A Study of the Effectiveness of Democratization through Conditionality in the Framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy – A case study of Moldova and Egypt

Master Thesis

Simon Wibbeling
s0167630

1st Supervisor: Dr. A.K. Warntjen
2nd Supervisor: Dr. C. van Ham

Raiffeisenstraße 9
48268 Greven
Germany

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University of Twente - Faculty of Management and Governance
Bestuurskunde European Studies
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List of Abbreviations

AIE  Alliance for European Integration
ECHRR  European Court of Human rights
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EU  European Union
EURMAP  European Union – Moldova Action Plan
FH  Freedom House
GRECO  Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption
HDI  Human Development Index
ILO  International Labour Organization
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization
NIF  Neighbourhood investment Facility
NIP  National Indicative Programme
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ODHIR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PACE  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PCRM  Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
UN  United Nations
1. Introduction

After the last enlargement round, also called the “big-bang” enlargement, the European Union gained new neighbors and the geopolitical context in Europe changed so that the EU consequently was faced with the task to redefine its relationship to these states (Carmen & Ramona, 2009). Because of this and being interested in strengthening and increasing its role on the external level the European Union started a “more coherent process of regional cooperation and openness within its proximity in the last two decades” (Carmen & Ramona (2009), p.388). This approach was defined by the three interest areas of Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea (Carmen & Ramona, 2009). These different regional approaches shared the common elements of peace, stability promotion of shared values, among which democracy, commercial development and integration (Carmen & Ramona, 2009). Up until today the most successful element of the EU’s foreign policy was the enlargement process, yet this cannot continue forever(Carmen & Ramona, 2009). At least nowadays there are, according to Carmen and Ramona, limits of the institutional system, a low level of social cohesion, weak European solidarity and identity, difficulties to balance and coordinate the national policies for the functioning of the internal market and achievement of joint objectives which are only the most visible aspects that draw attention to the fact that the European union has reached the critical point in the enlargement process (2009). Under these circumstances, the essential strategy aspect concerning the future of the EU is to find a system that can ensure the balance between the need to set the EU external limits and the provisions of the creating treaties which allow for any European state to apply for EU membership(Carmen & Ramona, 2009).

The answer might have been found in the European Neighbourhood Policy. As Reinhard quotes, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed in 2003 to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation” ( 2010, p.197). According to Reinhard the political conditionality used by the EU serves in this context both as a promising tool of the EU to promote democracy and a theoretical framework to explain causalities between the prospect of EU membership and a successful democratization process in the target country (Reinhard, 2010). Since conditionality is based on a “carrot and stick” mechanism, the membership perspective is assumed to be the only attractive “stick” (Reinhard, 2010). Yet, because the European Neighbourhood Policy does not offer a membership perspective critics argue that it cannot provide attractive incentives for political change and reforms and therefore fails to exert a real influence on the democratization process through conditionality (Reinhard, 2010). The proposed thesis will examine this assumption, analyze the impact of EU political conditionality on democracy in the ENP states and look at inhibiting and aiding factors of democratization which leads us to the proposed research questions and hypothesis.

2. Theory

2.1. Key Concepts and Hypotheses

The most important concepts that are going to be used for this thesis are EU political conditionality, democracy and democratization which will be explained in the following.
EU political conditionality:

In order to assess the impact of EU political conditionality on democratization in the ENP countries one first needs to understand the concept of conditionality itself. There is a difference in conditionality as used in the EU enlargement process and in the ENP. This difference will be further explained below.

So, what exactly is conditionality? According to Reinhard conditionality can be defined as an agreement between two actors in which actor 1 offers a reward to actor 2 who receives if it certain conditions are fulfilled (2010, p.200). If the conditions are not fulfilled by actor 2 the reward is either withheld (positive conditionality) or actor 2 is punished (negative conditionality) (Reinhard (2010), p.200). In order to exert conditionality as a reward-based policy between two actors there has to be asymmetric negotiation power in place meaning that actor 1 has to be able to offer incentives to actor 2 which actor 2 wants to have or cannot easily achieve in another manner (Reinhard (2010), p.200). This is also called the external incentives model. Conditionality then can be used to promote democracy in third countries by combining attractive rewards with certain conditions that lead to democratic development (Reinhard (2010), p.200).

However, conditionality as a political strategy depends on a number of conditions (Reinhard (2010), p.200). First, there have to be two actors in place with certain interests who are state governments or governmental international/regional organizations (Reinhard (2010), p.200). Secondly, these actors have to be capable of acting in general and capable of acting rationally on a reliable cost-benefit calculation (Reinhard (2010), p.200). The incentives that are offered by actor 1 are social or material, but have to be of attractiveness to actor 2 (Reinhard (2010), p.200).

In order to get a clearer picture of political conditionality let us take a look at the research done in the field of EU political conditionality with regard to the EU enlargement policy, so as also to assess the implications for answering this thesis’ research question: What is the impact of EU political conditionality on democracy within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy?

Researchers like Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, Engert and Knobel have dealt with the question of what conditionality is and how it helps democratization, extensively. The questions they asked referred to how and under which conditions the EU can be an effective promoter of democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe; what are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in the CEECs, and under which conditions it is most effective for the rule transfer of EU rules to the CEEC, and of course how does it work (Schimmelfenning, 2007; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003). Others like Freyburg and Richter have focused on the intervening factors of EU political conditionality, for example national identity.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier found out that rule transfer from the EU to the candidate states is best explained by an external incentives model of governance and Schimmelfenning argued that only the credible conditional promise of membership in the European Union has had the potential to produce compliance with the EU’s rules (2004,2007). However, this incentive was not sufficient when the power costs of compliance were high for the target government (Schimmelfennig, 2007).

Costs and commitment, even when being favourable to effective conditionality, did not help social influence to matter in rule transfer if it was not accompanied by an explicit linkage to EU membership and its material benefits (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003). Also, the degree of legitimacy
of European norms had no important influence on the effectiveness of conditionality in the target countries (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003).

“The previously mentioned cost-benefit balance depends on several factors such as the determinacy of conditions, the credibility of threats and promises as well as the size of adoption costs (Wibbeling, 2011).

Determinacy of conditions refers to the clarity and the formality of a rule (Wibbeling, 2011). In general the premise is that the clearer the behavioral meaning of a rule and the more legalized and legitimate it is to the target state, the higher its determinacy is going to be (Wibbeling, 2011). Determinacy is of great importance with regard to conditionality and because it helps the target governments to know what it is exactly what they have to do in order to receive the offered rewards (Wibbeling, 2011).

In addition to that determinacy functions as a signal to the target states and lets it know that it cannot avoid the adoption of EU rules by changing or manipulating to their advantage the interpretation of what exactly constitutes compliance (Wibbeling, 2011). Simultaneously determinacy binds the EU, since if a condition is determinate it is not as simple anymore to unjustly claim that it has not been fulfilled so that the EU could withhold the reward (Wibbeling, 2011).

Moreover, “One can assume that the clearer the conditions demand a specific transposition of EU rules into national rules and policy instruments, and the more explicit the EU demands their implementation, the higher the convergence will be on the part of the target governments with the EU” (Wibbeling (2011), p. 7).

In addition to that determinacy also enhances the credibility of conditionality (Wibbeling, 2011). So as to achieve compliance it is necessary that EU has high credibility in threatening to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance on the one hand and on the other hand that it also has high credibility in promising the delivery of the reward in case of compliance and rule adoption (Wibbeling, 2011).

“So for conditionality to be effective when following a strategy of reinforcement by reward one needs superior bargaining power of the EU, because otherwise threats would not be credible, and certainty about the payment of the rewards, because otherwise promises would not be credible.” (Wibbeling (2011), p.8,9). It is thus assumed that the likelihood of rule adoption increases with greater credibility of conditional threats and promises.

Schimmelfennig, moreover, shows that whereas political conditionality was largely unnecessary in the forerunner countries of democratization of the CEECs and generally ineffective with authoritarian regimes it proved to be highly effective in supporting democratic forces and locking in democratic reforms in unstable democratic countries (Schimmelfennig, 2007). To sum up his findings: credible EU membership perspective and low domestic political cost of meeting international conditions have been prerequisites of effective democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2007). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier additionally assert that EU conditionality might not be effective in achieving rule transfer in certain issue-areas or countries and there is furthermore no necessary causal link between the presence of EU conditionality and successful rule transfer in particular issue areas (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

Yet, it is important to point out that EU political is not redundant and Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel point out that it is hard to imagine that the reforms in Turkey and Latvia would have taken place without EU membership conditionality (2003).
Freyburg and Richter, in their analysis of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans with the example of media reform and prosecution of war crimes, furthermore showed empirically that national identity is another factor that influences the workings of conditionality (2008). National identity is thus a necessary condition for successful external democratization through political conditionality and when a state’s national identity contradicts the conditions linked to the benefit of an external incentive, the state will not or only inconsistently comply with these conditions independently of expected costs of adaption (Freyburg & Richter, 2008).

Another important factor for the working of conditionality is the safeguard clause.

“The European Union uses the safeguard clause, which allows for a one-year delay in the accession process in the event that the obligations for becoming member state are not met, to exert additional pressure on the candidate states and to emphasize the importance of fulfilling the conditions. In the accession process the safeguard clause can be the decisive factor in bringing about change in the candidate state and bringing it (back) on the road to membership.“ (Wibbeling (2011), p.9).

In case the safeguard clause is employed the targeted candidate country might speed up reforms and comply with the EU’s conditions more readily in order to receive the desired reward from the EU which in the case of enlargement is of course EU membership.

The question which remains is then if the EU can repeat the success of the enlargement policy’s conditionality approach within the European Neighborhood Policy without a credible membership perspective, where it might apply, and by using ex-ante conditionality, meaning that the rewards are paid out before the demands are taken care of and are only continued to be paid out if the demands are fulfilled.

What is more is that the above findings concerning the working and effectiveness of conditionality in the context of the enlargement policy are especially interesting with regard to the European Neighborhood Policy and this thesis since they give a possible outlook as to what the impact of conditionality in the ENP might be, but one has to bear in mind that the goal of this thesis is not to assess under which circumstances conditionality is effective, but rather what the assumed impact of it is on democratization.

In contrast to the European enlargement policy’s use of conditionality stands the ENP conditionality. Mocanu asserts that in the European Neighbourhood Policy, conditionality would be explained by “the possibility for the ENP partner states to benefit from ‘privileged relations’ with the Union, by an increased access to the EU Internal Market, depending on the concrete progress on sharing the European values and on the effective implementation of the economic and institutional reforms in these states” (Mocanu (2010), p.44). As he writes it is even mentioned in the ENP Strategy Paper (2004) that “any progress in the EU-partner states relation is conditioned by the latter’s commitment degree to the common values and the willingness and capacity to implement the agreed priorities” (Mocanu (2010), p.44).

The ENP incorporates elements of ex-post conditionality through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the assistance could be suspended if a partner country does not observe the democracy principles, rule of law, human rights or others (Mocanu (2010), p.44). The added value, so Mocanu, is represented by the ex-ante conditionality, through a permanent link between the development of further neighbourhood relations and the fulfillment of certain requirements or terms in the Action Plans (Mocanu (2010), p.44).
The European Union uses the Action Plans and the Progress reports to bring about and measure the progress made in certain beforehand agreed upon fields. Among these is the field of democracy. Therefore if one wants to measure the progress Egypt and Moldova made in terms of democratization it is important to define what democracy and democratization actually are.

**Democracy and Democratization:**

In the following the concepts of democracy and democratization as they will be used in the thesis will be defined, since in order to measure the progress the states dealt with in this thesis have made in terms of democratization, one first needs to have a working definition of these concepts.

What comes to mind when thinking of the concept of democracy? Probably the most famous words ever uttered in this regard are Abraham Lincoln’s “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Yet, the truth is there are many definitions of democracy and democracy itself is an essentially contested concept. According to Morlino there are six definitions of a political regime: general, procedural, genetic, minimum and normative (Baracani (2004), p.3). The most used definitions are procedural and minimal definitions. A procedural definition focuses on democratic procedures rather than on substantive policies or other outcomes that one might view as democratic (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). Minimal definitions of democracy then focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable definition (Collier & Levitsky, 1996).

Another widely used definition of democracy follows Schumpeter who equates democracy with elections (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). This approach, which may be called electoralism, defines democracy as holding elections with broad suffrage and the absence of massive fraud (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). Yet, according to many scholars elections do not constitute democracy without effective guarantees of civil liberties, and that one needs a procedural minimum for defining democracy which must not only include elections, but also reasonably broad guarantees of basic civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly and association (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). Furthermore, there exist definitions of democracy which go beyond the procedural minimum and several scholars have identified additional characteristics that must be present for these procedures to meaningfully constitute a democracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1996). Many scholars have added requirements as for example the power to effectively govern for a government this expanded procedural (minimum) definition of democracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1996).

However, in defining democracy there is always the danger of conceptual overstretching which leads to the concept suffering from conceptual validity. Collier and Levitsky come up with a number of strategies to avoid conceptual stretching with regard to the concept of democracy, but they first consider Sartori’s ladder of generality. “This ladder is based on a pattern of inverse variation between the number of defining attributes and number of cases. Thus, concepts with fewer defining attributes commonly apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of generality, whereas concepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and hence are lower on the ladder” (Collier & Levitzky (1997, p.434). Conceptual differentiation can be increased by moving down the ladder of generality to concepts that have a greater number of defining attributes and fit a narrower range of cases (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Moving down the ladder of generality also provides useful differentiation between the subtypes of democracy that one create by this move, e.g. parliamentary democracy or federal democracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Yet, exactly these subtypes may cause vulnerability to conceptual stretching, since it is presumed that the discussed cases are definitely democracies, but it might very well be the case that a particular case being studied is less than fully
democratic and then the use of these subtypes as a tool for conceptual differentiation may not be appropriate (Collier & Levitsky, 1997).

For this thesis the strategy put forward by Collier and Levitsky which is called precising the definition of democracy will be used (1997). This strategy precises the definition by adding defining attributes. However, one has to bear in mind that as the concept is extended to new settings one may be confronted with a particular case that is classified as a democracy on the basis of a commonly accepted definition, yet is not seen as fully democratic in the light of a larger shared understanding of the concept (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The innovation of precising the definition of democracy thus can increase conceptual differentiation by adding a further criterion for establishing the cutoff between democracy and nondemocracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Thus, this strategy may thereby also avoid conceptual stretching because it does not apply the label democracy to cases that the analyst views as incompletely democratic (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). An example of precising the definition mentioned by Collier and Levitsky is the emergence of the standard of an expanded procedural minimum. This thesis attempts to use such a procedural minimum which draws on Dahl’s suggested eight institutional guarantees for democracy: “liberty of association and organization, liberty of thinking and expression, right to vote, right of the political leaders to compete for the electoral support, alternative sources of information, possibility to be elected, free and fair elections, institutions that make the government policies depend on the vote” (Baracani, 2004), p. 4. To this list one should add, as Baracani did, the rule of law which includes not only the respect for existing laws, but also such things as “the realization of an efficient administration, the existing of an independent magistracy and of a working system to solve private and public conflicts, the absence of corruption and criminality, the presence of a pluralist system of information, 2004).

Thus, for this thesis the following indicators of democracy will be used. However, rather than measuring democracy with these indicators the progress on these indicators will be used to define democratization. Progress on these indicators does not mean that the concerned states of Moldova and Egypt are democracies. The concept of democratization will be explained further below.

1. Free, competitive and fair elections (including the right to vote)
2. Absence of corruption
3. Freedom of expression
4. Freedom of assembly
5. Freedom of religion
6. Trade union’s rights and core labour standards
7. Minority rights
8. Gender equality.

These indicators result from and draw on Dahl’s definition of democracy as well as on the perception of democratization by Freedom House and the European Union due to which they also include items not mentioned by Dahl, such as absence of corruption and trade union rights. Thus, in a sense this is an indicator driven definition of democracy. These nine indicators are sufficient to be able to measure progress in terms of democratization, but they are however not a perfect set of characteristics to classify the dealt with countries as e.g. liberal democracies and they do not suffice to put them into a category of a democratic or non-democratic regime. This will not be attempted in this thesis since there are many forms of democratic regimes, or as Diamond calls them, pseudodemocracies (2002).
Today more regimes than ever before are adopting the form of electoral democracy and hold regular, competitive, multiparty elections, but a many fail to meet a substantive test of democracy or do so only ambiguously and even with closer scrutiny like international elections observing, and closer international scrutiny of individual countries’ democratic practices, independent observers do not agree on how to classify regimes (Diamond, 2002). Among other things this lack of consensus on how to classify a regime has to do with the generality of the concept regime which entails a loss of conceptual differentiation (Collier & Levitzky, 1997). Many of the regimes that exist in the world are according to Diamond less than electoral democracies and what he terms competitive authoritarian systems, hegemonic-party systems or hybrid regimes of some kind (Diamond, 2002). Yet, there are also closed authoritarian regimes or full-scale authoritarian regimes, which contrast the pseudo-democratic regimes like electoral autocracy in the sense that in electoral democracies the existence of formally democratic political institutions like multiparty electoral competition masks the reality of authoritarian domination. (Diamond, 2002). These regimes are characterized by lacking an arena of contestation which is sufficiently open, free, and fair, so that that ruling party can be turned out of power if it is no longer preferred by a plurality of the electorate (Diamond, 2002). An electoral democracy on the other hand has these characteristics which next to formally democratic political institutions like multiparty electoral competition include open, free, and fair elections with the possibility of the opposition gaining power through turning the ruling party out of office. A liberal democracy then goes beyond this in the sense that it extends freedom, fairness, transparency, accountability and the rule of law from the electoral process into all major aspects of governance and interest articulation, competition, and representation (Diamond, 2002). However, when scrutinizing a regime one has to bear in mind that the regime types, of closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, electoral democracy and liberal democracy are only ideal types which probably do not exist in real life. For example even electoral and liberal democracies sometimes violate the rules and standards of democracy. Still, even when it is difficult to classify a certain type or regime one can observe the process of democratization.

Democratization:

How can one define democratization? Baracani here refers to Morlino according to whom democratization can be described as the transition from a non democratic political regime, especially an authoritarian one, to a different democratic regime which follows a process of instauration, consolidation and democratic quality (2004). Yet, democratization does not only consist of the transition phase. The three phases of democratization according to Schneider and Schmitter are liberalization, transition and consolidation (2004).

Liberalization can be defined as the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). Moreover, liberalization includes the exercising and respecting of the rule of law, meaning that individuals and groups are permitted by authorities to engage in certain forms of free behavior and a permanent commitment by the authorities not to engage in certain forms of coercive behavior (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). What liberalization according to Schneider and Schmitter does not connote is the right of citizens acting equally and collectively to hold their rulers accountable, including the possibility of the citizens removing their rulers from power by a pre-established procedure (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004).

What is meant with transition is an intermediate period in which a certain regime has lost some fundamental aspects of the authoritarian regime without having acquired all new characters of the new regime that might be set up (Baracani, 2004). Baracani asserts that the transition starts when basic civil
and political rights start to be recognized and one can view it as concluded when it is clear that that a democracy will be established of which the indicator are the first free, competitive and fair elections (2004).

The next phase of democratization is the consolidation of democracy. This is, so Schneider and Schmitter, is the process of inserting accountability to citizens into the political process (2004). In addition to that they define it as the processes that make mutual trust and reassurance among the relevant actors more likely which in turn makes regular competition for office and influence possible (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). It thus institutionalizes the willingness of actors to compete according to pre-established rules, and if they lose, to consent to the winners right to govern which is contingent upon the right of the losers to compete fairly and win honestly in the future (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004).

In this thesis it will however not be attempted to put the analyzed countries of Moldova and Egypt into a category of liberalization, transition or consolidation. Rather its goal is to measure the progress made in terms of democratization towards democracy.

The hypothesis one can develop while bearing in mind the existing research on the topic of conditionality and democratization with regard to the enlargement and European neighbourhood policy and the research question of “What is the impact of EU political conditionality on democratization within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, will be described in the following as well as the concepts related to them.

The first hypothesis is that since the European Neighbourhood policy does not offer a membership perspective, conditionality will not be effective and democratization will fail or in the words of Schimmelfennig:

“First, the absence of a membership perspective strongly reduces the external incentives of compliance. Second, almost all of the non-candidate neighboring countries are authoritarian or autocratic states. Thus, on the basis of the external incentives model and of the empirical results of studies on the candidate countries, the expectation is that EU political conditionality in the context of ENP will not be effective” (2005, p.11,12)

Yet, although the ENP has never offered a membership perspective the ‘prospect of accession to the EU’ is the main difference between the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood (Freyburg et al. (2011), p.1027). “The Eastern European countries, such as Moldova and Ukraine that have expressed a strong membership aspiration, and, despite the EU’s understanding that the ENP should be an alternative to membership, see the ENP as a first step towards accession and try to redefine it accordingly (Freyburg et al. (2011), p.1027). Furthermore according to Freyburg et al. EU actors recognize the membership aspiration of Moldova and acknowledge the membership perspective for Ukraine (Freyburg et al. (2011), p.1027). Therefore Freyburg asserts that although there is no direct membership incentive, we may expect the EU to possess a certain ‘leverage’ towards the Eastern European countries, inciting them to engage in political reforms in order to gain an officially favourable long-term accession perspective (Freyburg et al. (2011), p.1027). This leads to the second hypothesis: Even though the EU does not offer a membership perspective to the countries of the ENP their membership aspirations lead to a certain degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality towards them.

However, next to political conditionality there are other concepts and factors which might explain democratization in the states of the European Neighbourhood policy. These are among others linkage which includes and is interwoven with the civil society approach, socialization and domestic
empowerment and the governance or functional cooperation approach, economic exchange or the economic development and transnational exchange, the domestic situation, and the relationship to Russia. These will be explained in the following and will be controlled for in the analysis of the relationship between the EU and the states of Moldova and Egypt. Yet, there may even be more unknown factors influencing democratization which have not been considered in this thesis. However, first, we will take a look at leverage which is the political conditionality.

**Leverage:**

The leverage model foresees that the EU targets a third-country government with the aim of inducing it to introduce democratic change in state institutions and behavior (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The EU would do this by making use of political conditionality so as to produce the desired institutional reform. Conditionality as a concept will be explained much more as a concept below. It is important to note that leverage with the use of political conditionality is a top-down strategy of democracy promotion which however does little to foster a civic culture or to strengthen intermediary institutions such as civic associations or the public sphere (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Schimmelfennig and Lavenex also assert that even if leverage is successful as a democracy promotion strategy and thusly contributes to a formally functioning democracy this would however not necessarily be underpinned by a democratic culture and civil society (2011).

**Linkage:**

According to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig the transnational linkage model is based on two pillars: on the direct democracy promotion support for democratic civil society and political opposition groups, and on the indirect democracy promotion through intensive transnational exchanges with democratic countries (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The role of the external actor which in this case would be the EU, then consists of enabling and empowering societal, non-governmental actors to work for the democratization of their home country from below (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Linkage is thus a bottom-up approach. The direct support mentioned earlier can be material or educational and in this way the EU may give money to pro-democratic civil society organizations or parties or for instance provide them with infrastructure or organize meetings and seminars, and conferences to help these societal actors to improve their strategies and their cooperation (Schimmelfennig & Lavenex, 2011).

**Transnational exchange** the second pillar of the linkage model asserts that democracy promotion may also come from transnational relations such as cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least on actor is non-governmental (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007). The channels and instruments of transnational exchange can be very diverse and can on the one hand compromise trade and investment, but also on the other hand, personal interactions through various means of communication, tourism, academic exchanges, and cultural informational influences via the media, churches, or cultural performances (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007). Additionally are the effects of these interactions and exchanges on democratization diverse as well and some of them are direct and short-term, having an immediate impact on the pro- and anti-democratic political forces’ struggle in the country whereas other effects work indirectly and in the long term (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007). Examples are newspapers and broadcasts from abroad and external financial and technical support for the opposition on the one hand or the intensification of trade, a visa-free traveling regime, academic exchanges which can bring people from established democracies into contact with people from non-democratic countries, facilitating the spread of ideas and increasing the level of education and constituting a channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favor democratization (Schimmelfennig
& Scholtz, 2007). Therefore one can hypothesize that the level of democracy increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international environment (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2007).

What is also noteworthy about the indirect channel of linkage is that it is broadly related to the modernization account of democratization (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig refer here to Seymour Martin Lipset who studied the societal conditions that support democracy and identified economic development which can be broadly understood as a syndrome of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education as the most important one (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011).

Economic development in third countries then may be promoted by the EU by increasing trade relations, investment and development aid, so as to contribute to democracy-conducive wealth in general (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Economic development supposedly goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a large middle-class, and a competent civil service, thereby mitigating the class struggle and promoting cross-cutting cleavages or in Lipset’s words: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008). One can thus hypothesize that the level of democracy in a country increases with the level of economic development (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008).

The interfering external influence factor by other international actors:

There are several items in the relationship between Russia and the EU’s neighbors that may play a deterring role or an accelerating role in the accession path of Moldova. These factors will be discussed in this section and can be summed up under the title “interfering external influence factor”. Yet, one has to bear in mind that the interfering external influence on the democratization efforts of the EU come from Russia in the case of Moldova and from the United States in the case of Egypt.

In the case of Moldova what is important are:

- **Societal Relations with Russia.** For states like Ukraine or Moldova which are politically and economically closely related to Russia and have a large number of Russian people living in their country and also have close historic, cultural and social ties, the social costs of EU integration are much higher than for other countries (Reinhard, 2010).

- **Economic Relations with Russia/ Access to Energy.** Over the past years states as Ukraine and Russia have been playing power games over gas prices which lead to various clashes and at times even disrupted the supply of gas to the rest of Europe (Verdun & Chira, 2011). Russia’s gas gets imported at a considerably lower price to these states than to the rest of Europe and one can see a certain economic dependence on Russia since the reselling of these gas and oil imports can make up a great part of the GDP of these states and thus leads to wealth in these countries which otherwise would not be there. Hence, there is an interplay between the Russian factor and the economic development in these countries.

Overall, the EU cannot prevent these countries from relying on other sources such as those from a relationship to Russia, to deal with their economic and social problems (Verdun & Chira, 2011). In this way cooperation with Russia can easily result in Russia asserting influence on these countries affairs (Verdun & Chira, 2011). Verdun and Chira refer to Popescu and Wilson who stress that EU
should understand that if it does not actively help its Eastern Partners to solve their problems, Russia will (2011).

In the case of Egypt the situation is assumed to be similar. In any case one can due to the interfering external influence factor hypothesize that *the weaker the influence of an external actor like Russia or the USA is over an ENP country the more likely it is that EU democratization efforts will be successful.*

To sum up, as one can see in figure 1, EU political conditionality, transnational linkages, interfering external actors (states), economic development and possibly other factors may have an influence on democratization in the ENP states of Moldova and Egypt.

Figure 1: Factors influencing democratization:

2.2. Research Methodology

In the following the methodology used for the thesis will be presented and explained. Accordingly the research design will be presented, including possible shortcomings.

The suggested research will make use of a case study of the Eastern European state of Moldova and the African state of Egypt who are both part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, in order to answer the mentioned research questions of:

1. What is the impact of EU political conditionality on democracy in the ENP and how does it help democratization in the states of the ENP?

The approach taken for this case study is Mill’s method of agreement or in other words a most different design and hence includes purposeful sampling of cases which will be explained further below (Clark, Golder & Golder, 2009, Gerring, 2007). By using the method of agreement one compares very different cases which nonetheless have in common the same dependent variable. Thus, variation on X values is welcomed and variation on Y is avoided (Gerring, 2007). Accordingly in the ideal case one would discover a single X that remains constant across the two chosen cases which would then signal a causal relationship unless by definition absence of a certain factor e.g. absence of
transnational linkages in both countries, does not lead to democracy or unless presence of a certain factor, e.g. presence of interfering external influence does not lead to democracy.

Table 1: The Most-Different Method (example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>X1</th>
<th>X2</th>
<th>X3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This method is, however, more useful in eliminating possible causes than in providing positive proof of a causal argument. Therefore one might be able to eliminate economic development as a necessary cause of democracy, since the two hypothetical cases differ in this aspect, but without any variation on Y any positive conclusions about causation are especially vulnerable to the problem of causal comparison or in other words the omitted variable bias (Gerring, 2007). That means that although one may be able to eliminate certain possible causal factors it will still be difficult to conclude that the only remaining constant variable is the single cause of X only because it is the only hypothesis left over (Gerring, 2007). The reason for this is that it will always be possible that some other explanatory factor has not been included, because it is not apparent or because it is difficult to measure, and that this omitted variable is the key explanatory factor for democracy (Gerring, 2007).

Another weakness of the method of agreement is that one might be unable to eliminate all-but-one possible cause since cases with the same outcome are quite likely to be similar in other aspects as well (Gerring, 2007). For example, as in a hypothetical cases, two countries may both have strong transnational linkages and as well as they show response to political conditionality, so that none of these possible causes can be safely eliminated (Gerring, 2007). Therefore the method of agreement may be able to indicate which of a number of factors are insufficient, but it may not tell us too much about which argument is right (Gerring, 2007). Furthermore, there might be measurement errors which cause us to incorrectly eliminate of fail to eliminate a potential cause for the outcome we seek to explain (Clark, Golder & Golder, 2009). Exactly because of this we should not claim that e.g. economic development causes or does not cause democratization based on empirical evidence, since the instruments employed are imperfect and in general as well as in this thesis the indicators chosen to for example measure economic development or democratization may not perfectly fit the used concept of economic development or democratization (Clark et al., 2009). Given the likelihood of measurement error one would only be able to claim that for example economic development increases the probability that a country will be democratic (Clark et al., 2009) Moreover, there might be interaction effects between the independent variables and it thus might be the case that multiple causes lead to the common outcome (Clark et al., 2009). In addition to that we cannot be certain that all instances of the phenomenon that could have occurred have been observed and therefore the generalizability of our findings is restricted.

To come back to the case selection, the choice of Moldova is justified by its geographical proximity to the European Union, the possibility of a membership perspective of this state since it is located on the European continent unlike the other choice of the African state of Egypt and because Moldova belongs to the most advanced states participating in the ENP or as Freyburg et al. put it:
“These countries are among the most active and advanced participants in the ENP and are characterized as ‘willing partners’. At least until the 2011 revolutions, within their respective regions, these countries were the most politically liberalized” (2011, p.1032).

On the independent variable I chose factors influencing democratization, like EU political conditionality or economic development or the membership perspective which will be explained in more detail below. On the dependent variable I chose democratization which is assumed to be similar for both countries, Moldova and Egypt.

Furthermore, although there is no direct membership incentive for Moldova one may expect the EU to have a certain leverage towards this country, inducing political reforms in order to gain an officially long-term accession perspective, because it has expressed strong membership aspirations (Freyburg et al., 2011). Thus, even though the membership perspective is not a real one for Moldova and the EU has not offered it a membership perspective it is Moldova’s EU membership aspirations which create a fictive membership perspective for it and which leads the Moldovan government to hope that if it fulfills the EU’s demands, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria, will turn into a real membership perspective in the long run or as Freyburg et al. (2011, p.1027) put it a “favourable long-term accession perspective” or in other words Moldova at the moment has a “perspective of a perspective” which means that referring to the EU treaties Moldova could technically become an EU member state in the future but has not been offered such a perspective by the EU so far (Raik, 2011, p.11) Yet, if one then takes a look at the Southern neighbours of the EU, the situation is completely different, since they do not aspire to become members and cannot because they are not European states, and thus the EU does not offer strong incentives for implementation of agreed commitments (Freyburg et al., 2011). Therefore when trying to answer the question of how large the assumed impact of EU political conditionality on the dealt with states is, the prospects of policy change are to be expected much smaller for the Southern neighbors than for the Eastern (Freyburg et al., 2011). As, Freyburg et al. put it, there should in particular be less change with regard to governance reforms that transcend the level of pure technical convergence to EU standards (2011). Thus, the authors expect a clear dividing line between transfer of democratic governance in the East and in the South. Due to these consideration, this study will focus on the Eastern European state of Moldova since here one can rather expect democratization and policy change due to EU involvement and it will focus on the state of Egypt in the Southern Neighbourhood of the EU where incentives are less and the membership incentive, the strongest of them all, is not visible at all.

For the method of agreement to work in this comparative case study it will be assumed that the outcome to be explained which is democratization is the same for both, even though there are good reasons to assume that these two countries are not in the same phase of democratization, even before the analysis is conducted.

The case study will include an analysis of the progress reports of Moldova and Egypt of the years 2008 and 2012 which cover the time period from 2007 till 2011 in terms of the effectiveness of conditionality since democratization processes are believed to take quite some time and therefore at time period of 5 years should make it more likely to actually observe change. This time period is chosen, because it includes the first progress reports of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2008) till the last progress reports (2012) at the time of writing. The effectiveness of conditionality will be inferred by how much progress the respective country has made on becoming a democracy. This in turn will be measured by referring to Dahl’s eight institutional of democracy: “liberty of association and organization, liberty of thinking and expression, right to vote, right of the political leaders to compete for the electoral support, alternative sources of information, possibility to be elected, free and
fair elections, institutions that make the government policies depend on the vote” (Baracani (2004), p. 4). Additionally to this reference is taken to the rule of law which includes not only the respect for existing laws, but also such things as “the realization of an efficient administration, the existing of an independent magistracy and of a working system to solve private and public conflicts, the absence of corruption and criminality, the presence of a pluralist system of information(2004, p. 4).

Thus, for this thesis the following indicators of democracy will be used. However, rather than measuring democracy with these indicators the progress on these indicators will be used to define democratization. Progress on these indicators does not mean that the concerned states of Moldova and Egypt are democracies.

1. Free, competitive and fair elections (including the right to vote )
2. Absence of corruption
3. Freedom of expression
4. Freedom of assembly
5. Freedom of religion
6. Trade union’s rights and core labour standards
7. Minority rights
8. Gender equality
9. The rule of law/Independent judiciary

These indicators result from and draw on Dahl’s definition of democracy as well as on the perception of democratization by Freedom House and the European Union due to which they also include items not mentioned by Dahl, such as absence of corruption and trade union rights. Thus, in a sense this is an indicator driven definition of democracy. These nine indicators are sufficient to be able to measure progress in terms of democratization, but they are however not a perfect set of characteristics to classify the dealt with countries as e.g. liberal democracies and they do not suffice to put them into a category of a democratic or non-democratic regime. This will not be attempted in this thesis since there are many forms of democratic regimes, or as Diamond calls them, pseudodemocracies (2002).

In the progress reports I will look for the aforementioned items and thus asses if the specific state has made progress on these terms.

Moreover there will be an analysis of conditionality and the relationship between these states and the EU based on a literature review, thus qualitative data analysis. In this I will look for the aforementioned indicators of democracy and democratization, but also for the possible influence of other factors of democratization other than conditionality. These are: linkage with the subcategories of transnational exchange and economic development, governance and the ‘Russian factor’.

The strength of analyzing the progress reports will be that one can see what the EU expects from its Eastern neighbors and what benefits they get, but also by comparing these reports if there has been any progress on democratization so far. A weakness of this approach is that one cannot be certain that the changes observed and mentioned in the progress reports are actually due to the ENP conditionality or due to other circumstances. This is where the literature review comes in play. With the help of other author’s sources and qualitative date from Freedom house reports one can manage to paint a picture of the EU relationship to its neighboring states and the domestic situation and thus one can conclude what other factors might have had, and still might have an effect on democratization in the future. By referring to multiple sources for each country I hope to avoid drawing a one sided picture of the political realities and actually give an account of the situation within the countries that is unbiased and not based on only one authors observations and opinion.
3. Operationalization

In order to assess and give an answer to the earlier mentioned hypotheses one needs to be able to measure the concepts mentioned in the hypotheses. The operationalization of the concepts related to democracy will be done in the following part.

First we need to answer the question of how one can measure the effectiveness of conditionality and democratization. These two are intertwined in the way that the effectiveness of conditionality will be measured by its success to promote democratization which in turn will be measured by the 9 aforementioned items of Dahl and Baracani plus the sufficient items which show a transition to democracy which are: basic civil and political rights start to be recognized and one can view it as concluded when it is clear that that a democracy will be established of which the indicator are the first free, competitive and fair elections. For this purpose the European Union’s Commission Progress Reports of 2008(first progress report) till 2012(last progress report) about Moldova and Egypt will be evaluated and compared to the results of the evaluation of the Freedom House reports of the same years. The time frame 2008-2012 is chosen to have a time span of as many years as possible since it is expected that democratization processes are very slow in general and take time to develop and because in 2008 the first progress reports were issued and at the time of writing the last ones were issued in 2012.

For this thesis the following aforementioned indicators will be used in order to measure progress in terms of democratization.

1. Free, competitive and fair elections (including the right to vote)
2. Absence of corruption
3. Freedom of expression
4. Freedom of assembly
5. Freedom of religion
6. Trade union’s rights and core labour standards
7. Minority rights
8. Gender equality.

In the evaluation of the progress on democratization positive progress receives a “+” sign whereas regression or lack of progress receives a “-” sign. If the progress on the item was moderate it receives a “+/−” sign. The assessment is based on a subjective evaluation of the EU progress reports and the Freedom House reports.

These indicators result from and draw on Dahl’s definition of democracy as well as on the perception of democratization by Freedom House and the European Union due to which they also include items not mentioned by Dahl, such as absence of corruption and trade union rights and the rule of law/independent judiciary which are not explicitly included in Dahl’s definition of democracy. Thus, in a sense this is an indicator driven definition of democracy.

Whereas the EU progress reports are written up and conducted by an intergovernmental or rather supranational organization the Freedom House reports are written and the research conducted by an
independent nongovernmental organization. The Freedom House reports are being used as an additional independent source of information concerning the democratization process in order to balance out any possibly existing bias against the dealt with countries on the side of the EU and to get a better overall picture of the democratization process in these countries in general.

They are sufficient to be able to measure progress in terms of democratization, but they are however not a perfect set of characteristics to classify the dealt with countries as e.g. liberal democracies and they do not suffice to put them into a category of a democratic or non-democratic regime. This will not be attempted in this thesis since there are many forms of democratic regimes, or as Diamond calls them, pseudodemocracies (2002). Moreover one has to bear in mind that some indicators like freedom of expression might be more important for democracy than others like gender equality. I, however, abstain from making this judgment and a weighing of items crucial to democracy in the sense of modern liberal democracy in this thesis and regard all the indicators as equally important for reasons of simplification.

Next we need to be able to measure transnational linkages. Since this is very difficult to measure in numbers this paper will rely on qualitative data, that is accounts of transnational exchanges between the ENP countries and democratic countries in its international environment which is mainly the EU in this case. Transnational exchange than can be measured by the number and strength of items such as for example cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least on actor is non-governmental trade and investment, personal interactions through various means of communication, tourism, academic exchanges, and cultural informational influences via the media, churches, or cultural performances, newspapers and broadcasts from abroad and external financial and technical support for the opposition on the one hand or the intensification of trade or a visa-free traveling regime.

In order to get a complete picture of the effect of transnational linkages on democratization one would also have to be able to measure the impact of the support the EU gives to democratic civil society and political opposition groups. For this one can evaluate the National Indicative Programs of 2007-2010 of the EU for Moldova and Egypt, but the conclusions drawn from this would have limited generalization and would have to be put in relative terms since in order to get a clearer picture one would have to analyze all National Indicative Programs that have been issued under the ENP to any ENP country.

Furthermore we need to be able to measure economic development in order to assess its impact on democracy. For this paper the level of economic development will be measured by income, measured as gross domestic product per capita in the time period from 2008 till 2011(last available data at time of writing), and by the progress and ranking on the Human Development Index in the same time period.

Moreover we need to be able to measure the Russian or American influence over a third country. This can be done in two ways: by measuring the political and the economic influence. Out of these two the political influence is much more difficult to assess and thus the assessment will be left to accounts from different authors and be summed up in a literature review. The economic influence can be measured in terms of import/export trade values in US $ between Russia and the third country.

4. The European Neighbourhood Policy in General

First before addressing the research questions and hypothesis in this paper it is necessary to familiarize oneself with the European Neighbourhood policy and to know what it is and how it works. This will be done in the following part. For this reference is taken to the Commission’s internet presence.
The Commission states that: “The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all” (Commission, 2010). Furthermore the ENP framework is only proposed to 16 of the EU’s closest neighbors: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine (Commission, 2010). The focus on this paper will lie on the Eastern neighbor of Moldova and the Southern neighbour Egypt. The European Neighbourhood Policy was first outlined in the Commission Communication on “Wider Europe” in March 2003 and was followed by a Strategy Paper on the “European Neighbourhood Policy” in May 2004 (Commission, 2010). This strategy sets out how the EU proposes to work more closely with the countries which it considers its neighbors (Commission, 2010).

The ENP is mainly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country but it is further enriched with regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, namely the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea Synergy (Commission, 2010).

Within the ENP the EU offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values such as democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development (Commission, 2010). Furthermore the ENP goes beyond existing relationships to these states by offering political association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more people-to-people contacts (Commission, 2010).

What is important to note is that the ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudice, for the European neighbors, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions (Commission, 2010).

“Central to the ENP are the bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner (12 of them were agreed). These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years. Following the expiration of the first Action Plans succession documents are being adopted. The ENP is not yet fully ‘activated’ for Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria since those have not agreed Action Plans” (Commission, 2010).

What is more is that the implementation of the ENP is jointly promoted and monitored through the Committees and sub-Committees established in the frame of these agreements (Commission, 2010). The Commission also publishes each year the ENP progress reports (Commission, 2010).

Now that we know what the European Neighbourhood policy is we will take a closer look at how it works according to the Commission.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has among its objectives to build an increasingly closer relationship with its neighbors, a zone of stability, security and prosperity for all (Commission, 2010). Then the EU and each ENP partner country reach an agreement on reform objectives across a wide range of fields within certain common areas such as cooperation on political and security issues, to economic and trade matters, mobility, environment, integration of transport and energy networks or scientific and cultural cooperation (Commission, 2010). The EU accordingly provides financial and technical assistance to support the implementation of these objectives, in support of the partners own efforts (Commission, 2010).
In the beginning of the ENP the Commission prepared Country reports assessing the political and economic situation as well as institutional aspects and sectoral aspects in order to assess when and how it would be possible to deepen relations with that country (Commission, 2010).

In the next stage ENP Action Plans were developed for each country which are documents that are negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, based on the country’s needs and capacities as well as their and the EU’s interests (Commission, 2010). These documents jointly defined an agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term priorities of about 3-5 years (Commission, 2010). They covered political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade related issues, and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, sectors such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) and a human dimension in terms of items such as people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health, etc. (Commission, 2010). For change and progress on these items the EU would offer incentives such as greater integration into European programmes and networks, increase assistance and enhanced market access (Commission, 2010). At the moment twelve such ENP Action Plans are being implemented (Commission, 2010). The implementation of the reforms is furthermore supported through various forms of EC-funded financial and technical assistance which includes instruments that according to the Commission have proven successful in supporting reforms in Central, Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe, but also new instruments such as the Neighbourhood investment Facility (NIF) (Commission, 2010). Certain sub-committees within each country monitor the implementation of the mutual commitments and objectives contained in the Action Plans. Since May 2009 the Commission issued and adopted 12 progress reports on the implementation of the ENP (Commission, 2010).

After having taken a look at how the European Neighbourhood Policy works according to the EU we will now turn to the empirical part of this paper, starting with scrutinizing the progress made with regard to democratization in Moldova and Egypt in order to find out what the impact of EU conditionality on democratization is in those countries.

5. Analysis

In the following analysis part of the thesis the assumed impact of EU political conditionality on democratization in Moldova and Egypt will be measured. This is done by taking reference to the European Union Progress reports of the European Neighbourhood Policy and by taking reference to the Freedom House country reports on freedom in the world. The reports are respectively taken from the years 2008 till 2012 covering a time period form 2007-2011 respectively.

Moreover the analysis includes other factors that might have an influence on democratization in the aforementioned countries. This is done so as to be able to rule out these factors influence on democratization and to be more certain that EU political conditionality is the decisive factor or not. The alternative factors for democratization that will be analyzed are transnational linkages, economic development, and interfering external influence by other international actors.
5.1. Evaluation of EU political conditionality in Moldova and Egypt based on democratization

5.1.1. Moldova

In 2003/2004 when the EU developed its new European Neighbourhood policy and when Moldova made European integration its main foreign policy objective the EU’s reaction to Moldova’s European aspirations was simply to acknowledge them without taking any further steps (Verdun & Chira, 2008). What followed was the accession of Romania to the EU which made Moldova a new neighbor of the EU and Moldova officially acquired the status of ‘neighbor’ with the EU in the newly launched ENP (Verdun & Chira, 2008). Consequently on 22 February 2005 Moldova and the EU signed an ENP Action Plan (EURMAP) which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s own programme for democratic and economic reform. This Action Plan invites Moldova to:

“enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. One of the key objectives will be to further support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict” (Verdun & Chira, 2008, p. 433).

The EURMAP was at the centre of the government’s domestic reform programme and among its aims is the facilitation of Moldova’s transition to democracy and market economy by strengthening institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights so as to help democratize Moldova (Verdun & Chira, 2008). Other aims of EURMAP are promoting economic reform and improving living conditions and the strengthening of institutions and reform of judiciary (Verdun & Chira, 2008). Therefore one can say that the programme resembles one designed to ensure a state capacity that can cope with enlargement-like conditionality (Verdun & Chira, 2008).

Today the most important documents in the EU–Moldova relation are the Progress Reports issued by the Commission as discussed in the section above.

What is noteworthy and important is that according to Verdun and Chira is that the EU–Moldova Action Plan of (2005-2007) showed Moldova’s full commitment to an irreversible European integration policy (Verdun & Chira, 2008). Moreover Moldova allegedly engaged itself on a one-way European path, by intensely implementing political and economic reforms despite the vagueness of the European promise, which offered no membership assertion (Verdun & Chira, 2008).

Today the most important document in the EU–Moldova relation is the EU–Moldova Action Plan and of course the Progress Reports issued by the Commission as discussed in the section above. Both types documents will be analyzed now with reference to the workings of conditionality, its effect on democratization and alternatives to EU political conditionality in the ENP. It is important to first analyze the Action Plan in order to be able to judge the progress indicated in the Progress Reports which will be analyzed subsequently.

The EU-Moldova Action Plan 2007 and democratization:

According to this Action Plan Moldova is invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU (Commission, 2007). Moreover will the level of ambition of the relationship between the EU and Moldova depend on the degree of Moldova’s commitment to
common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities (Commission, 2007). The Action Plan covers a timeframe of three years.

In this Action Plan the EU offers Moldova a new partnership perspective. The EU offers incentives for political reform such as the efforts of democratization or more concretely for: further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law; ensuring the democratic conduct of parliamentary elections in Moldova in accordance with European standards; ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and the freedom of expression and further reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity (Commission 2007). The incentives are for example in more detail: a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the possibility for Moldova to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes, the opening of economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers which will stimulate investment and growth, increased financial support through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a deepening of trade and economic relations, and establishing a constructive dialogue on visa co-operation between the EU and Moldova.

Noticeable here is that not only the demands of the EU are rather vague (What exactly does it mean to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law), but that also the incentives or rewards for such actions are rather vague at times (e.g. what does deepening trade and economic relations mean in concrete terms?). This offers an opportunity to take another look at the six conditions that need to be taken into account when assessing the promise of conditionality to promote democracy. The incentives are certainly attractive to Moldova since for example a stake in the Internal Market of the EU and opening the economies to each other can only be beneficial for Moldova. What we can say about credibility is rather limited. We can however assume that the EU’s carrots and sticks are real since it seems based on the EU enlargement process willing to realize and withhold the incentive in accordance with the democratic performance of Moldova. If there are clear measurable criteria and evaluation mechanisms will be dealt with further on in this paper. Low adoption costs and lack of alternatives as well as asymmetries in negotiations in favor of the EU and the condition that interests of important stakeholders and veto players should not be harmed cannot be assessed only based on the Action plan.

For now we will take a look at the demands of the EU towards Moldova in the area of democracy and the rule of law as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The EU demands to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law which means that Moldova has to ensure the correct functioning of the Parliament and to ensure the democratic conduct of Parliamentary Elections as well as to continue administrative reform and strengthening local self government in line with European standards (Commission, 2004). Next, the EU demands that Moldova review existing legislation in order to assure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, that it ensure the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and that it ensure respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms including rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in line with European standards (Commission, 2004). Furthermore Moldova is required to develop and implement an appropriate legal framework for the prevention of, and for the fight against, the trafficking in human beings. What is more is that the EU wants Moldova to eradicate ill-treatment and torture, ensure respect of children’s rights, ensure equal treatment of men and women, ensure respect for freedom of expression, ensure respect for the freedom of association and foster the development of civil society, ensure respect for Trade Union’s rights and core labour standards, and ensure international Justice through the International Criminal Court (Commission, 2007). What is
striking here is that the requirements at first hand value are rather vague, yet they are always followed by more precise demands or instructions. Take the example of:

“(5) Develop and implement an appropriate legal framework for the prevention of, and the fight against, the trafficking in human beings, and for addressing the problems faced by victims of trafficking

- Revision of anti-trafficking law, including the relevant elements of the new criminal and criminal procedure codes, to bring it fully in line with international human rights standards;
- Enhance cooperation in the framework of relevant international organisations (OSCE, UN) on this issue; Ratify relevant international instruments, such as the UN convention against transnational organised crime (“Palermo convention”) and its Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children “,

which exactly tells the Moldova authorities what to do and what standards to apply to the making of their own legislation (Commission (2004), p. 7,8).

Now that we have scrutinized the EU – Moldova Action Plan with reference to democracy and democratization demands we can move on to the EU Progress Reports issued by the Commission and the “freedom in the world” reports issued by Freedom House, in order to find out if actual progress has been made on the aforementioned items and if conditionality which is the main instrument of the EU towards Moldova had any effect.

The EU Progress reports and the success of EU political conditionality

In this part the EU progress reports on Moldova will be evaluated with regard to progress on the aforementioned nine indicators which indicated democratization and to infer the success of EU political conditionality to bring about democratization.

*Free competitive and fair elections:*

Over the time period from 2007 till 2011 Moldova held several parliamentary elections as well as local elections. Overall there was an improvement in the conduct of the parliamentary elections. Whereas the local elections of 2007 and the parliamentary elections of 2009 were well administered and offered a genius choice, but also showed shortcomings regarding the right of the citizens to seek public office as well as shortcomings regarding equitable media access for all candidates, the November 2010 parliamentary elections met most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and the media ensured that a broad range of political views and election information was available to the electorate (Commission, 2008, 2010, 2011). The 2011 local elections confirmed the improvement of the electoral environment (the Election Code had been amended), in line with some of the recommendations of the OSCE (Commission, 2012).

*Absence of corruption:*

Even though the ranking of the Republic of Moldova in the Transparency International 2011 corruption perception index fell from 105th place in 2010 to 112th in 2011 the Moldova made some efforts to fight corruption (Commission,2012). The government adopted the National Action Plan on fighting corruption for 2007-2009 ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007 as well as
the additional protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention (Commission, 2008). Moreover due to Moldova’s national strategy and action plan 2007-2009 on fighting corruption, important anti-corruption laws entered into force or were adopted so that in its December 2008 Compliance Report, the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that significant progress had been achieved on its recommendations to Moldova (Commission, 2009). In addition to that anti-corruption awareness-raising and education campaigns were carried out, the Centre for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption turned operational (Commission, 2010). However, about a quarter of the recommendations made by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) have still to be implemented (Commission, 2012). Overall, one can say that there was mixed progress with regard to absence of corruption.

**Freedom of expression:**

According to the Commission the situation with regard to freedom of expression and media pluralism improved (2011). Proof of this is a new law on Freedom of Expression which was adopted in April 2010 and is largely in line with OSCE recommendations (Commission, 2011). Yet, judicial practice did not catch up with the recent legislative improvements and media thus did not enjoy the level of protection guaranteed by law (Commission, 2012).

**Freedom of assembly:**

There has been an improvement with regard to Freedom of assembly according to the Commission. In 2010 the number of violations on the right to peaceful assembly fell and by 2011 became the exception (Commission, 2011, 2012). The law provides a guarantee to the freedom of association and assembly (Commission, 2012).

**Freedom of religion:**

In the time period from 2007 till 2011 religion became an optional class in school, the law on religious organisations was adopted by parliament and religious activity by foreign citizens in public places was explicitly allowed in 2010 even though the Commission noted in 2012 that, limitation on the rights of foreigners to practice religion is not in conformity with European and international standards (Commission, 2011, 2012). What is more, is that members of religious communities can generally practice their religion freely and without fear of undue government interference (Commission, 2011). Yet, the Commission, noted that there remains a certain ambiguity in the legal framework potentially hindering the right of all people to practice their religion or belief, alone or in community, with others, in public or in private, regardless of their registration status (Commission, 2012). Thus, one can conclude that, overall, progress was made as regards freedom of religion.

**Trade union’s rights and core labour standards:**

The Republic of Moldova ratified 38 ILO Conventions, yet, with limited progress in their implementation since the government signed the ILO Decent Work Country Programme in 2006 (Commission, 2008). Moreover on trade unions’ rights and core labour standards, some but not all required amendments to the legislation on labour disputes have been adopted (Commission, 2009). Thus, limited progress had been made in this regard.

**Minority rights:**

In 2006, the Moldovan government adopted the Action plan to support the Roma population for the period 2007-2010 (Commission, 2008). Even though a law on preventing and combating
discrimination was not adopted and a number of groups (including Roma, persons living with HIV/AIDS, and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender persons) continued to suffer from discrimination limited progress has been made on the protection of minorities (Commission, 2011). The government put in place Roma Community mediators, with the help of UNICEF and the Council of Europe, and adopted an Action Plan on Roma Inclusion 2011-2015 (Commission, 2012).

Gender equality:

In 2010 the government started implementing a National Programme on gender equality and a related medium-term plan for the time period of 2010-2012 (Commission, 2011).

Still, women continued to be under-represented in both the central and local governments, even though the number of female mayors slightly increased following the local elections and even though gender equality is ensured and promoted by law, women continue to face substantial discrimination in practice, including high levels of unemployment and deep-rooted stereotypes. (Commission, 2009, 2010, 2012).

The rule of law/Independent judiciary:

Mixed progress can be reported regarding the rule of law. Concerning this Moldova adopted a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for reforming its judicial system, the capacities of the Supreme Council of Magistracy were consolidated and a Department for Judicial Administration, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, was created and started operating in 2008 (Commission, 2008).

Yet, the amendments to the Law on the Superior Council of Magistrates do not comply with Council of Europe recommendations and were considered as a significant step backwards in the judiciary reform process by the Commission (2010). Moreover, an action plan for implementing the judicial reform was approved in 2009 (Commission, 2010).

Other steps that were taken to improve the justice system and strengthen the rule of law include the amendment of the Law on the Status of Judges to increase judges’ responsibility (Commission, 2011). In addition to that another comprehensive justice sector reform strategy was adopted in October 2011, and the related Action Plan was approved by parliament in February 2012. (Commission, 2012).

Overall, after evaluating the EU progress reports one can say that the progress Moldova has made with regard to democratization has been positive, even though in some fields progress was mixed or limited, e.g. in the field of minority rights or gender equality, and in this regards works remains to be done.

The Freedom House “freedom in the world” reports and the success of EU political conditionality

In the following part the Freedom House “freedom in the world” reports will be analyzed in order to evaluate the progress made on the aforementioned nine indicators which will be used to indicated democratization and to infer the success of EU political conditionality to bring about democratization.
Free, competitive and fair elections:

According to Freedom House domestic and international observers viewed the November 2010 elections as a substantial improvement over the 2009 elections referring to a more open and diverse media environment, impartial and transparent administration by the Central Election Commission, and a lack of restrictions on campaign activities. Yet, some problems were also reported, including flaws in the voter list, unbalanced distribution of overseas polling sites, and isolated cases of intimidation (FH, 2011). The local elections in June 2011 were also assessed positively (FH, 2012). Thus, one can say that there has been progress with regard to free, competitive and fair elections in Moldova during the decade period from 2007-2011.

Absence of corruption:

According to Freedom House corruption remains a major problem in Moldova. There has been no major progress in this regard. Moldova was ranked 109 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index and was ranked 112 out of 183 countries in 2011 (FH, 2009, 2012).

Freedom of expression:

According to Freedom House the media environment improved following the 2009 change in government and in 2010, the public broadcaster, Teleradio-Moldova, grew more impartial and two new private satellite television channels added to the diversity of national news coverage. (FH, 2011).

Freedom of assembly:

There has been progress with regard to freedom of assembly. Freedom House reported that organizers of demonstrations must only give notice rather than seek permission from authorities, and the current government has generally upheld freedom of assembly in practice. (FH, 2012).

Freedom of religion:

According to Freedom House the constitution guarantees religious freedom, yet, a 2007 law banned so-called abusive proselytism and acknowledged the special significance and primary role of the Orthodox Church (FH, 2012). Still, over time the AIE government has moved away from the PCRM’s clear support for the Orthodox Church over the smaller, Bessarabian Orthodox Church (FH, 2012). An improvement was that in 2011, the government for the first time accepted the registration of a religious organization from Moldova’s small Muslim population and while other minority groups have also had difficulty registering and in some cases face harassment, according to Freedom House, foreign missionaries have reported less bureaucratic obstruction in recent years. (FH, 2012). Overall one can say that there has been limited progress in the field of freedom of religion in Moldova from the point of view of Freedom House in the time from 2007-2011.

Trade union’s rights and core labour standards:

Freedom House did not report any improvement with regard to trade union’s rights and core labour standards in the time period of 2007-2011. It views enforcement of union rights and labor standards as
weak, with employers rarely punished for violations, and workers in illegal strikes face possible fines or prison time. (FH, 2012)

**Minority rights:**

Progress with regard to minority rights has not been reported by Freedom House. Roma suffer harsh treatment and face discrimination in housing and employment, and are targets of police violence and gay men are reportedly subject to police harassment (FH, 2012).

**Gender equality:**

Freedom House did not report any progress with regard to gender equality. Women remain underrepresented in public life. (FH, 2012)

**The rule of law/Independent judiciary.**

Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, Freedom House reports that reform efforts suffer from lack of funds, and there has been evidence of bribery and political influence among judicial and law enforcement officials. (FH, 2012). No progress was reported.

Overall, the assessment of the democratization process in Moldova based on the evaluation of the nine indicators also used by Freedom House, for the time period of 2007-2011, is more negative than the one based on the European Union reports. Here positive and negative or limited Progress are about the same in numbers.

### 5.1.2. Egypt

**The EU/Egypt Action Plan 2004**

In this Action Plan the “Arab Republic of Egypt and the European Union as key partners and, near neighbours, reaffirm their commitment to deepen their political, economic and social relations on the basis of their close cooperation and strategic partnership(...)”(Commission, 2004). Moreover, the parties to the Action Plan want to further develop their strategic partnership through an increasingly close and enhanced partnership (Commission, 2004).

“The level of ambition of the EU-Egypt relationship, leading to continuing trade liberalization including in agriculture and services, a stake in the EU’s internal market, increased financial support and enhanced political cooperation, will depend on the degree of commitment to common values as well as the implementation of jointly agreed priorities to mutual benefits. The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully the efforts and concrete achievements in meeting those commitments” (Commission, 2004). The Action Plan will cover a timeframe of three to five years (Commission, 2004).

In terms of democratization the EU has certain demands towards Egypt related to democracy and the rule of law. This means in more concrete terms that Egypt should enhance the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the rule of law which in turn for example means to strengthen participation in political life and to foster the role of civil society as well as to
pursue and support decentralization of the government and the reform of local administration (Commission, 2004).

Moreover according to the EU demands Egypt should consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice and improve prison conditions, and ensure the independence of the judiciary (Commission, 2004). Also Egypt should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, promote the enhancement of women’s participation in political, economic, and social life and promote gender equality and reinforce the fight against discrimination and gender-based violence (Commission, 2004). In addition to that concerning freedom of association and expression and pluralism of the media, Egypt should implement measures that promote the right of assembly and association and assert freedom of expression and independence of the media (Commission, 2004). Furthermore Egypt should cooperate to combat all forms of discrimination, intolerance, racism and xenophobia, especially hate or defamatory discourse based on religion, beliefs, race or origin (Commission, 2004). Additionally, Egypt has to work on supporting fundamental social rights and core labour standards (Commission, 2004).

Incentives offered by the EU to Egypt for political reform are for example: continued trade liberalization including agriculture and services, a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, increased financial support and enhanced political cooperation, deepening trade and economic relations, etc. (Commission, 2004).

What is also noteworthy here is that not only the demands of the EU are rather vague as with the EU-Moldova Action plan, but that also the incentives or rewards for such actions are rather vague at times (e.g. what does deepening trade and economic relations mean in concrete terms?). This offers an opportunity to take another look at the six conditions that need to be taken into account when assessing the promise of conditionality to promote democracy. The incentives are certainly attractive to Egypt since for example a stake in the Internal Market of the EU and opening the economies to each other can only be beneficial for Egypt. What we can say about credibility is rather limited. We can however assume that the EU’s carrots and sticks are real since it seems based on the EU enlargement process willing to realize and withhold the incentive in accordance with the democratic performance of Egypt. If there are clear measurable criteria and evaluation mechanisms will be dealt with further on in this paper. Low adoption costs and lack of alternatives as well as asymmetries in negotiations in favor of the EU and the condition that interests of important stakeholders and veto players should not be harmed cannot be assessed only based on the Action plan.

For now we will take a look at the demands of the EU towards Egypt in the area of democracy and the rule of law as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The EU demands to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law (Commission, 2004). Next, the EU demands that Egypt foster the role of civil society, strengthen the participation in political life, decentralize the government and reform the local administration, that it consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice and improve prison conditions (Commission, 2004). The EU further demands that human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be promoted and enhanced, like the rights of women and children, freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of the media, the fight against discrimination, intolerance, racism and xenophobia, and fundamental social rights and core labour standards (Commission, 2004).
What is striking here is that the requirements at first hand value are rather vague, yet they are always followed by more precise demands or instructions. Take the example of:

“Consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice and improve prison conditions.

- In the context of political and democratic reform, continue the ongoing process of strengthening, maintaining and ensuring the independence of the judiciary.
- Further develop measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of the justice administration (including prison) and access to justice, including capacity building of bodies entrusted with the implementation of the law.
- Support Egyptian government policies and programmes aiming at improving places of detention and prison conditions, especially the placement of minors”,

which tells the Egyptian authorities what to do and in more detail, but then again comes short of precise instructions (Commission (2004), p.6).

Now that we have scrutinized the EU/Egypt Action Plan with reference to democracy and democratization demands we can move on to the Progress Reports issued by the Commission and the Freedom House “freedom in the world” reports in order to find out if actual progress has been made on the aforementioned items and if conditionality which is the main instrument of the EU towards Egypt had any effect.

The EU Progress reports and the success of EU political conditionality

**Free, competitive and fair elections:**

Limited progress could be noted with regard to the conduct of free, competitive and fair elections in Egypt. The Commission noted that the electoral system was reformed and that parliamentary elections were organized between November 2011 and February 2012 in a generally free and transparent manner (2012). However, did Egypt decline the EU’s offer for a fully-fledged election observation mission of the parliamentary elections but allowed seven international NGOs to ‘follow’ the elections (Commission, 2012). According to these observers, there was no systematic, large-scale vote rigging (Commission, 2012).

**Absence of corruption:**

According to the Commission some efforts could be noted in the fight against corruption even though reducing corruption remains a major challenge, as indicated by the fact that Egypt continues to fall down the ranking of the Transparency International Corruption perception index and has fallen 14 positions since 2010 and takes position 112 in 2011 (Commission, 2012).

**Freedom of expression:**

According to the EU there has been very limited progress with regard to the freedom of expression between 2007 and 2011. The diversity of the media increased in recent years and freedom of
expression is guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution and protected by law (Commission, 2008, 2010). Yet, during the election period at the end of November 2010 and at the beginning of the uprising in 2011 there have been a number of restrictive measures concerning media freedom (Commission, 2011, 2012). Thus, freedom of expression remains a cause for concern. Future developments under the Military Council and the newly elected president have to be awaited.

*Freedom of assembly:*

There was no significant progress in the reporting period from 2007-2011 with regard to freedom of assembly according to the Commission. It further noted that the excessive use of force against demonstrators and restrictions on freedom of assembly remain a major concern (Commission, 2012).

*Freedom of religion:*

There has been limited progress in the reporting period with regard to freedom of religion. Thus, two decrees regarding the renovation of churches were adopted and another decree allowed for the recognition of adherents of non-recognized religions to obtain identification documents without having to declare their religion (Commission, 2009, 2010). Moreover, could Christians who had converted to Islam reconvert to Christianity and have their original religion mentioned in their ID documents (Commission, 2009). Yet, acts of discrimination and sectarian violence continue to be reported (Commission, 2010).

*Trade union’s rights and core labour standards:*

The Commission reported that in the reporting period limited progress was made as regards fundamental social rights and core labour standards.

*Minority rights:*

The Commission did not note any progress with regard to minority rights between 2007 and 2011.

*Gender equality:*

Also with regard to gender equality the Commission did not note any significant progress and women continue to face discrimination.

*The rule of law/Independent judiciary:*

There has been mixed progress with regard to the rule of law and an independent judiciary. This was due to the Security Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) partially lifting the state of emergency in January 2012 (Commission, 2012). Still, according to the Commission, many other measures taken by the SCAF during the transition period fell short of democratic standards (Commission, 2012).

The overall assessment of the nine indicators used to measure progress in terms of democratization in Egypt, based on the EU’s evaluations, is that there was mixed or limited up to no progress in this regard in the time period from 2007-2011.
The Freedom House “freedom in the world” reports and the success of EU political conditionality

Free, competitive and fair elections:

There has been limited progress regarding the conduct of elections in Egypt. Reports on the first rounds of the lower house elections in November 2011, indicated that they broadly met international standards regarding election-day conduct even though there were some shortcomings. (FH, 2012).

Absence of corruption

There has been no progress with regard to the absence of corruption in Egypt in the reporting period. Corruption in Egypt remains pervasive at all levels of government. Egypt’s ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index worsened so that Egypt was ranked 112 out of 183 countries in 2011 (FH, 2012).

Freedom of expression:

According to Freedom House, Freedom of the press improved slightly after Mubarak’s ouster in early 2011 (FH, 2012). The reasons for this are particularly an increase in independent television stations and other media, yet, it continues to be restricted in law and practice (FH, 2012).

Freedom of assembly

There was no progress in this regard. Freedoms of assembly and association continue to be restricted (FH, 2012).

Freedom of religion

According to Freedom House there have been minor improvements with regard to freedom of religion in the reporting period. In 2009 ministerial decree recognized the right of adherents of so called non-recognized religions to obtain identification papers (FH, 2011). Moreover, a 2008 court ruling found that Christian converts to Islam were free to return to Christianity (FH, 2011).

Trade union’s rights and core labour standards:

There has been mixed progress with regard to trade union’s rights and core labour standards. Specifically, workers were granted the right to establish independent unions and formed an independent trade union federation (FH, 2012). However, the government criminalized protests that disrupt the economy (FH, 2012).

Minority rights

Improvements with regard to minority rights were not reported by Freedom House.

Gender equality:

Progress on gender quality was not reported by Freedom House and although the constitution provides for equality of the sexes, some aspects of the law and many traditional practices discriminate against women (FH, 2011).
The rule of law/Independent judiciary:

Limited progress could be reported in this regard. In 2011, judicial independence improved as judicial supervision of elections was restored, the SCAF partially lifted the state of emergency, and prosecutors pursued cases against Mubarak, his sons, and other senior NDP officials for their roles during the January 25 uprising, among other matters (FH, 2012).

The overall assessment of the nine indicators used to measure progress in terms of democratization in Egypt, based on Freedom House’s evaluations, is that there was mixed or limited up to no progress in this regard in the time period from 2007-2011.

The results of the EU Progress reports and Freedom House “freedom in the world” reports evaluation are summarized in the table below.

Table 2: Moldova and Egypt 2007-2011 - EU progress report /Freedom House freedom in the world reports (2008-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Moldova EU Progress Report</th>
<th>Moldova Freedom House report</th>
<th>Egypt EU Progress Report</th>
<th>Egypt Freedom House report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free, competitive and fair elections (including the right to vote)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Corruption</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of assembly</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union’s rights and core labour standards</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law/Independent judiciary</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the evaluation of the progress on democratization positive progress receives a “+” sign whereas regression or lack of progress receives a “-” sign. If the progress on the item was moderate it receives a “+/−” sign. The assessment is based on a subjective evaluation of the EU progress reports and the Freedom House reports.
Looking at the results in the table concerning progress in terms of democratization it quickly becomes clear that both countries, Moldova and Egypt, have made progress on these indicators – Moldova more so than Egypt – no matter to which source one refers.

Yet, if one compares the results in the table for Moldova it also quickly becomes apparent that the EU and Freedom House come to different conclusions in the field of the nine indicators which are being used here to measure democratization even though it is only a matter of degree. However, this is not the case if one compares the results of the EU and the Freedom House reports for Egypt. Here the results are very much the same concerning the nine indicators except for the category concerning absence of corruption. What is also apparent is that the EU, overall, gives are more positive assessment concerning the nine indicators used to measure democratization progress. This is most likely so because it observes the developments in terms of law changes more closely than Freedom House does. Freedom House is rather concerned with the actual situation on the ground, but like this overlooks important law changes that can have significant effects in the future. Therefore I decide to follow the judgment of the EU instead of the judgment of Freedom House even though there is always an element of uncertainty, since one cannot be sure that the measurement used by the EU or Freedom House are perfect.

What is important to retain is that both countries have made progress with regard to democratization. Yet, the results, if one adheres to the EU as a source, are slightly different for Moldova and Egypt. Moldova made slightly greater progress on the nine indicators than Egypt did.

What does this mean for the first two hypothesis of this thesis?

The first hypothesis and second hypothesis which state that:

1. *Since the European Neighbourhood policy does not offer a membership perspective, conditionality will not be effective and democratization will fail.*
2. *Even though the EU does not offer a membership perspective to the countries of the ENP their membership aspirations lead to a certain degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality towards them.*

The first hypothesis seems to have been refuted since Moldova and Egypt have shown some signs and a certain level of progress in terms of democratization over the scrutinized period of time, even if not 100%. Thus, it did democratize to a certain degree, even though the EU does not actually offer a membership perspective to it. This in turn seems to confirm what the second hypothesis posits, namely that Moldova’s membership aspirations lead to a certain degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality towards it.

Furthermore, even though the results are not the exactly the same for both countries under observation we can see that there is a positive development overall for both countries. According to Mill’s method of agreement we can therefore not eliminate conditionality as a possible cause for the democratization development in the countries of Moldova and Egypt.
5.2. Transnational linkages

However, there may be, as has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, other factors that cause democratization or might even hamper it. Thus we will now take a look at the effect that transnational linkages have on democratization and thus move on to the third hypothesis which reads as:

3. the level of democracy increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international environment;

we will take a look at and evaluate again parts of the Progress Reports of the European Union about Moldova and Egypt from the years of 2008 till 2012 concerning people-to-people contacts.

People-to-people contacts Moldova (2007-2011):

Concerning people-to-people contacts the higher education institutions used the tempus projects and implemented parts of the Bologna Process, like the Erasmus Mundus programmes which further underpinned education reform in cooperation with the European Union and promoted academic mobility (Commission, 2008). Furthermore, Moldova implemented a credit system based on EU standards and moved towards greater harmonization with EU standards in higher education with the implementation of the second cycle – the Masters level (Commission, 2010).

In addition to that higher education reform continued to benefit from EU cooperation through Tempus IV programme support and one additional project involving the Republic of Moldova was selected in 2011 (Commission, 2012). Moldova continued its active participation in the Erasmus Mundus programme in the academic year 2011-2012, with the award of a total of 182 scholarships and mobility grants (Commission, 2012).

Also the number of young Moldovan citizens and youth workers benefitting from the exchange opportunities under the Youth in Action programme increased from 247 in 2010 to 329 in 2011. (Commission, 2012).

People-to-people contacts Egypt (2007-2011):

Egypt has participated actively in regional programmes such as EUMEDIS and ETE as well as in Tempus III and further deepened the reform and enhancing the internationalization of its higher education system in the overall context of the Bologna Process (Commission, 2008).

Egyptian young people also benefitted from exchanges and voluntary service actions under the EuroMed Youth III programme as well as under Youth in Action. (Commission, 2010).

Cooperation in the context of EU higher education programmes continued throughout the time from 2007 till 2011 (Commission, 2012). In 2011 mobility schemes for 240 students and staff from Egypt are were foreseen (Commission, 2012). Moreover, in relation to university cooperation, four additional Tempus IV projects involving Egypt were selected (Commission, 2012).

Comparing the two countries on transnational linkages, measured by people-to-people contacts as observed by the EU, it is evident that both countries have made progress in this regard. They are about on equal footing with regard to people-to-people contacts with the EU.
However, even with the little information that was available concerning transnational linkages in Moldova and in Egypt from 2007 till 2011 one can see and assume that its impact on democratization in these two countries is probably quite limited. People-to-people contacts in the field of higher education and vocational training may be able to further democratization in a bottom-up approach via civil society, yet, even if they do, this would probably take a relatively long time considering the small number of students involved in e.g. a mobility scheme/exchange student programme. Yet, researching and analyzing the effect of transnational linkages is not the idea of this paper and would exceed the scope of this paper tremendously.

Moreover, as mentioned above, the strength of transnational linkages as displayed in the EU progress reports is about the same for Moldova and Egypt. Therefore, according to Mill’s method of agreement, we can at first glance not eliminate transnational linkages as the cause for democratization in these two countries. However, as described above, is the impact of the people-to-people contacts limited or rather insignificant and they can thus, by definition, be excluded as the cause for democratization.

In order to get a better impression of the transnational linkages between the EU and Moldova and Egypt we are going to take a look at the National Indicative programmes for both countries which tell us how much money the EU allocated to these countries for the purpose of democracy promotion.

**National indicative programs (NIP) Moldova and Egypt 2007-2010:**

As one can read in the National Indicative programmes (NIP) for Moldova and Egypt for the time 2007-2010 not only the amount of money granted to Moldova in the field of Support for Democratic Development and Good Governance (52,4-73,4 mn) higher than the amount of money allocated to Egypt (40 mn) during the same time period but also the share it makes up of the total budget of the NIP which for Moldova lies between 25-35% and for Egypt only at 7% (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2007). The conclusion that since Moldova is a much smaller country than Egypt that the greater amount of money which has been allocated to Moldova also should have a greater impact on democratization, could be drawn. However, it is the case that these raw numbers bear little meaning when it comes to what is actually done on the ground with the money and how it actually affects democratization since we do not know what kinds of organizations are being supported with it and how big their impact on democratization in the said countries is. Hence, the conclusion that the impact on democratization if so any of the NIP money on Moldova is great than in Egypt has to be treated with caution.

Therefore, the third hypothesis that *the level of democracy increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international environment* cannot be confirmed neither be rejected completely. Yet, we can assume that the impact of transnational linkages between the EU and the ENP countries of Moldova and Egypt is rather limited and not the decisive factor, also because according to Mill’s method of agreement, we would have to conclude that since the two countries overall differ in this regard, we could eliminate transnational linkages as a causal factor with regard to democratization.
5.3. Economic development:

Now we turn to the fourth hypothesis which posits that:

1. The level of democracy in a country increases with the level of economic development.

In order to investigate this we will compare the GDP per capita and the HDI ranking of Moldova and Egypt from the start of the European Neighbourhood policy in 2004 till 2011.

Figure 2: GDP per capita development Egypt and Moldova (2004-2011)


If one compares the GDP per capita in both countries one can clearly see that, even though both have risen considerably and constantly from 2004 till 2011, the GDP of Egypt has always been higher and by 2011 the Egyptian economy outperformed the Moldovan economy by about 800 US$ of GDP per capita. Thus, even though the level of GDP per capita in Egypt and Moldova differs, there has been economic progress in both countries in the years since the ENP has started.

However, one might wonder if this picture changes if one does not only look at the GDP per capita change but also at the HDI change over the years? To do this the following graphs will be evaluated:
If one compares the HDI score development of Moldova and Egypt it is noticeable that their scores were very much similarly high for the time period of 2004 till 2011 with Egypt’s score rising from about 0.61 in 2005 to about 0.65 in 2011 and the score of Moldova almost constantly rising from about 0.63 in 2005 till about the same level as Egypt in 2011 with a score of about 0.65. This leads only to a slight difference in ranking in 2011 with Moldova being ranked at place 111 and Egypt being ranked at place 113 in the world.

Thus, both countries have made progress in terms of GDP per capita and in terms of the HDI. Therefore we can conclude, according to Mill’s method of agreement, that since the two countries do not differ on this independent variable of economic development that we cannot safely eliminate economic development as a causal factor of democratization in Moldova and Egypt.

5.4. Interfering external influence by other international actors than the EU

The sixth hypothesis reads as:

2. Due to the interfering external influence factor one can hypothesize that the weaker the influence of an external actor is over an ENP country the more likely it is that EU democratization efforts will be successful.

This of course only concerns Moldova since there is no reported or relevant interference in democratization by Russia with relation to Egypt and according to Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut the ENP could be applied to Eastern Europe unhindered by external forces and in a favorable environment (2011). Yet, over the past years the EU policies in the region must contend with the interests of Russia (Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut, 2011). The EU of course cannot prevent countries like Moldova from relying on other sources to deal with their economic and social problems like help from
Russia, be it economically by supplying them with cheap gas and oil or in other ways. Verdun and Chira call the EU an inert and paralyzed international actor whose position since the latest enlargement mostly relies on its ‘magentism’ whereas Russia tries to be as attractive as possible economically and politically for its neighboring states (easy to obtain visas, cheap energy) (2011). In Verdun and Chira’s words: “The EU puts emphasis on bureaucratic requirements and does not work on powerful identity ties with its neighbours, whereas Russia does not lose any opportunity to evoke “fraternity” with the people on the neighbouring countries and engages itself in regional projects particularly beneficial to those countries “ (2011, p. ??7). Moreover, even though the EU has a trade surplus with the neighboring countries, Russia is more actively exerts political influence in the neighboring countries through economic actions like investing in key projects as infrastructure and energy (Verdun and Chira, 2011).

In order to get an idea about which partner might be more attractive for Moldova in economic terms we will now examine its trade relationship to the EU and to Russia more closely.

Table 3: Moldova’s Trade With Main Partners (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Import Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Export Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Trade Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World (all countries)</td>
<td>2905,5</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>World (all countries)</td>
<td>1162,7</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>World (all countries)</td>
<td>4068,2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>1290,6</td>
<td>44,4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>552,1</td>
<td>47,5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>1842,7</td>
<td>45,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>443,4</td>
<td>15,3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>304,3</td>
<td>26,2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>747,8</td>
<td>18,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>400,3</td>
<td>13,8%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>69,5</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>469,8</td>
<td>11,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>241,6</td>
<td>8,3%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>5,2%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>243,3</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>155,7</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50,9</td>
<td>4,4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>206,5</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>89,8</td>
<td>3,1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>150,5</td>
<td>3,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46,2</td>
<td>1,6%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>63,0</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Blue shading to distinguish EU27 and Russia.

As one can see are the EU27 and Russian the major import and major export partners and thus the major trade partners for Moldova in 2010. However, one needs to make a distinction between the EU and Russia, since the EU27 were responsible for 44,4% of all imports to Moldova whereas Russia could only account for 15,3% of the imports. In terms of exports of Moldova to other countries the difference between the EU27 and Russia is smaller but still quite significant with the EU27 having a share of 47,5% and Russia a share of 26,2% of the exports. Like this exports and imports in turn translate into the EU27 having a total share of 45,3% of the trade with Moldova and Russia only having a comparatively small share of 18,4% of the trade with Moldova.

One can conclude from this that the EU27 are obviously the more important and more attractive trading partner for Moldova in comparison to Russia, so that the Russian influence over Moldova should be limited in terms of economic influence and Russia should not be considered a major deterrent to the EU’s democratization efforts in Moldova via the ENP, at least not economically.
Now, let us turn to the EU-Egypt trade and compare this with the US-Egypt trade in order to assess which country should have the greater economic influence over Egypt and whether the US economic influence might be an intervening factor.

Table 4: Egypt’s Trade With Main Partners (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Import Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Export Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rk</th>
<th>Major Trade Partners</th>
<th>Mio euro</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World (all countries)</td>
<td>39 524,1</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>18 930,3</td>
<td>31,9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>12 878,0</td>
<td>32,6%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>6 052,3</td>
<td>30,3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3 719,0</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>203,1</td>
<td>6,1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1 596,5</td>
<td>4,0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>942,0</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 471,6</td>
<td>3,6%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>942,0</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1 360,1</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>918,4</td>
<td>4,6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1 360,1</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>619,1</td>
<td>3,1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 360,1</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 759,2</td>
<td>3,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking at Egypt’s trade with its main partners it quickly becomes obvious that the EU is the main trading partner with at total share of 31,9% of the trade with Egypt in 2010 and the USA following as the second most important trade partner with a total share of 8,2% in 2010. This also goes for the import share (EU 32,6% and the USA 9,4%) and the export share (EU 30,5% and the USA 6,1%). Thus from the economic point of view the United states should not be an interfering factor in the democratization efforts of the EU in Egypt.

Moreover are experts on EU – and US – Egypt relations like Wolfgang Zank of the opinion that the US and the EU share a very similar ambition in pushing Egypt on the way of reform towards and open market economy, ruled by law and democracy so that in this respect the EU and the US are partners (2010).

Thus, one can say that the influence of Russia over Moldova and the influence of the United States over Egypt is rather limited in comparison to that of the EU over these states – at least in economic terms. Thus, it seems more likely that the EU influence rather than the one by the USA or Russia over these countries is responsible for their progress with regard to democratization. Yet, exactly the absence of external influence from other parties and the domestic situation might have led to the democratization progress in these countries and cannot among other factors be excluded.
6. Conclusion

The goal of this master thesis was to answer the research question: What is the impact of EU political conditionality on democratization within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy?

In order to do this use was made of a most different design or in other words Mill’s method of agreement. Arriving at an answer for the above mentioned research question is obviously not that simple since one has to control for factors other than EU political conditionality that might bring about or hamper democratization in the countries scrutinized in this thesis – Moldova and Egypt – before one can say with at least relative certainty that it did or did not bring about democratization. These other factors that might or might not have an influence on democratization in Moldova and Egypt are: EU political conditionality, transnational linkages, the state of economic development in the concerned countries, and interfering external influence by other international actors.

Thus these other factors and the democratization process have been scrutinized, analyzed and evaluated to give an answer to whether or not EU political conditionality actually has an effect on democratization in the aforementioned countries.

With regard to the first and second hypothesis which are:

1. *Since the European Neighbourhood policy does not offer a membership perspective, conditionality will not be effective and democratization will fail.*
2. *Even though the EU does not offer a membership perspective to the countries of the ENP their membership aspirations lead to a certain degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality towards them.*

Looking at the results concerning progress in terms of democratization it quickly becomes clear that both countries, Moldova and Egypt, have made progress on these indicators – Moldova more so than Egypt – no matter to which source one refers.

The results show that both countries under investigation, Moldova and Egypt, have made progress with regard to democratization from 2007 till 2011. Even if there have been slight differences between those two countries in terms of progress with regard to democratization what is important that they both progressed with regard to democratization.

This means that first hypothesis seems to have been refuted since Moldova and Egypt have shown some signs and a certain level of progress in terms of democratization over the scrutinized period of time, even if not 100%. Thus, Egypt did democratize to a certain degree, even though the EU does not actually offer a membership perspective to it.

Also, since at a time when Moldova and Egypt both made progress on democratization and a membership perspective has been present to Moldova, but not to Egypt so that they differ with regard to this independent variable, we can eliminate a membership perspective as a cause for democratization. Thus, the second hypothesis seemingly can be refuted.

However, one has to be cautious with this assertion because even though both countries made progress with regard to democratization the country with the ficticious EU membership perspective, Moldova, still made greater progress with regard to democratization. Due to this fact we cannot completely refute the second hypothesis.
Furthermore, even though the results are not exactly the same for both countries under observation we can see that there is a positive development overall for both countries. According to Mill’s method of agreement we can therefore not eliminate conditionality as a possible cause for the democratization development in the countries of Moldova and Egypt.

Yet, in order to be more certain that EU political conditionality with or without the technical possibility of EU membership in the future is the decisive factor in bringing about democratization we of course have to be able to exclude the aforementioned factors above from having any impact on this process.

The first one in this respect is the factor called transnational linkages which in this thesis was measured by people-to-people contacts and by the money allocated to Moldova and Egypt for the purpose of supporting democracy under the NIP.

First, comparing the two countries on transnational linkages, measured by people-to-people contacts as observed by the EU, it is evident that both countries have made progress in this regard. They are about on equal footing with regard to people-to-people contacts with the EU.

However, even with the little information that was available concerning transnational linkages in Moldova and in Egypt from 2007 till 2011 one can see and assume that its impact on democratization in these two countries is probably quite limited. People-to-people contacts in the field of higher education and vocational training may be able to further democratization in a bottom-up approach via civil society, yet, even if they do, this would probably take a relatively long time considering the small number of students involved in e.g. a mobility scheme/exchange student programme. Yet, researching and analyzing the effect of transnational linkages is not the idea of this paper and would exceed the scope of this paper tremendously.

Moreover, as mentioned above, the strength of transnational linkages as displayed in the EU progress reports is about the same for Moldova and Egypt. Therefore, according to Mill’s method of agreement, we can at first glance not eliminate transnational linkages as the cause for democratization in these two countries. However, as described above, is the impact of the people-to-people contacts limited or rather insignificant and they can thus, by definition, be excluded as the cause for democratization.

Second, is not only the amount of money granted to Moldova in the field of Support for Democratic Development and Good Governance (52.4-73.4 mn) higher than the amount of money allocated to Egypt (40 mn) during the same time period but also the share it makes up of the total budget of the NIP which for Moldova lies between 25-35% and for Egypt only at 7%. Thus, one might jump to the conclusion that since Moldova is a much smaller country than Egypt that the greater amount of money which has been allocated to Moldova also should have a greater impact on democratization. However, it is the case that these raw numbers bear little meaning when it comes to what is actually done on the ground with the money and how it actually affects democratization since we do not know what kinds of organizations are being supported with it and how big their impact on democratization in the said countries is. Hence, the conclusion that the impact on democratization if so any of the NIP money on Moldova is greater than in Egypt has to be treated with caution.

Therefore, the third hypothesis that the level of democracy increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international environment cannot be confirmed neither be rejected completely. Yet, we can assume that the impact of transnational linkages between the EU and the ENP countries of Moldova and Egypt is rather limited and not the decisive factor, also because according to Mill’s method of agreement, we would have to
conclude that since the two countries overall differ in this regard, we could eliminate transnational linkages as a causal factor with regard to democratization, yet, not with absolute certainty.

Hence, we turned to assessing the impact of the level of economic development in Moldova and Egypt with regard to democratization. The hypothesis in this case was that the level of democracy in a country increases with the level of economic development. In order to investigate this we compared the GDP per capita and the HDI ranking of Moldova and Egypt from the start of the European Neighbourhood policy in 2004 till 2011.

In order to investigate this we compared the GDP per capita and the HDI ranking of Moldova and Egypt from the start of the European Neighbourhood policy in 2004 till 2011.

First, if one compares the GDP per capita in both countries one can clearly see that, even though both have risen considerably and constantly from 2004 till 2011, the GDP of Egypt has always been higher and by 2011 the Egyptian economy outperformed the Moldovan economy by about 800 US$ of GDP per capita. Thus, even though the level of GDP per capita in Egypt and Moldova differs, there has been economic progress in both countries in the years since the ENP has started.

Second, if one compares the HDI score development of Moldova and Egypt it is noticeable that their scores were very much similarly high for the time period of 2004 till 2011 with Egypt’s score rising from about 0.61 in 2005 to about 0.65 in 2011 and the score of Moldova almost constantly rising from about 0.63 in 2005 till about the same level as Egypt in 2011 with a score of about 0.65. This leads only to a slight difference in ranking in 2011 with Moldova being ranked at place 111 and Egypt being ranked at place 113 in the world.

Thus, both countries have made progress in terms of GDP per capita and in terms of the HDI. Therefore we can conclude, according to Mill’s method of agreement, that since the two countries do not differ on this independent variable of economic development that we cannot safely eliminate economic development as a causal factor of democratization in Moldova and Egypt.

Next, we turned to the fifth and last hypothesis which assumes that that the weaker the influence of an external actor is over an ENP country the more likely it is that EU democratization efforts will be successful. The influence of an external actor over the ENP countries Moldova and Egypt was assessed in economic terms.

For Moldova one can conclude that the EU27 are obviously the more important and more attractive trading partner for Moldova in comparison to Russia, so that the Russian influence over Moldova should be limited in terms of economic influence and Russia should not be considered a major deterrent to the EU’s democratization efforts in Moldova via the ENP, at least not economically. The same goes for the influence of the United States over Egypt. It is simply smaller than that of the EU and should not be an interfering factor in the democratization efforts of the EU in Egypt. Moreover are experts on EU – and US – Egypt relations like Wolfgang Zank of the opinion that the US and the EU share a very similar ambition in pushing Egypt on the way of reform towards and open market economy, ruled by law and democracy so that in this respect the EU and the US are partners (2010).

Thus, one can say that the influence of Russia over Moldova and the influence of the United States over Egypt is rather limited in comparison to that of the EU over these states – at least in economic terms. Thus, it seems more likely that the EU influence rather than the one by the USA or Russia over these countries is responsible for their progress with regard to democratization. Yet, exactly the
absence of external influence from other parties and the domestic situation might have led to the democratization progress in these countries and can, among other factors, not be excluded.

The following table modeled after Gerring’s view of Mill’s method of agreement sums up the results.

Table 5: Possible Causal factors for democratization Moldova and Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Factor influencing democratization</th>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>EU political conditionality</th>
<th>Transnational linkage</th>
<th>Economic development</th>
<th>External influence</th>
<th>Membership perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova 2007-2011</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 2007-2011</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Possible cause for democratization?

| Yes | No | No | No | No |

Drawing on the results of the table, it becomes clear that EU political conditionality is apparently not the only factor which might influence democratization positively and apparently does not only do so if the ENP country has a membership perspective. However, the problem with this result is that we cannot be certain that only EU political conditionality is the decisive factor for the democratization progress in Moldova and Egypt. The factor of economic development, which could not be eliminated might as well also be the cause for democratization or even transnational linkages might if further strengthened be the cause for democratization. In addition to this there might not only be multiple causes for democratization in Egypt and Moldova, but also interaction effects between these factors, so that for example EU political conditionality only works as a tool for democratization, if it is accompanied by positive economic development.

In addition to that it might be the case that for example the impact of the independent variables which could not be eliminated as a cause for democratization, e.g. conditionality, is much bigger than assumed right now or will have a stronger influence in the future, that is to say over time. Further research is necessary to assess this. Additionally, it might be the case that other factors not analyzed in this paper e.g. internal factors like the domestic political cost of EU rule adoption have an influence on democratization. For this, too, further research is necessary to assess it.

In addition to that, although EU political conditionality seems to be one possible decisive factor for democratization, the success of it has been limited up to date, even if the targeted country like Moldova had something like a membership perspective. Therefore, the EU should also try to create new tools and stronger incentives than a “maybe” for future membership in order to further its democratization efforts in its neighbourhood.

Moreover, the EU should put clearer evaluation criteria for democracy and human rights into the Action Plans. Moreover, the creation of benchmarks for democratization could help evaluation and implementation of democratization measures, thus improving the conditionality instrument the EU
should also, as mentioned before, consider exploring other options that might help further democratization in the ENP countries like the bottom-up civil society approach or employing economic sanctions. Unfortunately researching this would exceed the scope of this paper.

Furthermore, there might be measurement errors which cause us to incorrectly eliminate or fail to eliminate a potential cause for the outcome we seek to explain (Clark et al., 2009). Exactly because of this we should not claim that e.g. economic development causes or does not cause democratization based on empirical evidence, since the instruments employed are imperfect and in general as well as in this thesis the indicators chosen to for example measure economic development or democratization may not perfectly fit the used concept of economic development or democratization (Clark et al., 2009). Given the likelihood of measurement error one would only be able to claim that for example economic development increases the probability that a country will be democratic (Clark et al., 2009). Moreover, there might be interaction effects between the independent variables and it thus might be the case that multiple causes lead to the common outcome (Clark et al., 2009). In addition to that we cannot be certain that all instances of the phenomenon that could have occurred have been observed and therefore the generalizability of our findings is restricted. This is a limit to this study which is due to the research design is that the research only deals with two countries out of the whole European Neighbourhood Policy. Therefore generalization is restricted.
9. Bibliography

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