The Official Positions of the AKP and CHP on Turkey’s EU Accession Process - A Comparative Study -

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I. Abstract

The study analyses the positions of the two most important Turkish parties on Turkey’s accession process to the European Union by means of constructing empirically grounded typologies based on an in-depth text interpretation and the grounded theory approach by Strauss (1996). This approach is taken in order to, by means of closely looking at semantics and lines of argumentation, reconstruct the parties’ position from a constructivist perspective.

One party from the centre-right with an Islamic orientation, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), as well as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is a secular party from the centre-left, are the objects of scrutiny. With a detailed analysis of the party programmes and other official documentations of the parties’ positions this study explores where the party stands today with regards to Turkey’s ambition to accede to the EU. The leading research question is: What is the AKP’s and CHP’s position on Turkey’s accession process to the European Union as it is expressed in the official documents of the parties in 2007-2011?

It is concluded that the AKP wants to reform Turkey in order to be internationally competitive and reach a respectable place in the international community, rather than to become a member of the European Union. The CHP on the contrary has EU membership as its prime goal and sees cooperation in multilateral organisations such as the EU as the solution to global problems. These findings somewhat contradict the opinion of many scholars, who have stated that the AKP is currently the most supportive of Turkey’s EU accession process, whereas the CHP has slightly turned away from the EU.
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IV. List of Abbreviations

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, English name: Justice and Development Party (English abbr.: JDP)
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, English name: Republican People’s Party (English abbr.: RPP)
COM: European Commission
ECJ: European Court of Justice
EI: European Integration
EP: European Parliament
EU: European Union
FP: Fazilet Partisi, English name: Virtue Party
GT: Grounded theory
GTM: Grounded theory method
QDA: Qualitative Data Analysis
CAQDA: Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis
RP: Refah Partisi, English name: Welfare Party
SP: Saadet Partisi, English name: Felicity Party
TAP: Turkish accession process
TESEV: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, English name: The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TFP: Turkish Foreign Policy
TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly
1) Introduction to the topic and research question

The European Union and Turkey share a long common history of association and cooperation - in fact the longest history an accession country has ever shared with the EU. In September 1959 Turkey first applied for associate Membership of the European Economic Community (European Commission, 2011). This fact would be reason enough to justify giving special attention to Turkey's still enduring accession process to the European Union. The accession agreement, also called Ankara agreement between the EU and Turkey was signed in 1963 (Secretariat General for EU affairs, 1963). Due to the military coup in 1980, the relations between the two partners came to a virtual freeze and were only assuming their old momentum after Turkey newly applied for Membership in 1987. The relations reached a new height with Turkey entering the Customs Union in 1995, and four years later the Helsinki summit where Turkey was granted candidate status (Müftüler Bac, 2005, p. 20). The beginning of the new millennium was coined by many reform packages and constitutional changes on the side of Turkey (Özbudun & Yazıcı, 2004, p. 13). Yet, with the Commissions decisions to momentarily stop negotiations due to a lack of progress on Turkey's side regarding the Cyprus issue, the accession process became increasingly slow and tedious (Euractiv, 2010). At the moment the two seem to be stuck in a process characterised by slow progress and frustration on both sides. The European Union is discontent with Turkey's development and sometimes lack of commitment (Avci, 2003, p. 150-1). Turkey criticises the fact that certain EU countries are strictly against Turkey becoming a member and therefore doubts that even if it would fulfil all the criteria it would not be able to become a member- it hence misses strong incentives for reforms (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 70).

Coming to that, the situation has recently become especially difficult with the Commissions decision in 2006 to put the negotiations on hold until the Cyprus issue is resolved (Euractiv, 2010).

The research question summarises the aim of the study, namely to reconstruct the position of two Turkish parties, the AKP and CHP, on their country's accession process to the European Union. The question reads as follows:

What is the AKP's and CHP's position on Turkey's accession process to the European Union as it is expressed in the official documents of the parties in 2007-2011?

For Turkey's accession process to the European Union as just described is not an easy or self-acting one, there is much debate both within the EU, as well as within Turkey, whether it should still be pursued. The focus of the following paper lies on the Turkish position on the accession process, which is essentially shaped by the political parties in the country.

Firstly that is because parties generally represent the positions of their electorate and have the power to create, shape and implement policies, which have an influence on the development of the accession process of their country. Hence, whether the parties in government and in the opposition are in favour of the accession process, or rather against it, shapes the country's position on the accession process and eventually decides (on the Turkish side) whether Turkey will be able to join the European Union or not (cf Bektas 2009, 1). Secondly, the inability to deal with opposition and hence the tradition for strong ruling parties is characteristic for the Turkish political culture, which results in little opportunities for other groups and parties to have an influence on the policies made. It results out of the fear of a strong
civil society and losing elections. Kalaycioglu (2002) argues that because the Turkish state is actually a weak state for example in terms of its “regulatory, extractive and distributive capacity” and it therefore needs to use executive power to suppress potential or actual challenges (Kalaycioglu, 2002, p. 260). This weakness leads to considerable intolerance towards any form of party or group opposing the government policies. Having an influence on policies is hence rather difficult for the opposition parties, as well as interest groups, which are not incorporated into but rather excluded from the policy making process. Kalaycioglu (2002) describes the nature of the state in dealing with associations as “passive exclusive” and if associations demand recognition through protests or demonstrations, the Turkish state turns to an “aggressive exclusive” behaviour (Kalaycioglu, 2002, p. 261). In the field of foreign policy this pattern however declined throughout the last 10-15 years: more influence is possible, and more domestic organisation get involved in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy (TFP). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is thus challenged in its role as single organ responsible for TFP (Tayfur & Göymen, 2002, p. 119). Despite these recent developments, the Turkish party system is still described as a “democracy of the ruling party, in which rights are not shared by all” (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 43). In line with this, the recent statements by Recep Erdogan of wanting to transform the parliamentary democracy into a presidential one in order to give the president even more power, can be seen as an example to support what has been said above (Taspinar, Cook, & Barkey, 2011). The two most important parties in the Turkish party system, which, because of their recent success during the 2011 general elections, have the biggest influence on creating and implementing policies, are the AKP and CHP. For the first 25 years of the Republic, Atatürk’s party, the CHP (Eng.: Republican People’s Party) was the only one existing, as a multi-party system was only introduced in 1946. Islamist parties were only coming into existence in the 1970s with the foundation of the National order party (MNP) (Özbudun, 2006, p. 544). Coming to that, they were kept “at bay” through the military, which forced several parties out of government for four times: two times through a military coup (1960 and 1980), one time through an unofficial coup in 1971 and again in 1996, when it forced the Islamist Welfare Party to resign. Circumstances like the economic crises in 2000 and 2001 and a general shift to conservatism led to the rise of the AKP in 2002, which has been in power ever since, and has again won the elections in June 2011 (cf. Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2009). Through the emergence of Islamist (or sometimes called neo-Ottomanist) parties there is an increasing division of the Turkish Party system along secular-Islamist lines. The parties left to the centre, such as the CHP are secular, and the parties right to the centre, such as the AKP, are Islam-oriented (Secor, 2001, p. 544). The secular parties have traditionally supported Turkey’s Membership of the European Union. On the contrary, the Islamist parties have traditionally been at odds with the European Union integration process. Scholars, such as Kubicek (2010) and Dagi (2005) state that the AKP is currently the most supportive of Turkey’s accession process, whether the CHP has rather adopted a Euro-sceptic position (cf. Gülmез 2006 & 2008 and Patterson 2008). The two parties, AKP and CHP, are hence at opposite ends of the left-right and secular-Islamist cleavages. This study, in reconstructing the parties positions on Turkey’s accession process to the EU provides an answer to the question, where the parties lie on the third possible -pro-/anti EU- cleavage.
The parties’ positions will be reconstructed by means of an in-depth analysis of the semantics and lines of reasoning of the parties’ statements in official party documents, such as party programmes and election manifestos. These documents provide an overview over the parties’ positions on a broad range of issues, such as the parties’ view on the Turkish accession process. They are carefully prepared and written to give the voters an impression of the party’s issue priorities and are usually ratified by a party convention (cf. Cole 2005).

2) Assessing party positions on accession processes

Before coming to the parties’ positions on the EU as they are described and classified by scholars today, a short overview over the parties’ background is given in order to understand where the parties come from and in how far their EU position is significant. This chapter aims at establishing a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis. The first part is dedicated at presenting the parties’ positions on the Turkish accession process today as they are presented in scholarly literature. This step is particularly relevant to be able to put the findings from the hermeneutic analysis into perspective, and to be able to appreciate their significance. Whether the findings from the analysis are in line with the positions represented in scholarly literature will be assessed in chapter 5. The second part presents two models on how parties’ positions on accession processes to the EU can be classified. It mainly aims at clarifying the concept “position towards accession processes to the European Union”, which is central to this study.

Today’s AKP is a successor of the FP (Virtue Party), which was banned in June 2001. The FP itself was a successor of the RP (Welfare Party). The AKP is hence a part of Necmittin Erbakan’s (leading figure of RP) political legacy. The current leading official of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül have both been affiliated with the party(s) for a long time and were close colleagues of Erbakan. The former Prime Minister Erbakan, who surprisingly won the elections in 1996, was very Islamist and hostile towards the European Union or anything that would threaten ‘Turkey’s integrity’. Because the Military saw his rule as a threat to the secularity of the state, it pressured him and accordingly the party was “ousted from power in June 1997 and was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in March 1998” (Taniyici, 2003, p. 464). After the RP’s ban, the party elites founded the FP with the same institutional structure but different position on the EU. The FP however was also outlawed by the Constitutional Court in June 2001, as it was still, despite some change in policies, seen as a threat to the Republic. The court’s decision split the party in two groups: the ‘innovationists’ and the ‘traditionalists’. The AKP was founded by the former group: the SP (Felicity party) by the latter. The greater part of the AKP’s history was hence characterised by their aversion to the EU. The AKP won the elections in 2002 and 2007 with a landslide victory and is, according to Kubicek (as well as many other scholars), the biggest advocate of Turkey’s EU Membership today (cf. Kubicek, 2010).

The CHP’s party history is considerably longer than the AKP’s but also less shaken by external shocks, such as the fatal decisions of the Constitutional Court on the AKP and its predecessors. It was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 and “became the main political mechanism of the
newly emerging republic” (Gülmez, 2006, p. 1). The party continued to be in parliament in the years to come and was for a long time lead by Ismet Inönü, who carried out Atatürk’s legacy. However, the party was banned together with all other parties after the military coup in 1980. As all leaders and the name of the party were banned, it was founded as SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) under the leadership of Ismet Inönü’s son Erdal Inönü. The CHP was reopened as such under the leadership of Deniz Baykal in 1992, but did not manage reach the level of its old success (Gülmez, 2006, p. 4). In contradiction to the AKP’s predecessors, which have been in opposition to the EU, the CHP has since its foundation been in favour of Turkey’s EU accession process.

Secor (2001) classified the CHP as a left of centre, secular and pro-European party, and the AKP as a right of centre, Islamist and anti-European party (Secor, 2001, p. 547). Yet, “it is now the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its Islamist roots, that is the country’s strongest advocate for Europeanization while those with more secularist or nationalist orientations fear both the AKP and what its push for political liberalisation portends for Turkey” (Kubicek, 2010, p. 2). Dagi describes the same phenomenon: “The ruling JDP’s enthusiastic efforts for Turkey’s EU membership […] in contrast to the hesitations of the Kemalists, is indicative of the changing positions of political forces in Turkish politics” (Dagi, 2005, p. 34). This means that in the years from 2001 until 2010, both parties, according to Kubiccek and Dagi, have changed their position on Turkey’s EU accession process. Several reasons are mentioned in the literature to explain this change. The AKP is for example said to have turned towards the EU, because of the external shock they received after having been outlawed by the Constitutional Court (cf. Taniyici, 2003; Özbudun, 2006) and the leaders “realised that relying essentially on hard-core Islamist votes would condemn the party forever to a minority status” (Özbudun, 2006, 555).

In contrast to the opinions of the authors mentioned above, there are some recently published articles from think tanks, which do not support the view that the AKP currently is the most enthusiastic supporter of the EU in Turkey and that the CHP has become increasingly Euro-sceptic. A series of articles under the heading “What does Turkey think?”, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), suggests that the AKP by all means wants to be successful and elevate Turkey to a successful country internationally, but that this aim does not include becoming a member of the EU (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). It is also stated that Erdogan is becoming increasingly fond of power and authoritarianism and loses his interest in Turkey’s accession process, whereas the CHP under its new leader is supporting EU membership (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 42). As to the reason why the perception of articles published in scientific journals (such as those of Taniyici, Özbudun, Dagi and Kubicek) differ considerably from those published very recently by think tanks one can only speculate. It moreover seems that other think tanks, such as one of the most important Turkish ones, the “Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation” (TESEV), are in their latest reports from 20111 more in line with the journal articles. It can hence be concluded that the opinion toned by the ECFR is not very widely supported in the literature.

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1 See for example TESEV’s joint report “Turkey in Europe, but not of Europe?”, which can be retrieved from the following website: http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/AB/TESEV_Lund_Report.pdf (accessed on
In the following, second, part of this chapter, two models often referred to in the literature are presented in order to set up a conceptual framework for classifying party positions on accession processes. For that purpose, literature on all, European, party-based positions on accession processes to the European Union was taken into account.

The first model, by Taggart and Szczerbiak attempts to label only the negative or euroscepticist positions on accession processes, whereas the second model by Kopecky and Mudde takes into account both pro- and anti-European sentiments. The initial definition of euroscepticism stems from Taggart, who thought euroscepticism to be an “encompassing term”, which includes modest, as well as total opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart, 1998, p. 366).

Taggart and Szczerbiak later clarified further what euroscepticism means in their eyes and came up with a two-fold definition of the term: “we can distinguish between those who are broadly opposed to euroscepticism on principle and those who oppose European integration because of the form it takes” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, 27). Their model was primarily developed for the Central and Eastern European countries, where there is a relatively high degree of consensus that European integration itself is a good thing. Therefore, one can in these cases differentiate between those who “are outside the consensus and express hostility to the idea of European integration” or those “expressing limited objections to the nature of the accession process” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, 4). These two positions are called “hard” and “soft” euroscepticism. Hard euroscepticism is the total and outright rejection of European integration (EI), both in political and economic terms. Soft euroscepticism “involves contingent or qualified” opposition to European Integration (EI) and can be related to scepticism towards either policies or national-interest (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, 4).

Kopecky and Mudde developed another scheme of party-based Euroscepticism and criticised the widely acknowledged model of Taggart and Szczerbiak, for they think the conceptualisation of the terms hard and soft euroscepticism are too “broad”, “blurred” and “unclear” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, 300). Their model is somewhat more differentiated and does not only include euroscepticism, but also Euro-optimist standpoints and differentiates between the two dimensions “Support for the ideas of European Integration” and “Support for the European Union” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, 301).

The former includes and is further broken down into “Europhiles”, who “believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU”, both of political and economic nature (“institutionalised cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty”, and “an integrated liberal market economy”) and “Europhobes”, who are against a part of or even the whole idea of EI (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, 301). The latter dimension is split up in “EU-optimists”, who are satisfied with the EU and the direction it is heading at, and “EU-pessimists”, who are not satisfied with the EU and its prospective future.

The respective combinations of the two dimensions are also given names, which refer to “four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe”: Euroenthusiasts (Europhile and EU-optimist); Euro-pragmatists (Europhobe and EU-optimist); Eurosceptics (Europhile and EU-pessimist); Eurorejects (Europhobe and EU-pessimist) (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, 302).

The wording “position on accession processes” is widely used in the literature when it comes to looking at party positions, whereas the term attitude is mostly used when it comes to defining the opinion of the masses, although there are also exceptions, such as Gülmez (2008), who also uses the term attitude for parties.
In Chapter 4.2 it is concluded that the models can to some extent present the parties’ positions on the Turkish accession process, but need refinement in order to grasp all crucial points for the Turkish case.

3) Methodology

3.1) Research Design: Case study

The design chosen for this study is a comparative case study. A case study “allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” and thus be able to explain the circumstances of the phenomenon under study (Yin, 2009, p. 4). This in-depth and holistic approach is suitable for this study, as the circumstances and context of the parties are very relevant for understanding their position. Another characteristic of a case study, that “phenomenon and context” cannot be separated from each other, as would be possible within an experiment (Yin, 2009, p. 18). In the present case, one cannot separate Turkey and its accession process from the two parties, and respectively their programmes, under scrutiny.

3.2) Case Selection: AKP and CHP

Official party documents were analysed from two chosen parties, which were mainly selected for two reasons: Firstly, it was important to chose parties which have considerable support from the Turkish society and are presently in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The two biggest parties at the moment are the AKP and the CHP. The size of the party as expressed in the percentage of seats in the TGNA is closely interwoven with their influence on the actual policies. The AKP is the only party in government and managed to get 49.91% of the votes in 2011, which translated into roughly 59% of the seats in the parliament (Dimpool, 2011). The CHP is the biggest opposition party with 25.91% of the votes (Dimpool, 2011).

A new law can be enacted in the TGNA by a majority of the members present at the specific meeting (but no less than a quarter of all members), which means that the AKP (if voting cohesively) can pass or reject laws in the TGNA and can thus determine the policies made in the country to a great extend (Office of the Prime Minister, 2008). However, the governing AKP does not have the power to single-handedly change the constitution, as a two-thirds majority is needed for that. Secondly, the two parties chosen present different positions in the Turkish party landscape and are able to illustrate the polarised nature of the Party system (with very secular parties on the one hand and religious/Islamist parties on the other). As the two parties are located on opposite ends of the left-/right and secular-Islamist cleavages, it is interesting to see on which ends the parties are located on the pro-/anti-EU cleavage.

The timeframe from which the official documents were chosen was determined by the availability of the documents. The parties only publish the latest versions of their party programmes on their websites. The only party programme available for the AKP was hence its 2007 party programme, which
was translated to English, the latest version on the Turkish official website is also from 2007 – obviously, a newer version from 2011 has not yet been published.

As the CHP’s EU representation in Brussels was only opened in 2008, the earliest relevant documents were published on the website in 2009, and not later than 2010. Only after the actual analysis was already finished, the current election manifesto of the CHP was published online on the English version of the party’s official website. It was analysed with focus only on whether the results of the analysis could be confirmed or new aspects would have to be taken into account.

3.3) Data Collection

3.3.1) Material: Party documents

In order to identify a party’s position and political standpoint several kinds of documents could be analysed. These are on the one hand primary sources such as party programmes, opinion papers or other official party documents. Moreover, interviews with leading party officials could constitute a possible source. On the other hand, secondary sources such as scientific articles and/or EU documents (e.g. progress reports) could be used.

Official party documents, which are available in English, were chosen, because firstly, party programmes and other official party documents are the official standpoints, which “offer voters a summary of leading issue priorities” (Cole, 2005, p. 209). These documents are prepared with great care in the knowledge that they will be read and referred to by a broad public. Secondly, the programmes “are usually ratified by party conventions, they are authoritative statements of party policies and represent the whole party, not just one faction or politician” (Cole, 2005, p. 209). Thirdly, one can also assume that every word of the programme or opinion paper is carefully chosen, as the party’s policies are judged on the basis of the programme, meaning that if the party’s policies deviate greatly from the programme it will lose credibility. Fourthly, another advantage of studying official party programmes is that they are comparable as they are written for the same purpose and with the same goal: representing the party to the public. On the whole, in studying official party documents one gets an impression of how the party wants to present itself to the public and how it defines itself. Moreover, the fact that the authors carefully thought about the wording of the texts, provides and also asks for an in-depth analysis of the semantics of the documents. One can however not assume that the party programmes represent “the only” party position, as the party is for example not bound to act according to the programme, it will have to adjust to the particular situation in which it has to act, a change in leading politicians and a change in policy making circumstances can lead to a change in the position of the party.

The AKP party programme was retrieved from the English version of the official website of the party. The English version of the official website of the CHP did not provide any documents in English (until shortly before their elections in 2011). However, the CHP’s EU representation in Brussels has a website on which it publishes opinion papers and bulletins. Several documents dealing with CHP’s position on
Turkey’s accession process were taken from this website. One has to be aware of the fact that the AKP’s party programme was only translated into English, whereas the CHP documents were published in English originally. However, this does not necessarily imply that the AKP document is less well thought about than the CHP documents. It however means that the AKP document was written for the Turkish public, whereas the CHP documents were meant to present the party in Brussels. This could mean that the CHP attempts to write more positively about the EU in the documents dedicated for the EU public in order to make a good impression, but it could also be possible that the Brussels representation just summarises the Turkish documents and publishes them in English in order to make them accessible for the EU public.

Only very recently, a new document was published by the CHP, which was indeed written for the Turkish public and only translated into English: the election manifesto for the general elections in June 2011, which finally went into the sample of analysed documents, too. It did not contradict the opinion as reconstructed from the other documents, but only provided some more information on explanations on the party’s views, showing that the CHP’s documents from the EU representation website are indeed comparable to the AKP party programme.

Even if the range of documents and sources for this study is generally restricted, this limitation is of an advantage for the analytical depth of the study, as it aims at studying documents of the same genre thoroughly and comprehensively. Hence, instead of studying a broad range of topics and documents, thorough analysis is at the centre of this Bachelor study. Analysing party documents furthermore fills a gap in the current state of scientific research. The results from the analysis confirm that this gap indeed exists, by showing that the parties’ positions as reconstructed from the party programmes differ from the opinion scholars have attested to the parties.

3.3.2) Method: Grounded Theory

To start with, a quick introduction to the logic of interpretative methods, as used in this study, is given. Yanow, in her book “Conducting interpretative policy analysis”, explains that “interpretative methods are based on the presupposition that we live in a social world characterised by the possibilities of multiple interactions” and that there are no “brute data, whose meaning is beyond dispute”, but that all data require interpretation (Yanow, 2000, p. 5). It is also important to mention the concept of “local knowledge”, which is necessary to understand the consequences of a policy for the “broad range of people it will affect” (Yanow, 2000, p. 4). Local knowledge is defined as the “expert understanding of and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience” (Yanow, 2000, p. 5). Party documents can be in this sense seen as local knowledge or the result of local actions, because of what it took to write them: a multitude of actors and their interactions and not only a “cost-benefit analysis, decisions analysis”, but also “human meaning, including beliefs and feeling” (Yanow, 2000, p. 4). What is hence aimed at with interpretatively reconstructing party positions, is to make sense of the way positions on the accession process are phrased in the documents, why they were formulated in that

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3 For a list of the documents used, see Appendix 2.
specific way and what the party possibly wanted to achieve with formulating their views the way they did.

The critical point of what Yanow said about interpretation is that making sense and interpreting always includes a subjective element, as the researcher who is interpreting the data does so with a certain mind-set. Interpretation, in grounded theory, is necessarily present from the first until the last step, because generating and evaluating data happens at the same time (Brüsemeister, 2000, p. 195). In this Bachelor study in-depth text interpretation, based on hermeneutical principles, aims at the construction of two typologies of party positions towards Turkey’s accession process to the EU. In grounded theory, the aim is furthermore not to reach reproducible or representative conclusions, but to arrive at conclusions, which are bound to the researchers perspective (Strübing, 2002, p. 322).

As interpreting always includes subjective interpretation, there are measures to ensure a "good" analytical process. Firstly, constant comparison of data within the categories and categories helps to generate internally coherent categories. For that purpose, asking questions and setting up ad-hoc hypothesis, which are immediately proven right or wrong is helpful (Strübing, 2002, p. 330). Also comparison of the analysed documents to find differences and similarities is important. Secondly, the three-step process of open, axial and selective coding common in grounded theory method (GTM) helps to make sure that the concepts, categories and theoretical formulations are firmly based in the data and that the categories reach a certain degree of saturation (Strübing, 2002, p. 331), meaning “that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category” (Glaser und Strauss 1967, 61). Thirdly, theoretical sampling leads to further improve the generated theory by means of finding more data, which is used to either further prove or reject (parts of) the theory (cf. Strübing, 2002, p. 333 and Böhm, 2003, p. 476). Theoretical sampling is only possible if the parties are publishing new documents; otherwise the sample of material is constrained. A new CHP document, as mentioned above, was published at a later stage of the analysis and was used to check whether the findings of the analysis could be confirmed, or whether new aspects have to be taken into account. Fourthly, giving a very detailed account of the process of data analysis, development of categories and theoretical formulations is not only important for external validation, but very generally for making the process understandable, transparent and traceable, which is also supported by using the programme ATLAS.ti.

In the following, the method chosen to analyse the documents is outlined. The grounded theory (GT) approach is an interpretative approach, which aims at developing theoretical models from studying cases in-depth and thereby explaining social processes (Brüsemeister, 2000, p. 190). Unlike other qualitative and quantitative methods, the data is not used as proof for a theory, but a theory or theoretical formulations are being developed from the data.

Furthermore, GT is not only a method, which tells the researcher how to collect data, but also how to analyse and evaluate it (cf. Brüsemeister, 2000, p.190). It thus helps the researcher to fulfil two tasks: “the intellectual task of coding (open, axial and selective), and the intellectual task of developing and redeveloping concepts and theories” (Reichertz, 2010, p. 29). As GTM is not only a method to analyse data, but as mentioned above, collecting and evaluating data happens at the same time, the process of coding is also not a purely technical process, which includes assigning quotes to categories and core-categories, but is based on the researcher’s interpretation of the text, in this case party programmes.
A main advantage of the approach is that the distance between data and theory is minimised through the fact that the theory is firmly based in data. That is because in the process of developing concepts and categories, one always returns to the data for so-called “feedback loops” to check whether they are really based on and supported by the data.

Theory in GT differs in at least two ways from how it is defined in other methods. Firstly, the definition of what the nature of a theory is, and secondly the process of how to arrive at a theory differs. How these two features are understood and defined within GT is briefly discussed in the following. Taking up general definitions by for example Earl Babbie, theories are “systemic sets of interrelated statements intended to explain some aspect of social life” as opposed to paradigms which are “general frameworks”, “viewpoints” and “offer a way of looking”, whereas “a theory aims at explaining what we see” (Babbie, 2004, p. 43). In contrast to the “more abstract and formalised theories in academia”, theories in GT follow a processual understanding. They “embrace the interaction of multiple actors, and because they emphasise temporality and process, they […] have a striking fluidity” (Strübing, 2007, Sp 557). The process of generating a theory from the data hence does not stop after the study has come to an end, but is merely a pause in the process of theory-building. Moreover, theory in grounded theory does not have to have a great level of sophistication and abstraction, but is based on the notion “that all knowledge is theoretical to its core” and starts with the “active transformation of experienced aspects of the ‘world out there’ into conceptual objects and their interrelation” (Strübing, 2007, p. 558). Abstraction is thus only present to the extent needed for the individual study. Strübing (2007) even warns beginners of grounded theory to not approach the analysis with the ‘conventional’ expectations of theories that are being generated.

When speaking about theory derivation in GT, there are two main strands, which have been described by Reichertz: the inductive and the theoretical strand (Reichertz, 2010, p. 27). The inductive approach advocated by Glaser claims that categories and categories emerge directly from data without any prior theoretical knowledge. The theoretical approach advocated by Strauss argues that “theoretical pre-knowledge flows into the data’s interpretation” and that observation and development of theory are necessarily always already theory guided” (Reichertz, 2010, p. 2-3). Reichertz in his article comes to the conclusion, that the theoretical approach, which was mainly taken up by Strauss and Corbin (and others such as Strübing), contains an abductive research logic, although Strauss never went as far as to label his approach thus. As the conducted analysis is based, consciously and unconsciously, on existing theories and assumptions about the topic studied, it can be said that the logic of analysis rather follows the abductive approach as described by Reichertz.

In the following the constraints of my study in terms of the grounded theory method are pointed out. One the one hand one could argue that this study does not fulfil the expectations of generating a theory in the conventional sense, namely one that has a causal relationship at its core and can be tested and generalised. On the other hand, as I have shown above, in grounded theory the understanding of theory is processual. Therefore any criticism regarding the outcome of the study, which is a rather network of concepts and some theoretical formulations, can be somewhat confined and limited.

Another method of analysing documents and especially party manifestos (instead of using a grounded theory approach) would have been using existing coding schemes, such as the scheme developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project, or conducting manifesto analysis with the help of other computer pro-
grammes (cf. Volkens, 2007). The problem with these methods however is that there is not enough data available for the purpose of this study that would justify computerised coding. Another reason is that the Comparative Manifesto Project and other computerised programmes all assume that the documents analysed are of the same category and type, which is unfortunately not the case with the available documents for the study. The main reason however is that the discovery of concepts is the main purpose of this study and not the confirmation of already existing ones.

3.4) Data analysis

3.4.1) Analytical process according to the grounded theory method

Data analysis by means of GTM involves the construction of meaningful entities and quote-groups, which build the basis for typologies of the parties’ positions. Consequently, the process of coding is not understood as a primarily technical process executed by the researcher, but as an analytical process, which is based on the researchers interpretation of the text (cf Brüsemeister, 2000; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Soeffner & Hitzler, 1994). The term coding has hence to be treated with care, and when used in the following always refers to an action, which firstly involves interpretation of the coder and following on that creation of a new category, etc.

Coding, according to the grounded theory method in principle, consists of three steps (cf. Corbin & Strauss, 1990) including “open coding”, “axial coding” and in the end “selective coding”, which step by step lead to a typology of a party position. The steps taken in this study will be outlined in section 3.4.3. “Open coding” is a process, in which data “are broken down analytically”: First categories and concepts are thought of and compared (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 12). “Axial coding” consists of relating categories to their sub-categories and test these relationships against the data. The goal of “selective coding” is to find one central core-category around which the other categories and subcategories can be arranged.

3.4.2) Coding with ATLAS.ti

ATLAS.ti is a scientific software programme, which makes many tasks easier, which would have otherwise been done manually, such as “integrating all material in one place, attaching notes and finding them again, counting the numbers of coded incidences, offering overviews at various stages of a project” and others (Friese, 2011, p. 3). It can also contribute to increasing the validity of results at the conceptual stage, as it is very easy to get back to the raw data behind the concepts (Friese, 2011, p. 3). Coming to that, the research process can be easily reconstructed and made visible.

As to the question how grounded theory and ATLAS.ti fit together, one can say that the programme is very suitable to use when using a GTA, because it does not interfere or have an influence on the inductive/abductive logic of the analytical process. Konopasek even went as far as saying that GT is the
“more or less explicit alter ego of CAQDAS [computer assisted qualitative data analysis software]” (Konopasek, 2007, p. 15).

3.4.3) The analytical process of the party documents in ATLAS.ti

In this section the analytical process is briefly outlined. It was conducted in several steps, as presented by the subheadings below⁴.

In line with the understanding of the term “coding” as explained above, the terms “category ” and “core-category” presuppose the same interpretative effort. A category is hence not primarily a technical term for a group of quotes, but the outcome of the analysis and interpretation of a certain part of the text. However, there is a certain hierarchy of the two terms: a category is a rather descriptive term for a group of quotes and is more the result of the first steps in GTM, whereas core-categories, being more differentiated and conceptual headings for several categories, are the result of a more advanced stage in the analytical process and one step closer to reconstructing a typology for the two parties’ positions on the accession process.

*Getting an overview: Open coding*

The coding process was started in one document with firstly trying to get an overview over the whole document and identifying the most relevant paragraphs and sections. The party programme of the AKP was chosen for that, as it was the longest and most comprehensive document, covering the broadest range of issues, due to which one could assume that a broad basis for building categories was given. More relevant sections were considered to be those dealing directly with the EU, those less relevant are the ones which deal for example with domestic politics, such as the Turkish health or educational system, because the analysis showed, that these parts could not be brought in direct or indirect connection with the topic of the accession process. Those indirectly relevant, such as the parties’ perception of their own country, or relations to other international entities were taken into account, too in order to understand the ways in which positions on EU accession are contextualised.

*Finding topics and seeking internal homogeneity of categories (in-depth analysis of relevant parts)*

The more relevant sections were then closely interpreted and every phrase, or word (if necessary) was assigned to a newly introduced category, or to a category already existing after the first text parts were interpreted. From this first round of open coding, a first draft coding-scheme was developed. The coding scheme grouped quotes together under descriptive category names, such as for example all categories linking to the accession process were grouped under the category “accession”. This draft coding-scheme was then applied to the other documents, in so far as the interpretation of new text parts didn’t make new categories necessary. As more and more quotes were grouped under the categories, some of the categories had to be split up or rearranged in order to ensure greatest possible internal homogeneity of the categories, meaning that the most similar quotes were grouped together.

⁴ Kluge’s article on construction of types and typologies was consulted for understanding of how typologies are constructed, steps in construction, and meaning of internal/external homogeneity (Kluge 2000).
Having a fresh look at the data

As an intermediate step, which was also repeated several times at different stages of the coding process, the party programmes were read without any comments or categories to try to objectively look at the texts again. Looking at the data with as few presuppositions as possible and fading out the already gained knowledge about the data enables the researcher to discover things, which would otherwise be overlooked, because one is too preoccupied with finding quotes that fit to already existing categories.

Grouping categories into categories: axial coding

After a relatively coherent coding scheme had been developed, meaning that through further analysis no new or stronger aspects could be found, the scheme was structured and the categories sorted into core-categories. Thereby, the categories, which were most alike were grouped and given a less descriptive and more conceptual-level name, building a new core-category. Internal homogeneity within core-categories and external heterogeneity towards other core-categories was best possible arranged. Several network views\(^5\) were created to illustrate the (core-) categories and give an overview over the scheme. To ensure internal cohesion of the (core-) categories, the previous step of having a fresh look at the data was repeated.

Revising categories

A set of questions (a measure also proposed by Strübing (2002), see section 3.3.2) was developed. One question for each core-category was formulated, to again ensure coherence of the core-categories and also raise attention to parts of the questions, which could not be answered by the material.

Finding a central core-category and relationships between categories: selective coding

When the coding scheme seemed to be coherent and well-developed, meaning that no new aspects and quotes could be found in the material, networks were created including the core-categories and subordinated categories. The analysis showed that the categories and core-categories could be arranged around one central core-category and that there was only one core-category, which could appropriately be put at the centre. Coming to that, a table\(^6\) was created including all findings and definitions of categories and core-categories. This was useful to force oneself to get a clearer picture on which findings are the most important and where the parties differ.

Reviewing the central core-category

To prevent, after having gotten to a conclusion on the most relevant findings and central core-category, the documents were read once again and last adjustments made (including changes on quote names and unlinking and relinking quotes). The chance of finding new aspects in the material was minimised, which does not mean that a stage where nothing new or worth to rearrange can be found was reached—the perfect coding scheme does probably not exist.

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\(^5\) The network views were created by means of the relevant function in ATLAS.ti and another programme, called Omnigraffle.

\(^6\) The table can be found in Appendix 1.
4) Comparative analysis of the parties’ position on the EU

The findings of the analysis are presented in two parts. The first part (4.1.1-4.1.8) gives a broad picture of the reconstructed positions of the parties by means of a set of questions, which at the same time present the categories and core-categories. The part aims at giving an overview and insight into the range of statements, which are relevant to arrive at the central core-category. In the second part (4.1.9), the central core-category is presented and explained. On the whole, the findings are presented in the order they were ‘developed’, meaning that the first part presented was the result of the “open” and “axial coding” process, whereas the central core-category was the result of the “selective coding” step (as much as these three steps can be divided up like that), in order to be able to understand how the analysis and interpretation of the material and data lead to the central core-category.

4.1) Reconstructed positions along categories

The questions target at presenting the findings in a coherent and ordered manner – the answers to these questions include quotes which are representative for the party, as it is impossible to include all quotes of each core-category. The first three questions generally present findings concerning the parties’ pictures of their own country, the EU and the accession process. The questions following on that ask for the parties’ motives, willingness and conditions to further the accession process or implement reforms. The last question aims at presenting the parties’ long-term, and final goals. Tables shortly summarising the content of the categories per core-category are inserted in every chapter. In general, it should be noted, that, as the parties have different core areas and focuses in their programmes and therefore certain issues one party covers are not covered by the other party, not all categories include quotes from both parties.

4.1.1) Turkey

How do the parties depict their own country?

This core-category includes all statements that the parties give to describe their own country. The parties’ perception of Turkey is important, as self-perception is bound to influence external actions and relations with other entities, such as the EU. One could imagine that the parties would give a clear description of its vision of the countries past (wider past and last few years), and current situation, including important norms and values. However, both parties seem to be rather oriented towards the future with the programme and not assessing where the country stands now, but rather focusing on what they want to achieve. The categories in this core-category include statements the parties made about their country in relationship to other entities, such as the EU or the international community. However, the-

7 The italic table-entries signify that no quote was attached to the category for the specific party.
8 A complete table of the core-categories and categories, including the specific definitions and content, as well as the quotation numbers from the Hermeneutic Unit (ATLAS.ti) can be found in Appendix 1.
se statements have not always been made in direct reference to another entity, but enumerating Turkey’s advantages and things that Turkey deserves always presupposes the existence of an “other”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TR deserves</td>
<td>Turkey should be brought into a position it deserves, by activating the potential of the society and putting through reforms in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms and their political system, as well as make an effort to take a place it deserves in the ESDP</td>
<td>CHP does not mention anything in the direction of what Turkey deserves, presumably, because they are too modest and do not want to seem to be overconfident in the eyes of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR’s advantages</td>
<td>AKP only mentions the countries strong points without specifically meaning them to be profitable for the EU, which are about the same the CHP mentions</td>
<td>TR has advantages, which would be profitable for the EU, such as young population, geo-strategic role, cultural and historical richness, security and energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR’s potential</td>
<td>AKP speaks about Turkey’s great potential which needs to be activated in order to make the people happy and restore the respectability of our country (indeed that is the reason for the AKP’s existence)</td>
<td>CHP does not speak of activating TR’s potential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Core-category: Turkey

What is most conspicuous when looking at the AKP’s statements is that the party seems to be very confident of their countries qualities and attaching much national pride to it. Firstly, the AKP states that “efforts shall be maintained for Turkey to take the place it deserves within the new European Security and Defence Concept” (AK Party, 2007, p. 6). The AKP also in other places states that Turkey deserves to have a better position in the “civilised world”, although it is never mentioned why it deserves these positions (AK Party, 2007, p. 2.1). Secondly, the AKP often mentions the great potential Turkey has, which needs to be activated: “We are determined to mobilise the large potential of Turkey, in order to make our people happy and restore the respectability of our country” (AK Party, 2007, p. 1). Potential is elsewhere defined as human, physical and economic potential, which needs to be activated, meaning that Turkey is now less successful than it could actually be and in the view of the AKP also deserves to be. Saying that the respectability of the country needs to be “restored” brings up the question what or who actually destroyed it: two possibilities are previous governments, or the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne. This remains subject to speculation, as the AKP does not elaborate on that point.

AKP and CHP both speak about certain advantages the country has, which are for both parties roughly the same: young population, strategic geographical position, rich cultural and historical heritage, and others. However, whereas the AKP only generally enumerates these advantages, the CHP directly relates them to the EU saying that these advantages would be beneficial for the EU.

Summing up, the analysis of the statements for this core-category leads to thinking that the CHP is more EU-related and focused than the AKP, which is rather Turkey-focused and concentrates on improving its own country in order to be successful.

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9 Technical note: As there are no page or paragraph numbers in the AKP programme, the chapter the quote stems from is given instead of a page number.
4.1.2) European Union

How do the parties depict the EU?

The parties' perception of the EU is important for the issue of the accession process: if the party has an entirely negative picture of the EU one can assume that it would not want to become a part of it. This core-category includes categories, which describe how the parties depict the EU (and Europe or European nations) and Turkey’s relation with the EU in their texts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of Europe</td>
<td>Europe, EU, and European nations</td>
<td>EU, EP, COM, EC, European nations (CHP is one of them), Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close relations</td>
<td>AKP states that Europe and TR have been in close relations geographically and historically</td>
<td>CHP only mentions, that its party has supported TR’s MS from the start, but not close relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy: global circumstances</td>
<td>TR's foreign policy should be adjusted to changing global circumstances: a flexible foreign policy with many axes</td>
<td>CHP does not speak about the necessity to adjust its FP to changing global circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy: nature</td>
<td>AKP wants to follow a realistic foreign policy approach befitting Turkeys histor and geographical position, and a foreign policy that does not only concentrate on one, but multiple axes</td>
<td>Value-based, citizen-centred, peaceful, egalitarian, respecting human rights &amp; freedoms, respecting international law, having confidence in multilateral institutions, integrationist, European oriented, universalist, instituting regional peace and security alliances, realist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Core-category: European Union

The AKP refers in its programme to Europe, European nations or European Union, whereas the CHP uses a wider range of terms, including specifically addressing European institutions, and the European public, which could on the one hand mean that the CHP deals with the subject in a more differentiated way than the AKP. On the other hand, this impression could also stem from the fact that the CHP's documents (apart from the 2011 election manifesto) are only dedicated to the accession issue and the party hence wants to explain its position in more detail, whereas the AKP in its programme gives a rather general overview without going too much into detail.

The CHP defines Europe as “whole of values based on a foundation of democracy, human rights and a social state” (Republican People’s Party, 2011, p. 122). The CHP also counts Turkey as a European country: “Turkey was among the first countries of Europe”, which one could say clarifies the CHP’s view that Turkey has always been a part of Europe, even if only a very small part of Turkey geographically belongs to Europe (Republican People's Party, 2009b, p. 3).

The AKP does not specify what it means, when speaking about “Europe”. Yet, one can from the context assume that a geographic entity, rather than a political or economic one is referred to: “Turkey has been in close relations with Europe both geographically and historically” (AK Party, 2007, p. 6). When stating that Turkey and Europe have been in close historical relations, one can think of relations which are going back as far as for example the time of the Roman empire, as far as WWI, or only a couple of decades back with the signing of the Ankara agreement. Turkey’s geographical position is a given factor, which puts Turkey in the middle of several regions. Thus, whereas the CHP clearly states that Turkey belongs to Europe, the AKP wants to make use of its geographical positions, which is also apparent in their foreign policy.
Turkey’s foreign policy, in the eyes of the AKP should be flexible and addressing multiple axes, rather than only concentrating on one entity, meaning that the focus should not only lie on for example furthering relations with the EU or European countries, but also with its neighbours in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The foreign policy described in the party programme very closely resembles the foreign policy as propagated by the current foreign minister, Davutoglu. His “strategic depth” approach brings Turkey’s geographic position (“geographical depth”) and historical richness (“historical depth”) to the centre of attention and takes these characteristics of Turkey as the basis for his multi-dimensional, and often called neo-Ottomanist foreign policy. The out of this ‘strategic depth’ doctrine resulting “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbours” (Davutoglu, 2008, p. 4) has improved Turkey’s relations with its neighbours significantly. However, the West is no longer the centre of attention, and as Davutoglu emphasised, “Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door, and needs to develop a genuinely multi-directional foreign” (Murinson, 2006, p. 9).

4.1.3) Accession

How is the (current state of the) accession process described?

This core-category encompasses what the parties say about Turkey’s accession process, both concerning Turkey’s domestic political scene (critique government), and the process itself (deadlock, concepts of TAP and process). The analysis showed, that the parties focus on the future of the accession process, rather than how the process has been so far.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critique government</td>
<td><em>AKP does not criticize the CHP</em></td>
<td>CHP thinks that the AKP is partly to blame for the slow progress and deadlock in the accession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadlock</td>
<td>AKP does not mention process directly</td>
<td>CHP states that there is currently a deadlock in the progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td><em>AKP does not mention process directly, only says it wants to fulfil the promises in its relation with the EU</em></td>
<td>The process should be transparent for public, pluralistic debate, sound political vision, process is a project of social transformation naturally rooted in Atatürk’s modernisation vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of TAP</td>
<td><em>AKP does not mention process directly</em></td>
<td>CHP uses different words for the accession process, such as harmonisation or membership process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Core-category: Accession

Very significant in terms of the parties’ statements on the accession process is that the AKP does not with one word mention the process directly, as one would have assumed that a party which wants to become a member would discuss the accession process in its party programme. Only a statement expressing that it wants to “rapidly fulfil its promises in its relations with the European Union, and the conditions, which the union demands of other candidate nations as well” hints at the accession process (AK Party, 2007, p. 6). But other than that, the topic is not mentioned. The question is why the AKP would want to rapidly fulfil the promises, if they are not openly stating that they support the accession

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10 Strategic Depth (or in Turkish: ‘Stratejik Derinlik’) was the title of Davutoglu’s book, published in 2000.
process and want to become a member. This crucial point is discussed in section 4.1.9 in connection with the central core-category. The CHP on the other hand makes it very clear, that it “regard’s Turkey’s membership to the EU as a project of social transformation, naturally rooted in the vision for modernisation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” (Republican People’s Party, 2010, p. 2). It repeatedly states that it firmly supports the Turkish accession process and that it wants to fulfil the promises as quickly as possible. Moreover, the CHP makes the government partly responsible for the slow progress made in the accession process: “Despite the CHP’s clear demands […] the government preferred not to pass the social legislation and consequently the relevant chapter of negotiations was not opened with the EU” (Republican People’s Party, 2009a, p. 4). It is questionable, whether the CHP, in criticising the AKP, acts in its role as the opposition party, trying to build its own profile, or whether it would really act differently than the AKP when being in government. Apart from making the AKP responsible for the slow progress, the CHP also mentions that the deadlock in the accession process was also caused by “the attitudes of conservative parties in Europe” (Republican People’s Party, 2011, p. 122). The CHP (as well as the AKP) does not on the other hand name any parties, which would indeed help the party to further their accession process, but the CHP mentions that it is an associate member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Socialists International.

The CHP expresses a clear vision as to how the process should look like: “transparent”, “involving the Turkish public”, built on a “sound political vision”, and coined by a “pluralistic debate to which the CHP contributes as the main opposition party” (Republican People's Party, 2009a and b, p. 2 and 1-2). All in all, the evaluation of this core-category has shown that the CHP has a very clear perception of how the accession process is currently and should be going, and where the problems lie currently. Coming to that it very clearly states that it supports Turkey’s accession process, whereas the AKP seems to be very hesitant in making any clear statements on the process, and only mentioning it indirectly.

4.1.4) Motives

What are the parties’ motives to change and reform Turkey?

This core-category includes everything that is said about why the parties want to put through reforms in their country or why they want to change in a way that they said (e.g. why they want to comply with EU criteria or international standards). The parties mention things both in the domestic sphere, and also external reasons for wanting to reform the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believe in EU idea</td>
<td>AKP does not state that it does</td>
<td>Cooperation like in the case of the EU is the solution to global problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits for Turkey</td>
<td>AKP wants to put through reforms to make its people happy (they deserve it), and not because IOs want the country to</td>
<td>CHP thinks that upgrading of Turkish people’s standards of life is at the centre of the accession process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve EU</td>
<td><strong>AKP does not see this as a motive</strong></td>
<td>EU and TR have common concerns regarding Europe and have to work together for a better Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Core-category: Motives
Both parties say that they want to reform their country to upgrade the living standards of the Turkish citizens. The CHP is convinced, that Turkey’s accession process will lead to the desired improvement in living standards: “In all fields of social and economic life, the upgrading of the Turkish people’s standards of life is at the core of the EU harmonisation process” (Republican People's Party, 2009a, p. 2). The AKP however does not relate the well being of its citizens to the EU accession process. On the contrary, it says, “steps must be taken because our people deserve these rights and freedoms, rather than because international institutions want them to be taken” (AK Party, 2007, p. 2.1). Hence, the CHP mostly relates its statements to the EU, whereas the AKP rather seems to distance itself from it. What furthermore differentiates the CHP from the AKP in terms of their motives to change is the CHP’s conviction that “integration between countries, as seen in the EU example, goes beyond classic cooperation and gives more long-lasting and more effective results” (Republican People's Party, 2011, p. 122). The party thereby states that it supports the high level of cooperation in the EU and in order to be a part of it wants to fulfil the EU criteria as fast as possible. The AKP does not mention any such believe in the European idea.

Apart from both parties wanting to put through reforms for the benefit of its citizens, the CHP also states that it wants to work together with the EU and put through changes in order to enable a better future for Europe, as the EU and Turkey share common concerns. This can be summarised as a will to put through reforms to improve the EU.

4.1.5) Willingness

How willing does the party seem to change in order to further the Turkish accession process?

This core-category summarises all statements, which describe how willing the parties are to change. Change in this respect is not as generally defined, as in the last core-category, but targeted directly at the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting accession process</td>
<td>AKP does not speak of process</td>
<td>CHP firmly supports TAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top priority of Turkish foreign policy</td>
<td>AKP states that the European nations are at the top of its foreign policy priorities</td>
<td>Relations with other countries should be developed and led in synergy with the EU Membership target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfil promises</td>
<td>AKP wants Turkey to rapidly fulfil promises in its relations with EU</td>
<td>CHP commits fully to fulfilling promises, is in favour of accelerating process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Core-category: Willingness

A precondition for being willing to change in order to further the accession process is to support it. As the AKP does not openly mention that it is supporting the TAP, it is rather difficult to know whether they actually would want to put trough reforms in order to further the accession process. The CHP, as already said above, repeatedly confirms its strong support for the accession process.

Another sign of being willing to change in order to further relations could be the party’s foreign policy priorities. The CHP on the one hand says that it wants to pursue a foreign policy, which is in synergy with its EU membership target, which probably means that they subordinate their foreign policy preferences to the EU’s. The AKP on the other hand states that “European nations shall continue to be at
the top of the list in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda” (AK Party, 2007, p. 6). As the party does not really clarify why the European nations are top priority or which targets should be reached by putting them on top of the list, one can only speculate. It could for example mean that in order to become a member of the EU, Turkey needs to improve relations with certain countries, such as France and Germany (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, p. 70), because these countries are currently against Turkey becoming a member. It could also mean, that the AKP is not really interested in improving its relations with the EU on the whole and is rather interested in good (economic, political or other kind of) relations with the countries, because it hopes that the good relations would lead to for example increased trade and exchange of best practices in order to come closer to being a ‘contemporary democracy’ and increase European and international competitiveness. The second possibility seems to fit better to the impression the AKP gives in its programme, as will also be explained in the next section (4.1.9).

To give an answer to the question of how willing the parties seem to change ‘for’ the EU, it is likely that the CHP is very willing to do so, whereas the AKP does not show such signs of willingness as was reconstructed from their programme.

4.1.6) Efforts

What efforts does that party make to fulfil the accession conditions?

This core-category is also specifically targeted at the Turkish accession process. It summarises all quotes regarding any changes the party says it has already implemented to further the process or has planned in order to further the process. Whether it really did put through these changes or planned them in order to further the process can of course not been proven.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes proposed</td>
<td>AKP does not propose changes, does not speak of process directly</td>
<td>Many changes proposed and rather detailed in the following fields: Freedom of expression, press, religion, Kurkish issue, women rights, social rights and economic growth and jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete actions</td>
<td>AKP does not mention any concrete changes</td>
<td>EU office in Brussels opened to promote process (as well as other concrete actions to speed up process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efforts necessary</td>
<td>AKP does not mention any such efforts (only says that it wants to fulfil the conditions)</td>
<td>CHP says that Legislative changes are not sufficient and that more and better reforms to fulfil Copenhagen criteria are necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Core-category: Efforts

As already evaluated above, the AKP does not mention the accession process in its programme; neither does it state that it is willing to change in order to further the accession process. Following from that, it is not surprising, that the party also does not talk about any efforts it has put into effect or planned in order to fulfil the accession conditions.

The CHP mentions many changes it either put through, or which are planned in order to further the TAP. It can’t of course been proven whether these efforts were really put through for the EU or whether they are only declared as such. One of those concrete actions was the opening of the CHP EU representation office in Brussels, lead by Kader Sevinc the EU representative of the CHP. The office was opened in 2008 to “promote Turkey’s EU membership process and better inform the EU public
on the CHP’s social democratic policies” (Republican People's Party, 2009b, p. 1). Furthermore, the CHP criticises the current efforts, which are in their eyes “not sufficient for bringing Turkish democracy in line with those of the EU countries” (Republican People's Party, 2010, p. 8) and asks for a better fulfilment of the EU criteria. In sum, the CHP shows that it already undertook, as well as proposed many changes in order to further the EU accession process and is of the opinion, that the efforts currently undertaken are not sufficient.

4.1.7) Conditions

**What conditions does the party attach to fulfilling the membership conditions?**

The Core-category includes all statements on any conditions the party attaches to fulfilling EU requirements. These are on the one hand national (preserving national interests) and on the other hand external requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance between national &amp; EU interests</td>
<td>Relations with international institutions like EU have to be maintained along national requirements and interests</td>
<td>Fundamental values and national interests of Turkey must be respected and in line with EU requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal treatment</td>
<td>AKP hints to the fact that it will fulfil promises which the EU demands of other candidate nations</td>
<td>CHP asks the EU to treat TR equally to other candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair treatment</td>
<td>AKP thinks that TR deserves a place in ESDP</td>
<td>Deadlock deteriorates fair conditions, and EU imposed unilateral restrictions, as well as sometimes having a wrong opinion about Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Core-category: Conditions

Both parties attach conditions to fulfilling the membership conditions, or as the AKP put it “the promises in its relations with the European Union” (AK Party, 2007, p. 6). Both parties ask to be treated equal to other candidate states. It seems as if there is a hidden criticism, namely that the parties have the feeling that they are not treated equally, because otherwise there would not be the need put this down as a condition for fulfilling the conditions. Furthermore, both parties want to preserve their national interests and are keen to keep a balance between the European membership conditions and national priorities. The AKP states for example that “our relations with the European Union, World Bank, IMF, and other international institutions must be maintained along the lines of the requirements of our economy and our national interests” (AK Party, 2007, p. 3.1). In the eyes of the CHP, national interests for example also include Turkey’s standpoint on the Cyprus issue (Republican People's Party, 2011, p. 125). Coming to that, the CHP asks for fair treatment at the hands of the EU. The party states that the EU has imposed unilateral restrictions on the country, that “the EP is of contradictory, even wrong opinions about Turkey” (Republican People's Party, 2010, p. 8), that the deadlock in the process deteriorates fair conditions and that the “CHP is dedicated to reverse this situation [deadlock] in view of accelerating Turkey’s EU membership process under fair conditions accordingly with the European values and national priorities” (Republican People’s Party, 2009a, p. 2).

Summing up, both parties seem to have some reservation as to how the EU is treating them, in terms of what has been reconstructed above regarding equal and fair treatment, as well as respect for national
interests. It does not, however, become clear whether the parties would decide to not invest in the accession process if the EU would treat them differently from other candidate countries or disrespect their national priorities.

4.1.8) Final Goal

What is the final goal of the party?

This is a very broad core-category, consisting of what the party mention as their goals for the future. On the one hand certain standards want to be reached (EU standards, international standards, democratic standards), and on the other hand the party’s goals of gaining a place in the international community (AKP) and become a member of the EU (CHP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic standards</td>
<td>AKP only refers to “contemporary democracies” and that it wants to reach those values</td>
<td>CHP wants European democratic values to inspire TR’s constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU standards</td>
<td>AKP also states that it wants to comply with European standards</td>
<td>CHP mentions quite often that it wants to adhere to EU standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>AKP does not mention the process directly and does not state that membership is their goal</td>
<td>CHP firmly supports Turkish membership, does not accept status of special partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place in international community</td>
<td>AKP mentions that gaining international respectability and reaching a high place in the international community is very important to them</td>
<td>CHP does not mention that it wants to reach a certain place in international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International standards</td>
<td>AKP mentions many times that it wants to comply with international standards</td>
<td>The CHP only mentions that it wants to comply with ILO standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Core-category: Final goal

There are several goals the parties seem to want to be reaching. International standards, European standards, contemporary democratic standards are goals the parties share. For the AKP, reaching a respectable place in the international community and for the CHP, the EU membership goal should be added to the list.

In the case of the AKP the most mentioned goals are international and European standards, which should according to the party be reached in a broad range of issues, and especially in the economic sphere. Reaching a respectable place in the international community and being able to compete internationally seems to be of great importance for the party. The whole programme is in fact targeted at implementing measures “in order for our great nation to take the place it deserves in the international community and for our country to ‘rise above the level of contemporary civilisation’” (AK Party, 2007, p. 7).

In the case of the CHP the goal of reaching European standards seems to be more a positive side effect of their actual priority to become a member of the European Union and the CHP makes it very clear that nothing else than membership will be accepted: “Yes to membership, no to special partner-

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11 The AKP included the quote “rise above the level of contemporary civilisation”, but did not make a reference as to where they took it from. It is probable that it stems from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for example from his speech on the occasion of the 10th birthday of the Republic (to be found at: http://www.allaboutturkey.com/ata_speech.htm)
ship” (Republican People’s Party 2009b, 1). The party also asks the EU to “provide Turkey with an exact date for membership” (Republican People’s Party 2010, 2).

The priorities of both parties hence seem to differ: The AKP wants to get a respectable place in the international community and related to that wants to reach international, and European standards; the CHP has becoming a member of the EU as its primary goal.

4.1.9) Central core-category

What are the parties’ motives to reach its final goal?

In order to find out what the most important characteristics of the parties’ position on the Turkish accession process are, it was important to find one central (core-) category around which the others could be arranged. The analysis showed that the core-category “final goal” is very important, as it shows one fundamental difference between the two parties, namely that the AKP has ”reaching a respectable place in the international community” as one of their goals, whereas the CHP wants to become a member of the EU. The network views inserted below show, how the remaining categories are linked to the core-category “final goal”.

In the case of the AKP, the categories “EU” and “Turkey” are indirectly linked up to the AKP’s goal to reach a respectable place in the international community, as the AKP enumerates many advantages of its country, states that Turkey has great potential and deserves a respectable place in the international community. Furthermore, a flexible foreign policy with many axes does not point into the direction of prioritising EU membership. The core-categories “motives” and “willingness” are directly linked to the AKP’s final goal, as they state what the party’s motives are in order to change and reach these goals, and how willing the party is to further the accession process. As the AKP does not mention any efforts, no categories are linked to the core-category, but the core-category “conditions” for fulfilling the accession requirements is linked to it. The categories directly arranged around the middle-most box state the AKP’s final goals. The network view illustrates, what the analysis has shown above, namely that the AKP does not link Turkey to the European Union, does not relate to the accession process directly and does not state it wants to become a member of the EU, but focuses on Turkey itself and how to bring Turkey into a well-respected position.
In the case of the CHP, the core-categories “EU”, “Turkey” and “Accession” can all be linked to the party’s final goal directly, and more specifically to its goal to become a member of the EU, as the CHP relates many issues directly to the EU and the accession process. The same goes for the parties “motives”, “willingness”, “efforts” and “conditions” in order to further the accession process and become a member, which can be directly linked to its membership goal. The CHP’s network also illustrates the

12 The quote-numbers from the Hermeneutic Unit in ATLAS.ti for each category per party are given in the network view. 1:1/2 for example stands for the 1st and 2nd quote in the 1st primary document (P1).
reconstructed position of the party as described above, namely that the party attaches great value to becoming a member of the EU and furthering the accession process.
But only differentiating the parties in terms of their final goals would leave out other important and characterising differences of the parties. When looking at the overall picture of the findings, which is illustrated with the network views above, the most important point does not seem to be that the AKP does not mention directly that it supports the accession process, or that it is rather focused on Turkey and elevating the country to a higher level. Only comparing the final goals would still leave open the question of why the AKP states that it wants to fulfil the conditions set by the European Union if it does not want to become a member. The crucial point of the analysis seems to be that the AKP wants to fulfil the European criteria, reach European, international and contemporary democratic standards, because it wants to elevate its country to the current level of civilisation, be able to compete internationally and reach a respectable place in the international community.

The AKP’s motives to reach its final goal became visible from the analysis of four groups of statements as presented in the table below. These four groups of statements, representing four already existing categories in the data belong to the newly established central core-category “motives to reach the party’s final goal”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core-category</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motives to reach party’s final goals</td>
<td>Benefits for Turkish citizens</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further accession process and become a member</td>
<td>- (n.m.)¹⁴</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respectable place in international community</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>- (n.m.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Believe in European idea</td>
<td>- (n.m.)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Central core-category: What are the parties’ motives to reach their final goal?

In the case of the AKP the most important statement from the programme is that it wants to implement fundamental rights and freedoms (which later said should be based on international standards) “because the people deserve these rights and freedoms, rather than because international institutions want them to be taken” (AK Party, 2007, p. 2.1). Hence, the AKP indicates that it does not want to implement reforms and adhere to international standards for any institution, but for the benefit of Turkey and its citizens. Another reason why the AKP wants to reach international, European and contemporary standards is bringing their “nation to the place it deserves on the world scene” (AK Party, 2007, p. 7).

The CHP sees benefitting their country and citizens also as a motive to reach its final goal membership: “In all fields of social and economic life, the upgrading of the Turkish people’s standards of life is at the core of the EU harmonisation process”. However, rather than wanting to reach European, international and contemporary democratic standards to be able to reach a respectable place in the international community, it wants to implement these standards to further the accession process and eventually become a member. The CHP with several statements signals that it believes in the key ideas underlying European integration as described by Kopecky and Mudde (see chapter 2). The party in its election

¹³ A meta-analysis of the network views helped getting an overview over the findings and get to the central core-category.

¹⁴ N.m. = not mentioned; it is assumed that the party wants to express its goals and views with its party programme and other official statements. Therefore, what is not mentioned in the programme is not taken to be of importance for the party.
manifesto states that “multilateral organisations are the most important instruments through which suitable solutions [for global problems] can be developed” (Republican People’s Party, 2011, p. 122). The form of integration the EU takes, which “goes beyond classic cooperation” has “more long-lasting effects and more effective results” (Republican People’s Party, 2011, p. 122). The party’s belief that the EU is a solution to global problems and it goes beyond classic cooperation leads to assuming that the CHP’s belief in the European idea is a motive for becoming a member of the EU.

In sum, one can say that whereas the AKP wants to reach its final goals, namely adhering to international and European, as well as contemporary democratic standards in order gain a respectable place in the international community, the CHP wants to reach its final goals, which are also adhering to these standards, and finally becoming a member of the EU, simply because it supports the European Union as it is and wants to become part of the European community. The most important findings thus seem to be that the parties do not only have partly differing final goals, but that especially the parties’ reasons and motives to reach these goals differs.

4.2) Euroscepticism revisited

The models derived from the literature, which were presented earlier showed how positions on country’s accession processes are being evaluated. After having analysed the party programmes in order to find out about the AKP’s and CHP’s position on Turkey’s accession process, the model has to be adjusted as it does not seem suitable to assess the parties’ positions in the available case.

The model developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak included two forms of Euroscepticism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taggart and Szczerbiak’s model</td>
<td>Party expresses limited objections to the nature of the accession process (soft euroscepticism)</td>
<td>- (n.m.)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party expresses hostility to the idea of European integration (hard euroscepticism)</td>
<td>- (n.m.)</td>
<td>- (n.m.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Defining euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004)

Applying the model by Taggart and Szczerbiak is rather difficult for the AKP, as it does not mention the TAP directly. The CHP does indeed mention limited objections, such as that the EU imposed unilateral restrictions and that the EP has sometimes misjudged Turkey (Republican People’s Party, 2010, p. 8). The model by Taggart and Szczerbiak does not give an accurate picture of the parties’ positions, as it would from only looking at the table seem as if the CHP is more eurosceptic than the AKP.

The table below depicts Kopecky and Mudde’s two-dimensional model, including the AKP’s and CHP’s scores on the two dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kopecky and Mudde’s model</td>
<td>EU integration (Supporting key idea underlying EU integration)</td>
<td>+ / -</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU (Satisfied with EU and direction it is heading)</td>
<td>+ / -</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Defining positions on European accession processes (Kopecky & Mudde 2002)
Regarding the dimension “EU integration”, it can be concluded that the CHP supports the key idea underlying European integration fully, as it is both willing to cooperate politically and transfer sovereignty to the European level, and willing to cooperate economically in a common customs union. This can be derived from several statements, for example regarding foreign policy, which should in the eyes of the CHP be developed in synergy with its membership target, but also from the fact that they urgently want to fulfil all necessary criteria and become a member. In the case of the AKP one can assume that “institutionalised cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty” is not really wanted, as it is not mentioned anywhere and membership is not openly supported (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 301). As far as economic cooperation is concerned nothing speaks against the fact that the AKP would not want an “integrated liberal market economy”, as it would probably help them to become a greater economic power (Kopecky & Mudde 2002, 301).

Regarding the dimension “EU”, it can be concluded that the CHP is satisfied with the EU and the direction it is heading, as one can assume that it would not want to become a member if it would be in opposition to it. The AKP on the other hand says that it wants to implement European standards, which is something of confirmation that they are happy with the way the EU is currently, but on the other hand, the fact that their final goal does not seem to be membership, it is not likely that they are very satisfied with the EU and the direction it is heading. All in all it seems as if the conceptual model by Kopecky and Mudde can give some clue about the parties’ positions on the Turkish accession process, but does not manage to include the crucial point of where the parties actually differ. In the case of Turkey it would hence be good to include a dimension asking for the parties final goal (and whether this is membership or not) and their motives to get there, because these are the two points on which the AKP and the CHP can best be distinguished.

5) Discussion and Conclusion

5.1) Putting findings into perspective

It was already said in previous parts, that it is important to put the findings into perspective, meaning to explain what their significance is and in this available study having a look at how the findings are different from what has been discovered in other studies on the two parties (part 4.1).

The findings from the analysis can be summarised in two hypothetical statements, providing a typology of the parties’ opinions:

1. The AKP neither wants to become a member of the European Union, nor put through reforms ‘for’ international institutions, but wants to reach international, European and contemporary democratic standards in order to gain Turkey a respectable place in the international community and improve the living standards of the Turkish citizens.
2. The CHP is very keen on becoming a member of the European Union, because it believes in the EU and is convinced that membership will be beneficial for the Turkish citizens. Reaching
international, European and current democratic standards is necessary in order to become a member of the EU.

The picture given by the literature (presented in chapter 2) was a different one: the AKP came to be the greatest supporter of Turkey’s accession process and the European Union, whereas the CHP, traditionally being very pro-European, has rather turned away from it, although both types of documents stem from the same time period.

The AKP’s EU friendliness described in the literature can be partly confirmed, but “enthusiastic efforts for Turkey’s EU Membership” are by no means visible in the AKP party programme (Dagi, 2005, 34). Rather it seems as if Davutoğlu’s multi-directional foreign policy has lead to a rather neutral attitude towards the accession process, if not more.

The CHP’s slight turn away, or as Dagi put it “hesitations of the Kemalists”, cannot be confirmed by the statements made in party documents of the CHP (Dagi, 2005, 34). It rather seems as if the CHP would make the enthusiastic efforts to become a member, which have been ascribed to the AKP. Kubicek also argued that “those with more secularist or nationalist orientations fear both the AKP and what its push for political liberalisation portends for Turkey” (Kubicek, 2010, 2). This however cannot be confirmed with this study, as both parties explicitly state that their policies aim at political liberalisation and modernisation along Western ideals.

What could be found back in the CHP documents is that the CHP indeed criticises the government and also in places the EU. But rather than these criticisms being an expression of the CHP’s turn to a eurosceptic attitude, the AKP is criticised for not showing enough reform efforts, and even if the EU is criticised for some behaviour, the CHP continues to be very supportive of the Turkish accession process and the EU. All in all, the in the analysis reconstructed opinion of the AKP on the Turkish accession process does more significantly differ from the scholars’ opinions than the CHP’s.

5.2) Contribution of this study and implications for future research

The study contributed to the existing knowledge about the two most important Turkish parties, AKP and CHP, in the field of Turkey’s accession process.

On the one hand, the material used for reconstructing the parties’ positions differs from other studies, which base their analysis on secondary sources. Although scholars say that the parties do not always act according to their party programme, the programmes represent a position to which the party internally and officially agreed and on the basis of which the party can be judged and evaluated.

On the other hand, the grounded theory approach enabled a broad and open approach to the data, which did not include testing an existing theory, but grasping as much information as possible from the sources.

The findings, although different from many opinions presented in the literature, are not after all very surprising. Firstly, when comparing the foreign policy doctrine by Davutoğlu, which he detailed in his book ‘Strategic Depth’ to the one the AKP presents in their document, not many differences are to be found. Secondly, the very recent publication by the European Council on Foreign Relations, also confirm the rather hesitant and neutral attitude of the AKP towards Europe and the fact that the AKP by
all means wants to become a successful and powerful country internationally and puts its energy rather into this goal, than furthering the membership process.

Taking up the opinion of the European and Turkish public, both the percentages of supporters for the Turkish accession process in European Countries, as well as in Turkey are going down rather than up in recent years (Gerhards & Hans, 2010, 6). Hence, it seems as though also the public would support the path taken by the AKP, which does not apparently include the will to become a member of the European Union. Furthermore, both right-wing parties, which are on the rise in Europe, and German and French politicians, would be pleased if the AKP strives for turning Turkey into a country, which complies with Western standards, but does not necessarily want to become a member. This would also please those who fear that Turkey turns towards the East and abandons the West. The CHP will remain to be an opposition party for the coming legislative period and won’t therefore be able to dominate Turkish foreign policy, as the AKP got the majority of seats in the parliament, which means that the foreign policy course of the AKP is likely to be followed in the coming years.

In this Bachelor study, only English documents were analysed. It would be interesting to see whether an analysis of the Turkish versions of the documents would yield the same results. It also remains subject to future research to see whether coming party programmes of the parties are significantly different than the ones analysed in this study.
6) Appendix

Appendix 1: Table presenting findings

The quote-numbers from the Hermeneutic Unit in ATLAS.ti for each category per party are given in the table. 1:1/2 for example stands for the 1st and 2nd quote in the 1st primary document (P1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories and Categories</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Characteristics CHP</th>
<th>Characteristics AKP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do the parties depict their own country? (Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This core-category describes the picture the parties give of their own country. One could imagine that the parties would give a clear description of its vision of the countries part (wider past and last few years), and current situation, including important norms and values. However, both parties seem to be rather oriented towards the future with the programme and not assessing where the country stands now, but rather focusing on what they want to achieve. The categories in this core-category include statements the parties made about their country in relationship to other entities, such as the EU or the international community. However, these statements have not always been made in direct reference to another entity, but enumerating Turkey’s advantages and things that Turkey deserves always presupposes the existence of an “other”. Whereas the CHP often makes these statements with direct reference to the European Union, the AKP rather seems to compare itself to the international community or does make any such reference at all.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| TR deserves | -Thinks that TR did not yet get but thinks that it should do so -Mentioning of things that Turkey deserves (although it is not mentioned why it deserves things), but it is mentioned that it for example deserves a place in the new ESDP of the European Union. | -CHP does not mention anything in the direction of what Turkey deserves, presumably, because they are too modest and do not want to seem to be overconfident in the eyes of the EU | -AKP thinks that Turkey should be brought into a position it deserves, by activating the potential of the society and putting through reforms in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms and their political system, as well as make an effort to take a place it deserves in the ESDP (1:125/134/125) |
| TR’s advantages | -What TR has what others don’t have -Party claims, that Turkeys membership will have benefits for the EU (CHP), or party in general states its advantages, not particularly in regard to EU MS (AKP). These advantages the parties mention are pretty much the same (e.g. young population) | -CHP explicitly says that it has advantages which would be profitable for the EU, such as young population, geo-strategic role, cultural and historical richness, security and energy (7:14) | -AKP only mentions the countries strong points without specifically meaning them to be profitable for the EU, which are the same advantages CHP mentions plus rich resources (1:102/106/107/113) |
| TR’s potential | -Something that Turkey has, which needs to be activated, meaning that TR is now less than it actually could be -Turkeys main problem according to AKP is not resources or potential, but that there is a huge potential which has not been activated yet and needs to be activated (sounds like Ataturk). | -CHP does not speak of activating TRs potential | -AKP speaks about Turkey’s great potential which needs to be activated in order to make the people happy and restore the respectability of our country (indeed that is the reason for the AKP’s existence) -Turkeys potential has been left inactive for years, in many different spheres (economically, human and physical potential, etc) |
# How do the parties depict the EU? (EU)

This core-category includes categories, which describe how the parties depict the EU and Turkey’s relation with the EU in their texts. However, not only the EU as an organisation is included, but all statements, which refer to either the EU, Europe, or others (see E definitions).

Firstly, the core-category includes a category which summarises terms and names the parties use to address the EU, Europe, Institutions or European countries, from which one can derive whether the party sees or addresses the EU as a political, economical, cultural or other entity, or primarily addresses specific parts of the EU and not the whole organisation. Secondly, the core-category includes a category, which deals with in which relation the party sees their country and the EU or Europe. Thirdly, the core-category includes two categories dealing with Turkey’s foreign policy, for relations with the EU from the perspective of Turkey fall under the category of foreign policy.

What is problematic about what the parties say about the EU is that they use many different terms to address it, but never clearly define what they mean by it. For example when using the term Europe, it is not said clearly whether Europe is now seen as the organisation EU, a geographical entity, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts of Europe</th>
<th>EU, European Union, European Nations = different definitions of the term Europe (as geographic entity, as political entity, as different nation states...)</th>
<th>-CHP mentions different names of the European Union, but also specifically talks about the institutions, also mentions Europe as an entity and counts itself as one of the European countries, defines Europe as a value-based entity (3:41/43/45, 7:31/32/40/43)</th>
<th>-Europe seems to be mentioned as geographic entity, European nations as single entities, with which AKP has relations (priority!), European Union as political entity/international organisation (1:109/110/112)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close relations</td>
<td>The party mentions that Turkey has (or) had close relations with the EU, Europe or European nations.</td>
<td>-CHP does not mention that EU and TR have been in close relations, just that Atatürk has always seen Europe as a good example and idol for modernisation process (lift to contemporary civilisation)</td>
<td>-AKP thinks that Europe and TR have been in close relations geographically and historically -Seems as if Europe (not EU) is not seen as political entity, but rather geographic one -Historically could mean going back as far as Roman empire, or other Empires of which Istanbul has been the capital, or it could mean only going back as far as WW1 (TR on side of GER) -Geography is a natural given (IST) (1:129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy, global circumstances</td>
<td>The Party wants to adjust its foreign policies to global circumstances and new realities and is aware of its changing environment. As this concerns the relations with the EU, as EU is part of foreign policy of Turkey, this category is under the EU core-category.</td>
<td>-CHP does not express any such foreign policy characteristics, as it seems to maintain focus on the EU and reaching its Membership goal, and wants to adjust its other relations to that</td>
<td>-AKP speaks of its goal to engage in flexible foreign policy relations with many axes, not only concentrating on relations with a single power, but many (Davutoglu doctrine, zero problem with neighbours, etc) (1:108/124) -This foreign policy is needed, because Turkey’s environment, the world changed (regional and global realities) and its policies need to be adjusted to that -One could read into that that it does not only want to concentrate on the EU, or...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy_Nature</td>
<td>America, but also on its region</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Foreign policy=relations with EU only explicitly mentioned under the heading of ‘Foreign Policy’. In the rest of the document, EU is only adhered to when talking about concrete policies or issues which need to be adjusted to EU standards. -Nature=AKP talks about the nature of foreign policy making, that it should be realistic and what must be taken into account. As the nature of foreign policy making concerns TRs and the parties relations with the EU, it is under the EU core category.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-In the 2011 programme, several parameters of the CHP’s foreign policy are mentioned: value-based, citizen-centred, peaceful, egalitarian, respecting human rights and freedoms, respecting international law and having confidence in multilateral institutions, integrationist, European oriented, universalist, instituting regional peace and security alliances, realist (11:3/4/6/12/13)</td>
<td>-AKP wants to follow a realistic foreign policy approach befitting Turkey’s history and geographical position -Realistic meaning that the policies they implement should be possible to be implemented and on the other hand that AKP is realistic about its environment (its geographical position), probably meaning again that they have to be realistic about their neighbours and have to treat them well -Does realistic also mean that they will not be able to join the EU? (1:81)</td>
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</table>

**How is the (current state of the) accession process described? (Accession)**

This core-category encompasses everything of what the parties say about Turkey’s accession process, both concerning Turkey’s domestic political scene (critique government), and the process itself (deadlock, TAP definitions and process). The parties did not say much about the past or how they see the general development of the TAP over the last years and how they think it should change, but rather how it is currently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critique government</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHP wants to fulfill the promises Turkey made towards EU as soon as possible and makes the AKP responsible that these changes are not made quickly enough, CHP critiques AKP, consistent failures, giving up too much, not protecting Turkey’s interests, or not enough reforms, direct as well as indirect, not only policies, also actions</td>
<td>-CHP thinks that chapter was not opened because AKP preferred not to pass a law -CHP wants AKP to overcome consistent failures and seems as if it makes AKP partly responsible for slow accession process -Question is whether this is just “the opposition talking” (its easy for them to criticise, as AKP has not been in power the last 8 years), or whether they would seriously would act differently if they would be in government -They also say that the AKP should take all stakeholders into account, probably thinking that the opposition has a very difficult role in TR (3:11/16/24/25/32/51, 7:42, 11:10)</td>
<td>-AKP in turn does not criticise CHP, probably because the CHP did not get the chance to do much or have any influence on policies, cause the AKP has had the majority of seats in parliament for the last 8 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Deadlock | |
|----------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| CHP mentions a deadlock in the accession process, meaning that the process is not going very well or fast, but has rather come to a dead end. | -CHP perceives the state of process in ‘08 as being in a deadlock (which deteriorates fair competition for TR economy) -It does not become clear who they blame for this deadlock, they both accuse the AKP (for not doing enough and therefore blocking the process) and the EU (for having a wrong opinion about TR) (2:12, 11:10) | -AKP only sais that it shall also prevent the occupation of agenda with artificial problems, which indicates that they indeed think that the agenda is or has been (threatened to be) occupied by those problems in the past, because otherwise they would not say that they want to prevent it |

| Process | |
|---------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Requirements and expectations the party (only CHP) has of the process, how it sees the process | -Transparent for public, pluralistic debate, sound political vision, alignment with EU acquis, acceler- | -AKP does not mention process |
how it wants to conduct the process, e.g. involvement of the Turkish citizens in form of transparency towards and involvement of the public. -CHP sees itself as “the” opposition party, -CHP sees the process a project of social transformation naturally rooted in Atatürk’s modernisation vision (2:23, 3:34/36/37/39/50, 7:19, 22)

Different names and meanings of TAP(Turkish Accession Process), Membership, full Membership, accession process, EU MS process, EU process, modernisation process, -CHP uses different words for TAP, which on the one hand point to the fact that only Membership is acceptable and on the other hand harmonisation process is difficult to interpret but could mean that TR is adjusting to EU and not the other way around, accession process is official phrase used by EU (2:22/24/25/26,3:35/38)

The party states that cooperation and integration are good and able to solve problems (see Kopecky and Mudde in chapter 2) -The CHP states in its election manifesto that it believes in the idea of deep integration and cooperation beyond the usual level between states, such as in the case of the EU (11:07/08, 2:16)

The party claims that it is motivated to change and put through reforms, e.g. in the form of complying with European or international standards, because it will be beneficial for Turkey and its criticise -CHP thinks that upgrading of Turkish people’s standards of life is at the centre of the accession process (in all fields of social and economic life), so the party wants to put through reforms, because it benefits the people (2:9)

CHP says that it wants and needs to work together with the EU and put through changes in order to enable a better future of Europe. -EU and TR have common concerns regarding Europe and have to work together for a better Europe, hence the CHPs motive to change and put through reforms is also because they want to improve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAP definitions</th>
<th>What are the parties’ motives to change and reform the country? (Motives)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Party wants to make its people happy (they deserve it), and not because IOs want the country to (seems that they see the EU and other IOs as a foreign intruder wanting TR to become sth it does not want to become) -AKP does not mention concrete benefits it hope to get from becoming a member -Change because it is crucial for contemporary democracies and they apparently find it crucial to become one, because it will benefit the country, the people and gain them a respectable place -Change also to make everyone happy and bring peace (1:103/105/115)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Believe in EU idea</th>
<th>Benefits for Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party states that cooperation and integration are good and able to solve problems (see Kopecky and Mudde in chapter 2)</td>
<td>The party claims that it is motivated to change and put through reforms, e.g. in the form of complying with European or international standards, because it will be beneficial for Turkey and its criticise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improve EU</th>
<th>-AKP does not see this as a motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHP says that it wants and needs to work together with the EU and put through changes in order to enable a better future of Europe.</td>
<td>-EU and TR have common concerns regarding Europe and have to work together for a better Europe, hence the CHPs motive to change and put through reforms is also because they want to improve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Europe pave the way for a better future (7:25)

**How willing does the party seem to be to change in order to further the Turkish accession process? (Willingness)**

This core-category summarises all statements, which describe the willingness, i.e. how much the parties want to change. Change in this respect is not as general as in the last core-category, but change here is targeted directly at the EU. One aspect of this core-category is whether they support the TAP at all, because this is a prerequisite for being willing to change for the EU. Another part of this core-category is whether the parties state anywhere what their top priority is in TFP, for if they would indicate that their top priority is the EU, it would mean that they would want to achieve MS and therefore be willing to do sth for becoming a member and hence be willing to change. Another sign of being willing to change for the EU is that they say that they want to fulfil the Membership conditions, or EU’s conditions as the AKP calls it.

| Supporting Process | -CHP firmly supports the process  
-It has supported the process from the very start (natural continuation of Atatürk’s legacy and modernisation efforts)  
-As the EU is their top priority and they have supported the process from the very start they seem to be very willing to change (2:31, 7:9, 3:2, 11:11) | -AKP does not speak of process |
| Top priority in TFP | -AKP explicitly states that European countries are top priority, CHP does not state that explicitly, but takes it for granted/presupposes it, and says that relations with other countries must be developed in synergy with the EU  
-Relations with other countries developed and led in synergy with EU MS target, meaning that EU MS target is on the one end as a top priority target, all the other relations are on the other side (e.g. if US is against EU MS target, relations with US are less important)  
-As the EU is their top priority and they have supported the process from the very start they seem to be very willing to change (2:16) | -AKP states that the European nations are at the top of its foreign policy priorities  
-Why does AKP say that the European nations are at the top, when they elsewhere say that they need a balanced foreign policy with multiple axes?  
-Why only the European nations, not the European Union? Is it because they know that without improving their relations and image with and in Germany, Austria and France they will never be able to get into the EU? But as MS does not seem a worthy goal, and they do not seem to want EU MS, they only want good relations with the countries and lifting TRs standards to contemporary democracy (EU nations) standards  
-The party seems to be very willing to change, but not for the EU or other institutions, but for themselves (1:96) |
| Fulfil promises | -CHP commits fully, is in favour of accelerating, asks for better fulfilment, seems to be more determined that AKP to show that it wants to comply with criteria | -AKP wants Turkey to rapidly fulfil promises in its relations with EU  
-Does not say that process is going slow or that it needs |
What efforts does the party make to fulfil the accession conditions? (Efforts)

This core-category is also specifically targeted at the TAP. It summarises all quotes regarding any changes the party says it has already done to further the process or has planned in order to further the process. Whether it really did put through these changes or planned them in order to further the process can of course not be proven here, but at least the parties said so. The third category summarises statements saying that there need to be more efforts or that current efforts are not good enough/insufficient, which indicates that they want to put through more reforms.

| Changes proposed | Turkey shall fulfil promises rapidly, therefore concrete changes have been proposed such as articles which need to be amended in order to comply with EU rules and principles, -Many changes proposed and rather detailed in the following fields: Freedom of expression, press, religion, Kurkish issue, women rights, social rights and economic growth and jobs which are the main pillars of CHP's EU agenda (3:8/10/14/23, 7:23) -AKP does not propose changes, does not speak of process |
| Concrete actions | Party mentions concrete actions it initiated or executed to support or further the TAP (Turkish accession process) -EU office in BXL opened to promote process (as well as other concrete actions to speed up process) (3:6/40) -AKP does not mention any concrete changes (how is that a realistic policy?) |
| More efforts necessary | Party thinks that current Turkish efforts are not enough and that more effort is needed in order to come further in the Turkish accession process. -CHP says that Legislative changes are not sufficient and that more and better reforms to fulfil Copenhagen criteria are necessary -The CHP’s position on the accession process does not only seem to be very positive, but also productive, as they present many ideas how things could be improved and show significantly more efforts and willingness to make efforts than the AKP (3:48, 7:37) -AKP does not mention any such efforts (only says that it wants to fulfil the conditions) |

What conditions does the party attach to fulfilling the membership conditions? (Conditions)

Core-category includes all statements on any conditions the party attaches to fulfilling EU conditions. These are on the one hand national and on the other hand external things. Domestically, the parties want to protect their national interests and not give up too much for the EU probably and they want to be treated fairly, meaning in a way they deserve certain treatment. Externally, they want to be treated the same as any other countries.

| Balance between national and EU interests | There has to be a balance between Turkey’s national interests and the EU membership conditions and interests -National interest is Membership, which is the only acceptable alternative -National priorities are important -Fundamental values of Turkey must be respected and in line with EU requirements (2:10/15, 7:3/49, 11:20) -Relations with international institutions like EU have to be maintained along national requirements and interests (1:94) |
| Equal Treatment | Party urges/wants the EU to treat Turkey the same as any other candidate state -CHP asks the EU to treat TR equally to other candidates -Seems that there is the hidden criticism that it is not treated the same way, otherwise there would be no need to say so (7:5/11:17) -AKP hints to the fact that it will fulfil promises which the EU demands of other candidate nations -Same as CHP, there seems to be a necessity to say that it should be treated equally (1:98) |
| Fair treatment | Fair process conditions, fair treatment, fair conditions, just or appropriate in the circumstances, give a person/country the treatment it deserves, which -Reverse deadlock and accelerate process under fair conditions -Deadlock deteriorates fair conditions -CHP calls on EU to lift unilateral -AKP hints that TR deserves a (higher/different) place in ESDP, apart from his position in NATO (1:125) |
does not necessarily mean that it is treated the same as others.

restriction and also criticises EP resolutions and progress reports for being wrong and ill informed

-The CHP does not seem to be afraid to criticise the EU but does so only on certain grounds and reasons why it does underlined by concrete examples and sets out certain conditions to be fulfilled (does not say that it will otherwise not undertake any efforts, but will probably be less motivated)


What is the final goal of the party? (Final goal)

This is a very broad core-category, including everything the party mentioned about what they want to achieve in the future. Partly, the categories are EU-related, TR-related and international-related. One the one hand certain standards want to be reached (EU standards, Intl standards/trade, democratic standards), and on the other hand the party wants Turkey to gain a place in the international community and become a member of the EU.

| Democratic standards | Reference to the fact that the parties want to reach or adhere to certain democratic standards or become like a contemporary democracy
| The AKP firstly speaks about democracies and their characteristics, and then uses the word contemporary democracies, somewhat refining what the mean by democracies. In contrast to the CHP, they dont adhere to European democratic values, but just talk about contemporary democracies, as if they want to distance themselves from the EU. Nevertheless, the AKP also says that copenhagen criteria constitute minimum criteria they want to adhere to if it fits the choices made by citizens. |
| -CHP wants European democratic values to inspire TR’s constitution, and directly refers to European values (7:26, 11:1) |
| -AKP only refers to “contemporary democracies” and not to EU values, although democratisation on the whole is an important topic, and AKP says that Copenhagen criteria constitute minimum criteria to which they want to adhere, but only if citizens agree (1:120/121/122/128) |

| EU Standards | Mentioning of the fact that the parties want to adhere to Europea standards either in general or in very specific fields and policies. |
| -CHP mentions quite often that it wants to adhere to EU standards (2:2/6/17, 3:12/17/19/28, 7:11/15) |
| -AKP also mentions that it wants to reach European standards, but not as often as it mentions inernational standards (1:14/18/15/85/86/87/88) |

| Membership | Mentioning of the term Membership in contrast to accession or other term. CHP makes it very clear that Membership is the only form of cooperation with the EUnorean Union they want and will accept (although they cant do much if the EU decides that they only want a privileged partnership, CHP is der 'Bitsteller')
| -Membership (nothing else)
-Accelerating reform process
-Exact date for Membership
-Yes to Membership no to special Partnership (2:8/11, 3:1/4, 7:2/4/8/20, 11:14/15) |
| -AKP does not mention the process, not with one word and does not say that MS is a goal |

| Place in International Community | Mentioning of the fact that |
| -CHP does not mention that it |
| -AKP mentions that a gov- |
Turkey wants to achieve a respectable place in the international community, that it earns the place, that it needs to do something to achieve this place, be able to compete internationally.

**International Community**

Wants to reach a certain place in international community

International Community

Mentioning of the aim that Turkey wants to comply with international standards, universal principles, universal standards. Search words were international, global and universal. Universal is mostly used when mentioning universal standards of human rights, universal rights and freedoms, universal values, universal rights (consumer, justice, principles of law)

- The CHP mentions ILO standards a few times and that it wants to reach them, but otherwise it does not seem to want to comply with international standards (2:4, 3:26/52, 11:22/23/24)

International Standards

AKP mentions many times that it wants to comply with international standards (most frequent category of the AKP, around 40-50 quotes) (1:25/28/29/36/45/127/136/137, etc)

International Standards

All mentionings of the word foreign in the context of trade and economic matters, as in most cases foreign was mentioned in the context of economic matters. Other mentioning of foreign weren’t particularly important and not able to put into one core-category, e.g. foreign language, foreign cultures, etc.

- CHP also mentions international standards which should be implemented, but these statements are not as numerous as in the case of the AKP

International Standards_trade

- AKP mentions many times that it wants to comply with international standards (most frequent category of the AKP, around 40-50 quotes) (1:61/63/69(71/75/78, etc)

**Programme / Docs**

This core-category is not related to the content of the programmes, but more to the form, structure, what is being said in which parts, language, but also whether the parties mention why they wrote this programme. It was not included in the analytical part, as this core-category did not yield important results or findings, which contribute to answering the research question

**Introduction and Conclusion**

Content hinting at EU in intro or conclusion. Introduction and conclusion are relevant, because they give a summary of what is going to follow and what has been said and the main points of the programme are mentioned in these parts of the document. At least if they follow the usual logic of Introductions and Conclusions, which they seem to do!

- CHP’s Docs do not have Introduction or conclusions

- EU is neither mentioned in introduction, nor conclusion (1:130/131)

**Language**

Language used by AKP and CHP, does it differ? What verbs are used? What adjectives are used?

- CHP uses more meaningful/significant language, more words like “strongly supports”, or “firmly opposes”, difficult to say whether that is because it is not

- AKP seems to use less meaningful, significant, expressive words throughout the whole programme, but on the other hand it does
their party programme, because they are in the opposition or because they really are a stronger supporter of the EU and want to express that not speak about the EU much -Does it speak less passionate or expressive about EU than about others? No!

| Purpose of the programme | Parts where AKP mentions for which purpose their party programme was written. | "The CHP in its documents does not mention the purpose of writing it

AKP states that the programme was written so the public can assess them -Programme is a “democratisation and enterprise” project, which shows that they actually attach a lot of value on transforming and improving their democracy (1:104/118/119) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header and Footer</td>
<td>Header and Footer of the Documents of the CHP indicate the focus of the document (in the name and title) and other things that are important to the party, such as their Party logo or their Membership of other international parties</td>
<td>-Logo in the header and footer is a picture of the 6 arrows (representing Atatürk’s ideas of leading a state, made into these 6 arrows by İnönü). -The only consistent bulletin published as a series is the social democracy bulletin, all other bulletins are just single units, so there is no series of European bulletins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Does not have Header and Footer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Appendix 2: Table of official party documents**

The numbers (e.g. P1) in the brackets stand for the primary document number in the Hermeneutic Unit (HU) in Atlas.ti. In Atlas.ti, the first number of each quotes stands for the primary document in which the quote is located, e.g. 1:2 – the 2nd quote in P1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Document</th>
<th>Link</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Programme AKP (P1)</td>
<td><a href="http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html">http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html</a></td>
<td>Party programme of Consists of 4 parts: fundamental rights and political principles; the economy; public administration; social policies; foreign policy (EU under this heading); Programme is as far as I could understand the same as the original party programme in Turkish and seems as if it was only translated to English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the CHP’s new programme (01/2009) (P2)</td>
<td><a href="http://brussels.chp.org.tr/Dosyalar/Belge/31_20090310172342_1.pdf">http://brussels.chp.org.tr/Dosyalar/Belge/31_20090310172342_1.pdf</a></td>
<td>A summary of their 2008 Party Programme, published after the 2007 elections (Translation is from 2009). Document addresses several topics: Economic and Social Development, Political Reforms, EU Membership, Foreign Affairs and Security, Local Governments. The EU Membership part is the central part of the document for my analysis, the other parts only address the EU in terms of adhering to EU standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP and Turkey’s EU Membership Process (10/2009) (P3)</td>
<td><a href="http://brussels.chp.org.tr/?Islem=BultenGoster&amp;BultenID=76">http://brussels.chp.org.tr/?Islem=BultenGoster&amp;BultenID=76</a></td>
<td>CHP Document dealing with Turkey’s membership process, and more specific passages about the view of the party on their most important EU issues, which are Freedom of Expression, Freedom of press, freedom of religion, Kurdish issue, women rights, social rights and economic growth and jobs. Many specific changes and actions are mentioned, providing a detailed view of the party on membership issues. Introduction or First part of document most relevant for assessing the position of the party on the accession process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s EU Membership: CHP’s new</td>
<td><a href="http://issuu.com/kader.sevinc/docs/chp_bxl_bulletin_.pdf">http://issuu.com/kader.sevinc/docs/chp_bxl_bulletin_.pdf</a></td>
<td>Document combines several different topics and articles: EU-TR relations in CHP’s 2008 programme, CHPs view on the EU 2020 Agenda, Constitutional and judiciary amendments (detailed), the EP resolution and progress report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
programme 2008 (4/2010) (P7) | _april_2010_ (need to log into issuu) | 2010 and 2009, and an interview with Kader Sevinc, the CHP's EU representative. Only the first, 2nd and third part are relevant, the last parts are not being used, because they are pieces written by a party representative and a judge and have nothing to do with the party programme or other official utterings of the party regarding the EU, and are not primary sources.

| CHP Election Manifesto (6/2011) (P11) | www.chp.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/electionmanifesto | Election Manifesto, published shortly after the elections on 12th June 2011. Document covers all topics, which are being covered in their Party programme (as far as I was able to understand the Turkish version of the programme). Very lengthy document, with a large section on foreign policy. As the document was only published after the original version of the thesis was already finished, it was only roughly analysed, but provided some explanation on statements, which were only shortly dealt with in the other documents and therefore clarified some points.

7) **List of References**


