Integration or Power-Balancing?

The European Security and Defence Policy

Bachelor Thesis

by Thomas Mollen
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning and Control</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operation</td>
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<td>CMPC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Planning Cell</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Comité Politique et de Sécurité (Political and Security Committee)</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Military Staff</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HG2008</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2008</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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1 Introduction: Saint-Malo and Beyond

Since the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo in December 1998 the perspective on European security issues has shifted towards the newly-built common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This shift towards a “Europeanization” of military and defence issues has, together with other factors, major effects on the security framework for Europe as we knew it for the last 50 years. The new developments in this policy field are seen as a long-demanded paradigm-shift in European security matters, supporting the tasks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, some commentators hope. Others argue that ESDP is just a toy, serving the Europeans as a political instrument to demonstrate their independence from the United States. In fact, as no one would deny, Europe is dependent on the transatlantic partnership. Because of that, it is also feared that ESDP would not only not contribute to the NATO-centric Western security framework, but that it would weaken the alliance.

It was the former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who, just four days after the Saint-Malo declaration, made clear the circumstances under which the United States would support a new European approach: No decoupling from the US, no duplication of structures and, finally, no discrimination of NATO allies that were no EU members. Secretary of Defence William Cohen also insisted in December 2000, “that the European initiative would have to complement and be of benefit to NATO, which would otherwise ‘become a relic’” (as cited in Cornish and Edwards 2001: 592).

In contrast to American scepticism, European politicians considered their idea of a strong ESDP as a direct contribution to the security framework. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated at Princeton University in November 2003:

NATO is the key institution of the transatlantic alliance. No one wants to call into question its fundamental importance as the guarantor of our security. Rather, an ESDP capable of taking effective action will bring to life the concept of the “European pillar of NATO” - a concept, by the way, developed by the U.S. To achieve this, the EU must also improve its planning and command capabilities. What we want is for ESDP to complement NATO, not compete with it. (Fischer 2003)1

1 Wherever this paper makes use of sources originally in German or Dutch language, all translations were made by the author.
However, distrust and scepticism about as well the political background of ESDP as its operational outcome are still audible.

Also among political scientists there is a debate on whether the efforts of the European Union member states to integrate their security and defence policy should be seen as competing, a view that is broadly represented by structural realists. Other scholars, like neo-functionalists, argue that integration in the security and defence policy area happened by itself and was not particularly driven by nation states’ motives.

That leads me to my key research question: How can we explain best the development of the European Security and Defence Policy by using the theories of neo-functionalism and structural realism?

I have chosen those two theories because they can be seen as two of the most prominent theories in terms of explaining particular policy areas: Neo-functionalism has been and still continues to be one of the most influential theories of European integration, while structural realism has an enormous impact on the research in the field of foreign and security affairs. As ESDP is both: a policy in the field of foreign and security affairs as well as an important part of European integration, it seemed logical to me to apply the two theories to it.

The result is that both of the theories can explain parts of the development, but fail in capturing the whole picture. Neo-functionalism is all about integration as such, but fails to include the interests of the state actors. Structural realism approaches are keen on proving that the Europeans tried to balance the United States through ESDP but do not bear in mind the possibility that there might have been just the need to appropriately respond to imminent crises.

In chapter 2, I will explain the basic characteristics of neo-functionalism and structural realism. The next section will consist of a brief history of the European integration with an emphasis on security issues. After that I will point out three basic factors that promoted the development of ESDP and present its main institutional and legal framework. The next step is to bring together the different theories with the results of the analysis. At the end of this thesis I will sum up my findings in a conclusion.
2 Theoretical and Methodological Aspects

Although transatlantic relations have long been subject to research and analysis, the amount of publications that link together evidence of ESDP with theoretical explanations is comparatively small. Andreatta (2005) and Forsberg (2007) give a good overview about research findings so far and offer starting points for further research. Van Staden (1994) also delivers good insights on different theoretical approaches, even though his article antedates the emergence of ESDP.

Among political scientists it is highly debated whether the emergence of ESDP should be seen as a consequence of an ongoing European integration, which is what neo-functionalism would predict, or as a means to softly power balance the United States, which is stressed by scholars from a structural realist stance. Hanna Ojanen (2002 and 2006) for example looks at ESDP with a predominant neo-functionalist point of view and expects that security issues will be eventually completely integrated into the Union as a proof of the member states’ commitment to European integration as such (2002). Barry R. Posen (2004) approaches the issue from a structural realist position, calling the formation of ESDP a form of “balance-of-power behavior”. This point of view is clearly supported by Robert J. Art (2004) who claims that the European Union by erecting its own security and defence framework strives for more agenda-setting power within NATO and vis-à-vis the United States. Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) as well as Howorth (2007) oppose this argument and deny the will of the Europeans to challenge the US in any way. For them, ESDP is rather a response to regional security needs.

In this bachelor thesis I aim to test the mentioned theories and see how they can be applied to the case at hand. The basic knowledge for this study stems mainly from secondary, but as well from primary sources on ESDP, which means that my analysis is based mainly on argumentation and qualitative research.

2.1 Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism was developed in the 1950’s mainly by Ernst B. Haas. It is based on the assumption that economic integration cannot be limited to one specific market segment. Instead, integration tends to “spill over” to nearby economic sectors. Apart from this economic view, neo-functionalists have transferred the theory into political dimensions:
Integration in one policy field would inevitably trigger integration in the next one and so on. In this process, nation-states become less and less important because integration tends to favour supranational institutions in which decisions are taken by experts on their respective fields of in-depth knowledge.

One fundamental difference between neo-functionalism and structural realism is that neo-functionalists dismiss the axiom of international relations being a zero-sum game concerning gains and losses of relative power. Instead they predict that once processes of economic and/or political integration have started all participating countries will benefit from that.

If we assume that neo-functionalism is a possible explanation for integration on the field of security policy, creating ESDP followed certain logic of consequence. There was some kind of „integration pressure“, which spilled over from other policy areas to the field of security and defence, and complemented economic integration. In the 1990s, the European Union “ceased to be 'just' a market and aspired to emerge as a political actor on the world stage”, as Howorth (2007: 56) puts it. And as a more and more politically active entity, it became necessary to be able to enforce its vital interests not only in economic matters.

Following the theory of neo-functionalism we can thus derive development of the ESDP from the preceding integration of the European Union: “Just as a rock can provoke an avalanche, integration in a specific and technical area, such as coal and steel, can eventually lead, by a small series of small and gradual steps, to integration in a very wide area crucial for national sovereignty.” (Andreatta 2005: 22) The process of integration is believed to be endogenous in neo-functionalism, “meaning that the current level of integration determines – by facilitating and amplifying them – future levels. The expectation is therefore an ‘ever closer Union’ based on original intentions as well as on the integration already reached.” (Andreatta 2005: 21/22)

One main axiom of neo-functionalism is that integration leads to supranationalization, which consists, according to Ojanen (2006: 64) of three different, but simultaneous processes: socialization of national actors, inclusion of supranational actors and complex linkages between issue areas. The first process is socialization of national actors. With that is meant that actors on a national level, like political parties or interest groups, would push the integration process forward in order to achieve specific goals (like i.e. a better chance to export their own goods). A precondition for this is that the leaders of those political and societal groups (or the “political elites”, as they are often called in neo-functionalist literature) would develop an understanding that certain economic or political issues can be
tackled best by common European policies. Assuming that this is the case it seems consequential that those policies are implemented and supervised by supranational institutions that, later on, would even take part in the policy-making process. Both the socialization of elites and the formation of supranational actors are deeply connected with each other.

The appearance of supranational actors and an endogenous integration process, triggered by spill-overs that are not under control of nation states, would, altogether, inevitably lead to a transfer of sovereignty from states to the supranational European level.

For a long time, neo-functionalism was thus said to be a theory for “low politics”, that could explain economic integration but that was not applicable to the “high politics” at the core of a nation’s sovereignty. If we take the integration of security and defence policy for granted, we have to ask the question why this basic assumption may have changed.

If we follow the logic of neo-functionalism, we should expect that integration happens automatically and is not mainly driven by EU member states’ interests. We should also expect a visible shift towards supranationalization in the field of security and defence policy as well as a clear transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level.

### 2.2 Structural Realism

The theory of structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz, is founded on the assumption that the international system is a system of anarchy, which is described as the lack of a central authority. So the state itself is the most relevant player in this highly insecure system. Because power in a system of anarchy is relative, the state aims to gain power, security, and, in the end, survival. So the key variable that determines international relations is the distribution of power, structural realists argue. States have different options how to cope with this distribution of power and how to get themselves into a comfortable and secure position.

According to John Mearsheimer’s (2001) concept of “offensive realism”, the balance of power is crucial for a stable and peaceful international system. From the several strategic options of how to cope with an imminent or rising threat to the balance of power, he favors balancing and buck-passing. Balancing means to deter an aggressor and to make clear that the balancer is going to war if deterrence should fail. Mearsheimer describes three possible measures that can be taken. The first is to let the aggressor know through diplomatic
channels or otherwise, that one is committed to the balance of power and will take any action needed to stabilize the status quo. “In effect, the balancer draws a line in the sand and warns the aggressor not to cross it.” (Mearsheimer 2001: 156). A second option would be to form a defensive alliance with other powers (“external balancing”). This decreases the own costs of checking an aggressor – especially when it really comes to war – and increases the own amount of firepower “which in turn increases the likelihood that deterrence will work” (Mearsheimer 2001: 156). On the other hand, because states are driven by self-interests, alliance forming is often slow and inefficient. Even within the alliance, the actors tend to promote their goals and to diminish their costs which makes negotiations tedious. Thus, a third option for a state would be to mobilize additional resources on its own (“internal balancing”). However, the scope of such action can be limited, because as “they seek to maximize their share of the world power, states are effectively engaged in internal balancing all the time” (Mearsheimer 2001: 157).

An alternative to power balancing is buck-passing. This means to stay out of a rising conflict and to let another state do the work of deterring or fighting an aggressor. Buck-passing is, in Mearsheimer’s view, an attractive option especially for great powers. One of the reasons for that is that “if the aggressor and the buck-catcher become involved in a long and costly war, the balance of power is likely to shift in the buck-passers favor; it would then be in a good position to dominate the postwar world” (Mearsheimer 2001: 160). It can also be useful when a state faces multiple threats and tries to avoid confronting them all at once. Several measures aim to facilitate buck-passing: States can try to keep or reach good diplomatic relations with a potential aggressor in order to keep him focused on the intended buck-catcher. Another option is to avoid too close bonds with the buck-catcher, because this provides the opportunity to stay out of the conflict if the buck-catcher is dragged into war. At the same time, states may seek to support the buck-catcher’s build-up of arms, even if this means that his influence and power grows, because he then would have a better chance to contain the potential aggressor.

Bandwagoning as the third possible option for coping with an imminent threat means to join forces with a more powerful opponent and to acknowledge that the new partner is, and will be, the major one. The distribution of power will, in this case, “shift further against the bandwagoner and in the stronger state’s favor” (Mearsheimer 2001: 163). Because states seek to maximize relative power, as realism claims, it is a very uncommon option for great powers, because they would have the incentive to fight an aggressor. Minor powers and
politically isolated states, in contrast, may have no better choice than bandwagoning when they stand alone against hostile states.

In addition to Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism, there is also a defensive variant that developed from structural realism. The two variants show fundamental differences. Basic assumption in defensive realism is that states do not strive for a balance of power in an anarchic system, but for a balance of threats. Relative power is not the key concern of nation-state actors, as long as power-bearer does not appear to be potentially hostile. Instead, states do only balance other states when these pose an imminent or evident threat. Nation-state behaviour is thus not driven by the need to maximize power, but by rational choice. Their actions are determined by the threats they have to cope with. Of course the relative power of other actors is one factor that has to be assessed in order to find out if there are any threats. But it is not the only one. Following the concept of defensive structural realism, a state would also ponder the geographic proximity the offensive capabilities and the intentions of other actors.

If states do not seek to maximize their power but just to respond appropriately to possible threats, there is no incentive for themselves to show offensive behaviour in any way. They would generally prefer showing a defensive attitude. Thus, defensive structural realists argue that in an anarchic international system, states would rather support the status quo than maximizing their own offensive capabilities. If confronted with a potential hegemon, states would tend to form alliances in order to balance against it (see: Elman and Jensen 2012: 21).

This sort of conduct is often described as “soft balancing”, in distinction to the “hard balancing” concept of offensive realism. The goal is not to deter an aggressor but to cope with the dominance of one hegemon in the system. So soft balancing often comes tacitly as a form of collaboration between states, sometimes by erecting formal alliances, but more often by collaborating in regional or international institutions. Two key factors underlie the principle of soft balancing: First, it is always linked to a systemic concentration of power and second there must be a set of shared interests between the balancing states. Because soft balancing is aimed at preventing the emergence of threats, it is often perceived as a combination of balance of power and balance of threats theory.

The Cold War is a good example for the concept of structural realism. In a bipolar system, two super powers on each side were seconded by a vast amount of smaller, dependent states. The big players, the USSR and the USA, tried to balance against each other, while their allies bandwagoned with them to participate from the relative security. After the end
of the Cold War, we can speak of a system of unipolarity, with the USA as the only remaining super power in the world. But Russia and China are two big actors on the stage that can be seen as rivals or potential threats to America’s relative power.

Unipolarity, Kenneth Waltz claims, appears to be “the least durable of international configurations” (Waltz 2000: 27). He explains that on the one hand dominant powers would take on too many tasks beyond their own borders which would lead to a weakening. On the other hand, no matter how “friendly” a dominant power behaves, other states would constantly be concerned about its future behaviour. In this potentially insecure situation, stronger states often tend to form alliances and to balance against a dominant power, Posen (2004: 6-7) points out, whereas weaker states try to bandwagon with the greatest states in order to obtain a better position.

From an offensive structural realist perspective, we can derive the following expectations about state behaviour in Europe: The first thing is, in Mearsheimer’s words, that we should expect “fear and suspicion” among the European states, with the Soviet threat gone and the American interest in Europe remarkably declined, as I will explain later on. Offensive realism predicts a struggle for hegemony between the Europeans, dominated probably by the two nuclear powers, France and Britain, and possibly by Germany. If there was intra-European co-operation, it is argued, then just for the sake of temporary security in which individual states have got the chance to maximize their own relative power. If power is at a sufficient level, they would break up with the allies and try to balance against them. In no case states would transfer any of their sovereignty to a supranational organization, because this would imply a direct loss of influence and relative power.

From a defensive realist point of view we should expect the Europeans to integrate their security and defence resources just in order to counterbalance the American hegemon position in Europe and to gain more influence on NATO’s and the United States’ security policies.

2.3  Other Possible Theoretical Approaches

Apart from neo-functionalism and structural realism, there are some more theoretical approaches that are used to explain the development of European security and defence policy and that I would like to briefly mention here for the sake of completeness. One is neo-liberal institutionalism, in which states are depicted as “rational egoists, who are
concerned only with their own gains and losses” (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 26). The distribution of power among states plays a smaller role in this theory. Neo-liberal institutionalism, although admitting that states are the crucial actors in an anarchic system, assumes that the states are focusing more on external structural conditions under which governments take foreign policy decisions. “According to neoliberal institutionalists, conflict in the international system is an effect of the lack of trust between states in a condition of anarchy.” (Andreatta 2005: 30) When states share common interests, they are likely to cooperate. A precondition is that the interests states share can only be realized through cooperation. Institutions or regimes are thus “created by states as instruments to achieve certain (selfish) goals. […] Regimes reduce transaction costs, i.e. costs associated with the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements. (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 37).

Michael E. Smith observes a “progressive development and impact of institutionalized cooperation in foreign policy among EU member states” (Smith 2004: 18). He would not deny the fact that – like in realism – states are prominent actors in the field of international relations, but, unlike realists, he claims that actors’ goals and interests can be highly influenced by institutions. But according to Smith there is no single way to achieve institutionalization, but a complex structure of domestic and international influences.

What are these influences like, especially when looking at the creation of the European security architecture in the 1990s? Matthias Koenig-Archibugi has tried to give an answer by testing different hypotheses which all stemmed from different schools of thought using a method called fuzzy-set analysis. With that method he found out that e.g. “strong regional governance increases the probability that governments prefer a supranational foreign and security policy” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 163). Preferences for or refusals of supranational institutions can also be influenced by how europeanized a certain state identity might be, how much a state can rely on its own material capabilities or how much the state’s policy is conform to other states’ policies. Koenig-Archibugi finds that these four factors do affect the probability of supranationalism, especially when they appear together, but none of them is a necessary condition for supranationalism. In conclusion, he stresses that to preserve national sovereignty is not a common goal of all states because some of the governments “have shown a willingness to promote strong forms of political integration in Europe” (2004: 166).

Koenig-Archibugi’s argumentation is supported by Simon Collard-Wexler who strongly opposes structural realist views in the light of the European integration process. He
questions the structural realist axiom that anarchy is the dominant condition in international affairs: As far as the European Union is concerned, he claims that there are instead several examples of hierarchic structure, including the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice: “In a series of orders and rulings, the ECJ has abrogated itself the right of establishing a legal order autonomous from member states’ law, and in many cases superior to it.” (Collard-Wexler 2006: 407) The famous Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa vs. ENEL (1964) cases in which the ECJ introduced the principles of supremacy and direct effect of EU law can be regarded as milestones on this way. With rulings like that, the ECJ played “a crucial role in promoting integration and over time promoting a system of governance that significantly limits states’ autonomy” (Collard-Wexler 2006: 407).

Following the concept of institutionalism we would expect that states form institutions as a reaction to a set of problems or as a means of achieving goals that can be better obtained through co-operation. If states see the chance to realize their goals through institutions, there are may even be willing to give up some of their national sovereignty. It is an immanent feature of institutionalism that institutions, once they are formed, begin not only to operate under the will of their creators, but also to shape their will.

Based on institutionalist thoughts as well as on theories of interdependence, liberal intergovernmentalism, developed by Andrew Moravcsik, offers another approach to European integration and, by that, the integration of its security and defence policy. Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that states behave rationally, meaning they ponder the costs and benefits of (economic) interdependence. While doing so, they are influenced by domestic societal groups like labour unions or trade associations who try to put pressure on their political representatives. Bargaining European policy is thus always the attempt to reach an agreement that embraces different national preferences. Institutions emerge not by spill-over as claimed by neo-functionalists, but just as a means to fulfil certain tasks. “Integration can be seen as a process in which [governments] define a series of underlying objectives or preferences, bargain to substantive agreements concerning cooperation, and finally select appropriate international institutions in which to embed them.” (Moravcsik 1998: 5) States tend to create or join international institutions only if there is a clear benefit to achieve compared with formulating and conducting policies just on a domestic level. In case of the European institutions, liberal intergovernmentalists argue that institutions are welcome to the point where they strengthen, rather than weaken, governmental control over certain policies. This point is reached when political goals seem unattainable through
individual nation-state action or when institutions can help gaining easier access to the desired goals. Through establishing a forum for negotiations, through decision-making procedures and monitoring compliance, institutions “reduce the costs of identifying, making and keeping agreements, thereby making possible a greater range of co-operative arrangements.” (Moravcsik 1993: 507) Additionally, they strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis their domestic pressure groups, liberal intergovernmentalists argue.

European integration (also in the field of security and defence policy) would thus neither be the outcome of functional or political spill-over, nor the result of any kind of power-balancing behaviour. It is resulting from a rationally driven process in which the underlying political objectives and preferences of the actors involved are the crucial factors that can (but do not inevitably) lead to the formation of common institutions.

3 Partnership or Rivalry?

3.1 The Development of a Common European Security Policy

If we want to examine the development of a common European security policy, we will have to take a look back into the years after World War II. After six years of suffering, fighting and devastation, it is not surprising that Europe's political leaders had a strong interest in securing the continent's peace and prosperity. In the first years after the war, the Europeans mostly feared two scenarios: A quick rise of the former aggressor Germany and the constantly growing threat by the communist Soviet regime. This is why, from the very beginning of the post-war era, the involvement of the United States in Europe was seen as a guarantee of stability. That guarantee was put into shape by the signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4th, 1949. According to a well-known quote, NATO was founded to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down”.

During the following years it became obvious that the fear of a German threat was arbitrary. After demolition, demilitarization, deindustrialization and, finally, its division into a western-oriented and a Soviet-driven state, there was no more reason to act on the assumption of a direct menace originating from Germany. Nevertheless, its neighbour states tried to embed the Federal Republic actively into the process of the political reshaping of Europe by creating a network of bi- and multilateral treaties. With the
reconstruction aid provided through the Marshall plan Western Germany was furthermore closely connected with the United States.

The connections with the Soviet Union were completely different: While the Western powers and Moscow were close allies during the World War, fighting a common enemy, there was now the irreconcilable discrepancy between communism and the democratic system that came to the fore.

It was the confrontation of two directly opposed political and societal systems: that means, of free and pluralistic democracies with a strong emphasis on a market-based economy on the one hand and of Soviet-controlled, centralistic, one-party-dictatorships, whose economies had committed themselves to tight centralism and preferably total command economy on the other hand. (Gasteyger 2005: 63)

Europe became a chess board, on which the respective power blocs put their pieces into position. The Federal Republic of Germany was a place with a strategically vital importance for the Western allies because of its geographical position directly at the borders of the Warsaw Pact.

In this situation it was important for Europe to realign itself in terms of economy and of security policy. Within the framework of the Marshall plan there was already more than 20 billion Dollar of American reconstruction aid transferred to Europe in the years 1948-1950. At the beginning of the Fifties it was the task of the Europeans themselves to lay the foundation of a prosperous economy by creating a new form of co-operation. The impetus for this was a plan by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman: Following his proposal, in 1951 the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux states concluded a treaty on the creation of the European Community for Coal and Steel, which was the nucleus of the European Union.

Another French idea was the plan of a European Defence Community (EDC), whose core should have been a common European army with German participation and under supranational command. Two elements were crucial for this consideration: On the one hand Germany’s rearmament was seen as necessary to be prepared for the threat by the Warsaw Pact states on the peak of the east-west-conflict. On the other hand France did not trust its old enemy Germany enough to let it have the sole control over a newly-built national military. In the end, the “Pleven Plan”, named after the French Prime Minister, failed in 1954 because of his fellow countrymen: After a regime change in Paris, the new
French National Assembly refused to ratify the already signed treaty. But the development of this idea alone makes clear that from the beginning of the European integration process the issues of security and defence were on top of the agenda, like Kamp (2005: 2) states: “Although the founding fathers of the European Economic Community chose coal and steel as a basis for their unique experiment of integration, their main motivation was the desire for peace and security in Europe.”

To make this wish come true even after the failure of the Defence Community, West Germany was eventually admitted to NATO in 1955 and rearmed. This was based on the Treaties of Paris (23rd October, 1954), with which the Western European Union (WEU) was brought to life again.

Within the scope of the WEU, however, the main issue was not a common military like in the EDC, but the control and limitation of arms. Furthermore, the WEU did not have a supranational board for control and administration (like it was planned for the EDC), but was constructed strictly intergovernmental.

In the early sixties the common security and defence policy reappeared on the European agenda. The French government under President de Gaulle campaigned at this time vehemently for a European Political Union. The idea was the creation of an intergovernmental confederation. Among the political contents of this confederation was also the issue of security. The plans which became known by the name of the then French Foreign Minister Fouchet failed in the end due to a Dutch veto. The Netherlands feared that as a small country they would lose much of their influence on European politics in an intergovernmental system and therefore preferred to continue with the integration process by creating more supranational institutions.

In the following decades the European Community was developed constantly further. A milestone was the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 with the creation of the European Union, forming a three-pillar model of the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy and co-operation in the fields of interior and justice policy. For the first time since the EDC negotiations the EU member states decided to work out a common defence policy that should be organized under the umbrella of the WEU.

Although the basic tasks of the Western European Union had been already redefined by a 1992 meeting of the WEU council of ministers on the Petersberg near Bonn (so called “Petersberg tasks”: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces including peacemaking), the North Atlantic alliance and with that the United States
were still seen as the prior actor in the field of security and defence policy. The European Union as such played no substantial role in this policy area until then.

This perception changed fundamentally with the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo in 1998. For the first time ever, the European Union was named in this document an independent military actor:

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. [...] To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. (Joint Declaration of Saint-Malo 1998)

A real security and defence policy with the participation of all EU member states came into being about half a year later when the Amsterdam Treaty was commenced. Therein the member states of the European Union stipulated that the development of a common defence policy should be part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP). A next stimulus was the Cologne summit in June 1999, where the EU members committed themselves to make their military means reclaimable for ESDP. The wording of the Saint-Malo declaration was taken over nearly without any amendment, however a declaration was added that the EU should also be in state to carry out activities “without prejudice to actions by NATO” (European Council: 1999). The “Petersberg tasks” were explicitly included in the range of those activities.

ESDP was further concretized during the EU summit in December 1999 in Helsinki. There were substantial decisions taken for the creation of the Political and Security Committee as well as the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. In addition to this, the heads of states and governments established the „Headline Goal“, which implicated the formation of a European Rapid Reaction Force.

For the sake of completeness I want to point out to two other major steps towards the integration of the European Security and Defence Policy: The Berlin-Plus-agreement between NATO and EU on 17th March, 2003 and the so called “Chocolate Summit” (participants: France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg) at Tervuren/Belgium in April 2003. I will elaborate on the contents later on in this paper.

3.2 The Fundamental Drivers behind ESDP
As I have shown in the previous chapter, security and defence policy were on the agenda already since the beginning of the European integration process. It is no coincidence that these topics became more and more urgent in European politics at the end of the 20th century. On the contrary, this was the outcome of different developments that are partially connected to each other. Historians and political scientists have identified three fundamental drivers that stood behind the development of ESDP: One of those is the fact that after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Western) Europe lost a lot of its strategic importance for the Americans. This caused a security vacuum on the continent, which came visibly to the fore in the nineties, when the conflicts on the former Yugoslav national territory arose. While the USA did not attach very much strategic importance to what they interpreted as a regional conflict, and therefore had a low-key approach in the beginning, the Europeans proved to be incapable to stop the first wars on European soil since 1945. Hence, the conflicts on the Balkans can be seen as a second impetus for ESDP. In addition to this, there were fundamental changes in the political attitudes of Great Britain and France which only made the Saint-Malo-Declaration possible: Great Britain turned its head towards the continent more than ever before, and France slightly attenuated its sceptical attitude towards NATO.

3.2.1 Reduction of the US Strategic Interest in Europe

After the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact the strategic attitude of the United States regarding Europe changed fundamentally. To Washington, it did not appear contemporary any longer to take the leading military role in Europe after the Soviet menace had vanished. During the Cold War, Europe’s security had been the stakes in the global confrontation between East and West, but after its end there was little reason for the Americans to carry on guaranteeing this security with the same input as before. The Congress urged President George Bush to cut the defence budget by 25 percent and to partly withdraw American troops from the continent. The question that was posed in Washington was: “Why should the US taxpayer continue to underwrite the security of a political entity with a greater population than that of the USA and a comparable GDP – particularly since there was no longer any apparent 'threat'?" (Howorth 2007: 53). Nonetheless, the United States “wished to maintain the centrality of NATO in European defense, albeit at lower force levels.” (Keohane/Nye 1993: 119). At the same time, the Europeans reflected publicly on limiting the US influence on the continent. It was a logical
consequence that, in Washington, Europe was considered being strategically less important than before.

Time revealed that the Americans left a vacuum that had to be filled as quickly as possible by the Europeans. Without an effective European security policy, even the continuance of NATO seemed to be at risk. That is why especially the very atlanticist British were highly interested to create a new, common European security architecture.

3.2.2 The Yugoslav Wars

The vacuum the Americans had left came into notice very clearly during the different crises on the Balkans in the nineties. When the tensions between the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia began to spread, the US government indeed observed the situation with concern. But other issues, like the Gulf War or the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union were standing very much higher on the agenda. “The Yugoslav Conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless a regional dispute. Milosevic had Saddam's appetite, but Serbia didn't have Iraq's capabilities or ability to affect America's vital interests, such as access to energy supplies,” former US Secretary of State James Baker remembers (1995: 636, as cited in Witte 2000: 42). Due to those thoughts, America let it to the Europeans to take care of the cropping up conflict. And there was another reason: Washington was displeased about the fact that the Europeans – as a side-effect of the highly acclaimed Treaty of Maastricht – debated openly about a new security identity which would definitely scale America’s role in Europe down. James Baker writes:

We had been [...] trying to get them to recognize that, even with a diminished Soviet threat, they still needed an engaged America. But our protestations were overlooked in an emotional rush for a unified Europe. The result was an undercurrent in Washington, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia was as good as a test as any. (Baker 1995: 636-637, as cited in Witte 2000: 56.)

And finally, there was a third reason for the Americans to contain themselves: A one-sided partisanship, they feared, would not only undermine Yugoslavia’s fragile national unity, but completely destroy it. And this was something the USA wanted to avoid at all costs. They considered Yugoslavia as a “role model” for the much bigger Soviet Union. There too was a multi-ethnic, decentralized nation-state in a process of collapsing, and
Washington tried to avoid anything that could have supported this process (see: Paulsen 1995: 16).

During the following months the attitude of the United States changed. In August 1991 the putsch in Moscow occurred and the Soviet Union collapsed rapidly so that there was no more need to be considerate of the “role model” issue. Secondly, the European allies did neither accomplish in their efforts to persuade the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia to secure their state unity, nor were they able to detain then from armed conflict. And finally the Yugoslav issue became a topic in the now beginning presidential election campaign between George H. W. Bush and his challenger, Bill Clinton.

After Clinton had taken office, the USA played a much bigger role on the Balkans than before. In particular, US military forces supervised – within the bounds of a NATO mission – the adherence of the no-fly zone above Bosnia. By the medium of the USA the war-fighting parties signed the Dayton Peace Treaty in 1995 that put the armed conflict to a preliminary end.

At the beginning of the 1999 Kosovo war, it was again visible that the United States hesitated to engage, because they considered the conflict primarily as a European issue (see Loquai 2000: 68-71). But just as in the previous crises, the European Union proved to be unable to solve the conflict by itself. “Even with the lessons of Bosnia still fresh in Europe's collective memory, Europeans failed to take any meaningful joint action in Kosovo, forcing them to concede that in the existing climate only the United States can act in times of crisis.” (Mathiopoulos/Gyarmati 1999: 68) The inability to act made clear that without a new approach on security policy Europe would ever be completely dependent on US military aid.

3.2.3 Security Policy Changes in Great Britain and France

Until the declaration of Saint-Malo, security and defence policy was seen in Western Europe mainly as a task of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Western European Union (WEU) played just a small role while the European Union itself was irrelevant. The change of attitude is directly connected with a paradigm-shift of the British government. The new Labour administration under Prime Minister Tony Blair acted more Europe-oriented than its predecessor – even with regard to security issues. “The new regime in London espoused the notion that in the twenty-first century, there is no need to make a definite choice
between being European and at the same time being the closest ally of the Americans” (Mathiopoulos/Gyarmati 1999: 67).

The British government took the position that an enhanced European co-operation in security policy and military terms would primarily contribute to the success of the Atlantic alliance. As one of Europe’s biggest military powers, it was logically consistent to take the lead here and to claim a leading role. “London felt there were gains to be made from enhancing Europe's own capabilities and from being seen to take a major role of critical importance to the EU”, Flynn (3) explains. An increasing European (and mainly British) importance within NATO was expected as one of these gains. But to achieve it, there was the crucial task to involve France, “in London's eyes the loose cannon of European defence protagonists” (Flynn: 4), in the plans.

The French, on the other hand, were since decades quite reluctant to work together with NATO on basic issues. Their basic interest had been to not let the Atlantic alliance become the single pivotal factor in Europe’s security policy. Instead of that, France as the single nuclear power of continental Europe regarded itself to have the crucial military role. This perception had to be modified too, after the end of the Cold War, when the term „defence“ was replaced by „security“ even in France. “Furthermore, France had to come to terms with a renewed and dominant NATO and the unwillingness of its neighbours to accept French visions for European security. As such, Chirac concluded that a European defence identity could only be constructed within the Atlantic Alliance, effectively denying the relevance of Gaullist guidelines for defence which has previously been so dominant.” (Flynn: 2-3)
3.3 The Political and Institutional Framework of ESDP

At their summit in Amsterdam 1997 the member states of the European Union had already agreed to gradually constitute a common defence policy. With the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo the necessity of such a policy was again underpinned. Thus, in the following years the European Union developed several political mechanisms and institutions in the area of defence policy. Since the Treaty of Nice (2001) those are mainly embedded in the text of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Article 17 (1) TEU for example defines that all questions referring to the security of member states (including questions of defence policy) are subject to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union, while the member states’ relationship with NATO shall be left untouched. Rules made within the North Atlantic alliance are acknowledged explicitly. The second Paragraph of Art. 17 TEU lists the Petersberg tasks. This defines the scope of ESDP, it includes “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) makes clear that the term “security” is perceived in a broad sense. Thus the aspiration of ESDP goes beyond the Petersberg tasks. Yet was it a primary goal for the Europeans, to enhance their military capabilities in order to be able responding to crises like the ones on the Balkans appropriately in the future. After all, the Saint-Malo-Declaration had already stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces [and] the means to decide to use them” (Joint Declaration of Saint Malo 1998). At the EU summit in Helsinki, less then half a year later than Saint-Malo, the heads of states and governments of the EU member states thus agreed on a joint catalogue of military requirements “from which would be drawn appropriate resources for a range of hypothetical European missions, including the three main Petersberg tasks” (Howorth 2007: 103). The document, called “Helsinki Headline Goal”, envisaged that from December 2003 onwards 60 000 troops, 100 naval vessels and 400 military aircraft should be ready to deploy into their operational area within 60 days after the alarm call and that they should keep operational readiness for one year. The list of troops each EU member state could provide for this purpose was constantly revised and expanded during the following years. In May 2003 the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) stated that “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained [only] by recognised shortfalls” (as
cited in Lindstrom 2006: 1). Europe’s military capabilities were further enhanced by the concept of EU battle groups, which again was initiated by France and Great Britain and supported by Germany. The concept was adopted by the European Council in June 2004. The battle groups consist of 1,500 soldiers that can be deployed into their operational area within 15 and for a period of 30 days (with potential extension to 120 days). The battle group concept was an integral part of the new “Headline Goal 2010”, altogether with the introduction of a European Defence Agency and the erection of a Civil-Military Planning Cell.

Beside this progress in the military area the EU also developed its position concerning other aspects of security policy. In the 2003 published European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, it is argued that the manifold security risks that the EU considers to be exposed to cannot be tackled with military means alone. For this reason the European Council amended the military “Headline Goal 2010” with a “Civilian Headline Goal 2008” (HG2008).

To implement the different tasks within ESDP, a whole range of new institutions like the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), a Civil-Military Planning Cell (CMPC) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) was created. Other institutions like the Political and Security Committee (COPS) got additional tasks.

All these changes concerned the institutional design of the European security architecture, but at the same time the European Union seemed not to intend to make European institutions the primary arena for security policy. On the contrary, the 1999 “Berlin Plus” agreement ensured a deep interlocking of NATO and EU security routines. It granted the Union access to NATO assets and capabilities, e.g. communications units and headquarters. Under the conditions of Berlin Plus, NATO also aids with planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMOs). Notably about the Berlin Plus agreement is a routine that grants NATO a “right of first refusal”. This means that NATO has got the right to decide whether it does or does not take action in a given crisis situation. Not until NATO has decided, the Union has got the right to take action on its own.

So even if the Europeans now have their own security architecture, they are highly dependent on NATO assets as well as on the Alliance’s decisions. NATO therefore has a high amount of control over as well as European operations as the decision-making processes.
3.4 Controversies over ESDP in America and Europe

The development of a unique European Security and Defence Identity has been perceived ambivalently in the United States from its very beginning. On the one hand, the Americans had urged their European partners since long to make more efforts in this policy area. On the other hand they feared that a “Europeanization” of Security Policy would pose a serious risk to NATO coherence. Shortly after the Franco-British Declaration of Saint-Malo, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, thus reminded the Europeans of the conditions under which the USA would support the further development of ESDI:

First, we want to avoid decoupling: Nato is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organisation of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making.

Second, we want to avoid duplication: defence resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decisions twice – once at Nato and once more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against Nato members who are not EU members. (Albright 1998: 22, as documented in Rutten 2001)

Over time, Albright’s admonitions proved as not completely ungrounded. On April 29th, 2003 in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren the so called “Chocolate Summit” was held, where the heads of governments of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg not only agreed upon a deeper co-operation in the fields of military. They also proposed that all of the EU member states being capable and willing should create a European Security and Defence Union by the means of “enhanced co-operation”. This Defence Union was planned to include a mutual assistance commitment like the one under Art. 5 North Atlantic Treaty as well as a unique European military headquarter. The proposal was motivated especially by France and Germany who tried to revive ESDP and to strengthen the “European pillar” of NATO.

It is not surprising that the idea did not meet the approval of the US government. But there was resistance also in some of the other EU member states. Especially Great Britain, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands interpreted the Tervuren Summit as some sort of conspiracy against the United States and its allies in the second Gulf War, the “coalition of
the willing”. They criticised that an enhanced co-operation of only some of the EU states would not strengthen the Union but would rather weaken it due to an imminent split. Despite that criticism and the fact that the proposals of the four participants never were implemented, the “Chocolate Summit” was a considerable stimulus for ESDP and for instance an important step on the way to the Civil Military Planning Cell (see Howorth 2007: 112).

Another controversial subject was the difficult relationship between the planned crisis reaction forces of the two organisations. Shortly after the Helsinki decision on creating an EU Rapid Reaction Force within the “Helsinki Headline Goal”, the NATO summit in Prague (November 2002), stimulated by the USA, resolved on the creation of a “NATO Response Force” (NRF). Forces assigned to the NRF derive from the existant military of its member states that are being held on stand-by for half a year after they have undergone a one-year training period. To achieve the best preparation possible for the participating nations, there was set up a rotation system for a couple of years in advance. Hans Binnendijk, one of the intellectual fathers of the NRF concept, attributes its necessity directly to the time after the terrorist attacks on September 11: “In November 2001 we had an Article 5 commitment and we were going to war in Afghanistan. When NATO Allies asked US central command what they could do to help, no useful units could be identified. […] We decided that if this were to happen again, NATO would be in trouble.” (as quoted by Thompson 2005: 11) Beside this, the NRF was also erected “as a vehicle for the transfer of training and technologies between the United States and European Allies” (Thompson 2005: 11). So the first thing the Americans wanted to foster was enhancing the capability of the European contribution to NATO for the new duties.

However, this was regarded with deep scepticism in Europe. On the one hand the French feared that the ERRF would fall into obscurity due to the strong NRF promotion by the Americans. On the other hand, the actual military commitment of the United States was fairly limited: “While U.S. policymakers initially viewed the NRF as a way to boost European capabilities, many in Europe have come to suspect that the U.S. commitment to this crucial force may be lacking. To date, the United States has contributed only enabling capabilities, such as communicators. To many European observers, the United States seems unwilling to commit its own forces to make the NRF succeed – a perspective that does nothing to foster European commitment.” (Burwell et al. 2006: 3)

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean the duplication of crisis reaction forces was regarded sceptically, too, but from a completely different angle. They feared that “the force
pool from which NRF and ERRF would be drawn would be predominantly the same.” (Howorth 2003: 241) This problem of “double-hatting” even increases if one takes into mind that those military units not only have to be held available for NATO or EU missions, but also have to contribute to their original task, the defence of their own nation-state.

Another difficulty in the euro-atlantic co-operation is the so-called capabilities gap. The Europeans have not met yet the technological advance of the Americans. But there exists also a gap between the Europeans’ own expectations and the military reality. Two reasons are fundamental for this dilemma: First of all the governments seem to be incapable to rearrange their military spendings. They would have to invest much more money in order to ensure a rapid transformation of their armed forces and its material. But this would not be a popular decision in the light of big public deficits and strained social systems. So a lot of the military technology is not state of the art any more but a relic of the Cold War and not really usable for new, asymmetric tasks. Secondly, territorial defence still is being perceived as the nucleus of state sovereignty. Due to that, many states have in store the full range of military services. This is a problem especially for small and medium-size countries because of the military expenditure. Transforming the armed forces into units that can be used not only in territorial defence but also in out-of area missions will lead to high costs and to the abolition of units that are not required any more. “To keep the 'full toolbox' is useless as a matter of fact, because even a complete set of inevitably small – and by that inefficient – capacities will not enable the small and medium-size member states to carry out autonomous operations. They are still dependent on their fellow member states.” (Biscop 2004: 607) A probable solution for this problem would consist of two parts: co-operation and specialization. With the creation of ERRF the EU member states already made a small step towards a deeper co-operation. Pooling of jointly used support facilities as for logistics or airlift could be a next one. And pooling does not necessarily have to be restricted to capacities that are provided by one or more single states. Like NATO does it with the AWACS airplanes, the EU could also provide collective assets “which are no longer property of the participating member states but of the EU as such, this is maybe the only way to achieve capital-intensive capacities like in the field of satellite observation.” (Biscop 2004: 607) On the other hand, specialization would mean that several member states would completely abstain from keeping particular capacities and that those tasks would be carried out by other states. This could lead to the development of special capabilities that could be provided for the entire European Union.
With this, duplications could be avoided, costs reduced and work could be done more efficiently.

The difficulties between the European Union on the one hand and the US-dominated NATO on the other do not only consist though of the capabilities gap. The very different interpretation of the war in Iraq has split apart Europeans and Americans. Although there is a common set of shared values such as democracy, free market and the rule of law, European and US foreign policy differ fundamentally: “The EU and the US have very different ultimate global objectives and policy priorities. They have different methods and approaches, [and] considerable differences of strategic or security culture” (Howorth 2003: 237). But there are also chances deriving from this diversity. For instance, the European Union has considerable strengths in terms of “soft powers”: “The EU has already developed an impressive array of constabulary and civilian instruments and continues to grow in this area”, Smith (2005: 7) concedes. She proposes a “Berlin Plus in reverse” plan. Just like the EU can – under certain circumstances – use several NATO assets, also NATO should be given the ability to draw upon the EU’s civilian and constabulary capabilities for crisis management.

3.5 ESDP: Spill-over or Power-Balancing?

As I have shown, security issues were concerning the politicians already at the very beginning of the European integration process. However, it took until 1998 to create the common will to enhance the EU’s political capabilities with a common security and defence policy. But how can we explain the emergence of ESDP with regard to the presented theories of integration or international politics? Did ESDP derive from spill-over effects, as neo-functionalism might suggest? Or was it the outcome of power-balancing behaviour, as structural realists argue?

Earlier in this thesis, I have depicted the factors that indicate an integration process as neo-functionalism would predict it. This process would be endogenous, driven by political or functional spill-over, it would contain the socialization of powerful domestic political or societal actors as well as a transfer of national sovereignty to supranational European institutions.

If we assess the key drivers behind ESDP in light of these factors, we have to admit that the endogeneity behind this stage of integration is debatable. There might however be
some evidence for it, given that integration moved on from economic affairs to a common foreign policy, reaching security and defence issues in the end. But if this was an inevitably result of an ongoing and unstoppong process, critics argue, we should have seen security and defence issues appear earlier on the table of European co-operation. In addition, the decline of US strategic interest in Europe and the Balkan crises during the nineties are completely exogenous factors that facilitated the wish to strengthen the European defence capabilities. And the idea of a common security and defence policy was not born within the framework of the already existing European institutions, spilling over towards a new policy area. At the beginning there was the political will of two member states, France and the UK, expressing their demands in the Joint Declaration at Saint Malo. The socialization of domestic political and societal actors may indeed have supported the idea of a common European security and defence policy. Economical elites, especially from the military industry, are likely to have lobbied in favour of defence integration. The creation of the European Defence Agency may underline the need for stronger cooperation in obtaining military engineering assets. But the interests of domestic military suppliers, the development of the EDA and a co-ordinated European military procurement system are certainly rather an outcome of ESDP than one of its stimuli.

Another main assumption of neo-functionalism is that the spill-over effects cause supranational institutions to emerge. Hence, one could expect to find those within the ESDP set of institutions. The main arenas of policy-shaping and decision-making, like the COPS or the EUMC, remain however strictly on the intergovernmental level. Supranationality is only to find in close-to-economy areas, like the EDA, or in departments, like the Civilian-Military Cell, that are dependent on decisions of the EUMC or other intergovernmental bodies. For neo-functionalists, the reason for lacking those supranational institutions is simply, that there was no time yet for them to emerge, but that they definitely will do so: “[…] Once security and defence policy are ‘in’ the Union, they become subject to similar transforming processes as any other field.” (Ojanen 2006: 64).

But if integration of security and defence policy is inevitable, why did the process take so long? Why was each and every attempt to include security issues into the integration process doomed to failure? States just did not want to give up parts of their sovereignty, Ojanen (2002: 4) argues, and integration was to some extent limited to the “low policies” like economic issues:
The member states would not give up their autonomous decision-making power in these questions to common institutions or supranational authorities. [...] These issues did not follow any logic of “automaticity”, but instead showed that any development towards closer cooperation was dependent on the interests of the governments.

As neo-functionalism predicts a transfer of national sovereignty towards supranational bodies, this explanation is stunning in two different ways: First, if security issues were perceived as being core of national sovereignty, why did the European leaders in the end agree upon the creation of ESDP at all? The answer is, as Ojanen (see 2006: 62-63) argues, that security and defence were also becoming issues of ‘low politics’, since in many countries the era of conscription and territorial defence seemed over. Second, if there is no “logic of automaticity” (a synonym for spill-over) but instead the interests of nation-states are the key drivers (or non-drivers) of closer co-operation, the whole neo-functionalist explanatory framework is questioned here.

In summary, we have to see whether Ojanen’s predictions of developing supranationalization will come true in the future. Until that proof has been given neo-functionalism remains highly limited in its explanatory value of European Security and Defence Policy. Especially the lack of supranational institutions as main actors in this field argues against neo-functionalist views. In addition to this, none of the three key drivers behind ESDP (reduction of US strategic interest in Europe, the wars on the Balkans and policy changes in France and Great Britain) can be seen as contributory to the neo-functionalist argumentation.

How can we assess those key drivers in the light of structural realism? Offensive structural realism suggests that there would be no enhanced co-operation on strategic and military issues at all, because every single state in Europe would try to struggle for hegemony on the continent. In there was any (intergovernmental) co-operation, then just temporarily and strictly goal-oriented. If a common goal would have been achieved, the ties would loosen and the intra-European struggle would start over. In a climate of fear and suspicion vis-à-vis each other, no state actor would even consider shifting issues that are crucial for national sovereignty onto a common European platform.

Defensive structural realism, on the other hand, assumes that states however may cooperate if they share certain interests or concerns, such as the power of a (potential) hegemon. Then they would tend to form alliances (whether formal or informal) or to work together in regional or international institutions. This behaviour, often referred to as “soft
balancing”, can be regarded as pre-emptive, in order to either conserve the status quo or to prevent a potential threat from emerging.

All evidence shows that the basic assumptions of offensive realism do not meet reality when it comes to assessing ESDP: Like in economic affairs, the Europeans have created a very unique form of co-operation in the field of security and defence which seems to be as stable as any other part of European policies. Within Europe, there is no indication of a struggle between the different nation-states apart from “normal” bargaining. To enhance European armaments co-operation, even a supranational European Defence Agency has been created. For my analysis of the three influential factors of ESDP development, I will thus focus on defensive structural realism.

The significant loss of US strategic interest can be deduced by its position as a hegemon power. Whether it withdraws its forces from Europe or not, whether it takes an active part in European policy-making or not, all that does not play a crucial role in terms of US security, Barry Posen argues: “The US can be expected to behave in ways that seem capricious to its allies and friends. It will take up issues abroad with little thought to the views of its allies because their capabilities will not seem critical to US success.” (2004: 8). The main question that arises from such behaviour is how the allies react to that in the long run.

Even powers that do not fear US capabilities may fear the autonomy that such capabilities allow. The US may, for its own reasons, be absent from some regions. During its absence, those who have grown dependent upon it for security in the past could suddenly find themselves with regional problems that the US finds uninteresting. Consequential states will at minimum act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the US and will try to carve out an ability to act autonomously, should it become necessary. (Posen 2004: 9)

Defensive structural realism claims that with regard to the “balance of threats” the Europeans would interpret the US “caprices” as exactly that: a potential threat to their common security. Integration of security and defence policy is therefore to be seen as a means of soft counterbalancing. Through the enhancement of their assets the Europeans would obtain more importance within NATO, in the end being able to influence policies and decisions better than ever before: “A European Union that can act autonomously in its own region and that can provide for its own security is an EU that will be […] more
capable of influencing Washington across a certain range of issues.” (Art 2006: 182) In other words: It would gain agenda-setting power in NATO.

Barry Posen basically agrees that “ESDP is a form of balance-of-power behavior, albeit a weak form” (2004: 17). On the other hand he observes that many European also-NATO-members are bandwagoning at the same time by transforming their military: “Most European states, in their NATO guise, are not arming to defend themselves against agreed threats or to pursue vital interests – they are arming to make the US happy.” (2004: 10)

Especially Great Britain is seen as a major player of bandwagoning, which can explain the UK’s attitude vis-à-vis ESDP: „British leaders believe that the US will take Europeans more seriously if they deliver some usable capabilities to NATO. Furthermore, if Britain is seen as the agent of these improvements, its standing with the US will rise“ (Posen 2004: 13).

France, on the other hand, had very differing reasons for promoting ESDP: French president Chirac considered the world as not being unipolar, but multipolar and therefore aimed strongly at enhancing European security and defence capabilities.

„Some assert that the French simply want to drive NATO out of Europe. Others suggest a more plausible and subtle strategy, consistent with the public statements of French leaders that Europe will only get a voice in world affairs if it can stand on its own.” (Posen 2004: 14).

It is indeed true that France often expressed views on European security issues that were totally different from the US point of view. In the 1960’s these permanent controversies led to the French policy of the “empty chair”, when President de Gaulle terminated France’s co-operation in the NATO military framework. But was this really an outcome of power-balancing? Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2006: 549-550) provides us with another possible explanation. In his words, the French simply concluded, after being left alone by the US in the Suez and Indochina wars, “that the United States was not an ally to be counted on, at least not outside of Europe” (550). So France’s view of foreign policy may not have been aimed at balancing against the US but just at securing its own independence. But even if Posen’s view was right and France was indeed balancing with ESDP, its attitude was outweighed by the aims of the other European states: “The causes and timing of ESDP’s birth suggest that it is indeed a response to US hegemony. Its limits suggest that it is not quite a balancing project, but certainly an effort by Europeans, including many
who bandwagon in their NATO guise, to develop an alternative security supplier.” (Posen 2004: 12)

If the defensive structural realists were right, we should expect to see a significant increase of military spendings in Europe. To underpin their important security-political role, the Europeans would have to bolster their ambitions by trying to close the capabilities gap as fast as possible. Indeed, military spendings have risen, but to support the military transformation processes that have begun in many states after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Balancing is the creation of better outcomes by adding to the power assets of someone’s disposal, Art defines (2006: 184). But in fact the troops of the EU’s disposal, namely the ERRF, consist mostly of the same personnel than the NATO Response Force. Planning and communications capabilities of the ESDP are also relying heavily on NATO assets. Having in mind that the US expenditures on armament have been three times as high as those of all EU member states together for the last three decades, it becomes clear that as long as the Europeans do not multiply their military spendings, the closing of the capabilities gap is not only unlikely to happen, as Brooks and Wohlfirth point out (see 2005: 92), but that instead the gap will widen.

4 Conclusion

In this thesis, I wanted to answer the question with what theory the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy can be best explained: Neo-functionalism, as the principal theory of European integration, or structural realism as one of the prominent theories for explaining international relations. Both of them offer different approaches to the issue, ranging from the concept of spill-over to the theories of balance-of-power and balance-of-threats.

Neo-functionalism is mainly an integration theory and does not aim to explain the whole international system. There is some evidence that its concept of spill-over eventually can be applied to the so-called “high politics” of foreign relations which, according to Ojanen, are not that “high” any more. Indeed, with respect to the end of the Cold War and the new, asymmetric threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime etc., perception of foreign and security policy may have changed. As Barry Buzan puts it, political, economic, social and environmental factors have to be added to the defence dimension in the international security environment. Those “soft” factors are as
important as the “hard” military ones and the fading of military threats “naturally causes other types of threat to come more clearly into view” (Buzan 1991: 369).

So if we assume the possibility that spill-over may have reached the level of foreign, security and defence policy, I would acknowledge the fact that this could be a possible explanation for the emergence of ESDP. There are, however, some shortcomings: Neo-functionalism will have to prove over time if there develops in fact a supranational European security and defence architecture as expressed in the theory. However, in no way neo-functionalism can deliver a satisfactory explanation for the two exogenous drivers behind ESDP: The Yugoslav Wars and the US strategy issue.

Structural realism postulates that the international system is determinated by anarchy and self-help. The main concern is the distribution of security. States are seeking either a balance of power (offensive structural realism) or a balance of threats (defensive structural realism). From a realist point of view, the development of ESDP is a means of soft balancing against the United States as the hegemon power in Europe.

I do agree with the assumption that security plays a major, if not the dominant role in foreign policy. But in the context of ESDP structural realism overestimates in my opinion the hegemon role of the United States. ESDP as a reaction to the Yugoslav Wars was merely aimed at having a means at hand to solve problems on a small scale. Europeans neither had the attitude nor the means to challenge the United States. So while structural realism maybe can explain the motivation of single EU member states, it fails to deliver a comprehensive approach of the whole issue.

The Yugoslav Wars made clear the problem of the first post-Cold War years. The US showed no substantial interest in that issue and the Europeans had no means to cope with it. “The EU did try to wield its economic clout early in the Balkan crisis but it proved inadequate to the tasks”, Posen (2004: 14) observes. Thus the Europeans aimed to get the capabilities of dealing with tasks of crisis management, peacekeeping and peace making. I do not think that this reaction to a crisis in the direct neighbourhood has to be interpreted as balancing at all. It was simply a matter of necessity that the EU tried to build up capabilities it lacked before. I assume that the whole ESDP is built on this concept: Fulfilling the needs in the security and defence area for being able to cope with situations like Yugoslavia in the future. Of course, the different state actors had different intentions why they promoted this idea.

With regard to my research question, both theories can be useful in explaining the development of ESDP. But both of them also lack a comprehensive approach: Neo-
functionalism reduces the issue to a matter of spill-over, a rather technical concept that does not allow much consideration on the state actors’ motivations. Structural realism, on the other hand, strictly focuses on states as the only international actors and does not acknowledge the importance of international and even supranational institutions.

Assuming that the development of ESDP was the normal behaviour of states that have to come up with a solution for a specific problem, it occurs to be a promising idea to assess the issue from the perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. If states act as rational egoists, driven by domestic interests, they are likely to give up bits of national sovereignty and transferring it onto a supranational level if the potential gains are higher than the expected losses.
5 References


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