA SP will be under consideration. It will be argued that human security – the promotion of democracy and human rights – are only supplements to the security notion making it an extensive normative security strategy. But they can therefore be marginalised or abandoned if this serves primary interests.

5.2.1 The referent object – the state or the individual?

The referent object in the EU’s discourse get blurred, it is referred to the member states, the Union or to European security. There is no clearly defined referent object in the EU’s security discourse (Hintermeier, 2008): “European security” (European Council 2003), “global security” (European Council, 2003) or “the security of the Union and the Member states” as in the citation below. The dependence of the security within the EU on the neighbouring regions is also explicitly stated.

“Foreign and Security Policy covers all aspects of security. European security will, in particular, be directed at reducing risks and uncertainties which might endanger the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union and its Member States, their democratic character, their economic stability and the stability of neighbouring regions. […] The CFSP will develop gradually and pragmatically according to the importance of the interests common to all Member States […].” (European Council Meeting, 1993: 9; italic by the author).

Referring to the Treaty provisions concerned with decision making procedures on the CFSP it becomes even clearer that the EU has not succeeded yet in creating a unique identity in its foreign actions. But the more the EU engages as an international security actor as well as in fostering common interests of the member states the more it has grown to become a referent object itself (Hintermeier, 2008). The EU’s discourses seldom refer to ‘national security’ except by stating that this is an exclusive member state competence however it can be stated that “member states security is implicitly incorporated into the overall EU framework.” (Hintermeier, 2008: 663). The member states are also explicitly mentioned as referent object whereby the individual as referent object could not have been detected. To human security it is only referred in terms of promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law but not
in terms of the individual as referent object. And can be considered as a discourse about the EU’s identity it tries to develop. Especially the CFSP as a high ranking policy needs high coercion (Feichtinger, 2010) therefore the EU emphasizes the values the member states can agree upon to frame political action. The referent object therefore can be considered the state and the EU as a state like actor by adopting a state like agenda in its foreign policy actions.

5.2.2 Values at risk – territorial integrity and sovereignty or the quality of life

The values at risk are dependent on the referent object identified. The following values that need to be protected are mentioned: territorial integrity and political independence, democratic character, economic stability and the stability of neighbouring regions. These mentioned values further support the conclusion that the state (or the Union with a state like agenda) serves as referent object this is due to the characteristics of the mentioned values. The territorial integrity as well as the economic and political independence (sovereignty) are constituting principles and values of the state (Buzan et.al., 1993). Its democratic character is a value a constituted state is reliant on. This finding corresponds with the realist assumptions that the state as referent object has to defend and protect itself to guarantee the values society is reliant on. The dependency of the EU on energy imports is especially emphasized naming that already today the EU is the biggest importer of oil and gas making up 50% of the energy consumption and will rise to 70% in 2030 (ESS, 2003). This emphasizes the EU’s energy driven motivation to engage in the Central Asian states like Waltz argues states will engage in securing whatever they depend on. The EU is also concerned especially with the building of security in its neighbourhood to which after enlargement also the Central Asian regions belongs at least as neighbours of the EU’s neighbours (ESS, 2003; CA SP, 2007). The “regionalization of security issues is a growing trend” (Charillon, 2005: 532) as states are ever more affected by the security situation of their neighbours and the near abroad (Erler, 2007). Therewith the EU is interested in the security of its neighbours as its own security – the security within the EU - depends upon. Especially concerning this stability and peace promotion in the neighbourhood supports Keohanes assumption that “in a world characterized by interdependence and exchange (the EU is dependent on the security in its neighbouring states and on energy imports), the building of a secure regional milieu in a safe international system has become more important than the control of new territories and resources.” (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 207; see also Wolfers, 1962). The identified values at risk are belonging to the political-military dimension of state security.
5. The EU’s security interests as an international actor and in the Central Asian States

5.2.3 Threats – the role of democracy and human rights

The ESS first of all declares that today’s security threats are transnational in nature and therefore cannot be tackled by countries on their own but need cooperation (ESS, 2003). The EU therewith emphasizes its role as enabling states to pursue their fundamental interest of security (Hyde-Price, 2006). As key threats and global challenges terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure and organised crime have been identified which points to the widening of the security dimension. The CA SP identifies terrorism, organized crime, human, drug and weapon trafficking as the key threats to the region (CA SP, 2007). The threats identified could also belong to the human security concept as they affect the quality of life of the individual. But referring to the referent object and the identified values at risk it is coherent to categorize the identified threats as the state security concept. The notion is expanded from the traditional realist assumptions of threats occurring from another state by military means (Müller, 2002) and focuses on threats occurring from substate actors. As these actors are becoming important for the security within the EU human rights and democracy become “structural conditions to security” (German Federal Foreign Office, 2010).

Summing up the findings in the TEU provisions, the ESS and the European Council meetings the EU’s security notion can be identified as state security according to the definition above. Due to the widening in identified threats that also occur from substate actors human rights and democracy play a role in the EU’s CFSP and in its understanding of security. But it has to be emphasized that the EU’s core values are not identified as an integral part of the EU’s security promotion but rather as supplements.

5.2.4 Distinguishing the EU’s primary and secondary interests

The EU’s CFSP can be said to follow three ambitious focal aims: the first one is to maintain world peace, the second one to promote international security and the third one to work towards democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The respective provisions in the TEU are broadly defined as the CFSP still requires unanimity. Therefore too constricting Treaty language has been tried to avoid (German Department for Foreign Affairs, 2010). The aims of the CFSP have been clarified in Art. 21 (2) and 24 TEU. Art. 24 TEU states that the EU’s “competences shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all matters with the EU’s security.” Moreover it has been agreed upon the member states willingness to work towards a high degree of integration (Art. 21 TEU). In Art 21 (2) TEU the aims and basic principles of the CFSP are laid down according to which the member state seek to shape their cooperation in all areas of foreign policy. The thesis focuses on the first two paragraphs of Art. 24 TEU
incorporating the following aims: Safeguarding values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity as well as the consolidation and promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The EU’s security notion declaring democracy and human rights as structural conditions to security underpins the findings of Joffé. He states that after the events of 09/11 security was ever more conditioning all other aspects of the CFSP and that after the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 this process has dramatically expedited (Joffé, 2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that as long as democracy and human rights serve the EU’s security interest (i.e. through milieu-shaping) they will be promoted but if not they might be abandoned. It has been discussed that according to the Venusberg Group EU’s interests can be distinguished according to the categories of vital, essential and general or milieu interests. Frank mentions the following vital interests:

- Securing the EU’s position as an important actor concerning questions of global security
- The enforcement of own preferences against new geopolitical actors (like China)
- The maintenance of energy security and the secured access to strategic relevant resources
- Combating terrorism and organized crime
- The prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to stop nuclear ambitions of third countries

As essential interest not crucial for survival are mentioned:

- The stabilization of the southern instability and conflict regions from North Africa over the Near and Middle East to Central Asia.

As general interest Frank identifies:

- The assurance of security and fundamental rights of the individual (human security) against massive human rights violations and against natural disasters.

As argued above states are foremost interested in promoting their primary interests (which is mainly associated with their security and economic welfare) given the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979; Hyde-Price, 2006). These primary interests have also been identified above concerning the EU’s security notion.

Summing up the findings on the EU’s security interest discourse it can be argued that in the EU’s state security notion human rights and democracy are only supplements that are comprised due to the identified threats arising from substate actors which could be tackled by improving the quality of life of individuals. This finding is underpinned by the results of the distinction between primary and secondary interests referring to Joffé who elaborated that
security (identified as state security) conditions all other aspects of the security and foreign policy strategies and to Frank distinguishing the EU’s security interests according to the Venus Group’s categories: vital respectively essential (in structural realist terms primary interests) and general (in structural realist terms secondary interests). These findings are coherent with the conclusion that the EU by promoting a widened state security concept treats human rights and security as supplements— as secondary interests.

5.3 The EU’s security interest in Central Asia reconsidered

The policy towards the Central Asian states in terms of the Strategy Paper incorporates three main areas of action that include seven focal priorities – political actions including human rights, rule of law, good governance, democratization; youth and education and the promotion of an intercultural dialogue, economic actions including promotion of economic development, trade and investment; strengthening energy and transport links as well as environmental sustainability and water, the third category security actions comprehends the combat against common threats and challenges (CA SP, 2007; Schmitz, 2007; Erler, 2007 and Warkotsch, 2008). The area of security actions seems to be offering the most cooperation possibilities (Warkotsch, 2008) in which the EU is promoting an extensive security strategy build on norms and values and therewith linked possible cooperation to human rights and democracy promotion (Warkotsch, 2008; Schmitz, 2007). Even though the EU promotes various interests as mentioned above the EU’s interest is primarily security and energy motivated as outlined in the discourse analysis above (Schmitz, 2007).

“In June 2007 when the EU presented the ‘European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ Brussels argued that security and stability are its main strategic interests. Thus much of the activity from political dialogue to assistance programmes is part of the Strategy’s security objective.” (Boonstra, 2009).

This emphasizes the conditioning of all other aspects by security. Concerning the security interest and its promotion the CA SP focuses on questions of borderer management and migration policy (Sadyrbeck, 2009). Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share a border with Afghanistan that is over 2000 kilometres long. In Central Asia the Commission has supported the Border Management programme BOMCA and a Drug Action Programme (CADAP) since 2003. These substantial Commission funded and UNDP-implemented programmes are “heralded as EU flagship projects in the region” (Boonstra, 2010). Both serve
state security values as elaborated above by supporting the Central Asian states to foster and to preserve territorial integrity. If human rights and democratization promotion would be considered as structural conditions to security these fields would need much more attention. The CA SP and the EUCAM Report signalize limited interest or attention in and towards these fields as both only propose possible strategies, do not set benchmarks and do not monitor or evaluate the quality of certain policy instruments as the human rights dialogues in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan which from observers have been described as insufficient (Graubner, 2008).

Reconsidering the second function of the EU as an international actor (milieu-shaping) in the case of Central Asia as non accession countries makes clear that the incentive of membership is not applicable. The exclusion from the EU’s market is not executing huge pressure on the Central Asian states as they are economical dependent on Russia (also due to their soviet history and geography). The incentive of an improved partnership does not seem to pull the Central Asian states towards an EU like model (Sadyrbek, 2009). The EU therewith does not seem to be capable of shaping the Central Asian states according to its values. They do not serve the higher end of security making them second order interests from a structural realist perspective. The EU has already proven by successfully shaping its near abroad to act in relevant interest-based approaches rather than idealistic approaches (Charillon, 2005).

The EU’s discourse on security underpins the finding that human rights and democracy promotion are abandoned as secondary interests. This is for two reasons. First of all a discursive examination about human security respectively the individual as referent object in the case of external relations is lacking. Second the interest in security in the Central Asian states is overemphasized as focal priority in the CFSP and especially in the Central Asian case conditioning all other aspects of foreign relations (Joffé, 2007). The security interest of the EU’s engagement in the Central Asian region from a structural realist perspective can be summed up as follows, referring to the ESS and the CA SP:

- The EU is dependent on energy however the EU has not been able since 2008 to accomplish concrete results from its emphasized energy policy (Warkotsch, 2008).
- The EU is interested in the security of the Central Asian states, in terms of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- Human rights and democracy are secondary interests in state security concepts, if it serves the security interest of preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty it will be promoted (i.e. in milieu-shaping activities)
The EU’s engagement can be regarded as an interest-driven approach with human rights and democracy promotion being secondary interests. The EU is not able to promote its security interest in the region (except of the two programs BOMCA and CADAP) sufficiently especially concerning its interest in energy. The power analysis below shall elaborate the power position of the EU. If the EU proves to be the less powerful actor in the region it could be argued that the EU is narrowing its security strategy towards the Central Asian states to stay compatible in the fields of its main interests – namely state security in the region and the accession and use of its energy resources.

6 Power in terms of the distribution of capabilities

As argued above the interest analysis will be comprehended by a power analysis drawing on the power determinants Waltz has identified: Economic capability, political stability and military strength. As already elaborated in the methodology these determinants have been adapted to the Central Asian subsystem.

Which explanations from structural realism can be elaborated to explain the EU’s abandoning of human rights and democracy promotion concerning the influence of the international system? Central Asia has become a region of increasing power projection of the USA, Russia, the EU and China (Amineh, 2006) with most influential states being Russia and China (Schmitz, 2007; Erler, 2007; Warkotsch, 2008; Sadyrbeck 2009; Kubrick, 1997; Libman, 2006). As it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all external actors in Central Asia\(^\text{29}\). Thus it is going to apply Russia\(^\text{30}\) to exemplify the distribution of capabilities between the EU and other actors in Central Asia. Russia is chosen for several reasons. First of all it can still be considered as the regional hegemon in Central Asia and is therefore as argued by Waltz of major interest (Waltz, 1979). Another reason is that China and Russia in its expression of its interest towards these states are quite similar as well as concerning their capabilities in this realm. Therefore one could assume after having evaluated the distribution of capabilities between Russia and EU that the fact that another relative powerful actor as China or the US is in play just makes relative gains for the EU even smaller increasing the pressure to adapt to more successful strategies. It is to a certain degree problematic to compare a state and the EU. But as the EU is consider as an international actor in this thesis and itself has a keen interest in becoming a security actor with a state like agenda the feasibility of this comparison is assumed.

\[
\begin{array}{|l|l|}
\hline
\text{Russian Federation} & \text{EU} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]
Population: 141.9 Millions
County’s territory: 17,098.2

Population: 495 Millions
Territory: 4,322.0

Figure 3: Comparison of determinants solely referring to potential power, data from the EUROPA website and the German Federal Foreign Office; drawn by the author

6.1 Economic capabilities – The EU and Russia in comparison

As explained in the methodology in this section the economic capacities as an aggregate of power of the EU in comparison with Russia shall be under consideration. Therefore the economic capacities of both entities in terms of their potential to shape the actions of the Central Asian states shall be considered. The Central Asian states rely on Russia due to complex economic interdependencies (as well as due to their historical belonging to the Soviet Union) (Schmitz, 2007). As Russia is the main export and import partner of all five Central Asian states these, “have no interest to cut off the economic relations with Russia [...]” (Schmitz, 2007: 43).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHN 16.34%</td>
<td>FRAU 9.23%</td>
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<td>TUR 10.27%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>GER 6.24%</td>
<td>TUR 12.09%</td>
<td>HUN 6.75%</td>
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<td>KAZ 12.47%</td>
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<td>EU 0.0%</td>
<td>EU 0.0%</td>
<td>EU 0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison of the main export partners only in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the EU asserts itself against Russia but concerning imports all five states are highly reliant on Russia. Moreover Russia is the only actor who is able to compensate for a working force surplus generated in the Central Asian economies (Sadyrbek, 2009 and Schmitz, 2007). This is especially important for the Kyrgyz and Tadzhik economies (Sadyrbek, 2009). Therewith
Russia has a strong instrument of influence at its disposal and is regularly exerting pressure via its migration policy by the threat of visa denial or eviction orders (Peyrouse, 2007; Matveeva; 2007). Russian investment in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, to which all five Central Asian states belong) concentrates on strategic important sectors of economies in institutional weak states increasing the possibility to consolidate political influence from the economic presence (Libman, 2006).

![Figure 5: Russian investment in institutional weak states, source; Crane, et.al. 2005](image)

This is also backed up by Crane’s, Peterson’s and Oliker’s calculation of the simple correlation between investment indicators and differences of institutional indicators between Russia and the CIS. Therewith the volume of Russian investment decreases with increasing institutional harmonization in other words the weaker the legal-institutional framework the more Russian investment is transacted (Libman, 2006; Crane et.al, .). The concerted Russian investment makes Russia’s increasing influence apparent (Vahtra, 2005). Here it is pointed to the problems concerning data on Russian investment in the CIS as outlined in the operationalization. Nonetheless Russia is one of the most influential investors in the CIS region holding main assets in many strategic economic sectors (Libman, 2007; Vahtra, 2005; Warkotsch, 2008) and has been able “to gain a lot of economic influence which is politically vital[v]ia its state-owned enterprises […]”(Schmitz, 2007: 40). The close linkage between the Russian government and the financial and industrial companies is still existence (Mangott, 2008). For example the Russian power utilities monopolist RAO UES has developed a policy focusing on expansion in the post-Soviet world which is now implemented. The idea of a “liberal empire”, i.e. the use of investment to expand influence and control has been introduced by its CEO Anatolii Chubais in 2003 (Libman, 2006a). The EU as the table above indicates cannot be considered as major partner in trade in the Central Asian states. Export and import partners from the EU are: Germany, France, Romania, Italy, Greece, Hungary and Poland making up a share in import and export of 4% to 12% (except of Kazakhstan in which the EU holds a share of 27.91% as export partner, this could be in part
an explanation why Kazakhstan has tried to push the cooperation with the EU further with its state program Path to Europe – 2009-2011 (see also Sadyrbek, 2009). Compared with the Russian import and export shares which accounts for 19.25% at the median these is an acknowledgeable difference in importance of trade relations. This becomes even more striking if one considers also China’s role which in terms of trade is the second most important partner.

The biggest investors among the member states in general and in the case of European (non-EU) FDI flows are Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK (Eurostat and European Commission, 2007). The Central Asian states are not explicitly listed in Eurostat data but are subsumed under FDI outflows towards Asian countries making up a share of 12,7 % of total Extra-EU FDI flows (in the end of 2008) (Goncalves and Karkainnen, 2010). Here as well it has to be pointed to the operationalization concerning the availability of data. The biggest European investments can be found in energy, tobacco, mining, production and construction. But Russia’s dominance becomes apparent by looking at the gas sector, telecommunication sector and construction sectors in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as at the energy sector in Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan [note: See Annexe for listed major investors according to UNCTAD data: country/resident, firm and economic sector. Data on Turkmenistan as the country is following an isolation policy labelled as neutrality has not been available.] It is not only the quantitative superiority meaning more Russian firms but also the quality of the investment referring to the strategic importance of the sector invested in and on the position in the market (monopoly, quasi-monopoly). Russia holds the monopoly in the energy sector in Kyrgyzstan due to the privatization of Kyrgyzaz as well as the monopoly in telecommunication throughout the CIS. In Uzbekistan due to new developments [note: see Annexe - excursus, Court ruling on Zeromax) Russian companies assumingly have been able to reaffirm their monopolistic position in the energy sector. Russia has proven not only willing to expand its economic influence as political vital instrument it is also able to defend its monopolistic market positions in all five countries. The economic influence is political vital in comparison to European firms as Russian oil and natural gas industries are either directly controlled by the government or are subject to huge government influence and vice versa. The political and personal success of leaders is linked with the fortune of the firms in these industries as Russia’ economic revival in the Putin/Medvedev era has been due in large part to the massive revenues generated by energy exports, mainly to Europe (Nichol, 2010). In contrary European investment\textsuperscript{33} is not concerted as a mean of gaining major political influence or to improve its power position in the region. In the PCA’s towards the countries
6. Power in terms of the distribution of capabilities

(except of Turkmenistan as still not in force) no economic sector is mentioned in particular in fact the general aims of better private direct investment promotion and protection is declared several times in the PCA’s with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In the case of Kyrgyzstan mining is a sector that receives additional attention. In the PCA with Tadzhikistan the topic of investment whether domestic, foreign, private or public is not even mentioned. Drawing on the data available on European and Russian Investment it can be argued that Russian firms are the key players in the Central Asian economies. The Nabucco pipeline project is the only EU investment that tries to compete for energy reserves with Russia. Geographically Russia benefits from the gas- and oil pipelines that all cross Russian territory before they enter the world market. This position shall be solidified by long-term contracts of delivery (Sadyrbeck, 2009). This is for example the case in Turkmenistan that has signed a pledge to sell most of its gas to Gazprom in the next 25 years. Turkmenistan has the fourth biggest gas resource in the world available. Russia aspires similar contracts with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Warkotsch, 2006; Matveeva, 2007). This Russian quasi-monopoly in transport and transit concerning Central Asian energy could therewith be further consolidated (Sadyrbeck, 2009). Especially the Russian position as energy great power as well as the massive investments in the Central Asian economies and finance sectors can strengthen Russia’s power in the region (Timmermann, 2006). Russia has recognized the strategic importance of the Central Asian region and has been able to dismount its actual influence economical and politically. The potential power of the Russian oil and natural gas industries as important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia becomes apparent by its gas reserves: Russia has by far the largest natural gas reserves in the world, possessing over 30% of the world’s total. It is eighth in the world in oil reserves, with at least 10% of the global total (Nichol, 2010). Also established security cooperation - like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – are ever more focussing on energy policy interests (Schmitz, 2007).

6.2 Subconclusion

The EU as dependent on Russia has less potential power in the above analyzed economic sectors. Therefore concerning economic capabilities the EU is a far less powerful actor than Russia in terms of trade relations, of investment structure, geography (34 Project) and as compensation of working force surplus from Tadzhikistan and Kyrgyzstan (due to history and geography). The EU is not able to use economic means to exert pressure or incentives on the Central Asian states and has therefore less actual influence. Also concerning potential power
the EU lacks behind Russia in terms of resource endowment. This is due to its relative weak position in and towards the Central Asian economies, which could be shown in means of trade relations, the investment structure, migration flows and geography, all indicators are favouring Russia in its role as regional hegemon.

6.3 Political Stability – The EU and Russia in comparison

This section is structured according to indicators used by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index in 2010 (hereafter BTI) and therefore compares the following categories of political stability: stateness, stability of democratic institutions, checks and balances, transparency and effective power to govern (BTI, 2010). As outlined in the Operationalization the effective power to govern is the crucial indicator concerning political stability.

Russia as successful state concerning its macroeconomic achievements (GDP growth rate of 6.7 % at an average per year since 1999) is also characterized by an increasing political authorization. Vladimir Putin has by changes in the electoral law, the manipulation of competition in the party system and public perception consolidated an official party (‘Staatspartei’) Edinaja Rossija United Russia (Mangott, 2008).

The only issue that question Russia’s statenes is the Chechen war that began 1999 especially as Russia has not been able to acquire militarily control over the Chechen region. Representatives of state and economy are regularly targets of attacks and Russia experienced several terroristic acts. Besides no serious limitations of Russia’s statenes are detected. Also the ‘democratic’ institutions are considered as stable even though the adoption of legislative acts due to an inefficient bureaucracy can be regarded as sloppy (BTI, 2010). The weakly developed party system is identified as another shortcoming concerning the stability of democratic institutions in Russia. A serious deficit in contrary has been identified concerning the system of checks and balances respectively the separation of powers that play only a minor role in political decision-making procedures. This is due to Vladimir Putin’s role as Prime Minister controlling the United Russian Party which holds a “supermajority” (Ortung, 2010: 439) in the Parliament. Drawing on the Freedom House Nation in Transit Report from 2010 parliamentary control of the executive in Russia is virtually non-existent. Russia has not succeeded in any real democratization efforts of the political system. It is still common that officials from the Putin-era maintain control over policy and economic power also due to their established contacts with Russia’s security agencies (Ortung, 2010). The powerful position of the government is further consolidated through the nationalization of the media, at least of the most important print media, broadcasting companies and websites. Less successful or
important media branches that try to publish oppositional views become targets of an increasing execution of censorship by the state as well as of unsolved murder [note: see below] (Ortung, 2010). The close links between companies and government also exerts influence on the situation of the media; oligarchs with strong media-holdings have been eliminated and the media is used in purpose of formation of pro-government opinion (Mangott, 2008). The political stability is ensured by the repression of the media and by increasing the powers of the secret service. In July 2010 President Dmitri Medvedev signed a law that increases powers of Russia’s security services. These are going to be extended to the extent of stifling protest and freedom of speech (Aljazeera, 2010). Russia’s rating for independent media itself is modest with scoring at 6.25 in the Nation in Transit Report of 2010 (Freedom House Index, 2010). Main broadcasting companies stay under tight central control, censorship increases and violence against journalists continues. The non-prosecution of high profiled murders of individuals daring to oppose the Kremlin moreover supports the repressive policy of Moscow (Ortung, 2010). Already under the former Committee of state security (hereafter KGB) agent and President Vladimir Putin the Federal Security Service (hereafter FSB) has dramatically increased its influence on the Russian society (Aljazeera.net, 2010, Ortung, 2010, Mangott, 2008). Moreover, in Medvedev’s 12th November address to the Parliament he warned the opposition “not to use democracy as a cover to destabilize the state and split society” (Aljazeera.net, 2010). Stability is reached through repression of the media, old elites controlling main assets in political and economic live (Mangott, 2008) and the extensive use of the secret service. The effective power to govern is therefore not endangered and can be perceived as high due to the centralization of power, the stable majority in parliament and the control of the media. The only veto players that have been identified stem from the military and the secret service (“siloviki”) (BTI, 2010; Mangott, 2008). Their power and influence is under Vladimir Putin’s control (Mangott, 2008).

The CFSP aims at establishing the EU as a single actor acting in the service of “its interests and those of the international community in general.” (European Council Meeting, 1993: 8). The EU possesses an own legal personality since the amendments by Lisbon (Art. 47 TEU) and it works towards higher coherence and a state like agenda in its foreign relations nevertheless the EU’s CFSP remains a resort governed in an intergovernmental modus. Even though the member states have recognised the problem solving capacities at the Union level they do not want to give up foreign policy competences especially concerning questions of security (Hofmann and Wessels, 2008; Bopp, 2008). Therefore the member states scoring at
the BTI and the Freedom House Index shall be mentioned for sake of completion. The EU 27 member states score according to the Freedom House Index 2010 all between 1 and 2, concerning political rights and civil liberties between 1 and 2 making them perceived as “free” by the Freedom House index. The BTI as well supports these findings. Most of the EU 27 member states are not even included and those included score comprehensible high between Romania with 8.23 the lowest result for the status index and the Czech Republic with the highest score of 9.65.

Generally the EU competences are distinguished as shared competences (Art. 4 TFEU) and exclusive competences of the member states (Art. 3 TFEU). The CFSP (and the CSDP as an integral part) however is still situated in the TEU (Title V TEU) – and therewith it is still referred to the old pillar structure. Decisions on the CFSP have to be taken unanimously by the European Council. Therefore it can be argued that the EU in terms of the CFSP has not yet reached its aims of becoming a more state like actor even though its agenda already resembles state agendas. The divergent assignment of policy fields to different forms of competences reflects the missing consent between the member states how these important competences shall be coordinated especially with regard to their relations towards the member states’ competences. In general it can be reasonably assumed that the EU’s institutions are stable. They will not be abolished due to crisis or financial shortcomings nor are they going to collapse. Or at least that they are not severely suffering from instability. The Separation of powers refers in the case of the EU to its decision making procedures. Special regulations still apply for the CFSP – it is still subject to unanimity decisions (Directorate General External Policies of the Union, 2008) to the greatest possible extent further characterized by marginal participation of the Commission and the nearly total exclusion of the European Parliament (Hofmann and Wessels, 2008). The Union in terms of foreign relations can still be regarded as a technocratic rather than a democratic Union (Kleger, 2008). The crucial indicator according to the theoretical framework set is nevertheless the power to govern. The above mentioned missing consent is also reflected in the different modes of decision making in the CFSP. Possible threats to institutional stability could arise due to possible tensions between different offices and the assigned resorts. The European Council has the “power to determine the general direction of policy extends to the entire spectrum of EU activities” (‘generelle Leitlinienkompetenz’) (European Council, 2006). The newly created function of the president of the European Council has a central impact on the formulation of the goals of the EU’s foreign policy. Simultaneously foreign policy related competences are united in the function of the High Representative of the CFSP. This potentially creates tensions concerning the
profile of both functions. Similar tensions could occur between the function of the commission’s president and the high representative of the CFSP according to Art. 18 clause 4 TEU and Art. 17 clause 6 b TEU (Hofmann and Wessels, 2008; Bopp, 2008). The effective power to govern\textsuperscript{37} of the EU is determined by actors and decision making procedures in the CFSP. Even though the qualitative majority voting has been expanded there is still the veto possibility of the member states and it can be concluded that in general the intergovernmental modus dominates the CFSP. Therefore it can be assumed reasonably drawing on the findings above that the foreign relations of the EU will be highly disputed not only regarding its contents but also institutionally. The EU’s capacity to act is highly restricted (Hofmann and Wessels, 2008).

### 6.4 Subconclusion

The result is therefore that the EU’s effective power to govern concerning the CFSP is marginal and that still the member states are in charge concerning foreign policy. As the Russian government is not subject to real democratic control it is able to come to short-time decisions and their implementation. Therewith Russia is able to mobilize huge sums in a shortest possible timeframe\textsuperscript{38} (Sadyrbek, 2009; Schmitz, 2007). The EU on contrary is a slow, huge apparatus with different centres of power, a complicated institutional structure and needs therewith a long time to come to a decision, making it difficult to catch up on Russia not to mention to compete with Russia (Matveeva, 2007). In terms of structural realism in the political stability capacity of power the EU in the case of Central Asia is the less powerful actor.

### 6.5 Military Strength – The EU and Russia in comparison

In the realm of the international use of force three new actors have occurred or re-established their position as security actors in the world. First of all the EU finishes its Rapid Reaction Forces that comprehend 60 000 military personnel and grows towards a security and defence Union (Rozoff, 2009). Secondly the Russia dominated CSTO has deployed the Rapid Deployment Forces for Central Asia and thirdly NATO starts to create a 20 000 strong mobile force. The EU by its 1999 decisions therewith joined a rather small group of ‘militarized’ international institutions, in Europe comprising only NATO and the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Bailes, 2008). Military strength shall be measured by the indicators of defence spending, equipment and the defence industrial basement as well as military doctrine and military bases in Central Asia.
In August 2008 – with the beginning of the Georgia conflict – Russia arose as being willing and able to act military in its near abroad to assert its foreign policy interests. Moreover in August of 2009 Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a new Defence Law that enables Russia to deploy forces abroad to defend Russia’s foreign policy interests (Boonstra, 2010). Despite of an increase in the military budget and the emphasizing of reform necessity the modernisation and reform process of Russian military only progresses slowly. This is despite the disclosure of severe drawbacks respectively shortcomings concerning the equipment and working practices of the Russian armed forces during the short Georgian war in 2008\(^{39}\) (The Military Balance, 2009). This is also due to 20 years of mismanagement that cannot easily be improved. Concerning the equipment problems the defence industry is one of the major causes. After the Cold War the demand fell rapidly and the industries compensated output decreases by the reduction of costs in the quality-management systems “and currently very few can display the ISO 9001 international quality symbol, with many advanced weapons programmes increasingly reliant on imported components. “(The Military Balance, 2009: 215). Moreover an acute scarcity of specialists workers as well as the high inflation in machine-building and defence industry (The Military Balance, 2010). Another impediment towards the aspired reform process is the lack of a military doctrine, Russia has not been able yet to identify key threats in which terms the redeployment of the armed forces could be explained or legitimised. But if the process in face of all these impediments will be
6. Power in terms of the distribution of capabilities

successful, Russia’s armed forces could recover as suitable promoters in regional battlefields fighting local and regional conflicts (The Military Balance 2010).

In the case of the Central Asian region Russia is consolidating military strategies to combat threats to the state security of the Central Asian states. The civil war in Tadzhikistan in 1992 has demonstrated that peripheral ruling elites may be forced to call on the forces of Russia to maintain territorial integrity against internal and external forces (Menon and Spruyt, 1999). This attitude – the emphasizing of military means and state security – coincides with the tenors from the CSTO (Jackson, 2008). Through the CSTO which can be described as a Moscow dominated defence organization Russia has steadily be acquiring foreign military bases throughout the CIS at which its forces can be stationed or deployed. “In the recent past, Moscow has assigned a division and a brigade to [the CSTO] beefed up is power projection capabilities and secured bases for its own and presumably CSTO forces throughout Central Asia.” (Blank, 2009: 1). The creation of the Central Asian Rapid Reaction Deployment Forces expands the Russian military presence from Tadzhikistan to Kyrgyzstan. It comprehends 4000 personnel and is grouped in ten battalions (The Military Balance, 2009: 208). As the CSTO is clearly controlled by Russia it is likely to be used as an instrument of Russian policy. Russia moreover has successfully hindered other actors in maintaining military bases like the USA in Kyrgyzstan (Manaca air base) as well as in Uzbekistan with a German military base left while other foreign military presence (USA and NATO) expelled in 2005 (Rozoff, 2009). Not only foreign military presence is hindered by Russia it also is interested in subsume the independent states of Central Asia under its security leadership as a creation of a pro-Russian bloc in sharp distinction from a NATO controlled bloc (Rozoff, 2009; Quinn-Judge, 2009).

Central Asia is therefore a key geographical element in its desire to “increase its military capability” (The Military Balance, 2009: 208) as well as counterbalancing US and Western influence in the region (ibid.). Russia furthermore works towards a reinforcement of the CRDF air component at Kant in Kyrgyzstan and towards “boost[ing] the capability of [its] 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tadzhikistan.” (ibid.: 209). Even though the consideration of Russia’s absolute military strength has revealed severe shortcomings concerning the ability to operate and the equipment, in the case of Central Asia Russian relative military strength is increasing by the rise of armed forces deployment in the region and its successful policies of excluding Western military forces. Moreover the changes in law and its general military approach to tackle Central Asian security problems let reasonably conclude that the Russian military strength in the Central Asian states is relatively high and further increasing in relation to the EU.
The EU with the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in July 2004 and the development of two European ‘battlegroups’ comprehending 60 000 personnel has boosted its emergence as a security and defence union. It can however not be regarded as an effective counterbalance against US military hegemony in the world nor Russia’s military strength in Central Asia and there will not be a genuine European army develop in foreseeable future (Bopp, 2008). The EU battlegroups have reached their operational readiness in 2007 (The Military Balance, 2010; German Federal Ministry of Defence and Federal Foreign Office, 2010). In the case of EU led military missions five national operation head quarters are available (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Greece) that will be assigned to personnel from the member states. Alongside of the development of the EU’s defence capabilities the cooperation in the armament shall be advanced among others by improving the industrial and technological cooperation in the defence sector aiming at advancement in the European armament markets and the cooperative defence technological research (German Department for Foreign Affairs and the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). The EDA is part of the institutional framework of the EU and works under political control of the EU Council of Ministers. The strategic partnership with NATO is earmarked for two possible scenarios:

1. EU led missions using means and capabilities of NATO
2. EU led missions without using means and capabilities of NATO (hence called autonomous operations)

Due to most of the EU member states also being NATO members there is a prevailing interest in creating synergies between both organizations also because these 21 EU member states NATO members provide military staff to both organizations from a unitary national pool. In this context the table below has to be considered. Russia excels all EU member states except for France and the UK in military expenditure. Russia’s potential power in the military sector is therewith relatively higher as it has more financial means available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank in the world</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Expenditure in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>69,271,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>67,316,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>61,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48,022,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>37,427,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Power in terms of the distribution of capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>19,409,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13,917,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12,642,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10,860,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Schweden</td>
<td>6,135,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5,674,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4,884,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4,476,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3,768,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3,246,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,616,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,900,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,581,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,316,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1,191,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,127,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>888,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>692,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>648,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>406,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: National military expenditure in 2009 in US-Dollar, source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010

The EU member states’ spending on military capacities has even before the current financial crisis rocket been moderate. Most EU countries have been and are concerned with stabilizing the financial sector and with medium-term goals concerning demographic development, social services among others. Under these circumstances “it is likely that defence spending will come under scrutiny.” (The Military Balance, 2009: 106). The influence of the economic slowdown on defence spending can be summarized as posing tight budgetary conditions on all functions in the defence sector in the European countries. But still since the 1999’s the record of troops deployed by European governments outside the European border have constantly increased till today. The deployments and external operations vary strongly concerning their scale, distance and diversity (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004). The EU member states governments sustain 50 000-60 000 troops on operations in over 20 countries also in the
6. Power in terms of the distribution of capabilities

Central Asian states (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004). Here it is pointed to the problem of estimating figures on troop deployment as noted in the operationalization.

While Russia’s military modernisation is dependent on a new military doctrine, the EU member states have to agree upon a shared strategic culture. The member states hesitated to inform the public or the national parliaments about the significance of the ESS (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004) which furthermore underpins the member states reluctance to assign defence competences. The EU lacks an own military command structure in contrary to NATO and no battlegroup has actually been deployed in any operation (The Military Balance, 2010). Sweden and Spain while having the EU presidency in the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010 both set an ambitious agenda to tackle problems of inflexibility of the battlegroups, general civil-military capacity development for the CSDP as well as increasing harmonization and transparency in the European defence sectors. As in this year the timeframes concerning the civilian and military headline goals come to an end Spain tried to establish a defence ministers’ formation in the EU Council of Ministers but towards high expectations only informal meetings between the defence ministers have taken place. Defence matters have been addressed in the General Affairs and External Relations Council run by foreign ministers (The Military Balance, 2010: 105). For making autonomous EU actions possible and viable at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000 the member states identified those areas with severe shortcomings that have also be identified in The Military Balance of 2009 and 2010: strategic lift, transportation; command and control as well as intelligence gathering.

6.6 Subconclusion

Most outside observers would characterize the EU as an economic heavyweight but a political and military lightweight. US thinkers have stigmatized it for its perceived ‘softness’ and inability to face up to the hard power realities of the world. The actions of the CSDP and resources expended on it are trivial compared with the EU’s actions in the field of external trade and development assistance (Bailes, 2008). Moreover NATO stays the basement of the EU’s collective defence as no other organization will be able to take on this task in foreseeable future (German Department for Foreign Affairs and the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Russia’s military presence is increasing in Central Asia also due to existing security cooperation primarily the CSTO. The EU’s military presence in Central Asia is far less extended. As the EU’s military strength is considered here it has to be stated that the developments of a genuine EU armed forces (Bopp, 2008) is not happening in foreseeable
future making the comparison difficult. But Russia in contrary to the EU and its member states has been able to increase its power projection via military means on the region with the CSTO as a powerful instrument at its disposal.

7 Conclusion

The thesis tried to answer the question in how far respectively to what extent Waltz’s structural realism can explain the narrowing of the EU’s security strategy towards the Central Asian states. The structural realist theory emphasizes power and interest. Concerning power especially the influence of structure – namely the distribution of capabilities – on units’ behaviour. Therefore first of all the EU’s security notion and its security interests have been analysed. According to the referent object, the value at risk and the mentioned threats identified in the EU’s security discourse it has been concluded that the EU in its external relations adopts a state security notion. This finding enables to reasonably argue that human rights and democracy are supplements to the EU’s external security interests, which have been further differentiated according to primary interests and secondary interests as set out in the theoretical framework. The EU’s security strategy is primarily interested in security of the Central Asian states’ and the diversification of the EU’s energy imports. The interest in human rights and democracy promotion can be subordinated as secondary interests. These findings have then been applied to the EU’s security interest in the Central Asian region for the purpose of more soundly elaborating the EU’s security strategy in this special case arguing that the EU’s interest discourse corresponds with the EU’s policy actions (focussing on boarder management, migration policies). As set out in the theoretical and methodological framework interests are circumscribed by the structure respectively the distribution of capabilities within the structure. This is due to the constraints and possibilities units are facing due to their relative power position. Therefore not only the EU’s interests had to be considered but further its relative power position in the Central Asian region. The power analysis conducted considered potential power as well as actual influence to estimate the position of the EU in relation to Russia. Even though – especially concerning the military realm – the comparison of the EU and Russia faces certain constraints it could be reasonably and in accordance with the theory argued that Russia is the more powerful actor in the region. Therewith the abandoning of human rights and democracy as a change in units’ behaviour could be explained by the process of competition and socialization namely the EU is narrowing its security strategy to stay competitive. The fact that EU actors and US observers likewise argue that the EU should start to clearly define its interests and should not endanger
their accomplishment by conditionalizing cooperation – as no other actor conditionalizes cooperation (Erler, 2008; Schmitz, 2007) – indicates that the process of socialization and competition has an influence on the EU’s policies. The EU is therewith often advised to take part in the ‘New Great Game’ over Central Asia’s resources in close cooperation with the USA (Schmitz, 2007). Therewith to the extent to which the theory claims to have explanatory power it is applicable – namely in terms of interest and power the theory is able to explain the EU as an international actor, enables to distinguish between primary and secondary interests and is applicable to the subsystem at hand namely the Central Asian region.

In contrary to the advices outlined above others argue that the EU should develop its own and distinct profile in the Central Asian states also because of its relative powerlessness. They argue the EU will not be able to catch up on Russia’s power position and therefore should rather engage in becoming an attractive partner by emphasizing its role as a normative power (see for example Sadyrbek, 2009; Erler, 2008; Warkotsch 2008). As competition in Waltz’s terms only leads to imitation this aspect (innovation) could not have been considered. Moreover structural realist theory does not enable to take internal aspects of the state into account. This limits its force in the case of Central Asia as due to its specific history, the similarity in its political-institutional constitutions, shared values, shared history and common practices (informal institutions) are also crucial parts in explaining the influence of Russia and the difficulties the EU faces to become a more influential player.

Summing up the explanation of the narrowing of the EU’s security strategy would therewith be that the EU has policy instruments at its disposal that are barely competitive compared with Russian power resources and therefore the EU tries to adapt to more successful strategies by abandoning human rights and democracy promotion. The EU therewith already started to differentiate more precisely its interests by emphasizing security in its discourses. Still this lacks a coherent understanding of what exactly the EU means by security. Moreover the EU is mentioning a variety of interests therefore a more differentiated examination of its aims and its interests would be fruitful. Concerning the advices outlined above the EU should more forcefully engage in the region the problem is that even if the EU tries to become competitive by narrowing its strategy the EU keeps its limited freedom of action and its uncompetitive, less powerful policy instruments. How shall the EU then more forcefully engage in its interests? The thesis would agree on the outlook Schmitz has made concerning the EU’s engagement in the Central Asian states: The EU is and will be a relative powerless actor in the region as not being able to catch up on Russia.
Further research could engage the Central Asia states itself as objects of inquiry; especially concerning the theory of balance of power it could be elaborated in how far the EU is used by the Central Asian states to counterbalance the influence of Russia and China. Moreover based on this thesis the next step could be to take the unit level into account by comparing foreign security interest between the EU and the Central Asian states to elaborate their applicability. And in a next step to synthesize the findings and therewith reaching for a more coherent explanation of the EU’s security strategy in the Central Asian states.

8 Annexe

8.1 Excursus

Russian Monopolies in Kyrgyzstan

In December 2007 the Kyrgyz Premier Minister Chudinov went to Moscow to foster the Russian Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that Gazprom will take over the state owned monopoly in gas exports Kyrgyzgaz (86% of shares belong to the state) to then foster further geological exploration. In February 2008 Gazprom and the Kyrgyz Government agreed on several documents that coordinate the cooperation in the energy sector. Together a joint venture has been established with 12 million USD Russian capitals to foster the cooperation. Russia holds a premier presence in the Kyrgyz energy sector. Zarubezhneftegaz, a Gazprom subsidiary, is geological exploration operator in Kyrgyzstan as well as Gazprom Neft, a Gazprom subsidiary owns a network of 77 filling stations, eight oil depots and two liquefied household gas depots as well as rents of further four oil depots. The assets are managed by the Gazprom Neft Asia subsidiary.

(Article, online accessible at URL: http://www.neurope.eu/articles/83254.php#ixzz0YKuMs7Vk, last access November 17, 2010)

Therewith Russia has been able to solidify its monopoly position in the energy sector in Kyrgyzstan. The European investment in the Kyrgyz Petroleum Company in contrary is a joint venture between OJSC "Kyrgyzneftegaz" and "Petrofac Energy Developments International Limited" making the Kyrgyz government the main shareholder of this oil and gas Exploration Company. After all also Gazprom has been invited to the privatization discussions of Kyrgyzneftegaz.
Russian reaffirmation of monopolistic position in Uzbekistan

There is a further example illustrating that Russia not only has a monopoly position in Central Asian strategic economic sectors but is also willing and able to use its influence to defend this position. Zeromax was an exceptionally important player in Uzbekistan it was able to set up a large portfolio of interests in key economic sectors. Its website says that, by the end of 2007, it had become Uzbekistan's "largest foreign investor as well as its largest private sector employer". But Zeromax (not a EU registered firm but Swiss-registered) has been closed suddenly by a Court ruling of May the 5th 2010 instructing Zeromax GmbH to halt its operations in Uzbekistan and to hand over control of its assets there to the state. Different explanations are circling around the Court ruling. One explanation argues that the impetus for the closing of Zeromax came from outside Uzbekistan, namely from Russian oil and gas firms which were unsatisfied with Zeromax's role as the dominant player with which they had to deal. Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, and oil company Lukoil are the major energy-sector investors. Moreover Uzbekistan plays a major role in Gazprom’s strategic considerations due to its estimated unexplored gas and oil reserves (see URL: http://www.gazprom.com/production/central-asia/, last access November 17, 2010).

According to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting an Uzbek political analyst argued that the Russian companies have asserted their point of view on Zeromax role as key player during the recent meetings between Uzbek President Karimov and Russian President Medvedev. "Prompted by representatives of the Russian resource companies, Moscow may have voiced dissatisfaction with the monopoly position that Zeromax held in the resource sector" he said.

NBCentralAsia sources say that two weeks after Zeromax was placed under administration, 51% of its shares were transferred to the state oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz, while the remaining 49% were made over to a major Russian energy firm.

8.2 Major Investments in the Central Asian States

Major investing firms in the Central Asian states referring to UNCTAD data (UNCTAD,2009) shall be displayed here. The tables below shall indicate the position of Russian firms as key actors in the Central Asian economies. Minor company information (company websites) has been added on those regarded as crucial. Crucial refers to either
largest European investment or to the sector invested in. Therefore companies in mining, energy and telecommunication have been foremost considered.

### Major investing firms in Kazakhstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Economic sector/activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(France)</td>
<td>Areva Group</td>
<td>AREVA is joining with the mining company Kazatomprom to create a fuel marketing joint venture called Ifastar. We have two objectives: to sell integrated batches of fuel, and technical and economic assessment of a dedicated fuel fabrication line. Main area: uranium mining. <a href="http://www.areva.com">www.areva.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Turkey)</td>
<td>BVT</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Denmark)</td>
<td>Carlsberg</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(United States)</td>
<td>Chevron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(China)</td>
<td>China National Petroleum (CNPC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Netherlands)</td>
<td>Floodgate Mittal Steel</td>
<td>Mining <a href="http://www.arcelormittal.com">www.arcelormittal.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Romania)</td>
<td>Fraradex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Russian Federation)</td>
<td>Gazprom Kyshtym Electrolytic Copper Plant (KMEZ) Lukoil</td>
<td>“Natural gas from Central Asia and Transcaucasia is a crucial element in shaping Gazprom’s resource base to meet the demand in Russia, CIS and Europe.” <a href="http://www.gazprom.com">www.gazprom.com</a> Lukoil is the six biggest oil company in the world and has an equivalent of 20.1 bn in oil at its disposal making it number two in the world. <a href="http://www.lukoil.com">www.lukoil.com</a> RusAl’s share in the domestic aluminum market is 75% of all the aluminum produced in Russia. In addition, the company’s name is associated with 10% of all the aluminum produced worldwide. RusAL and SUAL agreed terms to merge by 1st October 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Economic sector/activity</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Canada)</td>
<td>Cameco Gold</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kumtor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Australia)</td>
<td>Central Asia Gold</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(United States)</td>
<td>Coca-Cola</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hyatt Regency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Katel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procter &amp; Gamble</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal Gold</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steinert Industries</td>
<td>The Kyrgyz Petroleum Company is a 50/50 joint venture between &quot;Kyrgyzneftegaz&quot; and &quot;Petrofac Energy Developments International Limited&quot; (PEDIL - assignee of Kyrgoil Corporation). &quot;Kyrgyzneftegaz&quot; explores for oil and gas in the Kyrgyz Republic. The main shareholder of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(China)</td>
<td>Dacheng</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Goong-I</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(United Kingdom)</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Petroleum Company Oxus Gold</td>
<td>in a deal crating the world's largest Aluminium producer controlling over half of the world market.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.rusal.com">www.rusal.com</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J&amp;W Holding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Japan)</td>
<td>JGC</td>
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<tr>
<td>(United Kingdom)</td>
<td>Oriel Resources</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pilkington</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tex Development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Spain)</td>
<td>Repsol YPF</td>
<td>Exploration and production: Repsol YPF is a multinational company and scores among the ten biggest oil companies in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.repsol.com">www.repsol.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Italy)</td>
<td>Saipem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Germany)</td>
<td>Steinert Industries</td>
<td>The German company Steinert Industries GmbH has built a 236 million-euro glass factory in Kazakhstan in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=69453794">http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=69453794</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kyrgyzneftegaz is the Kyrgyz Republic. Petrofac Energy Developments International Limited is the foreign shareholder of the Company.

www.kpc.kg/en/

Oxus gold: Mining

www.oxusgold.co.uk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Economic sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Germany)</td>
<td>Reemtsma Tobacco</td>
<td>Imperial Tobacco: Largest European Investment in Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://www.reemtsma.com">www.reemtsma.com</a> and <a href="http://eng.ibc.kg/">http://eng.ibc.kg/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Portugal)</td>
<td>Teviz Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Russia)</td>
<td>WimmBillDann Gazprom</td>
<td>Russia's largest juice-packaging and dairy-product company, Wimm-Bill-Dann <a href="http://www.wbd.com">www.wbd.com</a> Gazprom see excursus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Major investing firm in Tadzhikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Economic sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Russian Federation)</td>
<td>Bazovy Element Gazprom Russian Aluminium (RusAl)</td>
<td>Basic Element is one of the largest holding concerned with the management of private investment funds and is building a hydropower station. Oleg Deripaska is chairman of the executive committee of Basic Element and simultaneously owns the company RusAl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Italy)</td>
<td>Giavoni</td>
<td>Textiles, Apparel and Leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Giavoni (the company) is 56% owned by Carrera USA Inc., which is the holding company of Carrera Group; 32% by Abreshim S.A., which is the largest textile company in Tadzhikistan; and 12% by Sano S.A. – an investment vehicle. Both Abreshim and Sano are fully state-owned, Tajik companies. <a href="http://www.ifc.org">http://www.ifc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(India)</td>
<td>Hindustan Machine</td>
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</table>
Major investing firms in Uzbekistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Economic sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Russian Federation)</td>
<td>Bazovy Element</td>
<td>Basic Element is one of the largest holding concerned with the management of private investment funds and is building a hydropower station. Oleg Deripaska is chairman of the executive committee of Basic Element and simultaneously owns the company RusAl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gazprom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Aluminium (RusAl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Italy)</td>
<td>Giavoni</td>
<td>Textiles, Apparel and Leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Giavoni (the company) is 56% owned by Carrera USA Inc., which is the holding company of Carrera Group; 32% by Abreshim S.A., which is the largest textile company in Tadzhikistan; and 12% by Sano S.A. – an investment vehicle. Both Abreshim and Sano are fully state-owned, Tajik companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(India)</td>
<td>Hindustan Machine Tools</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

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Online accessible at URL: [http://aei.pitt.edu/1425/01/Brussels_dec_1993.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/1425/01/Brussels_dec_1993.pdf) (last access 12 November 2010)
The Treaty on European Union after Lisbon
Online accessible at URL: http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=QC3209190 (last access 22 November 2010)

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Online accessible at URL: [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140553e.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140553e.pdf) (last access 23 November 2010)


(last access 23 November)


Online sources


The European Council, 2006: URL:
http://www.eu2006.gv.at/en/About_the_EU/Institutions_and_Other_Bodies/Institutions/European_Council.html (last access 23 November 2010)


1 “Furthermore, members of Mr. Morel’s staff say that they are very careful to avoid creating any “double standards” by singling out any of the states for criticism on their human rights record. This approach benefits the countries with the most severe record of human rights abuses in Central Asia – Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – and discriminates against other countries with less severe human rights issues, for example Kazakhstan, by placing them in the same basket.” (Graubner, 2008:1).

2 Here it has to be acknowledged that Russia’s companies especially Gazprom are also dependent on the European Market as this is its major business market as long as the export strategies towards the Eastern regions are not further developed (Mangott, 2008). This is also due to constraints concerning the gas transportation; gas exports are financial profitable in distances of 4500 to 5000 km. Therefore by all means a mutual dependence
can be detected (Mangott, 2008). Even if the EU would be able to ensure all Russian exports this would not be sufficient to serve the EU’s estimated consumption in 2030.

3 Secretaries-General Boutros Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (2005) have conceptualized ‘security’ and ‘human security’ that according to Annan’s report Longer Freedom is based on ‘freedom from want’, ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom to live in dignity’. (Brauch, 2008: 36).

4 Classical realism uses human nature as explanation for the power-seeking behaviour of states (Thucydides, Machiavelli (1532) The Prince and Morgenthau, Politics among nations). Morgenthau explained a “seemingly endless cycle of war rooted in the essentially aggressive impulses in human nature.” (Dunne and Smith, 2005: 169). “Waltz (1959) held that classical realist’s powerful insights into the working of international politics were weakened by their failure to distinguish clearly between arguments about human nature, the internal attributes of states and the overall system of states.” (Wohlfarth, 2010: 11).

5 Other causes can be detected at the unit-level (Waltz, 1979)

6 Waltz makes system a synonym for structure by arguing that his theory is a system theory whereby he is exclusively considering the structure of the system. Therefore his “system level of analysis” could be regarded as “structure level of analysis”. Criticism arises here as a system theory logically has to content both levels: structure and units. (Buzan et.al. 1993). Keohane called Waltzs theory as a beginning of system theory rather than a finished product (Keohane, 1986).

7 Waltz as being interested in continuities of the political structure has succeeded in this field and made at least three great contributions towards a systemic theory: (1) he provides a structure definition that serves as a (2) firm structural basis for power politics and he identifies (3) important durable elements in a field. (Buzan et.al. 1993).

8 Self-reproducing in the sense that the operation of the balance of power sustains the anarchic arrangement (ordering principle) and therewith in Waltz’s view also the like-units. (Buzan, 1993).

9 “The power of [Waltz’s] idea is nonetheless demonstrated by the current configuration of the international system, in which superior power (in terms of competition) and attractiveness (in terms of socialization) of the sovereign state have virtually eliminated all other forms of government of the system.” (Buzan et.al., 1993: 42).

10 Waltz draws on Gustav Le Bon among others who explains that the bahviour of individuals in a group is different from behaviour of the individual in the same situation not being in a group. The effects f being in a group on the individual’s behaviour are here at stake

11 Two aspects can be critizised here: First of all Waltz distinguished his theory from the classical realist theories by explicity drawing on human behaviour that differs in groups. Moreover in his argument it is foremost the competitive pressure that leads to imitation and socialization. But he defines the effects of competitive pressure in highly restricted terms. Due to the anarchic survival system states should always be seeking for a marginal advantage (which would also microeconomic theories would suggest) and this could only be reached through innovation not imitation (Resende-Santos, 1996).

12 Whereby the “motivation of the actors is assumed rather than realistically described. I assume that states seek to ensure their survival.” (Waltz, 1986:85). But “beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied […] as survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals the state may have […].” (Waltz, 1979:85).

13 As for example resource endowment conditions a state’s capabilities and this is reliant on random geography the distribution of capabilities is likely uneven.

14 Authors like Buzan would disaggregate the single concept of power to look at its features separately in a sectoral manner (Buzan, 1993)

15 Arbitrariness in terms of using the theoretical assumptions that constitute an interpretative framework of realist theory (Keohane, 1986) which in this case would mean states are security seekers and all other interests are subordinated.
It is therewith implicitly agreed with the criticism that the reduction of most aspects of social reality and politics to discourse may tend to stretch the notion too far (Larsen, 1997: 22-24).

These can be summarized in the notion of the primary interest as Waltz argues that states are also eager in securing issues their security depends on (Waltz, 1979).

In foreign policy analysis also the internal structure of states would be considered (concerning the implementation phase of the strategy) (Wilhelm, 2006) but from a structural realist perspective the units’ internal actions, restraints, attributions etc. are not considered, states are black boxes.

For the sake of completeness: In interest analysis moreover the comparison of interests and aims is considered allowing inferences on the feasibility of certain foreign policy actions and also on the reactions of the country which is concerned. Depending on the foreign policies constellations and on the number of aims and interests involved these can function in a structuring way. First possibility is that they construct loose or tight interstate cooperation (policy networks) like alliances or integration or in forms of interstate conflict, crisis or war. This mostly concerns the aspect of how units’ behaviour shapes structure which is of no consideration in the main focus of the Thesis.

Drawing on reports of observers.

For example: Foreign investments from the offshore jurisdictions, which could be suspect of having Russian origin, exceeded formally registered Russian investments in Ukraine by more than 200%.

Moreover it emphasizes that due to the ever increasing convergence of EU interests the EU has become a more effective and coordinated actor in the promotion of the world’s security to which it sees itself as responsible as one of the major political and economic powers in the world. “The EU should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” (ESS, 2003: 1). This normative statement emphasizes again that the EU perceives itself as a value based community and as normative power in world politics and makes security a precondition to development.

concerning the CFSP it has to be mentioned that action still requires unanimity which lets assume that the EU in this field definitely serves the national interests of the states, it shall not be considered how these external interests have developed in the state’s internal realm, therewith sub national or regional interests are not considered here

Its increasing role manifests itself in “the (failed) EU intervention in the Balkans in the early 1990s; the (successful) process of EU enlargement; […], the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) [and the policy towards the Mediterranean and towards the Central Asian states]; and the (coercive) use of conditionality clauses for aid and trade.” (Hyde-Price, 2008:31)

From other sides perceiving the EU as a normative power it is even expected that “in providing security through the strengthening of the civil society and common good, the EU can at the same time promote its values (Manners, 2002). Moreover it is questionable how the EU will be able to maintain a normative power approach concerning “the efficiency of such an approach in a world dominated by US power.” (Charrillon, 2005: 530).

Concerning the concept of human security in the EU’s security notion a sharp distinction between the internal security notion and the external security notion has to be made. This can be done in analogies with the internal process of de-borderization (‘Entgrenzung’) even though states have not given up their territorial integrity its security relevance within the EU however has been abolished. But concerning the territorial integrity of the Union, this remains its security relevance which can also be seen in the EU’s compartmentalisation policies towards its near abroad through the ENP. Therefore it is of crucial importance to keep in mind that there is a difference in the internal security notion and the security notion in external relations.

Interdependence in realist tradition equals vulnerability (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005)

The Western Engagement is constituted through the USA and the EU but actors like Turkey, India, Iran, Pakistan are becoming increasingly important (Sadyrbeck, 2009).

Waltz argues too that the Theory can be applied to the major powers first (Waltz, 1979)
in thousand square km

Approximately 2 million working migrants from Central Asia (especially Tadzhikistan and Kyrgyzstan) are employed at the Russian economy. Their returned books have a huge influence on the Central Asian economies and societies. In Tadzhikistan for example money transfers from abroad make up approximately one billion dollar according to appraisals of the International Monetary Fond. This accounts for 50% of the Tajik GDP. (Peyrouse, 2007: 253-255; Matveeva, 2007: 287). See also Kyrgyz foreign minister on customs union at URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LI23Ag02.html, last access November 17, 2010

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, investment was a policy field with a specific division of work between the EU and its member states. Their roles in shaping investment policies were complementary: whilst the EU pursued the liberalisation of foreign direct investment, in particular through its trade agreements with foreign countries, the member states used to seek for protection of investment flows, by concluding Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The Lisbon Treaty allows the EU to bring all these elements under the cover of a single EU common investment policy and thus to ensure its comprehensiveness. (see URL http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=590 (last access 13 November, 2010)

The energy dependence on Russia has pushed the NABUCCO pipeline project as an attempt to transport non-Russian gas to Europe. The EU held a summit in Prague (May, 2009) Prague with leading transit and supplier nations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. And it has been agreed to press ahead with this project. The NABUCCO pipeline could have a capacity of 31 bcm per year. It would get its supplies from Azerbaijan and perhaps Turkmenistan through pipelines in Georgia and Turkey, the latter and Bulgaria signed an intergovernmental agreement on the project It is hoped that work on the pipeline could begin in 2011, with the first gas supplies available by 2014 and full capacity reached in 2019. “While denying that NABUCCO and South Stream (Gazprom project) are conflicting projects, Russian officials have cast doubt on NABUCCO’S prospects, claiming that the gas supplies for such a pipeline may be difficult to find. Russia has attempted to buy up gas supplies in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, in what some analysts view as an attempt to undermine Nabucco. In order to build political support for South Stream, Russia has tried to entice key western European companies to participate in the project. It has also discussed the possibility of changing the route for the pipeline in order to play potential transit countries off against each other.” (Nichol, 2010: 24).

Russia and China not only enjoy more freedom of action they are also institutional and political similar actors compared with the Central Asian states which makes cooperation among them easier (Warkotsch, 2008 and Schmitz, 2007) a fact not considered in structural realist theory. Russia does not conditionalize the cooperation in any field. (Schmitz, 2007).

Putin has taken the secret service officials and military officials with influence from the Kremlin into the government for being able to exert control over them (Mangott, 2008).

The effective power to govern could also be understood in terms of policy stability as defined by Tsebelis veto player theory, the more actors in play and the higher their divergence in preferences the higher is policy stability, meaning that fast changes in policy course are less likely (Tsebelis, 2002)

During the visit of the Kyrgyz former President Bakiyev in Moscow on the 3rd of February in 2009 Russia guaranteed a 2 billion financial aid. On this very same day he announced the closure of the US led Manas air base in Bishkek (see Quinn-Judge, 2009)

Another example is the Russian, Turkmen and Kazakh agreement on the expansion of the pipeline infrastructure from May 2007. The short time-frame in which this agreement was made even surprised professional observers (see Socor, 2007)

Major shortcomings concern the equipment for operations at night, the ability to coordinat forces from different Military Districts at short notice, at the tactical level, lack of sufficient air lift and support. But Russian forces were well prepared, with sufficient logistical support and firepower to meet all objectives (The Military Balance, 2010)

Tactical helicopter transport is one of the most pressing force generation problems. According to figures from the EDA show that only 6-7% of helicopters in the inventories of European armed forces were deployed in crisis management operations, and the insufficient supply was a problem of availability (Military Balance 2010).
“The collective European ability to gather and assess intelligence is underdeveloped.” (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004: 175). The EU’s small foreign policy and military staff relies on national generated intelligence when shared and material indirectly provided by the US through bilateral arrangements with certain EU members – Britain in particular, whose special intelligence relationship with the US separates it from its continental partners. It has been reported by Der Spiegel that the quality of national intelligence is gradually improving, and that the Situation Centre in the EU Council Secretariat, which reports to Solana, is becoming an effective coordination point (Koch, 2003).

41 See for example Kagan, 2002