Turkey’s EU Candidacy and the Cyprus Dispute:

How has Turkey’s Relation to Cyprus influenced its Accession Negotiations with the European Union?

Name: Vera Martina Otterstein
Address: Dürerstraße 1
          48174 Münster
          Germany
Phone: 004917641279876
Email: v.m.otterstein@student.utwente.nl
Student ID: 371929 (D)
            1381148 (NL)
Program: Public Administration (European Studies)

1st Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oliver Treib
2nd Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ramses Wessel
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>DTR</td>
<td>Direct Trade regulation</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National organization of Cypriot Fighter</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EUCE</td>
<td>European Union Centers of Excellence</td>
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<td>GLR</td>
<td>Green Line regulation</td>
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<td>LI</td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>TMT</td>
<td>Turkish Resistance Organization</td>
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<td>TNRC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nation</td>
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Figure 1: The Occurrence of ‘Cyprus’ in Turkey’s Progress Reports from 1999 to 2012

0.0. Introduction

0.1. Outline of the Problem

It is no secret that Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) have significantly slowed down over the past years. The list of conflicts impeding Turkey to become an EU member is long: Mistreatments of the Kurdish population and other minorities, human rights violations, the restricted freedom of speech and the strong military influence on the Turkish government. However, it is Turkey’s complicated relationship with the small EU member Cyprus which German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently considered the most lasting barrier in Turkey’s accession negotiations (Seibert & Brönstrup, 2013).

Cyprus acceded to the European Union as a divided country with EU law suspended in the north (Kyris, 2013). Negotiations for a comprehensive settlement between the northern and southern part of the country have been going on for more than 50 years starting in 1960 when Cyprus declared independence from British Colonial rule. Interethnic violence led to a partition of Cyprus and Turkey’s invasion of the northern part of the island (Mallinson, 2010). Since then, the Republic of Cyprus controlled by Greek Cypriots in the South remained the only internationally recognized state on the island while the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) lacks international recognition (Solomonides, 2008). Despite at least three major concerted efforts by the international community\(^1\) (Hannay, 2009) to reach a solution for the Cyprus problem the opponents remained intransigent.

Even though Turkey signed the Ankara-Protocol\(^2\) in 2005 declaring to open its ports to sea and air traffic for all European Union members it has refused to do so for Cyprus’ ships and planes. At this point, Turkey’s role in the Cyprus settlement got formally linked with its EU accession negotiations. Until today Turkey refuses to open its ports to Greek Cypriots’ sea and air traffic whereby it strongly contradicts some of the EU’s most important rights – inter alia the free movement of goods\(^3\). Consequently, the EU refuses to fully take on Turkey’s membership negotiations until it has not worked out a solution – a solution for an ethnic dispute that has remained unresolved for more than a half century.

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\(^2\) The Ankara Protocol requires Turkey to extend the Customs union it has had with the EU since 1996 to all countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007(Barysch, 2010b).

\(^3\) The free movement of goods is incorporated in the Treaty of the European Union in Article 28.
0.2. **Research Question**

Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union must certainly be regarded within a broad context of political, economic and cultural factors influencing the process. Each of these factors has its own dynamic and significance for Turkey’s EU-relation. With respect to the limits of this thesis it is, nevertheless, striking to focus on only one component. Reviewing the recent accession negotiations of Turkey, it is obvious that Cyprus’ intransigent veto on Turkey’s negotiating chapters displays a major obstacle on its EU accession. Additionally, Turkey is the first EU candidate ever that refuses to recognize a current EU member state under international law, namely Cyprus. Considering the strict application process of the EU, it becomes questionable how such a deadlocked dispute could reach so far into the political arena of the EU. As a result, this train of thought leads me to the following research question:

*How has Turkey’s relation to Cyprus influenced its accession negotiations with the European Union?*

This thesis pursues to analyse the nature of this impact and the way it has developed and changed throughout Turkey’s EU accession process starting with the Helsinki summit\(^4\) in 1999.

0.3. **Scientific Relevance**

When reviewing the literature on Turkey’s EU accession it is notable that most scientists intend to assess the issue within a wide context mostly identifying domestic and cultural issues as the biggest obstacle in the EU accession process: According to Bogdani (2011) the “fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria or other specific issues seem to be a fig-leaf to hide the real religion and culture based reservations” (p.47). Jung and Raudvere (2008) had already sharpened this allegation when they constituted that:

*“In particular since September 11, 2001, Turkey’s EU accession has been discussed within the coordinates of two central European threat perceptions: the menace of Islamist terrorism and the alleged failure of integration policies”* (p.5)

Other authors such as Kyris (2013) and Tannam (2012) analysed the impact of Turkey’s Europeanization on the settlement of the Cyprus conflict pointing to the interdependency of

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4 The 1999 Helsinki summit marks Turkey’s official grant of an EU candidacy status (European Commission, 2000).
the two issues. However, considering the recent developments in Turkey’s accession process it appears more than reasonable to take a closer look at the one factor catalysing Turkey and the EU in a political and technical negotiation-stalemate. Despite an outdated journal article by Semin Suvarierol of 2003⁵ there is barely any scientific documentation solely analysing and examining the influence of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s EU accession path. Accordingly, this thesis aims to fill this gap.

0.4. Theoretical Framework

The here conducted analysis is based on Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) as a theoretical framework. It is suitable for an assessment of Turkey’s EU accession process because it combines multiple theories into a single coherent approach to explain European integration (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 1999).

The LI is based on two assumptions: States are actors and states are rational (Moravcsik, 1998). The relation of the two premises demonstrates how states cooperate in an international environment which is explained within a three-stage framework: National preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice (Moravcsik, 1998).

First, states define their national preferences. Moravcsik (1998) describes these preferences as an “ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes” (p.24). These preferences are exogenous which means they might change due to a shift of preferences in the international political environment. Still, LI treats states as unitary actors. It assumes that domestic bargaining, diplomacy and representation eventually “generate a consistent preference function” (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 1999, p.69). Likewise, the preference function may differ on the issue concerned. In “The Choice of Europe” (1998) Moravcsik argues that national preferences predominantly stem from economic interests of powerful constituents due to rising trade and capital flows (p...). Here the balance of maintaining the competitiveness of national producers, achieving regulatory objectives and limiting government spending must be obtained (Moravcsik, 1998). Only when issues have no significant economic impact they are likely to derive from other geopolitical interests (ibid.).

Second, states develop strategies and bargain with each other to reach substantive agreements. Therefore, states aim to overcome rather suboptimal outcomes for the collective and to achieve cooperation for mutual benefits (ibid.). The problem with this rigorous aim is that

⁵ “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union” can be accessed online on http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/USBO/2006-1214-214424/suvarierol_03_cyprus.pdf
states possess a relative “bargaining power” which is a result of “asymmetrical interdependence” meaning the unequal distribution of power within an international community (Moravcsik, 1993, p.500). In other words, when states bargain about a specific agreement, mutual gains are naturally distributed differently:

“Actors that are least in need of a specific agreement, relative to the status quo, are best able to threaten the others with non-cooperation and thereby force them to make concessions” (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 1999, p.71).

As a result, a state’s bargaining power determines to what degree it can put conditions and make claims on its bargaining partner.

Third, states create or adjust institutions to “centralize technocratic coordination and planning, and (...) [to create] more credible commitments” (Moravcsik, 1998, p.68). When states reach an agreement achieving mutual benefit they consequently design international institutions to endure the cooperation. States deliberately delegate authority to these institutions considering the reduced transaction costs that result from its capacity to provide information on each state’s future preferences. Additionally, states establish rules for the distribution of mutual gains and the institution is able to monitor the behaviour of others and sanctions non-compliance (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 1999).

In sum, Moravcsik (1998) would describe EU integration as a

“series of rational choice made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments” (p.18).

Taking this into account, LI would probably argue that Turkey’s main motivation for further European integration stemmed from the economic incentives an EU accession implied such as agricultural and regional subsidies and a full market access. Therefore, geopolitical interests such as the support of Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus dispute should only play a secondary role when it comes to the accession process. Consequently, when states bargain about Turkey’s EU accession to reach a substantive agreement, LI would expect that Turkey made concessions regarding the settlement of the Cyprus dispute in favour of its economic interests. Hence, the following first hypothesis can be drawn:
**H1: Turkey’s EU accession policy is predominantly motivated by economic interests because of which Turkey is likely to make concession regarding geopolitical interests such as the settlement of the Cyprus dispute.**

It is to assume that one sole theory is not able to fully explain Turkey’s complicated process towards EU accession. As a result, an additional theory to Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism might be helpful. Here, a constructivist approach is likely to add an intersubjective perception to this thesis’ theoretical framework in order to develop a more profound explanation of Turkey’s EU policy.

Alexander Wendt (1994), one of the best known constructivists, defines constructivism as “a structural theory of the international system” (p.385) and makes three core claims on this regard:

“First, States are principal units of analysis for international political theory. Second, the key structures on the state system are intersubjective rather than material. Third, state identities and interests are an important part constructed by these social structures (...)” (ibid.).

In other words, constructivism refuses explanations that are solely based on interests and the material distribution of power. Regarding Turkey’s case, the last part of Wendt’s definition will be further investigated – the significance of state identities for the international system. Wendt defines these identities as “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt, 2001, p.21). According to Katzenstein (1996a) identities both generate and shape the interests of actors and thereby influence state policies. Hence, national interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This means that state policy result from “a direct enactment or reflection of identity politics” (Katzenstein, 1996b, p.60). Hereby it is crucial to keep in mind, that there is no sole identity. Instead, state identities “are always in the process of being formed and reformed” (Zehfuss, 2002, p.41) and keep changing over time.

Applying these premises to Turkey’s case, a constructivist approach would therefore assume that Turkey’s interests and policies are shaped by its state identity. According to Tachau (1959) the construct of nationalism has always represented a core part of Turkey’s identity. He argues that Turkish nationalism was one of the earliest and most successful “anti-colonial nationalist movements” (p.264) becoming popular with the rise of the Young Turk regime.

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6 The Young Turks were a Nationalist reform party aiming to reform the monarchy of the Ottoman Empire (Schweizer, 2008).
One must see this development within the context of the former Ottoman Empire. During this period, there was no national identity as people solely identified themselves by their religion due to the so-called *milliyet system* (Schweizer, 2008). When the multiethnic Ottoman Empire collapsed and several ethnic communities demanded independence, a group of Turkish elites started acquiring and promoting a national identity for the Turkish population in order to sustain their survival (Kentel, 2011). As a result, when Mustafa Kemal founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923, he constituted Turkish nationalism as one of the six pillars of Kemalism (Ismayr, 2004): “In the administration and defence of the Turkish Nation; national unity, national awareness and national culture are the highest ideals that we fix our eyes upon” (Turkish Armed Forces, n.d.).

This idea of Turkish nationalism can therefore be interpreted as highly influential for Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. In particular the fate of the Turks who remained living ‘outside’ the Turkish Republic became a very emotional issue for the newly founded republic and its idea of nationalism (Zürcher, 2004). In this context, Ulusoy (2008b) stated that the Cyprus issue represents an “extremely sensitive issue” (p.314) which has traditionally been considered a “national cause, a foreign matter of absolute priority” (ibid.). As a result, constructivists point to the significance of state identities claiming two premises: First, state identities generate policies and interests. Second, state identities reflect other state identities and thereby change over time. Additionally, Turkish nationalist ideals represent a significant part of Turkish state identity. Finally, this approach leads to the following hypothesis:

**H2:** *Turkey’s EU accession policy is shaped by its conceived state identity which is in a frequent process of formation. Therefore, if the influence of nationalism on Turkey’s state identity is high, Turkey will not be likely to make concessions regarding a self-determining future of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus even if it delayed the EU accession process implying great economic incentives.*

The following chapters will show to what degree H1 or H2 present a comprehensive estimation of Cyprus’ influence on Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU.

### 0.5. Research Methodology

In order to assess this thesis’ research question a qualitative and a quantitative approach has been combined.

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1. Within the *milliyet system* cohesive ethno-religious communities were administered by their religious leaders and institutions (Coufoudakis, 2006).
2. Kemalism is the founding ideology of Turkey based on six fundamental pillars: Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Secularism, Statism and Revolutionism (Kili, 1980).
All chapters generally rely on a qualitative historical research approach which is based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources. Historical research implies a systematic and objective evaluation of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events (Clarke, 2005). In general, primary sources are original documents presenting new thinking and information which must be collected (Kumar, 1996). In this thesis, primary sources include official EU and UN documents. Secondary sources, in contrast, include journal and magazine articles describing, analysing and commenting on primary sources which have been used to a large extend for this thesis. However, regarding the interpretation of secondary literature it is important to keep in mind that the literature in the two conflicts concerned, the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s accession process, often shows great deficits in terms of neutrality. Therefore an objective evaluation of the key events is crucial for a profound assessment of this thesis’ research question.

The research question consists of two variables: ‘Cyprus Dispute’ and ‘Turkey’s EU accession negotiations’. Consequently, in order to measure the influence and to test the two hypotheses (H1, H2), historical background knowledge for each variable is needed. Chapter 1 therefore deals with the development of the Cyprus dispute and Turkey’s role within that conflict. Chapter 2 is a review of Turkey’s EU accession process aiming to identify crucial obstacles within its negotiation phase. The third chapter eventually combines the findings of chapter 1 and 2 by analysing the research question and testing H1 and H2. Here, the impact of the Cyprus issue on Turkey’s accession negotiations will be evaluated in several categories each representing a crucial moment in Turkey’s path on becoming a possible EU member state. As an analysis of Turkey’s entire accession process would overdo this thesis’ content the emphasis is set on a limited period of time starting with Turkey’s grant of candidate status at the Helsinki summit in 1999 and ending with Cyprus’ presidency of the Council in 2012.

To test the qualitative research findings of Chapter 3 the impact will be further investigated through a quantitative research approach: a longitudinal study design. Every year the EU issues a ‘progress report’ on each EU candidate reporting the progress the country has made in the previous year regarding its alignment with the 35 chapters of the Copenhagen criteria. By counting the occurrence of the term Cyprus in these reports in the concerned time-period “the pattern of change in relation to time” (Kumar, 1998, p.85) is measured. The outcome will be illustrated and then put into correlation with the qualitative research findings with the aspiration to further underline former detections.
1.0. The Development of the Cyprus Dispute

1.1. Cyprus under Foreign Rule

Due to its geographical location and rich copper deposit, Cyprus has always been of interest to the great conquerors in history (Wendt, 2006). It has been influenced by several cultures of the eastern Mediterranean Sea such as the Minoic culture, ancient Greece or the Persian, Greek and Byzantine Empire. In particular, the Greek colonisation around 1400 BC brought language, culture and religion of Greece close to Cyprus (ibid.).

In 1571 the Ottomans\(^9\) conquered Cyprus and imported thousands of Anatolians as settlers (Mallinson, 2010). During this period, Cyprus acquired a Turkish Cypriot community, which later stood at 18% of the island’s total population (Coufoudakis, 2006). According to Mallinson (2010) the Christian Greek community and Muslim Turkish community lived together peacefully under the Ottoman rule. This must be interpreted within the context of the milliyet system: allowing cohesive ethno-religious communities to be administered by their religious leaders and institutions (Coufoudakis, 2006). As a result, the Orthodox Church\(^10\) in particular was granted crucial administrative powers in Cyprus and became an influential guardian of Greek culture and heritage on the island (ibid.).

In 1878 after almost 300 years of Ottoman rule Cyprus was annexed by Great Britain who used the island as a base on the Suez Canal to India (Solomonides, 2008). Under British colonial rule new democratic administrative methods were created for Cyprus known as “divide-and-rule policies” (Coufoudakis, 2006, p.5). However, the division of administrative duties among the ethnic communities were rather disproportionate: In the legislative council, for instance, British officials together with Muslim representatives balanced the Christian representatives even though the former represented only a fifth of the population (Coufoudakis, 2006). This led to great discontent and frustration among Greek Cypriots who began to long for Enosis, a union with Cyprus and Greece (ibid.). On the other side, Turkish Cypriots conceived British rule as a guarantee for influence and as a protector of their rights in Cyprus. All of these factors eventually contributed to a “preservation of the ethnic identity of the two Cypriot communities and the generation of a political schism between them” (Wendt, 2006, p.40).

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\(^9\) The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and long lasting empires in history and replaced the Greek Byzantine Empire as the major power in eastern Mediterranean (BBC, 2009).

\(^10\) During this time, more than 97% of the Christian population of Cyprus identified with the Orthodox Church (Coufoudakis 2006).
Facing the loss of political influence in Cyprus, the Orthodox Church finally triggered the community of Greek-Cypriots to seek for independence from British colonial rule (Coufoudakis, 2006). In 1955, Greek-Cypriots began a guerrilla war against Britain demanding Enosis. Britain, on the other side, aimed to maintain its colonial rule and made use of the nascent interethnic conflict: It set up a special army that solely consisted of Turkish Cypriots’ soldiers who were thereby exposed to brutal assassinations by the Enosis-movement (Yeşilyurt, 2000). As a result, the conflict of Britain and Greece transformed into a Greek-Turkish dispute In fear of Cyprus’ possible union with Greece, the Turkish community launched a movement to strive for Taksim, the partition of the island (Coufoudakis, 2006). Both movements eventually set up an own armed organization: The National Organization of Cypriot Fighter (EOKA) and the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) leading to a massive violent interethnic conflict (Solomonides, 2008). Despite brutal military tactics, torture, hangings, and other violations of human rights none of the two communities was able to reach their intended goal. Consequently, in 1959 the premiers of Greece, Turkey, Britain as well as the informal leader of the Greek and Turkish communities gathered in London to sign an agreement, the London agreement on Cyprus future statehood (Yeşilyurt, 2000). This agreement aimed to put an end to the interethnic riots and to discuss an independent Republic of Cyprus and the creation of a new regulatory constitution (Wendt, 2006). When British colonial rule ended in 1960, Cyprus was officially declared an independent state for the first time.

1.2. Cyprus’ Independence and the 1960 Constitution

The constitution came into effect intending to balance the interests of Greek and Turkish communities. During this period, Cyprus’ population consisted of 82% Greek and 18% Turkish Cypriots whereby neither of the two communities was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations on the new constitution11 (Hughes, 2011). The crucial problem was the fixed way in which the new constitution got imposed: None of the regulations of the London Agreement were allowed to be modified, extended or changed. According to Mallinson (2010) the new constitutional structure of Cyprus “was insulting to democratic principles and prevented the smooth running of the state, amounting to a complete denial of right of the majority” (p.27).

11 In sum., the new government was institutionalised by a strict bi-communalism: A prime minister elected by Greek Cypriots and a vice-minister defending Turkish Cypriots’ interest, a legislative power executed by a house of representatives elected through a ratio of 70:30 and finally a bi-communal divided legal system(Wendt, 2006).
Due to the fact that many Greek Cypriots considered the 1960 constitution only as a transition period to Enosis, Turkish Cypriots feared their future existence in Cyprus (Wendt, 2006). In 1964, the dispute came to a head when Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios made moves to change the island’s constitution, limiting the autonomy of the Turkish minority (Zürcher, 2004). Thousands of Turkish Cypriots were forced to flee from their homes due to attacks on their villages. Vice President Kutchuk subsequently withdrew from his positions followed by other Turkish ministers and representatives in the government (Coufoudakis, 2006). Turkish Cypriots gathered in small enclaves and their economic situation deteriorated. Here, it is crucial to know that Turkey came to Turkish Cypriot’s aid by supporting the refugees with food and budget resources (Wendt, 2006).

By 1964 the UN Security Council which unanimously adopted resolution 186 decided to send peacekeeping troops to Cyprus (Solomonides, 2008). The Green Line dividing the Turkish north and the Greek south of the country was drawn in order to ease down the violence. Soon talks were held by the two communities, under UN auspices, in order to revise the constitution of 1960 (Coufoudakis, 2006). Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots came together to reach a new agreement. However, new incidents causing the island to split aggravated the situation (ibid.)

1.3. Turkey’s Invasion in 1974 and the Partition of Cyprus

The talks on a common constitution were almost finalized when in 1974 a military coup by the Greek junta and pro-union faction EOKA to take over Cyprus prompted Turkish military intervention and a territorial division of the island (Solomonides, 2008). More than 180,000 Greek-Cypriots were forced to flee from their homes towards the south as well as 45,000 Turkish Cypriots to the north (Suvarierol, 2003). Even though the Coup by the Greek Junta collapsed, Turkish forces kept on occupying one third of the island in order to prevent further inter-communal fighting and to save the existence of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus (ibid.).

Referring to this thesis’ theoretical framework, Turkey’s invasion on Cyprus aiming to protect the existence of Turkish Cypriots points to the strong Turkish Nationalism and the degree to which Turkey felt responsible for the fate of the ‘Turks’ outside of Turkey. Some voices may argue that the invasion of Cyprus was a consequence of the Turkish government’s strategic interests in the Mediterranean Sea. However, the pressure of the public opinion that felt united

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12 Resolution 186 (1964) recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which became operationally established on 27 March 1964 (UNFICYP Background). “The reference in this resolution to the ‘Government of the Republic of Cyprus’ marked the first instance of the recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the legal government of Cyprus” (Suvarierol, 2003).
with these Turkish Cypriots was tremendous: According to Adamson (2001) “the enthusiasm for the Turkish army’s actions in Cyprus was so great that the public began to send in donations to Aid-the-Army funds set up by national newspapers”(p.290).

Soon after the invasion, the United Nation (UN) Security Council passed a resolution calling on Turkey to withdraw its troops. Despite further similar appeals repeated by the UN Turkish Cypriots established an independent administration with Rauf Denktash as president proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Until today, the TRNC remains unrecognized by the international community of states excepting Turkey (Karatas, 2010).

1.4. Failing Peace Negotiations and the Annan Plan

Turkey expanded its influence and control over Turkish Cypriot political life by implanting settlers to the northern part of the island, who soon outnumbered the native Turkish Cypriot population (Coufoudakis, 2006). Moreover, Turkey sent more than 40,000 armed occupation troops to Cyprus to control the political developments of the occupied areas (ibid.). UN-sponsored peace talks regarding a solution resumed, though collapsed again and numerous Security Council resolutions failed to be implemented (Karatas, 2010). Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leaders kept insisting that the Cyprus problem was solved through the invasion and partition in 1974 (Coufoudakis, 2006). In their opinion, the recognition of the existence of two states was the only way to protect the Turkish minority from the Greek Cypriots’ wish for enosis with Greece. Again, Turkey’s aim to establish a sovereign state of Turkish Cypriots displays its strong idea of an independent national identity. In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council in 1998, Denktash claimed an acknowledgment of legitimacy and the acceptance of the political equality of the two communities in Cyprus as the only solution (ibid.). These positions soon led to a “negotiating deadlock of the secretary’s mission of good offices” (Coufoudakis, 2006, p.26).

In the beginning of the new millennium, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Turkish Prime Minister. Erdoğan put a stop to Denktash’s three century lasting influence on the development of the Cyprus dispute and replaced him by Mehmet Ali Talat. Talat’s “more moderate attitude” (Coufoudakis, 2006, p.8) aligned to Erdoğan’s mission of leading Turkey towards EU accession as he was more likely to trigger a

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13 Resolution 353 (1974)
14 Resolution 541 (1983) considered the proclamation of the TRNC as invalid and demanded the annulment for all the states to recognize no other state than the RoC
soon settlement of the conflict (ibid.). This strategic move aligns with Moravcsik’s theoretic approach who would presume that Erdoğan was trying to foster a solution of the dispute against the background of the economic promises implied by a pending EU accession.

The largest international effort in the Cyprus dispute became known as the Annan Plan presented by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002. After this plan had been revised several times, a last attempt of the reunification-plan, Annan V, calling for a “federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal solution” (Solomonides, 2008, p.63) was issued in April 2004, only a few months before Cyprus was planned to accede to the EU. Annan V was submitted to a referendum to the two communities of the island and the result was surprising: Even though the plan was endorsed by 65% of Turkish Cypriots, it was overwhelmingly rejected by 75% of Greek Cypriots (Security Council Report, 2013). According to Coufoudakis (2006), the majority of the Greek Cypriots had the impression that nearly all of the Turkish Cypriots’ demands were incorporated in Annan V. As a result, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, called on Greek Cypriots to vote with a “resounding no” (Wendt 2006, p.166). According to the Economist (2009) the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 was partly a response to pressure from the UN and the EU. Moravcsik, however, would have interpreted this outcome much differently:

Reviewing his claim that states made concessions on geopolitical interests in order to foster issues of economic significance, it would have been obvious to him that Cyprus’ and Turkey’s motivation to reach a comprehensive agreement stemmed from different natures of interests. The fact, that the settlement of the Cyprus dispute represented no precondition for Cyprus’ EU accession while it still did for Turkey, created an asymmetrical interdependence among the two bargaining partners. Hence, the EU’s economic incentives triggered Turkey to make concessions and to approve the referendum in order to reach a soon solution. For Cyprus, however, economic interests were not sufficient to determine its policy as it has already been granted the EU accession in forehand. As a result, the LI would argue that due to missing economic incentives on Greek Cypriot side, geopolitical interest prevailed and the referendum was neglected.

Finally, Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as a divided island. The implementation of the acquis communautaire\(^\text{16}\) in the occupied areas has been suspended until the reunification of the island was achieved (Coufoudakis, 2006).

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\(^{16}\) The acquis communautaire is a set of approximately 80,000 pages of rules and regulations and constitutes the body of European Union law (Morelli, 2013).
1.5. New Negotiations after Cyprus’ EU accession

The question whether Cyprus’ accession to the EU damaged or fostered further negotiations on the Cyprus dispute is diversely discussed in scientific literature. Though, in short term perspective, it can be stated that Cyprus’ EU membership reinforced Turkey’s insecurity concerning its European identity. Additionally, Cyprus’ EU accession metaphorically transferred the conflict into the heart of the European Union.

After the rejection of the Annan Plan the EU decided not to punish Turkish Cypriots for the Greek Cypriots’ vote and adopted a package of financial and economic measures to foster the TRNC’s economy: The Green Line Regulation\(^\text{17}\) (GLR), the Financial Aid regulation\(^\text{18}\) and the Direct Trade regulation (DTR) (Wendt, 2006). Nevertheless, the Republic of Cyprus impeded its implementation in Northern Cyprus. By 2008, only 20% of the 259 million had been authorized by the Council for expenditure (Hugg, 2010; Christou 2010). Especially, Cyprus’ refusal to discuss the DTR, which would have been of great economic importance for the TRNC, triggered Turkey to call for a revenge. In 2006, Turkey decided to disregard the obligation of the Ankara Protocol and closed its ports to air and naval traffic from the Republic of Cyprus until the isolation of the TRNC was lifted (ibid.). Furthermore, Turkey blocked Cyprus’ membership in certain suppliers groups such as the Wassenaar Arrangement\(^\text{19}\) and the OECD (European Commission [EC], 2006). As a result, peace talks for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus dispute came to a further deadlock.

When Demetris Christofias won the Greek Cypriot presidential election in 2008, peace negotiations improved again. Some of the most crucial issues to solve were security and property issues: First, Greek Cypriots called on Turkey to end its military occupation and to withdraw its troops. Second, when Turkish army overran the north, 80% of the property belonged to Greek Cypriots who either fled or lost their lives during the invasion. Consequently, property questions emerged as both sides felt that compensation should be paid to former owners\(^\text{20}\) (The Economist, 2009). Those negotiations, however, stopped once again due to a regime change in Northern Cyprus in 2010. After Turkey had decided to ignore Cyprus’ EU presidency in 2012, peace negotiations reached a new bottom.

\(^{17}\) EC No. 866/ 2004
\(^{18}\) EC No. 389/ 2006
\(^{19}\) An agreement on export controls for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies (EC, 2006).
\(^{20}\) Concerning the property issue the Orams-case chilled further investments in Cyprus by foreigners: A British couple who bought land in the north from a Turkish Cypriot was sued for compensation by the original Greek Cypriot owner (The Economist, 2009).
2.0. Turkey’s path to EU accession

2.1. The Beginning of EU-Turkey relations

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish republic in 1923, Turkey’s first president Mustafa Kemal “pushed through (...) radical reforms to create a modern state, with Europe being treated as the model” (Bogdani, 2011, p.19). Hence, Turkey soon commenced efforts to become part of the European Community by joining EU organisations such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)\(^{21}\).

In 1959, Turkey applied for an official association with the European Economic Community (EEC)\(^ {22}\) which was realized through an agreement in 1963\(^ {23}\) and an additional protocol in 1970\(^ {24}\) (Europe Union [EU], 2005). The Ankara Agreement envisaged three stages for the integration\(^ {25}\) of Turkey into the EEC, namely a preparatory stage, a transitional stage and a final stage. The preparatory stage was fulfilled through the additional protocol of 1970 while the transitional stage would be reached by the completion of the Customs Union (Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

In 1987, Turkey transferred a first application to join the European Community which was eventually refused. Here, the EEC pointed to several drawbacks impeding Turkey’s European integration: the insufficient economic development, its lack of democracy in terms of political and civil rights and its poor relation with Greece including the dispute over Cyprus (EC, 1989). On the other hand the Commission claimed that the EEC itself would not be ready to start membership talks as long as Turkey has not completed the transition to a single market (Arvanitopoulos, 2009). A few years later, the Maastricht Treaty turned the EEC into the European Union and the Copenhagen summit of 1993 set the EU Eastern Enlargement process on priority (Consilium, 1993). Further, a procedural framework, the Copenhagen criteria, was established comprising political and economic criteria for an EU membership (ibid.). Soon Turkish-EU relations started to improve again and 33 years after signing the

\(^{21}\) The OEEC later became the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Jung & Raudvere, 2008).

\(^{22}\) The EEC was created by the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 with the goal to establish a common market (Goebel, 2003).

\(^{23}\) See Amtsblatt für Europäische Gemeinschaften (1964): Abkommen zur Gründung einer Assoziation zwischen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Türkei

\(^{24}\) See 21970A1123(01) Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, annexed to the establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey

\(^{25}\) For more detailed information on the EU accession process see: “The Process of Joining the EU” on the European Commission’s website on http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement.
Ankara Agreement Turkey took a step further in its European Integration process by joining the European Customs Union in 1995\textsuperscript{26} (European Parliament [EP], 1998).

However, the next disappointment was about to hit Ankara when the Luxembourg summit of 1997 turned out different than expected for Turkey. While eleven candidates including Cyprus as well as post-communist countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary were granted candidate status\textsuperscript{27} the same was declined to the longest standing applicant of the Union, Turkey (Consilium, 1997). Instead, Turkey was given a “special status with a long lead time to full membership” (Eralp, 2000, p.2). Turkey felt unfairly treated conceiving that it was ahead of many of those eleven candidates regarding the Copenhagen criteria. Additionally, the fact that Cyprus was appointed candidate status created a deep feeling of resentment and the impression that some countries were put ahead of Turkey because of the political support by other EU members (Eralp, 2000). Still, EU leaders were surprised by the harsh reaction of the Turkish government which subsequently to the Luxembourg summit decided to block essential meetings of the EU-Turkey association Council. Besides, Turkey suspended talks on the solution of the Cyprus conflict and threatened to veto the use of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) facilities for EU military missions (Schimmelfennig, 2009).

2.2. The Grant of Candidate Status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999

Finally, the 1999 Helsinki summit marked Turkey’s big turning point in its EU aspirations granting the candidate status due to its “recent positive developments towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria” (Consilium, 1999). This sudden change in the EU’s mind stemmed on the one hand from Greece’s transformed EU-policy on Turkey and on the other hand from the change of government in Germany into a SPD-Green coalition. The candidate status significantly changed the institutional context on Turkey’s membership. On the one hand, it strengthened the vague commitment of the 1963 association and on the other hand, it constrained the EU to apply the same criteria to Turkey that it had used for other eastern countries. The latter sets a very crucial point in Turkey’s case as it institutionally excluded cultural and religious arguments and thereby enhanced the “credibility of membership perspective” (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.424).

\textsuperscript{26} See Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union.

\textsuperscript{27} The grant of the candidate status officially starts an accession procedure in which the applicants must modify their legal, economic and social structures to conform to the pattern set in the EU, the acquis communautaire. Also, institutional structures of the EU must be altered in order to be able to satisfactorily integrate the new states (Goebel, 2003).
The beginning of the new millennium could be described as a period of profound change in Turkish history – no other political period had generated so many institutional changes before (Önis, 2003). In 2002, the AKP emerged and its candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan managed to form a majority government first time since 1991 (Network of European Union Centers of Excellence [EUCE], 2008). This political stability further promoted several constitutional changes such as the removal of the death penalty, allowing broadcasting and education in the mother tongues of minorities, the liberalization of laws restricting the freedom of speech and the acceptance of a new UN plan for a settlement of the Cyprus question. This list of institutional changes corresponds to LI’s bargaining power theory assuming that the EU leaders were less in need of Turkey’s EU accession because of which Ankara was forced to make concessions regarding the fulfilment of the acquis in order to reach an agreement. Accordingly, all these changes put Turkey on a good road towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria (ibid.).

2.3. The Opening of formal Accession Negotiations in 2005

The 3 October of 2005 turned into a new benchmark of Turkey’s accession process: After almost “50 years of knocking at the gates of Europe” (Bogdani, 2011, p.25) Turkey was lastly given a green light on the official screening process of the 35 chapters28 and the opening of formal accession negotiations. In addition, the EU decided that these negotiations would be based on an ‘open-ended’ prospective (EC, 2004a). This is rather significant as until then every negotiation has ended in a full membership29 (Aybet, 2006). According to Ugur (2010) the nature of an open-ended accession process is crucial as it “generates perverse incentives that may induce both the EU and the accession country to reduce the probability of their commitments to fulfilling their obligations” (p.985).

Accordingly, the first year of accession negotiations proceeded rather slowly. After the first chapter of Science and Research had been closed, it has remained the only one until today. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s non-compliance with the Ankara Protocol forced the EU to suspend negotiations on eight chapters30 of the acquis and decided that no more chapters would be provisionally closed until Turkey opened its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus again.

28 The 35 chapters of the acquis represent the different areas for which reforms are needed in order to meet the accession conditions. The different chapters are reviewed during the screening of the process and are evaluated regularly up until the time each chapter is closed (EC, 2012c)

29 This is not quite true anymore as Iceland, which began accession negotiations in 2010 has come under a new government telling the EU Commission that it was no longer interested in pursuing membership in the European Union (Morelli, 2013, p.2)

30 The eight chapters are: Free movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External relations (Council of European Union, 2006)
Moreover, the conservative French government headed by Nicolas Sarkozy vetoed talks in five chapters directly related to full accession claiming that it could only imaging Turkey acceding through a privileged partnership (Hugg, 2010).

Even though the period between 2007 and 2008 displayed a complicated time for the European Union as the global economic crisis started to attract the governments’ attention, it was rather fruitful for Turkey’s EU accession. Turkey managed to open negotiations on nine additional chapters (Morelli, 2013). Yet, those chapters were not allowed to be provisionally closed as long as Turkey did not apply the Ankara Protocol to Cyprus.

In the beginning of 2009 Turkey aimed to push forward the accession talks and appointed an EU chief negotiator as well as an own ministry for European affairs (Morelli, 2013). Also, Erdoğan cut back powers of military courts and set up a parliamentary committee for women’s rights (Barysch, 2010b). Foreign minister Davutoglu additionally offered to launch an “informal dialogue on issues of common interests” (Barysch, 2010b, p.9) but remained without reply by the European Commission. Here, it needs to be mentioned that the same year was marked by ‘diplomatic dropouts’ by President Erdoğan calling Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad “a friend” (Tait, 2009), dismissing worries about Iran’s nuclear weapons as “gossip”(ibid.) and downplaying incidents in Sudan by the claim that Muslims would not commit genocide (Freedman, 2009). On top of that, Turkey declared its objection of the exploratory drilling operations carried out by the Republic of Cyprus (Hacaoglu, 2011). As a result, Cyprus blocked the opening of six additional chapters including the chapter on energy (Morelli, 2013).

2.4. **Current Status**

In 2012, accession negotiations reached a technical stalemate when Turkey decided to ignore Cyprus’ presidency in the Council of Europe and failed to appear in any formal EU accession meetings (Morelli, 2013). Surprisingly, the EU this time decided to ignore Turkey’s disastrous relation with Cyprus and attempted to preserve Turkey-EU relation by initiating the *positive agenda* which covered the consultation on frozen chapters of the official negotiations such as energy cooperation, visas, mobility and migration or foreign policy (ibid.). Various voices interpreted this diplomatic move as an “institutional trick intended to circumvent the Cyprus EU Presidency” (Morelli, 2013, p.15).

Nevertheless, at the end of 2012 the European Council’s annual conclusions on enlargement expressed their overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on a number of issues including judicial reform, media freedom, freedom of expression, Turkey’s continual refusal
to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus and Turkey’s position on the Cyprus EU presidency (EC, 2012c). In this context Morelli (2013) claims in his research paper presented to the European Parliament:

“Turkey’s longstanding refusal to recognize Cyprus and continued refusal to open its air and sea ports to Cypriot commercial operations as required under the additional protocol will remain major stumbling blocks to any forward progress even as the accession negotiations restart” (p.15)

The year 2013 was supposed to set a new momentum to Turkey’s accession. In February the new Socialist government under President François Hollande in France signalled that it was prepared to support the opening of at least one new chapter of the acquis to rejuvenate the accession talks31 (Morelli, 2013). The new round of negotiation talks was eventually set on June. However, public protests over the future of the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul and the government’s tough reaction triggered a great uproar in Europe and a harsh response from Brussels. A resolution from the European parliament expressed its “deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by Turkish police” (EP, 2013). Even though the EU agreed to open the new chapter it postponed the resumption of the rest until October 2013 (ibid.).

3.0. Influence of the Cyprus Dispute on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations: an Assessment

This chapter analyses the influence of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s accession negotiations starting with the grant of candidate status in 1999 and ending with Cyprus’ EU Council candidacy in 2012. Finally, a quantitative assessment will contribute to the qualitative research findings and the two hypotheses stated in Chapter 1 will be tested.

3.1. Helsinki Summit 1999

When Turkey was granted candidate status at the summit in Helsinki 1999 many wondered how fast the EU had changed its mind. Only two years before, Turkey was neglected this very same status with the justification it would not comply with the Copenhagen criteria to a sufficient degree – a rather incomprehensible decision regarding the fact that some of the eleven candidate states such as Hungary and Bulgaria showed similar deficits in certain realms of the acquis. Apparently, certain EU member states had used their veto right on this decision. According to Suvarierol (2003) and Ulusoy (2008a) Greece only consented to the

31 The talks are about chapter 22 on regional policy.
Council decision to offer Turkey the status of a candidate in Helsinki, after the settlement of the Cyprus dispute had been cancelled as a precondition for Cyprus’ EU accession – a historical compromise assuring Cyprus an easy way towards EU accession\textsuperscript{32}. Though, the Cyprus issue was not the only motivation for Greece to change its mind: The devastations of the earthquake that hit Greece and Turkey in spring of 1999 forced the two opponents to cooperate (Ugur, 2003). According to Ker-Lindsay (2007) Greece furthermore realized that it was better to hope that the EU would play “a transformative role in bilateral relations” (p.73) with Turkey than to keep vetoing its candidacy. In sum, it is conceivable that all factors have contributed to Greece’s decision to lift its veto on Turkey’s candidate status. Nevertheless, while Cyprus’ role in the settlement of the dispute was not linked to its EU accession anymore, EU-leaders in Helsinki underlined the significance of Turkey’s further compliance with the Copenhagen criteria including the settlement of the Cyprus dispute in order to reach the ‘next level’, the formal opening of accession negotiations (EP, 1999).

In sum, the compromise with Greece has enabled Turkey to receive the grant of candidate status. However, this compromise simultaneously exerted a negative influence on Turkey’s further accession process as it complicated the settlement of the Cyprus dispute representing a precondition for Turkey to reach the next accession level.

3.2. \textit{The Annan Plan and Cyprus’ EU accession}

As the EU made the settlement of the Cyprus dispute a precondition for Turkey’s accession, the conflict became a significant bargaining chip for Ankara. Consequently, accepting the Annan Plan and passing domestic reforms in the political sector could serve as a sufficient commitment to start EU accession in exchange. However, Turkey did not expect the Greek Cypriot side to turn down Annan’s peace plan. For years Turkey “had remained the biggest obstacle in the settlement of the dispute” (Ulusoy, 2008a, p.316). Therefore, the fact that Greek Cypriots diminished the Annan Plan instead disappointed many EU leaders (Barysch, 2010a). As a result, Turkey’s positive stance combined with the support of the Turkish-Cypriot community dismissed the argument that Turkey and its intransigent position was the main hurdle for the resolution of the conflict.

At the same time, Cyprus’ accession to the EU can be interpreted as a negative turning point for Turkey in its EU accession policy. With Cyprus acceding to the EU, the question arose

\textsuperscript{32} According to Suvarierol (2003), Turkey’s accession to the EU’s Customs union has also become possible due to a compromise with Greece that guaranteed Cyprus’ accession negotiations for the lifting of its veto on the Customs union agreement with Turkey.
whether it was conceivable at all that Turkey could be accepted into an EU if Cyprus maintained veto privilege (Hannay, 2009). Additionally, Cyprus’ entrance to the EU as a divided country diminished any plans of using the prospect of EU accession as an incentive for both conflict parties and imported the complicated dispute straight into the political arena of the EU. Suddenly, Turkey’s will to settle the Cyprus dispute became closely linked to the advancement of its EU accession process. Similar to the assumption of H1, many EU members believed that the mere economic prospect of membership for Turkey would eventually unite Cyprus by default (Mallinson, 2010). However, Cyprus’ accession to the EU "created an unbreakable triangle between the EU, Turkey and Cyprus" (Bogdani, 2011, p.32) and generated an asymmetrical interdependence between the two opponents regarding their relative bargaining power within the dispute. Kerl-Lindsay (2007) even argues that the “prevailing view among Greek Cypriots [was] that if the Republic of Cyprus cannot use EU membership to extract a better deal from Turkey, then it [was] better to leave the situation as it [was]”(p.77). As a result, the aggravated relations between Turkey and Greek Cypriots “may have contributed to the beginning of a change in attitude within Turkey and the EU towards each other” (Morelli, 2013, p.4).

In the end, Turkey was eventually able to use its positive stance on the UN peace plan as an efficient bargaining chip in reaching the next level of integration (Ulusoy, 2008a). Eventually, the EU could not refuse Turkey the opening of the accession after it had concede so many political reforms and particularly after the EU had welcomed Cyprus into the Union despite its disappointing refusal of the Annan Plan. Hence, on the one hand Turkey’s positive role in the Cyprus settlement eventually triggered the formal opening of accession negotiations. On the other hand, Cyprus EU accession reinforced Turkey’s insecurity of its European identity and was expected to generate further complications.

### 3.3. Opening of Accession Negotiations 2005

Before accession negotiations were officially launched, Turkey was called to sign the additional protocol to widen its Customs union to the ten new member states including Cyprus. Turkey, however, passed a declaration that its signature did not amount to the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Pope, 2013). This statement contained great conflict potential as there has never been an applicant state that has failed to recognize an old EU member. The EU responded by revealing Turkey’s declaration “to be unilateral and with no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the protocol” (EC, 2005a, p.15). As a result, Turkey’s anti-Cyprus declaration had no real effect on its accession process besides the fact
that everyone was awaiting Cyprus’ reaction at the night of the formal opening of Turkey’s accession negotiations in October.

As expected the night of the 3 October 2005 almost ended very dramatically as a last-minute objection by the Austrian presidency caused the EU leaders to debate until they were able to present a negotiating framework to Turkey in the middle of the night. Surprisingly, Cyprus had not used its veto right. Yet, the EU summit did not forget about Turkey’s declaration: Within Turkey’s negotiating framework the EU Commission was ordered to frequently report on Turkey’s alignment with the Ankara Protocol within the annual progress reports (EC, 2005b).

In the end, Turkey’s non-recognition of Cyprus had no effect on the opening of its accession negotiations and Cyprus had additionally not used its veto power to take revenge for Turkey’s earlier declaration. Nevertheless, Turkey’s behaviour towards Cyprus regarding the application of the Customs Union was officially under close observation.

3.4. Accession Negotiation Process

With the opening of Turkey’s accession negotiations, its intransigent relation to Cyprus was officially transferred into the political arena of the EU. Cyprus’ veto to pass the EU’s financial assistance for the TRNC such as allowing them to trade freely with EU countries called for a revenge on Turkish side. A few weeks after negotiations have been launched, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that Turkey would not implement the Ankara Protocol’s obligation until the economic embargo towards the TRNC was lifted (EC, 2006). In addition, Turkey continued to veto Cyprus’ application to the international Wassenaar arrangement and insisted on its exclusion from the EU-NATO strategic cooperation in crisis management (EC, 2005a). The first crisis in Turkey’s accession negotiations was therefore expected to be in reach.

Consequently, in June 2006 Cyprus attempted to block the opening of the first chapter on Science and Research in order to force Turkey to finally apply its Customs Union to Greek-Cypriots’ ships and planes (Morelli, 2013). Only hours of diplomacy and a postponement of the issue to the end of 2006 were able to save the negotiations (ibid).

When Turkey still refused to apply the obligations of the Ankara Protocol at the end of 2006, Cyprus pushed the EU to block further negotiations with Ankara (Hugg, 2010). For that matter, Cyprus allegedly threatened to continue blocking all new negotiations until the pressure on Turkey would increase (ibid.). As a result, the EU Council issued the formal
decision to block the eight negotiation chapters related to the EU-Turkey Customs union and decided that “no chapter will be provisionally closed until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement” (EC, 2007, p.5).

Furthermore, the EU’s concern was triggered through Turkey’s continuing statements objecting the drilling operations carried out by Cyprus and expressing threats of the retaliation against oil companies participating in the Cypriot explorations. In the Enlargement Strategy paper of 2012 the European Commission reacted to Turkey’s statements stressing that the “sovereign rights of all EU members which include entering into bilateral agreements and to explore and exploit natural resources are in accordance with the EU acquis.” (p.68). Yet, this reaction did not calmed Cyprus who subsequently decided to block six further negotiation chapters on Turkey’s EU accession including the chapter on energy (Morelli, 2013).

In 2010(a), Barysch reviews Turkey’s accession process by stating that “the unresolved status of the divided island of Cyprus could be a time bomb under Turkey’s accession path” (p.2). Moreover, Bogdani (2011) claimed that the Cyprus issue has become “a cause and a symptom of the ups and downs in the EU Turkey relationship” (p.32).

Today, after eight years of formal accession negotiations, 17 out of 35 chapters are blocked by the EU, France or Cyprus. Additionally, 12 out of 17 chapters are blocked with reference to the Cyprus issue. Turkey’s intransigent relation to Cyprus therefore exercises a striking impact on Turkey’s accession negotiations as it displays the one institutional symptom besides France that keeps stalling the formal negotiation process.

3.5. Cyprus’ Council Presidency in 2012

When it was Cyprus’ turn to take over the rotating European Council presidency in the second half of 2012, Turkey threatened to end any relation with EU presidency during the six months of presidency as long as no settlement on the Cyprus issue was found (EC, 2011b). However, when Turkey carried out its threat by ignoring all meetings under Cyprus’ presidency, the EU simply circumvent the Cyprus dispute as a hindrance to Turkey-EU relations and initiated a new relationship called the positive agenda. As stated above many voices accused this agenda to be an institutional trick to avoid Cyprus intransigent relation to Turkey because it inter alia covered those realms that have been blocked in behalf of the Cyprus dispute. As a result, the launch of the positive agenda has decreased the influence of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s

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33 See the following press release of the Council of the European Union (2006): 16289/06 (Press 352)
accession negotiations as it enabled a consultation on the content of the blocked chapters of the acquis.

3.6. A Quantitative Assessment

Every year the EU issues a ‘progress report’ on each EU candidate reporting the progress the country has made in the previous year regarding its alignment with the 35 chapters of the Copenhagen criteria. The graphic below shows the occurrence of the ‘term’ Cyprus in Turkey’s Progress Reports from 1999 to 2012. The here conducted analysis relies on the following assumption: If the influence of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s accession negotiations increases, the occurrence of the term ‘Cyprus’ in Turkey’s Progress Reports will increase as well.

*Figure 1: The Occurrence of ‘Cyprus’ in Turkey’s Progress Reports from 1999 to 2012*


In sum, the linear graph shows that the occurrence of ‘Cyprus’ has increased over the concerned period of time. Starting with 16 occurrences in the year of Turkey’s grant of candidate status it increases by 10 further occurrences in 2001 when the UN launched new settlement negotiations with Cyprus under General Secretary Annan. By 2004, the graph reaches its peak counting 38 points. The failed Annan Plan and Cyprus’ EU accession are a conceivable explanation for this amplitude depicting the biggest deviation of the linear graph. Still, counting 33 occurrences in 2007 the graph remains on a rather high level and hits
another peak in 2012 in the background of Turkey’s ignorance of Cyprus’ EU presidency with 35 occurrences.

All in all, the linear graph shows an increase of Cyprus’ occurrence whereas the slope of the linear graph is rather flat. Regarding the fact that the EU reports deal with Turkey’s progress in the particular chapters, this could be an indicator for the consideration that Turkey’s relation to Cyprus shows less impact on the content of the negotiating chapters but rather on the procedural level. In the end, the Cyprus dispute only represents one of many conflicts complicating Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, with Cyprus acceding to the EU, the conflict got transferred to a procedural level regarding Cyprus acquirement of a veto right on the EU’s decisions.

3.7. Testing the Hypotheses

At the beginning of this thesis two opposing hypotheses on the impact of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s accession negotiations were stated, one based on a Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach and the other on a Constructivist approach:

H1: Turkey’s EU accession policy is predominantly motivated by economic interests because of which Turkey is likely to make concession regarding geopolitical interests such as the settlement of the Cyprus Dispute.

H2: Turkey’s EU accession policy is shaped by its conceived state identity which is in a frequent process of formation. Therefore, if the influence of nationalism on Turkey’s state identity is high, Turkey will not be likely to make concessions regarding a self-determining future of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus even if it delayed the EU accession process implying great economic incentives.

In general, H1 does to some extend align with Turkey’s decisions throughout its EU accession process. The assumption, that Turkey’s motivation to accede the EU predominantly stems from the economic incentives an EU membership implies, can barely be denied. The fact that Turkey belongs to those candidate states whose accession to the EU cannot proceed until the EU has passed a new financial framework in 2014 (Morelli, 2013) points to the great economic impact Turkey’s accession would imply. For instance, due to Turkey’s enormous agricultural sector, economic subsidies stemming from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would increase tremendously (Fellmann, 2011). Therefore, it only seems logical to assume that Turkey would make concessions regarding other political interests of less economic impact. Accordingly, Turkey actually did make many political concessions such as
the removal of the death penalty, allowing broadcasting and education in the mother tongues of minorities, the liberalization of laws restricting the freedom of speech or the acceptance of the Annan Plan. Nevertheless, the economic incentives of an EU accession were not sufficient to convince Turkey to agree with a political settlement of the Cyprus dispute at any price. This is indicated by Turkey’s harsh reaction to Cyprus’ economic embargo on the TRNC closing its ports to Greek Cypriots’ sea and air traffic showing its intransigent position regarding the conceived mistreatment of Turkish Cypriots. Even though, Ankara was able to foresee serious consequences regarding its EU accession it remained stubborn on this realm. Other examples for this attitude are Turkey’s ‘Anti-Cyprus declaration’ of 2005, the blocking of Cyprus’ membership in the Wassenaar Agreement and its refusal to negotiate any chapters of the acquis under Cyprus’ presidency of the European Council. As a result, H1 cannot explain Turkey’s intransigent position on the Cyprus dispute, in particular after Cyprus’ EU accession in 2004, and is therefore refused.

The constructivist approach of H2 provides an intersubjective perspective to the assessment of Turkey’s EU accession policy. Claiming that Turkey’s behaviour is shaped by its conceived national identity, H2 provides an interesting estimation for the influence of the Cyprus dispute on Turkey’s accession negotiations. As described above Turkish nationalist ideals are well known in historic literature on Turkey stemming from the core state principles of its beloved first prime minister, Mustafa Kemal. However, Constructivism argues that a state’s national identity is frequently generated through the interaction with other state identities. This could be a clue to Turkey’s provocative behaviour towards Cyprus contradicting its EU accession goal: When Cyprus acquired EU membership in 2004, it simultaneously acquired a new level of international recognition on its national sovereignty. Constructivism would rather say: The EU accession changed Cyprus’ conceived state identity. On top of that, claiming that states’ identities shape their policies and interests, a constructivist approach would assume that after the grant of EU accession, Cyprus’ state identity was suddenly less shaped by its economic interests. Instead, other interests of political nature such as the fear of losing sovereignty to Turkish Cypriots might have prevailed. This can be observed in Cyprus veto-policy towards the EU’s DTR to the TRNC. Reflecting Cyprus’ change of state identity, Constructivists would presume a change in Turkey’s state identity as well. This change could incorporate a shift to greater emphasis on Turkish nationalist ideals such as the solidarity with conceived ‘mistreated’ Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the assumption that Turkey’s solidarity with Turkish Cypriots even outran the prospect of economic advantages of an EU membership can be examined by Turkey’s intransigent policy towards Cyprus during the past years contradicting the alignment of the acquis necessary for a quick EU accession.
As a result, H1 provides a sufficient explanation for Turkey’s EU accession process until 2004 but is not able to foresee Turkey’s contradictory EU policy after Cyprus’ accession to the EU. H2, instead, can be accepted as a comprehensive explanation for Turkey’s contradicting policy regarding an EU accession.

4.0. Conclusion

Referring back to this thesis’ research question “How has Turkey’s relation to Cyprus influenced its accession negotiations with the EU?” the research findings of chapter 3 have shown that Turkey’s role in the Cyprus dispute and its EU accession process has become deeply interlinked. Hereby, the nature of Cyprus’ influence on Turkey’s accession process has changed over time and was often twofold:

First, the settlement of the Cyprus’ dispute was one of several preconditions of the Helsinki summit influencing whether Turkey reached the next accession-step, the formal opening of accession negotiations. However, the Helsinki summit simultaneously complicated any reunification plans by delinking Cyprus’ EU accession from its role in the Cyprus dispute. This compromise with Greece has on the one hand positively influenced Turkey’s accession process as it enabled the grant of Turkey’s candidacy status. On the other hand it exerted a negative influence on Turkey’s further accession process which depended from a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus.

Second, Turkey’s positive role in promoting the Annan plan to Turkish Cypriots and the EU’s decision to let Cyprus accede the Union despite its refusal of the same served as a sufficient bargaining chip for Turkey to trigger the EU’s opening of accession negotiations. Cyprus’ EU accession, however, transferred the conflict into the political arena of the European Union. By acquiring a veto right on every vote deciding on Turkey’s accession process, Cyprus’ influence significantly increased and thereby also changed Turkey’s policy towards the EU.

Third, Turkey’s intransigent position regarding its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and its threat to not fully comply with the Ankara Protocol might not hindered the EU to open accession negotiations but brought about a first warning by the EU putting Turkey’s relation to Cyprus in a particular place of attention.

Fourth, since the moment of opening the first chapter on Turkey’s accession negotiations Cyprus became the one institutional obstacle impeding the process from enhancement and leading the negotiations to a political stalemate.
Fifth, even though Turkey’s refusal to attend any EU meeting under Cyprus’ presidency stopped all formal accession negotiations reaching a technical stillstand in its negotiations, the EU yet diminished the influence of the Cyprus dispute by launching a new way of cooperation, the positive agenda. Hence, the influence mainly remained on the procedural level.

Additionally, the quantitative analysis of the EU’s progress reports depicts a relevant increase of Cyprus’ influence on Turkey’s accession process. Though, the rather flat slope of the graph supports the assumption that Cyprus influence on Turkey does not as much exerts on the content of the aquis as it does on the procedural level.

As a result, Turkey’s relation to Cyprus has strongly influenced its accession negotiations with the EU whereby the nature of that influence differs over the concerned period of time. With regard to content the settlement of the Cyprus dispute has represented one of many preconditions of the aquis and a useful bargaining chip determining Turkey’s further EU accession. However, the institutional level Turkey’s intransigent relation to Cyprus has directly been linked to its accession process when Cyprus itself became part of the European Union. Therefore, Cyprus EU accession can be indicated as the negative turning point in Turkey’s EU accession process. Since the opening of formal accession negotiations the Cyprus dispute has emerged to the one great obstacle stalling Turkey’s formal accession negotiations from advancement. Consequently, while it may not represent the biggest obstacle with regard to content it does represent Turkey’s biggest hurdle with regard to the procedural framework. This framework depends on the approval of all EU member states. So in Turkey’s case the negotiating framework will not enhance as long as one EU member in particular Cyprus keeps blocking the opening of new chapters. The crucial point is that the factors which may impede Turkey’s accession process to a much larger extend with regard to content cannot be assessed by the European Union as long as the formal procedure is hindered by Cyprus. Here the positive agenda might be a possibility for the EU to circumvent Turkey’s procedural stalemate and to at least foster its advancement on issues of higher significance with regard to the content such as the conflicts named in this thesis’ introduction.

In the end Turkey’s future perspective is not promising. Cyprus’ EU membership has established a reciprocal connection between the settlement of the Cyprus dispute and Turkey’s accession negotiations. Even though the EU has started efforts to reduce this interdependency by launching the positive agenda it will not be able to circumvent the strict formal procedure of an EU accession. Assuming that France’s governmental change will bring about new impulse regarding a more positive EU accession policy, the procedural
advancement in Turkey’s accession negotiations only depends on the improvement of its relation to Cyprus. Relating to this thesis’ theoretical framework, this improvement is not likely to happen as long as Turkey’s national identity and solidarity with Turkish Cypriots is threatened by Cyprus’ intransigent policy towards the TRNC. Therefore, a possible reunification plan would have to inherit an institutional guarantee for Turkish Cypriots’ sovereign existence on Cyprus. Otherwise, the Cyprus issue is likely to emerge to the one symptom deterring Turkey from further European Integration.
## 5.0. Annexes

Table 1: Waiting time for EU members and Candidates

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date of Application</th>
<th>Date of Admission</th>
<th>Waiting Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>22 or 6</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1959 or 1987</td>
<td>1959 or 1987</td>
<td>Average: 10 or 9 At least: 55 or 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1: Map of Cyprus


6.0. References


Plagiarism Statement

I hereby declare that bachelor thesis at hands is the result of my own independent work and makes use of no other sources or materials other than those referenced, and that quotations and paraphrases obtained from the work of others are indicated as such

Münster/ Enschede, 21.10.2013

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Vera Martina Otterstein