FUTURE EUROPE: DEMOCRACY OR TECHNOCRACY?
THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIZATION IN CREATING EUROPEAN IDENTITY – FOUR FUTURE SCENARIOS

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Abstract

The financial crisis in Europe is providing grounds for changing the political union within the EU. However, it is not clear how this political union will be governed: whether it will be a democracy or a form of technocracy. This paper assesses the prospects of this political union on the basis of current efforts of European stakeholders to influence the democratization process. The model that I constructed is based on the two primary processes that are caused by the political union and that influence the democratization process. The first is institutionalization: institutional reforms – e.g. new electoral rules, an instituted European government that is democratically accountable. The second is network strengthening and embedding of EU policies on a democratic basis – e.g. European regulations at the level of regional governments or societal organizations. These two processes are modelled around the theoretical framework of “liberal cosmopolitan democratization”. The data collection was based on sources from institutional, political and societal actors that are concerned with the European democratization process. By means of a theory confirming case study that is based on the comparative politics method of Arend Lijphart, the data analysis was conducted by means of examining the presence of the aspects of liberal cosmopolitan democratization.

Through the analysis, it became clear that the structures in the EU especially contribute to democratic institutionalization and network strengthening by means of the European parliament and the Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). However, the EP is argued to suffer a lack of representation and competition and the ECI’s bureaucratic threshold is argued to be too high to be truly democratic. Within the framework of the political union, current societal and institutional efforts seem to be focussing on the context of the political union – changing the financial, social and political order (network strengthening). The political efforts seem to be focussed on the content – the institutional setting in which the political union will be shaped (institutionalization). However, these efforts are being contradicted by current non-democratic policies of the European Commission and the lack of public and traditional political support.

Regarding the impact of the democratization process on the level of European identity, I constructed four scenarios: democratic European identity, hollow European democracy, technocratic European identity and hollow European technocracy. The key uncertainties of these scenarios are the shaping of the political union and the democratization process within the EU. The prospect of the scenarios are especially depending two main issues: whether the EU institutions are taking a democratic or technocratic stance in solving the financial crisis and whether the democratization process is backed up by political forces at the European level.
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1. INTRODUCTION

**IT’S HAPPENING RIGHT NOW**

In 2009, the world was shocked by the emerging cracks in the financial markets of the European Union. After the banking crisis, in which the EU member states urged to save their banking systems by means of public financing, the focus was redirected to a different crisis: the European Sovereign debt crisis. Suddenly, the debts of EU member states became risk full investments with sky rocketing interest rates. Countries were confronted with the danger of having a historically unique default (Candelon & Palm, 2010) – not being able to pay for their public necessities.

This financial crisis triggered an interesting debate. Initially, voices were raised to strengthen economic and monetary policies – issuing emergency funds for infected economies and starting negotiations on EMU fixes like the issuing of the controversial Euro-bonds (Weizsäcker, 2011). Recently, these talks have been accompanied by discussions about strengthening the political union within the EU – and especially within the Eurozone. Government leaders have been discussing new institutional settings and the notion of a “two speed Europe” (Wiesmann, 2012) – either between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries or between the wealthy North and the poorer South of the EU. On the 29th of June, 2012, something remarkable happened. During an EU summit, the French president Francois Hollande, who was feared to be against increased European integration, called for a strengthening of the political union in Europe (Mahony, 2012). This brought him in line with the previous calls of the German chancellor Angela Merkel – leading to the emergence of a French-German bound that presses towards a political, federal EU.

How will this new political union be governed? Will we face a technocrat government of unelected national representatives or a new form of democratic government? Phrased in other words: will we have an EU as an enlightened despotism or as a democratic federal state (Hix, 2008)? And what effect will these different forms of governance have on our feeling of being European – will we feel attached to or frightened by the European project? The difficulty of these questions lies in the uniqueness of the European project itself. It is the first international organization in which the participating member states are willing to give up a substantial level of their sovereignty. On the one hand, it’s not comparable with a typical, Westphalia nation state but on the other hand it’s not comparable with a purely intergovernmental organization that is focussed on negotiation between its’ members. The same applies to the democratization of the EU. In a purely intergovernmental organization, democratic accountability lies at the level of the nation state. Since the EU is not a typical intergovernmental organization, power and democratic accountability lie at different levels. Are these levels governed democratically or are they ruled by technocrats?

The contradiction between European technocracy and democracy becomes apparent in many areas. Marquardt argues that the current technocratic outlook of Europe contributes to a flawed democratization process (Marquardt, 1994 p.290). He argues that the institutional strengthening as such – the strengthening of the European parliament to fix the balance of power – is a technocratic solution to a democratic problem. Basing institutional reforms on pragmatic, positivist and bureaucratic arguments applies to a “non-European” form of technocracy; since its’ traditional democratic decision making is based on discussion and integration of interests (Montpetit & Rouillard, 2008 p.927). Is the European integration project guiding the EU towards an enlightened,
despotic form of technocracy that is based on risk-management and reason – confining public participation? Or is it leading towards a new form of democracy, based on free public participation?

RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question and sub-questions of this paper aim at understanding the process of European democratization and its’ impact on European Citizens’ identity. My descriptive and scenario research question will be: How do current democratization efforts of institutional, political and societal actors effect the democratization of the EU and what are future scenarios of its’ impact on the European identity of EU citizens?

In order to assess this question, I will take three sub questions into account that will pave the way towards a feasible discussion and conclusion. These questions will be aimed at highlighting the assessment of current developments in the democratization process and future scenarios about the impact of democratization on European citizens’ identity:

- What are the current structures that strengthen the democratization at the European level?
- To what extent do the current democratization efforts of institutional, political and societal actors influence the democratization of the EU?
- What are the possible scenarios regarding the impact of European democratization on the level of identity of EU citizens?

The first question will be focused on the current policies and practices in the European Union that contribute to its’ level of democracy. By analysing these structures, I will be able to assess whether the EU is currently functioning democratically and whether there are factors that might obstruct this level of democracy. The second question is concerned with describing current efforts that are aimed at democratizing the EU in the future. The assessment of these efforts will give a clear idea of the democratic prospects of the EU – whether it is likely that the democratic process will be strengthened or not. Finally, by means of the third question, I will try to look into the future of the EU by constructing four different scenarios. These scenarios are aimed at understanding the impact of the possible democratization processes in the EU on the level of European identity of EU citizens.

The nature of this study is one of a “framework guided description” study. I will try to construct an answer to the research question by means of collecting and analysing documents of institutional, political and societal actors. I will do this according to the method of a literature study that applies to the structure of a theory confirming case study (Lijphart, 2012). The findings in the documents will be linked with my model of European democratization that is based on existing theories of European democratization. Combining the descriptive part of the study with the overview of future scenarios will provide for an analysis of current democratization attempts on the European level and their possible impact on the future identity of EU citizens.
2. European Democratization: A Liberal Cosmopolitan Model

In this chapter, I will construct a theoretical model that applies to my research questions – both aimed at modelling the European democratization process and the process of European identity building. The emerging political union is the process that functions as the independent variable in my study. Therefore, the theoretical framework will be aimed at distinguishing variables that influence the process of democratization in the context of the development of the political union. Firstly, I will create a model that explains these processes according to factors that are determined by the emerging political union. Secondly, I will link my model with existing models of democratization and identity building that are mentioned in literature. To conclude the chapter, I will give a brief overview of the insights that I have gained from the theoretical model.

So at first, what is this context of the emerging political union and how will it influence my research question? In the introduction, I discussed the emergence of the political union in the context of the European financial crisis. It is not a question “whether” there will be a political union – there already is one – but “how” this political union will look like. The current developments are concerned with economic and fiscal integration – the creation of a European emergency fund (ESM) issuing of Eurobonds (financial bonds that function of a collective government debt of the Eurozone (European Commission, 2011)) and the control of government budgets. In its’ essence, this means that sovereignty from the member states is being conferred to Brussels. This transfer of powers causes two basic changes in the relationship with the EU versus the member states and its’ citizens: institutional changes and the embedding and strengthening of EU policies into national, regional and sectorial policy networks. This process can also be distinguished as so-called process of “Europeanization” (Howell, 2004).

What insights does this theoretical framework provide that can be used in the analysis of European democratization? Regarding the primary sources of democratization; those are identified as “institutionalization” and “strengthening of networks”. The institutionalization refers to the institutional reforms that are the result of further political integration. These reforms might have a positive or a negative impact on the democratization process. The strengthening of networks refers to the embedding and strengthening of EU policies at different levels which can have a similar impact on the democratization process. Consequently, my model of democratization has the following features:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalization</th>
<th>Political Union</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of networks</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: The model of democratization*

The process of European identity building is determined by the same two variables that I mentioned before: institutional changes and the embedding and strengthening of EU policies into national, regional and sectorial policy networks. These forms of “Europeanization” both have a profound impact on the identity of European citizens. The European institutions are seen as “identity builders”
The impact of their policies at different levels will influence the process of European identity building. For example, by means of strengthening or weakening of the European Parliament through institutional reforms that are the result of further political integration, the European identity of EU citizens might become stronger or weaker as well.

Figure 2: Model of European identity building

Although the above mentioned model of European identity does fit with the connected theories of European democratization, the models don’t imply a causal relationship between the two. There can be a strong European identity without the existence of a democratization process and vice versa. This will become more clear when I will discuss the several possible future scenarios in the last chapter of this paper. Why then bother with the influence of democratization on European citizenship, though there is no or only a limited causal relation between the two? The answer to this question is two-fold: first of all, the concept of democratization shares common indicators with the concept of identity building (Walkenhorst, 2009 p.17): citizenship, representation, legitimacy, cosmopolitanism, democracy and community of values. This implies at least a correlation between democratization and identity building; democratization at the European level will influence the level of European identity though it does not account for possible confounding variables. Secondly, since this paper is about European democratization, its’ impact on identity building does not simply involve the way of governance but also the values of governance. What European governance would lead to a European identity? Why would we prefer democratization over “technocratization” – democracy over a form of enlightened despotism - when talking about its’ impact on European identity building?

A way of assessing this question is by looking at the White paper of the European Commission on so-called “European governance”. It stresses that “democratic institutions and the representatives of the people, at both national and European levels” (democratization), “can and must try to connect Europe with its citizens” (identity building). “This is the starting condition for more effective and relevant policies” (European Commission, 2001 p.4). The five principles that function as guidelines within this white paper are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Central to the way of working of EU institutions is by means of a reinforced culture of consolidation and dialogue (European Commission, 2001 p.16). This would lead to the conclusion that democracy, as well as democratic principles, form the basic conditions of European governance.

As a second step, I will link my model with existing theoretical models that are to be found in the literature on European democratization and identity building. The influence of institutionalization on the democratization process is discussed in the theory of liberal-internationalism. According to McGrew, liberal-internationalism is in its’ essence “the construction of an international order based on the rule of law and cooperation between states” (Mcgrew, 2003). What would this theory imply in terms of democratization of the EU? With the focus on institutional framework that would foster “the rule of law and cooperation between states” – the application of liberal internationalism on European democratization implies a reform of the European institutions, especially the European
Parliament. According to Hix, “the best electoral system for the European Parliament would be relatively small multi-member districts and an open ballot structure in all EU member states” (Hix & Politique, 2009 p.50).

The influence of strengthening of policy networks is discussed in the theory of cosmopolitan democracy – also referring to the notion of “cosmopolitan Europe”. The central aspect of this model is “the principle of democratic autonomy, namely the entitlement to autonomy within the constraints of the community” (Mcgrew, 2003 p.17). This means that every community is autonomous within certain limits that are set by the overarching community, which is on its’ turn also limited by the smaller community. Therefore, this model “requires entrenchment in regional and global networks as well as in national and local politics” (Held, 2006 p.308). Regarding the European democratization process, the model of “cosmopolitan Europe” refers to the notion of a “global Europe” that is defined against the notion of a “national Europe” (Delanty, 2005 p.405). In its’ essence, the cosmopolitan Europe simply goes beyond the current idea of democracy that is based on the existence of the nation state – just because power has moved away from this traditional democratic structure. As Joseph Staat argues, in accordance with the theory of Habermas, external powers are threatening the traditional democracy in its’ core – like the threat of unchecked corporate power (Staats, 2004 p.593). The solution, according to the advocates of cosmopolitan Europe, is the “effective combination of top-down and bottom-up politics” (Archibugi & Held, 2011 p.11). Since the national idea is unsuitable for unifying and democratizing Europe(Beck, n.d. p.116), the democratization process should be present at the transnational, national, regional and sectorial level – at every level where power is present.

Two existing theories that are concerned with these two variables of my study can be combined by recognizing the most important difference between them – the anticipation on current structure reforms on the one hand (liberal-international democracy) and the anticipation on a new form of democracy that neglects the notion of traditional democracy in the nation state (cosmopolitan democracy). This is also indirectly mentioned by Simon Hix in his elaboration on the “new governance agenda of the EU” (Hix, 2011 p.54,55). He argues that although the emergence of a European _demos_ through democratization of networks of communities is a logic assumption since there can be no legitimacy at the European level without a _demos_ – a European people; the status quo in the EU is one of traditional politics and government. Taking this outlook into account, the most important inconsistency between the liberal-international and the cosmopolitan theory seems to be the division between the current status quo (= traditional democracy) and an ideal for future democratization. A new, coherent theory – which I will from now on call the liberal cosmopolitan Europe theory – would therefore be focussed on the transition of these two kinds of democracy:
Liberal Cosmopolitan Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary source of power:</th>
<th>Short-term (liberal-int.)</th>
<th>Long term (cosmopolitan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European institutions (traditional politics)</td>
<td>Regional and global networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary source of democratization:</th>
<th>Reform of the EP – introduction of transnational competition for power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European parliament (top down)</td>
<td>Regional, national, transnational and sectorial communities (top down-bottom up)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of democratization:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic autonomy of each community in accordance with overarching community</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 3: merging liberal-international and cosmopolitan democracy theories – liberal cosmopolitan Europe

The shaping of the political union within the EU will both have its’ impact on the democratization process and on the process of European identity building. The institutional changes and the embedding and strengthening of policies that are a result of the shaping of the political union will have their impact on the identity building of EU citizens. This paragraph will try to model this impact, with regards to the existing models on transnational identity building. The main question will therefore be: will institutionalization and strengthening of networks contribute to the European identity of EU citizens? The models that are closely related to the influence of these two variables on European identity are the “political-legal European identity” (Kostakopoulou, 2001), the “Social European identity” (Wendt, 2012) and to some extent the “European Post-identity commonness” (Lutz & Kritzinger, 2007). In the following section, I will construct a model that deals with the impact of the variables of institutionalization and network strengthening on identity building and relate it with the existing theories.

According to the political-legal European identity theory, European democratization will influence the creation of a European identity by its’ institutionalisation. As argued by Risse: “politicization of European affairs increases the salience of the EU in the perception of the citizens” (Risse, 2006 p.8). The democratic constitution making itself will foster the emergence of a European identity – because it makes EU citizens more attached to the European project. This creates a connection between EU political rights and the emergence of the Europeanization of citizenship and therefore a European identity (Meehan, 2000 p.174). In other words; the mere democratization of EU institutions itself will strengthen the European identity through the creation of political-legal democratic structures. Habermas captured this process with the term “Verfassungspatriotismus” – constitutional patriotism (MacCormick, 2012 p.341). Whereas the notions of social European identity and European post-identity are both related to the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, I will combine them in this assessment of the impact of democratization. According to these two theories of European identity building, the democratization process should rather be “global” than “European” (Jamieson, 2002 p.1). According to Smith, this identity should emerge through “shaping a cultural identity that will be both distinctive and inclusive, differentiating yet assimilative” (Smith & Smith, 2012 p.76). It refers to a process of creating a cosmopolitan identity “based on a cultural logic of self-transformation rather than as a supranational identity or an official EU identity” (Delanty, 2005 p.405). According to the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, European identity would be strengthened by the “top down” and “bottom up” process of democratizing structures at the transnational, national, regional and sectorial level.
CONCLUSION

The insights that can be derived from the discussion about the theoretical framework show a pattern of democratization that applies to two main developments that are influenced by the further political integration of the EU. These are the institutionalization process and the embedding and strengthening of EU policies in regional, national, transnational and corporate networks. The two variables influence both the level of democratization and the level of European identity building. After putting my model within the context of existing theoretical frameworks that can be found in literature, I linked it with the models of liberal and cosmopolitan democratization. In addition, I found consistencies with the models of political-legal and social/post identity models. As a next step, I will use my model for collecting and operationalizing my data and for the analysis of these data. In the analysis, I will assess to what extent there is a democratic institutionalization and/or strengthening and policy embedding in networks.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODS

In this chapter, I will elaborate on the data that I’m going to use in my analysis of the European democratization process. In addition, I will operationalize the data, by explaining the conceptualization of the theories with regards to the data analysis and the data selection of my study. After discussing the operationalization, I will mention the methods that I will use to analyse my data. For the first and second question of my research, I will describe the method of “theory-confirming case study” that is one of the methods of the comparative politics method of Lijphart. For the third question, I will describe the scenario method of Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt and Rothman and the Dutch government agency WRR. Regarding the target population and the sampling frame, which deals with the units that I want to include in the study (Babbie, 2007): policy papers, academic papers and statistical datasets.

Firstly, I made a data collection that is linked with the sub questions of my research. My first question is about the current structures in the EU that strengthen democratization\textsuperscript{1}. Data that I will use for assessing this question are therefore statistical data that describe the current state of the European democracy and European policy papers that reflect the current policies that control for democratic practices within the EU. My second question deals with the efforts of stakeholders that have not yet been put into practice. In order to assess these efforts, I will analyse the political proposal to reform the European Parliament and the party programs of transnational parties. In order to put these efforts into perspective, I will also deal with efforts of stakeholders that are countering the

\textsuperscript{1} The entire data collection can be found in the appendix
democratization (party programs of strong nationalist – anti-EU parties). For the third part of my analysis, the scenario study, I will use quantitative data that shows the current development of the European identity as well as quantitative data and theoretical insights that deal with the link between democratization and identity building.

Secondly, the operationalization of the data is aimed at ordering the data in such a way that I will be able to answer my sub questions within the theoretical framework that was discussed in the previous chapter. The ordering of the data has to relate to the two main variables in the theoretical model – the institutionalization and the network strengthening. Therefore, I will examine the presence and the function of these variables in the data. I derived the main aspects of the variables from my theoretical framework and the connected literature. Furthermore, I connected specific keywords to the aspects that are likely to be found in the text as indicators of the central variables. These keywords are used to identify the aspects in the data – they are guiding but not mutually exclusive. Therefore, other words might fit the keywords to such an extent that they are also fit in order to indicate a certain aspect (e.g. “experimentation” of government as “alternative government”). In the analysis, I will try to distinguish these keywords in order to examine the presence of one of the variables in the sources.

Thirdly, as for the research design that will be used in the first part of this study: this is a theory-confirming case selection, based on the comparative politics research design of Arend Lijphart. According to Lijphart: “Theory-confirming case studies are analysis of single cases within the framework of established generalization. Prior knowledge of the case is limited to a single variable or to none of the variables that the proposition relates. The case study is a test of the proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed by it.” (Lijphart, 2012 p. 692). When applied to the democratization process of the EU, this means that we will assess the single case of the EU within the theoretical framework of established generalization – being the frameworks of liberal-international and cosmopolitan democracy. Therefore, I need to measure the level of “institutionalization” and “network strengthening” in assessing the process of democratization. In the analysis, I will elaborate on to what extent the democratization process complies with one or both of the democratization theories.

The comparative method is focusing on “comparison of political inquiry” to create “conscious thinking” in the field of study. It is designed to indicate the how of an analysis without specifying the what. According to Lijphart, the comparative method can be regarded as “a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement” (Lijphart, 2012 p.683). The comparative method has some weaknesses and strengths that need to be taken into account while conducting the research. The main problem is that whereas there are many variables that are influencing the outcome of the study, the number of cases is often limited. “These two problems (many variables, small number of cases) are closely interrelated” (Lijphart, 2012 p.685). For this reason, Lijphart advises to use the comparative method only when a statistical method is not feasible. In addition, the comparative method is most likely to be used in creating macro hypotheses (relating to a small number of cases) and it should be primarily used as a first stage research, where hypotheses are carefully formulated. Since this study is focusing on macro hypotheses with a small number of cases, the comparative method seems to be a suitable method to apply to this research. Lijphart offers four categories of ways to minimize the problems that are discussed above (Lijphart, 2012 p.688-690):
1. Increase the number of cases as much as possible

As is true with almost all empirical research, a larger amount of cases accounts for a higher control. However, regarding this case study I’m only assessing one single case (that of the EU). In order to control for this methodological weakness, I will apply data triangulation (see paragraph 3.2) and I will include temporal variation within the case (Gerring, 2010 p.343)

2. Reduce the “property-space” of the analysis

Reducing the property space is referring to the number of variables – this can be done by combining two or more variables “that express an essentially similar underlying characteristic into a single variable” (Lijphart, 2012 p.687). In my study, this means that I need to focus on finding overarching variables that explain the democratization process when looking at the application of the theories within the cases.

3. Focus on the comparative analysis

When focusing on the comparative analysis, “comparable means: similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other” (Lijphart, 2012 p.687). This is mainly aimed at solving the problem of “too many variables” because it tries to use similar cases in which many variables are constant. This makes it better to look at the variables that are actually relevant for the analysis. In my study, it might be difficult to use only similar cases, because I’m going to look at different categories of data.

4. Focus the comparative analysis on the “key” variables

One way to solve the problem of too many variables is also, very straightforward, the selection of key variables that are most relevant for the analysis and omitting the variables that are of less importance. Though is it very important to take in account most of the possible variables, the actual research can be done by looking at only the key variables. In my study, this means that I will have to focus on the most important variables that are mentioned in the theoretical framework: institutionalization and network strengthening. The above mentioned solutions try to solve the most important weaknesses of the comparative politics method. Though the outcomes with regards to transnational democratization and European identity might give some interesting theoretical insight, they will not serve as a realistic reflection of the real implication of these concepts on e.g. European citizens. Nevertheless, they contribute to the fact that the method creates a basis for first stage research because of it general application.

The research design that I will be using in the second part of the study – where I will formulate different scenarios on the impact of European democratization on the level of European citizens’ identity – is the scenario analysis design. As a basis for this design, I will use the methods as described by Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt and Rothman and of the Dutch government agency WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policies). It is argued that there is no “correct scenario definition or approach” but there is a broad working definition: “scenarios are descriptions of possible futures that reflect different perspectives on the past, the present and the future” (van Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt, & Rothman, 2003 p. 424). By looking at three overarching themes – project goal, process design and scenario content – and 14 scenario characteristics, a typology of scenario analysis is
constructed (van Notten et al., 2003 p.440). The scenario type I will use is the foresight scenario typology in which more than one different future scenarios are possible (Molen, 2010 p.13). A good example of a scenario study in this respect is the study of the CPB (Dutch Central Planning Agency) “Four futures for Europe”. In this study, the two dimensions of international cooperation vs. national sovereignty and public vs. private responsibilities are used to predict four future scenarios (strong Europe, global economy, regional communities, transatlantic market) (Mooij & Tang, n.d. p.177). I will use a similar method to distinguish the different scenarios of European identity building.

**METHODODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES**
Due to both the limited scope of my study and the nature of the methodology (theory-confirming case study with a single case), there are some substantial methodological difficulties that I will have to take into account when making inferences out of the analysis. First of all, while I am studying only a single case, the EU, two solutions of Lijphart’s method of decreasing methodological flaws are difficult to comply with: maximizing the number of cases and focusing on the comparative analysis. I will try to compensate these threats by using triangulation in my case study design – using data from different stakeholders and different perspectives. Additionally, the scope of my study is merely targeted on the process of democratization – though this is only one form of governance. This implies that other confounding variables that influence the democratization might not be accounted for in the analysis (e.g. the influence of bureaucracy and financial markets).

**CONCLUSION**
In this chapter, I discussed the data that I will collect in order to analyse my research and sub questions. First of all, I provided for the data collection – describing the data that I will use in my analysis. Secondly, I operationalized the data by relating the data to the theory – distinguishing the variables, aspects and keywords that I expect to find in my data. Finally, I mentioned the methods that I will use: for the first two questions I will use the comparative politics method of Lijphart and for the last question I will use the scenario study methodology. In the following analysis, I will assess the data according to the presence and function of the variables of my study by looking at the keywords and interpreting the data.

**4. ANALYSIS**
In this chapter, I will analyse the data that are used to support the answering of my sub questions. I will discuss the separate sources, focussing on the relevant aspects within the framing of the question and the theoretical model I constructed in the second chapter. The main two processes that I will focus on are the democratic institutionalization of the EU and the democratic strengthening of networks of policy actors. I will distinguish these two processes in my sources and link them with the models of democratization and identity building in order to assess to what extent the theories can be confirmed according to the theory confirming case study model.

**AMBIVALENCE IN CURRENT DEMOCRATIZATION STRUCTURES**
The first question is aimed at describing and analysing the current state of the European democracy and the structures that control for its’ democratic functioning. For this analysis, I will use the Treaty
of the EU (TEU) and assess its’ provisions on democratic government. The TEU both provides for the embedding of the value of democracy in its’ institutional setting as for the translation of this value to practical policy provisions. When looking at the keywords in my operationalization, the TEU focusses on democracy, transparency and accountability (EU, 2010).

The value of democracy is being discussed in the section “provisions on the democratic principles” which states that “the functioning of the EU is based on representative democracy” (title II, article 10)” (EU, 2010 p.20). With regards to transparency, the TEU discusses that, “since the commission doesn’t any longer exist out of citizens of all member states, it should especially focus on the need for total transparency in its’ relation with all member states” (EU, 2010 p.342). This provision, that has been issued by the European council, handles the transnational nature of the commission and in its’ essence presents “transparency” as a solution to the direct representation of the member states in the commission. Accountability is provided for in the TEU with regards to the democratic accountability of European and regional governments. The two interesting aspects are the incorporation of accountability of the regional level and the mentioning of the primary accountability towards the national parliaments or its’ citizens (EU, 2010 p.20/21). The European Parliament is explicitly mentioned in relation to the commission, since the commission is accountable to the European Parliament. When connecting these findings with my theoretical model, it becomes clear that the commission claims to be focussing both on the institutionalization of and the network strengthening of the democratization process.

Thus, the democratization is included in the provisions of the TEU. But what are the actual structures that support this democratic process? These structures lie within the functioning of the European Parliament (representative democracy) and the so-called Citizens’ initiative (direct democracy). According to the TEU (title V – citizenship; article 39), “every citizen of the EU has active and passive voting rights through the elections of the European Parliament in the member state where he resides, under the same conditions as the subjects of that state” (EU, 2010 p.339). In addition, it provides that “members of the European Parliament are chosen by means of direct, free and secret general elections”. These provisions imply direct elections, but on a national basis – including only national representatives as the people that can compete for a vote. Relating this to the model, it becomes clear that the parliament contributes to the institutionalization of democratization in the EU.

The second, quite recent, institutionalization of democracy in the EU is the so-called citizens’ initiative. It is shortly mentioned in article 24 of the TEU, stating that citizens can issue directly a citizens’ initiative that is aimed at proposing new legislature in the EU. This Citizens’ initiative has been institutionalized by common EU legislature (only mentioned as a concept in the treaty). It provides for the possibility of European citizens to ask the commission for the initiation of a new policy (within the policy areas in which the commission has right of initiative) by gathering one million signatures, representing citizens of at least 25% of the member states of the EU (Council of the EU, 2011 p.65). In order to start a Citizens initiative, one needs to register the initiative, complying to a number of requirements within the framework of a so-called ECI committee. The gathering of signatures depends on both the requirements of the EU as on the requirements of the respective member states in which the signatures are being gathered (Kaufmann, Barbalata, & Murphy, n.d.). The whole process might take about 2 years. According to the model, the ECI should contribute to democratization through network strengthening.
Regarding the variable of institutionalization, the aspect of institutional reform is actively implemented – on the basis of the general democratic principles that are central to all EU policy. Regarding representation, it is provided that the elections for the EP are based on national conditions – limiting the possibilities of the institutionalization of a truly European party system within a European electoral framework. This is closely related to the aspect of competition whereas current structures do not contribute to an electoral system in which political parties can compete on the European level on the basis of European political campaigns. The aspect of European government is also not present today within the structures of the EU, since there are no institutional provisions that provide for a representative European government that can be held completely accountable by the European Parliament.

The variable network strengthening is reflected in the current structures as to the aspects of self-governing and direct democracy – taking in account the European Citizens’ Initiative that has been constituted by the treaty of Lisbon. This is the case because it provides for a direct democratic tool for citizen networks (direct democracy) that creates a bottom-up effect based on subsidiarity (it is initiated by European citizens when they find it suitable). However, it is not aimed at alternative government whereas it includes citizens in general and not agencies and communities as such. In addition, it doesn’t deal with the integration of top-down control and the extension of policies to the global level.

According to the treaty provisions and the institutional structures, both democratic institutionalization and network strengthening seem to be provided for to a certain extent. However, this creates an ambivalence with the theoretical framework that depicts a lack of democratization. When looking at the democratic practice, there indeed seem to be inconsistencies regarding both the instruments: the European Parliament and the European Citizens’ Initiative. The turnout of the European Parliament has declined with 20% of the European average between 1979 and 2009 and in addition, EP elections are functioning as “second-order” national elections (Hix, 2008; Malkopoulou, 2009) – showing little correlation between institutional reforms and actual democratic performance. According to Hix, the elections for the European Parliament are lacking the vital aspects of representation (indirect via national parties), transnational competition and the accountability of a real European government (Hix, 2008).

Regarding the European Citizens Initiative, similar critiques can be found – finding inconsistencies between institutional reforms and the practical implications. Although the new regulation was generally acclaimed when it first appeared (Sefcovic, 2010), some shortcomings arose as well. On the one hand, some of the promising first initiatives failed because of slow or no response of the European Commission (petition on genetically modified crops in 2010) (Alliance for natural health, 2011) or the total failure of an initiative because of the bureaucratic procedures attached to it (Happy cows initiative in 2012) (Groenlinks Europa, 2012). In addition, it is argued that the structure is rather a helpful tool for powerful, rich lobby movements than for regular citizens – especially because the costly nature of the campaigns (the Happy cows initiative failed though it was backed up by more than € 300.000,-) (Groenlinks Europa, 2012; The Parliament, 2012).

CONCLUSION
To conclude this paragraph: the structures in the EU do contribute to a certain level of democratic institutionalization and network strengthening – focussing more on the first than the latter. However just a few aspects of these variables have been translated to real policies which makes them arguably weak in creating a form of liberal cosmopolitan democracy. There seems to be an inconsistency between the institutional provisions and the practical implications. The European Parliament is argued to suffer a lack of representation, competition and there is no real European government that can be held accountable. In addition, the European Citizens’ Initiative is indeed a form of direct democracy, but it is argued that its’ threshold is too high because of costs and bureaucratic difficulties. The current democratic structures therefore seem to create an ambivalence between the democratic provisions and the practical democratic implications.

DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS – IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN A PROCESS OF INCONSISTENT PRACTICES
This paragraph deals with the analysis of the democratization efforts that are been taken by institutional, political and societal actors. I will shortly describe these efforts on all three levels and after that I will assess their influence on the democratization process according to the conceptualization of the theory. Will these efforts benefit the aspects of democratization, foster the status quo or even decrease these aspects? In this paragraph, I will summarize the sources in a systematic way and analyse the key aspects.

Within the scope of institutional efforts, I examined three different documents that reflect the efforts of the European commission to strengthen democracy on different dimensions: governance of EU institutions in general, the so-called Multilevel Governance (MLG) and the functioning of the European Parliament. The general pattern that can be seen, is that the democratic problems in these documents are mostly related to political bodies outside the framework of the European institutions, focussing on the member states and other “organizations”. The political actors are argued to be operating in a changing global setting – due to the EU enlargement. The commission reasons that the causes of change are “increasing scientification of politics, expanding role of organizations as vehicles of collective decision making and the changing international environment” (European Commission, 2000a p.2)

The proposed democratization efforts are put largely outside of the institutional framework of the EU. The institutions argue that it should “establish appropriate tools to support participatory democracy … and … implement experimentation at the local and regional level” (Committee of the regions, 2009). In addition, the Commission reasons that the public debate should be organized by “public spheres that are established by self-organizing agents” (European Commission, 2000a). The provisions on governance remain quite general, stating that the Commission should “encourage a discussion amongst citizens … reform processes for preparing and implementing rules and policies and organizing a debate on overhauling the objectives of the common policies” (European Commission, 2000b). According to my theoretical model, the efforts of the commission are especially focussing on the level of network strengthening.

The extent to which the efforts as described in these papers are and will be affecting the democratization process is difficult to assess. Certainly, the previously discussed European Citizens’ Initiative lies within the scope of these efforts, but most of the proposed solutions lie outside of the

2 The complete operationalization of each source can be found in the appendices
legal policy scope of the European Commission. However, the efforts of the European institutions clearly show a focus on network strengthening by providing forms of direct and alternative government. Regarding the shaping of the political union in the context of the financial crisis, critiques on the democratic procedures have been raised. The European institutions are trying to combat the crisis in the framework of a so-called “Troika” (a cooperation of unelected officials). It is argued that the Troika is a technocrat structure that is “enforcing a crushing austerity onto Greece on behalf of the international creditors” (The Blue Voice, 2012). In addition, the technocratic stance of the European Commission can also be derived from its’ statement that European politics is influenced by “political scientification” (European Commission, 2000a p.2). Taking this into account, the European Commission seems to be taking efforts to promote democratization at different levels of government but is to a lesser extent concerned with reforming the democratic structures of the EU itself.

The first document in the analysis that is dealing with the political democratization efforts is the proposal of MEP Andrew Duff. This proposal is the result of the work of the EP’s committee of constitutional affairs. It argues that it wants to “reform its’ (the EP’s ) electoral procedure with the aims of enhancing the popularity of Parliament across the Union, reducing dissimilarities between the electoral procedures of states and making Parliament more accountable to the citizens it represents” (Duff, 2010 p.6). The way that it wants to do so is reflected in four different reforms:” the election of 25 additional MEPs by a single constituency from the whole territory of the EU; a shift in timing of the elections from June to May, establishing a uniform supranational regime for MEPs regarding their privileges and immunities and an improved distribution of the existing seats” (Stratulat & Emmanouilidis, 2011 p.1). These efforts are strongly focussed on democratic institutionalization, focussing on the aspects of representation and competition, as discussed in the operationalization.

The documents that I examined in the context of political democratization are reflecting the stance of transnational political forces regarding democratization – the party programs of the Newropeans, which is the first transnational European party and the Pirate Party which is a transnational movement that is centred around the consequences of the information age. The Newropeans argue that “treaties should be ratified by EU-wide referenda”, “institutionalising a real European government”, “50% of the MEPs representing transnational parties” and “a regular political review of the EU bureaucracy” (Newropeans, 2009 p.9-12) would lead to democratization of the EU. According to the Newropeans, this democratization is very important whereas “the current political crisis of the EU is reflecting the growing mismatch between the expectations of the citizens and the extent to which the ruling elites can answer to these expectations”(Newropeans, 2009 p.5). The Pirate Party is calling for “risking more democracy”, though not specifying this directly for the EU (Reda, 2012 p.5). The efforts that would lead towards this democratization process are “facilitating digital, alternative governance”, “legal strengthening of the separation of powers” and “reforming the electoral system” (Reda, 2012 p.5).

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3 The President of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF
4 The party program of the ELDR surprisingly had no provisions on EU democratization – but the why of this absence is outside the scope of this study
5 Founded in 2005 by Franck Biancheri
The solutions that are mentioned in the political texts are mostly related to institutionalization of the democratization process. They are about the reform of European elections and the reform of the European Parliament that would create a political ground for transnational parties. In addition, they plead for institutional strengthening and the creation of a real, accountable European government. The extent to which these efforts will contribute to the democratization process depends on the level to which the political forces will be able to implement their policies. According to the latest election results of 2009, the Newropeans didn’t do very well and were “not even mentioned in the exit polls in the Dutch election” (Europanu, 2009). On the other hand, the Pirate Party is regarded as the “fastest growing political group in Europe” (Peterson, 2012). One interesting differences between these parties is the ideological background: the Newropeans see democratization as their primary goal whereas the Pirate Party sees it as a means to defend their transnational value of digital freedom. Regarding the prospects of the proposal of MEP Duff, the outlooks are uncertain. Until now, the proposal has been blocked twice by MEPs of the EPP to ensure that “parts of the report … were not thrown out” and because “MEPs are concerned the creation of a transnational election list of 25 MEPs will weaken the influence of smaller member states as well as create two classes of members” (Brand, 2012). In short, the democratization efforts of political actors contain substantial aspects to strengthen the institutionalization of the democratization process but seem to be held back by lack of popular support and resistance of traditional political forces.

The societal efforts that are aimed at democratizing the EU provide for the most fragile data, whereas there are very many societal groups that are somehow connected to the democratization process that their impact is much harder to identity than institutional and political actors. The data collection for the societal actors is consequently quite far from covering the actual situation. The first paper I examined is the response of the NGO network Bond on the white paper on governance of the commission on “strengthening European participatory democracy” (BOND, 2004). It argues that “guidelines and standards need to be set for assessing NGO legitimacy and representativeness” (BOND, 2004) – therefore issuing a democratic control for NGOs. In addition, it argues that there should be “a legal basis recognizing the role of NGOs and setting out the principles for consultation with the non-governmental sector” and “drafting the next TEU revision by a convention composed of representatives of governments and of notational and EP MPs” (BOND, 2004). The Bond network thus proposes to institutionalise both the democratic process at the NGO level as at the institutional level of the EU. The draft appeal of the Open Democracy movement is concerned with a similar democratic reform, stating that there should be “an institutional response to public protests of participatory and deliberative democracy” which would allow for “closer ties between democracy movements across Europe” (Rossanda, 2011). Control and institutionalization of the democracy of the societal sector seem to be the primary concerns in these two articles. The reason for this need of democratization are “the EU’s lack of putting policy into practice and meeting its’ stated object of coherence” and “traditional democracy does not provide answer to the current problems” (BOND, 2004; Rossanda, 2011).

In the other two documents, the focus is much more put on the importance of network strengthening. The movement Democracia Real Ya! – sprung out of the Spanish branch of the occupy movement, calls for “facilitating the political participation of citizens through direct channels that provide the greatest benefit to the wider society” (Democracia real Yal, 2012). In addition, the European Alternatives – “a civil society organisation devoted to exploring the potential for transnational politics and culture” - shares this stance stating that democratization should be realized
through “other forms of public engagement: social and political change being understood as a complete renewal of society which is not limited to any domain or sector” (European Alternatives, 2011). As a reason for these democratization efforts, it is brought forward that “the nation state is no longer the appropriate political form in which to define democratic decision –making” (European Alternatives, 2011) and because of “corrupt politics and finances without the democratic control of the people” (Democracia real Ya!, 2012). This reasoning is closely related to the development of the political union in the context of the financial crisis.

The extent to which these societal efforts really impact the democratization process is very hard to assess – on the one hand because of the broadness of the sector and on the other hand because of the lack of formal impact through institutional rules. A study on the subject of the impact of NGOs on EU policies show that “the direct impact of an NGO network on enforcement and policy review at the EU level may be limited” (Bugdahn, 2008). In addition, it is argued that “the NGO movement may think that it is the greatest expression of democracy. It is not... because a surfeit of political activism will arise” (Johns, 2000). Therefore, the proposals of democratic control from within the NGO sector itself seem very legitimate. In addition, they provide an insight that connects the practices of network strengthening with the condition of institutionalisation – showing a great link between the two variables that depict the level of democratization.

CONCLUSION

Within the framework of the political union, the institutional and societal efforts seem to be especially focussing on the context of this political union – being the changing global financial, social and political order. This context needs to be addressed by a democratization process that is focussed on the strengthening of networks, complying with the features of a cosmopolitan democracy. On the other hands, the political efforts seem to be focussing on the content – the institutional setting in which this political union will be shaped. The two most favoured aspects of democratization in the sources that I examined are institutional reform focussed on representation and alternative government focussed on self-governing⁶. However, some important critiques of this development are also to found. First of all, the efforts of the commission that are especially aimed at democratization outside of the EU institutional framework seem to be inconsistent with its’ own practices. Within the context of solving of the financial crisis, it works in the context of the seemingly non-democratic “Troika” that consists of non-elected officials. The efforts at the political level are questionable because of the lack for public and traditional political support. Finally, the societal efforts seem limited by the impact of NGOs on EU policy making and the democratic fallacies of the NGO sector itself.

Finally, regarding the methodological validity of the research, some important difficulties need to be taken into account. First of all, the generalization of the observations is based on a limited number of cases – which inadequately controls for possible confounding data. Especially regarding the data of the societal actors, this needs to be taken into account whereas, unlike the political and institutional actors, the observed data is just a small representation of the real N. In addition, the focus on the comparative analysis might be inadequate whereas I’ve analysed different categories of data that are difficult to compare on the basis of similar variables.

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⁶ Based on the number of observations of aspects in the data. see Annex – table V
5. Future Europe: Four Scenarios on European Identity

This chapter deals with four different scenarios on the future of Europe. The two key uncertainties that are built into these scenarios are the level of democratization and the shape of the political union. These two factors will eventually determine the identity of the European citizens within these four scenarios. The four scenarios that I will develop are the scenarios of Democratic European Identity, Hollow European democracy, Technocratic European identity, Hollow European technocracy. This will be done according to four steps (Mooij & Tang, n.d.): selecting strategic policy questions, selection of future uncertainties, merging uncertainties that are correlated and finally combining the two key uncertainties. I took the first three steps in modelling and analysing the democratization process – now the last step remains: developing the scenarios. First of all, I will shortly discuss the key uncertainties of the model, followed by a discussion of the four models; elaborating on the storyline (i.e. descriptions of the future in qualitative terms).

The Key Uncertainties

The first key uncertainty determining the nature of the European identity building is the shaping of the Political Union. Through the processes of institutionalization and network strengthening, the political union will have an impact on the identity building. It creates an identity based on the EU “as a civil power which has its roots in the classical-liberal tradition of equality and law” (Walkenhorst, 2009 p.11). What are the main trends that are influencing the shaping of the political union? In the global context, this is very much related to the extent to which the financial markets will be able to push governments towards further political integration and the extent to which the current Economic union can be preserved (Grauwe de, 2012). At the institutional level, this is determined by the extent to which the European institutions are able to press forward their agenda of reform. At the political level, the extent to which domestic politics are in favour or against political integration will determine the shaping of the political union. At the societal level, I’ve been unable to distinguish a trend that might influence the shaping of the political union.
The second key uncertainty is the development of the democratization process. As has been previously discussed, the democratization process is influenced by democratic institutionalization and network strengthening (Marquardt, 1994 p.290). In the global context, this is related to both the shaping of the political union as by the emergence of new democratic practices due to changing social, political and financial systems (Beck, n.d. p.116). At the institutional level, this depends on the extent to which the European institutions are able to implement new democratic practices. At the political level, the democratization process depends on the influence of political forces, both on the domestic as on the European level. At the societal level, the democratization process depends on the ability of societal groups to implement new democratic practices that deal with the changing social, political and financial systems.

**Scenario I: Democratic European Identity**

*Due to pressure of the financial markets and global challenges, the European institutions will be able to press for further institutional reforms and network strengthening. The current Economic union will prove to be strong enough to resist the perils of the financial crisis. At the domestic political level, the need for political integration will be supported. Due to the institutionalization process, the European Parliament will be able to implement new democratic practices – with as a vital ingredient the institutionalization of transnational politics. Ulrich Beck defends this vision, arguing that “Europe’s crisis is an opportunity for democracy” and that “sharing sovereignty will become a multiplier of power and democracy” (Beck, 2011). This new form of democratic institutionalisation is supported by the existing political forces and transnational political forces emerge as important political actors. Support for this scenario can be found in the paper of LEAP on Euroland 2012-2016. It illustrates a process that focusses first on stabilizing the financial situation in Europe, strengthening its’ international position and ultimately implementing the initiatives for the democratic legitimation of its’ governance (LEAP, 2012). Both by institutional, political and societal efforts, new forms of democracy are introduced that are aimed at the broadening the democratic process – not only applying it to the institutional level of traditional government but extending it to the social, political and financial level. This is done by a process of network strengthening and embedding of policies. The global democracy scenario that appeals to this development is the so-called Jefferson scenario that proposes the development of a new kind of global democratization based on technology (R. Barber, 2012).*

The democratic institutionalization and network strengthening will both support a process of identity building in the shape of “constitutional patriotism” and of the emergence of a “social and post-identity”. This will result in the shaping of a multi-layered identity that incorporates regional, national, European as well as global (cosmopolitan) identities that are all strongly embedded in the practice of liberal cosmopolitan democracy.

**Scenario II: Hollow European Democracy**

*Due to the difficulties that are caused by the financial crisis and the inability of the European institutions and the financial markets to adequately react on this crisis, further political integration loses its’ urgency and the European member states are forced to protect their individual interests. This scenario, in which the political project fails because of the Eurocrisis, is reflected in an article of the Financial times. It argues that “the political union is not the answer to the crisis” but “Eurozone leaders might somehow patch the current system up or the weaker members of the currency union could leave” (Rachman, 2011). At the political level, further political integration becomes very*
unpopular and populist anti-EU parties are gaining terrain at the expense of the strong traditional basis of middle parties that support European integration. This causes the nation state to remain the main player in European politics. However, the European parliament manages to reform the institutional democratic framework – making room for a transnational system. In addition, the societal forces are catching up with new democratic trends that shape the social, political and financial networks in Europe. That, nonetheless, the democratic reforms could be implemented is reflected in the vision of Andrew Duff, who argues that his electoral reform is “a big step forward for a United European Democracy” (European Parliament, 2011).

These developments cause the identity of EU citizens to be mainly based on the nation state – leaving the realm of politics to national actors. Therefore, there is no presence of a “constitutional patriotism” or a political European effort to strengthen networks of agencies. However, the EU is getting more democratic – as do the social, political and financial networks. This results in the emergence of a form of social/post-identity, although this is not a “European” identity and it might only be shared by a limited faction of the European citizens.

**Scenario III: Technocratic European Identity**

Due to the pressure of the financial markets, the European Institutions succeed in pressuring for further political integration. The major goals of this integration process is the political strengthening of the economic union. A number of economists argue that the strengthening of the powers of the institutions would be the key ingredient for solving the crisis. They suggest that “it is essential that the ECB take on the full responsibility” (Grauwe, 2011) and “a political union, especially if it involves fiscal transfers, creates solidarity and trust” (Hancke, 2012). This vision might be shared by the domestic political forces of the member states which is currently reflected by statements of Merkel and Hollande (Reuters, 2012). However, the democratization efforts at the European level fail, because of the urgency of stabilizing the financial situation. In addition, the traditional democratic process based at the representative democracy in the nation state is upheld by both the institutional level and the societal level. The societal and political efforts to strengthen democratic networks are marginalized by lack of popular and political support. The preferred positions of technocracy instead of democracy is reflected in several economic articles in which it is argued that “the appointment of economic experts, is viewed not as a problem but as an affirmation that the(se) nations mean business” (Guardian, 2011). In addition, it is argued that “the deeper Europe’s debt crisis becomes, the more European policymakers are clutching at solutions that substitute technocratic government” (T. Barber, 2011).

In this case, the identity of European citizens will merely be based on the institutionalization of the political union that causes a form of constitutional patriotism. However, this institutionalization is not based on democratic principles and does not call for democratic reform. Neither at the institutional level and regarding the strengthening of networks.

**Scenario IV: Hollow European Technocracy**

In this scenario, the financial markets and the European institutions fail to solve the difficulties that are caused by the financial crisis. This reduces the support for further political integration because of decline of domestic political support. Therefore, the nation state remains the primary source of political power. There is neither the possibility of institutionalization nor of network strengthening. In addition, the democratization efforts at the European level fail, both lacking the democratic
institutionalization and the democratic network strengthening. At the political level, there is no support for further democratization and at both the political as the societal level the traditional democracy, based on the nation state, is reserved as the primary mode of governance. This scenario, in which both the political union and subsequently the democratization of the EU fail, is reflected by some recent articles in the Economist and the Guardian. It is argued that “as the euro-zone crisis spooks governments, opinions are diverging dramatically about what the union is for” (The Economist, 2010) and “ticking off by Troika heightens fears of Greek exit from euro” (Elliott, 2012). The political union might fail because of the predominance of technocratic practices. Ulrich Beck reflects on this development by stating that “the grammar of power conforms to the imperial difference between creditor and debtor countries” with as its’ foundation a form of German Euro-nationalism” (Beck, n.d.-b).

In this case, the identity of European citizens remains at the level of the nation state, whereas there is no process of “constitutional patriotism”. Since this European identity is in its’ essence non-existent, one can also not argue of any form of democratic European identity – especially since there is no democratization process at the institutional level and regarding the strengthening of network. New forms of democracy remain a marginal phenomenon that are practiced by a small part of the European citizens.

PROSPECTS
In the following section I will shortly discuss the prospects of each of the scenarios that are mentioned above, both regarding the possible shaping of a political union and of its’ democratization process. What are the prospects of these two uncertainties and what how can we relate that to the probability of the scenarios?

As discussed in the scenarios, the shaping of the political union depends largely on both the global and financial developments and on the support of domestic politics to enhance further political integration – the latter being related to the first. Regarding the pressure of the European institutions, things are already being put into place with a proposal of Barroso, Van Rompuy, Mario Draghi and Jean-Claude Juncker. This proposal includes drastic steps towards a full political union – “a fiscal and political union would see EU countries issue joint bonds, co-ordinate tax policy and co-ordinate national spending on everything from healthcare to schools and social welfare” (Rettman, 2012). As for the other two factors, things are way more uncertain.

As for the prospect of the financial crisis, current bailout structures don’t seem to be working – resulting in rising interest rates in the south and growing differences between member states (Hewitt, 2012). This even led to threats from the side of the IMF to refuse any loans as from September 2012 (Spiegel, 2012). These developments have been beneficial to the strengthening of anti-EU “populist” parties. Those parties, with amongst them the PVV in the Netherlands, the True Fins in Finland and the Front National in France, are finding a common enemy in the EU (Altinas, 2012; Hartleb, 2012). However, it is argued that, although they are becoming stronger, they are not getting more unified (Hartleb, 2012). Therefore, it is uncertain to what extent they will have a voice in European integration matters. Arguably, they will have less impact on the coalition-based decision procedure in national parliaments but more impact on possible one-issue referenda on EU issues like

7 The heads of the commission, the council, the ECB and the Eurogroup
a new treaty (which is necessary for enhancing the political union). In short, the shaping of the political union largely depends on the success of EU institutions and the member states to counter the financial crisis and the extent to which anti-EU parties are able to influence the decision making process.

According to the scenarios, the democratization process directly depends on the efforts of the European institutions, the European politics and civil society actors (European NGOs). The extent to which these efforts depends on two main issues: whether the EU institutions are taking a democratic or technocratic stance in solving the financial crisis and whether the democratization process is backed up by political forces at the European level. With regards to the efforts of the European institutions, things currently seem to be handled in a technocratic way. At the European level, the financial crisis is tried to be solved by the so-called “Troika” – consisting of unelected technocrats from the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF (Xinhua, 2012). According to Collignon, at the domestic level the crisis is discussed at an intergovernmental level, providing no opportunity for democratic control (Collignon, 2011).

Regarding European politics, tendencies are quite uncertain – being influenced by political forces that are claiming in favour and against. Regarding the proposal in the European Parliament to support transnational parties, the political field at the European level is mixed (Marini, 2011), eventually leading to lack of political support for a reform at the moment. At the domestic level, support for democratization of the EU is difficult to assess, since it is closely related to the support for or against further European integration. However, the question of democratization is especially raised by anti-EU parties. The Dutch PVV argues about the voters’ choice “Eurofile or democrat” – implying that support democracy means the rejection of the EU (PVV, 2012). The True Fins – the anti-EU party in Finland – states as primary problems of the EU that “the EU in its current form and its development does not facilitate rule by the people” and “the idea of democracy was not one of the founding principles of the EU” (True Fins, 2011). This shows that the lack of democracy is one of the vital reasons for anti-EU parties to reject the European project.

Taking this into account, efforts of democratization of the EU are likely to be supported by domestic political forces. Regarding societal impact on the democratization process, the prospects are difficult to assess – both because of the methodological difficulties in the analysis of the societal efforts and because of the difficulty of assessing the impact of these efforts. In short, the democratization process in the EU currently strongly depends on the extent to which the European institutions are able and willing to change their efforts to solve the financial crisis. In addition, it depends on the extent to which political forces are able to issue an agenda of democratization – which is likely to be supported by domestic politics.

When linking the prospects of the two main uncertainties with the theory of European identity building, I will be able to assess the likelihood of the scenarios according to the theory. When taking in account the aspects of constitution building and network strengthening as main input variables for European identity, the current difficulty for the EU seems to lie in the area of constitution building – the two main processes being the efforts of the institutions to change their own practices and the efforts of the political actors to do so. At the moment, this means that the main determinant for democratization and identity building is the level of institutionalization of the democratization process. Since it is argued that there is “no more integration without more representation” (Thomas,
2012) a successfully enhanced political union is likely to be compatible with democratization of this union. Eventually, the most probable scenarios are therefore those of a “European democratic identity” and a situation between “Technocratic European identity” and “Hollow European technocracy”. This will all depend on whether the European institutions manage to change their ways of combating the financial crisis and the influence of political actors on this process. One might even argue that it will depend on the level of influence of the Troika versus the level of influence of democratic elected politicians.

6. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

This paper was aimed at finding an answer to the research question: How do current democratization efforts of institutional, political and societal actors effect the democratization of the EU and what are future scenarios of its’ impact on the European identity of EU citizens? The democratization process in the EU is closely related to the shaping of the political union in the context of the current financial crisis. This shaping of the political union causes two processes that are related to democratization: institutionalization and strengthening of networks and policy embedding at different levels of governance. Current structures within the EU especially contribute to the institutionalization of the democratization process. However, it is argued that the current structures are falling short of democratic structures because of their lack of representation, political competition and the absence of a European government that can be held democratically accountable. Regarding the network strengthening, democratic efforts are limited and they seem to be weakened by bureaucratic constraints. The efforts that are been taken to strengthen the democratization process at the institutional and societal level focus on the context of the political union. Because the shaping of changing global, political and financial systems, it is argued that government should adapt to it by enhancing forms of alternative government that are focused on self-governing. The efforts at the political level are focused on the content of the political union. Through increasing the representation by facilitating transnational political competition, the democratization process is tried to be strengthened. However, the democratization efforts are criticized because of the technocratic functioning of the European institutions in solving the financial crisis. In addition, the societal sector is argued to be functioning non-efficient and non-democrat and the political actors are argued to be lacking political and public support for their democratization efforts.

Summed up, the democratization process of the EU is supported by means of institutionalization and network strengthening, but hold back by non-democratic practices and lack of public and political support. Along with the shaping of the political union, these democratization processes are the determinants for the four scenarios that I designed that are related with the identity of European citizens – with as two determining variables “constitutional patriotism” and “network strengthening”. In the scenario of a democratic European identity, the identity of European citizens will be based on the emergence of a democratic political union. In the scenario of a hollow European democracy it will be based on a democratization process within a context of a lack of reforms toward a political union. A technocratic European identity will arise as a result of a strengthened political union without successful democratization processes. A hollow European technocracy might arise out of a lack of progress regarding both the shaping of the political union and the democratization process. The prospect of the political union are mostly related to the extent to which the EU institutions and the member states are able to counter the financial crisis and the extent to which anti-EU parties are
able to influence the decision making process. The democratization process is mostly depending on
the extent to which the EU institutions are willing to change their ways of combating the financial
crisis and the extent to which political forces are able to successfully issue their agenda of
democratization.

How are these conclusions related to the existing literature and what new insights do they deliver?

My conclusion that is focused on the democratization and identity building process as an
evolutionary process, in which first institutionalization and secondly network strengthening should
foster the creation of a European identity based on democratization, finds some important critiques.
Regarding the democratization process, one of the strongest critiques is to be found in the
(neo)realist theories. Moravcsik argues that “an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of a real-
world international institution is as much social scientific as philosophical” (Moravcsik, 2004 p.337)
and “ideal democratic theories tend systematically to ignore the transaction costs of political
participation” (Moravcsik, 2004 p.344). The three main critiques are that “the EU is not a state”, “EU
decision makers are not unaccountable” and “EU policy generates little interest in the population”
(Hurrelmann, 2012 p.16/17). My contention to this argument is that the neorealist critique is mostly
based on the first forms of the EU in which it functioned merely as an intergovernmental,
international organization. However, within the context of the shaping political union, the EU does
include aspects of a state, which would increase the interest of the population and leaves an
accountability gap because of the unelected European Commission. The second critique of the
democratization process is related to the deliberative democracy theory. According to deliberative
theorists, “democracy exists if political procedures ensure that all relevant arguments for or against a
certain decision can be exchanged and assessed” (Hurrelmann, 2012 p.22/23). Deliberative theorists
argue that, because these practices are very much present in European government “the EU is a
forerunner not an outlier” (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008 p.324). The EU practices are considered to be
exceptionally well functioning, causing “the emergence of experimentalist governance in the EU and
the potential for democratising destabilisation that goes with it foreshadow a possible future of ... governance on the global scale” (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008 p.326). My contention to this critique of the
democratization process is that the problem arises with “severing the link between deliberation and the
citizens” (Hurrelmann, 2012 p.22). On paper, the European system might be perfectly
democratically functioning – but the question whether “all citizens can actually take part in the
deliberations” (Hurrelmann, 2012 p.23) is left out.

When dealing with the different scenarios of European identity building, I have mainly dealt with the
concepts of constitutional patriotism and network strengthening. However, there are critiques on
these two factors being the most important determinants of European identity. The theory of
historical-cultural European identity focuses on the importance of a common past that defines “being
European”. It refers to “a commonly perceived pre-national or pre-modern past, when political and
intellectual elites across Europe shared the same cultural, linguistic philosophical and religious
framework” (Walkenhorst, 2009 p.8). Delanty states that “citizenship – despite its irreducibility to
nationality – cannot be totally divorced from the state, which remains the main guarantor of rights”
(Delanty, 2007 p.71). Whereas history can be seen as a strong determinant in the European
integration project, I would contest this theory at the point that it neglects the emergence of a
“European” history. The history of the European project has become a part of the lives of Europeans
just because of the two variables that I discussed earlier: institutionalization and network
strengthening. Another critique on the European identity building is rooted in the theory of
international European identity. This theory is based on a growing organizational identity of the EU vis-à-vis other actors on the international stage. According to the theorists, “the International identity of the EU is, like Babbage’s difference engine, based on addition – the addition of identities, processes, communication and socio-political networks” (Manners & Sørensen, 2007 p.400). The “difference engine” refers to “the aim of enhancing international recognition” (Walkenhorst, 2009 p.15). Through the international recognition of the EU as a global actor vis-à-vis other actors like the US, China and India, Europeans will identify themselves with the EU – thus creating a European identity. Although this theory is not inconsistent with my findings, it can only be really applied in case the political union is enhanced. This shows that even behind the external imaging of the EU, the processes of institutionalization and network strengthening are leading the way.

The new insights that have been gained with my study are related to the combination of different theories and concepts into one coherent model – linking the current developments of the shaping of the political union with both its’ democratization and its’ impact on European citizenship. What becomes clear out of the analysis, is that for creating a democratic European identity, institutionalization and network strengthening have to contribute to an evolutionary process of democratization and European identity building. Rather than viewing the democratization process as an institutional choice, it is an interplay of factors that influence the developments of the current financial crisis and the political consequences of this crisis. The EU seems to be at a crossroad – choosing between the enhancing or the weakening of the political union and between creating a political union based on democratization or “technocratization”. Currently, actors at the institutional, political and societal level are involved with both the politicization of the EU as with the democratization of the EU. The European Commission, for example, is arguing to enhance democracy by means of network strengthening – but especially outside of its’ own institutional setting. When reviewing its’ ways of combating the financial crisis – its’ functioning shows inconsistencies with the democratic values it tries to promote. Instead of establishing a democratic procedure at the European level and at other networks of actors, the commission works by means of a “Troika” – a group of unelected officials that mediate between member states and institutions. Same inconsistencies can be found at the political and societal level. My study shows that the way that the actors actually manage to implement their ideas of democratization in the shaping of the political union – both on paper as in practice – will ultimately determine whether we will see the emergence of a democratic or a technocratic political union.

The practical implications of these findings lead to some concrete recommendations for the different actors involved. First of all, the European institutions will need to adhere to their own democratic principles by reforming the way they are combating the financial crisis. The European government needs to become democratically accountable by reforming both the European parliament – through the institutionalization of transnational politics – and by changing the practices of the technocratic “Troika” into a democratic process that involves the European citizens. In order to create real European citizenship based on a European identity, the European people need to be involved in solving their own problems. By facilitating political competition for representation at the European level and a European government that is accountable for all its’ actions the political union will not be discussed in a context of “we against the EU”, “the north against the south” or the “99% against the 1%”. Instead, by institutionalization the democratization process at the European level, the European people will really have a saying in the way that the European government is taking care of their issues. Secondly, transnational political forces in Europe need to get themselves organized to
facilitate political competition at the European level and gather support for European issues. In this way, the institutionalization of the democratization process will be strengthened. Along with this process, Europe also needs to adapt to the new global social, political and financial developments by strengthening networks of policy actors and the embedding of EU policy at these levels. For this, the European institutions need to make sure to foster democratization outside of their own institutional setting. This would mean challenging democratic practices of national and regional government, but as well the democratic practices of NGOs and ultimately corporate actors. On the long term this is very important since, as Habermas has shown in his works on contemporary society, “unchecked corporate power is a threat to democracy” (Staats, 2004). Taking this into account, we need to take the practice of democratization beyond the level of the nation state, beyond the level of the EU, towards the societal and corporate actors. Eventually, this might be the only road towards a truly democratic EU instead of a technocratic super state.


Hancke, R. (2012). With no political union in Europe, the Euro crisis may be a "never ending game" for deep-rooted economic reasons. *LSE*.


MacCormick, N. (2012). IN THE DEMOCRACY, SUBSIDIARITY, AND CITIZENSHIP ’ EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH ’ This paper and related work have been born out of a sense of the of an urgency for legal theory to get beyond the straitjacketion that seems to me to have characterised m, 16(4), 331–356.


Mooij, R. D., & Tang, P. (n.d.). FOUR FUTURES.


**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECI</td>
<td>European Citizens' Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European Peoples' Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>European Stability Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How (what am I looking at):</th>
<th>Where (what are my data – the documents):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRACY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current EU policy</td>
<td>• Treaty EU – Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• European Citizens Initiative (Efler, n.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU policy proposals</td>
<td>• Green paper on Parliamentary democracy (European Commission, 2000a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• White paper on Multilevel governance (Committee of the regions, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• White paper on European governance (European Commission, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European political proposals</td>
<td>• EP Proposal Andrew Duff (Duff, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visions transnational parties</td>
<td>• Party program Newropeans (Newropeans, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party program Pirate party (Reda, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party program ELDR (ELDR, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visions NGO’s</td>
<td>• Bond paper (BOND, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Euralter “constitution” (European Alternatives, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Open democracy draft proposal (Rossanda, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manifest democracia real (Democracia real Ya!, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative data</td>
<td>• Democracy index 2010 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eurobarometer data (democracy EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDENTITY BUILDING (SCENARIO STUDIES):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative data</td>
<td>• Eurobarometer data (European identity data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• US electoral data (Tolbert, McNeal, &amp; Smith, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic papers on European identity &amp; democracy</td>
<td>• (Smith &amp; Smith, 2012), (Meehan, 2000), (Lutz &amp; Kritzinger, 2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Appendix – table I: Data collection*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept:</th>
<th>Variables:</th>
<th>Aspects:</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRACY</strong> (Held, 2006; Hix, 2008)</td>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Transnational politics, European Parliament powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional reform</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>European elections, campaigns, inter-party competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European government</td>
<td>EU president, majoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network strengthening</td>
<td>Alternative government</td>
<td>Agencies, communities,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-governing</td>
<td>Subsidiarity, bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct democracy</td>
<td>Referendum, Citizens’ initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global politics, democratic foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEAN IDENTITY</strong> (Jacobs &amp; Maier, 1987; Walkenhorst, 2009)</td>
<td>Constitution building</td>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Constitution, images, patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Political right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network strengthening</td>
<td>Ethnos</td>
<td>Education, self-transformation, Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demos</td>
<td>Feeling European, bottom-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix – table II: Operationalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current structure</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
<th>Main sources of democracy</th>
<th>Institutionalization/network strengthening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEU (EU, 2010)</td>
<td>Democracy, Accountability, Transparency</td>
<td>Legal texts</td>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Citizens’ Initiative (Council of the EU, 2011)</td>
<td>Direct citizens’ right of initiative</td>
<td>Network strengthening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex - table III: Operationalization of the current structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Problem statement</th>
<th>Democratic solutions</th>
<th>Democratization aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White paper on MLG (Committee of the regions, 2009)</td>
<td>Globalization makes societies uniform; growing inequalities within and between member states</td>
<td>-Establish appropriate tool to support participatory democracy</td>
<td>- Direct democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-experimentation at local and regional level</td>
<td>- Alternative government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green paper on the EP</td>
<td>Increasing “scientification” of politics; expanding role of</td>
<td>-Parliament as meta-sovereign: as the agent to assure transparency,</td>
<td>- Institutional reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 These keywords are used to identify the aspects in the data – they are guiding but not mutually exclusive (other words might fit the keywords to such an extent that they are also fit to indicate certain aspects)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Problem Statement</th>
<th>Democratic Solutions</th>
<th>Democratization aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary reform Andrew Duff (Duff, 2010)</td>
<td>Popular recognition of Parliament’s democratic functions remains limited; decline of turnout; inconsistency between voting systems</td>
<td>- Reform of the electoral system that are reserved for transnational lists</td>
<td>- Representation - Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDR manifest (ELDR, 2009)</td>
<td>No explicit democratic problem statement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newropeans election programme (Newropeans, 2009)</td>
<td>EU does not meet the citizens’ expectations; political crisis in the EU</td>
<td>- Institutional reform of the EU - Abolishment of legal immunity of EU officials - Ratification of treaties by trans-European referenda - Institutionalization of a real European government - 50% of MEPs on transnational lists - More influence of the EU in foreign policy</td>
<td>- Representation - Competition - European government - Direct democracy - Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest pirate party (Reda, 2012)</td>
<td>Threats to human dignity and freedom by digital revolution; lack of democratic global order that guarantees social justice and self-determination</td>
<td>- Strengthen the power of and independent judiciary and the public press - More freedom and independence of MEPS (independent from party politics) - Reforming elections</td>
<td>- Institutional reform - Representation - Alternative government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex – table IV: Operationalization of institutional efforts for democratization

Annex – table V: Operationalization of the political efforts for democratization
stated object of coherence; inability to tailor its policies, especially in development co-operation

NGOs - set **guidelines** and **standards** for assessing NGO legitimacy and representativeness

- legal basis recognizing the role of NGOs and setting out the principles for consultation with the non-governmental sector

- next **TEU revision** by a convention composed of representatives of governments and of national and EP

---

| Euroalter “constitution” (European Alternatives, 2011; Majone, 2012) | Nation state is no longer the appropriate political form in which to define democratic decision-making; democratic default because of financial crisis | - Other forms of **public engagement**: social and political change being understood as a complete **renewal** of society which is not limited to any domain or sector | - Alternative government
- Self-governing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

| Open democracy draft appeal (Rossanda, 2011) | The euro is in danger; financial crisis and a new great depression; traditional democracy does not provide answer to current problems | - **Institutional response** to public protests of participatory and deliberative democracy
- Closer ties between democracy movements across Europe | - Institutional reform
- Control |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifest democracia real (Democracia real Yal, 2012)</th>
<th>Corrupt politics and finances without the democratic control of the people</th>
<th>- Facilitating the <strong>political participation</strong> of citizens through <strong>direct channels</strong> that provide the greatest benefit to the wider society</th>
<th>- Self-governing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

### Annex – table VI: Operationalization of the societal efforts for democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept:</th>
<th>Variables:</th>
<th>Aspects (number of documents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **DEMONCRACY** (Held, 2006; Hix, 2008) | Institutionalization (11) | Representation (3)
Institutional reform (5)
Competition (2)
European government (1) |
| | Network strengthening (14) | Alternative government (5)
Control (2)
Self-governing (3)
Direct democracy (2)
Global (2) |
| **EUROPEAN IDENTITY** (Jacobs & Maier, 1987; Walkenhorst, 2009) | Constitution building | Legitimation
Citizenship
Representation |
| | Network strengthening | Ethnos
Demos |

---

### Annex – table VII: The accumulation of aspects of democratization in the sources