Bachelor Thesis

How does the developmental process of norms in the European Union differ due to the policy area?

A comparison of Swedish efforts in high and low politics

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Statement in Lieu of an Oath

"I declare in lieu of an oath that I have written this bachelor thesis myself and that I have not used any sources or resources other than stated for its preparation. I further declare that I have clearly indicated all direct and indirect quotations."

Bottrop, 01.07.2012

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# Table of Content

List of Abbreviation ............................................................................................................. 1

1. **Introduction** .................................................................................................................. 2

2. **Theoretical Framework** ............................................................................................... 4
   2.1. What are ‘norms’? ........................................................................................................ 4
   2.2. How do norms develop? – The norm lifecycle by Finnemore & Sikkink ............... 6
   2.3. What are ‘small states’ (within the EU)? ................................................................. 8
   2.4. Contradicting realist’s thinking: the Hypotheses ..................................................... 9

3. **Methodology** .................................................................................................................. 10
   3.1. Research design ........................................................................................................ 10
   3.2. Case selection ............................................................................................................ 12

4. **Analysis** ........................................................................................................................ 13
   4.1. Sweden and conflict prevention ............................................................................... 14
      4.1.1. Norm emergence ............................................................................................... 14
      4.1.2. Tipping point .................................................................................................... 18
      4.1.3. Norm cascade ................................................................................................... 18
   4.2. Sweden and sustainable development ..................................................................... 20
      4.2.1. Norm emergence ............................................................................................... 20
      4.2.2. Tipping point .................................................................................................... 21
      4.2.3. Norm cascade ................................................................................................... 21
   4.3. Comparison ................................................................................................................. 25

5. **Conclusion** .................................................................................................................... 29

Literature................................................................................................................................ 32
**List of Abbreviation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Committee on Environmental Objectives (Sweden)</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLO</td>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FYRM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment (Sweden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPA</td>
<td>Swedish Environment Protection Agency</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
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1. Introduction

50 years ago, the European Community was founded by three large states (France, Italy and West Germany) and three small states (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Nowadays, since the latest expansions in 2004 and 2007, the European Union (EU) comprises of 27 member states, of which the vast majority can be classified as small states. Hence, the EU consists of even more small states than ever before. Nevertheless, the four biggest member states, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, have 29 votes each in the Council of the European Union (Council) whereas the smallest state, Malta, holds only three votes. (Council, n.d.) Comparing the voting power of small and large EU member states, as well as considering the media coverage, it seems as if these big states are the influential actors in policy-making within the EU. Thus, to many, especially the Union’s external policy seems to be nothing more than what the large member states make of it. In connection to this, the question arises whether and how small states are able to have a say within the EU’s decision-making process, in particular in the field of high politics such as the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Against this background, Sweden as a small Nordic country has impressively demonstrated in June 2001, when the Göteborg European Council concluded the Swedish presidency and adopted the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, that also a small state can be able to push through a norm within high politics. But how did the high politics’ norm conflict prevention develop? Are there any variations from the evolution of the norm sustainable development that was promoted by Sweden in the field of low politics simultaneous? Does a possible difference affect the successful outcome of a high politics’ norm? In the following, the present Bachelor thesis argues that small states are able to push forward a high politics’ norm, even though the developmental process might differ compared to low politics’ norm evolution. In order to investigate against this background the main research question reads as follows:

‘To what extent is there a difference in the development of norms pushed forward by small states in the EU, in particular in the case of Sweden, due to the different policy area?’

1 From: Bunse, 2009, p.28
In the past, various scientists have already done a lot of research in the field of small state’s influence in international politics and to some degree in the European context as well. However, the existing research primarily focuses on the theoretical approach of small states and their possibilities to influence the evolution of norms in general without comparing the norm developmental process step-by-step in particular. Consequently, there are several scientists studying single case studies of small states within the EU policy by concentrating on one norm (e.g. Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2002; Kronsell 2002). Thus, there is merely little literature analysing how norms which were put on the EU-agenda by small states differ in their development with regard to the policy area. Moreover, although the study of norms in International Relations is dominated by constructivist theorists (Puschkarsky, 2009, p.6) researchers of small states mostly utilize approaches of realism or institutionalism to examine the influence of small states.

The following study aims to extend the existing research by tracing and comparing the evolution of norms within the EU which were put on the agenda by small states in two different policy areas, in particular in high and in low politics. Therefore, this study shall focus on the question whether the success of small states in developing norms, as well as their opportunities to influence the EU-agenda, depends on the particular policy area. Since the prevailing existing literature mostly applies realist’s thinking to deal with the issue of small state’s influence, the following study shall concentrate on a constructivist approach. Therefore, the present study makes use of the norm lifecycle by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) to provide a structure as well as to make the norm developmental process more tangible. This theoretical framework is applied on a comparative study of two norms which are of particular interest: ‘conflict prevention’ as a norm of high politics, and ‘sustainable development’ representing low politics. These norms were pushed through by the small state of Sweden.

In order to be able to examine the main research question, additional sub questions are posed which shall on the one hand help to structure the study and, on the other hand, provide necessary information to answer the overall research question. The first sub questions include: ‘What are norms and how do they develop?’ and ‘What are ‘small states’?’. After having answered these by providing the essential theoretical framework, two further questions arise: ‘How does a norm develop that was put on the EU’s agenda by the small state of Sweden in the field of CFSP?’ and ‘How does a norm develop that was put on the agenda of the EU environmental policy by Sweden?’. These two should establish the main part of the
analysis together with the last sub question: ‘Are there any differences in the development of the two cases and, if so, where are they?’.

For reasons of overview, this chapter ends with an outline of the study. After this introductory section, the present Bachelor thesis shall begin with the theoretical framework (Chapter 2). Therein, the terms ‘norms’, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘norm advocacy’ are defined in order to provide the necessary definitions to explain the norm lifecycle by Finnemore and Sikkink. With the theory of the norm lifecycle, the general developmental process of a norm in the international system is illustrated. Due to the reason that the norm lifecycle was initially developed to explain the evolution of a norm in the international system, the way of applying the norm lifecycle to the norm development within the EU’s context is also outlined. In a next step, the second sub question is answered by defining the term ‘small states’ in the EU. Chapter 3 concentrates on the methodology underlying the thesis by presenting the research design of a comparative case study and its limitations. Further, the afore-determined definition of ‘small states’ is applied to Sweden and the selection of the two norms is explained. The fourth chapter is the main body of the thesis: the analysis. This chapter shall trace the development of the two selected norms step-by-step by applying the stages of the norm lifecycle’s framework. The third section of Chapter 4 deals with a comparison of the most important differences and similarities of the evolution of both norms to answer the last sub question. Finally, the thesis concludes by answering the main research question, as well as assessing the outcome and limits of the study.

2. Theoretical Framework

As aforementioned, this thesis aims to examine whether the evolution of a norm that was promoted by a small state differentiates due to the policy area and whether a possible difference affects the outcome of the particular norm. Talking about norms and small states, the general questions arise: ‘What are norms and how do they develop?’ and ‘What are ‘small states’?’. Accordingly, this chapter shall concentrate on the theoretical approach of this thesis by defining the most important terms to provide a foundation for the later comparative analysis.

2.1. What are ‘norms’?

Referring to Hoffmann (2003, p.3) the term ‘norm’ is ubiquitous in the vocabulary of International Relations, as well as political science in general. Since the concept
of norms is of main importance for this thesis, it appears necessary to define the term as well as related expressions.

The theories of International Relations offer different perceptions of the term ‘norm’ which partly overlap and converge. According to Björkdahl (2002, p.40) the basic element of common definitions is that norms are said to be noticed as shared expectations based on prescriptions and generate regularity as well as stability. Following this, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.891) provide a constructivist approach defining norms “as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”. This implies that from their perspective, norms are considered to be a collection of intersubjective agreements as well as shared expectations concerning the proper behaviour of international actors (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996). Björdahl (2002, p.34) extends this definition by adding that norms also “prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations”. To sum up, from a constructivist perspective, norms function as channels in regularizing appropriate behaviour of international actors, and provide a social structure by expressing values in order to create new responsibilities and rights. As this thesis shall concentrate on the constructivist perspective of norm evolution, this definition is used in the following.

Dealing with the development of a norm, it is also necessary to clarify who generates a new norm in general. In this context, the ‘norm entrepreneur’ arises as the central actor concerning the emergence of a norm. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.896) ‘norm entrepreneurs’ can be defined as agents or policy innovators building and promoting a particular norm which they think to be the appropriate behaviour. There are various actors who could embody the role of a norm entrepreneur instancing states, individuals or societal actors (Ingebritsen, 2006, p.274). Further, norm entrepreneurs can be described as agenda setters since they introduce new norms to the international debate intending to reach normative change. By attempting “to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.895) they try to change the existing situation as well as the behaviour of other actors. Nevertheless, norm entrepreneurs need an appropriate platform to address their audience in order to be successful (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.899). Evidently, they play a significant role in putting new norms on the political agenda. But how does a norm develop in general?
2.2. How do norms develop? The norm lifecycle by Finnemore & Sikkink

After having answered the sub question ‘What are norms?’ the question arises ‘How do norms develop?’ since this paper aims to trace and compare the developmental process of norms. Purposing to answer the second sub question, the norm lifecycle by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) is particularly suited for understanding and tracing norm evolution. This theoretical framework classifies the general developmental process by three theoretical stages: norm emergence, norm cascade and internalization (see fig.1). Starting with the first stage ‘norm emergence’, norm entrepreneurs as mentioned above play the most important role by building and introducing new norms. During this step, they call attention to the particular issue they want to change and try to persuade as many supporters as possible by framing their issue. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.897) describe “the construction of cognitive frames” (“framing”) as a significant component of the strategy of norm entrepreneurs during the first stage. Furthermore, a norm that was set on the agenda needs to be advocated in order to be kept on the agenda. Therefore, there is the need of ‘norm advocacy’. According to Björdahl (2008) norm advocates try to shape the agenda as well as the terms of debate intending to push the new norm forward. For the purpose of convincing and gaining supporters, different strategies and diplomatic tactics are used depending on the particular norm, the influence of the norm entrepreneur and motive. If the critical mass is convinced with the result that there are enough states accepting and supporting the new norm, the ‘tipping point’ is achieved (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.901). Subsequent to the ‘tipping point’, the next stage is the ‘norm cascade’. During this second stage, the acceptance of the norm rapidly increases which is referred to as “contagion” by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 902). States adopt the new norm during a process of “international socialization” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.902) due to different reasons such as domestic legitimacy, esteem needs or reputation. But also during this stage, the norm entrepreneur continues to advocate and promote the norm. In connection to this, an institutionalisation of the newly accepted norm takes place. The last stage is called ‘internalization’. At this point, the norm ideally becomes internalised so that the government as well as its people take the norm for granted. Finally, the new norm becomes unquestioned and part of the everyday life by vanishing from the debate. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 895-905)
Since the norm lifecycle was initially introduced to explain the general evolution of a norm in international context, in the following this theoretical framework is applied to the EU to trace two norms from their domestic emergence until they are institutionalised on European level. The first stage ‘norm emergence’ is adopted like the general approach of Finnemore and Sikkink described above. Thus, the focus lies on the emergence of the norms on the domestic level and how the norm entrepreneur (in this case Sweden) introduced the new norms to the EU and its member states, shaped the agenda and pushed them forward until enough member states accepted the norms so that the ‘tipping point’ was reached. For the reason that there are no fixed measurement parameters to assess when the tipping point is achieved, as well as due to the available literature, documents and data, it appears difficult to draw a clear line between the stages. Thus, in this study, the threshold point is said to be reached when enough EU member states (the majority of votes) support the particular norms so that they could be adopted by the EU. After having convinced the critical mass, this paper interprets the second step, ‘norm cascade’, as the point where the norms were converted and adopted into EU legislation. During this stage, the focus is on the norm entrepreneur’s endeavours to advocate the norms in order to keep them on the European agenda. In this application, the third and last stage, ‘internalization’, describes the step where the member states adopted the particular EU legislation into national law and practice. Thus, internalization is the stage where the norms became internalised by the national government and people.

Due to the very complex process and available literature, this paper concentrates on the first two stages and the tipping point, omitting the last step ‘internalization’. Since the overall research question focuses on the differences of the evolution of the norms in the European context, meaning from the national emergence until their institutionalization on EU level, internalizing of the norm on the national level as the last step is not significant for answering the research question.
2.3. **What are ‘small states’ (within the EU)?**

Once the term ‘norm’ is clarified as well as the theoretical foundation of the norm lifecycle is provided, another significant term appears in the main research question: ‘small states’. But what exactly are small states in the EU? Various scholars have already tried to provide a definition but due to the different research approaches, there are diverse definitions and a broad spectrum of criteria used to determine the character of small states (e.g. Archner & Nugent 2002; Panke 2008; Thorhallsson 2006a). One criterion often used within the EU is the economic or financial power, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Another criterion is political power, especially in terms of voting power in the Council or the number of deputies in the European Parliament. But also the military budgets, size of population or territory is named as benchmark for defining small states within the EU. Applying, for instance, the criterion of territory as concept of size to Finland, it would be considered as a big state in the EU, whereas this country would be classified as a ‘small state’ in terms of population or voting power. (Panke, 2008) By this example it becomes obvious that the dimension of size is relative. Additionally, Archner and Nugent (2002) point to the fact that it is evidently not easy to draw a clear line between ‘big’ and ‘small’.

However, there are also some attempts to define the term ‘small states’ without using the above-mentioned criteria. One of these approaches is provided by Keohane concentrating on the (self-) perception of a country and its influence on the international system by defining a small state as “a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone, or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Keohane, 2006, p.60). Nevertheless, this definition is also not generally accepted. For instance, Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006, p.654) disagree with this approach arguing that the fewest states “enter the EU without believing that they can influence the system” as well as that this alternative definition omits other significant factors. This contradiction can be named as one example for several contrasting views regarding the definition of small states since there are several approaches: from simply defining a small state as a country that is not a great power, considering various criteria such as population, territory or GDP, relating the definition to the state’s capabilities meaning the possession of absolute or relative power, up to a combination of subjective (perceptions) and objective (material) factors (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006, pp.652-655).

As shown above, there is no generally accepted definition for the term ‘small state’. Due to the fact that this paper aims to examine whether a small state is able to influence the EU’s decision-making process, in the following a ‘small state’ is
primarily defined by its political power in the EU, and thereby determined as any country that possesses less than average votes (12.78) in the Council of the European Union.

2.4. Contradicting realist’s thinking: the Hypotheses

Indeed, much research has already been done within the field of small states and their influence, as well as possibilities to put new norms on the European agenda (e.g. Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2008; Nasra 2011; Panke 2008; Thorhallsson 2006b). Evaluating the basic literature, realist theorists argue that especially the large states dominate the area of high politics such as the CFSP which is regarded to be traditionally dominated by the big member states due to their greater power and influence. On the contrary, small states are said to be more concerned with low politics instancing environmental policies. Consequently, realists point out that big states act as leaders, particularly in high politics, by prescribing decisions which have to be formally adopted by the other (smaller) member states, whereas small states wield merely little influence on the tabling of new norms in the EU’s high politics. (e.g. Gégout 2002; Hoffmann 2000; Vital 2006) Thus, realists consider small states principally as pawns of larger states. This theoretical view derives from the realist’s theory which considers ‘power’ as the most important factor for being influential since small states are said to possess primarily little power. Furthermore, realists understate the role of policy fields, such as low politics, which are not said to be essential for the foreign policy or the survival of the state, such as high politics. (Hamid 2007, Jacobs 2010) Therefore, realist theorists would hypothesise against the background of the main research question that Sweden as a small state is incapable to successfully frame the high politics’ norm ‘conflict prevention’. In contrast, they would consider Sweden as successful in achieving their aims for the norm ‘sustainable development’ standing for low politics.

However, the realist’s theory has problems in explaining why European small states are sometimes very well able to set high politics’ norms on the agenda and achieve success therewith, as several researches have pointed out (e.g. Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2008; Jakobsen 2009; Nasra 2011; Romsloe 2004). One instance therefore is the Union’s small state of Sweden which successfully framed and advocated the high politics’ norm ‘conflict prevention’ so that it was adopted at the Göteborg European Council in the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ in June 2001. Hence, contrary to the realists, constructivists argue that small states indeed could have, and have had an impact on the policy shaping
process within the EU since constructivism holds the view that even small states are able to construct the EU’s agenda. Further, referring to Wendt’s famous quotation “anarchy is what states make of it” (Ulbert, 2010, p.433), constructivism means that the international system is a socially and collectively constructed creation between states, implying that small states are also involved in the constant process of creating identity as well as defining the international system.

As previously mentioned, the present Bachelor thesis intends to examine to what extent the evolution of norms pushed forward by Sweden in the EU differentiate due to the policy area and whether a possible variation affects the successful outcome of the high politics’ norm. Without downplaying the role of big member states, in the following it will be argued, contrary to the realist thinking, that small states are very well able to influence the EU’s agenda, and also to push norms forward in high politics. Thus, the hypothesis which will be explored is that even though the developmental process might differ, both norms, ‘sustainable development’ and ‘conflict prevention’, are able to successfully reach the second stage of the norm lifecycle. Referring to selected literature (e.g. Arter 2000; Jakobsen 2009) proving that small states can succeed in high politics but sometimes require a longer period of time to set the norm on the European agenda, this thesis further argues that although small states are able to effectively advocate norms in high politics, it is easier for them to frame a norm of low politics with the result that they reach their objectives faster.

In the following, this present Bachelor thesis shall test these hypotheses by examining the influence of the independent variables ‘norm in the field of low politics’ and ‘norm in the field of high politics’ on the dependent variable ‘success of Sweden’s norm entrepreneurship’ by using the methodology explained below.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research design

Once the theoretical framework is determined, it is time to outline the general research design of this study. Since the developmental process of two particular norms in two different policy areas are subject to critical scrutiny, the question arises which research design is appropriate in order to obtain the intended gain in knowledge? At this point, a case study stands to reason. According to Gerring and McDermott (2007, p.688) a case study is “a form of analysis where one or a few units are studied intensively with an aim to elucidate features of a broader class of
Such a research design “allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 1994, p.3) as well as the facility to gain in-depth knowledge of the issue’s underlying mechanism. In the following, a comparative case study will be applied. The design of a comparative study is rather simple, since the construction employs two or more cases that are related in some respects. Nevertheless, they also have to differ in some respects for the reason that it would not be otherwise useful to compare them. Subsequently, the differences of the comparison become the focus of examination. (Yin, 1994) Therefore, a comparative case study is an appropriate tool for this paper to study and compare the developmental process of the two exemplary norms intensively, as well as to gain thereby a better understanding of the complex and dynamic process. Further, a comparative case study is well-suited to detect which norm evolves better in which particular stage of the norm lifecycle.

Nevertheless, a case study also involves difficulties. Since the norm developmental process is of a dynamic nature and thereby hard to seize, a case study cannot precisely detect whether other potential third variables – which might have been neglected – might have a possible impact on the norm developmental process. Thus, Gerring and McDermott (2007, p.688) cite the non-experimental characteristic of a case study as negative reason, arguing that “case studies are often observational, rather than experimental”. Additionally, in most instances a single case study in itself does not provide a sufficient foundation for generalizations (Yin, 1994). Considering these problems, the question arises why the research design of a case study could still be applied? The first reason speaking for this research design is the fact that in this thesis an enhancement of the classical case study is used: the comparative case study. In order to be able to glance in the box of causality, the following comparative case study tries to counter the threats on the one hand via its theoretical approach. Thus, this paper structures the observations in a way that makes it possible to plot the developmental process of the two norms by employing the aforementioned theoretical framework of the norm lifecycle which functions as a tool to trace the particular processes and thereby to establish a time order. Further, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms develop to a certain extent in a similar way so that generalisations based on the norm lifecycle are possible. Besides, a comparative case study allows generalizations to a limited amount due to the fact that more than one unit is examined. The comparison of the two observations is another contribution to moderate the problem since it restricts
the threat of a possible third variable, as well as the comparative case functions as a kind of control group.

To sum up, although a case study faces some threats, such as not being able to abstract all findings on a general level or bias through possible alternative explanations, nonetheless relating to this thesis, a comparative case study seems to be a good tool to demonstrate the complex and dynamic developmental process of the norms, to recognise the differences as well as to examine whether the norm develops better in the area of low than in high politics.

3.2. Case selection

Since the main research question is ‘To what extent is there a difference in the development of norms pushed forward by small states in the EU, in particular in the case of Sweden, due to the different policy area?’ it has to be clarified whether Sweden can be considered indeed as a small state in the EU. Applying the above-mentioned criteria to Sweden, it is useful to have a look at the available data. Starting with the criterion ‘voting power in the Council’ Sweden has 10 votes whereas the EU average is 12.78 votes (Council, n.d.). For this reason, Sweden can be classified as a European small state owing to the fact that ‘voting power in the Council’ is the main criterion of this paper as defined in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, it also appears interesting to scrutinize the other criterion mentioned above. Considering the criteria of ‘population’ Sweden, counted 9,415,570 inhabitants in January 2011 in relation to the EU-27 population of 502,476,606 at the same time (Eurostat, 2011). Therefore, Sweden can also be considered as a small state in terms of population. Furthermore, it is also interesting to contemplate the economic and financial criterion, especially the GDP of Sweden. Thus, the Swedish GDP per capita is 386,202 m. euros. In relation to this, the EU has a GDP of 12,649,147 m. euros and Germany as the EU’s biggest economy has a GDP of 2,570,000 m. euros. (Institut für Wachstumsstudien, 2012) Thus, in terms of economic power, Sweden is positioned in the bottom mid-table of the EU, whereas the country can be clearly identified as ‘big state’ concerning its territorial size considering it landmass is 450,294 sq. km and is thereby the third largest country in the EU after Spain and France. However, the country is sparsely populated with only about 23 inhabitants per sq. km. In contrast to this, the EU average of population density is more than 100 people per sq. km. (Swedish Institute, 2011)

Although Sweden can be classified as a ‘big state’ in terms of territory, in the following it is regarded as a ‘small state’ since the main criterion of this paper is the
voting power, as this study aims to examine the influence of Sweden as a small state within the EU policy-making process. Furthermore, the territory of Sweden is not meaningful as criterion in this study owing the fact that the territory’s size does not affect the Swedish influence on the EU policy process, as the country is sparsely populated.

Once Sweden is categorized as a ‘small state’ in the EU, it is time to have a closer look at the selection of the two comparative units. Since the research question asks whether there is a difference in the evolution of norms promoted by Sweden owing to the particular policy area, the norms ‘sustainable development’ and ‘conflict prevention’ as two units for the comparative case study seemed to be well-suited. In the following analysis, the CFSP’s norm ‘conflict prevention’ shall represent the area of high politics within the EU. The term ‘high politics’ in the theories of International Relations covers all matters which are vital to the survival of the state, in this case for the EU, speaking of national as well as international security concerns. Therefore, the EU’s CFSP can be seen as high politics. In contrast to this stands the norm ‘sustainable development’ presenting the policy of environmental issues and thereby low politics within the EU. The theoretical concept of ‘low politics’ implies au contraire to ‘high politics’ that the particular policy field is not considered to be essential for the survival of the state. (Keohane & Nye, 2001)

The norms ‘sustainable development’ and ‘conflict prevention’ are chosen due to methodical and practical considerations. First of all, they provide a meaningful foundation to trace their development since both norms were promoted by Sweden starting in the 1990s and pushed forward in a large part during the Swedish EU presidency in 2001. Therefore, they have a similar basis that facilitates the comparison as previously mentioned. Since ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘sustainable development’ as well were adopted by the Göteborg European Council in June 2001, both norms developed apparently successful. Therefore one can assume that the developmental process did not end shortly after the emergence of one norm, as the study aims to detect the differences in the developmental stages. Apart from this, these norms are particularly suited due to good and accessible literature and documents.

4. Analysis

Once the necessary theoretical and methodical foundation is set, the following chapter shall concentrate in an analysis on the developmental processes of the norms ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘sustainable development’. After having examined
both norms on the basis of the norm lifecycle by Finnemore and Sikkink, the most important findings shall be compared in a third part.

4.1. Sweden and conflict prevention

In a first step the sub question ‘How does a norm develop that was put on the EU agenda by Sweden in the field of CFSP?’ shall be scrutinized. By answering this question with the help of the first case ‘Sweden and conflict prevention’, the thesis aims to have a detailed look at the different stages of the norm development in high politics.

According to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (1999, p.2) “conflict prevention refers primarily to measures that can be implemented before a dispute escalates into violence, or to measures for preventing violence from flaring up again after the signing of a peace agreement, cease-fire or similar document.”

4.1.1. Norm emergence

Even though Sweden was considered to be neutral until the end of the Cold War and still non-aligned today, the country contributed to peacekeeping missions as well as to NATO and EU battle groups. Promoting peace is a traditional component of the Swedish foreign policy which was realigned after the Cold War and gathered momentum in the last decades (MFA, 1999). The Swedish statesman and former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld coined the idea of preventive diplomacy in the UN in 1959 to prevent minor controversies from escalating into conflicts between the Cold War’s superpowers (Björkdahl, 2002, p.68). In the 1990s ‘conflict prevention’ became an important part of Sweden’s foreign policy so that the Swedish policy elite decided to push forward this norm by developing a proactive approach in order to mainstream conflict prevention. For instance, the Nordic country took actively part in the first ever preventive peace-keeping mission of the UN to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) in 1995. The fact that the concept of promoting peace was successful applied in practice through the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) mission, made the norm ‘conflict prevention’ more likely to become accepted by other actors. (MFA, 1999, p.46) So, although the idea of promoting and spreading peace was already included in the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (Wouters & Naert, 2004) and non-governmental actors were concerned with conflict prevention, Sweden was the one of the first states that developed theoretical and practical concepts concerning the concrete norm ‘conflict prevention’. In 1991 the Swedish State Secretary Pierre
Schori introduced conflict prevention in a speech during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (Björkdahl, 2007, p.176) These examples shall illustrate Sweden’s active and successful role within the field of conflict prevention and therefore presents itself as trustworthy norm advocate with international experience.

Referring to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 895) the first stage of the norm lifecycle ‘norm emergence’ is characterised by the norm entrepreneur’s endeavours to frame as well as to shape the agenda for the particular norm in order to persuade possible supporters. Like mentioned above, sharp framing is essential for the successful evolution of a norm. Thus, Sweden as a norm entrepreneur began to frame the norm in the European context even before the county became member of the EU in 1995. One example therefore is the Swedish effort to participate in the Petersberg Initiative in 1992 that defines the tasks of the EU’s CFSP. (Majchrzak 2010, MFA 1999) By doing so, the small state got actively involved in constructing EU’s foreign and security character even without explicitly mentioning conflict prevention.

Since for the Swedish purpose to act successful as norm entrepreneur aiming to promote conflict prevention in Europe, a platform to address the audience was necessary (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Considering that the EU can be characterised as “peace project” (Björkdahl, 2008, p.137), Sweden seized the chance to use the EU as a platform. In this context the Swedish policy elite made use of the EU institutions, especially of the European Commission. Apart from this, several scholars stress the significant role of EU institutions of small states who liaise closely together with the Commission in order to push their ideas through the Council. In practice, the smaller a state the more it relies on the Commission for support because small states have fewer national delegations in Brussels as well as less (administrative) staff to prepare meetings. Therefore, the institutions can be seen as allies of small states as well as a counterbalance against the domination and capabilities of larger states. (Bunse 2009; Steinbrenner 2007; Thorhallsson 2006b) The same applies to Sweden that “most frequently contacts the European Commission” (Panke, 2008, p.15). One example therefore is the communication from the Commission on conflict prevention which was published in April 2001 during Sweden’s EU presidency. Therein, Sweden’s arguments for European conflict prevention were supported. This report was strongly encouraged by Sweden and included many similarities to previously published Swedish papers. (COM, 2001a) Further, Sweden intensively cooperated with EU’s High Representative for
CFSP, Javier Solana as well as with the Commission’s representative Christopher Patten. Referring to Bjurulf (2001, p.20) Sweden as a small state relied on the representatives, whereas a larger state would have probably made use of its own foreign office to a higher degree. Thus, one important reason for its success was its fine relationship to the EU institutions and to powerful persons such as Soloana, Patten, Schröder or Blair.

According to the theory of the norm lifecycle, it is necessary for a norm entrepreneur to keep the particular norm on the agenda and persuade possible supporters by introducing arguments and using expertise (Kronsell, 2002). Thus, in spring 1997 the report ‘Preventing Violent Conflicts - A Study’ was presented including long-term objectives for Sweden’s efforts in conflict prevention (Björkdahl, 2002, p.178). Even though this study was primarily conducted for the national use, it illustrated the Swedish expertise and their efforts in that particular issue to persuade the European elite from the effectiveness of this norm.

Another Swedish instrument to frame the norm was the document ‘Preventing Violent Conflicts – A Swedish Action Plan’ published in 1999. This paper was commissioned by the study above-mentioned. In this action plan, the Swedish MFA pointed out the importance of conflict prevention within the context of the international institutions, the risks as well as conditions for successful conflict prevention and the Swedish role for its implementation. Furthermore, the EU’s potential in conflict prevention was highlighted. The document made use of moral arguments, such as democratic and humanitarian issues, as well as of rational arguments as in economic and financial matters. (MFA, 1999) The Swedish approach to conflict prevention is clearly depicted in the two above-mentioned documents serving as framing and starting point for the Swedish presidency.

Conflict prevention also became an issue on the expanding security agenda at the European Council summit in Cologne in June 1999 (Council, 1999). Even though it is not clear whether the awoken interest in conflict prevention definitely proceeded from the Swedish norm promotion, it can be considered as an important point for Sweden’s efforts in shaping the agenda and encouraged the Swedish norm entrepreneurship to continue their norm advocacy.

In December 2000 the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission presented the report ‘Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the field of Conflict Prevention’ to the Nice European Council. In this document, the European awareness for the importance of conflict prevention and
the need to carry on the development is underlined. Further it includes recommendations on the future role of the EU in the field of conflict prevention. (EU, 2000) This paper was worked out under the active participation of Sweden in order to prepare the imminent Swedish presidency. Thus, Sweden was able to build upon these recommendations a draft version for a European programme for conflict prevention as basis for discussions for the Göteborg European Council in June 2001. (Baumgartner & Gourlay, 2001)

During the first half of 2001 Sweden held the EU presidency under the self-chosen motto ‘enlargement, employment, and environment’ (ME, 2000). According to Steinbrenner (2007, p.29) the EU presidency can be considered as a “window of opportunities” for small states, especially in distinguishing themselves from big member states. Further, the EU presidency goes along with both normative influence and procedural resources. During the presidency the state has the chance to prove its political ability as well as to push forward ideas which are considered of importance by the particular state. (Bunse 2009; Steinbrenner 2007; Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006) Even though conflict prevention was not explicitly included in the Swedish motto, it played a central role in the objectives of Sweden’s presidency. The presidency was carefully prepared through bilateral consultations, informal and preparatory meetings with other countries as well as EU institutions in order to establish support. (Steinbrenner, 2007) Intending to use the presidency’s attention effectively, Sweden published the paper ‘Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century’ in the beginning of 2001 functioning as basis for EU discussions. In the document the MFA describes its goal of the EU presidency concerning the norm conflict prevention as follows: “The overall objective is to mainstream conflict prevention into all the EU’s policies” (MFA, 2001, p.69). Further, the success of conflict prevention in former missions such as in Hungary and Slovakia, FYRM or Estonia is outlined in order to persuade more supporters. (MFA, 2001) In spring 2001 the Swedish draft of the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ was worked out on the basis of the above-mentioned report of Nice. This draft became the working basis for the Council in Göteborg in summer 2001. (Baumgartner & Gourlay, 2001)

As previously mentioned, it is crucial for a norm entrepreneur to gain enough supporters during the first stage of norm emergence so that the norm is able to reach the tipping point (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.901). Small states especially need to make informal contacts as well as to establish support by likeminded influential states (Elgström, Bjurulf, Johansson & Sannerstedt, 2001). In the second
half of 1999 Finland held EU presidency. After successful negotiations Finland agreed to support Sweden’s idea of European conflict prevention by including the norm in the Helsinki summit conclusion. In contrast to that, the following presidency by Portugal in spring 2000 had fewest interests in conflict prevention. Nevertheless, Portugal was delegated by the Council to continue to work on conflict prevention. (Björkdahl, 2008) But Sweden also promoted the norm in other European governments. Since Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) underline the importance of influential states’ support, Sweden promoted conflict prevention especially in the biggest member states, using diplomatic tactics and bilateral talks. While Germany and Italy strongly supported the norm from the beginning, there was some scepticism in France and the UK. (Björkdahl, 2002, p.116) Nevertheless, at the end of the Swedish presidency in summer 2001, almost all EU member states were persuaded and agreed to adopt the norm ‘conflict prevention’. Thereby the ‘tipping point’ in the developmental process was reached.

4.1.2. Tipping point

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.901) the ‘tipping point’ of the norm lifecycle is reached when “norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to […] adopt new norms”. Due to the aforementioned problem of pinpointing the exact tipping point, in this study the threshold point is said to be achieved at the time when enough EU member states vote in favour of the norm. Applying this theoretical concept to the norm ‘conflict prevention’ the threshold point was achieved in June 2001 when the Swedish initiative for conflict prevention had enough supports so that the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ was adopted at the Göteborg European Council (EU, 2001).

4.1.3. Norm cascade

As mentioned above, Sweden actively convinced the critical mass of EU member states that the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ was adopted by the Council in June 2001. Therefore, the norm ‘conflict prevention’ can be seen as institutionalised with respect to the second stage ‘norm cascade’ of the norm lifecycle. The Presidency Conclusions outlines conflict prevention as “one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade” (Council, 2001, p.12). The four key priorities for the EU outlined in the European conflict prevention programme are “to set
political priorities for preventive actions, improve its early warning, action and policy coherence, enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and build effective partnerships for prevention” (EU, 2001, p.1). Even though the adoption of the Swedish drafted programme was an achievement for the norm ‘conflict prevention’ and can be seen as a political statement, the programme lacks legal status and therefore has only few institutional consequences (Björkdahl, 2008, p.148). In March 2002 the Commission published its report ‘One Year On: the Commission's Conflict Prevention Policy’ stating that the EU’s efforts for fulfilling the objectives of the programme evidently increased (EU, 2002). Consequently, in December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was developed under the authority of Javier Solana, emphasizing conflict prevention and embedding the norm in the European security culture (EU, 2003). Thus, the ESS provides a strong framework for strengthening and implementing the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (Frank, 2009). According to Majchrzak (2010, p.21) the strategy can be considered as the first attempt to equip the EU with forward-oriented institutional elements for a strategic proceeding in the field of security policy, although it is sometimes reviewed for its rather vague character.

The first application of conflict prevention by the EU was the Operation Concordia to Macedonia in March 2003 which is considered to be the first preventive EU mission. The next mission including more preventive elements was the Operation Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Rummel, 2004, p.86). Thus, in a background note the European Parliament concluded that “the EU's role in conflict prevention has matured in a relatively short period of time” (EU, 2006b, p.1). Apart from this, in 2003 the EU decided to explicitly include the idea of conflict prevention in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Wouters & Naert, 2004, p. 63) showing that although this treaty failed in referenda, Sweden was successful in keeping the norm on the agenda.

These examples illustrate that the norm ‘conflict prevention’ was put into practice after being institutionalised on the EU level through the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ as well as the ESS. Thus, conflict prevention as a norm within the field of high politics successfully achieved and proceeded in the stage ‘norm cascade’ of the norm lifecycle.
4.2. **Sweden and sustainable development**

After having examined the evolution of the high politics' norm ‘conflict prevention’, this section shall focus on the norm ‘sustainable development’ representing low politics by answering the sub question: ‘How does a norm develop that was put on the agenda of the EU by Sweden in the field of environmental policy?’.

Since ‘sustainable development’ is a frequently mentioned expression, it seems to be meaningful to determine the term by using the definition of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987, n.p.), also known as Brundtland Commission, who defined ‘sustainable development’ as a "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

4.2.1. **Norm emergence**

According to Ingebritsen (2006, p.277) the norm ‘sustainable development’ is said to be emerged with the Brundtland Report in 1987, a report by the Commission on Environment and Development. This report can be seen as the starting point for the international discussion on sustainable development and environmental issues.

However, early before this term reached the international forum and media attention, Sweden can be considered as forerunner in fields of environmental protection and sustainable policy making. Since environment is said to be a “true Nordic priority” (Bjurulf, 2001, p.18) Sweden lead by example in terms of sustainable development. The Swedish initiative to protect its environment started in 1803 when large parts of the Scandinavian forests were declared to be natural reserves. In the 1960’s Sweden's public attention to environmental issues increased and influential organizations arose putting the policy elite under pressure. Further, in 1972 the first UN Climate Conference on an initiative of Sweden took place in Stockholm and in 1988 the Swedish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) was established which was the first agency for environmental issues in Europe. Additionally, since the end of the Cold War Sweden has been engaged in sustainable development projects in the Baltic Sea Region. (Eckerberg 2000; Göll & Thio 2004; Ingebristen 2006) Furthermore, Sweden has an environmental sustainability index of 71.7 and therefore ranked as 4th country out of 146 (Yale & Columbia, 2005, p. 3). These examples illustrate that environmental issues as well as efforts in sustainable development have been important parts of Swedish policy making. Thus, for many years Sweden has been considered a role model and the
Swedish citizens are also highly concerned about environmental issues. Since Sweden enjoys a good reputation in green issues due to its expert knowledge gained by experience and ambitious national policies, the small state had a good starting position to promote sustainable development in the EU as a trustworthy norm entrepreneur during the first stage of ‘norm emergence’.

Similar to the Swedish norm entrepreneur activities for conflict prevention, Sweden used the EU as a platform to reach the European states and called for attention for environmental issues. From the very beginning of its membership, Sweden tried to persuade the EU to adopt its high environmental standards. Even though the idea of sustainable development was not new to the EU, there was neither an ambitious norm entrepreneur nor overwhelming success yet. Thus, Sweden was the first norm entrepreneur in this field and could go ahead. (Eckerberg 2000; Steinbrenner 2007) In order to use the EU effectively as a platform after becoming a Union member, Sweden began to shape the European agenda for the norm ‘sustainable development’. Intending to set the norm on the agenda as well as to frame it, in 1996 the Swedish policy elite published several reports and programmes such as ‘greening of the welfare state’ or a report by the SEPA wherein a first approach for a strategy for sustainable development with 18 environmental objectives was presented. Furthermore, Sweden held bilateral talks with other EU member states, the European institutions and important persons to frame the norm by calling for attention for sustainable development. (Lundqvist, 2004, p.103) By actively promoting the norm, the country reached its first achievements by the end of the decade.

4.2.2. Tipping point

As aforementioned, the ‘tipping point’ of the norm lifecycle in this application to the European context is said to be reached when enough supporters agree to adopt the new norm. After extensive negotiations, Sweden could convince the critical mass of states in 1997. At this time the majority of EU member states agreed on the importance of sustainable development and were willing to proceed with the project. Thereby the threshold point of the norm was achieved.

4.2.3. Norm cascade

Once the critical mass of European states was convinced, the second stage of the norm lifecycle ‘norm cascade’ is characterised by the willingness of even more states to adopt the norm during an “active process of international socialization”
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.902). Thus, Sweden continued its norm-promoting activities, so that the EU member states consented to enshrine ‘sustainable development’ in article 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam as principle of the EU in 1997. Although the establishment of sustainable development and the protection of the environment can be seen as a positive political statement, the Treaty lacks detailed regulations or provisions due to some divisiveness in this field. (EU, 1997) Furthermore, even though the critical mass was convinced, Sweden aspired to strengthen the norm making the idea of sustainable development more applicable. Therefore, inspired by these positive proceedings, Sweden enhanced its efforts of framing to implement the concept of sustainable development into a strategy.

The concrete preparations for a strategy began in 1998 when the European Council of Cardiff requested to develop a strategy concerning environmental issues and sustainability in fields of energy, transportation and agriculture (Steinbrenner, 2007, p.122). Sweden got its next chance to advocate and to push sustainable development forward when the Commission was invited by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 to prepare a proposal concerning a long-term strategy of ecological, social and economic sustainability for the Göteborg European Council in 2001. This request was recommended by the European Environment Council. (ME, 2000, n.p.) Since the Göteborg European Council was the conclusion of Sweden’s presidency, the Swedish policy elite was highly proactive to work out the requested draft as well as to promote their objectives in sustainable development. Therefore, the small state intensified its endeavours to further frame this issue, for example by publishing its final report ‘The future environment – our common responsibility’ in June 2000. In this paper, the Swedish Committee on Environmental Objectives (CEO) presented its main principles for sustainable development: “promoting human health, safeguarding biological diversity, protecting cultural heritage, reserving the long-term productive capacity of the ecosystem and ensuring that natural resources are properly managed” (CEO, 2000, p.6).

As previously mentioned, during the first half of 2001 Sweden guided the EU under the motto ‘enlargement, employment and environment’. As the last ‘E’ implies, the presidency focused on ‘green issues’ for example by developing the sixth Action Plan for environment protection or preparing the climate conference of Den Haag. (ME, 2000) Considering these thematic priorities, the norm ‘sustainable development’ lined up perfectly. Like mentioned above, the EU presidency can be seen as a chance for small states to present their objectives and use their normative power to push their norms through. On the one hand Sweden used this
opportunity to keep sustainable development on the agenda and promote their environmental concerns, for instance by arranging the conference on sustainable research and sector integration ‘Bridging the Gap’ which was held in Stockholm in spring 2001. The aim of this meeting was to examine research in the field of sustainable development and the question how to integrate this issue in all sectors of society. Further, the youth conference on environment and sustainable development took place bringing together young people from all over the world to discuss the issue of sustainable development and its progress since the Rio conference in 1992. (ME, 2000) Both conferences were official parts of the Swedish presidency showing the endeavours of Sweden to bring the topic into focus in order to call for attention as one tactic for a successful norm advocacy.

Nevertheless, on the other hand some problems concerning the collaboration with the Commission occurred during the Swedish presidency that compromised the good opportunity to advocate sustainable development. As mentioned above, since good relations to the European institutions are essential for a successful norm promoting by small states, Sweden closely maintained contact to the Council Secretary to work out a draft-strategy in the Environmental Council (Wurzel, 2002). Conversely, according to Kronsell (2002) the institutions, especially the Commission, rely on knowledge from outside the EU institutions owing to limited resources. Due to the fact that Sweden features a broadly accepted expertise in the field of environmental issues as presented in the stage of ‘norm emergence’, the country appeared as a good partner for the Commission despite of its small size. In the case of sustainable development the institution strongly supported the norm by interpreting it as an environmental quality target and expressed the wish to establish this norm within the EU. (Ingebristen, 2006, p.278) Thus, Sweden could count on the support of the Commission. Further, it was useful to have the Swede Margot Wallström as Commissioner for the Environment in the EU. Although a Commissioner ought to be neutral, having a Swedish national as counterpart provided a good basis for negotiations and collaboration since she shared the same view on environmental issues. (Wurzel, 2002)

But even though the Swedish government had a good connection to the Commission and could provide expertise, some problems concerning the Sustainable Development Strategy’s (SDS) draft version occurred. Notwithstanding, there was a close collaboration during the preliminary stages, “the Commission largely failed to consult the Swedish presidency on its SDS proposal” (Wurzel, 2002, p.208). Due to the well-working collaboration in environmental affairs prior to
the Swedish presidency, it appears surprisingly that Sweden did not insist on passing their opinion on the Commission’s proposal before it was published. Further, the Commission did not present its Communication ‘A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ until 15th May 2001. Consequently, the relatively late published proposal left the Swedish presidency little time for promoting as well as to negotiate it prior to the Göteborg summit. (Wurzel, 2002, p.208) In the proposal, the Commission pointed out that the SDS should function as environmental enhancement to the Lisbon Strategy of 2000. Furthermore, threats to sustainability, as well as recommended actions to combat these were outlined. (COM, 2001b) However, despite of the engaged and prosperous agenda shaping activities of Sweden, the proposal was often criticized as too “vague” (Wurzel, 2002, p.208) and as “considerably watered down […] and was a disappointment to many environmentalists” (Elgström, 2002a, p.186) except for some good approaches. One possible explanation for these mistakes might have been US President Bush’s surprising decision to abandon the support for the Kyoto Protocol in spring 2001. As consequence, Sweden exerted itself to ensure that the EU remained committed to the Kyoto Protocol and riveted on this task. (Wurzel, 2002, p.206) This is also one impressive example, therefore, that external factors can influence the success of a state’s norm advocacy.

But regardless of the above-mentioned problems, in this communication the influence of the Swedish norm advocacy becomes clear, since several significant objectives of Sweden’s environmental intention were included. Furthermore, Sweden managed enough EU member states’ assent to the draft version of the strategy so that it was adopted in the Göteborg European Council Conclusion. Thereby, Sweden reached its goal to enshrine an applicable concept for sustainable development by filling the gap of the Treaty of Amsterdam which lacked specific guidelines and actions to reach sustainability and further enabled the EU to specify its approach to achieve the objectives that were set in 1999. (ME, 2000) According to the Presidency Conclusions (Council, 2001, p.4), the agreed strategy “completes the Union’s political commitment to economic and social renewal, adds a third, environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy and establishes a new approach to policy making”. The strategy focused on four central objectives, namely climate change, traffic, health and natural resources as well as included statements to the global environmental protection. (Council, 2001, pp.4-8)

For the reason that the new strategy merely focused on the internal aspects of sustainability in the EU, the Council invited the Commission to develop further an
external dimension for the strategy (Council, 2001, p.5). This request was compiled in January 2002 when the communication from the Commission ‘Towards a global partnership for sustainable development’ was presented. (COM, 2002) In order to keep sustainable development on the agenda, Sweden published a national action plan on this issue in 2002 (Göll & Thio, 2004). Nevertheless, the further developmental process of the norm did not always run smoothly, since the Commission highlights in its evaluation of the SDS in 2005 several unsustainable trends which had gotten worse since 2001 (COM, 2005). Among others for this reason the SDS was revised in 2006 after a broad public consultation in 2004 in order to provide more concrete targets and guidelines. However, the Commission criticized in its review report in 2007 again the moderate success of the revised strategy, stating that it “shows relatively modest progress on the ground” (COM, 2007, p.3) although the EU’s efforts for making sustainable development as priority of the European agenda were increasing. Therefore, Sweden campaigned further for keeping the norm ‘sustainable development’ on the agenda and used its second presidency in 2009 to work out another review of the strategy (COM, 2009). Among others, this ambitious Swedish norm advocacy, despite of some problems and failures, made the EU confirm the significant role of sustainable development in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (COM, 2012a). The EU and also Sweden advocated their ideas of sustainable development at the Rio +20 UN conference in June 2012 (COM, 2012b).

Lastly, it can be said that the Swedish norm entrepreneurship reached its goal despite some problems during the presidency by finally implementing sustainable development in the SDS. Further, Sweden kept advocating the norm and attempted to keep it on the agenda so that the strategy was revised and enhanced. Therefore the low politics’ norm ‘sustainable development’ successfully passed through the first two stages of the norm lifecycle even though some problems concerning the implementation of the SDS occurred.

4.3. Comparison

In the two preceding parts of this chapter, Sweden’s endeavours for pushing forward the evolution of the norms ‘sustainable development’ and ‘conflict prevention’ within the EU were outlined. This was in order to answer the sub a question of how a particular norm developed that was put on the agenda by Sweden in low and high politics. Subsequently, by comparing the most important similarities and differences on the basis of the afore-ascertained facts, the last sub
question ‘Are there differences in the development of the two cases and, if so, where are they?’ shall be answered.

Starting again with the norm lifecycle’s first stage ‘norm emergence’ by outlining the similarities of the developmental process of sustainable development and conflict prevention within the European context, one might say that in both cases Sweden had a good starting position due to acknowledged expertise and long-term experience. These advantages qualified the small country as a trustworthy norm entrepreneur and thereby facilitated its efforts in framing both norms. Additionally, this common feature is particularly useful for the further comparison with regard to the methodological aspects since hereby both norms had the same basis regardless of the policy area. Their good reputation also helped Sweden at the negotiations prior and during its presidency in 2001 which represents another important similarity. In both cases, Sweden effectively used the (political) publicity and normative power of the presidency to frame and promote sustainable development and conflict prevention so that they were adopted at the Göteborg European Council Conclusions. This verifies the arguments of many scholars that the EU presidency is the most significant chance for small states to call for attention for particular norms. Even before the presidency, Sweden was ambitiously engaged in several EU proceedings to shape the European agenda for the norms such as the efforts to implement sustainable development in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 or the commitment for constructing the EU’s foreign and security identity to prepare the EU for conflict prevention. Besides, a similarity can be seen in the circumstance that in the second stage of ‘norm cascade’ both norms became finally implemented in European strategies. Thereby, in the end Sweden’s norm advocacy was able to produce success for both norms since “strategies are agreed upon at the European Council, the highest decision-making level, they are considered to be significant and to have public resonance” (Björkdahl, 2002, p.155).

In spite of these similarities, there are also several differences in the norms’ developmental process which shall be outlined in the following, since it is even more meaningful to examine the differences to answer the previously mentioned sub question, and thereby the main research question. As aforementioned, one significant point for the success of both norms in the stage of ‘norm emergence’ was the ambitious framing and agenda shaping activity by the Swedish policy elite. Thus, Sweden frequently published various documents to call for attention for the norms as well as to demonstrate its expertise. However, herein appears the first difference between the norm entrepreneur activities for sustainable development
and conflict prevention. Even though the Swedish government made great efforts for both norms, it seemed as if there were more endeavours for attracting the attention for conflict prevention based on a higher number of published supporting materials that were presented under a higher (European) publicity than material for promoting sustainable development. For instance, in 1999 Sweden provided a national action plan for conflict prevention before the norm was adopted in 2001, whereas the Swedish action plan for sustainable development did not follow until 2002.

Despite the apparently more ambitious norm-promoting for conflict prevention, the environmental norm achieved at first considerable success. Thus, the second significant difference of the norm developmental process and this once advantage for the Swedish norm entrepreneurship for sustainable development was that the concept was relatively fast implemented as one principle in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Even though the treaty lacked detailed guidelines or provisions concerning the application of the norm, it can be seen as first a concrete political step and consensus of the EU member states in the field of sustainable development. Due to this early consensus, the norm achieved its ‘tipping point’ approximately five years before the norm ‘conflict prevention’ was accepted by the critical mass. Thus, the Swedish norm entrepreneur activity in the environmental field of low politics is considered to be more successful at the first stage of ‘norm emergence’, and is thereby said to provide a better basis for further norm advocacy at the second stage.

Apart from this, as stated previously it is considered to be essential for a successful small state’s norm advocacy to establish a well-functioning collaboration with the European institutions. Even though in both cases the Swedish policy elite had a good relationship to the European institutions and worked closely together with the Commission and Council Secretary, in the case of sustainable development some problems occurred. For instance, although the cooperation on environmental issues with the institutions in the forefield of the presidency worked thoroughly well, the Swedish presidency is often reviewed for the reason that the Commission did not consult Sweden on its proposal for the SDS and published it relatively late. Thus, the Swedish policy elite had merely little time for negotiations on the draft prior to the Göteborg summit. Despite the engaged and prosperous agenda shaping of Sweden, the adopted strategy remained vague and included no more than the Swedish basic objectives. For the above mentioned reasons, Sweden’s presidency within its objectives of sustainable development is criticized by some reviewers as
not ambitious enough. (Bjurulf 2001; Elgström 2002a; Wurzel 2002) On the contrary, Sweden is often commended for its efforts in prioritizing conflict prevention during the presidency. Although the adopted ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ is termed as “‘motherhood and apple pie’ proposal” by Elgström (2002b, p.46), it was highly welcomed by the vast majority of EU member states as political statement and starting point for more European activity within this field. According to Bjurulf (2001) Sweden as a small state was successful in framing conflict prevention during the presidency within the high politics’ field of the CFSP.

Furthermore, even though the SDS was initially criticized for being vague and also the ESS was sometimes reviewed as not being concrete enough (Frank 2009, Majcharzak 2010), the two norms and therefore their strategies developed well to some degree during the second stage of ‘norm cascade’. Nevertheless, whereas conflict prevention was already applied to various EU missions, such as Operation Concordia to Macedonia or Operation Artemis to the DRC in 2003, it is difficult to find concrete achievements of the SDS shortly after its adoption by the Council. This is, among others, due to the fact that “there is a lack of concrete objectives and targets that would translate the concept of sustainable development into more tangible outcomes” (UK Government, 2004, p.2). Nevertheless, since the Commission reviewed several unsustainable trends in 2005, the SDS was revised in 2006. Here, Sweden became again engaged to equip the strategy with more concrete targets and guidelines. Despite these efforts to improve the SDS, as well as increasing endeavours by the EU to drive forward sustainable development on the European agenda, the Commission once more criticized in its review report in 2007 the moderate success of the revised strategy (COM, 2007). Nonetheless, by comparison the implementation and application of the norm ‘conflict prevention’ had also some negative criticisms. For instance, it is reviewed that “the EU has all the means to be fully effective in this field […] but fails in using these instruments in a coherent manner” (EPLO, 2006, p.38). But on the whole, the positive remarks on conflict prevention, such as in the Commission’s report of 2002, in the European Parliament’s background note of 2006 or in the above quoted review by European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a platform of European NGOs and Think Tanks who are engaged in promoting conflict prevention, prevail.

Finally, evaluating the literature with respect to the Swedish norm entrepreneur’s efforts, as well as to sum up, it is obvious that the Swedish policy elite successfully took advantage of the good starting position in both cases. First, it seems as if the norm ‘sustainable development’ emerges better due to its early
achievement of becoming enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and thereby its early attainment of the ‘tipping point’. This raised high expectations concerning the further Swedish norm entrepreneurship for sustainable development. In the following, considering the accomplishments during the significant time of Sweden’s presidency, it appears evident that although both norms were adopted in the Presidency Conclusions, Sweden did a better job in promoting and negotiating for conflict prevention prior to the Göteborg summit (Elgström 2002a; Bjurulf 2001). Thus, considering on the one hand the relatively short period that conflict prevention needed in the second stage ‘norm cascade’ to become institutionalised, as well as on the other hand the negative criticism the implementation of the norm ‘sustainable development’ won, one can argue that the high politics’ norm almost developed better in the second half of the norm lifecycle’s application. On the whole, even though there are several differences in the developmental process of the two norms, the ascertained distinctions were not detrimental for their developments.

5. Conclusion

Although the European media coverage seems to be contingent on the large EU member states - such as France, Germany and the UK - conveying the impression that small states have no, or merely little influence on defining the Union’s agenda, this thesis demonstrated that even small states like Sweden are very well capable to push forward norms within the EU in much the same successful manner in the field of high than in low politics. Thus, contrary to the realist’s view, the thesis showed in the comparative case study that Sweden was able to successfully advocate the high politics’ norm ‘conflict prevention’. Further, even though some differences in the evolution appeared, they cannot be said to affect the outcome of the norms in a negative way. Since the overarching aim of this Bachelor thesis was to examine to what extent the evolution of norms in the EU promoted by Sweden differs because of the policy area, and how a possible variation affects the influence of a high politics’ norm, it was hypothesised in the beginning that small states are able to successfully advocate high politics’ norms, even though there might be some differences in the evolution because it is considered to be easier for them to promote a norm of low politics. Lastly, taking everything into consideration, it becomes obvious that the hypothesis has to be relativized. Notwithstanding that the low politics’ norm ‘sustainable development’ reached the tipping point first stands in favour of the realist’s theory, the environmental norm took more time during the second stage of ‘norm emergence’ to become institutionalised in the
SDS. Contrarily, although ‘conflict prevention’ as norm of high politics needed admittedly a longer period of time to become accepted by the critical mass, it was easier for Sweden to make this norm become enshrined in the EU during the second stage of the norm lifecycle. For the above-outlined reasons, it may be concluded that although some variations in the evolution of these two different norms are observed, the differences were not detrimental to the final success of ‘conflict prevention’.

In order to assess the study critically, it has to be considered that, especially for small states, a lot depends on the current circumstances, such as the specific advantages of the country (e.g. expertise, history, confederates), the current situation and in particular the issues at stake. Thus, apart from the Swedish capabilities and efforts to promote the two norms, it also become clear that external factors play an important role in influencing the successful evolution of a norm. To some degree, such external circumstances can provide a positive effect on the norm entrepreneurship instancing the outbreak of the civil war in Macedonia between March and June 2001 which supported Sweden’s norm advocacy by making the European governments aware of the importance of effective conflict prevention, whereas President Bush’s withdrawal of the US backing for the Kyoto Protocol had a negative effect on Sweden’s endeavours for ‘sustainable development’. But also the internal circumstances and the endorsement of the EU and its institutions are essential for the successful norm entrepreneurship, regardless whether the small state aims to advocate a high or low politics’ norm as demonstrated in the comparative case study above. Consequently, in summary it can be said that even if Sweden obtained success in promoting their objectives of the norm ‘conflict prevention’, and thereby discounted the realist’s thinking, one cannot argue vice versa that every small state in the EU is capable of successfully advocating any norm. Finally, with respect to the initial research question, it is arguable that there is to some extent a variation in the developmental process of the two selected norms, but then the impression is created that this is less due to the difference of being ‘high’ or ‘low politics’ but mainly due to the aforementioned additional factors.

To conclude, this Bachelor thesis has demonstrated that Sweden as a small state can influence the EU’s agenda and push forward norms with respect to all policy areas. Further, the study could not distinguish any substantial differences in the developmental process that could be considered as detrimental to the norm entrepreneurship in high politics. Nonetheless, the small state’s influence does not
happen through voting power, such as France, Germany or the UK might act, but through bargaining, reputation and clever generalship. To come straight to the point by referring to Kronsell (2002, p.295): Small states win with facts. Sweden proved that impressively in both cases. By doing so the small Nordic country set a good example to encourage other small member states to become more proactive in establishing new norms also within high politics, since norms of that field have (almost) the same chances to emerge and develop successfully.
Literature


