Explaining EU policies in Nigeria
A Confrontation of Realism and Idealism

Bachelor Thesis

Ramona Lorenz – s0201553

First Supervisor: Dr. M.R.R. Ossewaarde
Second Supervisor: Dr. M. van Gerven-Haanpaa

7/14/2011
Abstract

This thesis presents a critique concerning the one-sided interpretations of EU foreign policy provided by pure idealism and pure realism. Therefore, these two theories are confronted, in order to examine the extent to which each of them is able to explain certain EU actions. This explanation is developed for the case of EU actions in its relations with Nigeria between 1995 and 2007.

In order to approach this topic, a qualitative analysis of EU documents is conducted. Within this framework, first of all the EU’s interests and instruments are identified and classified along idealist and/or realist lines. Secondly, the EU-Nigerian relations from 1995 until 2007 are observed over time. This analysis reveals two major phases characterized by different EU actions, implying different EU interests and instruments, resulting in different forms of cooperation with Nigeria. When accounting for these two major phases by realism and idealism, it turns out that both major phases of EU action can be explained by both idealism and realism to some extent. Nevertheless, a certain trend is observable over time. Whereas in Nigeria’s military period until 1999, EU actions are rather driven by idealist interests, since its transition to democracy that year, realist interests seem to develop increasingly.

For EU-Nigerian relations this development implies a shift in the division of power, becoming slightly more balanced, since the EU has come to recognize Nigeria more as a partner than as an aid-receiver.
Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 4
   1.1 Scientific discourse concerning explanations for EU actions....................................................... 4
   1.2 Outlook ......................................................................................................................................... 6

2. Theoretical framework – Confronting realism and idealism ............................................................ 7
   2.1 Realism as an intellectual construct ............................................................................................. 7
   2.2 Idealism as an intellectual construct ............................................................................................ 8
   2.3 Confronting realism and idealism in the realm of foreign policy ................................................ 8
   2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 12

3. Methodological framework – A qualitative document analysis ....................................................... 12
   3.1 Collection of EU documents ....................................................................................................... 12
   3.2 Identifying EU interests, instruments and forms of cooperation ................................................ 14
   3.3 Identifying realist and idealist traits ............................................................................................. 16
   3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 18

4. Analysis .............................................................................................................................................. 18
   4.1 EU Interests and Instruments towards Nigeria – Idealist and/or Realist? ................................. 18
      4.1.1. EU Interests........................................................................................................................... 19
      4.1.2. EU Instruments .................................................................................................................... 23
   4.2 Development of EU-Nigerian Cooperation .................................................................................. 26
      4.2.1. From Restricted to Resumed Cooperation ............................................................................ 26
      4.2.2. From Interests in Democracy to Diversified Interests ......................................................... 27
      4.2.3. From Negative to Positive Instruments .............................................................................. 28
   4.3 Characterizing key developments by idealism and realism ......................................................... 29

5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 30
   5.1 Realism and Idealism explaining EU Actions ............................................................................... 30
   5.2 A need to reconsider the EU’s international position? ................................................................. 31
   5.3 Reflection on the main Findings .................................................................................................. 32

6. Appendix .......................................................................................................................................... 33
   6.1 Appendix I: Indicators for Interests, Instruments and Cooperation ............................................. 33
   6.2 Appendix II: Document Analysis - Findings Overview ............................................................... 34
   6.3 Appendix III: EU-Nigerian Trade Data ....................................................................................... 37

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 38
1. Introduction

In 2007, there was much hope for effective democratic elections in Nigeria not only amongst the Nigerian people but also within the international arena, since it was the first personnel change in presidency since Nigerian independence in 1960 (Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2007). Other than hoped for, the process as well as the outcome of the elections was shocking and devastating: Already prior to the elections, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of then-president Olusegun Obasanjo and his successor Umaru Yar’Adua tried to “use the law and law enforcement agencies, in very perverse ways, to exclude those they regarded as strong opponents from the electoral process” (Alemika & Omotosho, 2008). During the elections, “in 95 per cent of the state no voting took place at all. Nevertheless, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) reported huge turnouts” (Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2007). In those places where voting took place, it was clouded by immense election fraud. According to the EU Election Observer Mission 1 (2007) “at least 200 people, including policemen, were killed in election-related violence”. Regarding these events, this election, or better to say selection (Aduba, 2008) was not much characterized by democratic principles. Even Obasanjo himself acknowledged that “the elections may not have been fair but that the nation should at least congratulate itself for having conducted the elections” (Obijiofor, 2007). By and large, the elections did thus not bring about the expected shift to democratic principles and differed only slightly from the patterns of the preceding elections in 1999 and 2003.

What is remarkable is that even though the EU Council Presidency expressed concern and disappointment about the elections in 2007, it did not urge Nigerian authorities to impose serious changes. Even though, in a case of unfulfilled obligations or violations of democratic standards, Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 allows for the possibility to examine the situation and to find an acceptable solution as well as remedy for it. What is remarkable in the case of the above mentioned three Nigerian elections is that this instrument has never been applied. This is particularly striking when considering the efforts undertaken by the EU to foster the establishment of democratic principles in Nigeria and the fact that democratic elections are a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. Hence, the question is posed why sanctions were not even openly considered by the Council. How can these actions be explained?

1.1 Scientific discourse concerning explanations for EU actions

The EU’s actions in its relationship with Nigeria are also discussed by other scholars, pointing at two different major explanations: First, the EU’s fear to experience economic or security political losses and second, the EU’s interest in pursuing the promotion of its inherent norms by rather soft measures.

The fact that Nigeria was not sanctioned by the EU - whereas other states actually were sanctioned because of undemocratic elections like Ivory Coast in 2000 (Portela, 2007) - reflects a certain inconsistency within the foreign policy of the EU. According to Crawford (1997) such ‘inconsistency’ indeed underlies a certain pattern, namely the EU’s economic and trade interests. In the case of Nigeria, these interests ought not to be neglected as “West Africa is accounting for about 40% of all EU [African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States] ACP trade” (European Commission, 2007) and Nigeria constitutes for the biggest share of West Africa in terms of GDP and population (European Commission, 2007). What makes Nigeria especially important to the

---

1 Hereafter referred to as EU EOM
EU in an economic sense is that it ranks seventh among the EU’s oil-providers (Directorate-General for Energy, 2011). In this context harsh measures like sanctions for democracy promotion might not only jeopardize oil supplies but also the position of EU companies being active in Nigeria, such as Shell, Total, and Agip (Khakee, 2008). According to Olsen (1998) other influential factors are security concerns such as migration concerns in case of an aggravation of the democratic situation in particular in North Africa. Olsen (1998) is furthermore claiming that obviously “strategic concerns prevail over democracy promotion policies, when strategic interests of the EU are at stake.” This is also approved by Smith (1997) claiming that the EU’s normative concerns merely serve as a mask for its strategic interests.

Against these detected interests of pure strategic nature, several scholars argue that primarily idealistic norms determine the reactions of the EU regarding violations of democratic principles. According to Aggestam (2008) one reason for the EU’s legitimacy to push for norms like democracy in its foreign policy - one of its main principles, as stated in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - is its own war-governed past and its successful transformation to a peaceful entity. That the EU indeed promotes development legitimately, despite any strategic concerns, is argued by Hazelzet (2005). She finds that “aid was generally found to be provided to those in need, rather than to "friendly" regimes” (Hazelzet, 2005). Even though, this finding does not necessarily thwart the argument that no sanctions are imposed to those ‘friendly regimes’, but it contrasts the view that the EU is acting according to economic rather than ethical concerns.

In contrast to those two rather extreme positions, some scholars claim that these are so closely intertwined that it is neither material interests nor ethical considerations exclusively shaping the EU’s policies (Aggestam, 2008) and that the EU is torn between strategic interests and ethical concerns (Brown, 2001; Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005). An example for such interdependence between different interests might be that the EU’s strategic interests e.g. economic ones are to some extent dependent on its ethical concerns, e.g. democratic ones. In particular, there is an intensive scientific debate revolving around the topic of whether a democratic system might foster a country’s economic performance. In such a case, the EU’s promotion of democracy would be a kind of pre-requisite for a functioning economy.

Considering these different interpretations and explanations for EU actions, there is a need for finding the true explanation for EU actions on an empirical basis in order to answer the question: Why is the EU promoting democracy in Nigeria in a rather passive way and not by imposing sanctions for violations of democratic and human rights principles? Is it in order to have relatively more economic and security political gains or because the EU wants to secure the rather unstable Nigerian democratic government and further strengthen democratic values in the country? In practice, as suggested by some scholars, it might also be possible that the EU somehow balances its different interests. Explaining the nature of EU actions towards Nigeria is the main goal of this thesis.

Concentrating on possible explanations for EU actions towards Nigeria, and the claim that strategic as well as normative concerns towards Nigeria exist, the main research question is

‘To what extent can idealism and realism explain EU actions towards Nigeria in the period from 1995 until 2007?’

This question aims at detecting the extent to which the different concerns, as discussed in the scientific discourse, are driving EU actions in particular situations. This is, to what extent do
realism and idealism influence the EU’s behavior separately from each other but maybe also in an interactive way. Just as argued by some scholars before, there might be a certain degree of interaction and interdependency between the EU’s strategic and normative interests. Due to the analysis of EU actions over a longer period of time, this question is also open for the identification of differing explanations for EU actions at different periods in time.

In addition to this, two sub-questions are posed in order to make this main research question more accessible: when considering the answers to the two sub-questions in combination, the main research question can be addressed. With the intention of explaining EU actions, the nature of as well as the interests behind these actions need to be assessed. Actions are taken in order to serve a certain interest, and need to be enacted by certain instruments in a particular framework. Therefore, the first sub-question is dealing with the issue of which EU interests and instruments actually exist in the case of Nigeria and in how far these are of realist and/or idealist nature: ‘To what extent can idealist and realist interests and instruments be identified in EU-Nigerian relations?’ In addition to the existence and the character of EU actions, the main research question asks for development of these actions over time, from 1995 until 2007 in particular. Therefore, the second sub-question deals with the development of EU actions towards Nigeria in this particular time period. In this context, special regard is given to the developments in EU interests, its instruments employed as well as the general forms of cooperation. Hence, the second sub-question is ‘In which ways did the EU-Nigerian relationship develop between 1995 and 2007?’ In order to address the main research question, the development in interests, instruments and cooperation in general are interpreted in the light of idealism and/or realism due to the characterization of certain interests and instruments along these two approaches.

1.2 Outlook
The proceedings of this thesis are the following: First of all, in theoretical framework the two theories of major interest, idealism and realism, are confronted with regard to their envisaged interests and instruments applied as well as their general views of international cooperation. In order to make these two approaches identifiable with regard to the EU’s actions, in the methodological chapter, the main identified characteristics of each theory are operationalized. In this chapter furthermore certain indicators are outlined in order to detect EU interests, instruments as well as more general forms of cooperation in EU-Nigerian relations. The analysis of this thesis consists of two main parts, each answering one sub-question. In the first, EU documents are analyzed with regard to existing EU interests and instruments as well as their idealist and/or realist nature. In the second part, the same documents are analyzed for key developments in the EU’s interests and instruments as well as the general forms of cooperation with Nigeria. In the concluding chapter, by applying the empirical findings from the first analysis, these key developments are explained with regard to their realist and/or idealist nature. In this chapter it is furthermore reflected on the main findings by considering possible implications for the EU as well as their scientific relevance and further research.
2. Theoretical framework – Confronting realism and idealism

The struggle of ideologies seems to be a characteristic feature wherever we find anything like a development of human thought (Popper, 1940).

The main research question of this thesis investigates the capability of realist and/or idealist thought to account for explanations for EU actions towards Nigeria. These two approaches are chosen in the case of EU-Nigerian relations since they very well reflect the two main viewpoints - that the EU is either driven by strategic or ethical interests - as presented in the scientific discourse in the introductory chapter. They are furthermore especially interesting as both are perceived as being of great importance for the understanding of international relations but also as contradicting each other. In order to apply the two theories on the core findings in the analysis, first of all, in this theoretical framework, the two mind-sets are introduced separately. Subsequently, in the main part of this chapter, they are confronted when providing explanations for possible interests, instruments applied and general forms of cooperation in international relations. This method of confrontation and reciprocal critique of the theories is similar to the style of the dialectic, a qualitative method of argumentation aiming at “producing a synthesis” by confronting a thesis with its antithesis (Popper, 1940). However, it needs to be stated that in this thesis, dialectic is not taken as the main method of research, but as stimulation to similarly discuss the main findings for each research question with both theories by assuming that none of the two theories is able to come up with a full explanation for EU action.

2.1 Realism as an intellectual construct

“Realism has dominated the study of international relations from the beginning. [It] has provided the most reliable guidance for statecraft, and offered the most compelling explanations of state behavior” (Norris, 2002). Probably the most prevailing and vigorous variant of this school of thought is neo- or structural realism which was introduced during the 1980s.

This theory sets its focus on the international system as the relevant level of analysis and regards the power struggle between states as central. Therefore, Waltz sees international relations taking place within an anarchic political system (Waltz as cited by Donnelly, 2000). Here, it needs to be stated that the EU – due to its distinctive foreign policy - is regarded as one single actor in the international system (Börzel & Risse, 2009) and thus to be put on one level with single states. According to Mearsheimer (2001) there are five realist pre-assumptions about how the international arena is organized. First, states are seen as the key actors, operating in an anarchic system. Second, all great powers have military capability, and thus are great powers due to hard power. Third, states can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions towards them. Therefore, there is always a certain level of mistrust and fear, leading to a world of self-help. Therefore, the fourth assumption is that the main goal to achieve is state survival in the international system. And lastly, states are regarded as rational actors, striving for the most efficient means to realize their non-emotional, but reasonable goals. Thus, according to the realist school of thought, states’ behavior can in the majority of cases be seen in the light of self-protection and the search of national power and prosperity.
2.2 Idealism as an intellectual construct

In the following it is turned towards idealism, another theory of great relevance for European Studies and EU foreign policy in specific. John Herz (1950) defined political Idealism as the assumption that there exists harmony “between the individual and the ‘general’ good, between the interests, rights, and duties of men and groups in society; and that power can be utilized for the common good, or perhaps, eliminated altogether from political interrelationships.”

Hence, this school of thought, developed in the late 18th century, gives common goods and international values a superior position over the individual states, with the long-run objective of creating a stable world. Thus, to characterize idealism by means of a few key points, Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1933) claims that firstly it should be stated that values and norms are objective or universal and secondly that reality is to be seen as something mental instead of something material. According to Hegel reality is furthermore seen as an organic unity with properties that its parts do not have. Fourth, reality is to be regarded as personal and only persons or selves are real. Any system affirming one or more of these four propositions can be categorized idealistic (Brightman, 1933). Thus, according to the idealist school of thought state-actions take place in an organic world, which is rich in terms of mental strength since its is built on universally applicable norms and values.

2.3 Confronting realism and idealism in the realm of foreign policy

Regarding these two very different approaches concerning the international system and state behavior, in the following the two are confronted in realm of foreign policy. In order to be able to explain EU actions by each of these theories, arguments are confronted with regard to their views concerning international cooperation in general, an actor’s envisaged interests as well as his instruments to be employed in the implementation of EU foreign policy. First, some idealist viewpoints are criticized by realism. Secondly this argumentation will be applied vice versa, with idealism criticizing realist arguments.

**Realism criticizing idealism**

According to idealism, the importance of inner-European cooperation rose in times of peace among the EU’s founding Member States, which is regarded as representing an important institution in the international arena. This is, the EU embodies and represents its inherent norms - shaped by its war-laden history - in a unique way and therefore is able to shape new and different forms of international cooperation with other actors. Its ‘normative difference’ is regarded as a basis for legitimacy of EU foreign policies (Manners, 2002).

Realists however criticize this idealistic argument of novelty and difference and merely regard it as “window-dressing” (Eriksen, 2006). They “tend to discount the possibility of fundamental change in the dynamics of the system itself” (Hyde-Price, 2004). For realists, “international relations are a realm of necessity [as] states must seek power to survive in a competitive environment and continuity over time” (Hyde-Price, 2004). This reflects the fact that realism - and neo-realism in particular - regards international cooperation as constituting an anomaly, as this theory supposes the international system to be actor-centric and anarchic with only rational unitary actors (Hyde-Price, 2006).

Hence, the two approaches agree that the EU fostered its prominence during the time of bipolarity, and thus peace among EU’s founding Member States. However, they regard this as having major different consequences. Since realism characterizes cooperation as an anomaly, it regards the EU as not being able of creating a real common foreign policy but being restricted to few activities driven by the great powers (Hyde-Price A., 2006). Hence, it criticizes the idealist
view that a new form of international cooperation is established. It might be helpful to consider these two points of view concerning the EU’s ability to act in international relations when conducting the analysis of EU-Nigerian relations. Since discovering certain patterns of EU-Nigerian cooperation might imply hints with regard to the extent to which the EU is able and legitimized to act in the international system.

A second point of critique is that according to idealism the EU’s establishment of commonly shared norms is of major interest. In particular, five core norms pursued by the EU are peace, liberty, human rights, democracy and rule of law. In general, exporting these norms and values is legitimate due to the fact that most of those values promoted by the EU are universal and objective and thus exist independently from the specific identity of an actor (Aggestam, 2008).

According to realism however, there are no universal values as each actor has different own norms. Therefore, it is impossible for an actor to claim to “do something good” in a diverse and pluralist international system since at the same time, it is also pursuing its own strategic interests (Hyde-Price, 2008). These different perceptions of the legitimacy to promote norms and values in the international arena are interesting to consider in the analysis with regard to the EU’s promotion of democracy and human rights in Nigeria.

A third point of revision for realism is the instruments envisaged by idealism to be employed in foreign policy. According to idealism the most important and effective instrument in foreign policy is diplomatic relations. They are essential due to their ability of maintaining or restoring peace and establishing mutual trust between the states (Pace, 2007). Also in cases of failure of norms-application in third countries, idealism favors a positive and forward-looking process based on EU norms, which is primarily directed at potentially leading to a transformation of a conflict instead of cutting aid (Pace, 2007). Diplomatic relations are characterized by dialogue and bilateral contractual relations as well as specific policy initiatives in fields like for instance human rights (Pace, 2007). Furthermore, it is argued that the EU’s “lack of coercive instruments and its consequent reliance on declaratory politics [...] constitute the very sources of its strength” (Hyde-Price, 2006).

For realists, such normative instruments like diplomacy might be regarded as ineffective (Brown, 2001) as there is an existing gap between the rhetoric in international law and the situation on the ground (Pace, 2007). Hence these instruments are merely seen as 'instruments of instruments’ (Vogel, 2009). In spite of the fact that also in realism norms and values can be employed as instruments to achieve policy objectives, these are rather regarded as second order concerns and used in order to achieve or legitimize their strategic interests ranking first. When addressing the first sub-question, these different perceptions of instruments employed are especially important to consider in the realm of the EU’s instruments applied in Nigeria, in order to explain EU actions in the light of one or both theories.

**Idealism criticizing realism**

In the following, major realist arguments are objected by some idealist points of critique. According to realism, the international system is to be regarded as a “mechanism [...] in which each unit can survive without the others” (Norris, 2002). Hence, for realists interdependency and interconnectedness between states does not exist since the international system is characterized by anarchy and made up of egoistic states. Mearsheimer (2001) concludes that

---

2 In context of the EU foreign policy these are set out in Article 11 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Manners, 2002)
international institutions have little independent effect on great-power behavior as powerful states create and shape institutions”.

This perception is very much contrasted by idealism, regarding the international system as being one organism in which “the legal order of each state is organically connected with the international legal order, [merging] into an integrated legal system” (Kelsen as cited in Eriksen, 2006). Within this system idealists draw “on empathy and a more extended conception of interest to include ‘others’ and the idea of ‘doing least harm’” (Aggestam, 2008).

Concerning the interests in foreign policy, the realist view is that the main interests of actors are self-interests and concern the aim of universal domination (Hathaway, 2002). In order to achieve greater power, actors drive for keeping or increasing their relative power and secure their strategic - economic or security political - interests. According to Mearsheimer (2001) and Hyde-Price (2004) only two situations could occur that might lead states to strive for non-security goals: either that the pursuit of non-security goals complemented the hunt for relative power, or that it would hardly have any effect on the balance of power. Hence, states use efforts to secure for instance human rights to justify actions that they take in pursuit of wealth and power. Therefore, the realist interests in first place is “making gains and avoiding losses as regards the security, economy and prestige of a state, and second, promoting moral politics when the state is secure” (Gegout, 2009).

Idealism however criticizes this second-order position of norms as it especially “concentrates on conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes of individuals and groups in favor of considerations beyond mere security and self-interest” (Herz, 1950). Hence, in EU foreign policy the first-ranking goal according to idealism is to export EU norms and ideas in order “for peace to stabilize and civil society to flourish in devastated, conflict areas” (Pace, 2007). In addition to the EU’s core norms outlined above, promoted norms are good governance as well as social and economic development, as the routes out of poverty, violence and conflict (Pace, 2007). EU-Nigerian relations can be characterized along the lines of these two points of view, depending on the EU’s instruments applied towards Nigeria as well as its intentions behind them.

As outlined above, the two approaches represent different perceptions of what the main policy instruments shall be. For realism, foreign policy instruments are mainly associated with the aim of achieving security and not diminishing the relative power. Hence states are willing to also employ negative instruments such as military intervention, coercion and economic sanctions in order to make other states comply with existing cooperation agreements (Wagner, 2005).

Idealists on the contrary very much rely on positive means, strengthening a relation instead of restricting it, such as “common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions” (Wagner, 2005). Considering EU policies towards Nigeria this would imply that the EU spreads universal morals and ethical norms (Manners, 2002) by means of positive instruments. When applying such instruments, it is important that the EU subjects its actions to a higher ranking law like human rights and other criteria of justice (Eriksen, 2006).

Hence, whereas idealism rather relies on positive measures like persuasion, the offer and grant of rewards, realism is also willing to make use of negative instruments like the threat of punishment, inflict non-violent punishment or the use force, depending on the advantage of a measure for self-interest. This discourse about instruments applied in foreign policy is essential especially for answering the first sub-question when assessing the nature of EU instruments.
**Key differences between realism and idealism**

Regarding the issue of why actors cooperate in foreign policy the two approaches are drastically different. Whereas international cooperation appears as an anomaly in realism, it is elemental to idealism. According to realism, in a world dominated by anarchy, cooperation on the international level is only possible when this does not thwart or even increases an actor’s interest in power and security. In contrast to this mechanical system stands idealism with its assumption that the international system is an organism characterized by interdependencies and harmonies between actors as well as the parting of common norms.

Another central point of confrontation is that the two theories recognize the same interests in foreign policy, namely on the one hand ethical interests and on the other hand security concerns and other strategic goals. However, they weight these interests differently. Realism puts strategic concerns at first order and only if these are secure, normative interests can be pursued. Idealism however supposes that normative goals are to be ranked first. The reason for this is to be found in the idea that if norms like peace and human rights are exported successfully, they might also secure Europe.

With regard to the main instruments envisaged to be employed, idealism and realism are aware of the existence of both, negative and positive means in policies towards third countries. They employ them however in very different manners. Whereas idealism prefers to use positive instruments to spread norms and values in a non-coercive manner, realism exploits such positive measures to improve the effect of negative instruments, e.g. by relying on close diplomatic relations but employing coercive measures in these. Table 1 provides a short overview of these key differences identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>International Cooperation</strong></th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Idealism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Anomaly, mechanic</td>
<td>Necessary, organic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflecting self-interest,</td>
<td>Harmony between the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rationality</td>
<td>individual and common good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>Readiness to employ negative measures</td>
<td>Positive measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these theoretical differences, as Kant points out, in practice it might be “a mixture of some sort of realism and some sort of idealism-its realistic element being that the world as it appears to us is some sort of material formed by our mind, whilst its idealistic element is, that it is some sort of material formed by our mind” (Kant as cited by Popper, 1940). Assigning this to the case of EU foreign policy implies that the two approaches in fact suggest the same: there are certain interests that are, to a certain extent, formed by EU principles and norms. However, the two theories focus on different parts in this relationship. For realists, it is important to emphasize that the EU very much pursues certain interests but it is a rather minor topic that these have been formed, to some extent, by EU norms and values. For idealism, however the fact that those EU interests are formed by or even equate EU norms and values is essential. Hence, the two approaches seem to be “not identical, but neither are they in opposition, since they are not offering contrary solutions to the same problems” (Pratt, 1933). This suggestion - that none of the two theories alone might be able to come up with a coherent explanation for EU action or that some combination of the two theories is needed - should be kept in mind when confronting
the two theories in the analysis, since it might influence the extent to which both theories can offer explanations for EU behavior.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter, by confronting realism and idealism, has delivered insights about differences and disagreements between idealism and realism concerning the conceptualizations of international cooperation, actors’ main interests as well as instruments employed. Even though there are mutual critiques, a possibility is discovered to combine these two approaches in the explanation of EU actions in its foreign policy, by stressing different aspects of a certain action, resembling realist and idealist motivations. Regarding the case of EU-Nigerian relations, both, the two theories on their own as well as possible combinations are important to consider as they all explain EU behavior differently. When addressing the research questions it is observed to which extent the different explanations apply to different parts of EU actions and hence, how these can be characterized.

3. Methodological framework – A qualitative document analysis

Regarding the explanation of EU actions towards Nigeria in terms of the EU’s interests, its instruments applied and the subsequent forms of cooperation, it is most adequate to conduct a qualitative analysis of EU documents towards Nigeria. In this methodological framework, it is pointed out how in particular this document analysis is to be conducted and what key methodological decisions are taken in this context. Therefore, first of all, it is outlined which documents are collected, for what reason and how this was done. Secondly, in order to address the research questions, first of all it is examined for indicators to be found in EU documents, hinting at EU interests, its instruments employed as well as different forms of cooperation in EU-Nigerian relations. Subsequently, in order to explain these identified EU interests and instruments, reflecting EU actions towards Nigeria, in the light of idealism and realism, it is examined for certain traits of each theory, identifying its envisaged EU interests and instruments as well as general forms of international cooperation.

3.1 Collection of EU documents
In order to address the research question, concerned with the explanation of EU actions towards Nigeria between 1995 and 2007, EU documents are collected, reflecting this particular period of time. This decision is taken on the basis of several methodological considerations.

Firstly, the decision to analyze the EU’s point of view by concentrating on EU interests and EU instruments, is to be justified by the fact that it is the EU’s actions towards Nigeria that are of interest – motivated by its interests and conducted by certain instruments - as pointed out in the introductory chapter of this thesis.

Secondly, it is acknowledged that also several other sources exist, providing information about EU actions in its relations with Nigeria, e.g. newspaper articles. There are however several reasons for relying on EU documents in particular. Firstly, other sources might be even more biased – in supporting or criticizing EU actions - than EU documents themselves. Secondly, EU
documents provide adequate information for the envisaged analysis by reflecting the state of affairs with regard to the form of cooperation between the EU and Nigeria, the EU’s main interests as well as its instruments employed. Moreover, since these documents are reviewed regularly, an analysis of succeeding statements allows for discovering certain developments in the relationship.

The third key decision is to concentrate on documents from the Council of the European Union only even though it is recognized that other EU bodies like the Commission and the Parliament also publish statements with regard to Nigeria. In the end, it is however the Council taking actions and decisions in EU foreign policy. Hence, it is the decisive and final instance. Moreover, as pointed out before, the purpose of this thesis is to explain final EU actions towards Nigeria and not the internal processes within the EU, shaping these actions.

The fourth methodological decision concerns the period chosen for analysis from 1995 until 2007. This time-frame partly embraces the last period of Nigeria’s military rule as well as its current period of democratic governance. Due to this alternation in history, it will be interesting to observe whether the Nigerian type of regime affects EU actions. It is not possible to find documents reflecting the entire last period of military rule starting in 1984, since the public register of the Council only reaches back until 1995 and a request concerning earlier data to the Council under Council Decision 2001/320/EC was not executed.

Furthermore, all documents selected for analysis are only dealing with the EU-Nigerian relations in particular and not with third parties as well, since these would lack sufficient precision enough to deliver information about the EU-Nigerian relations in particular and it might be false to

In particular, the Council Common Positions concerning Nigeria from 1995, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005, the Council Decisions from 1996, 1997 and 1999, Council Conclusion from 2003, the 1998 Joint Action as well as the Presidency Declarations from 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2007 were retrieved from the website of the Council (Council of the European Union, 2004-2011) as well as EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the European Union, 2011). These particular documents are collected since they are succeeding each other and often are introduced in the respective documents before. Furthermore - apart from the Presidency Declarations concerning Nigerian elections in specific - these documents all represent general EU positions towards Nigeria, reflecting the overall development of EU actions towards Nigeria. The Presidency Declarations are however also considered for the analysis, as they reflect the EU’s statements concerning Nigerian elections, as introduced in the introductory chapter and hence of basic interest in the framework of this thesis.

Furthermore, two Country Strategies for Nigeria (2001-2007 and 2008-2013) are collected from the website of the EU delegation to Nigeria (EU Delegation to Nigeria). These strategies provide a long-term plan for EU actions in Nigeria as well as the general nature of EU-Nigerian relations. Even though the second of those strategies only starts in 2008, it is nevertheless incorporated into the analysis. The reason for this is that it draws lessons from the foregoing EU policy towards Nigeria and hence reflects on certain consequences in the interest and instrument constellation envisaged in further cooperation.

All these documents are fully analyzed, including their preamble and specific remarks with regard to Nigeria as well as their specific provisions adopted. They are examined for indicators, hinting at implied EU interests, instruments employed as well as the general form of cooperation

---

3 Hereafter referred to as Council
In EU-Nigerian relations. An example for a hint at EU interests, for instance, is ‘attaches great importance’. This expression implies that the EU finds something important and hence, to a certain extent, is interested in this particularity. Hence, these identified patterns characterize particular actions taken by the EU towards Nigeria and hence are substantial for answering the main research question. Which phrases and verbiage are eye-catching with regard to interests, instruments and forms of cooperation is identified in part 3.2.

In addition to this, tables of quantitative data appear in Appendix III. Data for tables 5 and 6 concerning EU export as well as import from and to Nigeria, in comparison to the overall EU trade with Economic Community of West African States, were arranged at the website of the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD, 2002) for the period from 1995-2008. A comparison to ECOWAS in general is chosen in order to examine whether developments in EU-Nigerian relations similarly are visible for other states as well, in order to reduce the possibility of a spurious relationship between EU actions towards and its economic relations with Nigeria.

3.2 Identifying EU interests, instruments and forms of cooperation

In order to answer the first and second sub-question in the framework of the analytical chapter, the EU’s interests towards Nigeria and its instruments employed need to be identified from the EU documents at hand. In addition to this, within the framework of the second sub-question also the subsequent forms of cooperation are to be detected from the EU documents. In order to make this identification more reliable and transparent, Appendix I presents examples of verbiage or statements hinting at EU interests and instruments applied as well as forms of cooperation. Regarding these extracts, certain patterns of indicators can be identified. This identification is done in line with the purpose of a document analysis being “not a mere summary or description […] but rather an analysis of the motivation, intent and purpose of a document within a particular historical context” (Australian National University, 2010).

With regard to implied EU interests behind certain actions and statements – as retrieved from the EU documents - there are different categories of indicators to be identified. The first category is made up of verbiage requesting something from Nigeria such as ‘has to, if...then, encourages, appeals, expects, strongly recommends, calls on all...’. In the Common Position from 20 November 1995 it was for example stated that “the military regime has yet to demonstrate […] its intention to return to civilian democratic rule” (Council of the European Union, 1995). Such demand for a certain behavior clearly shows that the EU supports such behavior and hence reflects an EU interest. The second category embraces those terms appreciating a certain behavior: ‘attaches great importance, (warmly) welcomes, is willing to, congratulates, notes with satisfaction, hopes, intends, the objective is to..., pursues, looks forward, appreciates’. In the Common Position from 1998, the EU for instance “warmly welcomed recent developments in Nigeria” (Council of the European Union, 1998). When such terms are used, satisfaction is expressed and hence Nigeria’s actions are probably in line with EU interests. Therefore, from those actions appreciated it can be derived what the EU’s interests are. However, there is also the possibility of deriving knowledge about interests from disapproval concerning certain developments or actions. Considering disapproved actions enables the researcher to know that these are not in the interest of the EU. Hence, it can be concluded that the EU is interested in an opposite or at least

---

4 Hereafter referred to as ECOWAS
different development. Terms expressing such disapproval make up the third category: ‘noticed with concern, expresses concern, is disappointed’. An example for such expression of disapproval is the Presidency’s statement in 2007 that “the EU is deeply concerned that these elections were marred by many irregularities and by violent incidents...” (Council of the European Union, 2007).

Indications envisaged or preferred instruments of the EU can again be distributed over two categories of terminology. Whereas the terms of the first category are pointing rather indirectly at the employment of instruments, the terms falling within the second are directly introducing particular measures. The first category embraces phrases like ‘support, cooperation, maintain, pursue, action needed, has undertaken’. In its Common Position from 2001 the Council for instance states that “The EU shall maintain a close and regular political dialogue with Nigeria” (Council of the European Union, 2001) Even though this formulation indicates that a close and regular political dialogue shall be maintained between the EU and Nigeria, it is not concretized by particular measures, making this formulation a rather general and indirect hint. In contrast to this, the EU sometimes lists concrete measures to be taken towards Nigeria: “the EU [...] introduces the following additional measures: (i) visa restrictions... (ii) an embargo on arms...” (Council of the European Union, 1995) Such terms, which are directly followed by a list of measures taken are embraced in a second category, including phrases like: ‘to be achieved through, continue to, further contribute by, activities including, reaffirms/introduces/takes the following measures’

Concerning the hints at the form of EU Nigerian cooperation it can be distinguished between no or restricted cooperation and increased or full cooperation. For no or restricted cooperation phrases such as ‘suspension, restriction, expulsion, interruption, cancellation, embargo’ are used. Hence, in when the EU reaffirms the “suspension of military cooperation, visa restrictions [...] the cancellation of training courses...” (Council of the European Union, 1995) the EU restricts its cooperation with Nigeria. Whether there is no or restricted cooperation depends on the range of issue areas over which cooperation was suspended, restricted etc. Terms pointing at a form of full or at least increased cooperation are ‘in support of, readiness to cooperate, strengthening relations, working in cooperation, maintain cooperation and remains committed’. Thus, when the EU “stresses its readiness to cooperate” (Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations) this indicates a turn to increased or full cooperation.

Hence, if some of these phrases appear in the EU documents during the analysis for the first and second sub-question respectively, they point at an EU statement with regard to its interests towards Nigeria, its instruments applied or the form of cooperation with Nigeria. In order to provide a better overview of the main indicators detected, Figure 1 illustrates them in a structured manner.
3.3 Identifying realist and idealist traits

Furthermore, in the first sub-question the identified interests and instruments, and subsequent forms of cooperation need to be characterized as being of realist and/or idealist nature. In order to be able to label certain interests, instruments and forms of cooperation idealist and/or realist, a clear conceptualization of these theories is needed. This can be done by referring back to the insights delivered by the theoretical framework of this research. Due to such confrontation of realist and idealist approaches, this study very much gains scientific relevance because it develops the possibility to perceive the EU and its foreign policy towards Nigeria in new or modified ways, e.g. through a possible coexistence or interdependence of the two approaches. Scholars believing either in realism or idealism as sole explanation for EU behaviour are criticized by this method.

With regard to the identification of interests or goals of the two mind-sets, for realism the following can be stated: the overall aim for states is the survival in the international system. This means that the highest ranking goal is of strategic nature, security politics or economics. Non-security goals are rather second order normative concerns (Hyde-Price, 2006) which are only pursued if they complement the hunt for relative power or if they have hardly any effect on the balance of power. Therefore, realist interests can be identified mainly in two ways. First, by the mentioning of strategic interests and secondly, if normative achievements might be conducive or not effecting the balance of power. Idealist interests in contrast can be identified by giving normative concerns highest priority. This means that idealists aim at reaching a certain common good, like international/universal norms (Aggestam, 2008). Hence, in particular this means that the EU would export its norms and ideas in order for Nigerian civil society to stabilize and flourish (Pace, 2007).
Regarding the envisaged **instruments** to be employed examples for realist instruments are: the willingness to use military interventions, coercion, economic sanctions (Wagner, 2005) as well as the threat of punishment. However, also diplomatic instruments might be applied in order to foster those rather negative measures named before. Diplomacy on its own is however often regarded as ineffective (Brown, 2001) due to the gap between rhetoric and situation on the ground. In contrast to this classification of diplomacy as an ‘instrument of instruments’, for idealists it is one of the strongest means in international relations. Here, diplomacy is characterized by dialogue, bilateral contractual relations and specific policy initiatives (Pace, 2007). Furthermore, also persuasion as well as the offering and granting of rewards might be employed. Thus, whereas hard or negative instruments can rather easily be identified as realist instruments, diplomacy might be both, an instrument of other realist instruments or an instrument for the pursuit of idealist interests, depending on the EU interest behind it.

In the theoretical framework, international **cooperation** was characterized by realism as an anomaly in an anarchic political system, which is characterized by mistrust, fear and self-help. Furthermore, cooperation is regarded as a mechanism and a necessity in order to increase one’s relative gains. Hence, in the documents themselves realist motives for or against cooperation might be indicated by choosing for a certain form of cooperation only in cases when this does not limit or even increases the relative gains of the EU. For idealism on the other hand cooperation is seen as something organic and natural. Therefore, an indicator for idealist motives is that cooperation is always regarded as desirable and cannot be ceased easily.

Table 2 – Indicators for EU Interests, Instruments and general forms of Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for...</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
<td>survival in international system; non-security goals are second order concerns, first-ranking goals are of strategic nature; security policy or economics; reach common good: international/universal norms; export European norms and ideas</td>
<td>foster security politics and economic relations; spread values if conducive for or not hindering strategic interests</td>
<td>Diplomacy is instrument of instrument; also willing to use military intervention, coercion, economic sanctions and threat of punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idealism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>spread of norms and values; value compliance</td>
<td>Diplomacy, persuasion, offer and grants or rewards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hence, the task of identifying idealist and realist patterns in EU statements and actions might not always be unambiguous, but determined by the interpretation of EU argumentation. For, idealism’s interests and instruments applied might also be of interest and hence be used by realist actors, as long as this does not diminish the EU’s relative gains. Therefore, it seems to be easier to classify strategic interests and hard instruments as realist. Whereas, in order to identify interests and instruments of pure idealist nature, the relative advantages and disadvantages for the EU of a certain decision need to be considered, in order to rule out their realist purpose. This reveals that it is more difficult to prove true idealist characteristics in an interest or instrument than pure realism.

3.4 Conclusion
In the following, the steps presented above, which are to be taken in the analysis, are shortly summarized. In the framework of the analysis for the first sub-question, first of all, the EU interests and instruments need to be identified according to the patterns outlined in this chapter. Regarding those identified interests and instruments, realist and idealist explanations are confronted, relying on the typical characteristics of each theory, as identified in this chapter. Knowing which instruments and interests respectively are of realist and/or idealist nature allows for answering the first sub-question. In the course of addressing the second sub-question, main developments in EU-Nigerian relations between 1995 and 2007 with regard to EU interests and instruments as well as the overall form of cooperation are examined along the lines identified in this chapter. Regarding these developments, the knowledge about the theoretical nature of certain interests and instruments, as derived from the first analysis, can be applied in order to address the main research question.

4. Analysis
In order to approach the main research question, concerning the extent to which realism and idealism offer explanations for EU actions, this analytical chapter addresses the two sub-questions in two main parts, providing substantial knowledge for the main question. In the first part, first of all, the main EU interests and instrument with regard to Nigeria are identified and categorized. Secondly, it is analyzed to which extent these interests and instruments are of idealist and/or realist nature. In the second part of this analysis, the second sub-question is addressed by observing key developments in EU interests, instruments and the general forms of cooperation in EU-Nigerian relations over time. By combining the insights delivered by both parts, the main research question is approached in the concluding chapter. In particular the knowledge derived from the first part concerning the nature of certain EU interests and instruments is applied on key developments in EU interests and instruments, as indentified in the second part.

4.1 EU Interests and Instruments towards Nigeria – Idealist and/or Realist?
In order to approach the first sub-question, first of all, all the EU’s interests and instruments applied with regard to Nigeria are identified from EU-documents - as presented in the methodological chapter - and listed (see Appendix II). In order to get a better overview of
existing interests and instruments, as a second step, all the identified interests and instruments respectively, are categorized into main groups. Thirdly, as an interpretative step, concerning these categories, realist and idealist explanations for these certain interests and instruments are confronted in order to detect the realist and/or idealist nature of the identified EU interests and instruments.

4.1.1. EU Interests
First, by applying the list of indicators as outlined in the previous chapter, interests implied in EU documents are revealed. With Appendix II this process can be reconstructed, listing all identified interests of the EU. When regarding this list of interests, two things are striking. First, it is obvious that there are several repeating and revisited interests. Secondly, it is interesting that certain categories of interests can be observed, since many of those identified interests are quite similar, closely intertwined and sometimes dependent on each other. Hence, in order to provide a more structured overview of the major existing interests, five categories are established: democracy, values, economy, security and development aid (Table 3). These five categories can be regarded as five overall interests of the EU with regard to Nigeria, as it emanates from the documents analyzed. Within the framework of each of these main interests, several sub-goals are implied. In this context it needs to be stated that even though it is acknowledged that these interests might not be of equal weight for the EU, this is not considered in this first part. The purpose of this part rather served the basic knowledge concerning existing EU interests and their nature. How these different interests developed and are weighted by the EU over time is analyzed in the second part.

Table 3 – EU Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Development Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Principles</td>
<td>Shared values and interests</td>
<td>Nigeria’s economic influence</td>
<td>Nigeria’s important political, regional and international role</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian democratic rule</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Shared interests</td>
<td>Regional Integration/Crisis management in West Africa</td>
<td>institutional capacity building (constitution, elections, budget, military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Process</td>
<td>Commitment to Human Rights</td>
<td>Mutually beneficial relations</td>
<td>Economic and trade cooperation</td>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic quality and accountability</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>Economic and trade cooperation</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Immunisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reform</td>
<td>Involvement of civil society</td>
<td>Consolidation of economic growth</td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
<td>Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Economic reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening electoral process</td>
<td>Regional Integration in West Africa</td>
<td>EU energy supply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional capacity building (constitution, elections, budget, military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, with regard to these main interests, the next step is to identify to what extent these interests can be explained by realism and/or idealism. For this, each interest category is analyzed to the extent to which realism and idealism can provide explanations for pursuing
these interests. In order to discuss the consistency of the above mentioned interest categories with the two theories, the definitions of interests as provided by the two approaches, as defined in the methodological chapter, need to be recalled. The main interests of a realist actor are to foster its security politics and its economic relations in international relations in order to survive in the international system. Normative interests are only pursued in case they are conducive for or do not hinder the pursuit of these strategic interests. In contrast to this, idealists regard normative as prior interests e.g. the promotion of commonly shared norms and values. Hence, idealists are not interested in material gains but enrichment of the mind.

The first interest category Democracy can be identified due to several clear statements by the EU such as acting “in support of the democratic process in Nigeria” (Council of the European Union, 1998- 2 ). The EU’s promotion of the democratic process in Nigeria is also expressed by more specific interests stated such as the strengthening of the electoral process, aiming at free and fair elections, the promotion of democratic quality and accountability as well as the implementation of democratic principles.

This EU interest in democracy promotion does not constitute a realist strategic interest since this term is only embracing economic and security political interests and is therefore to be regarded as a second order normative concern. Nevertheless, as stated above, democracy might be pursued by realists in case a democratic government is somehow conducive for or not hindering the pursuit of strategic interests. Concerning idealism however the general EU interest in democracy promotion as well as the spread of democratic values is of major importance. According to idealism it would resemble an ideal situation if the EU was promoting its European values, legitimized through its unique history, in order to create a more stable world.

Thus, the main finding concerning the ability of realism and idealism to come up with explanations for the EU’s interest in democracy promotion, is that, at least to some extent, it can be explained by both theories. Whereas realism can only support this EU interest given the condition that democratic rule in Nigeria was conducive or at least not decreasing the EU’s relative strategic gains, e.g. trade gains, idealism is able to account for the EU’s interest in democracy promotion and the spread of democratic values more coherently since it is regarded as a major interest.

The second category of EU interests to be identified is Values. According to the EU, its relations with Nigeria “shall be based on ... shared values of respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance” (Council of the European Union, 2001).

Realists regard this promotion and spread of European values – like human rights, the rule of law and peace – as a second order normative concern. Only in case that the promotion and sharing of these values is valuable for realists, meaning that these values produce relative gains for the EU in its relations with Nigeria, it might become an interesting and pursued goal. One example of such an instance might be the promotion of peace through shared values. A peaceful situation in a country, regardless of the type of regime - democratic or military - creates a more stable political situation which also influences the economic stability. Also Cook and Moos (1954) argue that the sharing values or principles commonly agreed upon might be conducive or indeed necessary in order to pursue strategic goals more effectively. Hence, the EU’s interest in the promotion of values, just as that in the promotion of democracy can only conditionally be supported by realism. Idealist interests on the contrary are especially coherent with the EU’s interest in promoting commonly shared values and interests in Nigeria, like democracy or human rights. One example which is especially expressive with regard to the EU’s
promotion of human rights is the statement that Nigeria failed “to honour its commitment to human rights, as it stems from a number of international instruments…” (Council of the European Union, 1995). This evaluation of Nigeria’s actions of the EU is in line with the idealist approach, which is acknowledging the existence and appreciating the compliance with universal norms and higher ranking laws.

Hence, with regard to this interest category, again it can be stated that realism only offers conditional support for the EU’s pursuit of promoting values in Nigeria. Idealism however is able to come up with a coherent explanation, regarding the promotion of commonly shared values as a major goal.

The third EU interest category to be discussed is Economy. The EU expresses interests in economic and trade cooperation with Nigeria “by virtue of [Nigeria’s] economic influence” (Council of the European Union, 2001) and the fact that Nigeria is regarded as “key energy supplier for the EU’s energy security” (Federal Republic of Nigeria & European Community).

The EU’s interest in this issue area can be very well explained by realism since the promotion of economic development and relations resemble strategic interests of the EU, which are of highest priority. According to realism, well-functioning economic relations might be conducive in order to secure an actor’s position in the international system and to increase his relative gains. From 2001 onwards the EU indeed expresses its interest in strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Nigeria “in all areas of common interest” (Article 1.1) (Council of the European Union, 2001). Since Article 1.2 of this Position states the EU’s willingness to support Nigeria among others in its own process of economic development. This shows that not only the EU, but also Nigeria itself actively pursues economic development. Thus, arguing that the promotion of the Nigerian economy is a common interest, the EU is indeed interested in benefiting from these relations in some way. Hence, gives the EU’s actions a rational and realist character. Hence, the EU’s interest in increased economic relations and development of Nigeria’s economy can clearly be accounted for by the realist approach. Idealism on the contrary cannot come up with an equally coherent explanation. Even though also economic development could be regarded as being of idealist interest (Pace, 2007) reflecting certain European principles like liberalization, it does not belong to the core values of the EU, as set out in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Furthermore, even though EU-Nigerian relations are envisaged as being mutually beneficial, and hence also beneficial for Nigeria, this statement also implies the EU’s intention to cooperate in order for itself to benefit. Idealism however aims at overcoming such egoistic instincts and attitudes of individual actors in order to create a harmony between the individual and the general (Herz, 1950).

Hence, the EU’s interest in economic relations with Nigeria, due to the EU’s interest in benefiting from these relations, classifies this interest as being closer to realism than to idealism, since these relations as not solely for the common good.

Coming to the fourth main interest category, Security policy, the EU “attaches great importance to the relationship [with Nigeria] in recognition of [its] pivotal regional and international role […] especially its contribution to peace-keeping activities…” (Council of the European Union, 1998).

When the EU is expressing such interest in security political cooperation with Nigeria, the realist concern of securing strategic interests is reflected: Due to Nigeria’s regional importance, the EU might hope for advantages with regard to other African countries. Such advantages might be of direct nature, in case a more stable situation in Africa enables the EU to
also cooperate closer with other African countries. However, the advantages might be also of indirect nature if a more stable African situation prevents the EU from negative consequences like migration-waves, increased spending of development aid or an insecure energy supply. Even though idealism is not able to account for EU concerns with regard to energy supply, it can nevertheless support the idea that the EU is encouraging Nigeria to promote regional integration and conflict prevention in Africa since the overall aim of idealism is to arrive at a stable world, based e.g. on such values as peace. Hence, when integrating, the EU should encourage Nigeria to integrate other states by spreading universal norms and values.

Thus, idealism can explain the EU’s interest to that extent that it pursues an international stable situation e.g. by promoting peace in order create a stable world. It can however not explain the EU’s concern about security politics due to its individual advantage, e.g. through security in oil supply, like realism.

The EU’s fifth interest category, identified in the policy documents towards Nigeria is Development Aid. That the EU is interested in spending development aid is indicated by its funds provided for particular projects, e.g. in the two Country Strategy Papers analyzed. In case of Nigeria, the EU’s development aid is mostly directed at the most basic needs for individuals - like water and sanitation as well as immunization - as well as for the state – through institutional capacity building.

For realists, just as democracy and values, spending development aid cannot be regarded as having strategic advantages for the EU, since the EU is providing aid and hence money for Nigeria without receiving a certain advantage in return. What however might be the case is that the EU hopes or assumes that in the near future its budget spent e.g. on poverty reduction will pay off for instance in better economic performance of Nigeria. The same is true for institutional capacity building. Maybe the EU assumes that increased organization and manifestation of democracy will provide a more secure framework for economic cooperation, especially in the area of energy supply and trade relations. Accounting for the EU’s interest in spending development aid to Nigeria in terms of idealism, it can be said that it very well reflects the idealist concern to spread norms and values and to create a stable world. Especially sub-interests like poverty reduction, water and sanitation and immunization reflect fundamental human rights, as promoted and represented by the EU, e.g. the right to live or the right to health as well as the respect for human dignity. In addition to this, also the EU’s interest in institutional capacity building in Nigeria - by means of establishing a constitution, democratic elections, control over the budget and a reorganization of the military – reflects fundamental EU principles like the rule of law and is therefore in line with idealism.

Thus, also the EU’s interest in spending development aid to Nigeria can only be explained by realists if it is assumed to pay off after some time. Idealists however regard such aid as an effective form in order to promote the most fundamental values and principles.

Concluding this analysis, the first finding to be recorded is that five main EU-interests are to be identified in EU-Nigerian relations: the promotion of democracy and European values, good economic relations with Nigeria, security political stability and the spending of development aid to Nigeria. Referring back to the first sub-question, about the extent to which these interests are of idealist and/or realist nature first of all it can be stated that neither realism nor idealism alone are able to fully account for the EU’s interest identified from the documents.

In particular, idealism is able to come up with coherent explanations for the EU’s interest in the promotion of democracy in Nigeria, its interest in spreading its fundamental norms and its
interest in providing development aid. It is however not able to coherently account for the existence of economic interests in Nigeria and the interest in mutually beneficial relations, in particular. With regard to security politics, idealism is able to predict the EU’s pursuit of more stability in the world only if it is not to the advantage of the EU only, but in order to create a stable world.

Realism, on the contrary is very well able to justify the EU’s interest in promoting Nigeria’s competence to foster security political issues in Africa, due to its possible advantages for the EU. Also the EU’s interest in economic relations with Nigeria can be accounted for by realists due to its mutual beneficence. With regard to the three other interest categories, democracy, values and development aid however, realists can only come up with explanations under the condition that the promotion of these issues is somehow beneficial or at least not of hindrance for the EU’s strategic interests.

4.1.2. EU Instruments

With regard to the identification and explanation of EU instruments applied, the same categorization procedure is applied as for EU interests. As a basis for the categorization an overview of all the instruments applied is provided in Appendix II. In order to get a better overview of sometimes recurrent instruments, these are categorized (cf. Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Supporting Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspension/restriction/embargo of cooperation</td>
<td>Constructive/close/regular political dialogue</td>
<td>EUEOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active pursuit of a review of the situation by an international tribunal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Funding of projects/programs (development cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of imposing further sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of economic and political reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening basic democratic principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total three main instrument-categories can be identified: sanctions, diplomacy and supporting activities. Similar to the part of interests, in the following it is examined to which extent these instruments can be accounted for or justified by realism and/or idealism. As identified in the methodological framework, according to realism the EU should employ those instruments, most conducive in order to achieve security and not diminish its relative gains. In particular, realists might use diplomacy, but also show the willingness to use hard measures, like military intervention, coercion, economic sanctions or the threat of punishment in order to make other states comply with existing cooperation agreements (Wagner, 2005). It needs to be stated however, that diplomacy often is regarded as ‘instruments of instruments’, decreasing its meaning for realists. Idealists on the contrary predominantly rely on ‘soft’ and positive measures, such as diplomacy, economic cooperation, persuasion and the offering of grants and rewards. 
The first instrument-category identified is **Sanctions**. Even though the EU states that sanctions or restrictive measures\(^5\) may be also of diplomatic nature (European Commission, 2011), in this analysis sanctions are regarded as a distinct category. This decision is taken due to the diversity of EU sanctions imposed on Nigeria. In particular, the EU imposes sanctions on Nigeria when suspending military cooperation, restricting visas, suspending visits, imposing an arms embargo, cancelling military trainings etc. (Council of the European Union, 1995).

The realist approach can offer a quite coherent explanation for the EU’s use of sanctions. According to realism states are willing to impose negative measures, like sanctions, the threat of punishment and coercion, in order to secure their relative power in the international system. Hence, regarding the EU’s instruments employed within the category of sanctions, these clearly resemble the realist readiness to impose negative measures towards other states in their pursuit of self-defense. This claim is supported by the fact that economic cooperation is not suspended as can be similarly observed in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix III. Even though there are alternations in the amounts of EU imports from Nigeria, at all times the amount of imports is significant (Table 5, Appendix III) which is especially visible when comparing to the overall imports from ECOWAS. The same is true for EU exports to Nigeria as well which remain at a constant level in this period. The importance of trade in EU-Nigerian relations is fostered when considering the EU’s rather weak military ambitions. This is also expressed in the EU documents analyzed, where Nigeria’s economic influence as well as the EU’s interest in economic cooperation with Nigeria are outlined constantly from 2001 onwards, military cooperation is not addressed at all. Also with regard to development cooperation, where the EU is rather investing money than gaining itself, realists would not see any losses for the EU and hence could account for its decision to suspend development cooperation with Nigeria. Idealists on the contrary prefer to rely on the peaceful transformation of a conflict (Pace, 2007) as well as positive and peaceful means of conflict management (Wagner, 2005). Imposing sanctions, e.g. against development cooperation is thus not preferred and rather conflicting with pure idealism.

Hence, the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Nigeria is can be coherently accounted for by the realist approach, but is usually not supported by the idealist approach.

The second category of EU instruments employed towards Nigeria is **Diplomacy**. In particular, the EU stresses its pursuit of “close and regular political dialogue with Nigeria” (Council of the European Union, 2001).

According to realists, diplomacy is regarded as an instrument of instruments (Vogel, 2009). This is due to the assumption that diplomacy might be regarded as ineffective (Brown, 2001) by realists due to the gap existing between the rhetoric in international law and the situation on the ground (Pace, 2007). This implies that coercive or negative measures often are more effective when real conflicts are concerned than mere diplomatic relations. Hence, realists would only use diplomacy in order to foster the effectiveness of other instruments or the realisation of the main strategic interests. Idealism however, is able to offer a coherent explanation for the use of diplomacy in international realtions, since diplomacy is regarded to be able to maintain or restore peace and establish mutual trust between states (Pace, 2007), which might be essential for a successful conflict management.

Thus, with regard to the EU’s use of diplomacy, realism can offer a conditional explanation, in case diplomacy is regarded as an instrument of instruments, and is hence only used if it is conducive for the EU’s strategic interests. Idealism however, can come up with a

---

\(^5\) The two terms are used interchangeably (European Commission, 2011)
coherent and supportive explanation for diplomatic relations, as these might foster mutual understanding and thus a peaceful relationship.

The third identified category of instruments employed by the EU is Supportive Actions. This category embraces actions like the EU’s sending of an EU EOM in for the 1999 Nigerian elections. Such missions are “in support of the democratic process in Nigeria” (Council of the European Union, 1998-2). In addition to such missions, also financial support is offered by the EU with its National Indicative Programmes.

With regard to such supportive actions, realism could only support these EU instruments if they implied certain advantages for the EU. One possible advantage could be that e.g. though direct financial assistance the political and economic situation in Nigeria becomes more stable, which might be of advantage e.g. for EU-Nigerian economic relations. A second possible benefit for the EU might be its relative power in the international system, representing a major donor in the world. By investing money in other countries, the EU might gain a lot of influence throughout the world in terms of other states being dependent, trusting and/or respecting the EU. In contrast to this conditional explanation, idealism is again able to come up with an unambiguous one. According to idealists, among others, the cooperation in fields of economic and political reform is very valuable in order to achieve common solutions (Wagner, 2005). Furthermore, Pace (2007) claims that also specific policy initiatives e.g. EU EOMs in the field of democracy promotion, count as diplomatic measures and are hence highly appreciated by idealism. In addition to this, also the positive character of such supportive actions – by being characterized by funding, promoting and strengthening - is very much in line with idealism.

Therefore, regarding the category of supportive actions, the same logic applies as with regard to diplomacy: whereas idealism is able to coherently account for the use of such supportive and positive measures, realism can only explain such EU instruments, if their use implied certain benefits or at least no losses for the EU.

Hence, in order to directly answer the first sub-question it can be stated that neither idealism nor realism alone are able to account for all EU interests and instruments identified. Instead, characteristics of both theories can be identified to certain extends in the EU’s interests and instruments. Realist interests can be identified as to the extent that the EU is interested in well-established and mutually beneficial economic relations with Nigeria and that it is concerned with certain security political issues as well. Idealist interests can be identified as to the extent that the EU is interested in promoting democracy as well as other European values in Nigeria and that it is interested in providing development assistance, in order to establish a solid basis for respecting and enacting basic human rights and other fundamental European principles. The EU’s instruments employed can be characterized realist to the extent that the EU did impose sanctions against Nigeria, due to their negative nature. Instruments of idealist nature are the EU’s use of diplomacy in its relations with Nigeria as well as certain supportive actions, in order to stabilize the situation in Nigeria. As discussed throughout the analysis, it is however not always possible to rule out one of the theories. Especially realism could explain the existence of certain normative interests as well as the employment of certain positive measures if certain conditions applied. Since it is however not possible to test for all these conditions, only that theory, which is able to coherently and unambiguously account for a certain interest or instrument, is also assigned to it in this summary.
4.2 Development of EU-Nigerian Cooperation

In this chapter, in order to address the second sub-question, the development of EU-Nigerian relations is analyzed. For this, EU-documents between 1995 and 2007 are examined as to the developments with regard to the general forms of cooperation in EU-Nigerian relations, as well as the EU’s main interests pursued and main instruments applied.

4.2.1. From Restricted to Resumed Cooperation

When analyzing the EU-documents at hand, a first key finding is that there are three different stages of cooperation to be identified between the EU and Nigeria since 1995. These can be classified as a restricted, a reconsidered and a resumed stage of cooperation. The relationship developed from restricted cooperation from 1995-1998 over a reconsideration of cooperation in 1998 and 1999 to the resuming of cooperation in 1999, lasting until 2007.

That there is only restricted cooperation from 1995-1998 is documented by the existence of sanctions, imposed by the EU in the fields of military and development cooperation with Nigeria as stated in the Council Common Position of 20 November 1995. These sanctions are imposed due to “human rights abuses” and the Nigerian departure from a civilian democratic rule and intend to achieve an early transition to democracy as well as the respect for human rights (Council of the European Union, 1995). Since this suspension only affects two main fields of EU-Nigerian cooperation – military and development - but is not directed at other fields like economic relations, it can be labeled as restricted cooperation. Later in 1995, within the Council Common Position of 4 December 1995, these sanctions are extended to measures, which could be taken by individual Member States in order to increase the effect of these sanctions. This form of restricted cooperation is extended until 1 November 1998 since there are no significant changes in the transition to democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law on sides of Nigeria (Council of the European Union, 1997). Hence, in the fields of military and development relations there is no cooperation between the EU and Nigeria from 1995 until 1998.

In September 1998, however a remarkable change can be observed when the EU reconsiders cooperation with Nigeria. Here the EU Presidency declares and welcomes a positive development regarding the transition to democracy and the plan of conducting democratic elections in Nigeria in 1999 (Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations). A further indication of the EU’s willingness to reconsider the relationship is the repeal of the hitherto effective Common Position from 1995 as well as the EU’s active support for the electoral process by sending an EU EOM. EU-Nigerian cooperation at this point of time, can however not be regarded as re-established since even though the EU stresses its readiness to cooperate (Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations), the suspension of military and development cooperation still apply until the “installation of a democratically elected civilian government” (Council of the European Union, 2001). In 1999, after the Nigerian elections, the Presidency furthermore declares the EU’s “willingness to continue to promote political and economic reforms” (Council Presidency, 1999) in Nigeria with a special focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

As planned and assured by this statement, a second key development occurs in EU-Nigerian relations, namely the resumption of cooperation. This shift is proven by the decision of

---

6 It is acknowledged that already in 1993 cooperation was suspended in the field of military cooperation due to the annulment of democratic elections by the military regime. Therefore, document (95/515/CFSP) represents an extension of the sanctions imposed in 1993. The document of 1993 could however not be retrieved from the internet.
from 17 May 1999 to repeal the Common Position from 1998 and hence all sanctions against Nigeria. Furthermore, in the Council Common Position of 14 May 2001 the new EU-Nigerian cooperation is given form by establishing “close and regular political dialogue” (Council of the European Union, 2001). This form of cooperation, beyond cooperation in trade only, is supported and further defined in all following documents analyzed. Even though in some instances the EU expresses disappointment or concern, cooperation is abided and no sanctions are imposed.

Hence, the first main finding with regard to the second sub-question is that the EU-Nigerian relationship is undergoing a development from restricted to resumed cooperation.

4.2.2. From Interests in Democracy to Diversified Interests

The second development in EU-Nigerian relations refers to the interests and goals expressed by the EU with regard towards Nigeria. Whereas from 1995 until 1998, the EU is mainly concerned with the promotion of democracy in Nigeria, from 1998 onwards more often economic and security political concerns are stated.

From 1995 until 1998, the EU is mainly concerned with the establishment of democracy and democratic principles in Nigeria. Evidence for this is to be found in the interests and goals expressed in the EU-documents. In 1995, for instance, the EU’s main intention behind the imposing of sanctions is that the military regime should demonstrate “convincingly its intention to return to civilian democratic rule within a credible and rapid time-frame” (Council of the European Union, 1995). This goal remains of major interest until 1998 when democratic elections are announced. With regard to this event, in the Common Position of 30 October 1998, EU interests can be identified as being free and fair elections, democratic governance and to encourage Nigeria to work further on the improvements achieved already, as for example to publish the draft constitution from 1995 or the release of political prisoners. What is however striking in this Position is that the EU also expresses other and new interests and “attache[s] great importance to the relationship [by expressing its] recognition of the pivotal regional and international role of this country” (Council of the European Union, 1998). This statement resembles the EU’s interest in strengthened EU-Nigerian relations, which possibly is driven by security political advantages, since it is especially recognizing Nigeria’s “contribution to peace-keeping activities” (Council of the European Union, 1998). In the EU’s Common Position from 2001, this trend is confirmed when the EU considers Nigeria “a key partner in terms of political, economic, trade and development cooperation” (Council of the European Union, 2001). The EU’s increasing emphasis on economic development in Nigeria is also observable with regard to the allocation of the European Development Fund, of which 220 € mio. are allocated to economic - as well as state - and local institutional reform, whereas only four million euro are allocated to the promotion of human rights and five million to the improvement of democratic elections (Nigeria & Commission, 2001). That the EU is interested in benefits from this economic cooperation with Nigeria is clearly expressed by the statement that the objective is to “strengthen the mutually beneficial relations” (Council of the European Union, 2001). However, despite the observed tendency of increasing economic interests it should not be overseen that the EU still is interested in consolidating democracy in Nigeria. In general, it can be stated that the EU’s main goals toward Nigeria become more diversified, ranging from the consolidation of democracy and human rights over institutional capacity building, to poverty reduction, economic development and to the enhancement of Nigeria’s capacity to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development in West Africa. Another aim stated is to strengthen the involvement of civil society and public authorities in the EU-Nigerian dialogue and to build
civil society networks of NGOs, which promote democracy (Council of the European Union, 2001). With regard to the weighting or dominance of certain interests in this pool of diversified interests, it can be said that even though not all interests are expressed in all documents, all of them arise more than ones either in the preambles of Position or ‘key areas for future EU support’.

Hence, with regard to EU interests in its relations with Nigeria, a development is recognizable from only expressing interests in democracy promotion to also showing interest in diversified issue areas. Especially remarkable is the repeated emphasis of the EU’s recognition of Nigeria’s political and economic influence as well as its interest in strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Nigeria and the stressing of economic cooperation.

4.2.3. From Negative to Positive Instruments

Also regarding the EU’s instruments applied in its relations with Nigeria, one remarkable development is to be observed: from imposing negative measures like sanctions towards the instrumentation of diplomatic methods.

From 1995 until 1998 the EU imposes sanctions towards Nigeria. In particular, military and development cooperation is suspended, with only a few exceptions. In addition to this, the EU “actively pursued the adoption of a resolution on Nigeria at the 50th UN General Assembly and the inclusion of the situation in Nigeria on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights” (Council of the European Union, 1995 - 2). Hence, the EU actively takes certain negative measures to make Nigeria comply with its demands. Moreover, the EU clearly expresses its readiness to consider “further measures, including sanctions, if specific steps are not taken by Nigerian authorities” (Council of the European Union, 1995 – 2). This clearly indicates the EU’s willingness to impose further negative measures in case of Nigeria’s non-compliance. Such threatening by the EU can be seen as an instrument itself in order to make Nigeria comply with its demands. From 1998 onwards however - even though sanctions are still in force - another picture of the EU is revealed when the EU expresses its preparedness “to strengthen a constructive political dialogue with Nigeria and will consider concrete measures to support the election process in Nigeria (Council of the European Union, 1998). In consistence with this, in its Joint Action from 1998, the EU decides to send an electoral observer mission to the Nigerian elections if requested by Nigerian authorities. Even though the sending of an EU EOM and the implementation of dialogue still indicate an active pursuit of EU goals, they are of positive nature since they also allow for the promise of reward. In 1999 this trend to positive measures like constructive dialogue is completed when all sanctions are repealed. The main instrument stated in the Common Position from 2001 for example is “a close and regular political dialogue with Nigeria...but also associate civil society” (Council of the European Union, 2001). After rather undemocratic elections in 2003, again, special emphasis is put on EU future support to strengthen the electoral process in Nigeria.

Thus, with regard to the development of EU instruments employed in its relations with Nigeria it can be stated that the trend goes from negative measures like sanctions and threatening, to rather positive measures, like diplomacy and support.

In summary, the answer to the second sub-question is that there are three key developments to be identified in EU-Nigerian relations between 1995 and 2007: a development from restricted to resumed cooperation, a shift from the EU’s sole expressed interest in democracy promotion in Nigeria to more diversified interests, with a special emphasis on economic cooperation as well as its security political concerns and a development from rather negative to rather positive
instruments employed by the EU. What is remarkable about these three main developments is a recognizable connection between them: in all three separate developments, the main turning point is when democracy is introduced in Nigeria in 1999. This implies that there are actually two main periods – 1995-1999 and 1999-2007 - characterized by different EU interests and instruments as well as different forms of cooperation between the EU and Nigeria.

4.3 Characterizing key developments by idealism and realism
This analytical chapter revealed several key findings, on which basis the first as well as the second sub-question were addressed. In order to be able to address the main research question, in the following the main insights derived from the two analyses are considered and combined. This is done by applying the derived knowledge about the extent to which certain EU interests and instruments can be identified as realist and/or idealist on the two main detected developments in EU-Nigerian relations between 1995 and 2007. This way, also the two developments of the main EU actions can be characterized and explained in the light of idealism and realism.

As identified in the analysis of the second sub-question, it can be distinguished between two main periods of EU actions in its relations with Nigeria. The first period from 1995 until 1999 is characterized by the EU’s main interest in promoting democracy in Nigeria. Since Nigerian authorities violate democratic and human rights principles, the EU imposes a suspension of military and development cooperation on Nigeria. The second period, from 1999 until 2007, is marked by the resumption of cooperation due to Nigeria’s compliance with democratic principles. In this period, a broadened range of EU interests is at stake: in addition to its interest in democracy promotion, the EU also expresses economic and security political interests. These interests are pursued by the employment of positive instruments like diplomacy and supportive actions. In the following it is examined to which extent these two periods of different EU actions can be explained by realism and/or idealism.

With regard to the first identified period from 1995 until 1999, the EU’s interest in democracy promotion – as discovered in the first analysis - to some extent can be explained by both, idealism and realism. Idealism is able to coherently account for the EU’s promotion of democracy in Nigeria since it is one of its most fundamental values. Realism however would only be interested in promoting democracy if this was conductive for or at least not decreasing the EU’s relative gains and powers. The employment of sanctions, resembling a negative instrument in order to make Nigeria comply, however very much reflects realist interests and cannot be accounted for by idealism. The same is true for the overall form of restricted cooperation. According to realists, international cooperation is an anomaly and therefore only pursued if it is necessary in order to uphold the EU’s gains and powers. Hence realism can explain the EU’s suspension of cooperation in fields, which are not that important to the EU with regard to Nigeria, e.g. military cooperation, and its maintenance in fields of strategic importance, like trade. For idealism on the contrary, international cooperation is a natural phenomenon and of major importance in order to uphold the international system in general. Therefore, idealism prefers positive and progressive measures instead of restrictive ones.

Turning to the second main period identified from 1999-2007, the EU’s decision to resume cooperation with Nigeria can be accounted for by idealism, regarding international cooperation as a natural and organic phenomenon, needed in order to uphold the international system. Realists on the contrary could only explain the resumption of cooperation, if this step was
somehow beneficial for the EU since usually cooperation is regarded as an anomaly. A benefit, possibly envisaged by the EU - in order to provide for one possible realist explanation – is that within this second period, Nigeria becomes increasingly important for the EU as an economic partner due to increased trade with Nigeria (Appendix III). What should be stressed in this context is that in this period, the EU indeed frequently emphasizes its interest in mutually beneficial relations and economic reform in Nigeria. In general, it can be stated that from 1999 onwards, the EU-documents imply a great diversity of interests. Next to the EU’s further promotion of democracy and the outlined economic interests, in the documents, the EU furthermore expresses its interest in promoting Nigeria’s ability to solve conflicts in West Africa. These EU interests in security political and economic cooperation very much resemble the realist approach. Resulting from the new form of cooperation, no sanctions are imposed anymore but positive measures are employed by the EU, mainly based on diplomacy. This use of rather diplomatic means can be explained by both, realist and idealist advocates. Idealists regard diplomacy as most adequate in order to establish mutual trust between two actors and also realist might rely on this soft measure in order to not jeopardize the EU’s economic and security political relations with Nigeria.

In the concluding chapter - on the basis of this characterization of the two main developments – the main research question is addressed, concerning the overall extent to which realism and idealism can account for EU actions towards Nigeria.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter first of all an answer is formulated concerning the main research question of this thesis, dealing with the extent to which idealism and realism can explain EU actions towards Nigeria between 1995 and 2007. For this, the idealist and/or realist character of the main EU actions towards Nigeria is considered, as derived from the analyses. Subsequently, possible implications for the EU and its future policies, which might result from the main findings, are developed. The last part of this chapter reflects upon these main findings in terms of their ability to account for new insights with regard to the theoretical background, driving and characterizing EU actions.

5.1 Realism and Idealism explaining EU Actions

The theoretical characterization of the key developments in EU-Nigerian relations – as conducted at the end of the analytical chapter - presents the particular extent to which realist and idealist explanations can be identified for certain EU interests and instruments in the framework of different forms of cooperation with Nigeria. This analysis reveals two main findings:

The first key finding is that neither realism nor idealism alone can come up with a coherent explanation for EU actions.
Firstly, this is due to the finding that in both identified main periods of different EU action towards Nigeria, both approaches can account for certain instances of an EU action like interests and instruments. An example for this from the first main period between 1995 and 1999 is the EU’s rather idealist interest in the establishment of democracy in Nigeria, and its rather realist pursuit of this interest by the imposition of sanctions.

Secondly, another finding, pointing towards a likely co-existence of realism and idealism in EU actions, is that some instances can be accounted for by both, realism and idealism. An example for this is the EU’s interest in democracy promotion. Whereas realists are able to account for this EU interest on a conditional basis, idealists can fully support this interest. There might be two reasons for the existence of such an ambiguous account: Firstly, the restricted framework of this thesis, which does not allow for a broad examination of the fulfillment of realist conditions, or secondly, the actual existence of an ambiguous explanation, meaning that the EU is indeed driven by both, its realist and its idealist interests.

Hence, EU actions throughout the examined period relations with Nigeria – can, at least to some extent accounted for by both theories: idealism and realism.

The second key insight delivered by the analysis reflects a certain trend within this co-existence of realism and idealism in EU actions: it seems that the EU has taken a more realist attitude towards Nigeria since its formal transition towards democracy.

From the documents analyzed it seems that the EU is increasingly interested in economic and security political cooperation with Nigeria as well as in the protection of the relationship itself. Phrases like ‘the EU attaches great importance to the relationship’, is willing to ‘strengthen its mutually beneficial relations’ or ‘recognizes Nigeria’s pivotal regional and international role’ reflect this attitude and only came up after Nigeria’s transition to democracy. Hence, it seems that Nigeria increasingly playing an important strategic role for the EU. In the context of such strategic interests, also the rather soft instruments employed by the EU reflect a more cautious attitude of the EU. This is also reflected by the fact that from 1999 cooperation is upheld with Nigeria, despite of several instances of violations of human rights and democratic principles.

5.2 A need to reconsider the EU’s international position?

Considering this changed attitude of the EU, it seems that the EU increasingly recognizes Nigeria as a partner instead of an aid-receiver, explaining the rather deliberate promotion of European values and the increased stressing of strategic interests in mutually beneficial relations. That the relations indeed became more beneficial for the EU, in terms of economic benefits, is reflected in increased trade with Nigeria, as indicated in tables 5 and 6 in Appendix III. Especially with regard to increasing amount of imports –of which the biggest share consists of oil-imports- the EU might recognize its growing dependency on Nigeria, resulting in the trend that Nigeria is increasingly regarded as a partner. This trend is true for several African states that become, even though slowly, better developed and involved in international cooperation. A special advantage of several African states, like Nigeria, is that they possess scarce resources, especially oil and gas, which are valuable for Europe. Furthermore, many enterprising individuals, as well as organizations discovered the huge untouched investment potential of Africa, e.g. with regard to its developing infrastructure as well as its biodiversity. The consequences of this slow African awakening might imply a slightly renewed self-perception of the EU, becoming more dependent on former aid receivers. Hence, in order to make no losses with regard to its normative as well as economic influence and importance, the EU tries to protect its relationship with Nigeria by imposing positive rather than negative measures. As a consequence of this rather cautious
behavior, in some instances – as the elections in 2003 and 2007 - no consequences are drawn anymore for Nigeria.

5.3 Reflection on the main Findings
The findings revealed in this thesis deliver a modified picture of possible explanations for EU actions towards Nigeria since they deny both, the pure realist as well as the pure idealist approach, even though there seems to be a trend to realist EU actions since 1999. Hence, with regard to this period, the EU’s interest concerning its economic relations with Nigeria seems indeed to be a major force driving EU actions as claimed by Crawford (1997). However, just as in the first period until 1999, also in this period of EU-Nigerian relations from 1999, realism and idealism seem to coexist at least to some extent. With this finding, Aggestam (2008) is supported, due to the sometimes ambiguous nature of certain actions, as outlined above. In addition to this also Pratt’s (1933) argument seems to be reasonable that idealism and realism are “not identical, but neither are they in opposition”. Just as shown by the ambiguous nature of certain interests and instruments, they are not always “offering contrary solutions to the same problems” (Pratt, 1933).

Hence, the finding of this thesis that idealism and realism both account for EU actions to a certain extent, may serve as a stimulation to encourage scholars, believing either in realism or idealism as sole explanation for EU behaviour to rethink their views and to search for some common truths of the two. Hence, in order to develop human thought and further discover the EU’s true interests in foreign policy, the main findings of this study are welcomed to be criticized in future research.

Building on the main findings of this thesis, two interesting topics for further research are proposed. Firstly, in order to increase the generalizability of these findings, it might be interesting to examine whether the EU’s expression of increasingly diversified interests is unique with regard to Nigeria or if a similar reaction is shown towards other developing countries, too. If this was the case, it would be interesting to examine these cases for certain similarities, e.g. a similar turning point from becoming an aid receiver of the EU to a partner. A second interesting question, with regard to the findings is whether Nigeria is suffering or profiting from the changed attitude of the EU in terms of regarding Nigeria as a trading partner. In order to critically assess this topic, it could be asked whether it is wise of the EU to focus increasingly on Nigeria’s supplies instead of its needs. In this respect it could be critically assessed who is suffering or profiting in particular, having a look at the small elite society and the remaining population.
6. Appendix

6.1 Appendix I: Indicators for Interests, Instruments and Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Documents</th>
<th>Indicators for Interests</th>
<th>Indicators for Instruments</th>
<th>Indicators for Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Position 20.11.1995 (95/515/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>“The military regime has yet to demonstrate...”</td>
<td>&quot;reaffirms/ introduces the following measures...”</td>
<td>&quot;Suspension; restriction; cancellation; embargo”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Position 4.12.1995 (95/544/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Further measures will be considered... if specific steps are not taken by the Nigerian authorities”</td>
<td>&quot;Take the following further measures..&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Expulsion of all military personnel; interruption of all contacts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council Decisions of 1996 and 1997 (96/677/CFSP) and (97/385/CFSP), (97/821/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>No indicators found</td>
<td>No indicators found</td>
<td>Further extended since &quot;specific steps are not taken by the Nigerian authorities”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council Decision of 28.11.1997 (97/820/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>No indicators found with regard to interests towards Nigeria</td>
<td>May grant visas, may allow exceptions</td>
<td>Further extended but with some exceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidency Declaration 18.09.1998</strong></td>
<td>“Welcomes, appreciates, hopes, expects, encourages, calls upon, looks forward, on the understanding”</td>
<td>&quot;Prepared to support; send; intensify”</td>
<td>&quot;Intensifying political dialogue; readiness to cooperate, normalisation of relations; ready to review sanctions”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Position 30.10.1998 (98/614/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>&quot;... the European Union attaches great importance to the relationship between the Union and Nigeria in recognition of the pivotal role of this country...”</td>
<td>&quot;The following measures... shall continue to apply”</td>
<td>95/515/CFSP repealed; “Measures referred to in ... 95/515/CFSP shall continue to apply”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Action 22.12.1998 (98/735/CFSP)</strong></td>
<td>“activities to provide...” “EU’s willingness to... support..”</td>
<td>&quot;has undertaken.. activities... including...” &quot;Has adopted this joint action...” &quot;further contribute...by..”</td>
<td>“in support of the democratic process in Nigeria”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidency Declaration 03.03.1999</strong></td>
<td>“welcomes; congratulates; appeals to all parties; notes with satisfaction; assures its willingness to...; hopes”</td>
<td>&quot;Willingness to continue to promote... and cooperate..”</td>
<td>“EU’s readiness to cooperate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council Decision 17.05.1999 (99/347/CFP)</strong></td>
<td>“The conditions ... have been fulfilled”</td>
<td>No finding</td>
<td>“Common Position 98/614/CFSP ... repealed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Position 14.05.2001</strong></td>
<td>“attaches great importance.; is a key</td>
<td>“This is to be achieved through ; The EU shall</td>
<td>“Strengthen the relations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2001/373/CFSP)</td>
<td>“partner; the EU intends; welcomes; the objective is to...; the EU will pursue.”</td>
<td>“maintain political dialogue”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Support Strategy and Indicative Program (2001-2007)</td>
<td>“EC Co-operation objectives; with the aim of; encourage;”</td>
<td>“Response strategy; indicative program; working with; support for; encourage”</td>
<td>“Strengthen relations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Position 27.05.2002 (2002/401/CFSP)</td>
<td>“attaches great importance...is a key partner; the EU intends; welcomes; has noticed with concern; the objective is to...; the EU will pursue...”</td>
<td>“Action by the EU is needed in order to implement certain measures”</td>
<td>“This is to be achieved through; The EU shall maintain political dialogue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency Declaration 14 May 2003</td>
<td>“Welcomes; important step for; took positive note; expresses concern; strongly recommends; expects; notes with satisfaction; look forward”</td>
<td>“Cooperate; support”</td>
<td>“Working in cooperation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Conclusion 18.11.2003</td>
<td>“Welcomes; encourages; intends”</td>
<td>“Shall maintain dialogue...cooperation; support; to this end the EU shall pursue”</td>
<td>“Shall maintain...cooperation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency Declaration 27.04.2007</td>
<td>“Deeply concerned; disappointed; expects; calls on all; hopes; appreciates”</td>
<td>“EU remains committed to...; engage into; support”</td>
<td>“EU remains committed; strengthen mutual endeavor, The EU is ready to engage”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Support Strategy and Indicative Program (2008-2013)</td>
<td>“General objectives; strategic objectives; focal sector”</td>
<td>“Response strategy; support for; enhancing; promoting; improving; implementation of program; financial instruments, action on, assist”</td>
<td>“Broadening the scope of EU-Nigerian dialogue”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Appendix II: Document Analysis - Findings Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Documents</th>
<th>Interests identified</th>
<th>Instruments employed</th>
<th>Forms of Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.06.1993</td>
<td>Establishment of democratic rule</td>
<td>Suspension of military cooperation (visas, training, movement) and all high-level visits</td>
<td>Restricted: suspension of cooperation in several fields due to annulment of elections and coup of military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Position 20.11.1995 (95/515/CFSP)</td>
<td>Democratic rule, respect for Human Rights and the rule of law + Visa restrictions on members of state administration and an arms embargo</td>
<td><strong>Restricted</strong> cooperation -&gt; human rights abuses and departure from democratic rule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Position 4.12.1995 (95/544/CFSP)</td>
<td>Early transition to democracy and respect for human rights + Members States’ policies accounting for visa restrictions, withdrawal of military personnel and no contacts in the field of sport; Active pursuit of review of situation at UN level</td>
<td><strong>Restricted</strong>, since no improvement of situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency Declaration of 18.09.1998</td>
<td>Further engagement in democratic process (observance of human rights and based on the rule of law)</td>
<td>EU EOM in case of request; intensified political dialogue</td>
<td><strong>Reconsidered</strong>; ready to review sanctions/normalization of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Position 30.10.1998 (98/614/CFSP)</td>
<td>Upholding the relationship with Nigeria due to its important regional and international role; Democratically elected civilian government; Human Rights promotion; Free and fair elections in 1999 (EU EOM)</td>
<td>Political dialogue and EOM → repeal of Common Position 95/515/CFSP; <strong>BUT</strong> still suspension of military coop. and development assistance only after elections</td>
<td><strong>Reconsidered</strong> -&gt; importance of Nigeria, EU welcomes progress in democratic transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency Declaration 03.03.1999</td>
<td>To have democratic elections and to further promote democracy and development</td>
<td>Promotion of economic and political reform; strengthening the rule of law, human rights and good governance</td>
<td><strong>Reconsidered</strong>, ensures willingness and readiness to cooperate for political and economic reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Position 14.05.2001 (2001/373/CFSP)</td>
<td>Upholding relations due to political and economic influence and Nigeria being a key partner in political, economic, trade and development cooperation; Mutually beneficial relations; Consolidating democracy</td>
<td>Constructive, close and regular political dialogue (with government and civil society) and development cooperation</td>
<td><strong>Resumed</strong>, Cotonou Agreement, political, economic, trade and development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ special focus on water and sanitation policies; institutional and economic reform at state and local level</td>
<td>EU supports national programs: Water and sanitation: €230 million State and local institutional and economic reform: €220 million Immunisation: €64.5 million Other programmes: €37.5 million (among this human rights (4 million) and elections (5 million))</td>
<td>Resumed, on a bilateral basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening mutually beneficial relationship in all areas of common interest</td>
<td>Same instruments as in 2001/373/CFSP</td>
<td>Resumed, still challenges with Human Right and political violence, electoral/constitutional and economic reforms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 14 May 2003</strong></th>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 14 May 2003</strong></th>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 14 May 2003</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve the quality of democracy and increase accountability</td>
<td>EU EOM; support Nigeria’s endeavours to strive for steady democratic development and economic improvement by a consistent and coherent approach</td>
<td>Resumed, democratic elections were held, however concern about severe fraud in some instances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Council Conclusion 18.11.2003</strong></th>
<th><strong>Council Conclusion 18.11.2003</strong></th>
<th><strong>Council Conclusion 18.11.2003</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ strengthening the electoral process</td>
<td>Same instruments</td>
<td>Resumed, the same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The same goals as in 2003</td>
<td>Same instruments as in 2003</td>
<td>Resumed - repeal of Common Position of 27.05.2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 27.04.2007</strong></th>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 27.04.2007</strong></th>
<th><strong>Presidency Declaration 27.04.2007</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Further strengthen democratic process; involvement of civil society</td>
<td>EU EOM; foster its engagement and dialogue with Nigerians</td>
<td>Resumed, even though disappointment and deep concern on sides of EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security; Governance and Human rights; Trade, regional Integration and Energy</td>
<td>Peace and Security: 145 Million € Governance and Human Rights: 295 Million € Trade and regional integration: 73 million € Non-focal areas: 57 million €</td>
<td>Resumed, Importance of Nigeria: its economic and social strength; its youth; its political influence: EU energy supplier; fight against poverty; shared values and interests → new level of cooperation: also dialogue with civil society organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3 Appendix III: EU-Nigerian Trade Data

Table 5 - EU Imports (total of all products) from ECOWAS/Nigeria

Table 6 - EU Exports (total of all products) to ECOWAS/Nigeria

Source:
Bibliography


