THE PROTESTORS OF GEZI PARK
ANALYZING DISCURSIVE CLASHES
AT THE EDGE OF EUROPE

NIKLAS DAVID SOMMER
S1195832
BSC EUROPEAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

BACHELOR THESIS
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE

EXAMINATION COMMITTEE
DR MARINUS OSSEWAARDE
SEDEF TURPER (MA)
Abstract

The Gezi protests that sparked off in May 2013 in Istanbul turned out to be largest uprising in the history of the Turkish Republic. Especially in terms of the EU candidate country’s secular-Islamic divide, the protests have, in academia, thus far been rather marginally scrutinized. Drawing on this Kulturkampf from a discursive perspective, I will investigate the extent to which the Gezi protestors’ discursive practices show a dialectics of the two clashing discourses in this field - Kemalism and political Islam. Moreover, an inquiry will be made on whether the protest discourse can be considered as a cosmopolitan – a European discourse. After identifying the conceptual traits of the discourses under study, I proceed by conducting a critical discourse analysis (CDA). Deriving my cases from randomly sampled protest texts, the findings eventually show that the Gezi discourse earmarked a cosmopolitan transition from Kemalism to post-Kemalism which, mainly due to the discursive impact of political Islam, further deepened social cleavages in Turkey.

Keywords: Gezi protests; Discourses; Kemalism; political Islam; cosmopolitanism
Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4

Conceptualizing discursive clashes in the Turkish nation-state ................................................................. 9

The discourse of the Gezi protestors ........................................................................................................ 9

The Discourse of Kemalism .................................................................................................................. 11

The Discourse of Political Islam .......................................................................................................... 12

The Discourse of Cosmopolitanism .................................................................................................. 14

Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................................................... 15

Methodological considerations ............................................................................................................. 16

Critical Discourse Analysis as a research design ............................................................................... 16

Collection of Texts .............................................................................................................................. 17

Analysis of Texts ................................................................................................................................ 17

Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................................... 19

Analyzing discursive clashes at the edge of Europe ................................................................................ 20

The discursive characteristics of the Gezi Protestors ........................................................................... 20

Kemalism is dead – Long live post-Kemalism ................................................................................... 24

Inter-discursive mixes of the politicized Islamic discourse ................................................................ 26

The Gezi Discourse as a cosmopolitan European Discourse? ............................................................. 27

The social meaning of Gezi – Turkey’s shift to post-modernity? ......................................................... 28

Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................................... 30

Conclusion: Post-Gezi Turkey and Europe ......................................................................................... 32

References ............................................................................................................................................. 35

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 37

Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix 1.1 ......................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix 1.2 ......................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix 2.1 ......................................................................................................................................... 41

Appendix 2.2 ......................................................................................................................................... 51
Introduction

‘One bismillah1 of us is worth a million of their tweets’

At a political rally on June 15th 2013, Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Tayyip Erdoğan - possibly in an attempt to emphasize the moral superiority of his supporters – referred to a protest movement that, within a single month, became the greatest bête noire to his decennial rule (Radikal, 2013): Initially protesting against the transformation of downtown Istanbul’s Gezi Park (close to historical2 Taksim Square) into an Ottoman-style shopping-mall3, a small group of environmental protestors’ sit-in soon attracted the attention of thousands (Öncü, 2013): As the protestors documented an immense use of police violence on social media, thousands of solidarizing Turkish citizens – many of whom had never taken to the streets to protest beforehand - soon joined the occupants. From May 27th until June 15th 2013, Gezi Park was, despite a number of police interventions, under occupation by thousands of citizens. What was deemed to be the largest uprising in the Republic’s history, the occupation of the park went hand in hand with more than 3.5 million Turkish citizens taking to the streets in seventy-nine Turkish cities (ibid). Until riot police forces eventually cleared the park on June 15th, the park turned into a festival-like space. Highly diverse groups of Turkish civil society peacefully united against a PM who maintained a zero-tolerance stance, as he defended the construction project and the police crackdowns at all costs (Atay, 2013).

Be it the PM’s incomprehension, police brutality, political interest or mere curiosity for ‘Agent Orange’4 (Aydintasbas, 2013) - The motives behind why thousands of protestors occupied the park or took to the streets have been ascertained to be as multi-faceted as the protest movement’s composition. However, ‘OccupyGezi’ has, in academia, been put in perspective as an urban rights movement. In the light of the global Occupy movement and neo-liberal commodification of public spaces, Cihan Tugal made an early inquiry to identify a class-based composition of the protestors. Despite Turkey possibly constituting a neo-liberal ‘success story’, as he outlined, social life has nonetheless become impoverished in urban spaces. The occupation of Gezi Park thus epitomized an inner-city commune where citizens solidarily shared food, celebrated or engaged in participatory, political fora (Tugal, 2013). A similar approach has furthermore been envisaged by Kuymulu and Örs who both more or less depict the movement as the people of Istanbul reclaiming, in Henri Lefebvre’s words, their ‘right to the city’ (Kuymulu, 2013; Örs, 2014).

Analyzing the movement with urban sociological concepts most certainly enables us to detect patterns between the Gezi protestors and other Occupy movements, such as in Spain, Greece or

---

1 refers to the Islamic prayer opening ‘bismillahi-rahmani-rahim’ (Arabic: ‘In the name of God’)
2 Taksim Square, sometimes referred to as the ‘heart of Turkey’ witnessed a number of violent incidents in the Republic’s history, such as the ‘Bloody Sunday’ of 1969 or the 1977 Taksim Square Massacre (Örs, 2014)
3 Erdoğan envisaged to rebuild a military barracks called topçu that was to accommodate a shopping-mall (Kuymulu, 2013)
4 Rumors were spread that police forces would attack protestors with ‘Agent Orange’ (a chemical weapon that came to prominence during the Vietnam War) (Aydintasbas, 2013)
Brazil, declaring themselves against neo-liberalization, privatization or commodification (Tugal, 2013). However, the prolog of the protests revealed that a mere conceptualization of ‘Gezi’ as an urban rights movements neglects potential sociocultural factors the protests may have related to: Prior to the uprising, AKP\(^5\) - Erdoğan’s center-right, conservative party that had been backed by a parliamentary majority for 12 years – passed a bill to put limits on the sale of alcohol and announced stricter handle to on the sale of abortions or Caesarian sections (Benhabib, 2013). Besides, the PM, it seemed, intended to transform the historical city of Istanbul, in Thumann’s words, into ‘an exchangeable International-bul […] a modernism à la Dubai – with an Ottoman décor’ (Thumann, 2013, p. 1). Vociferating their grievances about policies that may gradually Islamize and privatize the secular Republic of Turkey, considerable factions of Turkish civil society thus feared, as has been argued, an authoritarian interference in their private spheres (Benhabib, 2013).

In this thesis, I draw back upon this sociocultural rationale in relation to the protests at Gezi Park. Yet, how is it possible to find a common ‘cultural denominator’ among a protest movement so diverse, as it united students, environmentalists, fans of three mutually ‘hostile’ Istanbul football clubs, pious Muslims and many more? A starting point, I find, lies in the *Kulturkampf* – a concept that, given Turkey’s political history, various academics adverted to grasp the ‘clash of cultures’ between modernist, secular Republicans and Islamic conservatives that have shaped Turkey’s political landscape since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 (e.g. Kaya, 2012; Keyder, 1997; Keyman, 2010; Lewis, 1961; Mardin, 1973). Turkish sociologist Şerif Mardin, for instance, identified this modern, cultural clash to take place between Turkey’s ‘center’ – i.e. the metropolitan areas – and its ‘periphery’, i.e. the rural areas of Anatolia. He highlights that the predominantly secular center, political parties in particular, are incapable of establishing close ties with rural Turkey. This, in return, induced the genesis of a ‘counter-official culture’, as he concludes (Mardin, 1973). In this regard, his research provided insights about the structural importance and patronization of urban areas that gave, vis-à-vis rural areas, fertile ground to socio-cultural cleavages between these ‘parallel societies’. Mardin’s conceptualization of the cultural clashes therefore ignites a debate to also view the Gezi revolt in the light of this historical disintegration of the center and the periphery. Similarly, Ibrahim Kaya recognized the *Kulturkampf* to be rooted in the inflexible, majoritarian setup of the Republic that had edged Islamic conservatives away from politics and made them focus on culture, instead. Notably, Kaya clarified that Islamic conservatives, once they politicized, underlined the economic and political dimensions of modernity, such as liberal markets or democratic institutions. However, they undermined the cultural aspects of modernity which, among other aspects, presupposed individual autonomy (Kaya, 2012). Repetitively, AKP’s electoral hegemony was significantly facilitated by Turkey’s rural constituency whose notions of the aforementioned cultural policies were, in the long run, heard and implemented by AKP. Kaya’s outline of the apparent irreconcilability of the secular and Islamic cultures hence allows me to see behind the curtain of young, secular protestors whose lifestyles were at odds with the government’s cultural policies.

Given the two varying approaches to Turkey’s clash of cultures, I find it reasonable to claim that Turkish society indeed appears to be socio-culturally dichotomous. This is further

\(^5\)Adalıt ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
corroborated by Ahmet Öncü who made a first inquiry on alleged coherences between the Gezi protests and Turkey’s *Kulturkampf*. He gave a descriptive account of two social sets that respectively shaped the Republic, i.e. the laic set from the 1960s – 1980s and the Islamic set from the 1980s until today. Finally, Öncü made the case for the Gezi protests to be irreconcilable with this cultural clash: He concludes that the protestors seem to identify themselves with the ‘laic set’, yet protest conduct revealed that the ‘Gezi community’ was virtually characterized by a cultural or ideological neutrality (Öncü, 2013). However, I disagree with Öncü. Instead, I argue that the protestors of Gezi Park were not culturally or ideologically neutral, yet instead they did, along the secular/Islamic divide represent secular Turkey and redefine the ideology of modern Turkish Republicanism – or ‘Kemalism’ as I will refer to it. The protestors, I contend, were not opposed to Islam *per se*, but mainly against its politicization or its impact – in short, political Islam. Thus, they showed, from early on, that the *Kulturkampf* had not been, in Öncü’s words, ‘neutralized’ in the ‘Gezi commune’, yet it was, given the overarching hegemony of political Islam, more appealing than ever to be a Kemalist (Öncü, 2013).

Yet, as distinguished from Öncü, who investigated the cultural clashes’ social dimensions via the above-mentioned ‘social sets’, I will make a new type of inquiry by focusing on how the protesting occupants of the park expressed themselves and what they argued for or against. Essentially, I thus explore the protestors’ statements to draw conclusions on whether their statements can actually be related to Turkey’s *Kulturkampf*. The latter concept can, however, merely be referred to, if I treat it, like the protestors’ statements, discursively. It is a post-structural undertaking, as I perceive it, since I attempt to critically emphasize the relationship between what the Gezi protestors stated and the social reality their very statements showed (Giddens, 1987). My claim is hereby that the social reality reflects this ‘clash of cultures’ in terms of a dialectics of two opposing discourses, i.e. the Kemalist discourse, on the one hand, and the discourse of political Islam on the other. Accordingly, the main descriptive research question I intend to find an answer to is: *To what extent does the discourse used by the protestors show a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam?* Thereby, I seek to add a novel facet to the debate around Turkey’s cultural duality and how the current political landscape of Turkey is affected or reshuffled discursively by the *Kulturkampf*. While Öncü attempted to pigeonhole the Gezi protests as a revolt that proceeded irrespectively of Turkey’s cultural dichotomy, I offer a perspective to view the protests as the genesis of a discourse that carried on or transformed the Kemalist discourse in an unprecedented fashion. Öncü hereby primarily riveted on descriptive accounts of the two social sets, but did not make the Gezi movement as such subject to analysis (Öncü, 2013). Therefore, an inquiry into this field is urgent and important, as the protests have not yet been analyzed discursively, in general, or were, regarding Öncü’s inquiry, not exclusively examined.

As will be outlined in the theoretical section of my thesis, a discourse will be considered as a ‘limited group of statements’ (Foucault, 1969). This requires me to firstly outline which types of recurring speech patterns emanated from the protestors. To make valid conclusions thereon, the research question hence requires a sub-investigation of: *What patterns in texts of speeches mainly characterize the discourse used by the Gezi protestors?* This descriptive sub-question is important since, aside from the *Kulturkampf* I relate the discourse to, it has to be established what principally characterized the protestors discursively in the first place. Only afterwards can I stipulate whether the discursive practices of the Gezi protestors align with the Kemalist
discourse, as I hypothesize, and direct themselves against political Islam which led me to the following descriptive sub-questions: First, to what extent do the protestors’ acts of speech reflect Kemalist discursive practices? And, second, to what extent do the protestors’ acts of speech direct themselves against the discursive practices of political Islam? What I did was to dichotomize my main research question’s variable, i.e. the dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam, into the discourses (or dimensions) it consists of. Such a categorization is necessary, as I would be most likely to draw erroneous conclusions from relating the protestors’ acts of speech to the variable as such. Therefore, I can respectively analyze and draw conclusions on whether the Gezi discourse could be regarded as a Kemalist discourse, on the one side, and be against political Islam, on the other. If this is the case, I would be confident to infer that the Gezi discourse does show the dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam.

Yet, against the background of modern Turkish protest discourses, where may the ‘Gezi discourse’ fit in? In this regard, Doğu Ergil contends that Turkish protest movements and their discourses thus far emanated from class struggles or ethnic or religious groups in Turkey: For example, the Marxist discourse used by protestors in the 1960s and 1970s precipitated two military interventions. These followed as a reaction to increased left-wing militancy and governmental incapability to solve Turkey’s economic problems (Ergil, 2000). Apart from that, the ethnic or religious rationale further plays a crucial role in Turkish protest discourse studies. Hereby, the religious protest discourse was crucially coined by Alevi religious freedom in Turkey (Bilgili et al, 2011). The ethnic protest discourse, on the other hand, was mainly characterized by the Kurdish minority, as they embraced Marxism. Subsequently, their protests have mainly been expressed via anti-bureaucratic kinship networks, political ‘representative contention’ (e.g. BDP6) and terror acts by the paramilitary PKK7 (Belge, 2011; Watts, 2006).

Yet, the Gezi movement’s discourse, I contend, is unprecedented, as it – contrary to previous Turkey’s protest discourses – does not primarily address labor struggles or ethnic/religious mistreatment, yet raises, in terms of the clash of cultures, questions about Turkey’s identity. AKP’s underestimation of the, as Ibrahim Kaya discussed, cultural program of modernity has, in the course of the suppression of the Gezi protests, hereby especially evoked earnest attention and criticism within the European Union (EU) (Kaya, 2012). Not only have the Commission, the European Parliament or member states’ governments strongly condemned the authorities’ apparent breach of human rights. For instance, an excessive use of tear gas, water cannons (TOMAs), rubber bullets and beatings resulted in five casualties and more than 7500 injured. Also citizens across Europe initiated solidarity protests to express that the people of Europe ‘stand with Gezi’ (McElroy, 2013; Tugal, 2013). Vis-à-vis Erdoğan’s exercise of authority, it occurred that European citizens bonded with the ‘vulnerable’ Turkish protestors. Nominal ‘strangers’ who yet claimed those individual liberties and rights granted to them by their constitution as well as, supra-nationally, by the European Convention on Human Rights that Turkey had been a signatory of.

---

6Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi - name of a Kurdish political party (Turkish translation: Democratic Regions Party)
7Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) is labelled as a terror organization by the EU (Kurdish translation: Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
8A paradigm that grants civil and political rights, such as freedom of assembly or of expression, to citizens (Kaya, 2012)
The protestors’ active demand for, at least, the ‘cultural program of European modernity’ therefore led me to make an inquiry into whether the occupants’ claims, statements or expressions can be aligned with European discursive practices. With the sphere of European discourses albeit constituting a highly multi-faceted and historical domain – comprising discourses such as classicism, romanticism or Euro-centrism – I nevertheless chose to explore whether the Gezi protestors’ statements can be matched with a contemporary European discourse. The discourse of cosmopolitanism, as will be corroborated in the next section, hereby illustrates a discourse that uniquely grasps the above-described bond Europeans established with Turkish citizens during the protests. Furthermore, I find this inquiry relevant since I cannot deny the possibility that the Gezi occupants may have discursively expressed themselves in a cosmopolitan, European fashion instead of in a Kemalist one. Accordingly, I am, apart from studying the alignment of the Gezi discourse and the dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam,Lastly interested in drawing conclusions on: To what extent do the protestors’ acts of speech reflect cosmopolitan discursive practices?

With the variables of this study being examined discursively, I will proceed by corroborating the discursive variables with theoretical insights. First, I will attempt to give a precise, conceptual outline of the yet scarce amount of academic literature on the discourse used by the protestors. In the light of a more broader selection of articles on the discourses embedded in the movements of Kemalism, political Islam and cosmopolitanism, I will narrow the theory at hand down to the most outstanding discursive features respectively. With the methodological tools of a critical discourse analysis, I will attempt to verify whether the conceptualized ‘Gezi discourse’ will, given a random sample of 40 texts, comply with its theorized features. Subsequently, the determined discursive practices of the protestors will be reviewed for its theorized Kemalist and cosmopolitan discursive practices as well as for its aversion to the discourse of political Islam. A comparison of the Gezi discourse with each of my discourses under study will finally enable me to estimate the extent to which a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam is reflected by the protestors’ statements. Finally, I will conclude this thesis with a summary of my findings and a short discussion about the relation between post-Gezi Turkey and Europe.
Conceptualizing discursive clashes in the Turkish nation-state

In this section, I will corroborate the concepts used in my research questions with theoretical insights. I will outline the conceptual traits of the discourses of the Gezi protestors – i.e. my unit of analysis –, of Kemalism, of political Islam, and finally of cosmopolitanism. I will show that, in theory, the discourse used by the protestors broadly concurs with the one of Kemalism and cosmopolitanism and does not concur with the discourse of political Islam.

Foucault’s dichotomous conceptualization of ‘discourses’ hereby constitutes a general framework with which I am enabled to outline the nature and characteristics of my discourses under study. At first, Foucault classifies ‘discourse’ as a limited group of statements that could be made due to ‘certain conditions’ and hence constitute ‘fragments of history’ (Foucault, 1969). Later on, he modified his conceptualization by specifying these ‘certain conditions’ as power, contending that socially-spread power determines the discourse and hence knowledge – claimed as truth - and subjectivities (Foucault, 2003). Influenced by Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe extended the concept to the social world, asserting that discourses give a temporary meaning to the social world. Yet, such meanings are never durable and shift, as different discourses frequently contend for becoming the hegemonic discourse so they may shape meaning, and hence reality, in their own manner (Jørgensen et al, 2002). My conceptualization of the discourse of the protestors as well as the discourses of Kemalism, political Islam and cosmopolitanism will be made in accordance with Foucault’s and Laclau & Mouffe’s theoretical input.

The discourse of the Gezi protestors

Journalists, academics or contemporary witnesses discussing the Gezi protestors and their discourse largely comply that the protests united highly heterogeneous factions of Turkish civil society against PM Erdoğan. The protestors hereby principally stood up, as previously mentioned, against governmental interference in individual autonomy, commodification of public spaces and violations of political and civil rights. It has been, from the point of writing, approximately one year since the protests occurred and there have been, up to this date, no actual studies on the discourse used by the protestors. What I hence do is to give an overview of short articles, essays or columns that give an account of the protestors’ characteristics that broadly frame what the occupants, and their statements, alluded to.

On the one hand, the authors’ stances towards the protestors’ discursive priorities and the repercussions for Turkish society reflect different focal points: Apart from Öncü whose arguments I outlined above, Tayfun Atay further underlined the cultural rationale of the discourse, indicating to concerns of the ‘secular masses’ (an umbrella term for the heterogeneous factions of the protest movement) about the Islamization of Turkey (Atay, 2013). Once supportive of AKP’s democratic vision, economic success and weakening of the military’s political influence, Turkish seculars became concerned about a number of aforementioned, seemingly Islamic policies - e.g. regarding abortion, sale of alcohol or contraception - during AKP’s second term in office (ibid). Hence, the discourse is, contrary to Öncü’s ‘ideological and cultural neutrality’, essentially secular according to Atay. Meyda Yeşenoglu more or less complements this assertion by relating to the long-term discursive struggle between Kemalism and political Islam. Yet, she particularly highlights that the protestors mainly resisted to an, in
Foucault’s words, imposed inscription of an Islamic subjectivity. In this regard, she remarks, Erdoğan’s forcing political style and concomitant slander of the demonstrators shaped the discourse in a carnivalesque fashion. The secular protestors thereby expressed themselves in a highly satirical manner towards their PM (Yeğenoglu, 2013). Yeğenoglu hereof refers to Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of a ‘ritualized rebellion’ wherein, as is the case with Gezi as she contends, words do not only gain new meanings and are satirically reinvented, yet also are power-relations turned upside down in a profane fashion (ibid.)

On the other hand, another strand of literature on the Gezi discourse primarily emphasized its pluralist and heterogeneous character, as the discourse was not essentially secular, but rather coined by shared resentments by diverse groups against a ‘common enemy’. For instance, Burak Kadercan gives an outline of how the governmental discourse lumped Kemalists, university students, LGBT activists, environmentalists or Fenerbahçe football fans together as ‘armed, secular rebels’, avoiding negotiation, yet instead following tactics of polarization (Kadercan, 2013). In this respect, it can be noted that the protest discourse was not united by the secular cause, but coined by diverse social group discourses. Yeşim Arat concurs with Kadercan’s line of reasoning as she asserts that, precedent to the protests, various social groups had been affected by governmental authority differently. This, in return, led the groups to push aside their differences and instead unite against the PM’s increasingly authoritarian stance (Arat, 2013). ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’, I find, adequately sums up the stances advocated by the two authors and reveals, vis-à-vis Atay and Yeğenoglu, a crucial perspective to regard the protest discourse as one that came into being through a common resentment against the PM so intense, as previous discursive clashes among groups came to an end.

What I additionally find relevant is the discourse’s spatial component, i.e. the site of Gezi Park on Istanbul’s Taksim Square, and how the Gezi discourse was spread. Over the course of history, the square permanently constituted an urban commons that does not only shed light on Istanbul’s character, but also on Turkey’s political establishment (Örs, 2014). In Turkish modernity, Taksim Square was primarily a ‘Kemalist site’, as it accommodates a central statue of Atatürk and the Atatürk Kültür Merkezi (Atatürk Cultural Center). Erdoğan, using brute police force, to construct an Ottoman-style shopping mall at Gezi Park, i.e. the inscription of an Islamic symbol on a secular site, saw the expression of a discourse that would also depict the people’s struggle at Taksim Square at spaces not yet under the influence of AKP’s discourse. With Turkish mainstream media not having, in the course of the protests, broadcasted the events at Taksim Square, the protestors thus made themselves heard via alternative means of expression, especially via social media or street art – spaces for expression not yet under the control of the governmental discourse. The cyberspace, i.e. Facebook, Twitter or Tumblr, and public spaces hence became the primary spatial components of the protest discourse (Yeğenoglu, 2013). Hereby, Meyda Yeğenoglu and one other author denote that the discourse was preeminently put forward by the Turkish urban and intellectual youth. The former, for instance, referred to the discursive values of the protestors who favor individual autonomy, freedom and mutual tolerance. It is further argued that the Gezi discourse was a breakthrough for Turkey’s apolitical youth. It was at Gezi Park where a vast number of young Turks pushed aside long-year warnings of their parents, many of whom witnessed the human rights violations of the 1980 coup d’état, not to be political and participated in protests for the very first time. (Alemdaroglu, 2013; Yeğenoglu, 2013).
The Discourse of Kemalism

With discourses generally constituting constantly changing entities, the discourse of Kemalism has, in its almost centennial subsistence, frequently altered. It is an internally heterogeneous discourse, I find, as a conceptualization of Kemalism is rather generally held and in my study, a rather historical, political account is given. It must be annotated, however, that more specific discursive studies of Kemalism, e.g. regarding gender roles, literature or music, are likely to bear different, discursive foci. As will be shown from a post-structural perspective, the power relations at stake shed light on when the Kemalist discourse was either imposed or spread more flexibly which respectively ushered in different subjectivities of Turkish citizens:

When the Turkish Republic was first founded in 1923, the political and civil society of the new nation-state experienced a radical transformation, as former military officer Mustafa Kemal’s secularizing, nationalizing and modernizing agenda was, to a large extent, at odds with the traditionally Islamic mindset of civil society (Mardin, 1973). The shift in power relations established a discourse – henceforth known as Kemalism - that would not only express itself politically and institutionally as in a secular constitution, the ruling CHP\(^9\) one-party government, the education system or a rationalized bureaucracy and military, yet also in a ‘civilizing’ agenda to produce modern, nationalist and secular Turkish subjects (Kasaba, 1997).

Notably, as Davison and Parla remark, the Kemalist discourse was virtually incoherent and nonideological. It was a pragmatic discourse that was to meet specific needs to modernize Turkey and to produce, apart from being nationalist and secular, rationalist and intellectual subjects (Davison et al, 2004). Therefore, Kemalism was, in its inception, a top-down, elitist discourse that would, on a binary, distinguish between the ‘enlightened bureaucracy’ and the ‘uneducated Islamic Anatolians’. In this regard, it should also be noted that the secularism of the Kemalist discourse did not follow the conventional definition as in the mere separation of state affairs and religious matters. Secularism, within the Kemalist discourse, originally meant that the Turkish state would have control of religious issues\(^10\) (Jung, 2006). Yet, instead of ameliorating the social status of Islamic Anatolian subjects inclusively, the Kemalist discourse was rather centered on the making of symbols of the new national identity (Mardin, 1973): A personal cult evolved around the Republic’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk whose images, and hence the Kemalist discourse, were henceforth displayed in all public spaces and institutions – be it at Taksim Square, in courts, schools or prisons (Özyürek, 2004).

However, the civilizing mission of this discourse hereby manifested itself in political acts such as, among others, the introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1928 or a 1934 law stipulating the adoption of surnames (Jung, 2006). Additionally, institutions, such as the Turkish Linguistic Society or the Historical Society, were founded to invent a linguistic and historical Turkish national heritage, i.e. the Turkish language and national myths of the Turkic people (ibid.) In this respect, Kasaba compared the Turkish modernization project to the 1792 French Jacobin Revolution that, similar to the Kemalists, envisaged a total subversion of the ancient regime by, for instance, introducing a new calendar, forcing people to change their names or prohibiting certain types of clothing\(^11\) (Kasaba, 1997). Following the introduction of the multiparty system

---

\(^9\)Cumhüriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Transl.: Republican People’s Party

\(^10\) Control over religious matters was institutionally exerted through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Buğra, 2006)

\(^11\) The fez – a traditional hat - was, for instance, banned due to its association with the Ottoman past (Jung, 2006)
in Turkey in the 1950s, it was specifically the institution of the military that acted, on numerous occasions, as a staunch safeguard of the Kemalist discourse (Gürpinar, 2013). The militarist rationale of the discourse thereby dispersed from the Kemalist power-holders, most of whom had been military officers, to even high schools where teenagers are, for example, instructed in a compulsory quasi-militarist course (Altınyay, 2004). Notably from the 1960s until the 1980s, it was primarily the military that imposed a rigid secularism, a ‘positivistic mausoleum’ as Bernard Lewis termed it, on the Turkish people, as it banned political parties from becoming too ‘Islamic’ and usurped governments due to their failure to cope with left-wing/right-wing tensions (Kasaba, 1997; Lewis, 1961). To overcome the latter tensions, the Kemalist discourse was, after the 1980 coup d’État, also modified by an Islamic rationale, as in ‘being a Turk also means being a Muslim’, to garner support and legitimacy for Kemalism from the Islamic movement (Eligür, 2014). Finally, Gürpinar highlights that, after 2002, the discourse became increasingly marginalized and impregnated by militaristic, nationalist and xenophobic sentiments in fear of AKP being an ‘Islamizing wolf in liberal-democratic sheep clothing’ (Gürpinar, 2013). Yet, it can be noted that, with the discourse’s marginalization after 1980, the imagery of the personal cult around Atatürk increasingly, apart from its continuing presence in public spaces, entered the private realm: Numerous citizens hereby sincerely and voluntarily embraced this visual discourse in the light of the discursive rise of Islamism and its symbols (Özyürek, 2004).

The Discourse of Political Islam

The discourse of political Islam, on the other hand, emerged, to a great extent, after the 1980s and is said to have become hegemonic in Turkey after 2002 when AKP came to power. It was at this time, after the post-1980 coup military administration under General Kenan Evren reimposed the Kemalist discourse on the Turkish people, that citizens had a ‘bellyful’ of promises of ‘better tomorrows’ and began re-examining their Ottoman past from which they had been detached (Kasaba, 1997). To conceptualize the discourse, I will give a short outline on the civil society level and will focus more on the political society level, as the discourse is, principally, a political one: Yet, contrary to the Kemalist discourse, Islamic factions of Turkish civil society, and not political society, constitute the power base of the politicized discourse. The Islamic movement, predominantly Muslim Sunni orders (cemaat) hereby played a crucial role, as they, mainly through the institution of the mosque, collectively transformed or reinforced the daily practices of the ‘Turkish periphery’ or the urban poor, making them subject to an alternative, an Islamic, non-secular, identity (Tugal, 2009). The movement hence envisaged a transformation of daily rituals, for example concerning traditional clothing (veils, fez etc), greetings (selam alaikum12) and others (Tugal, 2006). Essentially, the discourse can hence be regarded as a bottom-up and culturally conservative discourse.

On the political level, a number of Islamic parties have, especially since the 1980s, been in power, yet a majority of them faced closure by the constitutional court or the military due to their Islamic agenda (Eligür, 2010). It was through AKP, on the other hand, that the discourse of Islam has become hegemonic, as it understood to combine cultural conservatism with neoliberal economic policies. In 2001, the party thereby came into being as political successor

12Islamic greeting that translates as ‘Peace be upon you’
of the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi, FP*) which had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court, as the party’s Islamic agenda appeared to pose a threat to Turkey’s secularism (Keyman, 2010). With precedent Islamic parties in power having further been less able to cater for economic growth, AKP, contrary to its Islamic predecessors, rather presented itself as a center-right party advocating a reform-based approach. Firstly envisioning Turkey’s accession to the EU as well as democratic and economic reforms, the Islamic conservatives managed to obtain wide-spread electoral support across all spheres of civil society and their somewhat neo-conservative reforms were welcomed by governments across the world (ibid.). Concomitant with economic growth, the reign of AKP also saw the rise of an Anatolian, Islamic counter-elite – a bête noire to its established Kemalist counter-part. The discourse of political Islam, as in recent years and also contemporarily represented by AKP – has thereby been a highly pragmatic and populist one, because power elites acted highly instrumental and opportunistic in their political and economic choices as (ibid.). For instance, in an attempt to post successes in the PKK peace process, PM Erdoğan repetitively referred to a ‘shared Islamic bond’ between Kurds and Turks (Yavuz, 2009, p. 191). Following the globally hegemonic economic model, i.e. the neo-liberal one, AKP’s implementation of its culturally Islamic conservative agenda has thereby, in its first years in power, largely been pushed aside for the sake of neo-liberal economic and political reforms. The discourse’s neo-liberal rationale has, in this regard, accurately been described by Aziz Babuscu, the chairman of AKP Istanbul, who stated that the ‘second decade of AKP power would be a period of construction’ (Atay, 2013, p. 40). Megaprojects, such as the Marmaray tunnel, the Third Bosporus Bridge (*Sultan Selim Köprüsü*) and also the planned transformation of Gezi Park, have become testament of a discourse both epitomizing the greatness of this ‘new, Islamic’ Turkey and, from a neo-liberal stance, yielding economic profit as infrastructural sites as such. However, the other side of AKP’s neo-liberal discursive coin encompasses philanthropy, as it frequently portrayed itself as an empathic political actor (Keyman, 2010).

Lastly, the discourse has extensively been shaped and advocated by PM Erdoğan – a highly charismatic politician who made it from ‘rags to riches’ and is said, contrary to the ‘old’ bureaucratic elite, to be a man of the people (Kalaycioglu, 2005). Manifesting AKP’s political hegemony, Erdoğan curbed oppositional and military influence in the *Ergenekon*\(^\text{13}\) trials and, as electoral hegemon, managed to have the judiciary and the legislative govern in his favor (ibid.; Keyman, 2010). Yet, at Gezi Park, where the PM desired to – among other aspects – have an Islamic Ottoman-style building rebuilt, the discourse of political Islam experienced a decisive turn. What became especially visible in the Gezi protests was, on the one side, that the discourse of political Islam has not, as Kaya outlined, (yet) complied with the cultural sphere of modernity, i.e. with exclusively granted political and civil rights (Kaya, 2012). On the other, the discourse became, since the protests, increasingly polarizing, differentiating between the discourse’s subject and the secular ‘other’ (Kadercan, 2013).

\(^\text{13}\) a number of trials against alleged members of ‘Ergenekon’ - a secular, ultra-nationalist organization with suspected connections to Turkey’s military and police forces. During these trials, more than 250 military officers, journalists and oppositional politicians were sentenced to year-long prison sentences, as they supposedly conspired against the government
The Discourse of Cosmopolitanism

Contrary to the protest discourse or discursive Kemalism and political Islam, the cosmopolitan discourse, however, is significantly less of a political or socio-cultural discourse, but rather based on a philosophical premise. Spatially, the discourse is further not limited to the settings of the Turkish nation-state, as is the case with Kemalism or political Islam, or to an urban commons, as in Gezi Park from where it affected the national or even transnational space. Instead, it is a global discourse and, by definition, a discourse for the globe: Cosmopolitanism is centered around the concept of world-citizenship and primarily stresses that human beings are not to be defined by an identity inscribed on them by their locality or nationality, yet by humanity alone (Ossewaarde, 2007). Cosmopolitan virtues such as respect, compassion, tolerance, cultural interest or hospitality towards the ‘human’ are thus deeply embedded in the discourse. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is, by all means, a humanist discourse. This common ideological denominator of humanism can hereby be derived from the cynic and stoic origins of the cosmopolitan discourse: The former dates back to Diogenes the Hound, a cynic in ancient Greece, who not only broke free from the social identity inscribed on him as in being a citizen of the Greek city-state. Also, he escaped from the norms and laws of the known community by living in the unknown world – outside of the city-state – to become an independent, ungoverned human being, a world-citizen, ‘in the great wide open’ (Beitz, 1999). The latter stoic origin, on the other hand, can be traced back to Seneca, a Roman philosopher. In the face of being executed by Emperor Nero, Seneca committed suicide since he, as a stoic, chose to master his own life and death (Ossewaarde, 2007). I thereby find that both, cynic and stoic, discursive origins of cosmopolitanism indicate a strong emphasis on being independent or individually autonomous. The nation-state and national discourses, such as Kemalism, thus stand in sharp contrast to the cosmopolitan one, as it aims beyond national boundaries and can, in this respect, be conceptualized as a post-national discourse.

In this regard, Delanty’s claim that the European discourse, for instance, may qualify to be a cosmopolitan discourse is certainly not erroneous (Delanty, 1997). However, Ossewaarde contests Delanty’s assertion, as he interposes that the European identity is not a cosmopolitan identity per se, yet it has been the mere diversity of European movements, and their discourses, that contributed to the making of Europe’s cosmopolitan identity (Ossewaarde, 2013). Whether this identity is, however, truly cosmopolitan in practice can be doubted, with the EU, despite its strong policy emphasis on human rights and political or civil freedoms, has failed to act in the name of humanity. That is, for instance, when illegal African migrants drowned close to the shores of Lampedusa or, less explicit, when protestors of an EU candidate country are confronted with police brutality (Morris, 2009). In a globalized world, the cosmopolitan discourse, as Martha Nussbaum complements, comes forward with the advent of globalized media, i.e. predominantly social media. In case of a ‘silencing of mainstream media’, crimes against humanity can thereby no longer be hidden from the global ‘spectators’, while the latter, by becoming aware of the very crimes, become co-responsible for the atrocity (Nussbaum, 2003). Lastly, it did nevertheless appear that this ‘global spectatorship’ – the cosmopolitan discourse’s subjects – are mostly bourgeois. Indicating a high degree of financial stability and upward mobility, the cosmopolitan subjects persistently move transnationally in their pursuit of career advancement or discovering the unknown (Ossewaarde, 2007).
Concluding Remarks

Despite my assumption that the Gezi discourse would broadly concur with the Kemalist and the cosmopolitan discourse, I could observe that, theoretically, all discourses under study do not only exhibit very distinct traits, but also appear to be abstract concepts as such. The theoretical corroboration of my concepts allowed me, however, to sum up an outline of the characteristics that the discourses featured in theory: First, the discourse used by the Gezi protestors had been conceptualized as both uniting modern, secular Turks, on the one hand, and diversifying the protestors’ secularism into pluralist discourses at the same time. It is a discourse that, in its statements, avoided straightforwardly secular paroles, but instead indicated a high degree of satire against PM Erdogan and his accomplices that had spatially been preeminently expressed on social media and on public spaces (via graffiti, protest slogans, on posters etc).

The protestors’ discourse, as was lastly argued, further represented a benchmark in the Turkish youth’s apolitical attitude, with the ‘Gezi discourse’ having been primarily put forward by the well-educated, urban youth. Contrary to the protest discourse’s rather short presence, the Kemalist discourse, on the other hand, has, possibly due to its almost centennial longevity and former hegemony, persistently altered and produced different subjectivities. Having started off as a rather incoherent and non-ideological discourse, Kemalism soon came, emanating from the elites (i.e. Atatürk’s entourage and the bureaucracy), to be imposed (top-down) on the citizens of the newly founded Republic to produce Westernized, rationalist, intellectual subjects. Having interpreted secularism as in controlling religious affairs, the Kemalist discourse has, especially in times of turmoil, been rigidly inscribed on its subjects – particularly through the institution of the military. It was, however, merely until left/right-wing tensions in the 1970s/1980s that the Kemalist discourse was complemented by an Islamic rationale – a pragmatic move that, among other aspects, gave rise to the marginalization of the Kemalist discourse after the year 2000 and to a shift in discursive hegemonies: Backed by the reinvigorated Islamic movement within Turkish civil society, political Islam became the hegemonic discourse, after the Islamic conservative AKP came to power. Combining neoliberal economic and political reforms with a culturally conservative agenda, the discourse initially further gained wide-spread support from Turkish seculars. Politically embodied by hegemon PM Erdogan – initially highly pragmatic and reconciliatory – the discourse altered significantly after the Gezi protests sparked off. Ever since, the discourse of political Islam became increasingly polarizing and confrontational towards Turkish seculars. In comparison to these three discourses, cosmopolitanism has at last rather been portrayed as a philosophical discourse, as its key notion of world-citizenship – emphasizing humanity instead of a specific social identity – could not only be deduced from the discourse’s cynic and stoic origins. In fact, it was also emphasized that the discourse is culturally-mediating and, in contemporary debates around a European identity, post-national.
Methodological considerations

Critical Discourse Analysis as a research design

The aim of my study is to analyze the discourse of my unit of analysis, i.e. the Gezi protestors, vis-à-vis the cases of the Kemalist discourse, the one of political Islam and the cosmopolitan discourse. The central feature of my inquiry hence encompasses discourses which led me to make use of a qualitative research design suitable for analyzing statements and texts from which I can draw conclusions on my unit’s discursive practices, and, thereupon on broader social realities. I hence opted for administering a discourse analysis as my research design. Yet, there is no pre-established, methodological scheme on how such an analysis is to be precisely conducted. For the most part, the actual discipline of discourse analyses dates back to structural and post-structural linguists and sociologists such as Jacques Derrida, Ferdinand de Saussure and Michel Foucault theorizing discourses (Meyer et al, 2008). Their theoretical foundations had subsequently been methodologized by numerous discourse analysts, ranging from Wodak’s discourse-historical approach to van Dijk’s multidisciplinary critical discourse analysis. Hence, it is to note that the research design lacks methodologization by the post-structuralists who first conceptualized it (ibid.). Instead, discourse analysts contend that an analysis of discourses always is to be adjusted to a discourse’s specific concepts to reveal its verily analytical power (Müller, 2010; Tonkiss, 2012).

Given this vast array of discourse methodologies, I found a critical discourse analysis (CDA) after Norman Fairclough’s so-called ‘three-dimensional model’ to constitute the most suitable methodological approach for the following reasons: First, the model represents, among the most prominent CDA research designs used, the most advanced method for studies of culture and society (Jørgensen et al, 2002). Second, Fairclough’s model is based on the principle that a group’s discursive practices stand in a dialectical relationship with other social practices that, in return, suggest the context for analysis of the texts (Fairclough, 2003). Since my primary aim is to analyze the discursive practices of the Gezi protestors and how these practices show a Kemalist and cosmopolitan social practice (they hence stand in a dialectical relationship), Fairclough’s CDA constitutes the most suitable design for my study. In fact, it is shown that the discourse of the protestors is socially embedded, i.e. in the cultural clashes of secular modernists (Kemalists) and Islamic conservatives (political Islam). Third, utilizing a vast range of concepts to make sense of discursive patterns within texts, Fairclough’s model further stresses visual images to constitute texts as well. In the context of the Gezi protests’ high degree of visualization on social media, I find that Fairclough’s model represents the most relevant research design to also grasp visualized discursive patterns within the protestors’ statements (Jørgensen et al, 2002). To give an outline of the three-dimensional model, I finally illustrated Fairclough’s approach with regard to my research (ibid., see Appendix 1.1).

Yet, my utilization of this model also confronts me with two problems: First, it is unclear where I will make a distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices based on the texts. Jørgensen & Philipps thereby suggest that it is useful to analyze possible non-discursive practices as as if social practices under the condition of stating that the non-discursive practice is actually not part of my model (Jørgensen et al, 2002). Moreover, Fairclough’s model has been criticized for its lack of including group formation and subjectivity which is, in the case of Gezi,
highly relevant. Therefore, I will modify the social practice dimension of the model with aspects on group formation and subjectivity by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory who have widely emphasized this field of social practices.

Collection of Texts

The main focus of my research lies on the Gezi protestors’ discursive practices which therefore account to be the study’s population. Since the protests have de facto not come to a real end, as post-Gezi protests frequently pointed towards Gezi themes, I will nevertheless turn my attention to the discursive practices from May 27th to June 15th 2013, i.e. during the protests’ ‘crunch mode’. Detecting recurring, signified usages of ‘speech’ among large and seemingly heterogeneous factions of protestors will therefore be my primary case selection method. Choosing 40 cases of text hence enables me to draw multi-faceted conclusions on the protestors’ discursive practices. As will be shown in the following section, I will extract cases of text from the vast array of ‘speech’ there is on social media. More specifically, I, on the one hand, randomly sampled 20 ‘tweets’ by making use of Twitter’s Advanced Search Option. This tool hereby enabled me to search for tweets from May 27th to June 15th 2013. Moreover, I could narrow down my query by including the hashtags ‘#OccupyGezi’, ‘#GeziParki’ and ‘#DirenGeziParki’ which presented me with a large range of ‘cyber-text’. On the other hand, I will search for discursive patterns within 20 randomly sampled cases of ‘street’ text, i.e. samples of street art or graffiti. In this respect, the Facebook page of Diren Gezi Parki (followed by more than 600 000 users) served as source, as the account’s administrators posted more than 100 ‘visual texts’ – depicting graffiti protest slogans or pictures – during the protests. This range of cases thus represents a different set of cases which I expect to bear the same or similar discursive patterns. These sets of cases were, as mentioned, both selected at random which eliminates potential selection bias. However, in the light of millions of texts having been tweeted during the Gezi protests, it is to annotate that a precise textual analysis of other random samples of 20 tweets is likely to bear varying textual foci. Yet, the protestors’ discursive practices deduced from my analyzed texts will further be compared to my theoretical findings on the protestors’ discourse. This will, despite possible different textual core themes of other random tweet samples, give versatile information on the discursive practices of my unit of analysis and will add novel facets to existing theory on the ‘Gezi discourse’.

Analysis of Texts

With Fairclough’s model, I will first show, based on my theoretical pillars, how and what type of text is produced and consumed by the protestors which will provide me with an answer to my first sub-question on the characteristics of the protestors’ discursive practices. As mentioned earlier, the protestors’ discursive practices were, in theory and in a broader sense, predominantly secular, pluralist and humorous. Therefore, I expect the texts to be characterized by such statements that, for instance, contextually demand a non-intervention of Islamic policies with their private lives (secular) or that satirize existing political hierarchies as well (see Appendix 1.2). At first, I will hence look for recurring linguistic patterns within my 40 cases that will analytically, using Fairclough’s methodological concepts, be regarded as ‘communicative events’ referring to examples of language use (Jørgensen et al, 2002). Finding an answer to my first sub-question thus primarily encompasses an analysis of the linguistic structure of the very
communicative events. The utilization of tools for linguistic analysis will, for example, include the relationship between speakers (interactional control) as well as the use of metaphors or grammar, such as the nominalization or modality of the communicative events. The detection of linguistic patterns in my texts will thus present me with an outline of the Gezi protestors’ genres, i.e. their specific usage of language (ibid). These genres will, in return, shed light on the set-up of the discourse types which were used in the social field of Gezi Park. While Fairclough regards the very configuration as the ‘order of discourse’, I will refer to this production and consumption of texts as the protestors’ discursive practices (Fairclough, 2003). Characterizing the dominant features of the protestors’ statements in addition, or possibly in contrast, to the theory provided on their discursive practices will thus be embedded in the first part of my analytical section.

On the other hand, the cases of the Kemalist, the politicized Islamic, and the cosmopolitan discourse will not be analyzed on the textual level, but they are rather matched with the Gezi protestors’ discourse on the model’s second dimension which is the discursive one. In the following sections, I will hence check the analyzed protestors’ statements for Kemalist, politicized Islamic and cosmopolitan statements to estimate the extent to which the protestors’ discursive practices are coined by statements that are preeminent in these three discourses (see Appendix 1.2). This respective analytical juxtaposition of the ‘Gezi discourse’ to the other discourses will thereby eventually reflect whether the discursive practices at Gezi Park can, at first, be regarded as a Kemalist discourse, and, second, be considered as being opposed to the discourse of political Islam. Therefore, the second section of my analysis comprises an answer to my second sub-question on how Kemalist (discursive items: nationalist, secular, elitist) the protestors’ statements actually were or whether they simply redefined the Kemalist discourse (see Appendix 1.2). This requires me to re-check my previously determined discursive patterns of the protestors for statements that in this case, emphasize elements of Turkish national culture or even for texts in which an alleged superiority of Turks is alluded to. Subsequently, the third section of my analysis will be framed in a similar vein, as the statements of my unit of analysis will be compared to the discursive practices of politicized Islam (discursive items: conservative, neo-liberal, polarizing; see Appendix 1.2). I will hereby attempt to ascertain whether the protestors’ practices include statements that, for example, advocate Islamic customs, beliefs or norms or that stress privatization, commodification or the sovereignty of markets. By comparing the protestors’ statements with the discursive practices of both, Kemalism and political Islam, I am de facto enabled to give an answer to the main research question about the extent to which the protestors’ discursive practices reflect a Kulturkampf in terms of a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam. Before shedding light on the hypothesized social reality (third dimension), however, I find that more multi-faceted conclusions can be drawn, if I firstly determine the extent to which the protestors’ discursive practices exhibit cosmopolitan discursive practices (discursive items: humanist, culturally-mediating, individualist; see Appendix 1.2). Lastly, my 40 cases will therefore be accordingly reviewed for statements that, for instance, entail a prioritization of the human identity over other social identities or that highlight the worth of individual autonomy.

Although this cosmopolitan discourse is not part of my main research question, I will include analytical findings thereon in the final section of my analysis on the protestors’ social practices (see Appendix 1.1). A versatile conceptualization of the protests’ social reality, aside from the hypothesized dialectics, requires this, as all my analyzed discourses can, for the sake of
outlining the very social consequences, be related to. With Fairclough’s model having been criticized for its methodological shortcomings on group formation and subjectivities, I will finally supplement my conceptualization of the protests’ social reality by, as mentioned, concepts from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory, i.e. subject positions as well as representation in group formations (Jørgensen et al, 2002). At last, I am hence, without shortcomings, enabled to draw a multi-faceted conclusion on whether the Gezi protestors’ discursive practices actually reflect a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam, a cosmopolitan discourse or both.

Concluding Remarks

Apt to make texts or statements subject to analysis, a qualitative CDA has been chosen as research design for this study. Due to its renownedness in sociocultural studies, its methodological coherence with my research question and its affiliation to visual images, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model protruded in contrast to other CDA designs conceived by discourse analysts. The disclosure of recurring usages of ‘speech’ hereby constitutes the main case selected method whereby 40 cases of texts were randomly sampled via Twitter’s Advanced Search Tool - comprising random tweets by the protestors - and via the Facebook page of Diren Gezi Parki – encompassing random street art and graffiti texts. First, it will be established what types of texts are produced and consumed by the protestors and how they align with the theoretical evidence on the protest discourse (i.e. the model’s first dimension). A formulation of the protestors’ discursive practices is thereby enabled by the usage of methodological concepts introduced by Fairclough, such as communicative events, interdiscursivity or interactional control. Having determined the dominant features of the Gezi discourse (i.e. the model’s second dimension), I will proceed by repeatedly combing through the texts in search of Kemalist, politicized Islamic as well as cosmopolitan acts of speech. In this respect, insights will be provided into what characterizes the discursive practices of the protestors as well as into the extent to which a dialectic between Kemalism and political Islam is shown (i.e. the model’s third dimension). This hypothesized social reality of the protestors’ texts will hereby, due to my model’s flaw regarding subjectivities and classifications, be corroborated by concepts borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, such as subject positions and group formation. Following these methodological steps, I will finally be enabled to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question: To what extent does the discourse used by the protestors show a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam?
Analyzing discursive clashes at the edge of Europe

The discursive characteristics of the Gezi Protestors

The range of randomly sampled texts that capture how the protestors of Gezi Park expressed themselves above all presents me, in Fairclough’s words, with two types of communicative events (Fairclough, 2003). These instances of language use are the protestors’ tweets, on one side, and graffiti sprayed on Istanbul’s streets, buildings or walls on the other. Possibly due to Twitter’s setup of enabling users to merely express themselves in 140 characters or because of the temporal impossibility to sketch highly artistic discourses incendiaires, both types of communicative events are held textually concise by their authors. Ranging from one to three sentences, the protestors’ instances of language use are further predominantly manifested in their mother tongue Turkish with the exception of a few texts composed in English. The protestors were hereby apt to manifest themselves in the lingua franca for two reasons as I perceive it: On the one hand, they may have felt the urge to testify their protest experiences and confrontation with police brutality on Twitter for a European or international audience, as in ‘Polis must stop shooting innocent people! Istanbul stay strong!’ (Tweet 5, see App. 2.1) or ‘This is the field hospital area covered in tear gas’ (Tweet 15, see App. 2.1). On the other hand, the protestors used quotes that are notoriously stated in English, as they made reference to and rephrased themes from US popular culture alluding, for instance, to Game of Thrones character Ned Stark’s quote ‘(Tayyip), Winter is coming!’ (Image 5, see App. 2.2) or Fight Club protagonist Tyler Durden’s ‘Welcome to Fight Club, (Tayyip)!’ (Image 12, see App. 2.2). Although I will take up on this usage of popular culture motives in the course of my analysis, I will proceed by trawling the communicative events with textual analysis tools in order to grasp the discursive characteristics of the Gezi protestors – according to the texts.

Let me begin with a textual element, that Fairclough refers to as ‘interactional control’, to make sense of the relation between communicators and to determine who defines the interactive agenda (Fairclough, 2003). Ironically, a relationship between two speakers – a dialectics as it were – is textually not present. In all communicative events, it is the Gezi protestor who possesses interactional control and who therefore also sets the conversational agenda. Hence, the emitting protestor constructs a relationship in and by the texts, while his or her statements are envisaged for three different recipients:

First, the fellow protestor is primarily addressed in the tweets at hand and, among other aspects, referred to as ‘everyone’ (Tweet 2), ‘our brothers’ (Tweet 3), ‘innocent people’ (Tweet 5), ‘the marginals’ (Tweet 18) or ‘the marauders’ (Tweet 20). Notably the latter two terms appear to be paradoxic in contrast to the former two, as they indicate a more condescending connotation. However, I will go into details about this paradox in another section of my analysis (see section 4.3). Instances of language use towards fellow protestors on Twitter is hereby preeminently framed imperatively in terms of informative and cautionary statements, as in ‘Share these WiFi passwords and let everyone know!’ (Tweet 2, see App. 2.1) or ‘2.45 a.m. Gümüşsuyu (a neighborhood close to Taksim Square): All those who remain calm and have functioning gas masks, go help! Gas has struck the infirmary! There are wounded people!’ (Tweet 8, see App. 2.1). Thereby, the fellow protestor is informed about Wi-Fi passwords that were circulated by local shop owners, hotels or restaurants so protestors could quickly access the internet to inform
others about the latest occurrences at Gezi Park, Taksim Square or other Istanbul neighborhoods. Additionally, live updates are reported about the fellow protestor in jeopardy whereby the very is instigated to come to the other’s aid and rescue. Less cautionary, yet still informative, the fellow protestor is further indirectly addressed in terms of commentaries about the protests’ state of the art, such as a comment describing the atmosphere at Gezi Park (Tweet 10, see App. 2.1) or about incidents in Turkish politics, in general (Tweet 13, see App. 2.1).

Second, the Gezi protestor textually interacts with the police forces on numerous occasions in a highly critical and satirical manner: In Tweet 5, for instance, a protestor denotes that the police ‘shoots innocent people’ and corroborates his claim with an image of a fellow protestor with a laceration. The connotation was thereby geared towards portraying the police forces as ruthless murderers, though they did not fire live ammunition at the protestors and thus did not directly shoot anyone, yet their direct aiming and firing of rubber bullets at demonstrators most certainly made the victims claim they were ‘shot’. This violent police behavior is additionally put in sharp textual contrast to the peaceful protest behavior asserted by the ‘conversational agenda-setter’: For example, one tweet claims that ‘the only weapons these people have are books’ supplemented by an image depicting a small, nicely done up library-tent arranged by the occupants in Gezi Park (Tweet 12, see App. 2.1). Another tweet further substantiates this antagonism, as a protestor points to ‘the field hospital covered in tear gas’ (Tweet 15, see App. 2.1). Clearly, it is hereby connoted that peaceful protestors established a field hospital at Gezi Park and that police forces fire tear gas at a vicinity where injured citizens are doctored. In contrast, the graffiti texts reveal a more satirical and ironic stance towards the police addressed by the Gezi protestor. With the exception of one graffiti in which the police is advised to ‘live honorably and to go sell sesame-buns’ (Image 6, see App. 2.2), two others ironize the authorities, as in ‘Enough is enough! I’m calling the police’ (Image 13, App. 2.2) and ‘Brother Police, you literally bring tears to our eyes’ (Image 17, App. 2.2). Moreover, the excessive use of force by the police is ironically dealt with in the protestors’ graffiti: Sketched against the window of a MAC store (selling skin and beauty products for women), a protestor remarks that ‘tear gas makes the skin beautiful’ (Image 20, App. 2.2). Or, finally, a famous Turkish song by Barış Manço is rephrased from ‘Domates, Biber, Patlıcan’ (transl.: ‘Tomatoes, peppers, eggplants’) to ‘TOMA-Water (TOMA = water cannon vehicle), pepper (spray), Orange (as mentioned, it was believed that the police would use Agent Orange against protestors)’.

Third, the protestor constructs a textual interaction with PM Erdoğan and encounters him with warning, demanding, insulting and ironic statements. Hereby, the PM is interacted with on a personal, non-hierarchic level, with protestors repeatedly calling their PM ‘Tayyip’ – as if the protestors felt they knocked their PM ‘off his perch’. Corroborated, for instance, by an image showing a crying toddler in the arms of his mother, a tweet issues the clear warning that the tears of the child would eventually cause the PM to drown (Tweet 19, see App. 2.1). As to that, Erdoğan is held accountable for protestors being ‘hunted’ by the police to the point that they have to eventually find shelter in nearby hotels causing young children to be panicked. In two instances, the protestors further demand that ‘Tayyip’ should resign (Image 14, see App. 2.2) and that they – ‘the stoned youth’ - do not wish to have a PM who ‘gets high on fascism’ (Image 1, see App. 2.2). On two other occasions, the protestors also insult their PM, calling ‘Tayyip’ a ‘Kezban’ – a rather ambiguous slang word alluding to conservative, sexually-repressed ‘village girls’ (Image 19, see App. 2.2) - or insinuate him to have urinated against a mosque (Image 3,
App. 2.2). In this respect, the ‘conversational agenda-setters’ mock Erdoğan for his religious sensitivity and play with religiously-connoted terms to blaspheme him and his seemingly Islamizing agenda. Predominantly, it is a high degree of humor and irony, however, on which the Gezi protestors interact with their PM. The previously mentioned ‘Tayyip, Winter is coming’ quote does, for instance, connote that tough times or the end will come for the PM. Or, the ‘Welcome to Fight Club, Tayyip!’ quote, on the other hand, may suggest that a schizophrenic PM would ‘come of age’ through civil disobedience. Lastly, a graffiti – sketched against the window of a liquor store – ironically denotes ‘Cheers, Tayyip!’, seemingly satirizing the PM’s restrictive policy on the sale of alcohol (Image 8, see App. 2.2). Before I proceed by analyzing the communicative events for its metaphorical peculiarities, it should be annotated that in merely one instance, a protestors made an interaction with HALK TV. As one of the few channels that broadcasted the events at Taksim, the TV channel ironically showed a synchronized live conference of Yesilköy, from where CNN Türk broadcasted a documentary about penguins, and of Taksim Square where thousands of citizens were protesting at.

As mentioned previously, my communicative events under study further indicate a considerable number of figures of speech, particularly metaphors, allegories and irony, which may at least partially date back to Turkish being a quite vivid tongue, in general. Though some statements could certainly be figuratively analyzed in more depth and could, from a linguistic perspective, be classified with more rigor, the use of figures of speech – frequently complemented by visual images - reflects a textual commonality across-the-board: In one tweet, for instance, an excerpt of a poem by Turkish novelist Nâzım Hikmet is recited in which the poet metaphorically suggests to ‘live single and free like a tree, but in brotherhood like a forest’ (Tweet 7, see App. 2.1). Written on a piece of paper and attached to a ‘Taksim’ signpost by a protestor, Hikmet’s poem may, in view of the protests, epitomize the people’s desire to lead solidary lives unaffected by the wheelings and dealings of power-holders. In two other tweets, already referred to earlier, the protestors’ books are, on the one hand also figuratively described as their silah – their guns or, more abstract, their weapons (Tweet 12, see App. 2.1). On the other hand, the PM’s ‘drowning’ is, in a different tweet, metaphorically soothsaid in terms of a child’s tears (Tweet 19, see App. 2.1). Furthermore, the protestors’ pieces of street art are not only held highly figuratively, but also, in contrast to the tweets at hand, coupled with an extraordinary sense of irony. Apart from aforementioned graffiti such as the ‘stoned youth’s’ demand for a PM who does not ‘get high on fascism’ (Image 1, see App. 2.2) or the ironized metaphorical statement that the police ‘literally brought tears to the eyes of the protestors’, one piece of street art illustrates a Turkish language pun: Ironizing Fethullah Gülen (a highly influential Turkish imam and former Erdogan ally), a graffiti plays with the literal translation of his last name (Gülen = ‘smiling person’) and denotes that ‘you can’t smile with Gülen’ (Image 10, see App. 2.2). Therefore, the communicative events can be regarded as showing a high degree of figures of speech.

Moreover, what can finally be attested is that the protestors’ statements appear to be exceedingly intertextual. Bearing upon the condition that texts refer to earlier incidents or texts, the communicative events predominantly display references to either statements by Turkish politicians, poets or to popular culture themes. In particular, two tweets draw upon an event whereby the governor of Istanbul called on the protestors’ mothers to appeal to their sons’ and daughters’ consciousness to stop protesting. Yet, in both instances referred to, the mothers made
a stand against the call by joining their children at Gezi Park and Taksim Square (Tweet 16, 17; see App. 2.1). Furthermore, another tweet seemingly quotes the PM or one from his entourage, as it denotes that the protestors apparently attempt to portray the police forces as criminals, while making themselves out to be ‘innocent babies’ (Tweet 20, see App. 2.1). Apart from these political intertextualities, textual references are also made to quotes from famous Turkish poets, such as Nâzım Hikmet (see above) or Cemâl Süreya’s quotation ‘Dying will be forbidden the day freedom comes’ (Tweet 7, see App. 2.1; Image 7, see App. 2.2). Finally, various pop-cultural references are made which include, among others, singer Gil Scott-Heron (Image 2, see App. 2.2), the TV show Game of Thrones (Image 5, see App. 2.2), the band Red Hot Chili Peppers (Image 11, see App. 2.2), singer Barış Manço (Image 15, see App. 2.2) or the videogame Grand Theft Auto (Image 18, see App. 2.2).

Yet, how is it possible to draw conclusions on the Gezi protestors’ discursive practices beginning with the texts analyzed? A starting point, as previously emphasized, lies in juxtaposing my textual findings to what I initially expected to detect in the protestors’ communicative events. Based on coherences and inconsistencies between theory and methodological cases, I am hence enabled to give an accurate outline – and answer to the first sub-question - of what patterns in texts of ‘speeches’ the Gezi discourse is mainly characterized by: As we could observe, the texts produced and consumed by the protestors were, on the one hand, envisaged for the ‘fellow protestor’ in an informative and cautionary fashion. Setting the conversational agenda, the protestors also constructed an interactive relationship to their adversaries – Tayyip Erdoğan and the police. While the former was preeminently addressed in a warning and demanding, yet non-hierarchical and ironic fashion, the latter was not only satirized, but also heavily criticized and put in perspective as ‘hooligans in uniform’. Generally, these interactions were, as we could see, coined by usages of highly figurative speech and further indicated a high degree of intertextuality – notably referring to political statements, poetry or popular culture.

As much as the protestors may have had varying political views and opinions or may have made a stand against an intervention of Islamic policies in their private lives, the texts produced and consumed by the protestors do essentially neither reveal particularly pluralist nor especially secular discursive practices. Rather contrary to what has been expected, the communicative events preponderantly feature statements against Erdoğan or the police forces, instead of significantly secular statements. This does not imply that such texts did not exist, yet the majority of those did not argue for it per se which leads me to conclude that secularism – in terms of a non-interference of Islamic policies with private affairs - did not necessarily constitute a discursive priority. In this regard, my findings substantiate Yeğenoglu’s claim that the protestors, as secular-minded they may have been, avoided straightforwardly secular paroles and, instead, focused on either informing or warning ‘fellow’ protestors and on satirizing or criticizing Erdoğan and the police. Therefore, the protestors’ discursive practices were clearly less secular than initially hypothesized, even though they may have explicitly rejected the imposition of an Islamic subjectivity – which was, however, not primarily discussed in the communicative events. Similarly, it can be noted that the protest discourse’s prognosticated pluralism was rather underemphasized in the texts. Statements that would expose the different views, opinions or demands of the movement’s heterogeneous groups are rather absent and gave path to an amalgamated criticism of Erdoğan, his entourage and his policies.
Most certainly, the protestors pointed towards their heterogeneity, as one tweet reveals, for instance, that supporters of Fenerbahçe fraternized with their archrivals of Galatasaray or that Alevis, Kurds, and Turks stood together as one (Tweet 4, see App. 2.1). What remained rather unmentioned, however, were – as indicated above – tangible, group-specific demands that may have made the case for identifying this discourse as evidently pluralist. In my view, this phenomenon illustrates one fatal flaw of why this discourse did not actually pose a real challenge to the hegemonic discourse of political Islam. The mere complexity of this non-hierarchic movement, I find, was an obstacle to the postulation of discursive priorities, i.e. to have a clear agenda. Even though all the groups within the protest movement had their very own discursive priorities, their unity during the protests was upheld by distracting them from their discursive priorities and, instead, channeling their resentments against PM Erdoğan, as I perceive it. This may further shed light on why the texts produced and consumed by the protestors leave both, secular and pluralist statements, quite understated. The humorous rationale of the discourse therefore overweighs, as existing hierarchies were satirized via highly figurative usages of speech. Hereof, power-relations had been turned upside down, were satirized and power-holders were dealt with on a personal level.

*Kemalism is dead – Long live post-Kemalism*

Secularism – the central tenet of the Kemalist discourse – has been considered as understated within the discourse used by the protestors. With the Kemalist discourse having connoted secularism as state control over religious matters for the most part, secularism has, on the contrary, been rather perceived as a non-intervention of Islam in state or private affairs by the Gezi protestors. It is a less rigid definition of Turkish secularism and, although there may have been protestors who would have favored the Kemalist definition, we do not find secular statements in the Kemalist sense among the communicative events at all. This does not imply that the texts produced and consumed were by no means secular. Though understated, they were most likely, just not in the old sense.

A remarkable variation of Kemalist notions within the protestors’ discourse can, however, be found in how the protestors dealt with elements of Turkish national culture. We can, for example, observe that the protestors refer to texts that bear national or nationalist connotations and symbols, yet the way they treat these would reveal a momentous transformation of the Kemalist discourse: First, in one tweet, young protestors, referring to themselves as the ‘Republic’s youth’, announced that they were at Taksim Square, enclosing an image that depicts how they arranged empty beer bottles in the form of ‘T.C.’ – the abbreviation for ‘Turkish Republic’ (Tweet 6, see App. 2.1). Less humorously, another text – also tweeted from Taksim Square – noted that no police intervention was up and about, as protestors commemorated Abdullah Cömert - a 22-year old who died during protests in the Southern Turkish town of Iskenderun after having been hit by a rubber bullet (Fraser, 2013). The tweet further included an image of a few protestors who climbed up the Atatürk memorial, holding a Turkish flag and a banner stating ‘Immortal Abdullah Cömert’ (Tweet 9, see App. 2.1). Finally, another tweet remarks that founding father Mustafa Kemal actually abolished the name ‘Mustafa’ and altered the name ‘Kemal’, because the names were more or less remnants of Turkey’s Ottoman past (Tweet 14, see App. 2.1).
Although these instances of languages use do by no means typify the Gezi discourse as a Kemalist one, they give, however, some indication of how the apolitically brought up, urban Turkish youth was affected by and engaged with a subjectivity, that was at times rigidly inscribed upon their elders, as the new generation turned into active political participants in the Gezi protests. With the discourse of political Islam having become hegemonic, the marginalization of the Kemalist discourse was frequently dubbed by ultra-nationalist and xenophobic statements – a development that was once labelled as neo-Kemalism (Jung, 2006). Since the discourse of political Islam extended its hegemonic status more and more over the years, this neo-Kemalism, in my view, stands clearly at odds with how Turkish citizens engaged with Kemalism at Gezi Park. As I perceive it, the protests earmarked a transition of the Kemalist discourse, as moderately or ultra-nationalist it may have been expressed beforehand, towards post-Kemalism.

Though this concept definitely requires more theorization and discussion, I will draw upon a number of indicators in the communicative events that may allude to why the discourse used by the protestors does, in my opinion, deserve to be regarded as a post-Kemalist discourse. I do not claim that the protestors thereby turned their back on Kemalism. Instead, the protests presented the Turkish youth with the opportunity to critically engage with authority jeopardizing their free individual development. Be it a critical examination of Erdoğan and his policies that were increasingly perceived as authoritarian or even considerations of how their own parents epitomized authority for them or were, themselves, affected by governmental authority after the 1980s. The post-Kemalist discourse hence also enables a critical examination of Atatürk – whose visualized authority remains undisputed in public spaces and institutions – while remembering his achievements for the Turkish nation positively. This apparent antagonism is concurrently illustrated, on the one hand, by protestors humorously emphasizing that one of the pillars of the Republic is individual freedom, such as the freedom to consume alcohol, which was, among others, granted by Atatürk’s secular constitution. Hereof, post-Kemalists would clearly oppose to define secularism like the Kemalists. Much rather, they adhered to the aforementioned definition, especially in terms of a non-intervention of Islamic policies in private or public affairs. On the other hand, this post-Kemalist discourse also invites its subjects to put the founding father into a critical perspective, without subjects being immediately denominated as ‘blaspheming enemies of the state’. A protestor pointing towards a deep irony in Atatürk’s actions, that supposedly went as far as the founding father nominally abolishing himself (as he attempted to rid the newly established republic of all its ‘backward’, Ottoman bits and pieces), thus serves as an example for a type of statement that would align itself with post-Kemalist discursive practices.

Contrary to the Kemalist discourse with its elitist undertones, the post-Kemalist discursive power-base is further anchored, similarly to political Islam, within Turkish civil society. Avoiding distinctions between an ‘enlightened bureaucracy’ and ‘backward, uncivilized Anatolians’, post-Kemalism most certainly turned out to be non-hierarchical – a bit anarchic even - rather than elitist. Not only did the Çarsi, notoriously anarchist, die-hard fans of Beşiktaş Istanbul, join the protests (Tweet 1, see App. 2.1), but also the protestors themselves turned away from the hierarchic Kemalist structures and its sacrosanct father figure Mustafa Kemal. The placement of a banner, praising a deceased protestor’s ‘immortality’, alongside Atatürk’s statue may hereof epitomize that it is merely the founding father’s ideas that will perpetuate -
rather than his overarching presence – and that a departed Turkish citizen, such as Abdullah Cömert, is, from a post-Kemalist stance, on a par with the founding father himself. However, with regard to the vast number of texts that were produced during the protests, the post-Kemalist discourse would certainly manifest additional conceptual traits. Yet I find that, concerning my study, it is sufficient to note that the Kemalist discourse experienced a critical, non-hierarchic, yet still commemorative transformation – identified as post-Kemalism. In comparison to its Kemalist predecessor, the post-Kemalist discourse advocates, as was shown, a conventional secularism and non-elitism.

Inter-discursive mixes of the politicized Islamic discourse

What can principally be observed from the previous findings is that the post-Kemalist discourse of the protestors was textually directed primarily against PM Erdoğan and remarkably less against the discourse of political Islam. Generally, post-Kemalist discursive practices did, as could be seen, not feature polarizing statements advocating Islamic conservatism or neo-liberal privatization and commodification. Therefore, the discourse used by the protestors does not align with the discourse of political Islam. As far as I can see, Erdoğan came to embody a bull’s eye for resentments for an Islamizing agenda, for commanding a police crackdown or for privatizing and commodifying the entire country. The protestors’ alienation from the discursive core themes of political Islam, i.e. Islamic conservatism, neo-liberalism and polarization, could hereby easily be projected onto the PM. This may further explain why the protestors created an interactive, textual relationship to their adversaries and did not directly attack political Islam in their statements. In fact, opposition against central themes of political Islam were discursively combined with ‘Tayyip’ denoted as scapegoat. Even though it should be annotated that aforementioned Fethullah Gülen, the PM’s former ally, was, in one instance of language use, subject to ridicule, Erdoğan evidently constituted the main goal (Image 10, see App. 2.2).

Hereof, resentments for AKP’s culturally conservative policies were, for instance, ironized via ‘Cheers Tayyip’ (Image 8, see App. 2.2), regarding religiously motivated limits on the sale of alcohol, or via ‘Kezban (explanation of the term in Section 4.1) Tayyip’, concerning AKP’s ban on public displays of affection (Image 19, see App. 2.2). Again, this indicates that the Gezi protestors were not hostile towards Islam, with a group called the ‘anti-capitalist Muslims’ having, for instance, also joined the protests. In an interview with Hürriyet Daily News, the anti-capitalist Muslim leader made clear that the protestors, who envisaged a new approach towards Islam, invited his group to break the fast together at Taksim Square under the open sky (Yinanç, 2013). Nonetheless, apart from previously outlined, various non-hierarchical and personal appellations of the PM as well as intertextualities to pop-cultural themes (which Erdoğan has also been incorporated into) three texts deserve more particular focus, I find, as they help to shed light on the ways in which the protestors directed themselves against the discursive representation of political Islam.

First, one tweet illustratively states that the ‘marginals’ are ‘playing volleyball at Taksim Square’ (Tweet 18, see App. 2.1). In another text, a governmental official, possibly even Erdoğan, is paraphrased, connotatively clarifying that the ‘capulçu’ are not like ‘innocent babies’ (Tweet 20, see App. 2.1). Finally, a graffiti image depicts a street tag showing ‘Everyday I’m capuling’ (Image 9, see App. 2.2).
To make sense of these three seemingly unrelated communicative events, it should be clarified that, in the course of the protests, PM Erdoğan referred to the protestors as ‘capulcu’ – as looters or scavengers – and as ‘marginal groups’ (Güngör, 2013; Unknown Author, 2013). Yet, instead of taking these labels as an insult, the protestors wholeheartedly accepted these labels, calling themselves capulcu and ‘marginals’. Especially concerning the former, the protestors showed a great sense of creativity. For example, the jazz choir of Boğaziçi University performed a song at Gezi park in which they melodically asked ‘Are you a capulcu?’ (Boğaziçi Caz Korusu, 2013). The conjugation of the word capulcu into the verb ‘capuling’ and its usage in association with a famous pop song equally highlights that originally denunciatory slander was turned upside down by the protestors, as they prided themselves on that label (Image 9, see App. 2.2).

As I perceive it, the all-encompassing discursive presence of PM Erdoğan, whose hegemonic confidence appeared to remain undisputed despite more than 3.5 million citizens having taken to the streets, led the protestors to draw on unconventional ways of expressing their counter-conduct. The critical examination of authoritarian societal structures by the capulcu hence reached levels of a, in Bakhtin’s words, ‘ritualized rebellion’ – already ascertained by Yeğenoglu - against the PM (Yeğenoglu, 2013). Negating the conservative, neo-liberal and polarizing discursive practices of political Islam, the protestors hence expressed their seemingly hopeless opposition to Erdoğan’s authoritarian imposition of political Islam’s discursive nodal points. Due to a creative and ironic take on the very discourse, it is hence finally shown that the Gezi discourse can be regarded as, in Fairclough’s words, a ‘new inter-discursive mix’ (Fairclough, 2003).

The Gezi Discourse as a cosmopolitan European Discourse?

As we review the discursive practices of the Gezi protestors for its cosmopolitan features, we can observe a number of coherences between both discourses: To begin with, the humanist traits of this post-Kemalist discourse can be found in two communicative events. For instance, one protestors described that the atmosphere at Gezi Park was humanist to such an extent that occupants were ‘forcing foods and drinks on one another’ (Tweet 10, see App. 2.1). The non-discursive act of food-sharing was additionally addressed in the following tweet whereby occupants presented a box filled with food designated for the ‘fellow’ protestors (Tweet 11, see App. 2.1). Aside from that, I already exemplified how the protestors symbolically set a deceased ‘fellow protestor’ – a nominal stranger – on a par with Atatürk. As I see it, these statements certainly indicate that the protest discourse was significantly shaped by humanism which, in return, suggests that the discourse ignored its subjects’ social identities. Be they Laz people, Alevi, Sunnis, Kurds or Turks, the Gezi discourse first and foremost thought of all those heterogeneous groups as humans (Tweet 4, see App. 2.1). Embracing cosmopolitan virtues, such as mutual respect, tolerance or hospitality, the protestors discursively disregarded their and others’ social peculiarities and encountered one another in a humanist spirit. In this respect, they acted truly cosmopolitan, as they rid themselves of their known social affiliation and encountered nominal ‘strangers’ at Gezi Park, shared food with them and lived, temporarily at least, like trees in Nâzım Hikmet’s poem – ‘single and free, but in brotherhood like a forest’ (Tweet 7, see App. 2.1). In the course of Gezi Park’s occupation and protests around Taksim Square, the urban commons of Istanbul – and soon of most Turkish cities - became a mecca for

---

14 ‘Everyday, I’m capuling’ as in ‘Everyday, I’m shuffling’ (excerpt from LMFAO’s ‘Party Rock Anthem’)
citizens who felt attracted to these inner-city exiles where the laws and norms of a seemingly authoritarian discourse could temporarily be forgotten. In a cosmopolitan manner, the protestors stoically proclaimed that they wished to be the masters of their own lives and deaths – unaffected by a discourse that would dictate them how many children they should have, not to drink or not to protest. Hence, the Gezi discourse is deemed to be cosmopolitan in that regard as well, as it purports, though understated in the texts, individualist thinking. The protestors hereby expressed their thoughts, as was shown, via social media – ‘global media’ in Nussbaum’s words – and made their experiences visible for a ‘global audience’. Thereby, world-citizens were instigated to do what they can to help their Turkish brothers and sisters, as protestors were confronted with human rights violations. Via social media, the cosmopolitan Gezi discourse thereby transcended the national space and became global, reminding the ‘fellow world-citizen’ to not look away.

During the protests, all the diverse groups also still maintained their particular character – be it as supporters of Fenerbahçe, as anti-capitalist Muslims, university students and so forth. That is, they peacefully mediated their distinct sub-cultures and humanistically stood ‘united in diversity’ – a European microcosm in a manner of speaking. Yet, whether the protestors’ cosmopolitan discursive practices may account to be European discursive practices remain somewhat debatable, as a cosmopolitan hegemony over what constitutes ‘the’ European discourse is contemporarily challenged by other discourses such as Eurocentrism or post-colonialism. If we hence regard the European discourse as mainly being coined by cosmopolitan traits, as has been put forward by scholars such as Jürgen Habermas or Ulrich Beck, then it would be reasonable to conclude that the discursive practices of the protestors were indeed European (Beck et al, 2004; Habermas, 2003). These European discursive practices do not exclusively connote what is inherent to cosmopolitanism, but are instead centered around values such as the rule of law, democratic governance or respect for human rights. However, the communicative events do not indicate any demands for such European values, although the protestors may have certainly favored them. As I perceive it, what the Gezi discourse therefore revealed more clearly was not how European it may have been, but rather how non-European the discourse that it directed itself against was. Responding with the use of brute force and slander of the protestors, the discourse of political Islam thereby connoted more clearly that it does not embrace values regarded as European and hence indirectly put the protest discourse into perspective as a European discourse.

The social meaning of Gezi – Turkey’s shift to post-modernity?

Thus far, it could be observed that the discourse used by the protestors reflected post-Kemalist and cosmopolitan features and more or less leveled itself against the discourse of political Islam. Is it thus reasonable to conclude that the discourse used by the protestors reflected a dialectic between Kemalism and political Islam? First, it should be stressed that the protest discourse was not exclusively (post)-Kemalist or cosmopolitan, but a fragmented internally highly heterogeneous discourse in the abstract. Discourse types such as the environmental discourse, the Kurdish discourse, the discourse used by the anti-capitalist Muslims, the LGBT discourse and many more all constituted fragments of the protest discourse and would therefore all deserve to be subject of analysis. Hereof, the discourse types were also to a varying extent
distributed across the text, although their discursive nodal points, and hence their actual differences, were extensively underemphasized by a common resentment for the PM’s arbitrary and authoritarian political style. Within the social field of Gezi Park and Taksim Square, the discursive practices of the protestors hence included myriads of interactions between different discourse types. In these varying discourses, the protestors thereby, as has been outlined, mainly informed or warned each other. Second, common ground among these many groups was established through mutually perceived governmental arbitrariness regarding, for instance, cultural policies, the command of violent interventions or, how it all began, its negative alteration of the urban image.

Opposition to these ordered acts of the politicized Islamic discourse turned out to be so intense that the protestors were instigated to mediate their sub-cultural distinctions for the sake of humanity. In this humanist spirit, the protestors did, on the one hand, approach Kemalism in a critical and less hierarchic manner – as was exemplified by my post-Kemalist inquiry – and they, on the other hand, expressed their opposition to political Islam in new and creative ways. According to Fairclough, it is these ‘inter-discursive mixes’ that constitute a crucial indicator for cultural and social change (Jørgensen et al, 2002). Third, especially comprising numerous references to - often non-Turkish, popular culture - the protesting ‘Turkish youth’ drew on the discourse of political Islam in an ironic and highly satirical way. Words suddenly changed their meaning, as has been shown by the examples of the ‘çapulçu’ or the ‘marginal’. In the face of an attempted inscription of an Islamic subjectivity, ‘OccupyGezi’ thus constituted a cultural habitus where no boundaries were set to imagination and in which the discourse of political Islam was dealt with in many distinct ways. Overall, it was, however, critically examined, satirized and profaned.

In this social field, the protestors were, in line with Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourses, further positioned as subjects within the discursive structure of Gezi (ibid.). As mentioned above, a protestors could, for instance, be of Kurdish ethnicity, of female sex and a student among other aspects. Therefore, a subject was also more or less part of an ethnic discourse, a gender discourse or a social class discourse within the protest discourse. And, as I added, the subjects were more generally also coined by a post-Kemalist and cosmopolitan discourse. More precisely, subjects were, depending on the discourses that shaped their subjectivity, further expected to act in a particular way. In reference to the example given, a protestors may, for example, favor that the Kurdish minority or women should gain more rights in Turkey, that education should be freely accessible to everyone or that Atatürk should be commemorated, but also critically examined. Correspondingly, subjects were also overdetermined, i.e. a discursive conflict arose for them due to the high number of discourses at play (ibid.). Be it out of political interest, grievances towards the government or mere curiosity: As these subjects came to Gezi Park from May 27th 2013 onwards, the hegemonic discourse of political Islam gave, again with regard to the example given, another subject position to the female, Kurdish student. As she joined the protests, she was also a marginal scavenger – or even a terrorist – according to governmental discursive practices. It is this positioning of subjects within the hegemonic discourse that immensely facilitated group formation, as I perceive it. The labeling of protestors as çapulçu thus also instigated these highly heterogeneous groups to ignore their differences. In turn, Erdogan’s discourse of political Islam followed a ‘logic of equivalence’, as all protestors – irrespective of the extent to which they were involved in the protests – were considered as marauders, marginal groups or terrorists. Through the protests, Turkish society hence drifted
further apart on the secular-Islamic divide, with hegemon Erdogan painting very diverse groups with the same brush.

What hence primarily changed socially through the Gezi protests was that the protest discourse did not reflect the *Kulturkampf*, in terms of a dialectic between political Islam and Kemalism, *per se*. Instead, it could be observed that the protestors addressed Kemalism in novel ways – in a manner that I broadly conceptualized as post-Kemalism. Also bearing cosmopolitan features, the transition to post-Kemalism exacerbated the duality of Turkish society. In other words, within the Turkish nation-state, it seems as if the protestors culturally adopted a post-modern identity, while their politicized Islamic counterpart proved that they rejected this cultural program of (post)-modernity with brute force. Challenging the neo-liberal, politicized Islamic hegemon in a post-Kemalist, cosmopolitan way, the protestors’ identity is therefore most certainly European from a cultural perspective. Though they may have remained skeptical towards political implications of this assumption, such as EU accession, the protestors’ identity – as multi-faceted as it was – generally featured post-modern traits that align with the values and norms emanating from a cosmopolitan European identity. Not only were the protestors post-modern, because they critically and reflexively engaged with their national Kemalist heritage or due to their affinity to the internet and international popular culture, but also because they protested against post-industrial processes that were, among other aspects, heavily put forward by AKP. At the same time, Gezi Park enabled the once apolitical youth to reverse the social impoverishment neo-liberalization had brought upon them and to encounter one another as cosmopolitan individuals. Their cosmopolitanism further won the hearts of European civil society. In that regard, European citizens initiated solidarity protests and EU member states and institutions harshly criticized the excessive use of violence. It could be seen that hegemonic discourses within Europe did not label the protestors as *capulçu*, but to a varying extent as one of their own. Hence, I find it reasonable to conclude that the protestors of Gezi Park can, in their post-modern and cosmopolitan mindset, be definitely regarded as an ‘extended European family’.

**Concluding Remarks**

With the discursive practices of the Gezi protestors having initially been conceptualized as secular, pluralist as well as humorous, my analysis of 40 communicative events showed that, on the textual level, secular or pluralist statements were heavily underemphasized. The protestors’ conversational agenda was hereby, on the one hand, set towards the ‘fellow protestor’ who was mainly informed and cautioned about the latest incidents on the streets of Istanbul. Neither did they straightforwardly demand that the secular foundations of the Republic must be defended nor did their many statements reflect views or opinions that appeared to fundamentally differ from one another. What overweighed was a humorous, yet critical, conversational agenda against Erdogan and his henchmen of the police. Characterized by highly figurative and intertextual acts of speech, the texts especially ironized the former in a nonhierarchical manner. Though also ironized, the authorities’ crackdown on the protests was, regarding instances of language use, much rather juxtaposed to the protestors’ peaceful acts (of speech).

With secular paroles having been underemphasized during the protests, the central theme of Kemalist discursive practices was hence not a prioritized subject of the protestors, although
Kemalists more or less defined secularism differently. Much rather did the protestors allude to nationalist elements of the Kemalist discourse in their own way. While the modern values embedded in the discourse put forward by Atatürk were commemorated, its elitist and authoritative outlook were somewhat critically examined. Having broadly conceptualized this discursive transformation as post-Kemalist, I found that the discursive practices of the protestors can rather be considered as post-Kemalist than Kemalist.

Directed against the conservative, neo-liberal and polarizing discourse of political Islam, the post-Kemalist protestors on that account projected their resentments onto their PM – the main discursive emitter so to say. Not only through textual figuration and satire did the protestors discursively move in on Erdoğan and his entourage, but also by drawing on the discourse of political Islam in their own way. Erdoğan’s slander of the protestors thus became part of an inter-discursive mix in which the protestors gladly embraced the PM’s discursive labels and began referring to themselves as capulçu for instance.

Additionally, the protest discourse mostly revealed to bear cosmopolitan traits due to its humanist, culturally-mediating and somewhat individualist statements. In this regard, the discourse aligned with the so-called European discourse of cosmopolitanism. Put forward via social media, the Gezi discourse transcended the boundaries of the Turkish nation-state and raised awareness internationally about the mistreatment of citizens.

Regarding the protests’ social consequences, i.e. the hypothesized dialectic reflection of Kemalism and political Islam by the protest discourse, it was first adverted to the still highly internally heterogeneous nature of the Gezi discourse. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical objections on the positions of subjects and group formation hereby turned out to be of great aid to draw conclusions on the social consequences. Notably, the ‘logic of equivalence’ followed by the politicized Islamic discourse seemed to be the decisive factor for why so many diverse, even mutually hostile groups bonded. Positioning the protesting subjects as capulçu concomitant with an excessive use of force, the discourse of political Islam hence actively contributed to protest groups ignoring their differences. Culturally, the act of protesting more or less enabled citizens to be post-modern, European citizens through their critical examination of the hegemonic discourse (political Islam) as well as the past one (Kemalism). Therefore, the dialectics, and hence the Kulturkampf, was reflected by the protest discourse, as citizens – vis-à-vis a seemingly authoritarian discourse of political Islam - redefined the secular ideology of Kemalism in a post-modern way.
Conclusion: Post-Gezi Turkey and Europe

One year after Turkey was stirred up by the protests, the erstwhile ‘Gezi genie’ that was let out of the bottle by the uprising, seems to have faded away more or less. A cosmopolitan, post-modern renaissance of Kemalism, as has been ascertained, did occur through the protests. In this regard, the protest discourse did not show a dialectics of Kemalism and political Islam *per se*, but rather a highly diversified, critical re-examination of the Kemalist discourse. As was shown, the protestors advocated a modern definition of secularism and engaged with elements of national culture in new ways. Moreover, during the protests, secular or pluralist statements were, rather contrary to what was hypothesized, underemphasized. Vis-à-vis Öncü’s claim that the Gezi community was coined by a cultural or ideological neutrality, my findings do, in spite of underemphasizing essentially Kemalist statements, negate Öncü’s assertion: Instead, the protestors’ discursive practices primarily tended to inter-discursively criticize and satirize the discourse of political Islam, projected onto the PM. On the other hand, group formation was deemed to have been immensely facilitated by the governmental ‘logic of equivalence’ which incited protestors to ignore their differences. The government’s harsh and equated management of the protests has hereby put Mardin’s observation into a new light, as it is not only secular parties that failed to establish ties with the rural constituency, but also an Islamic conservative party like AKP that failed to bond with a secular, post-Kemalist youth (Mardin, 1973). In this respect, my findings comply with Mardin’s center-periphery paradigm, as contradicting notions of culture have not been taken into consideration by the Islamic conservative power-elites. Socio-culturally at least, the historical disintegration of the center and the periphery hence continues.

Additionally, the protest discourse failed to seed a strong, extra-parliamentary opposition. In post-Gezi Turkey, the experience of occupation and protest did rather solidify itself within the Turkish urban youth who developed democratic sensibilities (Yeğenoglu, 2013). For instance, increased political interest and participation could be noted, such as the establishment of neighborhood forums or voluntary poll assistance (Letsch, 2014). Despite an attempt to routinize the uprising’s ‘charisma’ into a political party, also post-Gezi demonstrations did not enjoy a clientele as large as after the AKP-controlled Istanbul Municipality gave orders to uproot the first trees at Gezi Park (Kazim, 2013). Yet, the funeral processions and subsequent demonstrations against the death of a teenager in March 2014, who fell into a coma during a police attack throughout the Gezi protests, were attended by hundreds of thousands (The Guardian, 2014). Still, the numerical significance of the Gezi protests remained unique, as a far-reaching corruption scandal in December 2013 or the censorship of YouTube and Twitter in March 2014 did not spark comparable turmoil (Scott, 2014; The New York Times, 2013).

To the contrary, the discourse of political Islam maintained and even expanded its hegemonic status. In fact, the protestors’ use of inter-discursive mixes, whereby they, among other aspects, referred to themselves as çapulcu, took an ironically tragic turn: In several May 2013 show trials, more than 250 protestors were charged for disobeying laws on demonstrations, for harming police forces and for ‘capuling’ (Aljazeera News, 2014). In this way, the discourse of political Islam again presented its hegemony, as its interpretation of the protestors asserted and institutionalized itself within the Turkish nation-state. Notwithstanding this, AKP reached a landslide victory in the March 2014 local elections. Due to a constitutional change, the Turkish
people further elected PM Erdoğan as their new president (with wider discretionary power) in August 2014 (Letesch, 2014). In the light of Turkey’s Kulturkampf, these developments indicate a pivotal immersion of, what Öncü framed as, the ‘laic-Islamic divide’ (Öncü, 2013). From a discursive stance, the balance of power is now strongly skewed towards the discourse of political Islam. As the politicized Islamic power-eldites are not only enabled to institutionalize their interpretation of ‘good governance’, but also their interpretation of political and civic rights. Throughout the glory days of the Kemalist discourse, in contrast, Kemalist power-eldites were able to institutionalize their discursive tenets. Nationalism, secularism and elitism, as I conceptualized, constituted the hegemonic norms until AKP rose to power. What took place now, however, was the reverse. Post-Gezi incidents, such as the ‘Gezi trials’ or Erdoğan’s bid and election for the presidency, hence manifested the final ‘hegemonization’ of political Islam. The ‘Gezi trials’ or the aforementioned censorship of YouTube and Twitter further indicate that Islamic conservatives now also attempt to edge their secular, post-Kemalist opposition away from political activism instead of, as distinguished from their Kemalist predecessors, including them in a pluralist way (Kaya, 2012). With Kaya having identified majoritarian and exclusionary policies to constitute the root of Turkey’s Kulturkampf, the non-pluralist extension of discretionary powers on the Islamic conservatives’ side will, as my findings have also underlined, deepen social cleavages in Turkey.

In this regard, the Gezi protests can be put in perspective as the last ‘secular stand’ against the implementation of, as I outlined, AKP’s discursive agenda of conservatization, neoliberlization and polarization. This ‘final stand’ hereby also provided an alternative definition of Kemalism that, contrary to past experiences, did not emanate from Kemalist power-eldites such as the bureaucracy or the military. Instead, it was a discourse I broadly conceptualized as post-Kemalism. It arose in a bottom-up fashion and was commemorative of Atatürk’s democratic legacy, as Gezi Park and Taskim Square were adorned by Turkish flags and banners of the founding father (Öncü, 2013). However, the Turkish youth and their discourse also criticized Atatürk more or less for his rigid definition of modernity, as in his attempt to completely rid the newly established Republic from its allegedly ‘backward’ Ottoman past. Subsequent Kemalist administrations also edged a significant faction of Turkish civil society away from politics which constituted at least as much of a cultural divide as the aftermath of the Gezi protests has shown. Although my post-Kemalist conceptualization of the protest discourse is still kept rather general and within the scope of the texts under study, a random sample of other texts, I find, is likely to come to similar conclusions.

It seems, in fact, as if history repeated itself, with a non-pluralist political style attempting to suppress a new generation from making itself heard. As much as the Erdoğan administration was praised within and outside of Turkey for its economic and democratic reforms, the crackdown of the Gezi protests earmarked a watershed in EU – Turkey relations. During and after the protests, EU institutions and member states’ governments repeatedly rebuked Erdoğan for his non-compliance with the European political and human rights discourse (McElroy, 2013). This, on a side-note, even caused diplomatic tensions between Germany and Turkey, after the Turkish minister for EU affairs Egemen Bağış made a threat against Chancellor Merkel for her criticism of police brutality. Hereof, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle even labelled Bağış’ statements as distinctively anti-European (Der Spiegel, 2013). Generally, European citizens condemned violations against, for instance, the freedom to assemble or
freedom of expression (Tugal, 2013). The cosmopolitan discourse advocated by the protestors thereby allied with this European discourse on political and human rights – a cosmopolitan discourse (Beck, 2004). It hence became clear that a discursive diversion did not only occur within Turkey, but also internationally, as European political and civil society became estranged of Erdoğan’s ‘new Turkey’. In this regard, the EU is confronted with two choices, as I perceive it: On the one hand, the EU may proceed with the status quo by maintaining a privileged, economic partnership, while its institutions or politicians may repeatedly admonish the Erdoğan administration for his maltreatment of opposition and violation of European political and civic rights. Less likely, the EU could also, in the light of future violations, actively side with the ‘post-Kemalist opposition’ by, for instance, making the signing of future economic agreements dependent on progress in pluralist policies on the part of the government and suspension of punishments for protestors. Yet, a move towards pluralist and democratic consolidation actually manifested itself in Erdoğan’s recent inaugural address in which he strove to be the president of all Turks – be they supporters or opponents (Letsch, 2014). In that respect, a slight gleam of hope remains that, in the future, one bismillah will be equal to, not a million, but one tweet.
References


DER SPIEGEL (2013). German-Turkish Spat: Berlin summons Turkish ambassador over Merkel Criticism. Website retrieved on 22-08-2014 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/harsh-criticism-of-merkel-berlin-summonsturkish-ambassador-a-907122.html


Radikal (2013). Başbakan Erdoğan: Bir Besmele Milyonlarca tweet’e bedeldir. Website retrieved on 30-06-2014 from


Bibliography


Appendix

Appendix 1.1.

Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensions model to conduct a CDA

Appendix 1.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Discursive items</th>
<th>Textual indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The discourse of the Gazi protesters</td>
<td>Pluralist texts</td>
<td>Statements that express different opinions/statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular texts</td>
<td>Statements for non-intervention of Islamic policies in ‘private affairs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanist texts</td>
<td>Statements that resemble existing territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kemalist discourse</td>
<td>Nationalist texts</td>
<td>Statements explaining elements of Kemalist cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular texts</td>
<td>Statements for non-intervention of Islamic policies in ‘private affairs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elitist texts</td>
<td>Statements in which an alleged superiority of Turks is denied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The discourse of political Islam</td>
<td>Conservative texts</td>
<td>Statements advocating Islamic cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neo-liberal texts</td>
<td>Statements undermining Islamic cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policing texts</td>
<td>Statements that buttress or undermine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cosmopolitan discourse</td>
<td>Humanist texts</td>
<td>Statements that prioritize the humane,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culturally-mediating texts</td>
<td>Statements in which respect and tolerance for cultural diversity is expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individualist texts</td>
<td>Statements that stress the worths of individual autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2.1.

20 Tweets retrieved at random via the Twitter Advanced Search tool using the hashtags #OccupyGezi #DirenGezi #DirenGeziParki from May 27th to June 15th 2013

Tweet 1 (transl.): ‘Together with the Çarşı group, we are forcing us to Harbiye Square’

Tweet 2 (transl.): ‘Share the Wi-Fi passwords, let everyone know’
Tweet 3 (transl.): ‘Emergency! We need more gas masks for our brothers in the clashes’

Tweet 4 (transl.): ‘What is at Taksim you may ask? Right-wing people, leftists, fans of Fenerbahçe, fans of Galatasaray, fans of Beşiktaş, Laz people, Alevi, Sunnis, Kurds, there are Turks. There is still hope.’
Tweet 5: ‘Polis must stop shooting innocent people! Istanbul stay strong!’

Tweet 6 (transl.): ‘The Republic’s youth at Taksim’
Tweet 7 (transl.): ‘To live, free and single like a tree, but in brotherhood like a forest! – Nazim Hikmet’

Tweet 8 (transl.): ‘2:45 a.m. at Gümüşsuyu: If you have functioning masks and can stay calm! Go and get help! Tear gas has struck the infirmary and there are wounded people!’
Tweet 9 (transl.): ‘Commemorated of Iskenderun’s Abdullah Cömert in front of the Atatürk monument. At this commemoration there was no gas, no stones, there was only a democratic response.’ (Banner in the picture: Immortal Abdullah Cömert)

Tweet 10 (transl.): ‘If a fight breaks out at Gezi Park, then it is because people are overwhelmingly sharing food and drinks which describes the humanist atmosphere there.’
Tweet 11 (transl.): ‘There is a foodbox on our tables today for the solidarity. Thanks for being there’

Tweet 12 (transl.): ‘The only weapons these people have are books’
Tweet 13 (transl.): ‘You crack me up HALK TV, super move’

Tweet 14 (transl.): ‘There are Kemalists who do not know that Mustafa Kemal got rid of the name Mustafa because it was a prophet’s name and changed Kemal to Kamal because the name Kemal was Arabic’
Tweet 15: ‘This is the field hospital area. Covered in gas.’

Tweet 16 (transl.): ‘The mothers who were told to leave reunited with their children at Taksim. Brave and honorable mothers like these’
Tweet 17: ‘Istanbul governor calls moms to ‘call their sons home’. Moms come to Gezi instead. Incredible.’

Tweet 18 (transl.): ‘The marginals play volleyball at Taksim’
Tweet 19 (transl.): ‘This child’s tear will be the cause of your drowning, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’

Tweet 20 (transl.): ‘They try to show that society’s criminals is the police, that works for peace, and that the marauders are like innocent babies’
Appendix 2.2.

Image 1 (transl.): ‘We do not want a Prime Minister who gets high on fascism – The stoned youth’

Image 2 (transl.): ‘The revolution will not be televised!’
Image 3 (transl.): ‘Tayyip, you pissed against the walls of a mosque!!’

Image 4 (transl.): ‘This tear gas is just awesome, my friend!’
Image 5: ‘Tayyip, Winter is coming!’

Image 6 (transl.): ‘Police, sell sesame-buns! Live honorably!’

Image 7 (transl.): ‘Dying will be forbidden the day freedom comes’
Image 8 (transl.): ‘Cheers to you, Tayyip!’

Image 9: ‘Everyday I’m capuling’

Image 10 (transl.): ‘You can’t laugh with Gülen!’
Image 11 (transl.): ‘Red Hot Chili Tayyip’

Image 12 (transl.): ‘Welcome to Fight Club, Tayyip’

Image 13 (transl.): ‘Enough is enough. I’m calling the cops’
Image 14 (transl.): ‘Resign Tayyip!’

Image 15 (transl.): ‘TOMA-Water, Pepper, Orangaange’

Image 16 (transl.): ‘Nothing will be as it was before! Wipe away your tears!’
Image 17 (transl.): ‘Brother Police, you literally bring tears to our eyes!’

Image 18 (transl.): ‘You mess with a generation that beats the cops in Grand Theft Auto!’

Image 19 (transl.): ‘Tayyip, the village-girl’
Image 20 (transl.): ‘Tear gas makes the skin more beautiful’