EU enlargement – “Why were some of the CEEC countries included in the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, despite shortcomings, whereas some of the candidate countries were left out?”

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Abstract

The following study will examine the conditions for a successful admission to the European Union by examining the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and the current candidate countries of the Union. By posing the question “Why were some of the CEEC countries included in the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, despite shortcomings, whereas some of the candidate countries were left out?” this study is aimed at examining the determinacy of identified conditions for EU enlargement. Namely, the European Union is imposing compliance factors on the candidate countries by means of reinforcement by reward to meet the core values of the Union. Once the conditionality criteria are fulfilled, the candidate countries are rewarded with accession to the Union. However, the question can be posed whether these conditions are actually fulfilled by those countries that joined the Union in the 2004/2007 enlargement.

A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will be used to assess the conditions by means of various indexes. By using indexes on democracy, development, economic freedom and human rights, one could analyze patterns of country’s performances and whether accession was the logical consequence of positive performance on these conditions.

In a second step, an in-depth case study on the deviant cases will be used to examine the countries shortcomings.

The research design is, therefore, a mixed-method design with a QCA analysis in the first phase and a follow-up, comparative case study in the second part. This follow-up case study itself will be a dynamic, comparative case-study design in which the causes for the relatively low success of the deviating countries in fulfilling the conditions will be examined and the reasons why some of these countries were admitted regardless of their shortcomings. The data used will be secondary data, which are mainly stemming from various indexes for the QCA and additional qualitative data for the follow-up case study.

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# Table of contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
2. Short historical outline .................................................................................................... 4
3. Theory section .................................................................................................................. 5
   3.2 Enlargement theory .................................................................................................... 5
   3.3 Democracy, development, economic freedom and human rights concepts ................. 7
4. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 9
   4.1 Measurement of the conditions .................................................................................. 10
      4.1.1 Measurement of democracy ................................................................................ 11
      4.1.2 Measurement of development .............................................................................. 12
      4.1.3 Measurement of economic freedom ...................................................................... 12
      4.1.4 Measurement of human rights .............................................................................. 13
   4.2 Case selection and sampling ...................................................................................... 13
5. Data and analysis ............................................................................................................. 15
   5.1 QCA analysis ................................................................................................................. 15
   5.2 Comparative case study of the deviating countries ...................................................... 18
      5.2.1 The case of Croatia ................................................................................................. 18
      5.2.2 The case of Iceland ................................................................................................ 19
      5.2.3 The case of Latvia .................................................................................................. 20
      5.2.4 The case of Cyprus ................................................................................................. 21
      5.2.5 The case of Poland .................................................................................................. 21
      5.2.6 The case of Slovenia ............................................................................................... 22
      5.2.7 The cases of Romania and Bulgaria ....................................................................... 22
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 23
7. Annex ............................................................................................................................ 26
   7.1 Data analysis ............................................................................................................... 27
8. Literature list .................................................................................................................... 29
1. Introduction

This study will be the Bachelor thesis in the field of European Union [EU] enlargement and on the question of why some countries are admitted to the Union whereas others are not. The research question is therefore aimed at the question which conditions have to be met to become a member state of the Union.

The research question can be formulated as:

“Why were some of the CEEC countries included in the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, despite shortcomings, whereas some of the candidate countries were left out?”

The enlargement of 2004 and 2007 was the largest in the history of the EU and the admitted Central and Eastern European Countries [CEECs] were finally admitted whereas other countries, which had the candidate status at the same time, were denied accession at that point in time. Furthermore, the literature shows that that the topic of further EU enlargement ranks high on the political as well as public agenda when it comes to EU matters. The process coined as Europeanization implies that countries that are joining the Union have to witness high degrees of homogeneity among them to achieve the necessary increasing harmonisation of legislation by establishing supranational legislation, which is applicable to all member states (Olsen, 2002, p. 2).

Moreover, some authors outline that some countries that did accede the Union are not complying with the criteria formulated in the accession negotiations, which led to several infringement procedures against these countries in recent years (Dobbels, 2009; Hughes & Sasse, 2003; Trauner, 2009a).

By examining the conditions that countries have to fulfil and by identifying the necessary and sufficient indicators for a positive closure of the accession negotiations, one could formulate a strategy towards successfully achieving membership status and, in turn, other countries inability to become Member State [MS] of the EU can be explained. For the purpose of this research, four conditions of
democracy, development, economy and human rights were chosen as possible determinants of successful accession to the European Union and were thus selected as independent variables. Accession will be the dependent variable (successful or non-successful accession). Moreover, these criteria are reflecting the Copenhagen criteria of the EU for further enlargements closely (European Commission, 2012d).

The research question is addressed by conducting, first, a qualitative comparative analysis [QCA] which will be used to examine the conditions effect on the dependent variable, accession. This analysis will be done on 18 countries. Secondly, a follow-up comparative case study with the deviant countries will be done to explain the shortcomings of the country’s case at hand. The deviating countries will be identified by means of pattern deviation as a result of the QCA method. Therefore, a mixed method research design will be used in which a QCA and a follow-up case study will be combined to answer the stated research question.

This thesis aims, therefore, at contributing to the large body of already existing enlargement literature, but using quantitative data to compare country patterns which is seldom used in the field. By examining the deviant cases, one could compare to which extent the European values are a necessity for admission or whether geopolitical interests are more important. This is especially valuable for the countries of the Balkan which cases are similar to the examined ones of Romania and Bulgaria.

2. Short historical outline

The research will be concerned with the last and the fifth enlargement of the Central and Eastern European Countries [CEEC] in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) (European Commission, 2012e) and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (European Commission, 2012e). Alongside these enlargement rounds, the European Union formulated various policy tools to cope with the widening of the Union and the smooth accession process of the candidate countries.

The Copenhagen criteria are a major cornerstone of the European Union concepts with regard to enlargement which was formulated at the Copenhagen European Council summit in 1993. Future candidate countries have to comply with the criteria of having “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Commission, 2012a). Furthermore, the potential member states have to have a functioning market economy and the ability to take on the obligations related to their membership with regard to political, economic and monetary obligations (European Commission, 2012a).

Secondly, the EU decided that countries must be capable of transcoding the European legal documents to their national legislation by means of appropriate administrative and judicial structures at the Madrid European Council in 1995 (European Commission, 2012a). Furthermore, the European Commission published a white paper on enlargement in the same year (European Commission, 1995) which was the pre-accession strategy for the CEEC enlargement which followed in 2004 and will be one of the two groups of countries included in this research. In this white paper, the Commission stressed the importance of the application of the *acquis communautaire*, which can be linked to economic and developmental strength of the acceding countries.

Thirdly, one has to mention the Helsinki European Council summit of 1999 which marks insofar a cornerstone of the EU enlargement process as the opening of pre-accession talks with Turkey were adopted in the presidency conclusions of the summit (“Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate [s]tates” (European Parliament, 1999) which is of importance as the selection of the CEEC countries is justified by the
proximity of the 2004/2007 enlargement round vis-à-vis the candidate countries. Thus, the candidate countries included in this research were, similar to the now member states of the CEEC group, candidates at that time, but accession was denied to Turkey amongst other countries.

3. Theory section

Before turning to the research design, several theories and concepts will be introduced that are essential to answer the question why some countries were admitted whereas others were not. Raising the question, on why some countries become member of the Union whereas other countries are left out, the corresponding concepts will be addressed that link the member state preferences to the corresponding enlargement theories, and constructivism and rationalism in particular.

The European Union itself is based upon several liberal-democratic values, which are also integral part of the decision to further enlarge the Union. These values will be addressed by examining the general theories of realism and constructivism in the first part of this section by keeping the overall concept of Europeanization, as introduced in the introduction, in mind.

In the following, the corresponding conditions to these European values, namely democracy, economic freedom, development and human rights, are subject of the second part of the theory section as acceding countries are expected to meet certain standards to be able to uphold the European Union’s values.

3.2 Enlargement theory

The above addressed theory of Europeanization has to be seen in the light of the general enlargement literature which is addressed frequently in the academic literature concerning enlargement and specifically in the work by Schimmelfennig et al. (Schimmelfennig, 2001, 2008; Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, 2004, 2005).

With the umbrella notions of rationalism and constructivism, one can interpret EU enlargement differently when following either one of the two theoretical camps. One definition of enlargement can be given by defining it as “a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 5). This notion follows the constructivist theoretical approach which is intended due to the fact that the enlargement is primarily researched from the European Union’s perspective with a specific focus on the conditions necessary for a country to become included in the Union. This is in line with the proposed research focus by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, namely by posing the question which conditions must be fulfilled by future member states to be admitted to the regional organisation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 9). Thus, the mentioned conditions will be the primary focus of this research and are addressed subsequently.

The aforementioned meta-theories of rationalism and constructivism will, thereby, not be treated mutually exclusively due to the fact that both are rather based on general assumptions of enlargement rather than opposing hypotheses that could be tested. Thus, both theoretical camps are based on non-mutually exclusive assumptions about the field rather than strict hypotheses (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 11). Nevertheless, the main assumptions of rationalism and constructivism can be seen as explanatory factors in the following analysis and the outcomes can be explained by means of the general assumptions of both theoretical camps.
In rationalist theory, on the one hand, the expansion of institutions and membership can be witnessed as long as the marginal benefits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs for the member states and applicant states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 15). In the case of the CEEC enlargement, the enlargement preferences of current member states were based on a material bargaining process among them (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 1). The benefits of such enlargement can be seen in the light of measures that stabilise Central and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and to control the possible negative side effects of the political and economic transformation of the CEEC countries and to expand the European Community to the East (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 4). Thereby, the countries with close proximity to the CEEC countries have an elevated interest in such an enlargement. Due to the close proximity of the central European states, the interdependence with neighbouring countries is to be seen higher than it is for the more remote member countries (i.e. the Northern European members of the EU). Thus, states on the eastern border of the EU are having higher interests in influencing the developments in Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 4) which explains their bargaining in favour of such enlargement. In turn, this reasoning explains in part why other candidate countries that were not sharing a direct border with EU member states were less preferably and benefits can be seen as fewer for the MS.

Still, this does not explain differences with regard to some of the countries under study. Other factors, and in particular geopolitical interests or effects on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and trade in general could be of importance, which might explain the differences between, for instance, Croatia being preferred for accession whereas Turkey has been considered but nevertheless has not yet been accepted. As outlined by Moravcsik, member states have a particular interest in security cooperation (i.e. coined as security externalities) with regard to geopolitical motives and trade considerations are particularly important in the long term with regard to increased trade flows, policy convergence and increasing capital mobility (i.e. coined as endogenous policy theory) (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 28). In terms of geopolitical interests, especially the occurrence of major geopolitical events (such as the end of the Cold War or the Balkan conflict), could lead to a shift in importance to stabilise such regions, which could be even more important as increased trade flows could be beneficial for member states over time (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 28). This, however, will be subject of the analysis in section 6 of this study.

Moreover, as Schimmelfennig puts it “rationalism can explain most actor preferences and much of their bargaining behaviour, it fails to account for the collective decision for enlargement” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 30)

In constructivism, on the other hand, enlargement is primarily shaped by a common, shared identity and beliefs which can explain the collective decision for enlargement, but fails to account for the actor preferences. Thus, the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with the CEEC countries is based on the common norm set of liberal democratic values (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, one might expect that the EU will admit states that adhere to the same liberal norms as codified in the founding principles of the Union (European Union, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2001). However, this is not accounting for the differing EU member preferences.

Hence, a decision of enlargement is driven either by marginal benefits of including a respective candidate country or due to a shared belief in liberal-democratic values. In both theoretical settings, nevertheless, the candidate countries are expected to fulfil several conditions which are enforced by the concept of conditionality as outlined in the previous section. The conditions that are expected to be met in order to decide in favour of further enlargement will be addressed in the second part of this section.
3.3 Democracy, development, economic freedom and human rights concepts

As the concepts of democracy, development, economic freedom and human rights are used as factors in the proposed research, these concepts are shortly elaborated on in this last section.

Overall, the European Union used political conditionality to promote human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe after the downfall of communism which makes these factors, again, valuable for the research conducted hereafter (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 128). As repeatedly mentioned throughout the theoretical section, acceding countries are expected to meet certain standards to be able to uphold the European Union’s values and to prevent “admission of non-liberal countries to the EU [which] would strongly increase the heterogeneity of the membership, the potential for serious intra-organizational conflict, and the costs of decision making” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, pp. 14-15).

Firstly, democracy is at the core of the European Union’s values and codified in the Treaties of the Union (Art. 2, 9 - 12 TEU) as well as in the enlargement criteria by means of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 (European Commission, 2012a). On the one hand, the concept of democracy can, thereby, be defined as rule by the people in a narrow sense and opposed to Monarchy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy, Theocracy or Dictatorship (cf. Raaflaub, 1983).

On the other hand, it can be defined as a set of global political rights and civil liberties which is a definition in a broader sense and thereby closer to the liberal democratic ideal of the EU. These political rights and civil liberties include factors such as electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government (for political rights) and freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (for civil liberties) (Freedom House, 2012). Democracy is thus of utmost importance to the European Union and future member states have to fulfil a certain standard with regard to democracy as set forth in the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, the European Union has significant influence on democratisation of associated countries (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 190).

Thus, one can consider the European Union as a unique democratic entity which undertook several efforts to enhance its legitimacy by means of the Treaties. Codified in earlier Treaties and now to be found in the articles 1 and 2 of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU), the liberal democratic values are legalised values of the Union. The liberal democratic values are from the EU perspective formulated as:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” (Art. 2 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty)

Therefore, one might expect higher scores of the acceded CEEC countries on the conditions intended to measure these values vis-à-vis the second group of countries being subject to this research, namely the countries which were not admitted. This is, moreover, to be expected as EU enlargement policy has remained consistently linked to compliance with basic democratic norms in the target countries (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 4), which is in line with constructivist theory as outlined in section 3.2.

Secondly, development is included in the research as the EU is founded upon the principles of “sustainable development, based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” and further “the combating of social exclusion and discrimination, and the promotion of social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child” (European Union, 2012). As further outlined in section 4.1 on the measurement of the conditions, the liberal democratic values of the Union require high degrees of social cohesiveness of the member states as freedoms cannot be achieved with a certain degree of equality within the Union.

Thus, countries that joined the Union in 2004/2007 are expected to show higher scores, concerning human development, than countries that were not accepted to join the EU. Moreover, these goals can be seen in line with the Lisbon agenda for the years 2000-2010 which formulated “modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion” as one of the strategic goals (European Parliament, 2000). The goal of sustainable development and the establishment of a social market economy can, thereby, only be achieved (according to the Lisbon agenda of 2000) through increased efforts in the area of human development. Thus, the factor is one of the cornerstones of successful European integration which needs to be achieved by (possible) member states.

Thirdly, economic freedom is of importance for this research since it is also one of the key principles of the European Union. Since the EU is nowadays based upon the free movement provisions and a completely harmonised internal market, any acceding country is expected to witness high levels of economic freedom to be able to be integrated in this supranational system. Thus, acceding countries are expected to show higher scores than countries that are left out in the fifth enlargement round in 2004/2007. As Schimmelfennig and Scholtz coined it, “[e]conomic development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a large middle class and a competent civil service. It thereby mitigates the class struggle and promotes cross-cutting cleavages” (2008, p. 193). Therefore, higher economic prosperity is a prerequisite for democracy and development in terms of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education which is also measured in this research by means of the other conditions (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 193). Despite that, free-market policies allow economies to absorb financial and other crises more quickly and with less long-term effects (Miles, Holmes, Mary Anastasia, Foundation, & Journal, 2006, p. 9), which becomes increasingly important in the context of global interdependence of markets and high levels of competition and openness in the particular case of the European internal market. Thus, economic freedom is highly important in several ways and one of the crucial factors for successful integration into the EU framework of a respective (candidate) country.

Finally, human rights is one of the core principles added to the Union’s set of values which is codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and added the dignity of the human being, equality and solidarity to the set of core values (European Union, 2010). Moreover, human rights gained importance since the late 1960s despite being left out in the original Treaties (Von Bogdandy, 2000, p. 1). Again, the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, are expected to show higher scores on this subject than countries that were not included in the fifth enlargement round. This becomes evident in light of Article 7 TEU through which “the Charter [of Fundamental Human Rights] could easily become the yardstick for EU surveillance mechanisms of the general human rights record […] for determining the readiness of a third country for accession (Von Bogdandy, 2000, p. 3). The requirement of human rights standards similar to the EU is, furthermore, set forth in the Copenhagen criteria for accession of a candidate country (European Commission, 2012a).

Summing up, the CEEC countries are expected to score higher on the four conditions outlined in the section above and especially vis-à-vis countries that were not admitted. Moreover, the CEEC countries are, according to the theory, expected to show similar scores on the conditions as they were admitted at the same point in time (or very shortly thereafter in the case of Romania and Bulgaria).
4. Methodology

After having outlined the theoretical foundation of this research, the conditions necessary to measure the candidate countries degree of compliance with the liberal-democratic values of the Union will be introduced in this section. As set forth in the theory section, the EU is based upon values such as democracy, economic freedom, harmonisation and thus similar degrees of development and human rights. Additionally, these factors are part of the accession criteria as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria. Again, the EU to determine the readiness for accession to the Union uses these factors. In a first step, the measurement of these conditions is introduced which is followed by the case selection for the analysis.

To analyse the case selection, a mixed-method research design will be used. At first, a qualitative comparative analysis [QCA] will be conducted. This analytical framework is based on Charles Ragin’s work (1989) who formulated an important aspect of case-study methods, namely that case studies “provide a basis for examining how conditions combine in different ways and in different contexts to produce different outcomes” (Ragin, 1989, p. 52). Thus, a QCA will be used utilised to derive a description of possible patterns that emerge between the independent variables (i.e. the four conditions which are labelled X1, X2, X3 and X4) and the dependent variable (i.e. accession to the EU which is labelled Y). The four conditions are democracy (X1), economic freedom (X2), development (X3) and human rights (X4). The QCA analysis will be used to examine the cases vis-à-vis their performance on the four conditions which should lead to accession in the case of positive performance (the case selection is, again, addressed subsequently).

To be able to measure the conditions, the median score per condition is computed due to the fact that a cut-off point is necessary for the further QCA analysis. The cut-off point will be, therefore, statistically justified in this research by means of the median score of all selected cases.

However, due to the usage of a statistical cut-off point, an outcome in which cases are artificially divided could be created which would make a justified correction of the cut-off point necessary (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 10). Especially, for the condition of democracy, the selection of the cut-off point at the median classifies countries artificially as non-democratic, even though the countries are regarded by all three indexes used in the study as ‘democratic’. Therefore, another cut-off point has to be established for the condition of democracy (X1). For this research, a cut-off point of 75 is used for the condition democracy since this marks the lower border of the categorisation of countries as “democracies” of the EIU democracy index and the Freedom House index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008; Freedom House, 2007).

In QCA research, cases having a score above the cut-off point signify that the country is regarded as having a positive score when the country’s score is above the median score of all cases. The positive result is coded as [1]. A country is regarded as economical not free if the country’s score is below the median score of all countries (which is coded as [0], respectively). In a congruent manner, all country scores are coded on every condition. It is important to note at this point that the usage of such cut-off points creates a threshold relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables which creates assumptions about the relationship (Seawright, 2005, p. 8). Thus, by selecting a cut-off point, which is done so by means of a statistical cut-off point (i.e. the median), the independent variables are dichotomized. However, this leaves no room for a grey area or room for discretion which could be given by the Union in terms of fulfilment of the conditions by the candidate countries. Findings in the QCA research could be negative in terms of a country’s performance on one of the conditions, but acceptable by the EU at that stage in the negotiations process. Therefore, the result are rather deterministic in their nature, but “an
informal process of adjusting measures in light of unexpected results, a process Ragin calls a dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Seawright, 2005, p. 9) might become necessary. This dialogue will be done to some extent in the follow-up comparative case analysis in which the outcomes of the QCA research are put in perspective.

The resulting dichotomised table of the QCA analysis, table 5.3, is to be found in the annex. Similar to the four conditions, the dependent variable of accession (labelled as Y) is dichotomised. For every country the score is coded as [1] for accession and [0] for no accession. Since all CEEC countries and Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, these countries score [1] on this variable whereas all other countries score [0] (except Croatia which will join next year and gets, therefore, a [1] assigned as well).

Therefore, the QCA analysis will be aimed at making inferences about the influence of the four selected conditions on accession for the selected countries in order to answer the research question (why some of these countries were admitted whereas others were not) (Gerring, 2012, pp. 346-358). It has to be noted, as outlined above, that the result of the QCA analysis are of deterministic nature due to the usage of statistical cut-off points.

As a second step, a comparative case study will be used as follow-up research with which the countries deviating from the overall pattern are examined. The countries deviating from the pattern do not fulfil the requirements of at least one of the four conditions and show an unjustified score on the accession variable in terms of pattern-matching. Thus, these countries were admitted to the Union despite showing contrary results on the conditions corresponding with the European values.

The advantage of the mixed method is, therefore, that the QCA design can be used to examine many cases and to establish a pattern of conditions vis-à-vis accession. The shortcomings of the QCA design, in terms of in-depth case analysis as to the reasons of the Unions decision to admit countries regardless of shortcomings, can be examined in the comparative case study. Moreover, the model used confirms the used conditions in terms of their necessity and sufficiency, due to the fact that the selected conditions are valid and reliable insofar as the results are confirming the established model.

### 4.1 Measurement of the conditions

In a first step, the four independent variables namely democracy, development, economy and human rights are collected by means of various indexes. These indexes are collected for the four conditions as of the year 2007 which was the point in time when the CEEC enlargement process ended. Why these four conditions are selected will be explained subsequently in the section concerning the measurement of the variables. The conditions are scored by means of indexes which are already available (such as the Freedom House democracy index) and collected in a raw data table (see table 4.1 in the Annex) for further analysis. Before turning to the four conditions in detail, the reliability of the indexes has to be addressed. The European values are measured by means of the selected indexes, as outlined in the theory section on the four conditions (section 3.3). As shown in table 4.1 below, the selected indexes show a high degree of reliability insofar as they are measuring closely the values codified in the European legislation. Despite the fact that some indexes include additional criteria, all European values as shown in the table are measured. The indexes measure, therefore, what is intended to be measured and the overall reliability of the QCA can be regarded as high.

The use of these indexes is explained in section 5.1 concerning the QCA analysis.
4.1.1 Measurement of democracy

As outlined in the section concerning the concepts, democracy (labelled as X1) as part of the Copenhagen criteria is a major cornerstone of the EU enlargement policies. Therefore, the incorporation of the condition democracy is inevitable. Again, the country scores are collected for the year 2007 when the CEEC enlargement process ended.

A significant bias would be introduced by using most recent data in which the CEEC countries would score higher due to the access to the internal market and various EU funds (amongst many other factors). Democracy is measured by means of three indexes which are the Freedom House democracy index (Freedom House, 2007), the Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU] Democracy Index 2008 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) and the Polity IV index (Marshall, 2012).

Unfortunately, the EIU index is made up on a biannually basis and the index of 2008 will be used instead of a possible 2007 index. Nevertheless, no major regime changes occurred in many of the countries in the time frame 2007-2008 which makes the EIU scores for 2008 valid for further research. Possible biases, if they nevertheless occurred, will be ruled out through the two additional democracy indexes.

It has to be noted that the three indexes use different scales, namely ‘1-7’ in the case of the Freedom House index, ‘1-10’ in the EIU index and ‘-10 – 10’ in the case of the polity IV index. Therefore, the indexes are scaled to 100 to make them comparable. These three sets are then combined to an average democracy score per country. Moreover, as outlined in table 4.1 on the reliability of the indexes composition, especially the Freedom House and EIU democracy index measure closely the concepts that closely correlate with the European values of liberal democracy.

As the Freedom House index and the EIU democracy index, in particular, measure pluralism and fundamental freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression and beliefs, the rule of law and civil liberties), these indexes measure exactly the set of liberal democratic values set forth by the EU in its founding
principles (European Union, 2012). As the EU is a sui generis (i.e. one of its own kind in the world), which explicitly is founded on these liberal democratic values of human dignity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, it comes with no surprise that the democracy indexes incorporate these values as overall standard that could be achieved. Therefore, the reliability of the three indexes used in this study with regard to the condition of democracy can be seen as high.

4.1.2 Measurement of development

Secondly, the development condition (X2) is also an integral part of the research design. Development is included due to the fact that the European Union is based on harmonisation and the four free of movement provisions (Art. 3 TEU and Art. 26, 28 and 45 TFEU). This, however, requires a certain level of equality with regard to the development of the member states. This is necessary as internal freedom can only be ensured if all countries included share a certain level of development. Therefore, the Human Development Index [HDI] (United Nations Development Programme, 2012) is included as second independent variable to incorporate this condition in the analysis. The country scores are collected for the year 2007 and also scaled to 100 to make them comparable. The data per country were, again, collected for the year 2007 to make the scores comparable vis-à-vis other conditions. With regard to the reliability of the HDI, one can note that the HDI index is included even more criteria than those associated with social, economic and territorial cohesion within the Union (see table 4.1 for reference). However, this index is covering the well-being of the people living in the respective countries which is the primary factor necessary for harmonised development which leads to social and economic cohesion. Thus, one can argue that despite being comprised of additional criteria, the HDI is a reliable measure for development in the Unions MS.

4.1.3 Measurement of economic freedom

The third factor, economy (X3), the Index of Economic Freedom was accessed which is conducted by the Heritage Foundation, one of the largest US based think tanks, in cooperation with the Wall Street Journal. The Index covers 10 freedoms – from property rights to entrepreneurship – in 184 countries (The Heritage Foundation, 2012). The scores were collected for 2007 for all 18 countries included in the analysis.

As argued for the development condition in the section above, the European Union is based on the harmonisation principle to ensure the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (Art. 3 TEU and Art. 26, 28 and 45 TFEU). Even more than in the case of the developmental factors, the condition of economic freedom is crucial for fulfilling the conditions for being a member of the Union. Therefore, this condition is included by means of the Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation, 2007). The Index of Economic Freedom is already measured on a scale from 0 to 100 which makes rescaling unnecessary.

As visualised table 4.1 regarding the reliability of the index, one can see that the Index of Economic Freedom is measuring, firstly, the free and undistorted competition within the market (European Union, 2012) by examining the presence of property rights and freedom from corruption as well as trade, investment, financial, business, monetary and labour freedom. Secondly, the aim of a highly competitive social market economy (European Union, 2012) is measured as well due to the fact that such competitive market economy is the result of an undistorted and free economy. Therefore, the criteria used by the Index of Economic Freedom match the values formulated by the European Union on this matter and a high degree of reliability is to be noted.
4.1.4 Measurement of human rights

Finally, human rights (X4) are included as independent variable and thus a condition in the analysis. Alongside democracy, a key principle of the European Union are human rights, which becomes visible in the codification of the human rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Union, 2010). This factor is measured by means of the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2007) due to the fact that up until now, no global Human Rights Index is established (Tatchell, 2009; The Green Party of England and Wales, 2008).

The Global Peace Index is comprised of several factors related to human rights and measures, therefore, to high extent the condition of human rights. Due to the unavailability of a Global Human Rights Index, this index will be used to measure this highly important factor despite some shortcomings with regard to the accuracy of this index in measuring not only human rights, but also peace related factors. The Global Peace Index is an index ranging from 5 to 1 (with one constituting complete peace and five constituting no peace). Therefore, this index will be rescaled to 100 to be comparable to the other indexes. In addition, one can note that the GPI is measuring closely the factors that can be associated with the European Human Rights values of freedom, equality, dignity and justice. Despite measuring additional criteria such as militarisation, the index can be regarded as reliable measure of the European concept of human rights as it is congruent with the European definition of human rights.

Again, the index is not a human rights index as such, but no global human rights index exists so far. Rather than measuring the values associated with human rights as defined by the EU, the index measures ‘negative peace’ which means that the opposite if such human rights values is measured (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2007). Thus, the index measures obstacles to achieve the human rights as defined by the EU, such as number of conflicts fought, military expenditure, number of refugees, terrorist activities, etc. One can argue that by measuring ‘negative peace’, the EU values are still measured insofar as the absence of ‘negative peace’ results in peace and human rights as set forth in the EU Charter on Fundamental Human Rights. Therefore, the index can be regarded as reliable as it is indirectly measuring the human rights values of the Union by means of ‘negative peace’ (European Union, 2000).

4.2 Case selection and sampling

The entire population of possible cases can be outlined as all current European Union member states. The six founding members of the Union are excluded from the research, whereas the current candidate countries of the EU are included due to the following reasons. The six founding states are excluded since these never undergone an enlargement process which means that these countries cannot qualify for this analysis. The population of all cases would be, therefore, 27 countries which includes the current candidate countries of Croatia, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey (European Commission, 2012d). As explained subsequently, the population will be however limited to 18 as only the 12 CEEC countries and the current candidate countries (six in total) will be used. Therefore, the case selection will be limited to the CEEC countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Romania and Bulgaria which joined in 2007 and the current candidate countries of the EU (Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) (European Commission, 2012e).
Thus, only the current enlargement of 2004 and 2007 which is referred to, as CEEC enlargement will be subject of the analysis for several reasons. First, the CEEC countries started with their enlargement negotiations in the early 2000s, but early negotiations reach back until the end of the Cold War in 1989. Due to the aforementioned reasons, the CEEC countries are comparable to the current candidate countries. The candidate countries differ on the accession-variable and thus did not accede yet, but had Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) signed in the early 2000s, when the negotiations with the CEEC countries started.

This makes the CEEC countries comparable to the current candidate countries which started negotiating with the EU in a similar timeframe, but did not accede yet and have had Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) signed such as Turkey (1963), Croatia (2001) or Iceland (1994).

The population of cases is, therefore, relatively small ($n = 18$) which already brings several threats to internal validity with it. However, as reasoned above, this case selection is based on the proximity of enlargement of the one set of countries, on the one hand, and the negotiations with the candidate countries, on the other hand. Therefore, the case selection is the largest possible for this research. Moreover, the QCA will be used to maximize the number of comparisons between the countries as outlined in the section concerning the research design.

In addition, it has to be noted that the generalizability of the research is not ideal which is inherent to case study analyses such as the QCA design. The QCA design is not taking care of threats that might be resolved by different designs which were, however, not feasible for this research. Furthermore, the influence of other factors or alternative explanations to the proposed conditions cannot be ruled out and these factors have to be kept in mind. This holds for the realm of international or inter-state relations, public governance or social policies, in general as policies and political decisions are interdependent and interrelated across actors. Thus, decisions taken by the European Union are affected by national decision-making processes as well as by decisions on an international scale.

Further research might be necessary to replicate the results which would increase the internal validity significantly and would prove causality. This could be done by examining other enlargement rounds or by selecting another timeframe (than 2007) for the same set of countries.

In addition, an empty cell problem is inherent if scores cannot be collected for some countries. As in the case of Malta, no data for the Global Peace Index could be found for 2007 (see table 5.2 for reference in the annex) and no scores for Malta and Iceland could be found in the Polity IV index for 2007. This empty cell threat to validity increases the uncertainty of measures, especially in the case of the human rights condition. As outlined in section 4.1.1 on the democracy condition above, the missing data of the Polity IV index are to some extent less crucial due to the usage of three indexes (Freedom House, EIU and Polity IV) on this condition.

However, as also outlined in section 4.1.4 concerning the human rights condition, no global human rights index exists which increases the bias concerning the missing data of Malta considerably. Despite that, the global peace index, as reasoned above, can be used since the countries are primarily scored on human rights issues amongst other peace related issues. As outlined in the methodology of the GPI, “[t]he index is composed of 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from respected sources, which combine internal and external factors ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to its relations with neighboring countries and the level of respect for human rights.” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011). Therefore, it qualifies as human rights index in the absence of a single, global human rights index.

Since only qualitative data can be used to confirm the status of Malta on the matter of human rights, this has to be kept in mind with regard to the QCA modeling.
Again, further research or the replication with recent data might be necessary to disregard this threat to validity.

In the following analysis, the QCA method will be applied to the selected 18 cases by means of the various indexes outlined above. By doing so, the overall pattern can be identified and deviating countries singled out. Furthermore, the comparative case study will follow the QCA analysis.

5. Data and analysis

5.1 QCA analysis

After having outlined the case selection and having established the measurement of the four conditions, the QCA analysis will be outlined in the following. It is important to note that the conditions are prerequisites that have to be fulfilled by the candidate countries before they are allowed in the Union, which is codified in the Copenhagen criteria (European Commission, 2012a). Moreover, as outlined in section 4.1 concerning the measurement of the conditions, data for the selected countries on in total six indexes were collected to examine these. The corresponding raw data as shown below in table 5.2, containing the country scores on the four conditions and their statues concerning successful accession to the Union by 2007 (at latest). Thereby, the scores are collected by country and, in the case of the usage of several indexes for one condition, separately per index. As stated throughout the methodology section, the indexes needed to be scaled uniformly to 100 to make them comparable (as shown in the table 5.2 below). In the case of multiple indexes, the average was computed.

Table 5.2: Raw data for the QCA analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Y1 Accession to the EU, binary (1=yes; 0=no)</th>
<th>X1 Democracy</th>
<th>X2 Development</th>
<th>X3 Economy</th>
<th>X4 Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77,273</td>
<td>71,42</td>
<td>70,4</td>
<td>7,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70,477</td>
<td>57,13</td>
<td>64,3</td>
<td>6,43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98,833</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96,5</td>
<td>9,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69,743</td>
<td>57,13</td>
<td>62,1</td>
<td>6,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50,255</td>
<td>64,275</td>
<td>6,49</td>
<td>6,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61,343</td>
<td>57,13</td>
<td>56,9</td>
<td>5,69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77,340</td>
<td>71,42</td>
<td>70,2</td>
<td>6,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79,988</td>
<td>78,955</td>
<td>70,2</td>
<td>6,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>87,300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81,9</td>
<td>8,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>88,933</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>76,8</td>
<td>7,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91,467</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>74,4</td>
<td>7,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>94,100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72,3</td>
<td>7,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73,6</td>
<td>7,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>87,767</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73,7</td>
<td>7,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79,6</td>
<td>7,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96,633</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83,9</td>
<td>8,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92,333</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>87,513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73,10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For further analysis, the country scores were coded for each index and visualised by means of a software tool (i.e. TOSMANA) (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 10). The country scores were coded in the form of dichotomised scores by using the median score as cut-off point between positively and
negatively scoring. Moreover, a truth table (see table 5.4 in the annex) containing the dichotomised country scores and identical country configurations is used to analyse country patterns further. A truth table, thereby, is the synthesis of the raw data into sets of similar country configurations. Thus, countries scoring identical on the four conditions are grouped together. This makes them better comparable and to insert the data into the software tool.

As this research aims at the question whether some countries were not fulfilling certain conditions while being nevertheless admitted, these countries are expected to deviate from the pattern. The perfect pattern match, thereby, is positive scores on all conditions and a positive outcome on the accession variable or negative scores on all four conditions and a negative score on the accession variable. Thus, are the countries that became member of the EU in 2004 and 2007 scoring higher on the conditions and are thus, consequently, eligible to becoming a member whereas other countries like Turkey, Iceland or Croatia were left out?

After the construction of the truth table on the basis of these data, a data model can be constructed. Before turning to this, however, the visualised model will be explained shortly. The country scores are grouped in the truth table since several countries show the same configurations. Thus, countries scoring [1] and therefore positive on all four conditions are grouped together. Important to note here, is that the output is contradictory (this is visualised by the C in the output below) due to the fact that Iceland is not a member of the Union despite fulfilling all four conditions. For this reason, a second analysis was conducted which includes a fifth condition, namely ‘willingness to join’ as X5. The output accounts for the unwillingness of Iceland to join the Union so far and removes thereby all contradictory cases from the model. The corresponding output is given as table 5.6 in the Annex. The output in table 5.5 reads as [1111] output for countries scoring positive on all four conditions and [0000] for four negative scores. The outcome of the dependent variable, accession to the Union, is visualised by different hatchings. The fine hatched area at the top-left is corresponding with a [0] and thus negative outcome on the accession variable, whereas the crude hatched areas correspond with a [1] and thus positive outcome on the accession variable.

Table 5.5: Visualised QCA model of country configurations
The result of the analysis is shown in table 5.5 above. At first glance, some countries already fulfil this model by means of perfect [1]-configurations (like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and most probably Malta even though no data were available on the Human Rights Index for that particular time frame). And some countries fulfil this model by perfect [0]-configurations (namely Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey). The pattern shows, therefore, that most countries which joined the Union in 2004 were included as they were fulfilling the prerequisite conditions necessary to join the Union. Again, these conditions closely correspond with the European values as argued in section 4.1 concerning the reliability of the measures and the composition of the indexes.

One could say, congruently, that the countries adhering to the European values were included in the Union whereas countries not fulfilling these values, namely Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, were not admitted. It is important to note that all of these excluded countries with the exception of Turkey had a short time span between their first Stabilization and Association Agreements until the most recent enlargement round in 2004 and 2007. Nevertheless, these countries are still regarded as having a long road towards accession even though eight years since the CEEC enlargement elapsed (Dobbels, 2009, p. 5). The case of Turkey has been discussed in the last decades by numerous scholars and, according to this model, the exclusion of this country as member of the Union is insofar justified as the country is not fulfilling the criteria set forth by the EU and is scoring on the lower end of all countries measured in this study. Thus, the Turkish case despite being controversial and subject to debate will not be further highlighted as the country is not deviant with respect to the conditions set forth and can be regarded as rather clear case of negative pattern matching (i.e. the country scores negative on all four conditions and became, consequently, not a member of the Union in the last enlargement round).

It is interesting to note that those CEEC countries included in the so called “Luxembourg group” (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus) (Breuss, 2000, p. 2), with which negotiation talks started as early as 1998, showed either perfect [1]-configurations with no shortcomings on any conditions or only one deviation (as in the case of Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus). Countries belonging to the so called “Helsinki group” (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovak Republic and Malta) (Breuss, 2000, p. 2), however, show multiple shortcomings as visualised in the model above (table 5.5).

The Luxembourg and Helsinki groups, thereby, were named after the respective European Council meetings in Luxembourg in 1997 (European Council, 1997) and Helsinki in 1999 (European Council, 1999), at which the Council decided on the opening of accession negotiations with the respective group of countries by 1998 for the Luxembourg group and 2000 for the Helsinki group (Breuss, 2000). In addition, it has to be kept in mind that the data were collected for 2007 which means that Romania and Bulgaria, despite their delayed accession in 2007, were showing shortcomings on two or respectively three of the four conditions. Why these countries were scoring so poorly and why they were nevertheless included, will be subject of the follow-up case analysis in section 5.2 (Trauner, 2009b).

Turning to another aspect of the model, it is important to note that Iceland is an exceptional case due to the fact that the country, despite having close relations to the EU due to its proximity and dependence for decades, was unwilling to join the Union in the past (European Commission, 2012c). The model shows therefore, a ‘C’ outcome for the perfect [1]-configuration, which means that a contradiction is occurring. As Iceland is an exception to the rule (European Commission, 2012c), it will be addressed as deviant case in the follow-up analysis in section 5.2.2 below.
All other cases, however, show deviant configurations in which the conditions are not leading to the respective outcome. Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Cyprus, Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria show deviations from the pattern (see table 5.5 above).

By subjecting these deviant cases to the following comparative case study, one can analyse in further detail the respective shortcomings of the identified countries and can attempt to explain the willingness to enlarge these countries regardless of their shortcomings on the conditions expected to be necessary for accession.

After the data analysis is completed, the follow-up case study can be conducted with the deviant cases. Thus, the countries that are deviating from the pattern of high scores on the independent variables which leads to the positive outcome of accession ([1111], [1]) or low scores on the independent variables which leads to a negative outcome of no accession ([0000], [0]) will be subject of the follow-up case study and are as such the most relevant countries to be subjected to an in-depth case study research. Detailed information on the data analysis for the QCA-analysis can be found in section 7.1 in the Annex.

5.2 Comparative case study of the deviating countries

After having singled out the deviating countries, the following section will address each country as to the nature of these shortcomings and why, in the case of countries that were admitted regardless of shortcomings, they European Union went through with the accession.

Thereby, the theoretical concepts addressed above in section four will be linked to the deviating countries at hand and will provide a logical foundation for the decision to enlarge or not from the perspective of the EU.

Before turning to the country analyses, one has to keep in mind that all countries subject to this analysis have very divergent socio-cultural and historical backgrounds. Whereas countries of the Western Balkan were involved in the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s and the CEEC countries were part of the Soviet Union until 1989, Iceland as a Western state, for instance, did not face such regime changes. Consequently, the reasons for enlargement or not enlargement of the subsequently addressed countries are following this divergence.

5.2.1 The case of Croatia

Firstly, the case of Croatia will be evaluated. The case of Croatia is especially interesting due to the fact that the country, on the one hand, will become member of the EU in 2013 but shows, on the other hand, deviating scores with regard to the four conditions selected in the QCA analysis (see table 5.5 for the country configurations above). In the light of the reasoning of the QCA analysis, it comes with no surprise that the country was not included in an earlier enlargement round due to several shortcomings with regard to economic freedom, development and human rights. The accession negotiations took place between 2005 and 2011 and followed closely the Copenhagen criteria and acquis chapters as it was the case with earlier enlargements.

However, the Yugoslav wars and the prosecution of war criminals thereafter in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] was a major obstacle in the accession negotiations. Coined as ICTY conditionality, the European Union member states demanded full cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY in apprehending Croatian war criminals which were seen as heroes by the people of Croatia. Ante Gotovina, one of the main Croat fugitives, was still at large when accession negotiations started with Croatia (Dobbels, 2009, p. 16) which led to a grid lock of the accession negotiations with the country in 2009 for almost one year until Gotovina was apprehended.
Another point regarding member state’s reluctance to include Croatia at an earlier point in time can be seen in the disproportionately high weighting of small states in Council voting and other decision-making processes (Field, 2000, p. 3). Concerning rationalist theory, changes in voting powers are affecting the relative bargaining positions of member states and are thus less favourable for member states (Hosli, 1995, p. 3). As of 2000, Croatia and other Western Balkan states were considered for enlargement, but compliance with the “EU conditions of respect for democracy, human rights, peaceful relations and an open economy” (Field, 2000, p. 4) was not visible at the point of the CEEC enlargement. Nevertheless, completion of the accession negotiations with Croatia were driven by some EU member states such as Germany which can be “exemplified by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's description of the full accomplishment of European unification as not just a historical duty, but even more so one which is in Germany's future interests” (Field, 2000, p. 7). Moreover, the Croatian state was seen as sharing the liberal democratic values which are supporting a continued effort towards accession from a constructivist point of view.

Summing up, Croatia’s accession was characterised by continuous efforts to improve the country’s performance with regard to the EU conditions for enlargement, on the one hand, and the failure to comply with regard to the so-called ICTY conditionality in the process of the accession negotiations. Consequently, the country was left out of the CEEC enlargement round despite plans to include the country as of 2000 due to the inability to keep up with the EU demands in the short run. Croatia’s compliance with the conditions for the last five years justifies, however, the inclusion of the country by 2013. According to rationalist theory, the country’s small size threatens the position of larger countries in decision-making processes within the Union due to the relatively elevated voting power of smaller states in the Council. This made the countries of the Western Balkan difficult states for enlargement in the first place (Field, 2000). The common liberal democratic values, however, made the country also in light of a historical duty a suitable member state for the Union which is in line with constructivist theory.

5.2.2 The case of Iceland

Secondly, as already mentioned in section 5.1 concerning the QCA analysis, the case of Iceland is the exception to the rule. On the one hand, the country did not witness significant regime changes such as the CEEC countries which experienced the change from the Cold War period with a socialist regime towards a liberal-democratic system after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The other countries included, namely the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the Western Balkan, were significantly impacted by the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 until 1995. This was not the case for Iceland.

On the other hand, the geopolitical position of Iceland enabled the country to establish close trade relations especially with its directly neighbouring country, the United Kingdom. Moreover, the close ties led to a close cooperation with the European Union of the last four decades. In particular, Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Association [EFTA] since 1970 and has had a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the EEC since 1972 (European Commission, 2010, p. 8). Additionally, about two thirds of foreign trade is with EU member states (and more than half of the imports are from EU member states) which makes Iceland very interdependent vis-à-vis the Union.

With regard to the QCA analysis, it comes without surprise that Iceland is scoring positive on all conditions due to the long-lasting tradition of democracy, codification of human rights as well as political and civil rights which are enshrined in the constitution of the country since 1944 (European Commission, 2010, pp. 10-12).

Before the financial crisis of 2009, Iceland has been unwilling to join the Union due to the fact that entering the Union was regarded as unnecessary step to take by the coalition of the conservative party
and the liberals which were in power from 1995-2007 (EUnews, 2012). After elections and the financial crisis, the government changed and gave way to the accession process. When introducing a fifth variable to the QCA analysis conducted above (see table 5.6 in the annex), namely unwillingness to join, the non-membership of Iceland can be explained. Thus, solely the unwillingness to join explains the non-membership of the country and not a negative performance of the country with regard to the factors of democracy, human rights, economic freedom or development (EUnews, 2012; European Commission, 2010).

When turning to the more recent development, the financial crisis has to be regarded as turning point of Iceland’s willingness to join the Union due to the collapse of several Icelandic banks in the process. The so called Icesave bill (European Commission, 2010, p. 7) saved the country from a possible bankruptcy. When turning to the meta-theories of rationalism and constructivism, one has to note that the constructivist approach explains the willingness to include Iceland in the Union from the Union’s perspective due to a shared set of values in almost all regards, in particular deeply rooted democratic values, and constitutionally enshrined rights and the codification of human rights. It fails, however, with regard to the current developments and the hard bargaining of several EU member states in the process of the accession negotiations. Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are opposed to an immediate accession of Iceland due to the unresolved matter of the Icesave bill. The two countries granted loans for a state guarantee of 3.9 billion € which is not refunded by the Icelandic state so far. Thus, material bargaining explains why some countries are reluctant to an immediate accession of the country despite common shared values. Summing up, a combination of constructivism and rationalism (especially with regard to material bargaining in the context of the Icesave bill) can be seen as explanation of the Icelandic case.

5.2.3 The case of Latvia

Thirdly, the case of Latvia can be regarded as successful application of conditionality by the European Union. However, the country had a rather poor performance due to its historical background as it scored rather low on civic and political rights when the accession negotiations started (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 15). Therefore, the reason why Latvia was in the second group of accession negotiations, the so called Helsinki group, can be explained by the reason stated above, as well as the reason why Latvia got a negative score regarding human rights. Especially ethnic minorities (and in particular the large Russian-minority group) suffer from limited access of rights such as minority language rights (Adrey, 2005; U.S. Department of State, 2007).

Nevertheless, the overall performance of Latvia with regard to the other three conditions can be seen as sufficient to uphold the liberal-democratic values of the Union and to integrate in the market economy of the EU (Galbreath, 2006). The EU approach to integrate the country within the Union can be seen as successful. This approach can be associated with the aim to provide geopolitical stability to the Baltic region and the post-Cold War attempt of Latvia to overcome Russian influence (Galbreath, 2006, p. 5). Accordingly, the case of Latvia is relatively unsurprising despite deviations with regard to the human rights condition, according to the QCA analysis, and the case can be put in line with the constructivist approach with regard to the approximation of Latvia vis-à-vis the liberal democratic values of the Union as well as with regard to rationalist theory, namely the attempt to stabilise the Baltic region from the EU’s perspective.
5.2.4 The case of Cyprus

Fourthly, the case of Cyprus is going to be examined. According to the conducted QCA analysis, Cyprus scored overall positively except for the condition of human rights as measured by the Global Peace Index (see table 5.5 above). The negative scoring is primarily related to the yet unresolved conflict with Turkey. For instance, the Cypriote state did not uphold the Human Rights Charter of the Union. Especially in the case Aziz v Cyprus the country denied Mr Aziz the right to vote which was based on the discriminatory grounds that he was a Turkish-Cypriote (European Court of Human Rights, 2004). However, this right was changed accordingly, now giving the right to vote to all Turkish-Cypriotes. In addition, discrimination of minorities was primarily targeted on the Turkish-Cypriote minority (U.S. Department of State, 2005).

Despite these negative scores with regard to human rights, Cyprus overall performance is satisfactory as it has an independent judiciary, a functioning market economy and the country has a special Committee for EU and External Affairs in order to assist the harmonisation process and to approximate all legal documents to the acquis (European Commission, 2012b). Thus, even so there are some shortcomings with regard to human rights, the accession of Cyprus to the Union can be seen as justified with regard to the high levels of approximation of the country’s performance vis-à-vis the liberal democratic values of the Union. Moreover, the accession of the country was of high geopolitical importance as the country originally applied as whole island in 1990 (European Commission, 2012b). As the Turkish-Cypriot part did not join the delegation of the Republic of Cyprus, the EU did not want to refrain from the positive accession negotiations with the Republic. Hence, the northern part is excluded whereas the Republic was admitted to the Union (European Commission, 2012b). Summing up, the difficult geopolitical situation of the island was primarily causing difficulties in the accession process and separation-related violations of human rights led to negative scores of the country. Nevertheless, the accession of the country can be seen in line with constructivist theory, namely the upholding of liberal-democratic values of the Republic, and the specific geopolitical interests of the Union led to the accession despite the unwillingness to join by the Turkish-Cypriot region.

5.2.5 The case of Poland

Fifthly, the case of Poland shows relatively few surprising deviations from the expected pattern of countries fulfilling the conditions set forth by the EU and a resulting successful accession to the Union. As one of the largest CEEC countries to be included in the enlargement round, Poland was included in the so called “Luxembourg group” with which negotiations started as early as October 1998 (Breuss, 2000, p. 2).

However, due to a special exception requested by Poland, namely “a transition period until 2017 for certain state aids granted to businesses in the Polish ‘Special Economic Zones’” (Mayhew, 2000, p. 26), a transition period for the liberalisation of the energy markets (gas in the Polish case) (Mayhew, 2000, p. 27) and especially a restriction concerning land ownership by foreigners (Mayhew, 2000, p. 51) led to the relatively poor performance of Poland. But it has to be noted that many of the weaker CEEC countries were showing even weaker performances than Poland (and Hungary) in both reform and legal harmonisation before the enlargement in 2004 in many other aspects (Mayhew, 2000, p. 44).

Above all, in “the accession of the three 'large' countries in central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, with their close historical and political links to [W]estern Europe” (Mayhew, 2000, p. 65), one can clearly see the linkage to common values which were the driving factors behind
the enlargement (constructivism) rather than pure material bargaining strategies (rationalism). Despite threats of a large country such as Poland to the relative power position of EU-25 member states with regard to agriculture and cheaper labour forces amongst other factors, have not led to an exclusion of the country. Common values and historical ties were elevated in the accession negotiations with Poland and led to a very speedy accession process of only six years.

Moreover, one has to point out those countries with geopolitical interests, especially Germany and France, that pushed for such accelerated accession with rhetorical action as “Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac separately mentioned the year 2000 as the date for the EU accession of Hungary and Poland during visits to those countries in 1996” (Mayhew, 2000, p. 8).

5.2.6 The case of Slovenia

Sixthly, turning to the case of Slovenia, which is deviant only insofar as the country is scoring relatively low on the economic freedom condition. Thus, the overall pattern holds also for Slovenia as the country fulfils the criteria with regard to liberal-democratic values, an appropriate level of development and the upholding of human rights. Due to the fact that the labour market of the country is tighter regulated than the EU average (The Heritage Foundation, 2007, p. 49), the country scores low on the index of economic freedom (see table 5.2 for detailed data in the annex).

Even though the country scores rather low on this condition, it is neighboured by France and Italy in this regard (The Heritage Foundation, 2007, p. 80) and a crucial impact on Slovenia’s fitting within the European Union can be doubted.

Summing up, the country can be seen as one which overall fulfilled the conditions set by the EU to become a member states and shares the common values by the Union and implemented the EU rules and regulations to a similar extent as founding states (such as Italy and France with regard to economic, labour regulation) (The Heritage Foundation, 2007).

5.2.7 The cases of Romania and Bulgaria

Finally, the cases of Romania and Bulgaria are in itself deviating from the rest of the CEEC enlargement countries due to the fact that their accession was postponed due to shortcomings in the implementation process. Thus, the accession occurred only by 2007 instead of 2004.

Several scholars and EU officials pointed out that the accession of the two countries was still premature and numerous infringement procedures against the two countries are significant indicators for that (Dobbels, 2009, p. 5).

It comes without surprise that the two countries were scoring - even at the point of their accession to the Union (2007) - negatively in the QCA analysis. The following conditions of economic freedom, development and human rights (Romania scored just above the median score in the GPI index measuring the human rights condition) were not met by the two countries. Therefore, they were not allowed to join together with the other CEEC countries in 2004. Moreover, both countries scored just slightly above the cut-off point of 75 on the democracy condition which can be seen as the highly important condition with regard to the European liberal-democratic values (as outlined in the reliability measure in table 4.1) (European Commission, 2012a).

To safeguard against failure to comply with EU measures after the accession, the Union applied for the first time post-accession conditionality and “the Commission preserved the right to monitor Bulgaria’s and Romania’s judicial systems” (Trauner, 2009b, p. 2). The two accession processes were also seen as lengthier as and more difficult than the accession process by the other countries. One can see in the adherence of EU rules prior to accession, which was mainly driven by rational cost-benefit trade-offs by the actors involved, a rationalist argument (Trauner, 2009b, p. 2). Moreover, the fact that the
Kosovo crisis was inherent at that point in time, which made a stabilisation of the South-Eastern European region necessary, and key countries such as Great Britain due to geopolitical interests pushed for the inclusion of the two countries, made a change in the status of the two countries possible (Trauner, 2009b, p. 5). Again, the inclusion of the two countries in the accession negotiations with regard to geopolitical interests can be seen in the light of rationalist behaviour. Nevertheless, the two countries never caught up with the other CEECs which led to the delay of the accession until 2007 (Trauner, 2009b).

As outlined above, the two countries met the conditions set forth by the Union just before 2007 and the Commission “was given the right to invoke safeguards measures up to three years after accession if serious shortcomings were observed in three areas of the acquis, i.e. the economic (Art. 36), the internal market (Art. 37) and the justice and home affairs areas (Art. 38)” (Trauner, 2009b, p. 5). Hence the post-accession monitoring was introduced to safeguard European interests due to the lack of political alternatives. It was believed by the Union that a postponement of the accession of the two countries would lead to a further slowdown of reforms and the accession can be seen as “a reflection of wider security imperatives which led the EU to allow the accession of ‘imperfect’ new member states instead of risking the unpredictable costs of their exclusion” (Trauner, 2009b, p. 6).

Therefore, despite the deficits of both countries with regard to reforms in especially the economic sector and justice and home affairs, which became visible as well in the QCA analysis conducted in this research, the EU decided to include the two imperfect countries due to geopolitical and security reasons. Especially the on-going conflicts in South-Eastern Europe around 2000 led to an inclusion of the two countries contrary to earlier decisions not to include them after the Luxembourg European Council meeting (in 1997 after which the so called Luxembourg group was formed) or the Helsinki summit in 1999 (Trauner, 2009b). Summing up, especially rationalist cost-benefit considerations let to the inclusion of the two countries despite considerably shortcomings with regard to European values which became visible in the QCA analysis conducted above as well as the fact that the EU Commission got the right to invoke safeguard measures in the post-accession period for the first time in the history of EU enlargements.

6. Conclusion

After having examined the selected countries in the QCA analysis and subjected the deviant countries to the follow-up comparative case study, the proposed research question will be addressed:

“Why were some of the CEEC countries included in the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, despite shortcomings, whereas some of the candidate countries were left out?”

This research paper was divided into several sections, mainly the theoretical framework of the research, the methodological approach and the analysis of the research area, EU enlargement. The conducted research was twofold with the QCA analysis in the first part and the follow-up, comparative case study in the second part.

The QCA analysis showed that the applied conditions in the research very valid insofar as the countries subjected to the research confirmed the model with the exception of the Icelandic case. Furthermore, the QCA analysis showed that the majority of the countries admitted to the Union in 2004/2007 fulfilled the conditions measured in the QCA analysis and their admittance can be seen as justified with regard to the values of the Union.
As argued in this paper, the exceptional case of Iceland can be explained by adding an explanatory, independent variable to the model, which means, in turn, that the overall validity of the model can be seen as satisfactory. Nevertheless, further research is necessary as the research is having shortcomings with regard to external validity due to the limited number of cases and observations as well as threats to internal validity, especially an empty cell problem due to the lack of data in some cases. Nevertheless, the reliability of the research can be seen as satisfactory as the values of the EU with regard to liberal-democratic values as well as liberal market-economy features and human rights are measured by the indexes incorporated in the research.

In the following, the deviant cases need to be addressed: Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Iceland, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. One can see minor shortcomings, especially in the cases of Poland, Latvia, Cyprus and Slovenia. These shortcomings are arguably in contradiction to the conditions set forth by the Union to enter the EU. However, the follow-up case study showed that primarily geopolitical considerations outweigh these shortcomings. Also, provisions were included in the accession treaties to ensure compliance of these countries in the future. Thus, despite shortcomings at the point of admittance, the countries were let into the Union due to the greater importance of stabilisation of the various regions and, therefore, due to geopolitical considerations. Poland was of great importance to Germany and France (Mayhew, 2000) due to close proximity as argued in the country analysis in section 5.2.5). Furthermore, Latvia was of importance for the stability of the Baltic region (Galbreath, 2006) as argued in section 5.2.3). As stated before, the case of Iceland is as exception to the rule and the case is only insofar deviant as the country is fulfilling almost all the conditions but is not (yet) a member of the Union.

The major deficiencies with regard to the EU conditions and the most striking deviations from the pattern could be reported for Romania and Bulgaria. Not only were these countries delayed in their admission to the EU. But the amount of infringement procedures (Dobbels, 2009) after the accession show the decreased approximation of the two countries towards EU rules, norms and values. Consequently, the EU applied for the first time the post-accession conditionality to an admitted country (Trauner, 2009b). The admission of these two countries can be viewed again as related to geopolitical interests of the Union’s member states by stabilising the South Eastern European region (i.e. the Balkan) and the willingness to adhere themselves to historical commitments.

Thus, the enlargement of several countries regardless of their shortcomings on one of the conditions can be attributed primarily to geopolitical interests of EU member states and the objective to stabilise the various neighbouring regions of the Union. This is in line with the rationalist theoretical framework as the EU’s member states have a greater interest to ensure stability in regions of close proximity and to foster economic exchange, which increases material benefits in the long run. The admission of countries such as Romania and Bulgaria can be considered as congruent with constructivist theory as these countries repeatedly stressed their common belonging inside the liberal-democratic family of the Union and to “always been part of West European traditions” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 23). This, is a probable explanation of the surprising special support of France, Greece and Italy for Romania and Bulgaria (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 5). It does not, however, explain the case of Turkey. As Turkey is of great geopolitical importance (in terms of energy security and stabilisation of the region to the EU), the support for accession is not credible in recent years (cf. Hödl, 2010; Öniş, 2007). This case should be subjected to further research as the credibility of the membership prospect is one of the key instruments of the EU to achieve compliance with the accession criteria. This would go, however, beyond the scope of this paper and cannot be addressed further.
All in all, the research showed that the current candidate countries were, and still are, not ready for accession to the Union. The countries included in the CEEC enlargement were overall performing well with regard to the reforms necessary to be included in the European Union. The exceptions to the overall positive performance, thereby, can be explained by means of geopolitical considerations and member state specific preferences that led to an inclusion of all CEEC candidates in the end. The research question, “Why were some of the CEEC countries included in the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, despite shortcomings, whereas some of the candidate countries were left out?”, can be answered partially by stressing the fact that geopolitical interests with regard to the stabilisation of the various regions gave way to include countries such as Romania and Bulgaria despite their deficiencies. Thus, the shortcomings were also recognised by the EU, but the EU’s interests to stabilise various neighbouring regions were of greater importance.

However, it cannot be answered with complete certainty why these interests were given priority over the conditions set forth by the Union for the enlargement process (i.e. the Copenhagen criteria). The credibility of EU enlargement can be questioned as geopolitical considerations are given priority over admission criteria in some cases. One can argue that this is in line with rationalist theory and confirms the argumentation by Moravcsik that current member states put a high emphasis on geopolitical stability, especially in the case of turmoil (such as the end of the Cold War for the Baltic region or the Kosovo crisis in the Balkan region) to safeguard their interests and increase their trade flow in the long run. Thus, the research confirms the general rationalist assumptions, but this prioritization should be subject of further research as well.

The study is insofar limited as the findings cannot be generalised to any set of countries outside the European Union. Due to the \textit{sui generis} nature of the EU with its supranational structure and harmonisation across countries, generalisations to other regions of the world are impossible. Moreover, the findings are only valid for the specific set of countries selected or countries which are situated within the geographical boundaries of Europe and might apply to the Union in the future. Thus, the generalizability of the findings can be limited to current member states, candidate countries and countries in the process of applying to become a member state of the Union (such as the remaining countries in the Balkan region and Turkey).

According to Schimmelfennig (2001, p. 30), while “rationalism can explain most actor preferences and much of their bargaining behavior, it fails to account for the collective decision for enlargement. Sociological institutionalism, in turn, can explain the outcome but not the input”. He coined this as community trap, which could be witnessed in this research and can explain the outcome of the CEEC enlargement in an alternative manner. Community trap insofar as the countries were forced to uphold the Communities interests. As it became visible in the CEEC enlargement, “[o]nce caught in the community trap, [EU member states] can be forced to honor identity- and value-based commitments in order to protect their credibility and reputation as community members” which led to the extensive enlargement witnessed in 2004 and 2007.

Further research on the long-term performance of the CEEC countries will be necessary to determine whether the countries performances are positive in the long run. One has to see if they will be contributing to the sustainable growth of the Union in the future and whether the decision to include these countries was useful.
7. Annex

Table 5.3: Data table with dichotomised conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>X1 Democracy</th>
<th>X2 Development</th>
<th>X3 Economy</th>
<th>X4 Human Rights</th>
<th>Outcome (accession Y1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Truth table showing the various configurations

Truth table output

Truth Table:

v1: X1 Democracy  v2: X2 Development  v3: X3 Economy  v4: X4 Human Rights
O: Outcome (accession Y1)  id.  Country

Created with Tosmana Version 1.3.2
7.1 Data analysis

As a first step, the collected scores per country for the year 2007 (and the year 2008 for the EIU index) are scaled to 100 to make them comparable. Secondly, the three indexes on democracy are combined to an average democracy score per country.

As second step, the median score per condition is computed. Again, in the case of democracy this statistical method seems unfeasible due to the fact that the resulting cut-off point would disqualify several countries as ‘non-democratic’ even though these were coherently scored as ‘democratic’ by the initial three indexes. Therefore, on the basis of reasoning and cut-off points used in the initial indexes, a cut-off point of 75 will be used for the condition of democracy instead of the median. See table 5.2 for reference on the scaled indexes and the median scores.

As a third step, a dichotomized table is constructed by using the statistically computed cut-off point of the median for the assignment. Thus, countries scoring lower than the median (or 75 as in the case of democracy) are categorized as [0] whereas countries scoring exactly the median or higher are assigned to the category [1]. This process is done in accordance with the procedure set forth by Rihoux and de Meur (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009).

As fourth step, a truth table is constructed on the basis of the dichotomized table. This will be done by using the software “Tosmana” (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009).
At this stage of the analysis, it will be checked for the necessity and sufficiency of each condition with regard to the outcome. This is done by means of the suggested formula: [the number of cases with a [1] value on the condition AND a [1] outcome value, divided by the total number of cases with a [1] outcome value] (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 15).

As fifth step, contradictions in the data have to be resolved as some cases cannot be explained by the model (and the included conditions) which would exclude these cases when proceeding with the QCA without resolving the contradictions (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 18). To put it differently, some cases might not be explained by the selected conditions.

Therefore, an additional condition might be necessary to explain contradictions, due to the fact that removal of cases would be highly problematic with regard to the internal validity of the research. As the sample is relatively small, the removal of cases could create unwarranted biases that could be avoided by introducing a fifth condition that could resolve the contradictions. If, however, some cases might remain unresolved with regard to contradictions with the model, the “option is simply to accept that those […] cases deserve some specific qualitative-historical interpretation and that hence they should be left out for the next steps of the csQCA” (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 21).

As sixth step, the results are visualized in a 2D model similar to the example below (Figure 7.1).

**Figure 7.1: Example of a visualized QCA by (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009)**

![Figure 7.1 Example of a visualized QCA by (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009)](image-url)
8. Literature list


