EU AND NATO: SECURITY STRATEGIES BETWEEN MARS AND VENUS?

OR

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

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**Declaration**

I declare on oath that I authored the following paper independently and without assistance and that I only used the resources indicated in the paper.

All extracts that have been copied from publications analogously or literally, are marked as such.

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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Strategic Concept</td>
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EU and NATO: Security Strategies Between Mars and Venus? Or Prospects for Future Cooperation

1. INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, the European Union (EU) has transformed from a pure civilian towards a civilian and military (civ-mil) power. This occurred within the context of the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).\(^1\)

Set apart from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU has added a security and defense component to its integration project and as the potential for institutional overlap with NATO has grown, so has concern about the danger of competition between them.\(^2\)

The question whether EU and NATO are partners or rivals in international security policy is an ongoing debate and due to this, several scholars are voicing concern about the feasibility of a complementary relationship between the two organizations.\(^3\)

Doubts concerning the establishment of extensive cooperation culminated in the aftermath of the Anglo-US invasion in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. At that time, plenty of articles were produced, asserting a ‘transatlantic gulf’, ‘clashing world-views’ or even a ‘frozen conflict’ between both sides of the Atlantic.\(^4\)

The most influential work stirring up the debate was Robert Kagan’s (2002) article ‘Power and Weakness’,\(^5\) famously placing Americans on ‘Mars’ and Europeans on ‘Venus’.

According to Kagan, divergent realms of responsibility that each side feels obliged to protect, and different transatlantic opinions on threats as well as disagreement on the appropriate response to them are so massive, that the establishment of a common transatlantic security culture is perceived as impossible.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

Employing Kagan’s caricature of different transatlantic security cultures as an analytical frame; within this thesis, the following research question will be examined: To which extent differ the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy and to which extent is more extensive cooperation between them to be preferred and possible?

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1 former known as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
5 Later turned into a book (Kagan, 2003)
To answer the research question, the following sub-questions will be resolved:

I. What are the objectives and ambitions of the EU in international security policy?

II. What are the objectives and ambitions of NATO in international security policy?

III. What are the differences between EU’s and NATO’s objectives and ambitions?

IV. Which problems actually hinder extensive EU-NATO cooperation?

V. What visions regarding future EU-NATO cooperation mechanisms exist and what are their limits?

1.2 RESEARCH METHOD

To find out about the differences in objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy, two key documents will be examined: EU’s ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS, 2003), adopted by the European Council in 2003 and NATO’s ‘Strategic Concept’ (SC, 1999), first published in 1991 and approved by the Heads of State at the Washington Summit meeting in April 1999.


These documents have been chosen because besides defining the objectives and ambitions of their issuing bodies in international security policy, they are recognized for specifying the means by which they should be reached. In that the EUISS analyses and the NATO Handbook date back to 2009 respectively 2001, they are of principal relevance for investigating if the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy have changed from 2003 respectively 1999 onwards or are subject to current changes.

In order to analyze to which extent the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy differ, both documents will be examined regarding Kagan’s three dimensions, characterizing strategic cultures, namely:

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6 The full title for this document is A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy
7 The initial formulation of NATO strategy was The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area
8 See official website of the EU (www.eu.int) and NATO (www.nato.int)
(a) The realm of responsibility that each side feels obliged to protect
(b) The main threats identified
(c) The instruments and partners deemed necessary to answer those threats.

Analyzing secondary literature on the topic and the findings of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a non-governmental organization committed to preventing and resolving conflicts, it will be pointed out to which extent both organizations are expected to meet their objectives. Their ability to make the rhetoric commitments a reality will be critically assessed.

Examining official documents of EU and NATO as well as scientific articles together with other secondary literature on the topic, it will be outlined to which extent more EU-NATO cooperation is to be preferred by both organizations and whether this is possible.

Finally, modifications concerning the institutional EU-NATO cooperation framework, currently hindering extensive relations, will be listed and existing visions regarding future cooperation mechanisms will be presented and evaluated.

Investigating how EU-NATO cooperation could be organized in future, a focus is laid on the provisions outlined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), dealing with regional security arrangements under the auspices of the UN.

1.3 FINDINGS

Comparing the prevailing security strategies of EU and NATO, the following thesis poses a critical case for those, like Kagan, stressing a transatlantic divide in security cultures or claiming that the establishment of an effective EU-NATO relationship is not realizable as a consequence of ‘clashing world-views’.

Against all moribund predictions, no ‘transatlantic gulf’ concerning the objectives and ambitions with regard to Kagan’s three dimensions can be detected and the existing differences between the two organizations are rather conducive for the establishment of a complementary EU-NATO relationship.

Although it is questionable if the EU – in contrast to NATO – is able to reach its ambitions and may against its objectives yet focus on a regional provision of security in future, in theory, EU and NATO are able to ‘swim together’ (Keohane, 2003, p. 77) regarding their current objectives and ambitions in international security policy.

Moreover, given that for both organizations more extensive cooperation is to be preferred and considered as a normative goal, the following thesis reveals that the current ‘frozen conflict’
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between them stems from inadequate cooperation mechanisms and NATO’s obsolete Strategic Concept dating back to 1999.

To avoid that significant amount of time, energy and money is wasted when it comes to the planning and execution of international security missions – which in the worst case could even lead to double structures or mutual blockades between EU and NATO missions – an effective cooperation mechanism is needed, adequately accommodating the advent of the EU as a new security player.

With respect to this, Chapter VIII of the Charta of the UN provides useful information of how a subsidiary model for peacekeeping – characterized by a geographic division of labor between regional security arrangements under the auspice of the UN – could be realized. Although the accurate framework of such a division of labor between regional security arrangements still needs to be worked out more precisely, Chapter VIII seems to build the basis for a flexible approach concerning the provision of security in a decentralized and global world-order.

1.4 IMPLICATION OF MY FINDINGS

If both organizations fail to establish an effective cooperation mechanism, adequately accommodating EU’s ambitious objectives in international security policy, increasing ‘beauty contests’ (Larrabee, 2009, p. 56) between EU and NATO missions, as has happened in the Darfur crisis, cannot be ruled out.9

As an inadequate cooperation framework opposes effective crisis management, the security of the 21st century is dependent on effective EU-NATO cooperation.

To override the deficits in the current transatlantic security framework, I argue that the ‘Berlin Plus Agreement’ (Berlin Plus), the essential institutionalized framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, as well as NATO’s Strategic Concept, needs to be updated.

However, it remains questionable if politicians – especially in the United States (US) – strive for such a refinement as it may redefine the interaction mechanisms between EU and NATO and as a consequence alter their power relations. Despite the fact that on a rhetorical level

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9 The United States saw the crisis in Darfur as an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate its continued relevance and more global orientation, while France argued that the EU, not NATO, should take the lead in managing the crisis. In the end, two airlifts were conducted – one by NATO and one by the EU – leading to an unseemly ‘beauty contest’, hindering effective crisis management.
both organizations are committed to effective EU-NATO cooperation, it seems that behind closed doors, everything is done to maintain the status quo.\textsuperscript{10}

The intention to adopt a new Strategic Concept at the NATO meeting in Lisbon in November 2010 sounds promising. Within the new Strategic Concept, NATO needs to define its position in the evolving European security architecture and needs to recognize EU’s plans to play a stronger and – to some extent – more independent military role.

As the Alliance still needs to find its place in a less centralized international order, the most crucial point is to ensure that the new Strategic Concept of NATO will be more than old wine in a new bottle.

Moreover, EU and NATO need to strengthen the UN and remain committed to the Security Council, the primary guarantor for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In doing so, both organizations will pave the way for making a subsidiary model for peacekeeping – characterized by a geographic division of labor between regional arrangements under the auspice of the UN – a reality.

Pursuant to the UN Security Council (2010), EU and NATO – as regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter – are not only able to lighten the burden of the UN Security Council but also have the capacity to contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.

The continued commitment of EU and NATO with respect to the UN remains crucial in attaining further progress in this regard.

\textsuperscript{10} See Hofmann & Reynolds (2007).
1 What are the objectives and ambitions of the EU in international security policy?

2. THE OBJECTIVES AND AMBITIONS OF THE EU

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), the first common strategic security vision of EU Member States. The ESS clarifies the EU’s security strategy, identifies key threats, defines the Union’s strategic objectives and ambitions, specifies its approach to security and sets out the political implications for Europe.

As according to Grevi, Helly and Keohane (2009), the strategic outlook of the EU has ‘changed dramatically’ (p. 14) during the last decade; the ESS as the major document of analysis is backed up and complemented by the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy\(^\text{11}\) (2008) as well as two volumes of the EUISS, namely What ambitions for European defense in 2020? and European Security and Defense Policy: The first ten years (1999-2009).

In that the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the analyses of the EUISS date back to 2008 respectively 2009, they are of principal relevance for investigating if the objectives and ambitions of EU in international security policy have changed from 2003 onwards or are subject to current changes.

Based upon these documents, the EU’s objectives and ambitions will be examined regarding Kagan’s three dimensions, characterizing strategic cultures, namely:

(a) The realm of responsibility that each side feels obliged to protect
(b) The main threats identified
(c) The instruments and partners deemed necessary to answer those threats.

2.1 REALMS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Investigating EU’s strategic outlook requires analyzing what kind of missions should be conducted within the framework of CSDP, which geographical area the EU feels responsible for and on what security approach EU’s security strategy is based upon.

2.1.1 KIND OF MISSIONS

Examining the ESS as well as the analyses of EUISS, it seems that there is no limit set for the kind of missions CSDP should undertake in future. By stating that CSDP will ‘become what we make of it’ (Saryusz-Wolski, 2009, p. 153), the development of CSDP is based on the strategic needs and military capabilities EU Member States are willing and able to provide for CSDP.

However, according to all practitioners and analysts, contributing to What ambitions for European defense in 2020?, CSDP is and should be anything but collective defense as CSDP is predicated on the assumption that ‘the collective defense of EU Member States falls outside its remit’ (De Vasconcelos, 2009b, p. 160).

Establishing a collective defense mechanism is ‘unnecessary’, ‘not on the cards today’ and even ‘seems a very unlikely prospect in 2020’ because NATO is the military expression of transatlantic solidarity, and as such the guarantor of European security’ (De Vasconcelos, 2009b, p. 160).

2.1.2 FROM AN AMBIGIOUS REALM OF RESPONSIBILITY

The following section reveals the tension of EU’s local and global strategic outlook as characterized by the ESS.

While emphasizing the Union’s ‘increased awareness of conflicts and tragedies anywhere in the world’ (ESS, p. 7) and referring to its role as a ‘global player’, the ESS seems to leave no space for doubt that the EU is ‘ready to share in the responsibility for global security’ (ESS, p. 1). Highlighting its engagement in distant places such as Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo and admitting that ‘in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’ and that ‘the first line of defense will often be abroad’ (ESS, p. 6), EU’s engagement in international security policy seems not to be limited to a certain regional area.

Ambiguously, at the same time, the ESS almost exclusively deals with the European continent in substance by focusing on the ‘European neighborhood’, the ‘European region’, ‘problems for Europe’, crises that ‘impact European interests’ and threats affecting the ‘regional stability of Europe’.12

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12 See references on pages 4, 7 and 8 of the ESS
Thus, the ESS indicates the necessity to ‘think globally’; the note that ‘even in an era of globalization, geography is still important’ and that ‘act[ing] locally’ (ESS, p. 6) is the main paradigm and guideline, points to a regional realm of responsibility.

Although distant threats such as civil wars in Somalia and North Africa as well as nuclear risks emerging from North Korea or South Asia are all perceived as ‘concern to Europe’ (ESS, p. 6), the EU’s security strategy does not mention that those threats will be tackled by the Union. Within the ESS, the only strategic objective outside the European periphery is the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.1.3 TO A GLOBAL REALM OF RESPONSIBILITY

Half a decade later, EU’s strategic outlook seems to have knocked the unresolved tension between local and global realms of responsibility on the head.

Highlighting that the EU must become more ‘visible around the world’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 2) and ‘more active […] beyond its immediate neighborhood’ (p. 7) as otherwise the EU ‘would not count for much in the twenty-first century world order’ (De Vasconcelos, 2009a, p. 21), the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy as well as the analyses and recommendations of the EUISS indicate a shift towards a fully-fledged global realm of responsibility.

Emphasizing that a truly global status inevitably requires a commensurate global security dimension, most of the analysts contributing to the two mentioned volumes of EUISS assume that being reduced to a regional organization, concerned with the stability of its immediate surroundings, would run counter to Europe’s global aspirations as laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon, defining Europe’s responsibilities in a globalized world.13

According to De Vasconcelos (2009a, p. 21), if the EU remains excessively region-focused when it comes to international security, it ‘will hardly be able to persuade others to live up to the international responsibilities world-power status implies’.

Expanding its geographical perspective and being involved in crisis beyond its immediate frontier is highly recommended as the world of the future ‘will be awash with what Mary Kaldor calls new wars’ (Howorth, 2009, p. 44), characterized through asymmetric warfare and increasing security interdependence. As a consequence of these new wars, according to Howorth (2009), in a globalized, coalescent and interdependent world, EU’s security interests

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might come under physical threat all around the globe in future. Therefore, developments beyond the EU’s immediate frontier ‘must be seen […] as the continuation of its near abroad’ (p. 44).

2.1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE EU

Investigating official documents of the EU with respect to justifications for shifting from an ambivalent local-global to a global realm of responsibility in less than five years, the following main arguments can be identified:

In several key documents the EU legitimates its global ambitions in international security policy with its economic success story. ‘With 27 Member States and over 490 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP) the EU has become the cornerstone for security, stability and peace in an increasingly interdependent world’ (European Commission, 2010).

According to the European Commission (2010), Europe’s global economic status calls for ‘intensified efforts to play an international political and security role more in line with its economic power’.

Such declarations are based on the assumption that a strong and economically successful EU should act on the global world stage in order to ‘promote its values and interests globally’ and to ‘spread its success beyond its borders’ (ESS, p. 2) also with respect to security issues. However, this argument is not very conclusive and convincing as being successful in the globalized world economy does not automatically imply to be successful in providing global security.

Although, according to John M. Keynes (1920), economic success often goes along with peaceful developments, the EU is not able to ensure positive economic developments all around the world but can only provide incentives by focusing on intensified trade relations with certain regions.

Another justification often mentioned is the added value lying in the political legitimacy of operations undertaken by the EU and the comprehensive nature of its competences as the EU is far more than just an alliance of military resources. According to the Eurobarometer Standard (2008), today CSDP enjoys high levels of support, is strongly backed by all national parliaments and by 76% percent of European public opinion and with a majority support in all 27 Member States, it is based on sound multilateral legitimacy.

Although it is true that global operations of the EU enjoy a high degree of legitimacy – as the Eurobarometer Standard (2008) demonstrates – other security arrangements, whose missions are legitimized by the UN Security Council receive the same amount of legitimacy (O’Connell, 2000).

As both presented arguments lack coherence and are not convincing, it seems that EU has difficulties to consistently justify its shift towards a global realm of responsibility in international security policy. The shift can therefore not be of fundamental necessity. As a consequence of the identified tension between local and global outlook, characterized by the ESS as well as the unpersuasive arguments for a fully-fledged global realm of responsibility, I argue that the EU is still struggling to find its place as an emerging security actor in a globalized world.

2.1.5 APPROACH TO SECURITY

The approach to security, underlying the ESS, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy as well as the recommendations and analyses of the EUISS, is characterized by a broad, multidimensional and comprehensive notion.

Broad in the sense of not just focusing on the avoidance of direct military danger but rather focusing on the interdependence between all dimensions of security; including political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military aspects.

Multidimensional in the sense of emphasizing the need for multilateral cooperation and dialogue – especially via the United Nations (UN) – as security is seen as indivisible and interdependent.

Finally, comprehensive in the sense of being able to draw on a developed toolbox, comprising a broad spectrum of economic, diplomatic and military capabilities for tackling security threats.

According to Biscop (2004), the broad, multidimensional and comprehensive definition of security is distinctive for the EU’s approach to security.

2.2 MAIN THREATS

Regarding the main threats identified, the ESS begins by stating that ‘Europe has never been […] so secure’ (ESS, p. 1) as any ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’ (ESS, p. 4). Nevertheless, it stresses a new security environment of increasing
complexity and interdependence, producing a number of global challenges, ranging from interconnected infrastructures to poverty.

The document specifies five key threats, emphasizing that they are ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ than the threats we were faced with two decades ago: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime; whereas the proliferation of WMD is perceived as the potentially ‘greatest threat to our security’ (ESS, p. 4).

According to the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), five years onwards, these threats ‘have not gone away’ but have rather ‘become more complex’ (p. 3). Besides highlighting that terrorism and the proliferation of WMD have even ‘become more significant’, two new key threats are identified, namely increasing energy crises and climate change (p. 8).

2.3 INSTRUMENTS AND PARTNERS

The following section investigates the instruments and partners, deemed necessary by the EU to address the threats identified.

2.3.1 INSTRUMENTS

Viewing the process of integration as the driving force of peace and prosperity in Europe, the ESS stretches the contours of a belief in stability through cooperation and dialogue via for instance the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council or the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Trade and development policies, the spread of good governance, the support of social and political reforms and the establishment of the rule of law are perceived as ‘the best means of strengthening the international order’ (ESS, p. 10). These are all civilian means.

However, the EU is not trapped in its longstanding commitment towards a culture of prevention, tending to address socio-economic root causes and post-conflict peace building tasks rather than offensive military action.

During the last two decades, the EU has moved away from its pure ‘civilian power image’, having dominated the debate on Europe’s role in the world for several decades.  

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15 See references on pages 1, 6, 8 and 11 of the ESS
Stressing the need for having a ‘full spectrum of instruments’ (ESS, p. 11) at its disposal, ranging from civilian to military means, the ESS highlights EU’s intention to build up twin robust civilian and military capacities.

2.3.2 PARTNERS

The ESS identifies threats as ‘common threats’ that have to be tackled ‘with all our closest partners’ (ESS, p. 13), while a focus is laid on all those sharing ‘our goals and values’ (ESS, p. 14).

With regard to this, the ESS stresses the importance of the transatlantic relationship, defined as ‘one of the core elements of the international system’. Cooperation with the US is perceived as a ‘necessity’ (ESS, p. 13).

Besides strengthening transatlantic cooperation, the ESS also highlights the need to build effective relationships and dialogue with Russia, the Ukraine, the Mediterranean countries, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, particularly regarding developing strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India (ESS, p. 14).

Delegating the primary responsibility for international security to the UN Security Council and the Charter of the UN, declared as the ‘fundamental framework for international relations’ (ESS, p. 10) and the ‘apex of the international system’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 11), the EU stresses its cooperative and multilateral approach to security.

One could however also state that in doing so, the EU shirks its responsibility for global security challenges.

This is especially interesting with regard to the identified tension between EU’s local and global strategic outlook and the assumption that the EU is still struggling to find its place as a security actor in an interdependent and global security environment as outlined in paragraph 2.1.3.

Although the UN Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the document explicitly allots the sharing of that role with ‘regional arrangements or agencies’.

In the event of an eruption of a local dispute, member-nations of the UN existing in that particular geographical location are expected – if they are part of a regional arrangement or agency – to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council.
Chapter VIII provides an interesting framework for EU’s ambivalent local-global realm of responsibility: As a regional arrangement in reference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the EU could be acquainted with the settlement of regional disputes, existing in the European region only but at the same time being involved in a global security framework under the auspice of the UN. Concerning disputes outside the European region, other regional arrangements – as far as they exist and are able to work effectively – would be responsible for the settlement of such conflicts before referring them to the Security Council.

2.4 CONCLUSION

With regard to Kagan’s three dimensions, the following objectives and ambitions of the EU in international security policy regarding (a) realms of responsibility, (b) threat assessment and (c) instruments and partners deemed necessary to address those threats can be stated:

(a) Comparing EU’s strategic outlook of 2003 – as held in the ESS – with its realm of responsibility half a decade later – as outlined in the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* and the EUISS’s recommendations in *What ambitions for European defense in 2020?* and *European Security and Defense Policy: The first ten years (1999-2009)* – a shift from an ambivalent local-global strategic outlook towards a fully-fledged global realm of responsibility is obvious. As the lack of coherence and persuasiveness of the arguments put forward by the EU in order to justify this shift demonstrate, there is no fundamental necessity for the EU to be involved in crises all around the world as not at least within the framework of the UN, an effective and legitimate guarantor for global security issues already exists.

In delegating the primary responsibility for international security to the UN Security Council, the EU however indirectly solves the tension between its local and global realm of responsibility as Chapter VIII provides an interesting framework for EU’s ambivalent local-global realm of responsibility. This will be dealt with in more detail in chapter seven.

Concerning the kind of missions CSDP aims to conduct CSDP is defined as being anything but collective defense. The approach to security, underlying the ESS, is defined as broad, multidimensional and comprehensive.

(b) In reference to threat assessment, the ESS identifies five key threats: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime; whereas the proliferation of WMD is perceived as the potentially greatest threat.

(e) Concerning the instruments and partners deemed necessary to address the threats, the EU has a wide range of instruments at its disposal, ranging from civilian up to military means due to its comprehensive approach to security.

Although, with considering trade and development policies, the spread of good governance, the support of social and political reforms and the establishment of the rule of law as ‘the best means of strengthening the international order’ (ESS, p. 10), the ESS attaches slightly greater importance to civilian rather than military instruments to achieve its objectives, the EU clearly focuses on building up twin robust civilian and military means.

In terms of partners, emphasis is laid on a cooperative approach to security, based on effective multilateralism. The UN is declared as the ‘apex of the international system’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 11) and as such the primary guarantor for international security.

Besides appreciating the transatlantic relationship as ‘irreplaceable’ (ESS, p. 13), the ESS accentuates the need for closer cooperation with partners such as Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India

2.5 CRITICICAL ASSESSMENT: IS THE EU ABLE TO REACH ITS OBJECTIVES?

Analyzing EU’s ambitions and objectives and their implementation in international security policy on the basis of the ESS, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the analyses of the EUISS, one has the feeling leafing through ‘glossy brochures’.

Emphasizing that the EU ‘carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history’ and that ‘since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflicts’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 1), official documents of the EU create the impression that the Union is able to reach the stars in international security policy.

Although acknowledging that ‘there is no room for complacency’ and that ‘for our full potential to be realized we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 2), in the
literature, the question if the EU is able to reach its ambitious objectives has generated a considerable amount of commentary. The following section offers a critical appraisal of EU’s ability to meet its objectives.

2.5.1 MISMATCH BETWEEN AMBITIONS AND RESOURCES

According to Gnesotto (2009), ten years after its inception, CSDP has delivered very ‘mixed results’. Although the Union has conducted 22 external military and/or civilian operations in four of the world’s continents since 2003, there is great frustration concerning the overall performance achieved and according to Gnesotto (2009), the Union continues to be perceived as a ‘marginal, little-known security player, most often absent when it comes to settling the major strategic issues of the planet’ (p. 29).

The fact that the 1999 Helsinki Goal – the creation of a 60,000 man intervention force – has still yet to be met in practice demonstrates that EU’s ambitions as outlined in the ESS ‘continue to exceed its capabilities’ (Larrabee, 2009, p. 59).

Stubb (2009) is arguing similarly when claiming that ‘the EU and its Member States struggle to find resources to match the ambition of strengthening the global role of the Union’ (p. 131). Although the ESS ‘reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively’, according to Becher (2004), ‘the practical implications of the European Security Strategy still need to be worked out’ (p. 1).

2.5.2 REASONS FOR THE MISMATCH

Focusing on the analyses of the International Crisis Group (ICG), the following section investigates reasons for the mismatch between ambitions and resources.

According to the ICG (2001), the necessity of collective decision-making is the main hindrance for the EU to meet its ambitious targets as ‘several Member States are not willing to give Brussels the means or authority […] as they fear a lack of sovereignty’.

Pursuant to Toje (2005), the 2003 Iraq crisis did not only make obvious a lack of common policy grounding among the EU and the US but also demonstrated an inter-European divide of security traditions, appearing incompatible in important respects.

By ‘failing to outline a credible alternative to collective decision-making, the ESS places the responsibility for these choices firmly in the hands of the governments of the Member States,

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who in the final instance will decide how the strategy is to be implemented’ (Toje, 2009, p. 133).

Gnesotto (2009) is arguing the same when highlighting the ‘untenable mismatch between increasing demand from outside and the stagnation, even shrinkage, of the resources which Member States make available to the Union’ (p. 30).

According to the ICG (2001), as the ESS lacks answers of the question how the EU will use force in a way that is acceptable to all member countries, as no permanent pool of military or civilian forces exists and as very few structures in CSDP are permanent, stagnation is pre-programmed.

2.5.3 WAYS TO OVERCOME THE MISMATCH

In order to overcome the current gridlock, the EU needs to improve its ability to ‘channel the richness’ (De Vasconcelos, 2009a, p. 8) of the diversity of its Member States’ perception in international security policy.

Making decision-making processes and command structures more flexible, the Lisbon Treaty is considered as a ‘new momentum’, giving the EU the potential to ‘strengthen its comprehensive nature and cohesion beyond the level of rhetoric […] and to act more cohesively and with greater flexibility’ (De Vasconcelos, 2009a, p. 8).

In order to make the EU’s foreign policy structures adequate for its ambitious agenda, the Lisbon Treaty creates favorable conditions as it includes two important innovations: permanent structured cooperation\(^\text{18}\) for those Member States which wish to go further in the field of defense, as well as the application of enhanced-cooperation\(^\text{19}\) in the context of the broadened scope of Petersberg tasks,\(^\text{20}\) in which the EU can use civilian and military means.

\(^{18}\) Articles 42 and 46 of the TEU, and the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation

\(^{19}\) See Title IV of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

\(^{20}\) The Lisbon Treaty Article 28B sees the ESDP missions as covering: ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.’ (expanded Petersberg Tasks in italics).
II What are the objectives and ambitions of NATO in international security policy?

3. THE OBJECTIVES AND AMBITIONS OF NATO

The Security Concept (SC) of the Alliance, first published in 1991 and approved at the Washington Summit meeting in April 1999, is the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provides the highest level guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them (NATO Handbook, 2009).

The SC expresses NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It ‘identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s broad approach to security and provides guidelines for the further adaption of its military forces’ (SC, par. 5).

As the terrorist attacks of 2001 fundamentally impacted NATO’s strategic outlook – not at least expanding the options available in the campaign against terrorism – the SC as the major document of analysis, is backed up and complemented by the NATO Handbook, a reference book on the Alliance’s policies, published in 2001 by the NATO Office of Information and Press.

Although the NATO Handbook is not a formally agreed NATO document, it portrays an Alliance profoundly influenced and transformed by the tumultuous changes of the terrorist attacks of 2001. It is therefore of principal relevance for investigating if the objectives and ambitions of NATO in international security policy have changed from 1999 onwards or are subject to current changes.

To be able to compare the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy, the SC and the NATO Handbook will also be assessed with reference to the three dimensions of Kagan.

3.1 REALMS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Analyzing NATO’s SC with regard to Kagan’s first dimension, NATO’s strategic horizon appears to be highly ambivalent and – like the ESS – seems to be caught in an unresolved tension between global and local realms of responsibility. Turning to the NATO Handbook,

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21 The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area
NATO’s strategic outlook is apparently undergoing fundamental changes towards fully-fledged global realms of responsibility.

3.1.1 KIND OF MISSIONS

Investigating NATO’s realms of responsibility firstly requires analyzing what kind of missions it feels responsible for.

Although the Alliance’s original purpose – to provide immediate defense for its member countries – remains its core task today, ‘its immediate focus has undergone fundamental change’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 30).

In expanding its essential purpose, namely to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means, besides defense, NATO nowadays also stands ‘to back the efforts of the international community to prevent crises and conflict or, when they occur, to prevent their spread and assist those involved in them’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 11). In doing so, it has ‘identified a new role for itself’ (Ibid).

In contrast to Europe’s CSDP, emphasizing to be anything but collective defense (De Vasconcelos, 2009b), NATO appears to be anything and collective defense.

3.1.2 FROM AN AMBIGUOUS REALM OF RESPONSIBILITY

The following section presents the tension between NATO’s local and global strategic outlook as characterized by the SC.

Assuming responsibility for crises throughout the world and emphasizing the necessity of the Alliance to ‘take account of the global context’, at a first view, NATO’s realms of responsibility seems to be global in outlook. Highlighting that NATO’s security interests can be affected by ‘risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources’ (SC, par. 24) amplifies this perception.

Given that NATO aims to enhance ‘the security of all’ and that its activities in international security policy should ‘exclude nobody’ (SC, par. 33), NATO clearly appreciates a global function.

Taking a closer look at paragraph six of NATO’s SC, dealing with the purpose and tasks of the Alliance, NATO’s essential and enduring intention is ‘to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members’ (SC, par. 6). This indicates NATO’s regional focus on the Euro-Atlantic region.
Throughout the document, the word ‘global’ is mentioned only twice, whereas twenty-four times emphasis is laid on the ‘Euro-Atlantic area’. This indicates a more regional rather than global focus.

Identifying the UN Security Council as the primary guarantor for the maintenance of international peace and security, NATO – like the EU – stresses its cooperative and multilateral approach to security but at the same time abdicates somehow from accepting global realm of responsibility for security issues.

### 3.1.3 TO A GLOBAL REALM OF RESPONSIBILITY

After the terrorist attacks of 2001, NATO’s realms of responsibility has widened in depth and scope.

In expanding its functions, namely ‘to back the efforts of the international community to prevent crises and conflict or, when they occur, to prevent their spread and assist those involved in them’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 11) and in expanding the options available in the campaign against terrorism, NATO’s ‘immediate focus has undergone fundamental change’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 30).

Recognizing NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan since 2003 in order to assist the government ‘in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance’ (NATO, 2010), a true global realms of responsibility, going beyond collective defense tasks, can no longer be denied.

### 3.1.4 APPROACH TO SECURITY

The approach to security underlying NATO’s SC is characterized by a broad, multidimensional and comprehensive notion.

The broad and comprehensive approach to security recognizes the ‘importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension’ (SC, par. 25). ‘Encompassing complementary political and military means’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 45) is perceived as highly important.

Emphasizing cooperation with other states that share the Alliance’s objectives and outlining its increasing effort ‘to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic

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22 See paragraphs 23 and 24
23 See paragraphs 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41 43, 47, 48, 49 and 50
organizations as well as the United Nations’ (SC, par. 25), reflects NATO’s multidimensional approach to security.

3.2 MAIN THREATS

Concerning the main threats identified, NATO’s SC acknowledges positive developments in the strategic environment as the threat of general war in Europe has virtually disappeared. Although large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is perceived as unlikely, ‘the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict’ (SC, par. 20).

According to NATO, Euro-Atlantic peace and stability is confronted with unpredictable changes and complex new risks, including oppression, ethnic conflict and economic distress, the collapse of the political order, the abuse of human rights and the proliferation of WMD, with the latter being considered the main threat of Euro-Atlantic peace and a ‘matter of serious concern’ (SC, par. 22).

The lack of NATO’ SC to focus on terrorism as one of its key threats identified, is due to its obsolete strategic concept, dating back to 1999. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that after the terrorist attacks in 2001, terrorism is identified as one of the most important threats NATO has to deal with in the 21st century (NATO Handbook, 2001).

3.3 INSTRUMENTS AND PARTNERS

The following section investigates the instruments and partners, deemed necessary by NATO to address the identified threats.

3.3.1 INSTRUMENTS

Stating that NATO’s essential and enduring purpose – to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members – should be reached by political as well as military means, the SC explicitly highlights its ‘broad approach to security’ (SC, par. 25).

Encompassing complementary political and military means, affirms the Alliance’s objective to enhance security at the ‘lowest possible level of forces’ (SC, par. 40).

Despite the fact that military capabilities are considered as ‘the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute effectively to conflict prevention and crisis management’ (SC, par. 29) and the maintenance of adequate military capabilities for deterrence and defense remains central to
the Alliance’s objectives, NATO ‘recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension’ (SC, par. 25).

3.3.2 PARTNERS

NATO does not seek security for its members alone, ‘but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives’ (SC, par. 9).

Characterizing the UN, the EU as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as ‘central features of the security environment’, NATO highlights the importance of complementary and mutually reinforcing organizations for making ‘distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability’ (SC, par. 14).

Deepening cooperation and dialogue with other states, including Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean countries and preparing for the accession of new members, NATO demonstrates its multilateral approach to security.

With respect to the EU’s emerging role as an international security player, the SC demonstrates how its intention to ‘reinforce the transatlantic link’ as ‘a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share’ (SC, par. 27) helps to make ‘a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance’ (SC, par. 30).

3.4 CONCLUSION

Investigating NATO’s SC as well as the NATO Handbook with regard to Kagan’s three dimensions, the following objectives and ambitions of NATO in international security policy can be stated:

(a) Comparing NATO’s strategic outlook from 1999 – as held in its SC – with the realms of responsibility of 2001 – as outlined in the NATO Handbook – a shift from an ambivalent local-global strategic outlook towards a fully-fledged global realm of responsibility can be stated. This is not least a consequence of the terrorist attacks in 2001.

Whereas within the SC, the security space emerging most considerably is the Euro-Atlantic region and its periphery, from 2001 onwards, NATO has expanded its realms of responsibility both in width and depth.
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Expanding its functions, namely ‘to back the efforts of the international community to prevent crises and conflict or, when they occur, to prevent their spread and assist those involved in them’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 11) and in expanding the options available in the campaign against terrorism, NATO’s ‘immediate focus has undergone fundamental changes’ (NATO Handbook, 2001, p. 30).

(b) Referring to threat assessment, NATO’s SC identifies ‘a wide variety of military and non-military risks, which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict’ (SC, par. 20). The most important ones are oppression, ethnic conflict and economic distress, the collapse of the political order, the abuse of human rights and the proliferation of WMD (SC, par. 3). After the terrorist attacks of 2001, terrorism is added to the key threats identified (NATO Handbook, 2001).

(c) Concerning Kagan’s third dimension characterizing strategic cultures, namely the instruments and partners deemed necessary to address the threats, NATO pursues a ‘broad approach to security’ (SC, par. 25). Encompassing complementary political and military means, the Alliance affirms its objective to enhance security at the ‘lowest possible level of forces’ (SC, par. 40). Considering military means as ‘the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute effectively to conflict prevention and crisis management’ (SC, par. 29), the SC attaches slightly greater importance to military rather than civilian instruments to achieve its objectives. In terms of partners, NATO is ‘committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives’ (SC, par. 9). Enhancing cooperation with the UN, which is considered as ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, NATO emphasizes its multilateral approach to security.

3.5 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: IS NATO ABLE TO REACH ITS OBJECTIVES?

In contrast to the EU, NATO is not opposed with lots of critics when it comes to discussions concerning its ability to meet the objectives and ambitions outlined in the SC.
It is a highly debated topic – especially between realists and institutionalists\textsuperscript{24} – if NATO by widening its realms of responsibility to more than just collective defense tasks has gone out of its area of activity. However, I argue that at the moment no other organization is better suited to deal with the threats NATO actually deals with. Given NATO’s long-standing experience and knowledge in the field of international security policy, the Alliance’s ability for institutional adaption and the perception of new tasks and roles seems promising. Not at least because NATO has already successfully managed institutional adaption and the adjustment to new tasks and threats at the end of the Cold War.

III What are the differences between the EU’s and NATO’s objectives and ambitions?

4. COMPARISON OF EU’S AND NATO’S OBJECTIVES

Returning to the question formulated at the outset: To which extent do the ambitions and objectives of EU and NATO differ in international security policy?

And by extension, how far do they confirm the caricature of different transatlantic strategic cultures as drawn by Kagan?

In the following table, the objectives and ambitions of the EU as well as NATO in international security policy are listed with respect to Kagan’s three dimensions characterizing strategic cultures.

Table 1: Objectives and Ambitions of the EU and NATO in international security policy

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of Measuring</th>
<th>Objectives and Ambitions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Security Strategy (ESS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach to Security</strong></td>
<td>➢ Broad ➢ Comprehensive ➢ Multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kind of Missions</strong></td>
<td>➢ Anything but collective defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>EU Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>➢ Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>➢ Proliferation of WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Conflicts</td>
<td>➢ Regional Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>➢ State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime</td>
<td>➢ Organized Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Threats (Terrorism, Proliferation of WMD, Regional Conflicts, State Failure, Organized Crime)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments and Partners</th>
<th>Civilian and military means with a focus laid on civilian means</th>
<th>Civilian and military means with a focus laid on military means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Comprehensive approach to security</td>
<td>➢ Comprehensive approach to security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Cooperation, dialogue, partnership</td>
<td>➢ Cooperation, dialogue, partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Multilateral approach to security</td>
<td>➢ Multilateral approach to security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1 REALMS OF RESPONSIBILITY

According to Kagan (2002), the EU’s sense of responsibility ‘is married to the process of integration’. Europeans are perceived as totally inward-looking and indifferent to threats outside their own region.

In contrast, the US realm of responsibility – in my thesis represented by NATO – is characterized as being global in its outlook.

Investigating the strategic concepts of EU and NATO, both strategic horizons are caught in an unresolved tension between global and local realms of responsibility. Backing up the results with more current documents as the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy from 2008 and the NATO Handbook from 2001, in both organizations a shift from an ambivalent local-global strategic outlook towards a fully-fledged global realm of responsibility can be stated.

Based upon the EU’s rhetoric commitments of being ‘ready to share in the responsibility for global security’ (ESS, p. 1) and highlighting that the EU must become more ‘visible around the world’ (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 2) and

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25 NATO’s Strategic Concept does not list terrorism as one of the key threats identified. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the NATO Handbook includes terrorism as one of the key threats identified.
‘more active […] beyond its immediate neighborhood’ (p. 7), Kagan’s thesis has to be fully rejected for the EU.
Although the EU is not totally inward-looking and indifferent to threats outside its own region, several voices are raising concern if the EU is able to make its rhetoric commitments a reality and if it is able to put its ambitions into practice. Scholars like Becher (2004), Gnesotto (2009), Larrabee (2009) and Stubb (2009) have reservations with regard to the ability of the EU to make its promises a reality. According to them, EU’s ambitions exceed its capabilities and pursuant to Gnesotto (2009), the EU is a ‘marginal, little-known security player, most often absent when it comes to settling the major strategic issues of the planet’ (p. 29).

As outlined in paragraph 2.5.2, for the ICG, the main hindrance for the EU to meet its ambitious targets is the necessity of collective decision-making in international security policy.
Although the Lisbon Treaty creates favorable conditions for making decision-making processes and command structures more flexible, it remains questionable if the EU will be able to carry out a fully-fledged global role or if it will rather be a regional security arrangement according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, dealing with regional arrangements in the sphere of international security policy. Nevertheless, Kagan’s thesis needs to be rejected for the EU so far.

With respect to NATO, though Kagan (2002) is right in characterizing NATO’s realms of responsibility as global in outlook, he is wrongly labeling NATO the ‘world’s policeman’, a notion the Alliance definitely rejects (NATO Handbook, 2001).

Kagan’s thesis – claiming a regional-global divide of responsibility between EU and NATO – must be fully rejected for the EU and partly for NATO when considering their rhetoric commitments as outlined in official documents.

4.2 THREATS
According to his thesis, the US focuses on hard threats such as terrorism, organized crime or nuclear weapons. In contrast, Europeans are perceived as being more tolerant in the assessment of threats and preoccupied with soft dangers, such as ethnic conflict, migration and environmental degradation.
Comparing the strategic concepts of EU and NATO it can be found that both organizations focus on a similar set of threats, with both considering the ‘proliferation of WMD’ as the most important threat the security environment of the 21st century is confronted with. The lack of NATO to include terrorism as one of its main threats identified is not a consequence of a focus on soft threats but rather due to its obsolete strategic concept, dating back to 1999. In 1999, terrorism was not as present as it was in 2003, the time when EU’s security strategy was announced. This is due to the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. The *NATO Handbook* of 2001 takes up terrorism as one of the key threats identified and expands the options available in the campaign against terrorism. Though, as the *NATO Handbook* is no official document, NATO’s SC needs to be updated as it dates back from 1999, which seems not promising in a world which is in constant flux. NATO’s new strategic concept not at least needs to identify terrorism as one of the main threats of our security.

As the EU and NATO are identifying almost the same threats, the ESS and NATO’s SC pose critical cases for those like Kagan, stressing a strategic transatlantic hard-soft divide with regard to threat assessment.

### 4.3 INSTRUMENTS AND PARTNERS

On the choice of instruments deemed necessary to address the threats identified, Kagan (2002) states a civilian-military cleavage between the EU and the US.

Although it is true that for decades François Duchêne’s notion of a civilian power Europe has dominated the debate on Europe’s role in the world, nowadays the EU is able to fall back on a broad range of instruments, ranging from civilian up to military means.

As during the last two decades NATO also has incorporated civilian elements into its crisis management capabilities, both EU and NATO are based upon a broad and comprehensive approach to security. Encompassing complementary political and military means and enhancing security at the lowest possible level of forces are basic commitments of EU and NATO.

With regard to partners, both organizations are committed to a multilateral approach of security, fostering cooperation, dialogue and partnership. The UN Security Council is characterized by both as the primary guarantor for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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4.4 CONCLUSION

Comparing the prevailing security strategies of EU and NATO, this thesis poses a critical case for those like Kagan, stressing a transatlantic divide in security cultures or claiming that the establishment of an effective EU-NATO relationship is not realizable as a consequence of ‘clashing world-views’.

Against all moribund predictions, no ‘transatlantic gulf” concerning the objectives and ambitions in international security policy with regard to Kagan’s three dimensions can be stated.

As the current ‘frozen conflict’ between EU and NATO cannot simply be reduced to different objectives and ambitions and as the existing differences are rather conducive for the establishment of a complementary EU-NATO relationship, the second part of the thesis investigates what the ‘frozen conflict’ between the EU and NATO actually is about and to which extent more cooperation is to be preferred by both organizations and possible.
V Is more extensive cooperation to be preferred by EU and NATO?

5. THE PREFERABILITY OF FUTURE COOPERATION

As my analysis demonstrates, the ‘frozen conflict’ actually hindering effective EU-NATO cooperation cannot be led back to divergent objectives and ambitions of their issuing bodies regarding Kagan’s dimensions.

Investigating statements and official documents of EU and NATO, the following section examines to which extent the conflict is based on a lack of intention of EU and NATO to strengthen effective cooperation between them.

Although the issue was touched in paragraph 2.3 and 3.3, dealing with the partners deemed necessary by both organizations to address the threats identified, this section examines the issue in more detail.

5.1 EU’S PERSPECTIVE

According to Javier Solana (2009), former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), ‘the either/or EU-NATO debate is outdated’ as the EU is not going to ‘transform itself into some kind of new NATO’ (p. 19).

Emphasizing this, Solana appeases those fearing that the EU as a new militarized superpower is going to drive NATO out of business.27

Despite initial concern that the EU does not strive for the establishment of a complementary relationship28, the EU – by passing several documents concerning the creation of an effective EU-NATO relationship29 – has made great efforts to convince the majority of skeptics that CSDP has not been established to rival NATO but rather intends to play a complementary and supporting role.

Within the European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy (2002), the EU emphasizes ‘the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention’ and reaffirms that ‘NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members’ (p. 1).

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The EU further ‘welcomes the strategic partnership’ (p. 1) established between them.

Pursuant to remarks by Solana (2002) following the *European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy*, the document marks ‘a clear milestone in our joint efforts in order to face the challenges of the new century’ and sets the start of a ‘new area of cooperation’ (p. 1).

Also with respect to the ESS, no lack of intention to strengthen effective EU-NATO cooperation can be stated. The ESS calls NATO ‘irreplaceable’ (ESS, p. 13) and ‘an important expression of the [transatlantic] relationship’ (ESS, p. 12) which needs to be strengthened.

Despite all those commitments to reinforce an effective EU-NATO cooperation, according to Álvaro de Vasconcelos (2009a), NATO is not perceived as the only option for the EU when it comes to dealing with international security issues: In future, ‘the EU’s main partner outside NATO may sometimes be the US, but at other times it may be India or China, the African Union or Latin America, or even a large coalition of states legitimized by the UN’ (p. 22).

### 5.2 NATO’S PERSPECTIVE

Despite initial fears that EU and NATO are rivals in international security policy, according to former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2007), the logic of CSDP is not in dispute anymore and ‘even the USA, after some initial hesitation, has acknowledged that this process is right and important.’

As ‘the roles of the EU and NATO have become more and more intertwined’ (Scheffer, 2004), the ‘development of closer institutional relations’ (SC, par. 17) between them, in support of the values and interests they share, is considered as a normative goal.

NATO’s security strategy confirms that ‘reinforcing the transatlantic link’ (SC, par. 4) helps to make ‘a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance’ (SC, par. 30).

The *European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy* (2002) is arguing the same when reaffirming that ‘a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance’ (p. 1) as a whole.

NATO further declares to ensure ‘that the crisis management activities of both organizations are mutually reinforcing’ and to promote ‘effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency’ (p. 1) between the EU and NATO.
With respect to EU’s emerging role in international security policy, NATO’s security strategy ‘remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership’ (SC, par. 30).

5.3 CONCLUSION

As the selected documents and statements of EU and NATO reflect, both organizations are committed to strengthen effective EU-NATO cooperation. On a rhetorical level, an obligation to more extensive EU-NATO cooperation exists. However, investigating the wording of the ESS and SC in more detail, one aspect deserves further inspection:

Despite the fact that a ‘balanced […] partnership’ (ESS, p. 9; SC, par. 30) is highlighted by both the EU and NATO, there is a fundamental difference between their statements: Whereas for the EU, a balanced partnership is not yet reached and ‘should be’ (ESS, p. 9) established, NATO ‘remains committed’ (SC, par. 30) to it, implicating that the EU-NATO relationship is already a balanced partnership.

As for the EU, a balanced partnership is not yet reached, the Union – to some extent – passes criticism on the current EU-NATO cooperation mechanism. The cooperation mechanism seems not adequately accommodated to EU’s increasing role in international security policy. Based on these findings, the following section describes and evaluates the ‘Berlin Plus Agreement’ (2002), the essential institutionalized framework for EU-NATO permanent relations. It will be investigated what the ‘frozen conflict’ between EU and NATO actually is about and which problems currently hinder effective EU-NATO cooperation.
IV Which problems actually hinder extensive EU-NATO cooperation?

6. DEFECITS HINDERING EU-NATO COOPERATION

As no remarkable differences in objectives and ambitions between EU and NATO in international security policy exist and on a rhetorical level both organizations are committed to more extensive relations between them, there is another problem hindering effective EU-NATO cooperation.

6.1 BERLIN MINUS

Built upon NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999 and the EU-NATO joint declaration in 2002, the ‘Berlin Plus Agreement’ (Berlin Plus) provides the basic document, defining current NATO-EU cooperation mechanisms in crisis management operations.\(^\text{30}\)

Berlin Plus states that when a given crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation, the EU and NATO will draw on the mentioned agreement, covering three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined:

Firstly, on the basis of Berlin Plus, NATO guarantees that the EU has access to NATO planning. At the early stages before the EU even knows whether an operation will eventually take place, this may involve a NATO contribution to the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition of options. Subsequently, should the operation take place with use of NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will provide the operational planning required.

Second, the EU may request that NATO makes available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation and last but not least, with reference to Berlin Plus, the EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, including command structures and assistance in operational planning, where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

As a consequence, the use of NATO assets by the EU is subject to a right of first refusal of NATO as the Alliance must first decline to intervene in a given crisis.

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\(^{30}\) See official website of the EU (www.eu.int) and NATO (www.nato.int)
Although *Berlin Plus* is a step in the right direction for coordinating capabilities in order to prevent duplication, I argue that instead of strengthening EU-NATO cooperation, *Berlin Plus* rather hinders cooperation since it is only a one way agreement. Whereas *Berlin Plus* allows the EU to use NATO’s military capabilities, nothing comparable is stated for allowing NATO access to EU civil assets and capabilities in return. *Berlin Plus* exclusively focuses on how NATO could help the EU to conduct military operations.

According to Clément-Noguier (2008), this can be criticized as an attempt by NATO to take full control of EU military actions and to link all security actions to its own institution. As outlined in paragraph 5.1 and 5.2, this is against the objectives of EU and NATO to establish a ‘balanced partnership’ (ESS, p. 9; SC, par. 30) between them. Moreover, according to Dobbins (2006), out of the two organizations it is NATO that needs EU assistance to successfully execute many of the tasks that it is called upon to perform today, not the reverse.

### 6.2 NATO’S MINUS

Besides the failure of *Berlin Plus*, NATO’s current security strategy – the SC – is not appropriate for dealing with EU’s increasing ambitions in international security policy. Alongside being outdated regarding new threats as outlined in paragraph 4.2, NATO’s security strategy lacks answers to what its role should be in the evolving European security architecture.

Examining exclusively how Europe’s military missions can be conducted within the framework of the Alliance,³¹ NATO’s SC fails to concede to the EU an autonomous role in international security policy, a fact that can no longer be denied. As the EU will no longer accept NATO’s dominance and its right of first refusal in international security policy anymore, the Alliance needs to redefine its role in the evolving European security architecture.

### 6.3 CONCLUSION

As my findings demonstrate, the current ‘frozen conflict’ between EU and NATO stems from inadequate cooperation mechanisms as *Berlin Plus* is only a one way agreement and NATO’s security strategy fails to grant the EU a greater role in international security policy. Instead of

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³¹ See references in paragraphs 13, 18, 24, 26, 30, 42, 45, 53, 58 and 61.
providing a balanced cooperation mechanism, *Berlin Plus* rather creates an imbalance, hindering effective EU-NATO cooperation.

To avoid that significant amount of time, energy and money is wasted when it comes to the planning and execution of international security operations – which in the worst case could even lead to double structures or mutual blockades between EU and NATO missions – *Berlin Plus* and NATO’s security strategy need to be updated, adequately accommodating the advent of the EU as a new security player.

The intended revision of NATO’s strategic concept in 2010 will be an opportunity to take stock of the specific civilian/military role of CSDP and to set a new basis for effective EU-NATO cooperation.

Meanwhile different visions of how to coordinate the EU-NATO relationship continue to be a topic of great dispute,\(^{32}\) ranging from a functional over a geographic division of labor to the proposal of NATO’s right of first refusal.

\(^{32}\) See Dobbins (2006)
V What future EU-NATO cooperation mechanisms exist and what are their limits?

7. FUTURE EU-NATO COOPERATION MECHANISMS

In the following section, the existing visions of how the EU-NATO relationship could be organized in future are summarized and evaluated.

It will be analyzed to which extent each vision conflicts with the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy as outlined in chapter 2 and 3.

7.1 FUTURE VISIONS

Future NATO-EU cooperation has been discussed from a variety of point of views, ranging from a functional over a geographic division of labor up to the question whether NATO should have the right of first refusal.

Table two summarizes the basic assumptions of these future visions.

Table 2: Visions for future NATO-EU cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Vision</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional Division of Labor</td>
<td>➢ Functional division of labor between the EU and NATO, with NATO assuming responsibility for high-intensive, large-scale military operations and the EU for lower-intensive, civilian tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO’s Right of First Refusal</td>
<td>➢ NATO should have the ‘right of first refusal’, implicating that the EU should only act once NATO has decided not to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Division of Labor</td>
<td>➢ Geographic division of labor with the EU and NATO being bounded to different and clearly defined regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2 EVALUATION

Based on my findings mentioned in chapter 2 and 3, I will argue to which extent each of these visions conflict with the objectives of EU and NATO in international security policy and which visions have to be rejected as a consequence of clashing ambitions.

7.2.1 FUNCTIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

The idea of a functional division of labor between EU and NATO – especially put forward by Moravcsik (2003) and Menon (2003) – is only relevant in theory. According to this vision NATO should assume responsibility for high-intensive, large-scale military operations whereas EU should focus on lower-intensive, civilian tasks.

As my findings in chapter 3 amply demonstrate, EU and NATO are both based upon a broad and comprehensive approach to security, deploying the full range of crisis management capabilities, ranging from civilian up to military instruments and considering a complementary use of civilian and military means as one of their main objectives.

Although it is true that by a functional division of tasks, conflicts with regard to competence and responsibility could be avoided, the EU is not about to be a pure civilian power anymore. According to De Hoop Scheffer (2007), the logic of CSDP is not in dispute anymore but is rather considered as right and important, being able to strengthen the transatlantic relationship as a whole.

I argue that the EU cannot concentrate on civilian means only as it needs to stay alert to the changing security environment, requiring new responsibilities and tasks. As we cannot predict what future brings with regard to new security threats and the ability and competence of other security actors to deal effectively with these new threats, it is better to be equipped most efficiently and exhaustively in order to be prepared to all kind of challenges the security environment of the 21st century is confronted with today.

7.2.2 NATO’S RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

Those claiming that NATO should have the right of first refusal have to be countered that the EU is not willing to ‘pick up NATO’s leftovers’ anymore (Keohane, 2003).

Current EU discontent concerning EU-NATO cooperation stems from such an unbalanced partnership.
To limit the EU to ‘pick up NATO’s leftovers’ with recourse to NATO’s assets is to overlook one of the core reasons CSDP was established for in the first place: that is to overcome EU’s ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993, p. 1) and to develop an autonomous security policy. It was for this reason that EU developed ESDP – the predecessor of CSDP – independently from NATO. Whereas the predecessor of ESDP, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) still fell under the jurisdiction of NATO and was intended to create a European pillar within NATO structures, partly to allow European countries to act militarily where NATO wished not to and partly to alleviate the United States’ financial burden of maintaining military bases in Europe, ESDP marked a fundamental change in exclusively falling under the jurisdiction of the EU itself. In creating ESDP independently from NATO, EU sent a clear signal that it was ready to be treated as an equivalent partner in international security policy and that it was no longer about to fall under NATO’s jurisdiction and supervision.

7.2.3 GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION OF LABOR

The third future vision often discussed deals with a geographic division of labor between EU and NATO. At a first view it seems that any talk of a fixed geographical division of tasks needs to be abandoned as today’s security threats such as terrorism or the proliferation of WMD have external effects and as a consequence of this are not bounded to a certain territory anymore. A geographic division of labor seems to be too artificial and inconsistent with regard to the global nature of today’s security challenges. Moreover, according to Hofmann and Reynolds (2007), any geographic division of labor should be regarded with suspicion as both sides should be cautious of ‘ever translating […] this into something more formalized, which would invariably smack of the ‘sphere of influence’ politics of the last century’ (p. 8).

However, keeping in mind that EU lacks sufficient and persuasive arguments for justifying its global strategic outlook with regard to security policy and as it is questionable whether the EU is able to reach its global ambitions as outlined in chapter four, the vision of a geographic division of labor regains importance. As both EU and NATO are struggling to find their places in a less centralized, interconnected and globalized world and especially the EU faces difficulties to convincingly justify its global
shift— as outlined in chapter two and three – Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides an interesting framework for EU’s and NATO’s ambivalent local-global realm of responsibility. Whereas within official documents of EU and NATO glossy brochures are pictured, emphasizing their global strategic outlook; by delegating the primary responsibility to the UN Security Council, both EU and NATO seem to be aware of the limits their issuing bodies are confronted with in order to deal effectively with global security issues.

Although the UN Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, Chapter VIII explicitly allots the sharing of that role with ‘regional arrangements or agencies’. According to Knight (1996), Chapter VIII characterizes a particular vision of how the division of labor should take place between the UN system and regional agencies and arrangements. ‘In the event of the eruption of a local dispute […] member-nations of the UN existing in that particular geographical location would be expected, if they were part of a regional arrangement or agency, to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council’ (p. 32).

Delegating the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace to the Security Council, EU and NATO indirectly accept the subsidiary model of global security governance as described in Chapter VIII of the UN, in which lower levels of governance are not denied of their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned to them.

Although on a rhetorical level both EU and NATO are committed to a global realm of responsibility, the future vision dealing with a geographical division of labor between the two organizations in conformity with the UN Charter – especially Chapter VIII dealing with regional security arrangements – seems promising as this could avoid tensions and conflicts between EU and NATO.

7.2.4 PROSPECTS

Based on my findings concerning the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy, I argue that in the following years only a flexible working approach between EU and NATO is able to recognize both EU’s and NATO’s objectives and ambitions in international security policy.

Out of the three presented future visions, the geographic division of labor between EU and NATO seems to be the most appropriate and feasible vision as the functional division of labor
as well as the vision dealing with NATO’s right of first refusal conflict to some extent with the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements – like EU and NATO – either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

According to Hettne and Soderbaum, today the debate between the UN and regional organizations like the EU and NATO has resurfaced as one of the most important issues in the global security architecture, including reform of the UN Security Council.

Whereas the bipolarity of the Cold War was not conducive to making Chapter VIII of the Charter operational, with the end of the Cold War and the increasing need to address the issue of the overburdening of the UN system’s peace and security mechanisms, the time has come to re-examine this regional arrangement Chapter of the Charter. In doing so, a possible division of labor can be worked out between the world body and other entities that are able to play a role in the peacemaking and preventive diplomacy functions of governance at the global level.

However, up until now, the UN has not established a universal and constant model defining the ideal relationship between the UN and the different regional arrangements in peacekeeping operations. Chapter VIII lacks to address several questions: What exactly are regional arrangements or agencies? Under which circumstances should regional security arrangements intervene and who is responsible in which circumstances? These questions still need to be addressed.

The UN justifies its widely-defined Chapter by arguing that in different types of peacekeeping operations, different levels of cooperation are required and as the future belongs to a flexible approach of security provision, the only requirement the UN states is that before an operation, the regional arrangements involved in that operation need to agree to a framework for cooperation, clearly spelling out the responsibility of each entity in the mission. Cooperation should be based on comparative advantages the UN and relevant regional arrangements possess, leading to complementarity of efforts and elimination of duplication and competition.
8. SUMMARY OF MY FINDINGS

According to Kagan (2002) – famously placing Americans on ‘Mars’ and Europeans on ‘Venus’ – divergent transatlantic realms of responsibility that each side feels obliged to protect, different transatlantic opinions on threats as well as disagreement on the appropriate response to them are so massive, that the establishment of a common transatlantic security culture is perceived as impossible.

Graph one illustrates Kagan’s thesis.
Within the formal cooperation framework (see legend below), EU and NATO are pictured separately. Each organization has its special set of realms of responsibility, threat assessment and partners and instruments, deemed necessary to address the threats. The three arrows demonstrate Kagan’s perception of irreconcilable differences concerning all three dimensions, characterizing security cultures.

**Graph 1: Kagan’s thesis of different security cultures between EU and NATO**

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**Legend**
- Cooperation framework
- Differences in security cultures
- Lack of intention for more cooperation
Employing Kagan’s caricature of different transatlantic security cultures as an analytical frame, within this thesis the following research question was examined:

To which extent differ the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy and to which extent is more extensive cooperation between them to be preferred and possible? Subsequently, my results are summarized.

1. Step: Comparing the prevailing security strategies of EU (European Security Strategy) and NATO (Strategic Concept), the following results can be stated:

- The objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy do not differ fundamentally with regard to Kagan’s dimensions, characterizing strategic cultures.
- Existing differences between EU’s and NATO’s objectives are rather conducive for the establishment of a complementary EU-NATO relationship.
- The comparison of EU’s and NATO’s security strategies poses a critical case for those, like Kagan, stressing a transatlantic divide in security cultures.

Graph two illustrates my findings. As by investigating the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO with respect to Kagan’s three dimensions no ‘transatlantic gulf’ can be stated’, the three arrows – demonstrating Kagan’s perception of irreconcilable differences in security cultures – are removed.

**Graph 2: ESS and SC as critical cases for Kagan’s thesis**
2. Step: As the current ‘frozen conflict’ between EU and NATO cannot simply be reduced to different objectives and ambitions and as the existing differences are rather conducive for the establishment of a complementary EU-NATO relationship, the second part of the thesis investigated to which extent this conflict is based on a lack of intention of EU and NATO to strengthen effective cooperation between them.

Analyzing statements and official documents issued by the EU and NATO, the following results can be stated:

- Both the EU and NATO are committed to strengthen effective cooperation. On a rhetorical level, an obligation to more extensive EU-NATO cooperation exists.
- Despite the fact that a ‘balanced […] partnership’ (ESS, p. 9; SC, par. 30) is emphasized by both the EU and NATO, there is a fundamental difference: Whereas for the EU, a balanced partnership is not yet reached and ‘should be’ (ESS, p. 9) established, NATO ‘remains committed’ (SC, par. 30) to it, implicating that the EU-NATO relationship is already a balanced partnership.
- As for the EU, a balanced partnership is not yet reached, the Union passes criticism on the current EU-NATO cooperation mechanisms.

Therefore, the dashed line between EU and NATO is removed in graph three. As no lack of intention for more extensive cooperation can be stated, nothing seems to hinder extensive cooperation between the two organizations anymore.

**Graph 3:** Intention of EU and NATO for increased and effective cooperation
3. Step: As no remarkable differences in objectives and ambitions between EU and NATO in international security policy exist and on a rhetorical level both organizations are committed to more extensive relations between them, thirdly, in order to investigate what actually hinders extensive EU-NATO cooperation, the ‘Berlin Plus Agreement’ (Berlin Plus) as the essential institutionalized framework for EU-NATO permanent relations as well as deficits regarding NATO’s current security strategy were described and evaluated.

With regard to this, the following results can be stated:

- Although Berlin Plus is a first attempt for coordinating capabilities in order to prevent duplication, instead of strengthening EU-NATO cooperation, Berlin Plus rather hinders cooperation since it is only a one way agreement.
- Besides the failure of Berlin Plus, NATO’s current security strategy – the SC – is not suited to deal with EU’s increasing ambitions in international security policy as it lacks an answer to what its role should be in the evolving European security architecture.
- Examining exclusively how Europe’s military missions can be conducted within the framework of the Alliance, NATO’s SC fails to grant the EU an autonomous role as a player in international security policy, a fact that can no longer be denied.

Graph four shows these findings. As nothing seems to hinder extensive EU-NATO cooperation, both organizations are pictured in one figure. However, as Berlin Plus and NATO’s current security strategies make extensive cooperation impossible, the picture, illustrating extensive cooperation between EU and NATO needs to be refused as it is not realizable at the moment.

Graph 4: The current cooperation framework hinders extensive EU-NATO cooperation
4. **Step:** As the current cooperation framework hinders extensive EU-NATO cooperation, different visions of how to coordinate the EU-NATO relationship continue to be a matter of great dispute, 33 ranging from a functional over a geographic division of labor to the proposal of NATO’s right of first refusal. 

In order to investigate which of the existing future vision best fits to both the objectives of EU and NATO, in a fourth step, they were described and evaluated.

The following results can be stated:

- Out of the three presented future visions, the geographic division of labor is the most appropriate and feasible vision as the functional division of labor as well as the vision dealing with NATO’s right of first refusal conflict to some extent with the objectives and ambitions of EU and NATO in international security policy.

- As both EU and NATO are struggling to find their places in a less centralized, interconnected and globalized world and especially the EU faces difficulties to convincingly justify its global shift – as outlined in chapter two and three – Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides an interesting framework for EU’s and NATO’s ambivalent local-global realm of responsibility.

- Delegating the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace to the Security Council, EU and NATO indirectly accept the subsidiary model of global security governance as outlined in Chapter VIII of the UN, in which lower levels of governance are not denied of their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned to them.

- In the following years, only a flexible working approach between EU and NATO will be able to recognize both EU’s and NATO’s objectives and ambitions in international security policy.

- In the coming decade, the EU will need to learn how to develop CSDP missions within NATO, in cooperation with the US, alone or with other international actors. For the EU, NATO will and cannot be the only option when it comes to dealing with international security issues. Therefore, the UN, recognized as the fundamental guarantor for international security needs to be strengthened.

- Pursuant to the UN Security Council (2010), EU and NATO – as regional arrangements according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter – are not only able to lighten the burden of

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33 See Dobbins (2006)
the UN Security Council but also have the capacity to contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.

All in all, my findings can be summarized as follows:
The security strategies of EU and NATO do not differ to such an extent that cooperation between them is impossible by definition.
As both organizations even prefer more extensive cooperation, nothing seems to oppose the establishment of a complementary relationship between them.
The possibility for more extensive EU-NATO cooperation solely depends on strengthening the UN as the primary guarantor of international security and making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter a reality.
9. REFERENCES


