Changes in attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims between 1995 and 2005, as a result of immigration and integration policy and perceptions of threat

Master thesis

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1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to understand and observe the changes in Dutch citizens’ attitudes toward Muslims as a result of a perceived threat and of an immigration and integration policy. My research involves Muslim immigrants and minorities living in/coming to the Netherlands and attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward these people; and I am interested in what determines these attitudes. Under Muslims, I refer to non-Western immigrants of the Islamic background, especially the Turks and Moroccans, as representing the two biggest Muslim minorities in the country (CBS, 2011) and being primarily mentioned in the survey; but other Muslim immigrant groups are mentioned as well. This research shall have a socio-political orientation, reflecting the policy, but also social aspects of immigration, religion, cultural differences and stigmatization. My time frame is 1995-2005 because of the data availability and the fact that the trend and the chosen variables, showing certain attitudes toward Muslims, were observed during this period. The focus will be on the attitudes of Dutch citizens toward Muslims, as related to immigration and integration policy and their perception of threat. In my theoretical model, the threat (cultural) implies the mood toward Muslims. Because there has been enough research done on perceptions of threat toward ethnic minorities, my first variable is the immigration and integration policy and my overall aim is to add to the existing knowledge about the relationship between the threat and negative moods toward immigrants, the effect that policy has on the attitudes in combination with the threat and the other contextual variables. We already know that perceptions of threat create anti-immigrant prejudices and affect the attitudes of the native population toward immigrants and ethnic minorities; and from the existing research we even know that the levels of anti-Muslim prejudices are higher than the levels of general anti-immigrant prejudices in most of the Western European countries, including the Netherlands (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007). Therefore, a lot of research has been done on individualistic approach, examining determinants of the attitudes that take only individual characteristics (perceptions of threat or prejudice) of actors into account, thus focusing on one type of actor only (citizens with attitudes). My research shall move beyond this single actor by adding a second (macro) type of actor on the contextual level – the state, which makes certain policies. In this way, it is possible to move from a single actor to multiple actors, when analyzing attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants. Thus, what we do not know yet and what I aim to examine, is how the state and its policies affect the attitudes toward Muslims on the contextual level, in combination with individual-level perceptions of threat. I include both immigration and integration policy because I believe that both are in place to be reflected. The immigration policy concerns the access to the country and is therefore decisive in terms of setting the rules and requirements for an immigrant to be able to enter the country. The integration policy is directed toward migrants, being already in the country and is aimed at their successful integration and possible naturalization (acquisition of the citizenship), and therefore it regulates the life of immigrants and minorities when trying to settle down in the host society. The second variable is the threat and its cultural aspects. The chosen individual-level determinants/control factors, influencing the perception of threat, are gender, age, educational level and political orientation of citizens, acquired from the Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands survey.

The country of my focus is the Netherlands. In general, it is a Western European country with a considerable Muslim population, with the highest proportion of immigrants coming from Turkey and
Morocco (the two biggest minorities in the country) (CBS, 2011). Muslim question, cultural differences and controversial religious aspects of Islam, as well as immigration itself, have become relatively broadly discussed topics in the public and political discourse. Since the 1990’s, the Netherlands was the first European country promoting a compulsory civic integration of immigrants, later followed by other Western European countries (Joppke, 2007). Likewise, the restrictive policy measures on immigration, especially the family migration set even stricter conditions for immigrants than other Western European countries (Goodman, 2011). From personal reasons, I chose the Netherlands because I have been living and studying here since few years, while being in touch with both native Dutch people and foreigners of a Muslims background. By a personal experience, I have also witnessed few situations when I could observe a lighter form of hostile behavior of the native Dutch persons toward members of a Muslim minority (Turkish or Moroccan) or toward foreign students of a Muslim background.

The existing research on attitudes toward Muslims can be divided into two groups: the first one focusing on the description of the consequences of stereo-typing of Muslims (Allen and Nielsen, 2002; Sander, 2006; ECRI, 2008); and the second, relatively small group of research aims to explain the anti-Muslim attitudes (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2003, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008), however these were based on data from surveys that precede the terrorist attacks in United States in 2001 (Savelkoul et al, 2010). In the present study, I aim to join the second group of research and add to an existing knowledge, explaining the anti-Muslim attitudes in the time frame of 1995-2005, that captures the situation at the turn of the millennium, when during that time, the levels and patterns of anti-Muslim attitudes and prejudice were in a period of rapid change (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007).

In the Netherlands, the integration of immigrants has become one of the political controversies (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008). During the past decades, the government has changed its policy at several points, while changing the definition of integration, target groups and the value attached to the multiculturalism (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008). However, after the turn of the millennium, the policy was changed significantly, as being testified by the debate on the ‘multicultural tragedy’ in 2000, the public unrest following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn who was murdered shortly before the national elections in 2002. The ad-hoc Blok Commission, created by the parliament, which was supposed to report on the success or failure of the integration of immigrants, concluded that immigrant integration had by that time been a ‘total or partial success’, which however seemed to be sharply in contrast with the negative public and political debate on immigrant integration (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008). The commission was criticized for focusing on socio-economic indicators and disregarding the cultural and religious aspects of integration. The commission’s evaluation probably helped to initiate a discussion on the nature of immigrant integration and this issue has generally become a policy controversy (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008).

As mentioned earlier, the Dutch immigration and integration policy has become relatively strict since 2000’s and it has been more restrictive than in other Western European countries. In 2005, the political consensus was reached to adopt a new more restrictive immigration policy to tackle
especially the family migration and the government agreed that currently, the cultural diversity represents a threat to social cohesion of the Dutch society (Bonjour, 2010).

Besides the general immigration and integration controversy, Islam and the presence and immigration of Muslims in particular, have become widely discussed topics in the political and public arena (Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma, Hagendoorn, 2010). In general, Muslim immigrants face the same problems as other immigrants, but they also represent a specific religious and cultural group. There were a couple of international events in the last few decades, which increased the saliency of Islam in terms of minority-group identity. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001; Rushdie affair in United Kingdom; murder of Theo Van Gogh; terrorist attacks in London and Madrid; controversy around the cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark etc. – have represented prominent subjects of the public discourse and have had an impact on shaping the attitudes toward Muslims (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007). Global terrorism in general is also to a large extent associated with radical Muslims and Islam. In 2004, a controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim ‘extremist’, which resulted in more negative mood of the public and even in some attempts for arson attacks on mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al, 2010). The murder of Theo van Gogh “has not only become a landmark in Dutch discussions on Islam and immigration and integration policies, it has also been world news. What happened in the Netherlands that – within Europe – had a leading position in discussions on integration policies for quite some time” (Penninx, 2005, p. 1). Thus, by this act, the violence related to radical Islam was demonstrated in the country itself. Since the late 1970’s, Islam has developed and been perceived also as a political phenomenon, influenced by the Iranian Revolution.

What is the relation between Islamic culture and Islam as a religion? The cultural differences of Muslim immigrants/citizens of a Muslim faith stem from the religious aspects of Islam and controversial Islamic practices which are said to contrast the Western and modern Dutch values, such as keeping women off the labour market, headscarf wearing (burqa), forced/arranged marriages; and in worse instances, practices like honour killings or female genital mutilation (Lettinga, Saharso, 2009; Goodman, 2011). Religion itself plays an important role when it comes to cultural integration. In 2004, there were more than 900,000 Muslims living in the Netherlands (Gijsberts, 2004). Both first and second generation of Turks and Moroccans virtually always regard themselves as Muslims. “This unwaveringly strong identification with Islam is moreover closely related within these groups to a close identification with their own ethnic group” (Gijsberts, 2004, p. 30). The religious identification however seems to become more separated from the religious practices as fewer second-generation Muslims participate in religious activities. First-generation of Turks and Moroccans tend to have the least modern views on the role of religion, emancipation of women and power relations in the family; while the second-generation Turks and Moroccans already posses more modern views. More or less the same traditional views apply for Afghans and Iraqis, while Somalis hold even more traditional attitudes than these groups. In contrast, non-Muslim immigrant groups such as Surinamese, Antilleans or immigrants from other European countries do not differ much from the Dutch in terms of cultural and social views. Therefore these ethnic groups tend to integrate into a different extent in terms of culture. Surinamese, Antilleans and most of the refugee groups appear to be much less culturally distant from the Dutch than most of the Turks and Moroccans (Gijsberts, 2004).
According to Rath et al, Islam can be understood as a normative system, consisting of norms and values that guide a daily life of Muslims, who are primarily concerned with the formal aspects of their religion (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, Meyer, 1999). Islam and its institutions have dealt with different responses and mixed attitudes in European host societies, especially when it comes to women wearing headscarves, introduction of Islamic primary schools, particular rituals and honor killing. The original Minorities policy of 1983 indirectly helped to create more room for Islamic institutions and more sensitivity to claims made by Muslims. There seems to be a prevailing opinion that Muslims tend to cling together and resist becoming a part of the Dutch society; that they are not willing to and not able to integrate into the society, preferring traditional (non-democratic) forms of leadership. They tend to bring up children in old-fashioned ways; women are not treated equally with men and Muslims are said to be highly susceptible to influence of the conservative political powers. Therefore, for some, Islam "is a conglomeration of pre-modern and culturally alien elements" (Rath et al, 1999, p. 63). Therefore it is presumed that the cultural difference particularly arises from the religion and religious traditions and values, which to a certain extent differ from European ones.

Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands have a similar social standing as immigrants from the non-Muslim countries, thus they are not being treated as 'exceptional' by the society (as compared to e.g. Blacks in United States) (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007). Nevertheless, they are labeled as non-Western 'allochthons' (those born abroad or whose parents were born abroad) who originate from Africa, South America, Asia and Turkey, except for Indonesia and Japan; in contrast with 'autochtons' (native Dutch) and Western allochthons (Bonjour, 2006; Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). Muslim immigrants also generally tend to be less successful in socio-economic terms than some other groups of immigrants and they face somewhat stronger levels of prejudice, reflecting the term 'islamophobia' since the late 1980s. Since that time, several international events and political aspects have lead to an increased attention and negative stereotyping of Islam in media and public discourse, with the tendency of the general public to perceive Islam and Muslims with alarmism. According to the study of Strabac and Listhaug (2007), there are two major sets of negative stereotypes toward Muslims - the first one based on the argument of a 'clash of civilizations' referring to the presumed military and political threat of Islam for the non-Muslim world; and the second one referring to a notion of 'Muslim cultural traits' emphasizing issues such as family life and gender relation. These stereotypes are specifically related to Muslims. In addition, the immigrant status of Muslim minorities represents a relevant source of prejudice, carrying two main components: the 'generic anti-immigrant' component based on unsuccessful integration of non-Western immigrants; and the 'specific anti-Muslim' component, resulting from the stereotype-generating processes in the last decades. Also, there has been a general decrease in tolerance after the terrorist attacks in 2001 and a large increase in hostility toward Muslim communities in European countries in terms of both xenophobia and acts of physical aggression (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007).

Throughout the last decades, the immigration and integration of different types of people such as guest workers, ex-colonials or asylum seekers to the Netherlands, has resulted in emergence of the new ethnic communities and change of the ethnic composition of the host society, leading to an increased tension between the minority and majority members (Semyonov, Rajman, Gorodzeisky,
After restrictions were imposed, the actual number of immigrants was steadily increasing (until 2000, then we start to observe a decline until 2008), especially because of the family reunification and a lack of expulsion (McLaren, 2003; CBS, 2011). Electoral success of the right-wing parties in Western Europe, including the Netherlands, shows that there is a substantial number of citizens who believe that immigration has a negative economic and non-economic impact, and thus prefer a more restrictive immigration policy (Meuleman, Davidov, Billiet, 2009). We can observe mentioned patterns in Western Europe in general and also in the Netherlands in particular.

Ethnic group competition takes place in both socio-economic and cultural arenas. Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are overrepresented in crime statistics and crime is one of the most important themes in the newspaper articles on Turks, Moroccans or Surinamese. In case of Muslims as a characteristic group, the publicity on criminal behavior is also related to international terrorist acts and honor-related violence. This fact may contribute even to a feeling of a physical or safety threat, subsequently leading to a suspicion and lack of trust toward these out-groups (minorities) in general (Tolsma, Lubbers, Coenders, 2007).

As a result of socio-economic problems, criminal behavior and cultural differences related to minorities, some Dutch citizens have begun to view foreigners as a social problem and question their inclusion within the national community. Immigration and integration of foreigners has been a social problem since long time (70’s), but the issue gained a political outlet only since 2001. Despite the differences in ethnic background and civic status, immigrants can be viewed as out-group populations and may often become a target of prejudice, discrimination and hostility. The research on attitudes toward out-group populations showed that an increased hostility toward foreigners relates to an increased public support for the implementation of restrictive immigration policy. The anti-foreigner sentiment and ethnic tensions have been growing in European societies and immigrants are perceived not only as outsiders, but also as a “threat to the social, political and economic order as well as a threat to the cultural homogeneity and the national identity of the state” (Semyonov et al, 2008, p. 6). The existing research on attitudes toward out-group populations in Europe has shown that these attitudes are influenced by three major factors: perceptions of the out-group population, characteristics of the host-society and characteristics of the respondents. Negative attitudes toward out-group population are affected by individual as well as and structural-level contextual variables (Semyonov, Raijman, Gorodzeisky, 2006). The individual-level characteristics of the respondents include socio-demographic attributes such as age, education, income, employment status and political orientation of individuals. In particular, negative attitudes toward immigrants are more common among the socio-economically weak individuals, individuals with low education, low income or unemployed, men, older persons, religious people, supporters of the right-wing political ideology, residents of rural areas and residents of ethnic neighborhoods. There are structural or country-level attributes which affect the attitudes toward immigrants, such as the size of the out-group population, economic conditions in the country and political climate of the host society. Primarily the size of the out-group population and economic conditions are used as indicators of the threat and competition. When it comes to political climate of the society, many populist politicians make the immigration a central issue of their political campaigns and in this way create an ideological climate conducive to growing hostility and discrimination toward foreigners. These three contextual indicators constitute the ‘context of reception’ for immigrants in the host society (Semyonov et al, 2008).
Indicators of threat (primarily size of the out-group population and economic conditions) interact with individual-level attributes of the citizens to produce different patterns of prejudice and negative attitudes. The majority population can perceive the competitive threat from the view of socio-economic interests of individuals; or from the view of culture and collective identity of the nation. As a result, an increase in the size of the out-group population leads to a greater competition for resources and a greater challenge to interests and identity of the majority population; and thus increases the anti-minority sentiments and xenophobia (Semyonov et al, 2006). The threat can also be material, perceived as challenges to one’s well-being; or symbolic, referring to a social identity (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, Armstrong, 2001). According to the radical right-wing parties, the invasion of immigrants represents the most relevant threat against national identity, particularly in case of immigrants from Muslim countries, who are said to threaten the European values, as they appear to be least able to and willing to assimilate. “It has been suggested that popular xenophobia and ethnocentrism that resonate with the ethno-pluralist theme have grown more common and/or important as a result of ‘a crisis of national identity among the post-industrial democracies brought about by the transformation into a multicultural society’” (Ryndgren, 2008, p. 746). Besides the ethno-pluralist frame, the radical rightist parties tend to denounce and frame immigration and immigrants as a problem in four ways: as a threat to ethno-national identity; as a major cause of criminality and social insecurity; as a cause of unemployment; and as immigrants abusing the generosity of the welfare states in Western countries, resulting in providing less state subsidies for the natives (Ryndgren, 2008).

According to the study of Strabac and Listhaug (2007), the levels of anti-Muslim prejudice are significantly higher than the levels of general anti-immigrant prejudice in 13 out of 17 Western European countries, including the Netherlands. However, the mechanisms or patterns of the anti-Muslim prejudice appear to be similar to those patterns that underline the anti-immigrant and ethnic prejudices in general. These findings make them conclude that “Muslim identity is simply a boundary marker of minority-group affiliation which has become unusually highly visible”; and that “we are dealing with the familiar form of ethnic prejudice, and that it is only a new target group that has come into spotlight” (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007, p. 274, 282). Surprisingly, they found that bad economic conditions and the size of the Muslim population in the country have barely any effect on the level of anti-Muslim prejudice. This is somehow in conflict with a classical argument that size of the out-group population affects the negative attitudes. Thus, the relations between the majority population and Muslim minorities generally seem to depend on two main sets of factors: The first set of factors belongs to a large extent under the national influence (immigration/integration policies or how prominent controversial issues are handled in the country). The second set of factors consists of international issues which influence the relations and attitudes toward the Muslim population in the country (political situation in the Middle East or terrorist attacks) (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007).
2. Research questions

The main research question of this research is:

*How can we explain the attitudes of native Dutch citizens toward Muslims between 1995 and 2005 with the (A) immigration and integration policies and (B) the perceptions of threat?* It is an explanatory question with attitudes (moods) toward Muslims as a dependent variable and policies and threat as independent variables. These variables and data used in the analysis are quantitative. The unit of analysis (= observation) in this case are individual members of the Dutch society (citizens) and the time frame is 1995 – 2005.

**Sub-questions**

There are the following sub-questions:

1. **How have the attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims changed between 1995 and 2005?** Here I examine what are the current attitudes of the mainstream Dutch society toward Muslims and how it has changed over time. The major source I use here is the Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands survey (SOCON).

2. **How have the Dutch immigration and integration policies changed between 1995 and 2005?** With the use of this sub-question, I elaborate on the development of Dutch immigration and integration policies since 1995 until 2005. Here I rely on academic articles, policy documents and into some extent, on my bachelor thesis, which is about the recent developments in family migration policies as a means of controlling the immigration from Muslim countries to the Netherlands.

3. **How have the Dutch citizens’ perceptions of threat changed between 1995 and 2005?** In this respect, I look at how the chosen individual-level determinants determine the perception of cultural type of threat. The threat variable is examined with the use of SOCON survey, measuring the variable ‘Minorities are threat to our own culture’.

4. **To what extent are the policies and perceptions of threat related to attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims?** Here I observe the effect of the 2. and 3. sub-question on the 1. one, or in other words, to what extent are variations in 1. sub-question explained by 2. and 3. one.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Theory

In my theoretical framework, I reflect on couple of relevant theories that are linked to the relationship between the state policy and public opinion; attitudes of native citizens toward immigrants and minorities (in our case Muslims), the concept of threat, and the relationship
between these two variables. The theories explaining the attitudes are ethnic exclusionism theory and theory of prejudice; ethnic competition theory (composed of realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory); and the theory on threat. The impact of immigration and integration policies on citizens’ attitudes can be explained with the use of theory on the relationship between the state policy and public opinion.

First, I would like to look at some theories on the relationship between the state policy and public opinion, in order to provide some background for the influence of Dutch immigration and integration policy on attitudes toward Muslims. The representation of public opinion assumes that the public notices and responds to what policy-makers do and therefore, a responsive public behaves like a thermostat (Soroka, Wlezien, 2005). This means that the public adjusts its preferences for the policy in response to what policy-makers do. The public normally responds to the actual policy change when put into effect. “If policy makers are responsive to public preferences, changes in policy will be associated with levels of the public’s relative preference. Where the public notices and responds to policy in a particular domain, policy makers would notice and respond to public preferences themselves” (Soroka, Wlezien, 2005, p. 668).

The responsiveness of the governmental policy to citizens’ preferences is a central element in the normative democratic theory. Politicians and policies are said to affect the public opinion, however the relationship between the policy and public opinion is possibly spurious, as being influenced by some outer factors. These processes are not mutually exclusive and they can also occur in different combinations, as well as they might vary across different issue areas and policy domains. There might also be variations across political systems and cultures, time periods and political institutions. In many cases it was found out that public opinion affects the policy, this however does not rule out the possibility that there is also a reciprocal influence. Thus, it is also possible that policy affects the public opinion. First, it is rarely certain that policy changed before the opinion. The public opinion could have changed earlier at some point when no survey was conducted. Second, the policy-makers can and often do anticipate the public reactions and attitudes, hence that public opinion can affect the policy even when the policy changes first. Therefore, the research of Page and Shapiro suggests that policy may affect the opinion in around half the cases of congruence between the policy and opinion. However, it is still more prevalent that opinion can affect the policy through anticipated reactions (Page, Shapiro, 1983). My assumption in this study is that policy (on immigration/integration) influences the public opinion (attitudes toward Muslims), rather than opinion affecting the policy. It is however likely that Dutch policy-makers have been paying a lot of attention to public opinion polls, general public discourse and the reactions in media, regarding international and national events and general moods related to Muslim immigrants and minorities. It is also possible that policy influences the public moods, when citizens are dissatisfied with direct and indirect effects of the policy, not necessarily only with the policy itself. All in all, I would like to note that because the causal mechanism here appears to be indecisive, we have to be cautious when making conclusions about the impact of the policy on public opinion and citizens’ attitudes.

Generally, the most common finding is that the political responsiveness is greatest when it comes to highly salient issues for which there is a broad scope of conflict (Page, Shapiro, 1983). Monroe (1998) also concludes that salience is an important factor in the opinion - policy relationship. The public
opinion - policy consistency in his research was greater on the issues of a highest public salience. In those issues where there was a significant change in public opinion, the policy change that followed was in the same direction and thus congruent in 66% of the time. Thus, similarly as Page and Shapiro, he suggests that the key variable in political responsiveness is the salience of the issue (Monroe, 1998). We can consider immigration and integration of foreigners in the Netherlands to be a salient topic, especially when it comes to Muslims. Therefore we can expect that the policy – opinion consistency and responsiveness will be in this case high. However, we have to take into account that the level of salience has evolved since 1990’s and there are still other, more salient topics for Dutch citizens, than immigration/integration of foreigners.

The attitude refers to a “favorable or unfavorable evaluation of an object. An individual’s attitude towards some object is determined by his beliefs that the object has certain attributes and by his evaluations of those attributes” (Coenders, 2001, p. 3). Unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities are referred to as ethnic exclusionism from the side of the ethnic majority group. Ethnic majority group is a dominant ethnic group in the country, when it comes to political power and economic status. Accordingly, the ethnocentrism refers to the set of attitudes, which consists of positive attitudes toward ethnic in-group and negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Coenders, 2001). The key issue is the conflict of interests between ethnic in-group and out-groups in the country. Thus, when there is a competition between these groups, the out-group(s) pose a group threat to the in-group; with this perceived group threat in turn affecting the ethnocentric attitudes (Coenders, 2001).

The realistic group conflict theory proposes that “competition between social groups, such as ethnic groups, over scarce resources and values, induces conflict of interest between those groups and eventually antagonistic inter-group attitudes” (Savelkoul et al, 2010, p. 2). These competitive conditions can affect the majority’s perceptions of competition and perceived socio-economic threat from the side of ethnic out-groups; which may, in turn, produce hostile and unfavorable stances toward these out-groups (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, 2003). Blalock (1967) made a distinction between the actual and perceived competition and linked the group-level of an actual intergroup competition to unfavorable attitudes at the individual-level. Bobo (1988) added a distinction between the perceived competition and perceived threat, proving that the first strongly predicts the latter. According to him, the perceived threat is the most direct determinant of unfavorable attitudes toward minorities (Savelkoul et al, 2010).

The social identity theory uses a social-psychological perspective to explain the unfavorable attitudes toward out-groups. One of the key mechanisms is the process of categorization, leading to group identification (Savelkoul et al, 2010). The Social identity theory poses that individuals have a basic need to perceive their in-group as superior to ethnic out-groups and therefore they apply favorable characteristics, perceived among the in-group members through mental processes defined as social identification; while they value out-groups negatively through mechanisms of social contra-identification (Coenders et al, 2003). Social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory complement each other and are synthesized in a framework labeled as ethnic competition theory.

The general proposition of the ethnic competition theory is that “the competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social identification and contra-
identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism” (Coenders et al, 2003, p. 9). At the contextual level, competition is related to macro-social conditions. At individual level, competition is related to social conditions of the members of the dominant (in) group and it can be specified in terms of perceived threat of competition, which then mediates the effects of social conditions on ethnic exclusionism. When the ethnic threat arises, it can be because of the macro-social conditions (e.g. immigration flows) or because of the meso-social conditions (e.g. ethnic segregation in jobs). In either case, the majority groups will react with exclusionary measures and they do so based on their threat perceptions (Coenders et al, 2003). Thus in summary, “the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, leading to stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionist attitudes” (Coenders, 2001, p. 42-43).

The ethnic exclusionism involves different aspects and social phenomena related to majorities, trying to exclude ethnic minorities. One of the first aspects refers to ethnic prejudices, which “refer to generalized unfavorable opinions on one or more different ethnic out-groups” (Coenders et al, 2003, p. 1) and are refined into various types. “Ethnic prejudices towards other ‘out-group’s’ have more than often been shown to be accompanied by prejudices towards one’s in-group, which has been labeled as ethnocentrism” (Coenders et al, 2003, ibid). The anti-immigrant prejudice is also a “kind of defensive reaction toward implicit or explicit threats to the dominant group’s exclusive superiority in terms of access to resources” (Semyonov et al, 2006, p. 428); and can be conceptualized as an "antipathy or hostility toward immigrants, or in Ashmore’s terminology, as a negative attitude toward a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be a member of that group” (McLaren, 2003). A second aspect is related to the influx of immigrants and is referred to as resistance to immigrants. There are more types of resistance, such as resistance to asylum seekers or resistance to multicultural society; and “emphasizing societal limits to the acceptance of minority groups which stance we refer to as limits to multicultural society” (Coenders et al, 2003, p. 2). A third aspect is related to the presence of immigrants in European societies and is often referred to as social or ethnic distance. Bogardus proposed that “the closer minority groups approached majority groups, the stronger majority groups would try to keep minority groups at a distance and try to avoid actual interethnic contact. He found strong evidence for this proposition, and a long lasting research tradition has built that evidence” (Coenders et al, 2003, ibid). A fourth aspect refers to an opposition to civil rights for legal resident migrants, when native citizens oppose granting the rights to legal migrants or even favor the repatriation policies for them. The last aspect is related to the presence and process of migrant social integration. There is a view in public debates that “migrants will be quickly and more smoothly accepted if they deny, at least in public, their own ethnic identity and consequently assimilate into the dominant society that is if they conform to the law and social conventions of the majority” (Coenders et al, 2003, p. 3). This is referred to as insistence on conformity of migrants to law, as the easiest way for them to be accepted in the host society (Coenders et al, 2003).

The following types of social categories are found to support ethnic exclusionism: people with lower level of education; manual workers and self-employed people; people dependent on social security; homemakers; people with the lowest income; older people; people living in the countryside; and
those regularly attending religious services. In terms of national characteristics related to ethnic exclusionism, the more immigrants live in the country, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism. When it comes to individual perceptions, people tend to favor ethnic exclusionism more when they perceive the decrease of their personal safety; they distrust others or political leaders; they are supporters of the right wing parties; and they consider ethnic minorities to pose a collective threat (Coenders et al, 2003).

Now let us look at the typology of threats as such. There are two, rather complementary views on competitive threat held by the majority population. The first view focuses on the individual level and competition in the social and economic arenas, reflecting the threat to self-interest of individuals. The second view focuses on threat at the collective level, reflecting the threat to the cultural and national identity of the majority population. Thus, according to the first view, antagonism and negative attitudes are a result of socio-economic competition or threat of competition among individuals regarding housing, jobs, social services or economic benefits. The second view claims that prejudice and discriminatory attitudes can be a result of threat to the majority population’s collective identity. "That is, individuals fear, regardless of their own self-interests, that the presence of out-group populations may constitute a threat to the collective identity and the cultural, national, and ethnic homogeneity of the society" (Semyonov et al, 2006, p. 428). Subsequently, an increase in the size of the out-group population leads to a greater competition for resources and greater challenge to interests and identity of the majority population; and thus increases the prejudice and anti-minority sentiment (Semyonov et al, 2006).

Threats can be material, perceived as challenges to one’s well-being; or symbolic, referring to social identity. With respect to material threat, realistic group conflict theory argues that group competition for resources increases the efforts to limit the access of other groups to the available resources. With regard to symbolic threat, social identity theory claims that the social categorization of people into in-group and out-groups creates a motivation to perceive positive group distinctiveness (Esses et al, 2001).

Furthermore, threats to important values of the native population can increase the inter-group bias, negative out-group attitudes, and to influence the attitudes toward social policies targeting minorities. The integrated threat theory classifies threats into four major types: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes. The realistic threat is similar to threats considered by the realistic group conflict theory and refers to conflicting goals, perceptions of competition and threats to physical and economic well-being of the in-group. The symbolic threat is related to symbolic racism and arises from the conflict in norms, values and beliefs between groups. The intergroup anxiety includes feelings of uneasiness and uncertainty about how to behave in the presence of out-group members. The intergroup anxiety increases the hostility and avoidance of the contact with the out-group. The negative stereotypes contribute to the perception of threat by generating negative expectations about the behavior of the out-group members. Negative expectancies also influence the social judgment and social information processing and they are related to negative emotions like fear or anger toward the out-group, intensifying the negative attitudes. All four types of threats are assumed to contribute to negative out-group attitudes (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, 2006).
As already mentioned, differences in the level of anti-Muslim prejudice depend on effects of individual and country-level predictors, which correspond with effects found in studies of anti-minority prejudice. When it comes to concept of prejudice, nowadays there has been a distinction between old and new forms of prejudice. For my study, I have chosen a blatant form of anti-Muslim prejudice, as used in the research of Strabac and Listhaug (2007) and defined as “an openly expressed negative attitude toward a social group, or negative attitude toward an individual that is based on that individual’s membership in a social group” (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007, p. 269). The term ‘anti-Muslim’ prejudice corresponds with the term ‘social distance toward Muslims’ or ‘anti-Muslim attitudes’ (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007). The support for ethnic discrimination in The Netherlands dropped between 1979 and 1986; however, between 1988 and 1992 the proportion of Dutch population supporting ethnic discrimination rose dramatically (Meuleman et al, 2009). This was also the period when immigration and integration policy started to become more restrictive. As a matter of fact, according to the study of Meuleman et al (2009), in countries with high levels of immigration, attitudes toward immigration seem to have become more restrictive (Meuleman et al, 2009).

When it comes to individual-level predictors of negative attitudes and prejudice towards immigrants, education has been found as the strongest determinant of the ethnic prejudice - the higher educated individuals have less prejudice against ethnic minorities than the lower educated individuals. Higher educated individuals are also less inclined to avoid the social contact with minorities (ethnic distance). This phenomenon has been interpreted as a ‘liberalizing effect of education’: the educational system as the most important socializing agent by which liberal values aimed at reducing ethnic intolerance and prejudice are transmitted (Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst, Gerris, 2004, p. 253). Because ethnic minorities tend to be ranked among the lower socio-economic strata and to be often lower educated, natives with lower education levels are more likely to feel threatened by them (Hello, Scheepers, Sleegers, 2006). “Since lower educated individuals are more likely to live in the same neighborhoods, and to attend, or to have attended, the same schools as ethnic minorities, the competition for various scarce resources among the lower educated is more often interpreted in ethnic terms” (Hello et al, 2006, p. 961-962). On the other hand, higher educated individuals tend to have more advantaged positions and therefore face less ethnic competition on the labor market and in the society. Thus, higher educated individuals are less likely to view ethnic minorities as a threat (Hello et al, 2006). Higher socio-economic status is another individual factor that is found to be correlated with lower levels of prejudice. Another predictor is the age, assuming that older people tend to be more prejudiced than the younger ones. Furthermore, when it comes to another factor – location/place of residence - the residents of urban areas seem to have lower levels of prejudice than the residents of rural areas. Finally, when it comes to religiosity, it is generally assumed that religious people tend to be more prejudiced. However, according to the research by Strabac and Listhaug (2007), the religiosity seems to have little or no influence on prejudice, even though the situation may differ with respect to regions. When it comes to prejudice towards Muslims in particular, their results do not show that religiosity and cultural elements play an important role. Overall, as mentioned earlier, they conclude that here we deal with a familiar kind of ethnic prejudice and it is only a new target group in the spotlight (Strabac, Listhaug, 2007, p. 282).
3.2. Theoretical model of the research:

Based on theories explained above, I decided to use a partly similar model as used in the research by Savelkoul et al (2010). In my model, the basic causal assumption is that 1) the policies (on immigration/ integration), which are on the contextual level; and 2) the perceived threat (cultural) influence the attitudes toward Muslims. The perceived threat is presumably influenced by the individual-level determinants, functioning as micro-indicators. In my analysis, these are gender, age, educational level, and political orientation (left-right). Accordingly, the immigration and integration policies, as well as the concept of threat, represent the macro-indicators influencing the attitudes toward Muslims.

3.3. Hypotheses

Based on theories mentioned above, the two major hypotheses I am going to test in this research are:

H1: The more restrictive Dutch immigration/integration policy is, the more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward Muslim immigrants.

H2: The more Dutch citizens perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, the more negative attitudes they possess toward them.

The related sub-hypotheses I aim to test, are:

H3: Women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants.

H4: The older people are, the more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants.
H5: The more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood they possess toward those Muslim immigrants.

H6: People who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.

4. Data and operationalization

4.1. Methodology

My research is empirical and it is based on a repeated survey with random samples of Dutch citizens. The country of interest is the Netherlands, with individual members of the society as the unit of analysis. I use a deductive reasoning. The study has a partly cross-sectional character (variation in individual-level factors/micro indicators, influencing the key variables) and partly longitudinal character (evaluation of the policies, perceptions of threat and attitudes over time), and the research is explanatory and unobtrusive. I use both qualitative and quantitative data - qualitative for the description of the development of immigration and integration policies; and quantitative for the elaboration of threat and attitudes, in form of values obtained from the survey. The qualitative data are represented by the scientific journal articles and policy documents, while the quantitative data are represented by the values from the SOCON survey. I rely on an existing data set (survey) with the use of secondary sources. My major quantitative source is the SOCON survey in the period of 1995 - 2005, which studies the socio-cultural developments in the Netherlands. It is a national cross-sectional survey, which used to be processed and published every five years since 1979. I examine 2 waves of the survey in years 1995 and 2005. The answers were obtained with the use of 75-90 minutes’ interviews and partly different questionnaires (A and B), with an additional self-administered e-mail questionnaire. The questionnaires covered themes such as politics, value system, social structural characteristics, religion, conservatism, personal social network, environmentalism, child-rearing values and behavior. The total of 2019 respondents, who participated in the survey in 1995 were selected from municipalities that had been selected by the two-stage stratified random sampling method; covering all types of areas according to their proportion in the population. These municipalities subsequently selected a random sample of their residents aged between 18 and 70. In 2005, the similar procedure was used, with a total of 1375 respondents (Codebook SOCON, 1995, 2005). The used data set can be assumed to be representative of the national population in the Netherlands. They survey data and codebooks were obtained from the Data Archiving and Networked Services in the Netherlands (DANS).

In this survey, I examine the data in two waves, from years 1995 and 2005 and I observe the changes in five variables, included in both years under measurement. The first set of statements refers to the concept of negative mood toward immigrants and here I use the following statements: ‘Muslim women with scarf do not adapt’; ‘Muslims are dangerously fanatic’; ‘Muslims use religion for political aims’; ‘Muslims easily resort to violence’. The perceived threat is observed with a single
statement: ‘Minorities are threat to our own culture’. These variables are observed with respect to chosen factors influencing the perception of threat and affecting the citizens’ attitudes. In order to construct the scale of anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands, I measure people’s attitudes with 5-answer categories ranging from “don’t agree at all” to “agree entirely” in the following variables: “Muslim women with scarf do not adapt”; “Muslims are dangerously fanatic”; “Muslims use religion for political aims”; and “Muslims easily resort to violence”. The threat is measured with the same 5-answer categories in the variable “Minorities are threat to our own culture”. These items were already partly derived from a recent study of Savelkoul et al (2010), who used them in order to measure the concept of threat and anti-Muslim attitudes. Finally, the immigration and integration policies represent the independent variable and a macro-indicator of the analysis.

The individual-level determinants (socio-economic and demographic characteristics) used as predictors of the attitudes toward minorities and influencing the threat perceptions in mentioned theories, are: gender; age; educational level; and political orientation (left-right). The first determinant is gender, having 2 categories – male or female. The scale of the age of respondents is between 18 and 70. The third determinant is an educational level of respondents having 4 categories (primary education, secondary education lower level, secondary education higher level, tertiary education). The political orientation determinant is measured on the left-right scale in 2 categories (left, right).

### 4.2. Measurement of the variables

#### 1. Attitudes

Attitudes represent a dependent variable of the analysis and it is based on the measurement of the following four items:

- ‘Muslim women with scarf do not adapt’ (v2135)
- ‘Muslims are dangerously fanatic’ (v2136)
- ‘Muslims use religion for political aims’ (v2139)
- ‘Muslims easily resort to violence’ (v2140)

First I looked at the scale of the attitudes toward Muslims, coded as ‘negative mood’. I rescaled and recoded those 4 variables and computed a new common variable called “Negative mood”, based on a reliability analysis, resulting in a Cronbach Alfa of 0.809 for year 1995 and Alfa of 0.818 for year 2005. I rescaled the original 7 answer categories into the following 5 categories:

1 =“don’t agree at all”
2 =“don’t agree”
3 =“don’t agree/don’t disagree”
4 =“agree”
5 =“agree entirely”

The score 3 includes the original survey answers of “never thought about it” and “no answer”, therefore, values that originally belonged to these categories, are now included in category “don’t agree/don’t disagree”. The rest of the missing values were excluded from the analysis. The rest of
the variables in this analysis (threat, policies, gender, age, education and political orientation) are independent variables explaining the attitudes toward Muslims.

2. Threat

This variable was analyzed based on the measurement of the following item: ‘Minorities are threat to our own culture’ (v2152). It was recoded into a new variable “Threat”, which was also rescaled into having these 5-answer categories:
1 = “don’t agree at all”
2 = “don’t agree”
3 = “don’t agree/don’t disagree”
4 = “agree”
5 = “agree entirely”

Again, the score 3 includes the original answers of “never thought about it” and “no answer”. Thus again, values of these original categories are now included in category “don’t agree/don’t disagree”. The rest of the missing values were excluded. In the analysis, the relatively high score indicates a large perceived threat.

3. Policies:

I computed a variable “Policy restrictive”, in order to statistically measure the effect of policies on the attitudes in given time periods. I used the following scale to differentiate between the policies being more and less restrictive, as being compared in years 1995 and 2005: 0 = ‘less restrictive’ and 1 = ‘more restrictive’. In order to assess the development of the policy and changes that made it to become more or less restrictive between 1995 and 2005, I use a qualitative data from academic articles, policy documents and into some extent, from my bachelor thesis, which was about the recent developments in family migration policies as a means of controlling the immigration from Muslim countries to the Netherlands.

**Individual-level determinant variables**

4. Gender

This variable was measured by the item ‘Respondent’s sex’ (v0013) and recoded into a new variable “Female”, which was rescaled from the original scale into 2 categories: 0 = ‘male’ and 1 = ‘female’. Missing values were excluded from the analysis.

5. Age

The variable “Age” was recoded from the item ‘Respondent’s year of birth’/ ‘Geboortejaar respondent’ (v0014), having a scale of age between 18 and 70 and based on the range of years 1925-1977 (for the measurement year 1995) and 1935-1987 (for the measurement year 2005). Missing values were excluded from the analysis.

6. Educational level
The new variable “Education” was recoded from the item ´1ST School completed after elementary school/Hoogste voltooide schoolopleiding´ (v0040). I rescaled it and changed the value labels from the original 7 and 13 categories of all the educational possibilities in the Netherlands, into the following categories: 1= 'primary education'; 2= 'higher education lower level'; 3= 'higher education higher level'; 4= 'tertiary education'. The category ‘primary education’ consists of respondents having no education followed after the elementary school. The category 'higher education lower level' consists of lower vocational school (LBO) and lower secondary school (MULO, ULO, MAVO, additionally VMB in 2005). The category 'higher education higher level' consists of secondary vocational school (MBO to HBO), 0 levels (MMS/HAVO) A levels (HBS, VWO). Finally, the category 'tertiary education' consists of college (HBO), university education (WO) and doctoral/post-doctoral study. Here again, missing values were excluded from the analysis.

7. Political orientation

The measured item ´Political vote today´/´Stem nu op politieke partij 2e Kamer´ (v0080) was recoded into a new variable “Vote right”. The original scale consisted of 16 categories based on political party choice and 'no opinion' types of answers, therefore I rescaled it and changed the value labels into only 2 categories (based on where all the parties belonged on a left-right dimension in given years): 0= ‘left’ and 1= ‘right’. The following parties, that respondents could vote for, are classified as rightist and thus form the category ´right´: CDA, VVD, Christen Unie (SGP), GPV (1995), RPF (1995), AOV (1995), Unie 55+ (1995), CD (1995), LPF (2005), “Nieuw rechts” (2005), “Groep Wilders” (2005), and PRDV (2005). The parties classified as leftist and forming the category ´left´ are: PVDA, D’66, Groen Links, SP, and PvdD (2005). Missing values were again excluded from the analysis.

4.3. Development of the Dutch immigration and integration policies between 1995 and 2005

In this part of the chapter, I am going to describe the development of the Dutch policy on immigration and integration between 1995 and 2005, that is, during the period, when – as we shall see - the policies were going through interesting changes. My aim here is to compare the two points in time and investigate the impact of the policy on citizen’s attitudes within this time period. I start with the background information, including first, types of migrants and the most common ways of immigration to the Netherlands since 1950’s; and second, the background information on the policy development since 1970’s in order to show an overall picture. Then I describe the development and changes in policy between 1995 and 2000, with a focus on specific acts and the political discourse, influenced by the national and international circumstances.

Different types of Western and non-Western immigrants have for various reasons migrated to the Netherlands since the 1950s. Chronologically, in terms of large waves of immigration we can divide them into various groups: colonial repatriates and immigrants from the former Dutch colonies of Surinam and Indonesia; labor migrants – so-called guest workers - from Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco; and more recently also from Eastern Europe; family migration associated with settled
guest-workers; asylum seekers and refugees from different countries; and irregular migrants (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

After the Second World War, the low-skilled male workers were recruited from Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece and later since the 1960’s, from Turkey and Morocco; in order to temporarily work in the Netherlands. Afterwards, they were expected to return to their countries. Many of those from Southern Europe returned, but some of them and especially those from Turkey and Morocco decided to stay and settle down. Since 1970’s, the oil crisis and growing unemployment made the Dutch government to restrict the labor migration and the admission policies. At that time however, many Turkish and Moroccan workers had their families come over, causing the continuing (chain) migration, in form of family reunification (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). The government decided to come up with a more restrictive policy for family reunification, but without any large effect. Since 1980’s, although the family reunification slowed down, the chain migration continued in form of family formation – opting for partners for the guest workers’ children from their country of origin. In order to limit this marriage migration, the government tried to set stricter conditions - minimum income requirement of 70% of the minimum wage; residence in the country for at least 3 years; and minimum age of both partners was set to 21 years (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

Political refugees and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe, especially from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were admitted to the Netherlands between 1950’s and 1960’s (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). Since that time, the refugees from countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and South America started to arrive and the flow of this type of immigration increased. Since the end of 1970’s, the resettled refugees were systematically admitted based on the framework of the resettlement program of the United Nations. Those refugees in an emergency situation were invited by the Dutch government, which aimed to demonstrate the solidarity with the recipient countries. In the course of 1980’s, the initial quota of 750 refugees per year from the late 1970’s was changed to 200 and later to 500 (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). In the end of 1990’s, the system became more flexible as it became possible to invite up to 1500 refugees every three years. In the mid 1980’s the number of asylum seekers rapidly increased and the asylum became an important issue of the political agenda, especially in terms of duration of the procedures, illegal residence of rejected applicants and the fact that the Netherlands was admitting more asylum-seekers than other European countries (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). Since the 2001 however, the revised Aliens Act helped to decrease the amount of asylum applications substantially. Recently, almost half of the asylum seekers come from Somalia and Iraq. The other most relevant asylum-seeking groups between 2000 and 2008 were those from Afghanistan and countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The duration of the asylum procedures has decreased since 2000 and the Dutch government implemented a number of amnesty regulations between 2000 and 2008 (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

Until recently, the family migration and asylum were the most common and often the only ways of immigration from the non-Western countries to the Netherlands; as the labor migration became limited and was mostly from the European countries (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). After 2005 however, the policy changed in order to ‘manage’ the migration, following the principle of ‘a modern migration policy’, based on the existing needs of the Dutch society and the contributions that immigrants can make to it. Thus, the immigration of highly educated people and a high-skilled
labor is encouraged, while restricting the immigration of a low and middle-skilled people (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

When it comes to an overall policy and its development, the 1970’s were characterized by a so-called dual policy (‘two-track policy’), underlined by the question of which types and nationalities of migrants were supposed to stay and which were not (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). The ‘two-tracks policy’ was underlying a general political consensus that the Netherlands was not a country of immigration and hence no integration policy was needed (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008). A relatively low degree of integration was required and the ‘maintenance of group identity’ was considered as positive (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). A turning point came in 1983, when in the White Paper (‘Minderhedennota’) it was for the first time officially acknowledged that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration; with more attention on the socio-economic situation of minorities and a shift of the integration discourse from the structural toward social and cultural integration. Thus, the policy of 1980’s was characterized as a ‘minorities policy’ (‘Minderhedenbeleid’), with categories of immigrants being defined as “Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, guest workers and their families from southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco, ‘gypsies’” etc. (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009, p. 41). The aim was still to integrate the minorities and make them participate in the society while giving them possibilities to retain their own ethnic identity. A minorities policy aimed at cultural emancipation of the minorities and improvement of their socio-economic position in the multicultural Dutch society, where members of these minorities should have an equal position (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008). In 1989, it was also acknowledged that the immigration is likely to continue (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). Since 1985, it was required from immigrant to be ‘sufficiently integrated’ in order to become a Dutch citizen and to possess a ‘reasonable knowledge’ of the Dutch language. The process of naturalization was considered as a means of and a step toward achieving a complete integration (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). Generally, the immigrant integration concerns the performance and degree of the newcomer’s incorporation into a host society; while the citizenship concerns the rules which extend the legal status and rights at different ‘entrance gates’ of the state membership (Goodman, 2010).

In the 1994’s ‘Contourennota’ policy document, the minorities policy was replaced by the ‘integration policy’ (‘Integratiebeleid’), expressing that integration is a mutual process, with citizenship being a key word (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). In 1998, the Civic Integration (Newcomers) Act (‘Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers’, thereafter WIN) was introduced and its aim was to set obligatory Dutch language and culture training programs for those new immigrants that were considered to be at a ‘risk of deprivation’ (usually non-Western immigrants); and it was up to municipalities to decide about these categories and the training for them (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). The idea was that municipalities provide the civic integration courses and immigrants are obliged to attend them, otherwise they would risk losing their social benefits (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

The program for newcomers launched by the WIN involves a training of the Dutch language, and social and vocational orientation. A social counseling and general program coaching is also part of the program, which provides a referral to the labor market or follow-up courses. The primary goal of
the policy is to encourage the self-sufficiency of newcomers, so that they are able to function independently as soon as possible (Ministry of Interior, 2002). In this way it is possible to prevent the formation of new underprivileged minority groups. Therefore, those newcomers who are likely to join the underprivileged group, are required to participate and take an advantage of a made-to-measure integration program, provided by the municipality, and receive an early referral to a further training or a job. All the newcomers with a residence permit for a fixed period, asylum or regular residence permits, and newcomers of a Dutch nationality born abroad are eligible to participate in the program. The following categories of foreigners are exempted: persons who come to the Netherlands temporarily, for employment or self-employment and those who have physical, psychological or other serious reasons that do not allow them to participate (Ministry of Interior, 2002). The newcomers shall apply for the program within six weeks after being registered in the municipality or after issue of the residence permit. The program is concluded with a language test (NT2 level) which includes listening, speaking, reading and writing; and based on which the educational institution assesses the level of the newcomer’s achieved knowledge. Besides the educational institution, the Centre for Work and Income is involved in the inquiry, providing a coaching and social counseling. The municipalities determine the allocation of the budget they receive from the government for the purpose of the WIN; and the amount of the government’s contribution is determined by the budget legislation on the basis of an estimate of the number of newcomers to be integrated (Ministry of Interior, 2002).

The integration policy of 1994 was formulated with the goal of making immigrants to become active and responsible citizens. The purpose of the WIN was to make immigrants be capable of living independently in terms of social and professional activities and the attendance of obligatory integration courses would represent a first essential step toward their integration (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The introduction of WIN already emphasized the self-responsibility of immigrants to integrate and we can see it as a first step in introducing the formalized integration tests for immigrants. At that time, the political discourse concerning requirements for naturalization started to focus on the language and integration requirements. The Christian Democrats were already supported by the Conservative Liberals and the small Christian parties in demanding written language skills for immigrants who wanted to acquire the Dutch citizenship and a higher proficiency in the Dutch language than the level under the WIN. They were successful, as the new naturalization test required the ability to understand, speak and read Dutch at the level A2 according to the Common European Framework of Reference; and a sufficient knowledge of the Dutch society (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). Since then, the naturalization started to be seen as a reward for completing an integration process (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

After the turn of the millennium, immigration and integration became more politicized, with different politicians openly supporting a more restrictive approach. Immigration and integration of foreigners became one of the top priorities of the government in 2000’s, also due to national and international developments in that period (Scholten, Van Nispen, 2008).

The Aliens Act of 2000 entered into force in April 2001. Its aim was to provide clearer rules, shorter procedures and faster decisions on applications for the residence permits (Ministry of Justice, 2004). Foreigners have to apply for an authorization for temporary stay (‘Machtiging Voorlopig Verblijf’,
thereafter MVV) at the Dutch embassy or consulate in respective country. They have to fulfill the following requirements: to submit documents proving an identity; to show that they have financial resources to live on; and not to have any convictions for criminal offences. The following categories of immigrants are exempted from the MVV: certain nationalities such as EU citizens; students, self-employed persons, people working for a Dutch employer, au pairs and interns. After the arrival to the Netherlands, the MVV is converted into a temporary residence permit and this is renewed every year as long as the holder continues to meet the conditions; and after five years, he/she is able to apply for a permanent residence permit (Ministry of Justice, 2004). Applicants for asylum in the Netherlands belong to a separate category - they can be granted a residence permit: on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; for humanitarian reasons related to their individual circumstances; and if return to their country would place them to a serious risk because of the general situation there, for example in case of war (Ministry of Justice, 2004). If the asylum application is granted, the asylum seeker obtains a temporary residence permit and he/she may stay in the Netherlands up to three years as long as there is a need for protection, but when the protection is not needed anymore, the person shall return. The temporary residence permit gives the asylum seekers right to a paid work, housing, education and student finance, and members of their families can also join under certain conditions. After more than three years of a needed protection, the person qualifies for a permanent residence permit (Ministry of Justice, 2004). In 2000 besides the Aliens Act, a minimum level of required income for the family migration was increased to 100% of the minimum wage. This measure was taken in order to restrict the family migration (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009).

Generally in the year 2000, the public and political debate over integration of minorities emerged as a response to an essay of a publicist Paul Scheffer about ‘the multicultural tragedy’, where he argued that the Dutch multiculturalist approach toward minorities has failed (Scholten, 2010; Entzinger, 2005). He expressed concerns about stagnating integration and increasingly growing immigration of a particularly Muslim population, with their illiberal values that may undermine the liberal Dutch values and the social cohesion of the Dutch society (Entzinger, 2005). Furthermore, “immigrant integration became the central political issue in ‘the long year of 2002’ that shocked Dutch politics” (Scholten, 2010, p. 13). At that time, the leader of ‘Lijst Pim Fortuyn’ party, Pim Fortuyn received a lot of public attention with his statements on immigration and integration issues. Furtuyn made strong statements primarily about the failure of immigration and integration policies; the threat of Islam for democracy; accusation of the political elite from the integration failure; and referring to a Dutch voter as to a victim of all this (Penninx, 2005). Despite his murder shortly before the elections in 2002, his party temporarily became the second largest in the parliament and his views had an influence on further development of the political discourse (Entzinger, 2005). In that period, the political concerns about integration of immigrants grew also due to international events (terrorist attacks).

After the elections of 2002, a centre-right government came into power. The government decided to reform the Act from 1998 (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The ‘Integration Policy New-Style’ was introduced, based on a citizenship, self-responsibility and cultural integration; and integration itself being addressed as a participation in the Dutch society (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). This new policy made the cultural integration of immigrants one of its major objectives. Immigrants began to be required to accept the norms and values of the Dutch society and the issue of integration became also related to more general concerns about the national Dutch identity (Scholten, Van Nispen,
Since then, all migrants were supposed to learn the Dutch language and to know and accept the norms and values of the Dutch society. “The government regarded control of immigration as an absolute prerequisite for permanent improvements in the integration of immigrant groups” (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009, p. 43). A Temporary Commission for Research on Integration Policy (the Blok Commission) was set up to evaluate the integration policy between 1970 and 2003. The Commission reported that in this period, the Dutch government did not implement any clear integration policies and neither achieved the integration goals (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). The commission also concluded that the integration of many immigrants had been generally successful, though it was not clear whether this was due to the integration policy. It was also reported that only a small amount of participants in the integration courses had reached level A2, it was however associated mainly with the practical problems related to courses (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). These conclusions led to a significant change in the parliamentary debate concerning the immigration and integration. Since then, all immigrants who permanently wished to stay in the Netherlands would have to attend and pay for the integration courses. In case of failing the integration examination in the end of the course, there would be financial sanctions for the immigrant and the residence right would be kept on a temporary basis (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

What probably had even more impact on a public opinion and political debate in the first half of 2000’s was the shocking national event - the murder of the movie maker and publicist Theo van Gogh (Scholten, 2010). This murder was clearly intended and politically/religiously motivated, carried out by a radicalized Muslim, a Dutchman of a Moroccan origin (Penninx, 2005).

I would shortly like to elaborate on this event. According to Penninx, there were 2 predominant ways of interpreting this event in the public debate. The first one perceived the murder as “an attack on the freedom of speech, and thus on the basic principles of democracy” (Penninx, 2005, p. 9) as it was assumed that Van Gogh was murdered because of his negative statements on Muslims and Islam in general, and the film ‘Submission’ which he made in cooperation with a member of Parliament of a Somali origin Ayaan Hirsi Ali (both were threatened for insulting Islam). This framing confirmed the Fortuyn’s thesis of Islam as a ‘backward religion’, as well as the earlier thesis of politician Frits Bolkestein that Islam and democracy are irreconcilable (Penninx, 2005). The second way this event was framed was exposing it as “the ultimate evidence of the failure of integration of immigrants and integration policies, in particular of Muslim immigrants who segregate themselves, and are allowed to do so in Islamic schools, who import intolerant and fundamentalist imams” (Penninx, 2005, p. 9). These interpretations came both from the media and Dutch politicians, particularly from the LPF and the Liberal Party. The minister for Immigration and Integration Verdonk considered the murder as a justification for the new more restrictive policy. Furthermore, these interpretations led to a further polarization and series of actions against Muslims - some extreme-right wing supporters exploited the situation by attacking Islamic symbols, schools and mosques. These interpretations reveal a certain level of prejudice against Muslims and Islam, as a result of a tendency to generalize, if comparing the murder of Van Gogh with that of Pim Fortuyn: “that murder was a comparable attack on the freedom of speech and democracy by a native Dutchman of the ecological movement. That murder, however, has never been seriously put on the account of the ecological movement as a whole” (Penninx, 2005, p. 10). Based on these assumptions, we could conclude that the ways murder of Van Gogh was framed by both media and politicians and in this way put forward to Dutch citizens, could have been highly influential for their
further perceptions of threat, stemming from Islam. Such negative perceptions might have, in turn, implied a more negative mood of native Dutch toward Muslims in the country.

Overall, as a response to those events between 2000 and 2004, we can assume that the government tried to restore the confidence of the public in Dutch politics. We may argue that it “actively tried to articulate popular ideas and concerns to avoid being blamed for ignoring the voice from the street” (Scholten, 2010, p. 15). Also according to Penninx, a discourse of a ‘New Realism’ emerged, “which tried to break with taboos and engage in debate and confrontation with immigrants as a signal that they are taken seriously” (Penninx, 2005, p. 8).

The second Balkenende government began to improve the process with asylum and the Aliens Act of 2000 effectively managed to decrease the asylum admissions from 18,388 in 2002 to 8,262 in 2003, and since then to level off at around 3,000 admissions per year (Goodman, 2011, p. 8). After accomplishing this goal, the focus of the government has been on the so-called ‘normal immigration routes’, involving the family migration (Goodman, 2011). Hence, in 2000’s, the Dutch immigration policy began to be primarily focused on limiting a family migration - family formation and family reunification following the asylum or the labor-based migration. First, the family migration is said to have negative effects on the integration process; and second, the volume of family migration started to seem problematic after the initial successes of government in reducing the asylum-based migration (Goodman, 2011).

In September 2005, a proposal for a new civic integration, that was supposed to replace the existing WIN from 1998, was introduced. The centre-right government decided to pursue a more result-oriented policy and in the explanatory memorandum it was stated that “in order for immigrants to catch up and to allow them to successfully participate in the social markets, they would need to have knowledge of the Dutch language and to know and accept Dutch norms and values” (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010, p. 11). Generally, a full social position of an autonomous citizen should be the primary goal of integration. In order to achieve this, knowledge of a language and values and norms of the Dutch society are the basic requirements. The immigrant is also supposed to live according to unwritten rules and codes of the society and thus to assimilate into Dutch society and to lead an active social life (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). In years 2000-2007, the three Balkenende governments “increasingly put emphasis on the individual responsibility of the migrant and on shared values, amongst others equal rights for men and women and the separation of religion and state” (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010, p. 14). Therefore, the emphasis on a socio-economic participation in 1990’s was replaced by emphasis on a cultural integration of immigrants to Dutch society in 2000’s and the responsibility for the integration merely shifted to immigrants themselves (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The government aimed to set the knowledge standards of the Dutch language and culture, while immigrants themselves, whether newcomers or those residing in the country for a longer time, became responsible for passing the civic integration exams. According to the Civic Integration Act, immigrant is required to take a second integration exam once he/she is in the Netherlands. A failure to pass the exam has consequences for the extension of the residence permit and the possibility of naturalization and there are also financial sanctions (Kullberg, Kulu-Glasgow, 2009). The courses were not organized and financed by the municipalities and the government anymore, but left to the market. The new Civic Integration Act then came into force in 2007, making the integration examination a condition for a permanent residence with the level of
examination being equal to the level of the naturalization test, and hence replacing the naturalization test itself (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

In 2005, along with the Civic Integration Act, the second Balkenende government adopted the Civic Integration Abroad Act (‘Wet Inburgering Buitenland’, thereafter WIB), which came into effect in 2006 (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). This was a significant reform, introducing a new criterion for immigrants – before obtaining an authorization for the temporary stay MVV, which is necessary for the non-Western migrants to be able to enter the Netherlands; they have to show a sufficient knowledge of the Dutch language and Dutch society (Bonjour, 2011; Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). This new policy made the Netherlands to be the first European country to apply such pre-entry examination for immigrants (Goodman, 2011). The WIB was approved by all the parties except the Socialist Party and the Greens (Bonjour, 2011). The WIB is supposed to make migrants start their integration in their country of origin in order to improve their starting position once being in the Netherlands. The government also aimed to make immigrants aware of their responsibilities early and to select the most motivated ones (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

This basic required knowledge is tested in the Basic Civic Integration Examination which takes place in the applicant’s country of origin. An applicant has to take an oral exam at the Dutch embassy or consulate in the country. The exam consists of the first part testing the knowledge of Dutch society, (geography, history, legislation and politics, housing, education, labor market, system of health care and civic integration) and second part testing the knowledge of the spoken Dutch language (listening and speaking skills) (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The level of both tests is set at level of A1 minus. The applicant is charged €350 every time he/she takes the exam and passing it is a condition for obtaining the MVV. There are no courses or learning material provided, but the government provides a practice package that can be purchased for € 70.40, consisting of the film ‘Coming to the Netherlands’, a picture booklet about the Dutch society, a list of possible questions and language tests (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The examination applies for all the persons between 18 and 65 who apply for an admission to the Netherlands with a goal of settling there permanently; and who need to obtain the MVV and are obliged to participate in a civic integration procedure after their arrival in the Netherlands (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). In general, primarily the applicants for a family migration are concerned by these provisions. There are certain nationalities and types of immigrants that are exempted from the examination. These are: citizens of the EU and EEA member states, Surinam, Australia, Canada, United States, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Japan and North Korea; immigrants coming to the Netherlands for a temporary stay (study, au pair work, exchange or medical treatment); persons with a working permit, self-employed and highly educated migrants (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The same accounts for the immigrants who were granted a status based on the Long-term Residence Directive (2003/109/EC) in another EU Member State. The family members of an immigrant holding an asylum-related residence permit, are not required to take the exam, as long as the family reunification is concerned (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

According to the explanatory memorandum, the WIB targets primarily the family migration as this type of immigration was said to create the largest integration problems. According to the government, “the large scale immigration of the last ten years has seriously disrupted the integration of migrants at group level”; when the integration was said to be “held back by the fact that a large number of second generation migrants opts for a marital partner from the country of origin” and “an important part of these (family migrants) has characteristics that are adverse to a
good integration into Dutch society” (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010, p. 19). In a parliamentary debate, these characteristics apply primarily to Turks and Moroccans, who represent the most prominent and the largest groups of marriage migrants. The government acknowledged that this type of migration is a continuous self-repeating phenomenon which worsens the socio-economic situation of these minorities (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). According to the government, the WIB has four purposes. First, it can prepare the family migrants and to make them manage the situation after their arrival more easily. Second, the examination allows applicants to make a better informed choice on moving to the Netherlands. Third, the applicants would become more aware of their responsibility for the integration into Dutch society. Fourth, the examination was supposed to work as a ‘selection mechanism’, as only those with a real motivation and thus with a higher probability of a successful integration, would be admitted. Finally, the government acknowledged that even thought the reduction of immigration was not its primary goal, it would be a welcomed side-effect (the WIB was also expected to decrease the family migration by around 25%) (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). Beside the WIB, in 2004 other requirements for a family migration became more restrictive too: for the family reunification, a required minimum age for both partners remained 18 and the minimum income requirement was 100% of the full-time minimum wage; however for the family formation, the minimum age was raised to 21 years and the minimum income to 120% of the full-time minimum wage, resulting from a stable working contract for at least 1 year (Bonjour, 2006; Leerkes, Kulu-Glasgow, 2011). Therefore it became obvious that after the turn of the millennium, the most problematic and the most targeted form of immigration was a family migration.

To conclude, the Netherlands has clearly become a country of immigration, dealing especially with problems related to a chain family migration and asylum-related migration of non-Western immigrants. These migrants become a subject of a certain level of integration at 3 stages: during the application for admission to the Netherlands before they are allowed to enter the country; when they apply for a permanent or independent residence permit; and when they apply for a Dutch citizenship. The required level of language in the admission procedure is A1 minus and in the other two procedures, it is A2 (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010).

To sum up the development of the integration requirements between 1995 and 2005, we could see that the original underlying stance was to give migrants a strong legal position in order to promote their integration, was replaced by the stance that this legal position shall function as a reward for reaching a successful integration level. The shift in general position of a government occurred also in the way the responsibility of this successful integration is perceived. There was a shift from a responsibility, equally shared by the authorities and the immigrant, to a sole responsibility of the immigrant (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). The integration requirements were at first used as a condition for the citizenship and as an obligation for the newcomers. Later, the introduction of an examination for the possible immigrants was also introduced and the required level for naturalization was increased, partly as a result of the conclusions about the integration courses and the presumably failed integration policy. Finally, even though in 2003, the official rhetoric of the government was that integration tests shall not serve as a selection mechanism of new immigrants and Dutch citizens; later the government acknowledged that those tests are supposed to function as a selection mechanism for admission of only motivated immigrants, who are likely to be successfully integrated into the society (Strik, Luiten, Van Oers, 2010). Overall, the
current Dutch civic integration policies follow the idea that “successful incorporation into a host society rests not only on employment (economic integration) and civic engagement (political integration), but also on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship, specifically country knowledge, language proficiency and liberal and social values” (Goodman, 2010, p. 754).

Within a decade we could observe an interesting change of approach of the Dutch government in framing of the policy. Between 1995 and 1998, the government was stressing the value of diversity and multiculturalism that can enrich the Dutch society. In 1998, the cabinet stated that no social tensions have occurred while incorporating the migrants of different cultures. Between 1998 and 2002 however, the diversity started to be framed as problematic and the government started to frame the immigration as something that should be restricted and prevented. Between 2002 and 2005 the cultural diversity was not considered as valuable anymore; the first and the second Balkenende government began to take the neo-liberal approach toward immigration, emphasizing the individual responsibility of migrants and criticizing the earlier policies focusing on multiculturalism. In 2003, the cabinet’s rhetoric apparently changed, as it stated that there are social and cultural gaps between the native Dutch population and minorities, and it is difficult to bridge those gaps (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007). It is also minorities who are responsible for bridging those gaps. “The autochthonous Dutch population is only marginally seen as a target group in that it should get more acquainted with minorities and learn more about their culture in order to reduce prejudices that may hinder integration of migrants” (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007, p. 281). The cross-cultural dialogue should be stimulated, but only minorities are those who shall reduce the cultural gaps and assimilate to the Dutch norms and values (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007).

The government tried to stimulate the integration through putting more and stricter requirements and obligations on immigrants. Moreover, while until 2003, the socio-economic integration was seen as the precondition for the cultural integration; since that time it appears that cultural integration is considered as a necessary precondition for a successful socio-economic integration (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007). Therefore, the problem of immigration and integration was extended as the cultural dimension was added to the original socio-economic definition of the problem. Furthermore, the Muslim culture began to be defined as an obstacle to the emancipation of immigrants, and thus as a problem in Dutch society, as the origin of the problem shifted from socio-economic causes and individual attributes of migrants (knowledge, skills etc.) to cultural causes, most prominently including the Islamic culture. In this respect, the religious and cultural practices of Muslim minorities started to be increasingly defined as problematic (such as headscarf wearing, arranged marriages, domestic and honor-related violence, sex-segregated education etc.) and are said to be in conflict with the liberal Western/Dutch values (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007). The second Balkenende cabinet also put a particular emphasis on Muslim women. Thus, it seemed that the individual is responsible for the overall problem, but also the culture is responsible (Roggeband, Verloo, 2007).

Overall, we can conclude that the Dutch policy on immigration and integration visibly changed and became much more restrictive between 1995 and 2005. The policy changes were accompanied by the change of an overall political discourse in the country in terms of integration of immigrants. Consequences of the past immigration and integration policies, such as the perceived insufficient or failed integration of immigrants, and more and more visible cultural gaps between the mainstream society and the Muslim minorities, caused the change of the approach of the government toward
definition of the problem and how it should be approached. The situation escalated after the turn of the millennium as an aftermath of the series of national and international events – starting by statements of Paul Scheffer on ‘multicultural tragedy’, terrorist attacks abroad, the rise of Pim Fortuyn and his murder, and the murder of Theo van Gogh. The government responded by adopting more restrictive measures, especially toward the family migration, with already openly addressing the problem associated with Muslims and Islam in the Dutch society. The government probably did so in order to restore the confidence of the Dutch public in politics, as it wanted to avoid being blamed for ignoring the public opinion. For now, we can assume that the acts of the government were related to public preferences and that the public opinion possibly had an impact on the policy. In the last part of my analysis I shall assess whether the policy also had a significant effect on the attitudes of the public toward Muslims. After describing the policies and providing an answer to the second research question, I will now proceed to the quantitative analysis itself.

5. Data analysis

The data for 1995 and 2005 were merged into one data file, but the first descriptive analyses were performed for both years separately. This was done by sorting the cases and splitting the file by the variable “policy restrictive”. In order to see how negative mood (attitudes) relates to independent variables, I compared the means for the categorical variables female, education, threat and vote right; and examined the correlation between the negative mood and the interval variable age.

In order to perform a first bivariate test of the hypotheses, I examined the relation between the variable negative mood and the policy restrictiveness; the negative mood and the threat, and for the chosen individual level determinants, I looked at the mean scores of the variables threat and negative mood for the variables policy restrictive, female, education and vote right; and at the correlation between the threat, negative mood and the age.

I subsequently performed a multivariate linear regression analysis, including analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the relations between 1) threat (dependent) and independent variables female, age, education and vote right; and 2) negative mood (dependent) and variables policy restrictive, threat, female, age, education, and vote right.

5.1. Attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims between 1995 and 2005

The aim of this section is to examine what are the attitudes of the mainstream Dutch society toward Muslim immigrants and how they changed in a 10 years-time. In the following analysis, the attitudes, in which a high score indicates a more negative mood, are referred to as ‘negative mood’. First, in order to provide a first bivariate test of my hypotheses, I provide the average scores on the
relationships between the negative mood, policy, threat and the rest of the variables (gender, age, education and political orientation). Afterwards, I multivariately test my hypotheses in a multiple linear regression for the dependent variable ‘negative mood’ in order to see how well my theoretical model fits the data.

The relationship between negative mood and policy restrictiveness

In table 1 I bivariately test the hypothesis 1, which states that the more restrictive Dutch immigration/integration policy is, the more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward Muslim immigrants.

TABLE 1: Average score on negative mood – scale by level of policy restrictiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of restrictiveness</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common average</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)
Results based on own calculations

Table 1 shows that there is a significant difference between the level of policy restrictiveness in 1995 and in 2005. Therefore, from this table it appears that the restrictive policy goes together with more negative mood toward Muslim immigrants. This finding confirms the first hypothesis that the more restrictive Dutch immigration/integration policy is, the more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward them.

The relationship between negative mood and threat

In the following table I bivariately test the hypothesis 2, stating that the more Dutch perceive Muslim migrants as a threat, the more negative attitudes they have toward them.

TABLE 2: Average score on negative mood – scale by level of threat perception in 1995 and 2005 (N=686; 1211, respectively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1995, the data show rather smaller differences between the given response categories of a perceived threat, except for the slightly bigger difference between the 2. and 3. category. In 2005, there is on average around half a point difference between the given categories. On average, the perception of threat among respondents seems to have increased between 1995 and 2005 with those differences being significant. This is in line with the expectation that the higher the level of a perceived threat, the more negative mood respondents have. This confirms the hypothesis 2 that the more Dutch citizens perceive Muslims as a threat, the more negative attitudes they possess towards them.

The relationship between negative mood and gender

In Table 3 I bivariately test the hypothesis 3, which states that women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increase their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants (here I look at the part on the relationship between the negative mood and gender only, I show the means on threat by gender later in the section 5.2.)

TABLE 3: Average score on negative mood – scale by gender for 1995 and 2005 (N=686; 1211, respectively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social and Cultural Developments in the Netherlands (1995, 2005);
Note: significance at $P<0.05$ (two-sided test of significance)
Results based on own calculations

In 1995 we find that there are negligible and statistically non-significant differences between men and women in their attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, with the total sample of 686 respondents. There are even slightly smaller and less significant differences between men and women’s attitudes in 2005, with the total sample of 1211 respondents. In 1995, people on average scored 2.86 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. In 2005 this average was 3.13. I thus conclude that the average level of negative mood of both women and men between 1995 and 2005 has increased. From the fact that there are no significant differences between men and women in their attitudes toward Muslims, I conclude that we need to reject the hypothesis 3 that women are more inclined to possess negative mood toward Muslim immigrants than men.

The relationship between negative mood and age

Correlation: (Pearson, 2-tailed; N=686, 1211, respectively)
In 1995, we find a weak positive correlation (0.165) between the age of respondent and the negative mood he/she possesses (sig.=.000). In 2005, the correlation (0.089) between the age and the negative mood is even weaker (sig.=.002). This suggest that we at this stage cannot reject the hypothesis 4 which states that the older people are, are more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.

The relationship between negative mood and educational level

TABLE 4: Average score on negative mood – scale by educational level for 1995 and 2005 (N=686; 1203, respectively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education lower level</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education higher level</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: .000 .000

Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)
Results based on own calculations

Table 4 presents the average score on the negative mood scale for the different educational levels that I distinguished. With this table I aim to bivariately test the hypothesis 5, which states that the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood toward Muslim immigrants they posses (I show the means on a threat by educational level later in section 5.2.)

Table 4 shows in 1995 a relatively visible and significant difference between the attitudes of the respondents with only primary education, and respondents with at least lower level of secondary education. There is also a more visible difference between the respondents with a lower and higher level of secondary education. The further differences between respondents with a higher level of secondary education and the tertiary educational level are very small. Thus, the more educated the respondent is, the less negative mood he/she possesses. This suggests that we need to accept the hypothesis 5.

We can see that in 2005, the overall level of negative mood is higher among all the levels of education. The differences are visible and significant especially among the respondents with a lower and higher level of secondary education, where differences represent increase of around half a point between 1995 and 2005. A similar increase (0.45) can be seen between the respondents with a primary education. The differences remain smaller for those with a tertiary education, who still tend to possess the least negative mood. Again, this suggest that we accept the hypothesis 5 which states that the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood toward Muslim immigrants they posses.
The relationship between negative mood and political orientation

In table 5 I bivariately test the hypothesis 6, which states that people who vote for the right-wing parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the left-wing parties, which in turn increase their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants (again, I show the means on a threat by political orientation later in section 5.2.)

TABLE 5: Average score on negative mood – scale by political orientation for 1995 and 2005 (N=588; 1008, respectively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)
Results based on own calculations

We find that in 1995, the respondents who vote for the right-wing parties tend to possess around half a point more negative mood towards Muslims, than those who vote for the left-wing parties. This can be considered as relatively large and significant difference. Table 3 shows a similar pattern in 2005. This supports the hypothesis 6 which states that the right-wing supporters are more inclined to possess negative mood toward Muslim immigrants. There is an overall increase of negative mood between both left- and right-wing supporters between 1995 and 2005. These findings confirm the hypothesis 6 that those who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslims as a threat than those voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increase their negative mood toward Muslims.

Regression analysis of the negative mood

In table 6 I multivariately test my hypotheses in a multiple linear regression for the dependent variable ‘negative mood’. I first apply the regression analysis for 2 years separately and later in the last section of the analysis part I merge the data for the both years together and do the regression analysis again.

TABLE 6: Regression analysis of negative mood in 1995 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(constant)</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regression for 1995 takes the value of 0.59 and value of 0.63 in 2005, thus the model on negative mood accounts for 59% of the variation in threat, age, gender, education and political orientation in 1995 and for 63% in 2005. Thus we can say that the relationship between variables is relatively strong. The coefficient B indicates how the level of negative mood changes on its scale for a one unit-change in the level of the independent variables threat, gender, age, education and political orientation.

R² tells us about how much the variation in negative mood is associated with an overall covaration between the negative mood and the rest of the variables in percentage. It represents a fraction of the data’s variation accounted for by the model. Because we have a variation of 35% in 1995 and 40% in 2005, it is an evidence that the regression was useful and successful. We have explained a significant part of the variation in the dependent variable with our explanatory variables. The associated analysis of variance (ANOVA) also proves that the overall regression is an improvement over just negative mood with its mean and that the group means are not all equal (F=62.9 for 1995 and 133.06 for 2005 with sig. of .000).

Table 5 shows the following results: On average, in 1995 the level of negative mood is 0.07 points lower for men, compared to women. The level of negative mood among Dutch citizens is higher by 0.01 point by a year or age. The level of negative mood is lower by 0.13 points by the level of education. It is higher by 0.24 points for those who vote for the right-wing parties. Finally, the level of negative threat is higher by 0.43 points by a level of perceived threat. Apparently, some independent variables seem to be less relevant or less successful predictors of the negative mood in this model than others. This is the case for the variable gender, which does not appear to be significant. The effect is strong and significant for the threat, political orientation and educational level. The effect is weaker for age, though it is still significant.

In 2005, on average the level of negative mood does not appear to increase by age and gender differences – the effect of both of these variables is non-significant. The level of negative mood is lower by 0.16 points by the level of education and is higher by 0.21 points for those who vote for the right-wing parties. Finally, same as in 1995, the level of negative threat is higher by 0.43 points by a level of perceived threat. The education, political orientation and threat have a significant effect on the level of negative mood.

On the basis of these results, we confirm the hypothesis 1 on the effect of restrictive policy and hypothesis 2 on the effect of threat on negative mood toward Muslims. We reject the hypothesis 3 on the effect of gender, as there were no significant differences between men and women in their attitudes toward Muslims. At this stage we could not reject the hypothesis 4 on the effect of age. We
confirm the hypothesis 5 on the effect of education and also the hypothesis 6 on the effect of political orientation on negative mood toward Muslim immigrants. So far however, we could not completely confirm or reject given hypotheses, as we still need to examine the threat part of those hypotheses. Nevertheless, in terms of regression analysis, we are able to explain a significant part of the variation in negative mood variable with our explanatory variables policy, gender, age, education and vote right.

In 1995, some of these independent variables seem to be less relevant predictors of negative mood in this model than others: there is a strong and significant effect of the threat, political orientation and education; weaker but still significant effect of age; and non-significant effect of the variable gender. In 2005, the effect of both gender and age is non-significant. Otherwise, the education, political orientation and the threat have a significant effect on the level of negative mood.

We can conclude that the theoretical model fits the data in case of policy affecting the negative mood of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants; and in case of education, political orientation and in 1995 also in case of age, having a significant effect on those negative moods. Only gender and in 2005 age do not have a significant effect on negative attitudes toward Muslims.

In order to provide an answer to the first research question, we can also conclude that in general, the attitudes of Dutch citizens toward Muslims have changed in a more negative direction, or in other words, the negative mood toward them became stronger between 1995 and 2005. This is so as it appears that both women and men; both left-wing and right-wing voters; and people with all educational levels possess more negative attitudes in 2005, compared to the situation in 1995. The same accounts for the increased average perception of threat in 2005 compared to 1995, causing a more negative mood of those respondents toward Muslim immigrants.

5.2. Dutch citizens’ perceptions of the threat between 1995 and 2005

The aim of this section is to examine how the chosen individual-level determinants determine the perception of cultural type of threat between years 1995 and 2005. I assume that the perception of threat is influenced by the following individual-level determinants: gender, age, educational level and the political orientation of Dutch citizens. I first provide the average scores on the relationships between the dependent variable threat and the rest of the variables (gender, age, education and political orientation). Subsequently, I multivariately test my hypotheses in a multiple linear regression for the dependent variable ‘threat’ in order to compare my theoretical model with the data.

The relationship between threat and gender

In table 7 I bivariately test the hypothesis 3, which states that women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.
TABLE 7: Average score on perception of threat – scale by gender for 1995 and 2005 (N=854, 1308, respectively)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)

Results based on own calculations

In 1995, we again find small and non-significant differences between the perception of threat among men and women. These differences are even smaller and less significant in 2005. Same as in case of negative mood, we can see that the average level of perceived threat among both men and women between 1995 and 2005 has increased by around half a point. In 1995, people on average scored 2.52 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. In 2005 this average was 3.10. I thus conclude that the average level of perceived threat of both women and men between 1995 and 2005 increased significantly. As there are no significant differences between men and women in their perception of threat, I conclude that we need to reject the hypothesis 3 that women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.

The relationship between threat and age

Correlation: (Pearson, 2-tailed; N=854, 1308, respectively)

When it comes to age, in 1995, we again find a weak positive correlation (0.101) between the age of respondent and his/her level of perceived threat (sig. =.003). In 2005, the correlation (0.083) between the age and the perception of threat among respondents is even weaker (sig. = .003). Hence, same as in case of negative mood, this result suggests that at this stage we cannot reject the hypothesis 4 which states that the older people are, are more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.

The relationship between threat and educational level

In table 8 I bivariately test the hypothesis 5, stating that the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood toward they posses toward them.

TABLE 8: Average score on perception of threat – scale by educational level for 1995 and 2005 (N=854, 1299, respectively)
Table 8 shows that in 1995, the level of perceived threat is significantly higher (around half a point) among the respondents with a primary education, than is in case of respondents with a secondary and tertiary education. However, the perceived threat seems to be on a similar level between the respondents with the lower level of secondary education and those with tertiary education. Even though the pattern between the secondary higher level education and tertiary education is not in line with our expectation, in general we can accept the hypothesis 5.

In 2005, we can however observe a clear linear pattern, where the level of perceived threat decreases with the level of education. On average, we can see that the level of perceived threat among all the respondents has increase by around half a point between 1995 and 2005. These findings suggest that we again accept the hypothesis 5 which states that the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood toward Muslim immigrants they posses.

The relationship between threat and political orientation

In table 9 I bivariately test the hypothesis 6, which states that people who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significance</strong></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)

Results based on own calculations
Regarding political orientation, we find relatively large and significant differences (around half a point) between the perception of threat among right-wing and left-wing voters in both years. Thus, same as in case of negative mood, this fact supports the assumption that the right-wing voters are more likely to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat. On average, the level of perceived threat among both right-wing and left-wing supporters has increased by more than half a point between 1995 and 2005. These findings confirm the hypothesis 6 that people who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslims as a threat than people who vote for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslims.

Regression analysis of threat

TABLE 10: Regression analysis of threat in 1995 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(constant)</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote right</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)
Results based on own calculations

The regression takes the value of 0.35 for year 1995 and the value of 0.34 for year 2005, thus the model on perception of threat accounts for 35% of the variation in gender, age, education and political orientation in 1995 and for 34% in 2005. Therefore we can say that the relationship between variables is still relatively strong. The coefficient B indicates how the level of negative mood changes on its scale for a unit-change in the level of gender, age, education and political orientation. The gender, age, education and political orientation seem to account for 13% of the variation in perception of threat among Dutch citizens in 1995, and for 11% in 2005. Because we have a variation of 13% in 1995 and 11% in 2005, it seems that the regression was not especially useful. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) still proves that the overall regression is an improvement over just the threat with its mean (F=25.27 for 1995 and 33.41 for 2005 with sig. of .000).

Table 10 shows the following results: On average, in 1995 the level of perceived threat is higher by 0.11 points for women, compared to men. The level of perceived threat is higher by 0.01 point by a year of age of the respondent. The level of perceived threat is lower by 0.32 points by the level of education. It is higher by 0.50 points for the for the right-wing supporters. Also in case of threat in 1995, the variable gender does not have a significant effect. The effect is strong and significant for
the political orientation and educational level; while the effect of age is weaker and has a low significance.

In 2005, it appears that the variable age is not significant and does not have an impact on the level of perceived threat at all. Similarly, there is a weak and non-significant effect for the variable gender, as the level of perceived threat is higher by 0.04 points for women. The level of perceived threat is lower by 0.31 points by the level of education; and it gets higher by 0.46 points for those who vote for the right-wing parties. These two variables have a significant effect on the level of perceived threat among Dutch citizens.

Based on these findings, we reject the hypothesis 3 on the effect of gender, as there are no significant differences between men and women in their level of perceived threat. Yet we could not reject the hypothesis 4 on the effect of age. We confirm the hypothesis 5 on the effect of education and also the hypothesis 6 on the effect of political orientation on the perception of threat. When it comes to regression analysis, we are still able to explain a significant part of the variation in a threat variable with the independent variables gender, age, education and vote right.

In 1995, again some independent variables seem to be less relevant predictors of the perception of threat: same as in case of negative mood, there is a strong and significant effect of education and political orientation; weaker and barely significant effect of age; and non-significant effect of gender on the perception of threat. In 2005, in the same way, the effect of both gender and age is clearly non-significant. The education and political orientation have a significant effect on the level of perceived threat.

We can conclude that our theoretical model still into a large extent fits the data in case of education and political orientation having a significant effect on citizens’ level of perceived threat. However, gender and age did not have a significant effect on the level of perceived threat. In order to answer the third research question, we can conclude that in general, the citizens’ level of perceived threat has also changed in a more negative direction and it became higher between 1995 and 2005. It again appears that both women and men; both left-wing and right-wing voters; and respondents of all the educational levels perceive Muslim immigrants more as a threat in 2005, compared to 1995.

5.3. The policies and the perceptions of threat in relation to attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims

In this last section of the analysis, I aim to examine to what extent the policies and perceptions of threat are related to attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims; and I aim to observe the effect the policies and the perception of threat have on negative attitudes together. I am going to use the facts and results mentioned above in order to analyze the relation between the negative mood, policy and threat and the individual-level determinant variables together. Here I multivariately test my hypotheses in a multiple linear regression for the both dependent variables
‘negative mood’ and ‘threat’ in relation to the policy restrictiveness, gender, age, education and vote right.

Regression analysis of threat and negative mood in relation to policy

TABLE 11: Regression analysis of threat and negative mood in relation to policy in 1995 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Negative mood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(constant)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote right</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy restrictive</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: significance at P<0.05 (two-sided test of significance)

Results based on own calculations

At this point I decided to merge the files in order to observe the overall relationship between the threat, negative mood and the policies. Here the regression takes the value of 0.42 for the threat and the value of 0.63 for the negative mood. Thus, the model on perception of threat accounts for 42% of the variation in gender, age, education, political orientation and policy. The model on the level of negative mood accounts for 63% of the variation in gender, age, education, political orientation, threat and policy; and thus, the relationship between variables is relatively strong. With this variation, it seems that the regression was useful especially for the negative mood variable. The analysis of variance proves that the overall regression is an improvement over only the use of means of the threat and negative mood (F=173.57 for negative mood 76.49 for the threat; with sig. of .000). The coefficient B indicates how the level of perceived threat and negative mood changes on its scale for a unit-change in the level of gender, age, education, political orientation, threat and policy.

Table 11 provides us with the following results:

First, let us look at the extent to which policy influences the threat and negative mood variables between 1995 and 2005. The level of perceived threat is higher by 0.83 points by the level of restrictiveness of the policy. The level of negative mood is higher by 0.11 points by the level of restrictiveness of the policy. Therefore, the policy appears to have a significant effect on both threat and negative mood, with slightly higher impact on the level of perceived threat. These results clearly support the hypothesis 1 that the more restrictive Dutch immigration and integration policy is, the
more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward them. These findings show that the more restrictive the policy becomes, the more threat Dutch citizens perceive, and in turn they possess more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. As both level of perceived threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims increased along with the level of policy restrictiveness, I propose that the policy in this case had an impact on the public opinion.

The level of negative mood is higher by 0.43 points for those who perceive immigrants as a threat. Thus, the variable threat has a significant effect on the level of negative mood towards Muslims. This finding confirms the hypothesis 2 that the more Dutch citizens perceive Muslims as a threat, the more negative mood they possess toward them.

The level of perceived threat is higher by 0.07 points for women, and the level of negative mood is lower by 0.03 points for men; with a non-significant effect in both cases. Thus even though women tend to perceive threat and to possess negative mood towards Muslim immigrants more than men, this variable is not significant. Based on this finding, we reject the hypothesis 3 that women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants.

The variable age does not seem to affect the level of perceived threat and neither the level of negative mood, with this variable not being significant for the model. Thus even though based on previous parts of the analysis we could conclude that the older the people are, the more they perceive threat and negative attitudes, this variable has a non-significant effect on our dependent variables. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the hypothesis 4 which states that the older people are, are more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants.

The level of perceived threat is lower by 0.31 points; and the level of negative mood is lower by 0.15 points by the level of education. The variable education clearly has a significant effect on both threat and negative mood. This finding confirms the hypothesis 5 that the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood they possess toward those Muslim immigrants.

Finally, the level of perceived threat is higher by 0.47 points, and the level of negative mood is higher by 0.22 points for the right-wing supporters. The variable political orientation also has a significant effect on both threat and negative mood, therefore this finding confirms the hypothesis 6 that people who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants.

To conclude the overall hypothesis testing, we confirm the hypothesis 1 on the effect of restrictive policy and hypothesis 2 on the effect of threat on negative mood toward Muslims. We reject the hypothesis 3 on the effect of gender on the perception of threat and on the attitudes toward Muslims. We cannot reject the hypothesis 4 on the effect of age but we find its effect to be non-significant. We confirm the hypothesis 5 on the effect of education and also the hypothesis 6 on the effect of political orientation on the perception of threat and on the negative mood toward
Muslim immigrants. My findings are generally in line with the theory and the previous research on threat and individual-level determinants influencing it.

To assess the significance of the impact of all the variables on the threat and negative mood, it appears that the variables with the most significant effect on both threat and negative mood are the educational level, political orientation of respondents and the policy. For the negative mood, the variable threat also has a significant effect. On the other hand, variables gender and age have only weak impact on the perception of threat and negative attitudes, and this impact is not significant.

Finally, we can conclude that the theoretical model developed for this analysis fits the data in case of the immigration and integration policy affecting the negative mood of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants; and in case of education, political orientation and in 1995 also in case of age, having a significant effect on those negative moods. Only gender, and in 2005 age did not have a significant effect on negative attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants. Overall however, my findings confirm the relationship between most of the chosen individual-level determinants and the threat; the relationship between the threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims; and finally the relationship between the immigration and integration policy and those negative attitudes of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants. Therefore, the answer to the last research question of this analysis is that attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims are to a large extent related to the policies and perceptions of threat; and both policies and perception of threat seem to have a significant effect on those negative attitudes. I finally propose that when it comes to policy, because both level of a perceived threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims increased between 1995 and 2005 along with the level of policy restrictiveness, the policy seem to have had an impact on the public opinion. Nevertheless I have to acknowledge that as the causal mechanism between the policy influence and the public opinion is indecisive, we need to take these results with caution and we need to admit there might have been additional factors influencing the policy changes and the public opinion in the given time period.

6. Conclusion and discussion

6.1. Conclusions

The aim of this study was to understand and observe the changes in Dutch citizens’ attitudes toward Muslims as a result of a perceived threat and the immigration and integration policy. This research focused on the attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants and minorities living in the Netherlands and I aimed to examine what has determined these attitudes. My time frame was 1995-2005 because of the data availability and an interesting trend showing certain attitudes toward Muslims and certain policy development. The country of focus was the Netherlands. The focus was on attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims, being related to immigration and integration policy and the perception of cultural threat. My first variable was the immigration and integration policy and my overall aim was to add to the existing knowledge about the relationship between the threat and negative moods toward immigrants, the effect that policy has on the attitudes on a contextual level, in combination with the threat and its individual-level
determinants. I included both immigration and integration policy. The second variable was the threat and its cultural aspect. The chosen individual-level determinants which were assumed to influence the perception of threat were gender, age, educational level and political orientation of citizens.

The major research question of this research was: How can we explain the attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims between 1995 and 2005 with the immigration and integration policies and the perceptions of threat? This research question was divided between the 4 sub-questions, examining the changes and evolvement of 1) the attitudes, 2) Dutch immigration and integration policies, 3) Dutch citizens’ perceptions of threat, and 4) the extent to which the policies and the perceptions of threat are related to attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslims between 1995 and 2005. The major source I used in order to answer those questions was the Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands survey (SOCON).

In my theoretical framework, I used couple of relevant theories which are linked to the relationship between the state policy and the public opinion; attitudes of native citizens toward immigrants and minorities, the concept of threat, and the relationship between these two variables. The theories explaining the attitudes were ethnic exclusionism theory and theory of prejudice; ethnic competition theory; and the theory on threat. To assess the impact of immigration and integration policies on citizens’ attitudes, the theory on the relationship between the state policy and the public opinion was used. My assumption was that policy (on immigration/integration) influences the public opinion (attitudes toward Muslims), rather than opinion affecting the policy. I however also assumed that there can also be a reciprocal relationship and that it was likely that Dutch policy-makers were paying a lot of attention to public opinion, general public discourse and the moods toward Muslim immigrants and minorities. I also expected the immigration and integration of foreigners in the Netherlands to be a salient topic, especially when it comes to Muslims. Based on theories I decided to use a theoretical model, where the basic causal assumption was that 1) the policies (on immigration/integration), which are on the contextual level; and 2) the perceived threat (cultural) influence the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The perceived threat was presumably influenced by the individual-level determinants. These were gender, age, educational level; and political orientation.

Based on theories, I developed and tested 6 hypotheses, where I used the following assumptions. First, the more restrictive Dutch immigration/integration policy is, the more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward Muslim immigrants. Second, the more Dutch citizens perceive Muslims immigrants as a threat, the more negative attitudes they possess toward them. Third, women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants. Fourth, the older the people are, the more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants. Fifth, the more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood they possess toward those Muslim immigrants. Finally, people who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim immigrants.
The analysis was based on an existing data set (survey with random samples of Dutch citizens). I examined 2 waves of the SOCON survey in years 1995 and 2005, where I observed the changes in 5 items, included in both years under measurement. The anti-Muslim attitudes (dependent variable) were measured with the 5-answer categories ranging from “don’t agree at all” to “agree entirely” in the following items: “Muslim women with scarf do not adapt”; “Muslims are dangerously fanatic”; “Muslims use religion for political aims”; and “Muslims easily resort to violence”. Here I rescaled and recoded those 4 variables and computed a new common variable called “Negative mood”. The rest of the variables in this analysis (threat, policies, gender, age, education and political orientation) were independent variables. The perceived threat was measured with the same 5-answer categories with the item “Minorities are threat to our own culture”. It was recoded into a new variable “Threat”. The immigration and integration policies represented a macro-indicator of the analysis. I computed a variable “Policy restrictive”, in order to measure the effect of policies on the attitudes in the given time period. I used the following scale to differentiate between the policies being more and less restrictive: 0 = ´less restrictive´ and 1 = ´more restrictive´. The individual-level determinants used as predictors of the attitudes toward minorities and influencing the threat perceptions were: gender, age, educational level, and political orientation of citizens. The first determinant was gender, coded as ´female´ and had 2 categories – male or female. The scale of the age of respondents was between 18 and 70. The third determinant, coded as ´education´ was an educational level of respondents and had 4 categories (primary education, secondary education lower level, secondary education higher level, tertiary education). The political orientation determinant was coded as ´vote right´ and measured on the left-right scale in 2 categories (left, right).

I first described the development of the Dutch policy on immigration and integration between 1995 and 2005. In this respect we could see that the policy in 2000’s had changed significantly along with the underlying position and approach of the government, compared to 1990’s and the previous decades. Overall, between 1995 and 2005, couple of new acts and restrictive measures were introduced in order to limit primarily the asylum and the family migration, and in order to improve the integration of immigrants: introduction of the Civic Integration (Newcomers) Act in 1994 (WIN); Aliens Act of 2000 that was among other goals supposed to manage the asylum migration; and after 2005, the Civic Integration Act and the Civic Integration Abroad Act (WIB), managing the integration examination abroad which was required in order to obtain an authorization for a temporary stay and entrance to the country for the non-Western (primarily family) migrants. Besides these acts, in the course of years, there were restrictive measures introduced in terms of minimum age and income, required for the family migration. In general we can say that the overall policy visibly changed and all the policy measures became more restrictive between 1995 and 2005, while the major focus of the government was on limitation of the family migration, after it was able to manage the asylum migration. Between 1990’s and 2000’s there was a shift from the responsibility that was originally equally shared by the authorities and the immigrant, to a sole responsibility of the immigrant. The integration requirements were firstly used as an obligation for the newcomers and as a condition for the citizenship; however, the conclusions about the integration courses and a failed integration policy caused the introduction of the integration requirements also for the admission to the country. Later in 2000’s, even though the initial official rhetoric of the government was that the new integration tests were not supposed to serve as a selection mechanism of the new immigrants and Dutch citizens; later it acknowledged that those tests were supposed to select only motivated immigrants, who were likely to be successfully integrated into the society. The government
increasingly started to put more and stricter requirements and obligations on immigrants and newcomers.

Between 1995 and 2005 we could observe some interesting changes in approach of the Dutch government in terms of framing the policy. Between 1995 and 1998, the government was stressing the value of diversity and multiculturalism enriching the Dutch society. Between 1998 and 2002 however, the diversity already started to be framed as problematic and the government started to perceive the immigration as something that should be restricted and prevented. Between 2002 and 2005, the cultural diversity was not considered as valuable for the society anymore and the first and second Balkenende government began to emphasize the individual responsibility of migrants and to criticize the earlier policies of multiculturalism. In 2003, the cabinet stated that there were social and cultural gaps between the native Dutch population and the minorities, and that it was difficult to bridge those gaps. It was the minorities who are responsible for bridging those gaps and who shall assimilate to the Dutch norms and values. Furthermore, while until 2003, the socio-economic integration was perceived as the precondition for the cultural integration; since that time it appeared that cultural integration became a necessary precondition for the successful socio-economic integration. Hence, the problem of immigration and integration was extended and the cultural dimension was added to its original socio-economic definition. The Muslim culture began to be defined as an obstacle to the emancipation of immigrants, and thus as a problem in Dutch society, as the origin of the immigration and integration problem shifted more and more to the cultural causes, including especially the Islamic culture. The religious and cultural practices of Muslim minorities started to be increasingly defined as problematic and were said to conflict the liberal Dutch values. In that way, it seemed that the individuals became responsible for the overall problem, but also their culture became responsible, according to the government.

Based on described policy development, we could conclude that the Dutch immigration and integration policy changed and became much more restrictive between 1995 and 2005. The policy changes happened along with the change of an overall political discourse. Consequences of the past policies, such as the presumably failed integration of immigrants, and more and more visible cultural gaps between the Dutch population and Muslim minorities, caused the government to change the approach toward definition of the problem and toward possible solutions. The situation changed most visibly after the turn of the millennium, in the aftermath of various national and international events, such as statements of Paul Scheffer on ‘multicultural tragedy’, terrorist attacks, the rise and the later murder of Pim Fortuyn, and the murder of Theo van Gogh. The government probably wanted to act promptly, to restore the confidence of the Dutch public in politics and to respond to public preferences, and thus it responded by adopting more restrictive measures, primarily toward family migration, while it was already openly addressing the problems associated with Muslims in Dutch society. At that stage I concluded that the acts of the government were related to public preferences and that the public opinion possibly had an impact on the policy.

In this first part of the analysis, the aim was to examine what were the attitudes of the native Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants and how they changed in a 10 years-time. I first provided the average scores on the relationships between the negative mood, policy, threat and the rest of the variables (gender, age, education and political orientation) in order to provide the bivariate test
of my hypotheses. Then I multivariately tested the hypotheses in a multiple linear regression for the dependent variable ‘negative mood’. The results confirmed the first hypothesis on the effect of restrictive policy and the second hypothesis on the effect of threat on negative mood toward Muslims. We rejected the hypothesis 3 on the effect of gender, because there were no significant differences between men and women in their attitudes toward Muslims. We could not reject the hypothesis 4 on the effect of age. We also confirmed the hypothesis 5 on the effect of education and also the hypothesis 6 on the effect of political orientation on negative mood toward Muslims. However at that stage of the analysis, we could not yet completely confirm or reject mentioned hypotheses, because we still needed to examine the threat part of those hypotheses. Generally, with the use of regression analysis, we were able to explain a significant part of the variation in negative mood with the (independent variables) policy, gender, age, education and vote right. In terms of significance of the effects of independent variables, in 1995, some of them seemed to be less relevant predictors of negative mood in than others. There was a strong and significant effect of the threat variable, political orientation and education variables; weaker but still significant effect of age; but a non-significant effect of the variable gender. In year 2005, both gender and age were non-significant. Based on those findings, I concluded that the theoretical model fits the data in terms of policy affecting the negative mood of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants; and in terms of education, political orientation and in 1995 also in terms case of age, having a significant effect on the negative mood. Only gender and in 2005 age did not appear to have a significant effect on attitudes toward Muslims. In general, the negative mood of Dutch citizens toward Muslims had changed and became stronger between 1995 and 2005.

In the second part of the analysis, the aim was to examine how the chosen individual-level determinants determined the perception of a cultural threat between 1995 and 2005. I again first provided the average scores on the relationship between the dependent variable threat and the rest of the variables (gender, age, education and political orientation). Afterwards, I multivariately tested the hypotheses in a multiple regression for the dependent variable ‘threat’. Based on the findings I received, I rejected the hypothesis 3 on the effect of gender, as there are no significant differences between men and women in their level of perceived threat. Again, I could not reject the hypothesis 4 on the effect of age. I confirmed the hypothesis 5 on the effect of education and the hypothesis 6 on the effect of political orientation on the perception of threat. By the regression analysis, we were still able to explain a significant part of the variation in threat with the variables gender, age, education and vote right. Concerning the significance of the effect of independent variables, in year 1995, same as in case of negative mood, there was a strong and significant effect of education and political orientation; weaker but still significant effect of age; but a non-significant effect of gender on the level of perceived threat. In 2005, again the effect of both gender and age was non-significant. At this stage, I concluded that our theoretical model still into a large extent fit the data when it comes to education, political orientation and in 1995 also age, having a significant effect on citizens’ level of perceived threat. However, gender and in 2005 age did not have a significant effect on the perception of threat. I generally concluded that the citizens’ level of perceived threat had also changed and it became higher between 1995 and 2005.

In the last third part of my analysis, my aim was to examine to what extent the policies and perceptions of threat were related to attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims. I aimed to
observe the effect the policies and the perception of threat have had on the negative attitudes together. I multivariately tested my hypotheses in a multiple regression for the both dependent variables ‘negative mood’ and ‘threat’ in relation to policy restrictiveness, gender, age, education and vote right. I decided to merge the files in order to observe the overall relationship between the threat, negative mood and policies. The model on perception of threat accounted for 42% of the variation in gender, age, education, political orientation and policy. The model on the level of negative mood accounted for 63% of the variation in gender, age, education, political orientation, threat and policy; and thus, the relationship between variables was relatively strong.

From the regression analysis I acquired the following results. First, the policy had a significant effect on both threat and negative mood, with a higher impact on the level of perceived threat. These results made me support the hypothesis 1 that the more restrictive Dutch immigration and integration policy is, the more negative mood Dutch citizens possess toward them. These findings showed that the more restrictive the policy becomes, the more threat Dutch citizens perceive, and in turn they possess more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Because both the level of perceived threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims increased with the level of policy restrictiveness, I proposed that the policy in this case had an impact on public opinion. I however also acknowledge that we should be cautious with such conclusion, as according to the theory the causal relationship between the state policy and the public opinion can also be reciprocal and spurious; and there might have been also other additional factors influencing the policy changes, perceptions of threat and negative moods during the chosen time period. Second, the variable threat had a significant effect on the level of negative mood toward Muslims. This result confirmed the hypothesis 2 that the more Dutch citizens perceive Muslims as a threat, the more negative mood they possess toward them. Third, even though it appeared that women tend to perceive threat and to possess negative mood toward Muslim immigrants slightly more than men, this variable was not significant. Based on this result, I rejected the hypothesis 3 that women are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than men, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants. Fourth, the age did not seem to affect neither the level of perceived threat, nor the level of negative mood, hence this variable was not significant for the model. Therefore, even though we could conclude that the older the people are, the more they perceive the threat and the negative attitudes; this variable had a non-significant effect on our dependent variables. Nevertheless, I could not reject the hypothesis 4 which stated that the older people are, are more they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, which in turn increases their negative mood toward those Muslim immigrants. Fifth, the education clearly had a significant effect on both threat and negative mood and this finding confirmed the hypothesis 5 that more educated people are, the less they are inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat, and thus the less negative mood they possess toward those Muslim immigrants. Finally, the political orientation also had a significant effect on both threat and negative mood. Therefore this result confirmed the hypothesis 6 that people who vote for the rightist parties are more inclined to perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat than people voting for the leftist parties, which in turn increases their negative mood toward Muslim. To conclude the hypothesis testing, my findings were generally in line with the theory and the previous research on threat and individual-level determinants influencing it.

Overall, in terms of significance of all the variables influencing the threat and negative mood, it appeared that the variables with the most significant effect on both threat and negative mood were
the education, political orientation of respondents and the policy on immigration and integration. For the negative mood, the variable threat also had a significant effect. However, the variables gender and age had only weak impact on the perception of threat and negative attitudes, and that impact was not significant. Based on the overall analysis, I conclude that the theoretical model fits the data when it comes to immigration and integration policy affecting the negative mood of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants; also in case of education, political orientation and in 1995 also in case of age, having a significant effect on these negative moods. From the analysis it seems that only gender, and in 2005 age, do not have a significant effect on negative attitudes of Dutch citizens toward Muslims. Generally however, my findings confirmed the relationship between the threat and most of the chosen individual-level determinants; the relationship between the threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims; and the relationship between the immigration and integration policy and those negative attitudes of Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants.

Therefore, I can finally conclude that attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants are to a large extent related to Dutch immigration and integration policies and perceptions of threat; and both policies and perception of threat seem to have a significant effect on those negative attitudes. I finally propose that regarding policy, as both the level of perceived threat and negative attitudes toward Muslims increased between 1995 and 2005 along with the level of policy restrictiveness, the policy seems to have had a substantial impact on the public opinion. Therefore I conclude that based on the analysis, the policy might also have had a significant effect on the attitudes of the public toward Muslim immigrants.

6.2. Discussion

Finally, I would like to shortly discuss some strong and weak points of this research. First, in terms of sources I used, it was possible to perform the statistical analysis of the chosen variables because of the availability of the SOCON survey, which I consider as very useful on the field of social research, providing a unique and valuable information, also for my topic. Another advantage was the availability of the policy documents and academic articles, providing background information for the description of the policy. Based on these sources, I was able to gather data relatively quickly and easily.

I was however limited by the fact that I was using a secondary data; therefore I had to work only with the information and data that were already given. The major problem I have encountered in this research was the fact that even though the survey was made in more waves between 1979 and 2005 and in almost all years under observation it encompassed couple of useful variables concerning the attitudes toward Muslims, those variables were changing with almost every wave. In this way it was a problem to find the identical variables in more than two years, or in years following each other. Therefore, even though I originally planned to observe the long time period between 1979 and 2005, because of the limited availability of the same variables being measured, I had to choose only 2 points in time, resulting in only 10 years-period to be observed.

The strong point was that within a chosen time frame, we were able to observe interesting changes in overall policy, as the change of the framing of the issue, political discourse and the policy acts was
happening around the turn of the millennium. Due to the change of the overall political and public discourse and couple of national and international events, it was possible to observe the changes in perceptions of the Dutch citizens toward threat and their attitudes toward Muslims. Nevertheless, in order to increase the quality of the research, it would be useful to analyze such changes in more years/in a longer time period in order to really understand the role of the policy; as in my analysis I assumed the effect of the policy from the general notion of the policy becoming more restrictive over the years. This was however the case only within this relatively short period, thus between 2 years, while many other events and factors changed and might have influenced the context. Hence, what could have been done better in case of availability of data would be to compare the situation within few decades.

Another thing that could improve the quality of the research would be to compare more countries concerning the attitudes of the citizens toward Muslim immigrants, ideally to compare the situation in the Netherlands with some other Western European countries with a relatively large Muslim communities, such as for example United Kingdom, Germany or France. In that way we could observe the policy effect on attitudes toward Muslims across different contexts and settings, therefore the results could be more valid.

One more improvement that could be done about this kind of research would be to compare the attitudes of the native citizens toward more minority groups which are somehow distinct from each other, for instance the attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslims; immigrants from Eastern Europe and post-communist countries; immigrants from the former colonies; and the western migrants, based on the proportion of these types of migrants and their countries of origin. Then we could investigate have how attitudes toward different nationalities and types of migrants changed as a result of the policy changes and changes in the people’s perception of threat.

Good thing is that I was able to find suitable theories for my theoretical framework and in that way to develop the theoretical model and derive the hypotheses. Then however, I became limited by the fact that according to the theory, the casual relationship between the policy and the public opinion can be interpreted in both ways, thus being reciprocal and indecisive. This on one hand gave me a possibility to develop my assumption about the effect of the policy and build on it; on the other hand, even though my results supported my major hypothesis, I had to remain cautious with making the conclusions about it in general.

Overall, I am glad that most of my hypotheses, especially the two major ones, could have been confirmed by this research and that the core variables – the policy and the perception of threat – appeared to be relevant and to have a significant impact on the negative attitudes of the Dutch citizens toward Muslim immigrants. In this way I hope and believe that my thesis was able to contribute to the existing knowledge on this field of social research.
7. Bibliography


