The Impact of Recent Enlargements on EU Voting Cohesion at the UNGA

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1 Introduction

The European Union is eager to act in international organizations like the United Nations as a single cohesive bloc in order to be recognized as a powerful actor in the arena of foreign policy. This study examines to what extent the EU succeeds in regard to this goal and especially whether the 2004 and 2007 enlargements had any detrimental effects on those attempts. In other words, the question of interest is whether the number of EU Member States is correlated with EU voting cohesion at the General Assembly or not. A longitudinal research is the most feasible design to answer this question. Voting data on roll-call votes in the Assembly is already available (Voeten and Strezhnev, 2013). This study is of potential relevance for policy-makers because if the proposed relation can be proven, further EU enlargement will probably weaken the EU’s foreign policy. If, on the other hand such a relation does not exist, further EU enlargement can strengthen the EU’s position concerning international relations, because it then represents a greater number of countries.

The European Union is mainly seen as a body of economic coordination and an area of free trade and common market policies, but initially the Union’s predecessors were designed to stabilize and maintain international peace and security in Europe by creating strong dependencies between its member states. War between member states is not an issue any more, instead relations with third countries are crucial for the EU’s security today. This trend has been recognized and resulted in the creation of the European Political Cooperation, superseded by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and finally the Treaty of Lisbon. The question is “does it work?”.

Due to feasibility constrains this question is too general to be answered. Instead many researchers use the EU’s voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly as a proxy for EU foreign policy coordination, which is a problematic, but unfortunately unavoidable assumption. To sum up the main findings in current literature a link between EU voting cohesion and the number of member states cannot be established. Since the 1980s the overall EU voting cohesion is increasing. France and the United Kingdom are the most likely countries to deviate from common EU positions due to their colonial ties and their role as permanent members of the Security Council. Positions of other EU countries shift from progressive to conservative and vice versa from time to time. European countries which are not members of the EU but feel attached to the European voting bloc mostly align their votes with the EU, though they cannot influence the EU bargaining process. In cases where member states disagree with the EU majority position, they prefer to abstain from voting instead of casting a divided vote.

This study will basically test if the pre-existing knowledge is still valid today by extending the research period until the end of the 66th Assembly session. This is needed because the 2004 enlargement extended the number
of EU member states by two-thirds, which is the biggest increase the EU has ever encountered. Moreover the mainly Eastern enlargement extended the EU to countries of the former Soviet voting bloc, which had different preferences in many policy fields.

The research question tests whether and in which way the number of EU member states is correlated with the EU’s voting cohesion at the United Nations General Assembly. The following sub-questions are needed to get a comprehensive picture on the EU’s and the accession countries voting behaviour. First, do accession candidate countries align their foreign policies with the EU prior to actual accession? Second, are there differences regarding policy fields? And third, are there any differences within the accession countries? Do Eastern countries align their votes more strongly than others (i.e. Cyprus and Malta) do?

This study argues that the General Assembly needs to be understood as a form of social network. A country’s main interest is to maximize its utility from the network in form of social capital. This means countries seek for alliances they consider to be profitable for them. The EU is one possible alliance. Members states prefer EU bloc voting only if no better option to maximize their social capital is available. The effect of EU enlargement is characterized by an alignment process during which new EU members start to perceive joined EU positions as being more and more profitable, though not on all occasions.

2 Literature Review

This section serves as a description of what is already known in the current scientific literature on the key concepts used as a basis behind this research. The first part clarifies what the United Nations General Assembly is and how its decision need to be understood. Part two deals with the organizational framework under which the European Union operates at the United Nations. To conclude this section, part three presents mainly empirical insights on EU voting cohesion at the Assembly.

2.1 United Nations General Assembly

The Assembly is one of the six major United Nations institutions and the only one operating under the principle of sovereign equality, which means that all currently 193 members (as in June 2014) have one vote (Art. 9 & 18 UNCh) each. In principle, all matters within the scope of the UN Charter can be discussed, except those which are under consideration by the Security Council (Art. 10 & 12 UNCh). A resolution is adopted by a simple majority of “members present and voting”, but a two-thirds majority is required on issues the Assembly considers important, which are e.g. the budget or the admission of new member states (Art. 17 UNCh).
The UN Charter’s legal provisions set the Assembly as the most important global deliberative body. Nevertheless, the Assembly has no legal authority to shape international law. All its decisions are not legally binding, except those referring to the UN budget or to the election of “officers”. (The least cohesive EU voting pattern on a resolution during the period of analysis has been on resolution A/RES/58/245 (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict), which shifted the funds for the Special Representative towards the regular, instead of the special (voluntary) UN budget). Non-permanent “officers” to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Committee are elected by the Assembly with regard to “equitable geographical distribution”. Regional groups have been created for this purpose (the African, Asian-Pacific, Eastern European, Latin American and Caribbean and Western European and Others group), but those groups are not necessarily cauussing groups on other issues. Caucussing groups are e.g. the non-aligned movement, the G77, JUSCANZ or the European Union, which spread across regional groups (Kirn, 2006).

Due to its design, the Assembly works mainly on norm-creation/adjustment, which is why resolutions are usually adopted by consensus. Decisions by consensus provide the necessary leverage to set international standards, because members have to decide for themselves whether to comply with the Assembly’s recommendations (Peterson, 2006). Votes on resolutions are public and therefore it is known which country favours which opinion, whereas votes on “officers” are kept secret. Resolutions are moderately formulated in order to not alienate other countries, especially as consensus is desirable (Alker and Russett, 1967). This converge to the centre is a very-well known phenomenon (Downs, 1957), though not always correct as resolution A/RES/3379 “Zionism is a form of racism” (1975) illustrates.

2.2 The EU and its members states at the General Assembly

After the shock waves caused by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the EU member states felt the necessity to intensify cooperation on their external affairs even further and established the European external action service and a high representative as its head (Lisbon Treaty). Moreover the EU as a whole got legal personality, which enables it, if all UN member states agree, to speak on behalf of the Union and gain observer status. This is of particular interest on issues where the Commission has all competences of the member states, e.g. fishery policy as the most prominent example (Hoffmeister and Kuijper, 2006). Nevertheless, EU coordination efforts at the Assembly are governed by the common foreign and security policy as a legal framework, which relies on the EU council’s presidency for Assembly coordination (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). The goal of EU activity at the Assembly is to present the Union as a cohesive bloc, which is done in
an intergovernmental bargaining process between the member states’ permanent missions to the UN in New York.

Some basic guidelines of the member states’ Assembly policies are created by the general affairs and external relations council in Brussels. Those guidelines have a broad scope. The real negotiation process takes place in New York, because Brussels-based coordination would take too long. New York coordination is done by the member state having the EU presidency position for a six month period (Paasivirta and Porter, 2006). The presidency acts on behalf of the EU towards third parties, issues speeches at the Assembly’s committees and drafts resolutions. Bargaining processes at the Assembly within the EU are structured by the presidency and are carried out mainly between various levels of the member states’ embassy personnel (dominantly on expert level) and input from the capitals. Due to the CFSP framework coordination does not incorporate votes, but is done by unanimity, which requires more than a thousand formal meetings a year and silent agreement procedures to clear e.g. draft resolutions or speeches of the presidency (Rasch, 2008).

2.3 EU Voting Cohesion at the Assembly

Based on the knowledge what Assembly resolutions are and how the EU countries coordinate their work, it is time to have a look at what is already known on the effectiveness of those coordination efforts. The Benelux countries were the first ones which started to align their votes in the early days of the United Nations. During the various rounds of EU enlargement, this informal voting bloc expanded, but its main mode of operation (intergovernmental bargaining between the countries’ missions to the UN) is still the same, though it is today institutionalized by the Lisbon Treaty. It is therefore possible to drag conclusions from outdated literature as well.

First of all, it is reasonable to examine how voting cohesion is measured. Traditional voting cohesion indexes depend on the number of countries within a voting bloc. If a bloc consists of less than fifteen countries, voting cohesion is significantly effected by chance. The Rice-Beyle method avoids those problems by using pair-wise comparisons between countries (Lijphart, 1963). A major problem of cohesion indexes is measurement validity, which is not established because Assembly votes can either be an expression of an attitude or bloc support. Furthermore Assembly voting blocs seemingly do not exist outside the UN. No generalization to other arenas is possible. The Assembly is a micro cosmos of its own rules. Therefore all conclusions drawn in this paper have no external validity outside of the Assembly (Tomlin, 1985).

Besides the methodological considerations, some basic information is required on other voting groups in the Assembly and what a vote actually means. Before turning to the EU it is a good idea to analyse other vot-
ing blocs like ASEAN beforehand to keep the EU in context. Of course 
ASEAN is not comparable to the EU in terms of internal integration, but 
ASEAN countries share a similar amount of foreign policy objectives as the 
EU countries do, which makes them comparable in this regard. The re-

sults show that ASEAN voting cohesion is similar and in some cases even 
higher than the EU’s, which supports the idea that voting cohesion does 
not depend on the internal integration levels of member states. A surprising 
side finding is that the voting cohesion between North and South Korea is 
greater than between South Korea and the US (Ferdinand, 2013). The sec-

ond question is what a vote in the Assembly actually means. Information 
on the relationship between countries with poor human rights records and 
their voting behaviour on human rights resolution help to understand this 
issue. One would expect that those countries vote against human rights 
resolutions because they may become targets themselves. The question is: 
do countries express their domestic attitudes in the Assembly, or are differ-

ent motives driving their voting behaviour, such as expressive voting. The 
results show that a country’s human rights record is not correlated with its 
human rights voting behaviour, if controlled for membership in a voting bloc, 
which means that Assembly voting is for some countries not an instrument 
to express their attitudes but a means to send messages of support to their 
neighbours (Boockmann and Dreher, 2011). This may be true for European 
countries as well. Their votes may are mainly messages to their European 
partners and the entire international community and not necessarily about 
the actual topic concerned.

Keeping those facts in mind, it is time to have a look at how EU voting 
cohesion developed over time, starting with the European Economic Com-

munity. An analysis on the effects of the first EEC enlargement from six 
to nine member states on cohesion in the Assembly states that the 50% en-
largement is having major detrimental effects to voting cohesion. Note that 
coordination was at the period of analysis (1948 to 1973) not institution-
ized and Western Germany was not a member of the United Nations. A 
level of 80% cohesion is shown between the EEC5 and the three candidate 
countries, which would be even higher if France (old member) is excluded 
from the calculations (Hurwitz, 1975).

The following years and the developments towards the European Union 
are characterized by the three country groups mainstream, neutral and P2 
(Great Britain & France). Their overall cohesion is relatively high on middle 
east and human rights issues, whereas policies regarding security, prolifer-
ation and decolonization split EU countries. Nevertheless, a general trend 
towards greater cohesion continues since 1983, with the single anomaly of 
a Greek Pasok government (Luif, 2003). This assumption is confirmed and 
extended by the finding that European cohesion is generally higher com-
pared to the whole Assembly. A link between low/ high politics and voting 
cohesion can nevertheless not be confirmed (Hosli et al., 2010).
Recent studies on the EU at the Assembly show some characteristics in more detail. On the one hand, a consensus and coordination reflex as predicted by constructivist IR theory exists. On the other hand, actions are motivated by the states own interest as realists argue (Smith, 2006). The impact of the EU’s Eastern enlargement on voting cohesion is two sided. Starting in 1991, the accession countries’ cohesion with EU-15 positions is usually greater than 80% and it increases to more than 90% from 1997 onwards. Central and Eastern European countries align their votes faster than the Baltic states, which due to their NATO aspirations tended not to vote against the US position regarding security issues. Cyprus and Malta diverge from the EU on human rights and self-determination/ decolonization resolutions due to their membership in the non-aligned-movement (Johansson-Nogués, 2004). The EU itself contains voting blocs. An analysis of the Assembly votes of fifteen EU member states from 1990 to 2002 regarding isolate and minority votes and the impact of the transition from EPC to CFSP illustrates this. Changing minority voting blocs in the EU are revealed. France and the UK as permanent Security Council members are the most likely to cast minority votes, though isolate and minority voting is rare and declining. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis of a positive impact on voting cohesion by the introduction of CFSP (Young and Rees, 2005). Additional benefits to EU cohesion can arise due to the external influence of EU votes on other countries. Three groups of country groups are identified. Armenia and Azerbaijan align their voting with Russia and have a greater distance to the EU positions. Turkey, Albania and Serbia show unsteady alignment with EU positions which is nevertheless much greater than those of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia show very strong convergence with EU votes, which makes them appear to be a member of EU bloc. Surprisingly this is independent from their level of European integration, which means that the de-facto EU voting bloc indirectly includes more states than the EU itself (Marciaq, 2012).

3 Theory

This section covers the relevant theoretical background used to construct the hypotheses. Due to the complexity of the issue at hand, public choice, social capital (Lin, 2002), liberal, neorealist and constructivist theory is used to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework. The whole framework assumes that countries’ Assembly votes rely on rational considerations. Countries have preferences on policies and they intend to shape the international system accordingly. Rational theory expects countries to maximize their utility from their voting decisions depending on their individual preferences, which means they compare costs and benefits of possible votes in the Assem-
bly. This requires that costs and benefits exist for Assembly votes, which is obviously not the case, because votes in the Assembly are low-cost decisions. Assembly resolutions are not legally binding and therefore cannot cause direct costs or benefits. Consequently, no country is expected to cast a vote at all. Instead low-cost decisions do not depend on direct costs or benefits, but on indirect ones like social approval (Kirchgässner, 1992). This is especially true for the Assembly, because votes are public. Social capital (the more common term for social approval) is an investment in social relations in order to get future returns (Lin, 1999). This expects the Assembly to operate as a form of social network (Beauguitté, 2009). Countries strive to maximise their social capital by creating alliances that are expected to be useful when it comes to decisions in other international bodies that affect a country’s preferences directly. Given that all countries aim for that goal, one expects that resolution texts are formulated in a way every country can agree upon, because this is the ultimate way to gain maximum social capital from the network without alienating any other country. But on some issues, an unanimous decision is not possible. Those cases are difficult for countries, because if they are forced to vote they run into a potential danger to alienate some of their allies and lose social capital. If those assumptions are correct, rational/public choice theory can be used to explain Assembly voting decisions, because costs and benefits are to be considered changes in a country’s social capital equipment.

A country has to make two decisions in the Assembly. The first one is whether to cast a vote at all and the second one is how to vote. Due to the low-cost Assembly decisions and social capital theory it is rational for a country to cast a vote under almost all circumstances, because absenteeism is against the unwritten social norm of the whole Assembly to participate in voting and therefore damages a country’s social capital anyway (at least if it occurs multiple times).

The second question is how to vote in order to maximize a country’s social capital. Assembly countries make use of pooling to maximize their social capital. Pooling means countries select the allies they consider to be most important to gain maximum social capital and start bargaining with them on a common position. EU countries (or members of any other voting bloc like the Group of 77, non-aligned countries etcetera) may be forced to make a decision between supporting a common position of their voting bloc or supporting a different proposal. Countries will only opt for a common voting bloc position if this maximizes their social capital more than any other option (Frieden, 2004).

EU enlargement has two effects. On the one hand, more EU member states are a source of possible social capital. On the other hand, countries may consider those extra social capital not worth the efforts needed to realize it (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Obviously pooling requires making compromises and the more actors with different preferences need to be
taken into account, the stronger the incentive grows to go for alternative arrangements. An increase in alternative arrangements is shown by decreasing voting cohesion of the voting bloc in question, in this case the EU bloc.

**Hypothesis 1.** *The more countries join the European Union X₁, the less cohesive EU voting Y₁ at the Assembly becomes.*

According to social capital theory, member states will not vote in isolation, because this decreases social capital. Instead they will diverge from their voting bloc only if an alternative arrangements offers more increase in their social capital. As a natural consequence of the expected increase in alternative arrangements, new voting alliances are expected to emerge within the EU voting bloc.

**Hypothesis 2.** *Enlargement X₁ creates new minority voting groups Y₂ within the EU voting bloc.*

As already mentioned, the perception of social capital increase or decrease is caused by a country’s preferences. Preferences are not fixed. Instead they change and are not objective matter of facts issues. EU membership can be expected to change the preferences of a country, because they now share more common objectives. The result is an alignment process where EU member states consider a common EU position more favourable to their social capital equipment more often than before.

**Hypothesis 3.** *Candidate countries align their voting behaviour Y₁ prior to EU accession X₂.*

Hypothesis three examines this process, by stating that EU accession countries align their votes when accession negotiations start. During alignment, accession countries change their own order of preferences towards the EU majority position. Why do countries behave like that? Liberal IR-theory provides some answers to that. Cooperation, or in this case alignment, takes place, if the absolute gains are greater than the costs imposed by not completely following domestic interests (Dunne, 2011). What gains do accession countries realize when aligning their Assembly votes with the EU? Alignment aims at strengthening the accession country’s social capital ties with the other EU members states. It casts a message to the current EU members, saying that the accession candidate seriously wants to join them, which provides profits in form of access to e.g. the internal market and EU funds for the candidate country. But why is alignment not reversed after accession? There is no danger of getting expelled from the Union. Member states instead get additional social capital gains from cooperation/alignment. If the EU is perceived as a strong international actor, small players like the accession countries can gain additional leverage to their foreign policy via influencing EU positions. The EU is involved in high-level talks and even if
those countries are not able to change the EU’s policy preference, they at least get access to valuable information e.g. on discussions within the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, a free-riding problem may arise, because accession countries can profit from the EU’s international position and pursue their own interests by weakening the EU’s position. Free-riding can be omitted by (fear of) punishment. The EU does not have any direct means to punish non-compliance in the Assembly. But all European countries are strongly interdependent (Keohane and Nye, 1977), which means that there are other options for “punishments” outside of the Assembly. To put it in a nutshell, cooperation/ alignment is in the vital interest of all EU member states.

**Hypothesis 4.** Matters of high politics $X_3$ are more likely to cause defection $Y_1$ than issues of low politics $X_3$.

But why is the EU not a 100%-cohesive voting bloc? Neorealist IR-theory helps to explain this (Waltz, 2010). Realist’s perspective on the international system is based on relative gains and the country’s pursuit of security and power (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011). Obviously, there is no possibility to earn a relative power gain from Assembly votes, but the Assembly distributes social capital between its member states. Look e.g. at the US-invasion in Iraq. Some Eastern European countries joined the UK (“new Europe”) and the United States, because they expected protection from the US in return (in this case the missile defence system). In other words, if benefits outweigh costs, countries will derive from the EU majority position. But this is not only true for traditional fields of high politics like security. This is because defection depends on the perceived costs and benefits. The international system is to a certain degree anarchic, which creates uncertainty about the real costs and benefits. How do member states deal with that uncertainty?

They make guesses or estimates on what they think is best for them. As the Assembly voting data shows, the EU is unable to pursue a member state to change their position if the country thinks it is better off by casting a diverging vote. But is there any other way the EU might influence its member states? Constructivist IR-theory says that a country’s perceptions can be changed. The situation is still the same, but the interpretation what is best for the country is constructed. Ideals are the basis for the construction process (Barnett, 2011). Recurring to the Iraq example, the question is whether the missile defence system is actually needed. Are there other equally effective ways to achieve the same result, e.g. by having treaty arrangements? A change of perception is probably the hardest and longest taking effort in international and EU politics, but it can be very powerful, if countries e.g. value a strong EU position in foreign policy higher than their own interests. This a learning process that incrementally changes a country’s order of preference and unfortunately it is impossible to prove that
such processes happen, but neoliberalism and neorealism are able to explain the complete alignment process. This is where a possible constructivist influence can be found.

### 4 Research Methodology

This section deals with the research design, case selection and measurement of variables needed to test the research hypotheses. The overall question is how recent EU enlargements effects EU voting cohesion at the Assembly. This is done by analysing the Voeten dataset, which is the basis for all current research on the Assembly. “Recent” enlargement refers to the 2004 enlargement (ten countries), the 2007 Bulgaria and Romania enlargement as well as to Croatia’s accession in 2013. The dataset allows a longitudinal analysis starting in 1945 to 2011, which is arguably the best non-experimental research design. This analysis mainly covers the period between 1994 and 2011 only, because the 1994 session is the first one where all accession countries are UN members. Case selection is based on the Voeten data, which provide nearly all roll-call votes in the Assembly. Nevertheless readers should be aware that failed resolutions are not included in the dataset, but failure of a resolution is a very rare occasion and therefore no threat to internal validity. Moreover resolutions passed unanimously are missing. About 80% of all resolutions are passed without a vote. Ignoring those votes biases the analysis, because the actual cohesion level is much higher than shown in the analysis. But this study is concerned with relative differences in cohesion levels and not with absolute levels.

Table 1 provides an overview of the data that has been used in this analysis. During the eighteen sessions under scrutiny, the Assembly adopted 5,773 resolutions. A roll-call vote has been employed in only about 22% of all cases, which results in a total number of observations of 1,290 resolutions. Usually between sixty and eighty roll-call votes are employed each year. The only exception to this rule is 2006 where nearly ninety votes have taken

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<tbody>
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<td>352</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>351</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>325</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roll-Call</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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Table 1: Share of roll-call votes on all adopted UNGA resolutions
place in thirty percent of all adopted resolutions, though the total number of resolutions is average. Table 2 shows how many of those 1,290 resolutions belong into one of the six policy categories. Note that not all resolutions fit into one of these categories, while others are belonging to more than one policy field. This categorization is done by the authors of the Voeten dataset. Middle east is the most prominent category, followed by human rights, disarmament, nuclear issues, colonialism and economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roll-Call</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Nuclear Issues</th>
<th>Disarmament</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Colonialism</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
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Table 2: Roll-call resolutions per policy field

The dependent variables are voting blocs \( Y_2 \) (hypothesis 2) and voting cohesion \( Y_1 \) (hypothesis 1, 3 - 4). The independent variables are the number of countries \( X_1 \) (hypothesis 1 and 2), the alignment process \( X_2 \) (hypothesis 3) and the policy field of the resolution in question \( X_3 \) (hypothesis 4).

\( X_1 \) is a dichotomous variable that is either referring to the EU-15 countries or to the whole EU after accessions. Cohesion scores \( Y_1 \) are calculated for both \( X_1 \) values and compared. \( X_2 \) measures the time dimension, which is used as a proxy for the alignment process. In order to create reliable results, the period of analysis needs to be extended by another thirty years into the past to 1964, which results in an unavoidable reduction in the selection of observations, because some countries were not UN member states at that time. \( X_3 \) is used to measure differences between policy fields. Thanks to the Voeten dataset, resolutions are already coded into six categories. Those are very broad categories and they may do not reflect recent changes in the UN agenda. They were used because the categorization is accessible to the general public, which makes this research comparable and transparent.

Voting blocs \( Y_2 \) are measured using R (R Core Team, 2014) and the social network analysis library igraph (Gabor Csardi and Tamas Nepusz, 2006). Network analysis distinguishes between nods (vertices) and links (edges). All resolutions and the 28 EU member states are nods. Votes on resolutions are links and connect resolutions and countries. The graphs are displayed on pages 32 to 37. The network is calculated for non-cohesive votes only, because the hypothesis focusses on new voting blocs within the EU and those naturally are characterized by voting defection. Six graphs illustrate the network separated by policy field, because voting blocs differ accordingly. All non-cohesive votes between the 1994 and 2011 Assembly sessions are drawn into the same graph. The colour of the nods indicate the year the country was admitted to join the EU (shades of red: old members, shades of yellow: new members). The colour of the links represents the type of non-
### Table 3: A country’s decision matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc vote</th>
<th>Country’s attitude</th>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Against</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Abstain ((No))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>Abstain or Yes</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>Abstain or No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Abstain or ((Yes))</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cohesive vote (divided vote: yes - no, solidarity vote: yes/no - abstention, and absent “votes”). Due to the complexity of the top graphs, the bottom graphs offer a reduced network. The gray links between member states at the bottom graphs are calculated by counting the number of shortest paths between two countries. Shortest paths refers to connections that follow a Country A - Resolution - Country B pattern. A threshold of a minimum of ten shortest paths is used. The threshold is based on a comprise based on analysing feasibility and open to discussion. The line width shows how many shortest paths connect two nodes (the thicker, the more paths). The font size used to display the country names are scaled logarithmic based on the total number of paths from the country. Member states having only paths falling below the threshold are not shown.

The measurement of $Y_1$ (voting cohesion) is probably the most difficult one. UN member countries can choose from four different options when voting. Those are “Yes”, “Abstain”, “No” and “Absent”. Table 4 provides an overview which votes EU countries cast. In 78% of all observations, EU countries vote either “Yes” or “No”, which can easily be interpreted, whereas abstentions can either be treated as half-yes, half-no votes or as “No”-votes. The arising question is, when does a country casts an abstention? There are nine possible situations as outlined in table 4. In five of those situations a country may decide to abstain from voting. It is impossible to determine, which of those five situations caused the abstention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Absent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>23171</td>
<td>7391</td>
<td>5227</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>36120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Distribution of EU Votes

Another issue is caused by the 331 absent “votes”. Those non-votes can either be treated as abstentions or skipped from the analysis. Table 5 shows that all European countries except Finland were at least once absent during the period of analysis. It does not make much sense to code absent votes as abstentions, because if absent is meant as abstention, why do countries not cast an abstention vote? Therefore this analysis will skip absent vote from the analysis. This is unlikely to cause biased results, because only 1% of all votes are absent votes.
Voting cohesion can be measured by different scores, which are all based on some kind of euclidean distance measure (Bailey et al., 2013). The index of voting cohesion (IVC) as used by Hurwitz is used to calculate the distance between two states. It compares the total number of votes with the number of identical votes and solidarity votes, which is understood as one country casting an abstention (Hurwitz, 1975).

\[ IVC = \frac{\text{identical votes} + 0.5 \times \text{solidarity votes}}{\text{total votes}} \]  

Another measurement score is the agreement index as employed by Hix et al., which uses the number of majority and minority votes within a group of countries. Minority votes are understood as solidarity votes plus divided votes, where a country casts the opposite vote compared to the majority position (Hix et al., 2005).

\[ AI = \frac{\text{majority votes} - 0.5 \times \text{minority votes}}{\text{total votes}} \]  

Obviously both scoring methods are similar and it is irrelevant which score is employed. Nevertheless, this study uses another score, which works in a similar fashion as described above, but has some subjective advantages when analysing EU votes. Given that the EU is a very cohesive voting bloc, it may be more reasonable to use the defection ratio (Iida, 1988). It compares the number of minority votes to the total number of votes.

\[ DR = \frac{\text{divided votes} - 0.5 \times \text{solidarity votes}}{\text{total votes} - \text{absent votes}} \]  

\( DR \) has to be interpreted differently from IVC and AI, because the higher cohesion gets, the lower DR is. A value of 1 reflects no cohesion, whereas 0 means total cohesion.

The key question from the methodological point of view is not which cohesion score is applied, but how abstentions are handled. As pointed out earlier, there is no logical argument to this, which cannot be refuted. As a consequence, the question is, whether it is of any importance how abstentions

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Number of “absent votes” by country
are coded. To solve this question, two correlation scores based on DR are calculated for the whole EU dataset between 1994 and 2011. One treats abstentions as 0.5 no-votes and the other one as complete no-votes. The result shows, that both scores are correlated by a factor of 0.982 (pearson’s r), which is close to being perfect. In essence is does not matter whether abstentions are coded as 0.5 no-votes or complete no-votes. The absolute values differ, but hypotheses testing is not influenced by that. This analysis will therefore treat abstentions as half no-votes, not because it is necessary, but because most other researchers do it as well.

5 Data and Analysis

This section is organized by the four consecutive hypotheses created in the theory part. First, do accession countries align their votes with the EU majority? Second, which new voting blocs are created by enlargement? Third, how does alignment work? And finally, when does alignment fail?

5.1 Hypothesis 1: More EU members decreases voting cohesion

Hypothesis 1 assumes that the more countries join the European Union $X_1$, the less cohesive EU voting $Y_1$ at the Assembly becomes. In other words, EU-28 defection levels should be higher than EU-15 levels. Figure 1 compares EU-15 and EU-28 defection scores between 1994 and 2011. Since 2004, the EU-15 defection scores are always above the EU-25 scores, which means that the number of member states increases instead of decreases average voting cohesion. Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. Starting from this general insight, figure 2 takes a closer look at differences in policy fields. Cohesion scores are calculated for EU-28 and EU-15 countries separated by policy field and session. Positive values mean that EU-15 cohesion is higher, whereas negative values mean higher cohesion scores for the EU-28 countries. Only on resolutions regarding the middle east conflict, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed, because EU-28 defection levels are above EU-15 levels. For all other policy fields, hypothesis 1 needs to be rejected. On human rights, middle east and nuclear issues, a clear trend towards higher EU-28 cohesion over time emerges. EU-28 cohesion levels on disarmament, colonialism and economic development are quite stable since 2000 and below or at least nearly identical to EU-15 levels. Regarding policy fields, EU accession countries are more cohesive voters than EU-15 countries except for middle east issues, but there is a clear trend that this will change in future sessions. After having a look at policy fields, it is reasonable to investigate further whether there are differences on defection levels between the EU-15 and individual accession countries. Figure 3 shows differences between accession countries. All Eastern European countries are usually voting more cohesively than the EU-15.
Figure 1: The graph shows the mean defection scores across all policy fields for EU-15 and EU-25 countries. Higher defection values indicate less cohesion.
Difference between the EU–28 mean defection scores and the EU–15 mean defection scores across policy fields

Figure 2: The x-axis states the start of Assembly session. The difference between the mean defection score of EU-15 and EU-28 countries is captured on the y-axis. Positive values mean higher defection for the EU-28 and lower value for the EU-15.
average, though this is only partially true for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania prior to the year 2000. For the Southern countries Cyprus and Malta a different trend shows up. Both countries vote less cohesive than the EU-15 average during the whole period of analysis, but there is a clear trend towards greater cohesion. Obviously, the source of voting defection within the accession states are not the Eastern European countries, but Cyprus and Malta. All in all, hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed, though accession countries cause additional voting defection. The new member states are simply voting more cohesively than the old ones except for middle east issue and the island countries. Hypothesis four tries to explain why that might be the case. But why are those new member states not increasing voting defection as expected? The answer is that those countries align their voting behaviour with those of the EU-15 countries. It is possible to argue that this effect is due to a policy shift from the old member states towards the new members, but this does not make much sense, especially because the new member were more cohesive voters even prior to actual EU accession. This raises another important question. The data analysis so far does not prove that there ever was an alignment process, though some trends hint to that assumption. It is perfectly possible that this “alignment” is not by design, but caused by always shared common interests.

5.2 Hypothesis 2: Enlargement creates new voting blocs

It is interesting to analyse whether new subgroups within the EU are created due to enlargement. Are Eastern European countries casting similar votes? This is difficult to answer with cohesion score measures like the defection ratio, because similar values do not indicate the same source for defection. The appendix on pages 32 to 37 shows the results of the network analysis. Regarding colonialism, France, the UK and Belgium make up the vast majority of defecting votes. A second, but small voting bloc is created by Malta and Cyprus. Resolutions dealing with economic development only show a rather weak voting alliance between the UK and France. Human rights issues are more controversial. There is a voting bloc between Cyprus and Malta again. The second bloc is a mixture between old member states (the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Belgium) and new member states (Czech Republic and most notably Hungary). On disarmament, Sweden, Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus are a voting bloc. But Cyprus and Austria are also connected to a second voting bloc with Hungary and Finland. France and the UK create a third voting bloc. A similar, though more extended pattern emerges concerning nuclear issues. This time France and the UK are integrated into the Sweden, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Austria voting bloc. The Finland, Hungary, Cyprus, Austria bloc is joined by Estonia. The Cyprus-Malta connection is the only existing voting bloc on resolutions dealing with the middle east conflict.
Figure 3: The graph compares the average defection score among EU-15 countries with the average defection between the indicated accession country’s vote and the EU-15 majority position. Positive (red) values mean higher defection scores for the accession country and negative (green) values lower defection scores respectively.
All in all, enlargement creates exactly one new voting bloc, which is the Cyprus-Malta link. The other accession countries seem to gain more social capital from joining the EU majority, whereas Cyprus and Malta value their connection more profitable than pooling EU votes on various occasions, namely on the middle east conflict.

5.3 Hypothesis 3: Alignment takes place when negotiations start

Hypothesis 3 tests if candidate countries align their voting behaviour $Y_1$ prior to EU accession $X_2$. As already mentioned, between 1994 and 2011 there is no real proof of any alignment. Given that alignment exists, the only possible explanation for this behaviour is that the accession countries aligned their voting behaviour many years before actual EU accession. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is difficult to answer, because it requires a long-term longitudinal analysis. Only six accession countries have been UN members prior to 1990. Those countries are Hungary (1955), Poland (1945), Cyprus (1960), Malta (1964), Romania (1955) and Bulgaria (1955). A similar caveat arises regarding the EU-15 countries. (West-)Germany only became an UN member in 1973. Greece, Portugal and Spain were at some time dictatorships. Therefore those four countries are skipped from the analysis. The remaining eleven countries will serve as EU-11-core to compare voting cohesion, though not all of those countries were EU members during the whole period. Figure 4 shows, how voting alignment of those countries changed from 1964 onwards. All accession countries showed high defection scores against the EU-11-core between 1964 and 1989/90. Note that Malta and Cyprus were more cohesive voters than the Eastern European countries. In 1989/90 all accession countries abruptly changed their voting behaviour massively, which explains why alignment cannot be proven after 1994. It simply happened before. It may be save to say that if it would have been possible to observe similar changes for those countries, which were not UN members at that time, they would be there. Obviously, this alignment is correlated with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989/90 and the EU’s offer to start the accession process with Eastern European countries. Remember that the Assembly is basically distributing social capital. This alignment is a message to the EU countries that underlines their intention to join the Union, because their former power bloc is no longer in existence and EU membership was the inevitable “end of history” (Fukuyama and Bloom, 1989). The situation for Cyprus and Malta was different. Both countries were not members of the Soviet bloc but of the non-aligned-movement (NAM). There was no immediate need for action, because the NAM still exists today. Nevertheless, the NAM was founded due to the bipolar structure. The collapse of that structure therefore effected them as well, which resulted in their decision to join the Union. Remember that they have been slightly more connected to
Figure 4: The graph shows the average defection score for the indicated accession countries compared to the EU-11-core countries (BEL, NLD, LUX, FRA, GBR, ITA, DNK, FIN, IRL, AUT, SWE) for all resolutions adopted between 1964 and 2011.
the EU voting position before 1989/90 than the Eastern European countries. After 1990, their alignment took a bit longer than those of the Eastern European countries and still today Cyprus and Malta are more often casting diverging votes than the Eastern countries. This is because their former attitudes have not been discredited with the end of the Soviet bloc as it was the case with the Eastern countries.

All in all, hypothesis 3 is confirmed, though alignment is not correlated with actual EU accession, but with the country’s decision to join the Union, which in this case has been made fifteen years prior to actual accession.

5.4 Hypothesis 4: Matters of high politics cause increased defection

Hypothesis 4 investigates whether matters of high politics $X_3$ are more likely to cause defection $Y_1$ than issues of low politics $X_3$. As already indicated, the analysis showed that defection from the new member states is an issue regarding middle east resolutions and the positions of Cyprus and Malta.

This section is going to examine the relations between policy fields and defection more closely. Regarding realist IR-theory, matters of high politics are more likely to cause defection than matters of low politics. Traditionally, issues concerning security and power positions are high politics, whereas economic or environmental issues are low politics.

Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between policy field and defection scores. This is done by comparing the accession countries’ votes with the average cohesion scores of the EU-15 countries. Colonialism is a matter of low politics for all countries, though the former “colonies” Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are a bit more concerned about that. Economic development is important to almost all accession countries, though their defection levels are comparatively small. For Cyprus and Malta, especially middle east, nuclear and human rights issues and to a smaller extend disarmament are important. Nuclear and disarmament issues are a matter of no concern for the Eastern countries, which is to a smaller extend true for middle east issues as well, whereas human rights topics are of importance to some Eastern countries as well. Actually, different countries perceive different policy fields as matters of high politics. The subsequent question is how great the influence of the European Political Coordination is on that perception and whether there may be a trend in perception from high to low politics. This can most easily be demonstrated by analysing the defection scores of Cyprus and Malta on middle east, nuclear issues, disarmament and human rights resolutions.

Figure 6 shows clearly, that there is no relationship between elapsing time, used as a proxy for EPC coordination efforts, and cohesion scores. The only exception may be Cyprus on disarmament, where a slightly positive trend can be observed. But in general it is more likely that the variation shown can best be explained by the changing UN agenda and not by EU member
Figure 5: The graph compares the average EU-15 defection score by policy field during all sessions (1994 - 2011) with the average defection score between the EU-15 majority position and accession countries. Positive (red) values indicate higher defection on the accession country’s side, whereas negative (green) scores mean less cohesion at the EU-15’s side.
states persuading Cyprus or Malta. All in all, hypothesis four is confirmed, though it depends on the individual countries which issues they regard as high and which as low politics. EPC is not needed for issues of low politics, because member states gain absolute advantages from voting with the EU majority. Instead, EPC works (in vain) on issues of high politics, where member states are reluctant to change their position. This is done by using constructivist IR-theory. As it turns out, it is difficult to change a country’s perception of a certain issue, but it may can work as the Cyprus case on disarmament shows, though in a very limited range.

6 Conclusion

This section sums up the main results, provides implications and limitations. Readers should be aware that the used dataset contains only observational data, which means that hypotheses can be falsified but not confirmed directly. If the data analysis reveals a correlation between the variables, this may can be due to other factors not covered by the current research design. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to conclude that hypothesis 1 (the negative influence of EU enlargement on voting cohesion) can be rejected. Nevertheless, this is only true for the most recent enlargements, which makes it impossible to generalize this finding to past or future EU enlargements. Furthermore only Cyprus and Malta create a new voting alliance within the EU. The Eastern European countries behave differently (hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 3 (start of voting alignment) provided interesting insights, because in this “case study”, voting alignment is correlated not with EU accession, but e.g. with the start of accession negotiations and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is impossible to say which cause caused the alignment effect, but due to similar findings with Cyprus and Malta it might be reasonable to state that both named causes had an influence on voting alignment. But other factors cannot be ruled out, which means this is merely an educated guess. Regarding hypothesis 4 (differences between high and low politics), it is obvious that EU members have individual “hot” topics, on which they may cast divided votes, but those are not necessarily issues of international security as proclaimed by realist IR-theory. This may be caused by the structure of the Assembly as a deliberative body without executive power (the uniting for peace procedure has not been invoked during the period of analysis) and by the growing importance of global governance institutions, which reduce the anarchy in the international system and put new issues on the agenda.

How should the EU react to those developments? A probably good idea would be to put the EU’s new high representative and its external actions service in charge of New York UN coordination. The current system of a member state acting on behalf of the Union may not be the ultimate
Difference between Cyprus’ or Malta’s mean defection scores and the EU−28 mean defection scores

Figure 6: The graph compares the average EU-28 defection score with those of Malta and Cyprus on middle east, nuclear, disarmament and human rights issues. Positive (red) values mean less cohesion on Cyprus or Malta’s side, whereas negative (green) values indicate the opposite.
efficiency solution. Small member states are overtaxed by the burden to chair more than a hundred EU meetings a month. Moreover, third parties have to keep track of which country is currently in charge, because it changes every six months, which is rather frequent. Given, that the Assembly usually resumes its session in spring, the EU presidency even changes during the same Assembly session. Common institutions like those provided by CFSP may help to solve those issues and keeping negotiations more consistent.

Finally, some suggestions for further research arose. Many resolutions at the Assembly are adopted each and every year with minimal change in wording. Coordination on those resolutions should be easier than those on new issues. Moreover it should be analysed how active the EU is in drafting proposals for resolutions. Or are they mainly voting on resolutions other countries initiated? To what extend is the EU able to coordinated its efforts with third parties and can it speak for other European countries as well (EEA/ EFTA, ENP)? Future analysis should additionally focus on accession countries like Turkey. Has the Turkish government aligned its Assembly votes with the EU?

References


# RECODE FUNCTIONS

calc.maj <- function(vec){
  return(as.numeric(names(sort(-table(vec)))[1]))
}

calc.maj.no <- function(vec){
  return(28 - (-1 * as.numeric(sort(-table(vec)))[1]))
}

calc.sol <- function(maj){
  switch(maj,
    "1" = return(c(2, 8)),
    "2" = return(c(1, 3, 8)),
    "3" = return(c(2, 8))
  )
}

calc.sol8 <- function(maj){
  switch(maj,
    "1" = return(c(2)),
    "2" = return(c(1, 3)),
    "3" = return(c(2))
  )
}

calc.dich <- function(vec, maj){
  i <- 1
  while(i <= length(vec)){
    if(vec[i] == maj) vec[i] <- 0
    else vec[i] <- 1
    i = i + 1
  }
  rm(i)
  return(vec)
}

calc.trio <- function(vec, maj, sol){
  for (i in 1:length(vec)){
    if(vec[i] == maj) vec[i] <- 0
    else if(vec[i] %in% sol) vec[i] <- 0.5
    else vec[i] <- 1
  }
  rm(i)
  return(vec)
}
calc.quad <- function(vec, maj, sol){
  for (i in 1:length(vec)){
    if (vec[i] == maj) vec[i] <- 0
    else if (vec[i] %in% sol) vec[i] <- 0.5
    else if (vec[i] == 8) vec[i] <- 1.5
    else vec[i] <- 1
  }
  rm(i)
  return(vec)
}

# SCORE FUNCTIONS

# SCORE FUNCTIONS

calc.count <- function(vec, num){
  if (num %in% as.numeric(names(table(vec))))
    return(as.numeric(table(vec)[names(table(vec)) == num]))
  else return(0)
}

drI <- function(vec){
  return((calc.count(vec, 1) +
          calc.count(vec, 0.5)) / (length(vec) -
          calc.count(vec, 1.5)))
}

drII <- function(vec){
  return((calc.count(vec, 1) + 0.5 *
          calc.count(vec, 0.5)) / (length(vec) -
          calc.count(vec, 1.5)))
}

drIII <- function(vec){
  return(calc.count(vec, 1) / (length(vec) -
         calc.count(vec, 1) - calc.count(vec, 1.5)))
}

drIIs <- function(country, maj){
  sol <- calc.sol8(maj)
  na <- c(8, 9)
  if (country == maj) return(0)
  else if (country %in% sol) return(0.5)
  else if (country %in% na) return(NA)
  else return(1)
}
Defection Network Colonialism

Colonialism – Reduced Network

Type of Vote:
- Divided Vote
- Solidarity Vote
- Absent Vote

Figure 7: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.
Figure 8: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.
Figure 9: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.
Figure 10: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.
Figure 11: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.
Figure 12: The top graph shows all minority votes of EU-28 countries throughout the whole period of analysis. The bottom graph displays the most important voting blocs.