




MASTER THESIS

**Ideological Coherence Among Right-Wing
Eurosceptic Parties in the European Parliament**

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Abstract

The last European election of 2014 resulted in a Eurosceptic surge: parties skeptical of the European Union, both on the left and right wings of the Parliament, saw a dramatic increase of their number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and even won unprecedented victories in countries such as the United-Kingdom, France or Denmark. The results were particularly good for right-wing Eurosceptic parties.

The goal of this thesis is to characterize this Eurosceptic right. Who is part of it? What unites it, what makes it different from the rest of the European Parliament? And what divides it, what makes it more complex than a uniform bloc of parties?

To answer these questions, I use the data obtained from the development of the voting advice application EUVox. A number of coders were asked to position European parties on several issue statements in order to create the application. I use their answers to position the parties on a two-dimensional political space, created by combining issue statements together, and to find the characteristics of the Eurosceptic right.

The first finding is that it is mainly comprised of the European Conservative and Reformists group, of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group and of the right-wing non-attached members. There are however a few exceptions. These parties have in common an opposition to further European integration and an overall right-wing position on a general left-right dimension that includes issues such as the economy, law and order, immigration and social issues.

There is not, however, a uniform group of Eurosceptic right-wing parties. The results of my research lead me to divide them in three categories. The most Eurosceptic of these is a 'EU-rejecting' group that opposes EU integration on its principle. It is mostly comprised of parties generally considered as far-right. A second group is called 'eurocritical'. These parties are opposed to the practice of EU cooperation but not to its principle. They oppose the euro, and support more centrist economic policies than the 'rejecting' group. Finally, there is a smaller group that is less critical of the functioning of the EU but still opposes further integration in the current context. I call them 'eurorealists'.

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Abbreviations

ALDE	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (EP political group)
ECR	European Conservative and Reformists Group (EP political group)
EAF	Europe Alliance for Freedom (proposed EP political group)
EFD	Europe of Freedom and Democracy (former EP political group)
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EP political group)
EP	European Parliament
EPP	Group of the European People's Party (EP political group)
Greens/EFA	Group of the The Greens - European Free Alliance (EP political group)
GUE/NGL	Confederal group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (EP political group)
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NI	<i>Non-Inscrits</i> (non-attached members of the European Parliament)
S&D	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
VAA	Voting advice application

I also refer a lot to national political parties. Their abbreviations may be confusing and a bit mysterious. As a rule of thumb, I try to give the full name of the party and its country of origin before using any abbreviation. The full list of parties and abbreviations can also be found in annex 1.

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Introduction

The last European election of 2014 resulted in a Eurosceptic surge: parties skeptical of the European Union, both on the left and right wings of the Parliament, saw a dramatic increase of their number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and even won unprecedented victories in countries such as the United-Kingdom, France or Denmark. The results were particularly good for the Eurosceptic right, that I define as starting from the moderately Eurosceptic or 'eurocritical' parties, gathered around the British Conservatives in the European Conservative and Reformists group, and including every party on their right. However, a recurrent question with Eurosceptic parties is whether they will be able to work together to bring some change within the EU, or even dismantle it. It has always been difficult for these parties, often stirred by conflicting nationalist ideologies, to agree on what to do with the EU. In the favorable context of the 8th legislature of the European Parliament starting after the last election, it remains to be seen whether this situation can change. This leads to the following research question:

What unites and divides the Eurosceptic right after the European election of 2014?

Theoretical background

Comparison of political groups in the European Parliament

As noted by Bressanelli (2013), the Treaty of Lisbon makes the functioning of the EU more similar to the traditional mode of representative democracy adopted by member states at the national level. It recognizes the role of political parties at the European level, as they 'contribute to forming a political awareness and to express the will of citizens of the Union' (art. 8.4). The new circumstances framed by the Treaty provide Europarties with a mandate to assume a new role, enabling them to campaign (Skrzypek, 2014). In particular, Members of the European Parliament now elect the President of the European Commission, on proposition of the European Council (art. 9.D.7). Being allowed to indefinitely reject the candidates put forward by the Council, MEPs have interpreted this new power as a right to choose the President of the European Commission themselves, with little regard for the European Council. In practice, this led Europarties to nominate their frontrunners (the German term *Spitzenkandidaten* was widely used in the media) for the position (sometimes after conducting primaries), to campaign in their names and to present their frontrunner as the future President of the Commission in case of victory. After the election, the main parties quickly agreed that Jean-Claude Juncker, the candidate of the victorious European People's Party, would be the only acceptable President of the Commission. Despite opposition coming from Eurosceptics and resistance from the European Council, MEPs successfully managed a grab of power that was not predicted by the Lisbon Treaty. This election thus increased the power of the European Parliament and of Europarties. There is no doubt that the *Spitzenkandidaten* are here to stay. At the next elections, political groups will be more prepared for this process, the struggle to win the frontrunner positions within the Europarties will become more controversial and the candidates are likely to receive more media attention. Therefore, Europarties have more power than they ever had and this power is likely to increase, making it more relevant than ever to study the composition of the European Parliament.

However, Europarties cannot be strictly compared to national parties. The parties for which European citizens vote in their national constituencies are not the party groups that determine the policies of the European Parliament (Rose & Borz, 2013). Parties compete nationally; each member state is a separate constituency with its own party system, and it is only after the election that MEPs aggregate in political groups in the Parliament. It should be noted that these groups often differ slightly from registered Europarties, but they are almost always the unit of analysis in studies of the EP, even if they are sometimes wrongly labelled as Europarties. Each national party determines the context of its own program, and does so by giving preference to the national context with little regard for its multinational political group (Sigalas & Pollak, 2012). Moreover, national parties may still have a tendency to view supranational groups as irrelevant or potentially disruptive (Lodge & Herman, 1982). On the other hand, there are strong incentives for MEPs to join a group. Groups receive financial funding and other resources such as office and administrative assistance, and they open access to positions in the different committees of the Parliament. Therefore, national parties are expected to aggregate within political groups, even if there is ideological disagreement among them. Several authors have studied the position and the internal coherence of EP groups with different methods. Some analyzed recorded roll call votes to establish the extent to which MEPs vote together in a group (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005). Other have used national parties programs (Bressanelli, 2013; Rose & Borz, 2013) to assess the policy coherence within the transnational groups. However, the first of these methods may have a tendency to exaggerate the coherence of the groups, as voting cohesion is boosted by party discipline (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). Bressanelli (2013) also remarked, that contrary to members of groups in national parliaments, members of groups in the EP are not individual MEPs, but rather national parties (even if individual membership is possible). Therefore, coherence of the political groups is the policy congruence of the national member parties.

The other aspect of any study of political parties (or groups) is the competitiveness among them, often conceptualized as the difference between them on the relevant issue dimensions (Wolinetz, 2006). Given the particularities of the European Union, Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006) expect politics in the EU to be more complex and multidimensional than national politics, and thus understanding the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament should be an important step forward in understanding the politics of the EU. The most obvious dimension is the traditional left-right scale. The division between left and right is a well-established dimension of party competition and is frequently used as a proxy for the most salient political conflicts in Europe (Benoit & Laver, 2006). Some argue that national parties choose their EP groups affiliations largely on the basis of this left-right ideological conflict (Lo, Proksch, & Gschwend, 2014). Besides this dimension, another dimension is often added in studies of the European Parliament, representing the parties' position on EU integration, or in other words support or rejection of the EU (Bressanelli, 2013; Hix, 1999; Hix et al., 2006). This second dimension plays a more important role in the EP as voting is more multidimensional than in national parliaments (McElroy & Benoit, 2007). It has been argued that this sovereignty-integration dimension often undermines the cohesion of the Europarties. The Left-Right dimension has been sometimes divided in more detailed dimensions. For example, Rose and Borz (2013) studied the positions of the EP groups on five dimensions: EU integration, permissiveness, socio-economic welfare, green policies and immigration. Bressanelli (2013) identified eight dimensions:

liberal society, law and order, economic liberalization, financial policy, welfare state, environment, immigration and anti/pro EU.

Euroscepticism

It is commonly agreed that people still perceive the European elections as national elections of second importance, as shown by the low-turnout. One main reason is that many have the feeling that they do not produce a tangible outcome. According to the second order elections theory (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), since stakes are perceived as minor compared to general elections and the electorate feels less constrained in its electoral choices, European Parliament elections can be used to punish traditional parties, making them more favorable to opposition and protest parties. However the Lisbon Treaty introduced important changes that were meant to have an effect on these attitudes, with the larger objective of politicizing more the Union. Given that it was not ratified in all member states before the election of 2009, the election of 2014 was the first EP election to take place under this new framework. However the all-time low turnout and the strong performance of Eurosceptic parties show that those who expected these changes to be favorable to pro-EU parties can be disappointed.

Euroscepticism is of course not a new phenomenon: it has always been the corollary of increased integration. There is strong evidence that Euroscepticism was an important phenomenon even in the most pro-European countries as early as in 1992, with the complicated ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in several countries. The rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 acted as a reminder that European integration can be rejected even in core EU countries. These facts tend to be forgotten by those who explain populism and Euroscepticism by pointing at the recent economic turndown in Europe (Mounk, 2014).

Attitudes of political parties towards the process of European integration have attracted growing attraction from party scholars. Several have studied what unites and differentiates Eurosceptic parties. However, the diversity of the opposition to European integration has always been important. As noted by Taggart (1998), in addition to specifically anti-EU parties, the issue has been taken up by 'new politics' parties, neo-fascist parties, agrarian and 'new populist' parties, bringing together parties from across the political spectrum. Vasilopoulou (2009) identified three types of Euroscepticism after conceptualizing the positions on Europe as a three-fold dimension, namely positions on first the principle, second the practice and third the future of EU cooperation. From this, the three types of Euroscepticism are the following: first, the 'rejecting' type comprising parties against all abovementioned dimensions, second the 'conditional' type containing parties not against the principle of EU cooperation but against its practice and its future, third the 'compromising' type including parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU cooperation but against further cooperation. In accounting for this diversity, the author concludes that first, the parties displaying strong authoritarian values reject Europe regardless of their economic policy. Second, the parties in the two other types support more centrist and capitalist economic policies, and display less authoritarian values. According to Poli (2014), most Eurosceptics can be seen as soft populists, not expressly antidemocratic. Indeed many of them favor more direct democracy at both the national and EU level. There is also a clear difference between the mainstream Eurosceptic parties, running to dismantle the EU, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the French National Front (FN) or the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and the 'eurocritic' parties who merely want to change its

functioning, such as the British Conservatives, the True Finns, Alternative for Germany (AfD) or the Italian Five Stars Movement (M5S). This difference reflects the gap between those critical of the EU project as a whole, and those critical of the effectiveness of its institutions. Another common point of disagreement among Eurosceptic parties concerns the deep ideological differences on economic policies, which may harm chances of cooperation. It would be hard for these parties to agree on a common exit strategy because their monetary and economic recipes differ a lot: the pro free-market ideology of the UKIP is for example hardly compatible with the statist preferences of the FN. Besides, divergence between the Northern Europe anti-establishment parties, representing wealthy countries, and Southern Europe parties confronted by the EU austerity policies are also an obstacle, and may hamper the possibility for any agreement on economic policies.

Conti and Memoli (2012) found that Euroscepticism is an attitude to be found among radical parties. However they also found that unconditional opposition to the EU is more marked on the extreme-right, while the extreme-left shows a broader acceptance of the EU since the late 1990s. Left-wing parties are more active in presenting proposals for reforming the EU and are also demanding an extension of competences of the EU in social policy. On the other hand, the main request of the extreme-right is a shift of powers from the EU to the nation state (yet with exceptions across countries and at different points in time). The authors then conclude that if Euroscepticism is defined as a fierce opposition to the current trajectory of the EU, both extremes can then be classified as Eurosceptics. However, since the far-left concentrates more than the far-right on how to transform the Union, this attitude could also be defined as 'eurocriticism' rather than Euroscepticism, i.e. criticizing the EU without being opposed to it.

Groups in the European Parliament after the 2014 election

The political groups of the European Parliament were constituted shortly after the election, on July 1st, when the inaugural session of the 8th Parliament took place. As of September 2014, there are currently 7 political groups in the European Parliament. Table 1 sums up the repartition of MEPs by group.

The EPP (European People's Party) remained the most important group with 221 seats, however its members cannot be fully satisfied since they lost 59 seats compared to the previous Parliament. This group defines itself as a center-right pro-European political family. It comprises politicians of Christian Democratic and conservative orientation. It is one of the oldest EU political groups and has been the largest group in the European Parliament since 1999. As such it provided the last two Presidents of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker. In the European Council, 14 out of 28 Heads of State and Government belong to the EPP family.

The S&D (Group of Socialists and Democrats) lost 5 seats and was granted 191 seats. It is the political group of the Party of European Socialists and has been the dominant center-left force since the dawn of modern European cooperation. It was founded in 1953 and was the largest group of the Parliament until 1999. It provided several Presidents of the Commission, such as Jacques Delors. Its largest members are the ruling Democratic Party of Italy, the German Social-Democrats and the British Labour Party.

Abbreviation	Full name	MEPs	MEPs (previous Parliament)
EPP	Group of European People's Party (Christian Democrats)	221	265
S&D	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	191	196
ECR	European Conservative and Reformists Group	70	57
ALDE	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	67	83
GUE-NGL	Confederal group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left	52	35
Greens-EFA	Group of the The Greens - European Free Alliance	50	57
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group	48	31
Non-attached		52	33

Table 1: Political groups of the European Parliament in September 2014

The elections were a good performance for the ECR (European Conservative and Reformists), which was created around the British Conservatives and the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) during the previous legislature. With 70 members, the group gained 13 seats and managed to attract relatively important parties from other groups such as the Belgium N-VA (*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* - New Flemish Alliance, from the ALDE), the True Finns and the Danish People's Party (all from the EFD), as well as the newcomer Alternative for Germany. It is now the third-largest group in the Parliament. It is a conservative, anti-federalist group and is more Eurosceptic than the two largest groups. It campaigns for urgent reform of the European Union.

With 67 members, the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) lost 16 seats and its position as the third-largest group of the Parliament to the ECR. It is a centrist, liberal and pro-European group. It supports neoliberal policies, European integration and the European single market, but is more diverse than in the past, including now members from different centrist traditions, such as social-liberal and Nordic agrarian parties.

The left-wing group GUE-NGL (Confederal group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left) increased its number of MEPs by 17, to 52 seats. It is sometimes considered as Eurosceptic but more exactly, it is committed to integration but opposed to the present European political structure. Established in 1995, it comprises political parties of mostly socialist and communist orientation. Its current largest member is Syriza (Greece – Coalition of the Radical Left).

The Greens/EFA (European Free Alliance) group contains green and regionalist parties. It consists of two distinct European political parties: the European Green Party and the European Free Alliance, representing stateless nations, regionalist and minority political interests. The group lost 7 seats in 2014, with 50 members. .

The results were very satisfying for the EFDD (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, formerly EFD). Despite losing several member parties, the group created around the UKIP of Nigel Farage managed to attract several smaller parties such as the Sweden Democrats but above all created an unexpected alliance with the Italian Five Star Movement. With 48 MEPs (+17 compared to the previous legislature), this an undeniable success for the EFDD. It is 'the' Eurosceptic group of the Parliament.

The big question on the right of the European Parliament was whether there would be two anti-EU groups; a 'moderate' one headed by the UKIP and Nigel Farage and a 'far-right' one headed by the French Front National and Marine Le Pen. Both parties were in strong positions after winning unprecedented victories in their countries. Marine Le Pen failed to create a group after the proposed EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) group, only composed of the French FN, the Dutch PVV, the Austrian FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), the Belgian VB (*Vlaams Belang* – Flemish Interest) and the Italian LN (*Lega Nord* – Northern League) was unable to fulfill the requirement to form a group (at least 25 MEPs coming from 7 different countries). This resulted in an increasing number of non-attached MEPs (52, +19 compared to the previous legislature).

Who, in this Parliament, can be considered as belonging to the Eurosceptic right? The *a priori* definition I will use includes all parties belonging to the ECR group, which can be considered as moderately Eurosceptic. It also includes the EFDD group, as well as all the Non-Attached members (the abbreviation NI, from the French *Non-Inscrits* is generally used in the European Parliament), at the exception of the MEPs of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE – 2 MEPs) and Die PARTEI (Germany – 1 MEP), which is a satirical party. Therefore, when studying the non-attached parties, I will sometimes exclude these parties. Annex 1 lists the parties affiliated with each political group in the Parliament.

Methods

Trying to answer the research question could of course be done in many different ways. The method I chose is to first determine what characterizes the Eurosceptic right in respect with the rest of the European Parliament, and then calculate the coherence of these parties on different issues. Trying to find what characterizes a group of parties means that I have to compare them to the rest: indeed what unites them is what makes them different from the rest. Thus if I want to know what makes a group special, I have to study all parties in the EP, and then single out the group I want to study and compare it to the rest.

1/ Determining the position of parties and EP groups in the political space

The data I used comes from the Voter Advice Application (VAA) EUvox. VAAs offer voting advice on the basis of calculating the ideological congruence between citizens and political actors. EUvox was designed as a VAA covering all the EU countries to advice voters for the European elections of 2014. In order to make a VAA, its creators must first estimate the positions of political parties. There are different methods to do that (Gemenis, 2013b). The EUvox VAA uses a method based on the construction of Likert scales. According to Likert (1932), the measurements of attitudes can be achieved through measuring responses on individual items that are representative of the attitude in question. When this method is applied to political science, the position of political parties is determined on a number of issue statements, using a five-points scale (strongly disagree/disagree/neither agree nor disagree/agree/strongly agree). An example of statement is: 'EU membership is a bad thing for the country'.

Each statement is then assigned to a pre-determined dimension. The underlying idea is that the political competition is structured by a limited set of dimensions, such as economic issues. A party position on a dimension is the average of its answers to the statements related to it. There are different methods to determine what are the actual dimensions of the political space. I use here a deductive method, that is, I decide *a priori* the one that I consider relevant, and then I assign each individual statement to one of them. Therefore there are three steps in the process: (a) positioning the party on individual statements; (b) determining the dimensions of the political space; (c) using the individual statements to position the party on these dimensions.

(a) Positioning the parties on individual statements

To create EUvox, a number of coders were asked to position parties on several issue statements. Twenty-eight statements were common to all EU countries, and a number of additional questions (up to eleven) were varying per country. These twenty-eight stem statements can be found in annex 2. Coders were asked to respond by relying in priority on parties manifestos, and then other sources such as press articles if they could not find the information in the manifestos. They were also requested to justify every answer by quoting the text that led to their decision. The expectation was that coders would actually use what is written in the manifestos, instead of their prior knowledge and their own views on the parties. This differs from an expert survey where experts are asked to position the parties based solely on their own knowledge. However, since the process is not automated and is done by human coders, it is unavoidable that their assumptions and their prior knowledge plays a role in the process. Several coders (five most of the time) did the same task for each country. A moderator then reviewed all the responses in order to

detect mistakes and contradictory results. In a second round, coders could see each other answers as well as the moderator comments, and were allowed to change their own answers. At the end of the process, the responses of the different coders were averaged and the point on the Likert scale closest to the average was kept as the position of the party on a given statement (Gemenis, 2014).

I was a coder for the French, French-speaking Belgian and Luxemburgish parties. Once the EUvox application was released, I was given access to a preliminary version of the aggregated responses among the different coders at the party level, so I could use it for my own research. Gemenis (2013a) discussed several methodological considerations on this coding process, and I will use these considerations to reflect on my own coding process and the difficulties I encountered.

Some issues arise from the phrasing of statements. The use of double-barrelled questions for example, is known to be problematic. Double-barrelled questions are questions that ask for opinion on two different things. This is something I can relate to because determining the position of the parties on some questions was made difficult because of these double-barrelled statements. There are a number of them in the EUVox VAA, but I found two of them to create difficulties in the French context. The first one was statement 5: 'There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of [country] to act independently'. This issue is in general not presented like that in the French context, and the second part of the sentence made it difficult to answer the question. The reason is that parties in favor of a common EU foreign policy would never acknowledge that it would limit the capacity of France to act independently. They seem to consider that there could be both a EU common foreign policy and an unchanged capacity for France to act independently. With such a statement, I had two choices as a coder: either I tried to ignore the second part of the sentence and just considered the statement "there should be a common EU foreign policy" or I considered the whole question. The problem with the second option is that I would have had to say that all French parties disagree, while in reality the main governing parties are actually making quite a lot of efforts to build a EU foreign policy. That did not make much sense to me, and I decided to answer the question as if the second part was missing.

The second problematic double-barrelled statement was issue 14: 'Protecting the environment is more important than fostering economic growth'. While the statement may be clear, it is difficult to answer because most parties do not present the debate in these terms. Even among the Greens, only a small minority would answer 'yes' to this question, but my guess is that, if asked this question directly, all the others would not answer the question. The reason is that the statement seems to consider that there is a trade-off between protecting the environment and fostering economic growth. Most parties would refuse to make a choice and would answer that both are important and both could be done together. Typically, at least in France, they would reply that the changes undertaken to protect the environment would create growth and jobs. In that case, I ended up not really answering the question but answering a question that could be 'How important is the environment for this party?'.

Double-barrelled questions, as expected by the theory, can be problematic for coders. The fact that the EUvox questions are the same for 28 different countries can make them unadapted to the specific electoral context. The two statements above were problematic in the case of France, but probably led to straightforward answers in other questions. It is true that VAA designers may feel the need to present policy alternatives in terms of trade-offs, but if political parties simply deny the existence of this trade-off, coders are left in a grey area. They may just decide not to answer the question, attribute a middle position

to every party, or make their own guess of what the designers actually want to measure, and then answer accordingly. There is no doubt that it undermines inter-coder reliability on these particular issue statements.

Another issue identified with stem statements is the presence of statements that are too general. Using statements that are too specific in conjunction with statements that are too general in a Likert scale is create problems because all questions on a same latent dimension are given the same weight. A clear example is on the statements used for the pro/anti EU dimension. Among the eight statements that I use on this dimension, some are very general, such as statement 7 'Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for [country]' and statement 28 'European integration has gone too far', and some are much more specific, such as statement 2 'To address financial crises, the EU should be able to borrow money just like states can'. This is problematic because in order to place a party on the pro-anti EU dimension, it seems that item 7 or 28 could measure the latent dimension alone. If a party strongly agrees that EU membership is a bad thing, we can safely assume that it is strongly anti-EU, regardless of its position on question 2. In practice however, I average them with items such as item 2 that seem much less important. A solution could be to give different weights to different statements.

Finally, there are several problems inherent to the use of a 5 points Likert scale. One of them is the difficulty to find the position on a party on two dimensions: the direction (agree/disagree) is often relatively easy to determine, but the intensity is more complicated (agree/strongly agree). Coders probably all have a similar definition of agreement and disagreement, but the border between agreement and strong agreement is very blurry. In this case there is a tendency to compare parties between them that can be problematic. For example, if I found that party A agree on an issue and realizes that party B agrees 'more' than A, I will have a tendency to position party B on 'strongly agree'. But if later I find that party C agrees much more than A and B, there is no alternative to 'strongly agree', while it would be appropriate to position it on 'more than strongly agree'. Therefore, if the direction is probably more reliable because it is straightforward, I suspect the intensity to be less reliable and to vary a lot among coders.

(b) Determining the dimensions of the political space

The next step was to decide what dimensions would be relevant to compare parties across Europe and model the political space. The goal of spatial modeling and scaling analysis is to move from observed manifest items to unobservable latent dimensions. Spatial modelling is a method of data reduction: one moves from an overwhelming number of observations to a limited number of dimensions (Otjes & Louwerse, 2014). How many dimensions are necessary to capture the essential differences between political actors is central to most scaling issues. There is no 'one-size-fits-all' model and the ideal number of dimensions and their definition is unique to each political context, so any common European model is imperfect, nonetheless it is still doable. However, as Benoit and Laver (2012) put it, the job of mapping is made much easier if we can use assumptions about the number and the nature of dimensions useful to conceptualize the political space. In this study I decided to use the spatial model described above, with two dimensions: one left-right dimension and one pro/anti EU dimension. Then I allocated the twenty-eight issue statements to one of these two dimensions. I decided not to use the few country specific statements, even though it makes the model less accurate because by leaving out issues that are probably

very relevant in the given country. It would be interesting in future research to observe how these particular items fit in the left-right and pro/anti EU dimensions. However, since I want to compare parties from different countries, it is easier to use only common statements.

Eight items were allocated to the pro/anti EU dimension and eighteen to the left-right dimension. It is important to keep in mind that most of my knowledge is based on French politics, with a bit of knowledge of additional Western Europeans contexts. On the other hand I have a very limited or non-existent knowledge of the political context of Eastern European countries for example. Thus I can safely assume that the two dimensions that I built have a French bias and are not 'really' Europeans: they are Europe seen through French eyes. On the other hand, most of the items are sufficiently broad to be safely placed on one of the two dimensions. One item was placed on both scales: item 4, 'The right of EU citizens to work in [country] should be restricted'. This is controversial because it makes the two dimensions not exactly orthogonal. However I considered that this statement measures the position of a party on migration within the EU, and thus it was concerned both with the EU and immigration (left-right dimension). Three of the twenty-eight statements were not included in any of the two dimensions, because they did not fit in. The first one is item 8: 'EU treaties should be decided by (name of national parliament) rather than by citizens in a referendum'. I could not foresee a pro/anti EU or left/right divide on this question. The second one is item 9: 'The EU should impose economic sanctions on Russia, even if this jeopardises gas supplies to EU countries'. I was less worried about leaving this one out: this is a topical issue not really relevant on the long-term and I assume the divide to be more between countries than on the two studied dimensions. Finally, I left out item 28: 'External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a good solution to crisis situations'. With this question I suspected centrist parties to be in favor and more extreme parties on both sides to be opposed, so it would not fit on the linear left-right dimension. The detailed repartition of issue statements on the two dimensions can be found in annex 2.

Additionally to the two main dimensions, I divided the left-right axis in further subdimensions. The objective of doing that is to get a more insightful image of what separates and unites parties. While the left-right dimension is simple, one may miss relevant information if not looking at the more precise issues of the political debate. This is a classical dilemma with data reduction: by making the model simpler it makes it easier to understand, but there is the risk to discard important information. Looking at these different subdimensions also give insight on what is actually in the left-right dimension. I decided to use five subdimensions and assigned each of the eighteen issue statements of the left-right dimension to one of them: economic and fiscal issues (seven items), law and order (three items), social issues (four items), environment (one item) and immigration (three items). As with the two main dimensions, this allocation can be debated. For example, creating a dimension with only one item (environment) can be problematic. On the other hand, the issue statement 14 captures in my opinion almost all of the underlying dimension. Another example is item 4 ('The right of EU citizens to work in [country] should be restricted') on the immigration dimension. While it may be accurate in Western and Nordic EU countries that mostly receive migrants from the rest of Europe, it is less true regarding emigration countries, such as Eastern European countries.

(c) Positioning the parties on the different dimensions

Once the dimensions are created, I simply average the answers of the corresponding items to determine the position of a party on a given dimension. However, the assumption with the method used here is that each item is a correct indication of the underlying dimension. It is thus important to assess scale validity, that is whether the items I believe to form a consistent scale actually do so (Otjes & Louwerse, 2014). Every item on the scale should be monotonically related to the underlying latent dimension, implying that the scores of an item that fits well into a scale should increase as the scores in the latent dimension increase, and vice versa (Jacoby, 1991, p. 40). To assess scale validity, I fit a locally adjusted regression curve on scatter plots between each item and a scale consisting of all other items of the dimension (Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Gemenis, 2013a).




Figure 1: Examining the scalability of the items in the pro/anti EU scale




Figure 2: Examining the scalability of items in the L-R scale

The scatter plots in Figure 1 show that every item in the pro/anti EU scale is monotonically related to the respective rest scores, which implies a good item-scale fit. However the scatter plots in figure 2 show that some items on the L-R scale do not actually fit in the scale. The relationship between item 16 ('When a state rescues a bank it should take control over it') and the latent L-R dimension is not monotonic. I initially assumed that left-wing parties would support this proposition and right-wing parties oppose it, but there seems to be exceptions to that. I suppose that there is variation among countries on this issue, maybe between countries that were actually concerned with this issue and countries where this debate did not happen. Item 25 ('The recreational use of cannabis should be legal') also seems not to fit exactly in the left-right scale. This is a bit more mysterious to me, since I would have guessed that the left generally supports it and the right opposes it. For some reason, it does not seem to be exactly true. As a result of these findings, I excluded these two items from the left-right scale.

I also performed the same validity assessment on the subdimensions. As can be seen in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, most items fit in their subdimension. The only exception is item 27 ('Downloading copyright protected material from the internet should be allowed for private use') that does not fit well in the social issues scale. This is not particularly surprising, this issue being probably minor in many countries, at least

compared to other social issues such as abortion rights, same-sex marriage and drug policy. Therefore I excluded it from the social issues dimension.

As we can see there are several problems with the construction of the left-right scale and its subdimensions. The fact that some items fit in the L-R scale and not in the others, or vice versa, shows that the dimensions that I am calling 'subdimensions' are not exactly that.

Once the position of every party was calculated, I computed the positions of the political groups of the European Parliament. To do, I simply took the center of gravity of the different member parties of this group (weighed by the number of MEPs of each party).




Figure 3: Examining the scalability of items in the economic and fiscal scale




Figure 4: Examining the scalability of items in the law and order scale




Figure 5: Examining the scalability of items in the social issues scale




Figure 6: Examining the scalability of items in the immigration scale

2/Measuring the ideological coherence within EP groups

In a second part, I measured the coherence of the different political groups of the Parliament, that is, the level of agreement between the members of the group. To do so, I relied on the measure for respondent agreement developed by Van der Eijk (2001), also known as Van der Eijk's A. This approach has been successfully used in similar contexts (Hansen & Rasmussen, 2013). This measure ranges from -1 to 1, and the smaller the number the less agreement there is. 1 means perfect agreement (all observations fall in the same category), 0 is a uniform distribution (each category has the same number of distributions) and -1 is extreme polarization (half of the observations at 1, the other half at 5). Within each political group, I calculated the level of agreement for each of the twenty-eight questions. I averaged these coefficients to obtain the overall coefficient of agreement within a group, and also averaged the results for each dimension.

Results

Obtaining the positions of every party on the two main dimensions allows me to graphically represent the results in a two-dimensional space. One straightforward way of doing so is to put together parties from the same country. I decided to use the Netherlands as an example: the results can be seen on figure 7. Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 show the positions of the Dutch parties on the five subdimensions of the left-right axis.




Figure 7: Dutch parties in the political space




Figure 8: Dutch parties on the law and order dimension




Figure 9: Dutch parties on the economy dimension




Figure 10: Dutch parties on social issues




Figure 11: Dutch parties on environment




Figure 12: Dutch parties on immigration

EP groups

Figure 13 displays the center of gravity of the EP groups in the two-dimensional space. The results are similar to what we could expect. The ECR, the EFD as well as the non-attached members are the only one to fall on the Eurosceptic side of the anti/pro EU axis. On the left-right axis, the GUE/NGL, Greens and S&D are clearly left-wing parties, the EPP, ECR, EFDD are on the (center-) right while the ALDE is centrist. Figures 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 display the positions of these groups on the law and order, economic, social issues, environment and immigration dimensions.




Figure 13: EP groups in the political space




Figure 14: EP groups on the law and order dimension




Figure 15: EP groups on the economy dimension



Figure 16: EP groups on the social issues dimension




Figure 17: EP groups on environment




Figure 18: EP groups on immigration

Table 2 shows the level of agreement within each EP groups, ordered by decreasing overall agreement. It also displays the van der Eijk's A for the anti-pro EU and left-right dimensions, as well as for the five subdimensions. For clarity reasons, I highlighted the highest values (at least 0.70) and the lowest ones (under 0.30). The detailed coefficients of agreement for individual questions can be found in annex 3. As mentioned in the theoretical part, I also did the measurements when excluding the KKE from the non-attached members. The reason is that I expected the KKE to be a clear outlier since it is the only left-wing party. This is confirmed by the data, since the coefficient of agreement clearly increases when the KKE is not taken into account. The most coherent political groups of the European Parliament are the three left-wing group: the GUE/NGL, S&D and Greens/EFA groups, with respective Van der Eijk's coefficients of 0.61, 0.60 and 0.59. In what follows, I will say a few words about each group, going from the most coherent to the least coherent.

EP group	Overall	EU	L-R	Law and Order	Economy	Social issues	Environment	Immigration
GUE	0.61	0.38	0.71	0.61	0.82	0.61	0.61	0.56
S&D	0.60	0.70	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.61	0.67	0.57
Greens/EFA	0.59	0.48	0.71	0.84	0.65	0.53	0.45	0.75
EPP	0.55	0.65	0.51	0.40	0.52	0.44	0.63	0.61
ALDE	0.52	0.54	0.51	0.59	0.46	0.49	0.65	0.55
NI	0.48	0.69	0.34	0.24	0.19	0.58	0.48	0.57
ECR	0.46	0.45	0.47	0.39	0.42	0.48	0.67	0.61
EFD	0.37	0.32	0.36	0.30	0.40	0.33	0.17	0.44
Ni without KKE	0.55	0.73	0.45	0.39	0.24	0.61	0.72	0.71

Table 2: Coefficients of agreement within EP groups




Figure 19: GUE/NGL coherence. Each blue dot represents a party and the red diamond represents the center of gravity of the group.

Despite being the overall most coherent of all EP groups, it does not mean that the GUE/NGL members agree on all types of issues. We indeed observe important variations depending on the dimension of interest: the GUE/NGL is the most coherent group on the left-wing scale (0.71) but among the least coherent on the EU scale. Not surprisingly, the group is the most left-wing of the Parliament on economic and fiscal issues, it is also the most coherent on that dimension. If I were to choose the most important characteristic of the GUE/NGL, it would be the left-wing economic policies of its members. This is of course not a surprise, since the group mostly comprises socialist and communist parties. It is also the most left-wing party on the law and order issues, with a relatively high coherence on this topic, and the second most left-wing on the other topics (environment, immigration and social issues).

We also notice at the questions' level that the group is very coherent on what can be considered the "core" of left-wing policies: almost all parties strongly favor wealth redistribution (Q13) and government spending (Q15), oppose free market in the domain of health care (Q10), and are against layoffs (Q17). They also strongly favor women and gay rights (Q23 and Q24) and we can recognize the anti-racist pattern often exhibited by these parties (in Q24 on Islam). There are some outliers on specific questions, probably due to the national contexts. For example, the Sinn Fein opposition to abortion is at odds with the group's position but is not surprising in the Irish context. The group is also deeply divided on drug policy, but this does not come as a surprise as it is the only group with the Greens where there is an important support for cannabis legalization, without unanimity (Q15). This explains why the group is slightly more conservative than the Green on social issues. The Dutch Party for the Animals, which defines itself as a single issue party, is also an outlier, being in opposition with the rest of the group regarding immigration or even economic policies.

We can also recognize some classic patterns of the European left, namely their 'pro-democratic' stance and their opposition to international organizations, often seen as too capitalist, or too pro-USA. Thus there is a widespread opposition to the IMF intervention in the European crisis (Q18) or to sanctions against Russia (Q9). The 'pro-democratic' stance can be recognized with the strong support for the use of referendums for ratifications of EU treaties (Q8) or the right for a single member-state to veto treaties change (Q3).

The general agreement on the Left-Right scale cannot hide the fact that the party is deeply divided on the question of European integration. Even if all parties agree that the EU should be more democratic, they do not agree on the benefits and the soundness of the EU itself. On the pro-anti EU dimension, the party appears as mildly pro-EU and the disagreement among its members can be observed in the low coefficient of agreement regarding EU-related questions (Q1, Q4, Q5, Q7, Q28) and the role that should be given to the EU in the resolution of the economic crisis (Q2). The things they agree on are more redistribution among states and more democracy. There are some surprising outliers on the right of workers to move freely within the union, such as the Dutch, Danish or French parties (Q4). These parties are usually not opposed to the free movement of workers per se, but denounce what they call 'social dumping', meaning employers abusing cheaper migrant workers. On the EU question, there are those who think that the EU is a positive thing and should be changed from inside (such as Die Linke, Syriza or the different Spanish left-wing parties), and the clearly Eurosceptic ones (the Danish People's Movement against the EU, the Swedish Left Party or the Dutch Socialist Party). My opinion is that we observe here the left-wing dilemma between 'reformism' and 'revolution' brought at the European level, between those who want to change the European Union and those who want suppress it to start something new.

The GUE/NGL is the most overall coherent group of the European Parliament. However, if there is a very strong agreement on left-wing policies, in particular on the economy, there is an important divide on the benefits of the European Union, the group being divided between Euro-sceptics and reformists.




Figure 20: S&D coherence

The S&D group is the second most overall coherent group of the European Parliament with only a negligible difference with the GUE/NGL. However, if the overall coherence is more or less the same, we can observe a different pattern; while the GUE/NGL is very coherent on the left-right issues and much more divided on the European Union, the coherence within the S&D is roughly the same on all dimensions. Indeed, it is the most coherent group on the sovereignty-integration (0.70) and it also exhibits a strong coherence on the Left-Right dimension (0.60) and its subdimensions. As a symbol, the most dividing question within the S&D is a topical question (Q9 on sanctions against Russia) that do not represent a long-term divide.

The findings of my research show both that the S&D group is the most pro-EU group in the EP, and that there is a strong agreement within the group on that issue. At the questions' level, there is a very strong support for the euro (Q1) and for solidarity among EU countries (Q6), a strong satisfaction with EU membership (Q7) and an almost unanimous support for more integration (Q28, with the exceptions of the Swedish Feminist's Party and the Dutch Labor Party).

There is also a strong (albeit less than within the GUE/NGL) and shared support for social-democratic economic values such as wealth redistribution (Q12), participation of the state in the economy (Q13) or support of employees' rights (Q17). However, there is a lower agreement on economic issues that came to the fore with the economic crisis, such as the size of the public sector (Q11), government spending (Q15) and the IMF's role in the economic crisis (Q18). This is representative in my opinion of the doubts and debates created within social-democratic parties by the economic crisis, sometimes labelled as a crisis of social-democracy (Keating & McCrone, 2013). There is a divide between partisans and opponents of

austerity (with parties such as the British Labour, the Greek PASOK, and the French Socialist Party on the second side) , illustrating a debate certainly happening among parties at the European level, but also within each party.

There is a strong agreement on environment (Q14); social-democrats generally support a middle position favoring both the environment and the economy. On social issues, social-democrats mostly adopt coherent mildly progressive positions with a few outliers on each topic, making the S&D less progressive than the GUE/NGL or the Greens/EFA. For example, while they all agree on abortion (Q24), a few parties oppose the common position in favor of same-sex wedding (Q23), while a few others such as the Dutch Labour, the Flemish Socialist Party Different or the Italian Democratic Party are at odds with the general opposition to cannabis legalization (Q25).

On law and order, there is a strong and shared support for alternative measures to imprisonment (Q22) and opposition to anti-authoritarian measures (Q20, Q21) with a few outliers mostly in Central and Eastern European Countries. On immigration, most parties favor pro-immigration policies despite different positions of the integration efforts required from the migrants, probably representative of the different countries traditions on this question (Q19).

The S&D is the most unequivocally pro-EU and pro-integration group of the Parliament. It is in general very coherent on most issues. We can recognize its center-left economic values, even though the crisis within the Eurozone created a divide on the most current economic questions. Despite the unavoidable outliers on specific questions, we also observe coherent center-left positions on social issues, immigration and law and order, and a centrist position on environment.




Figure 21: Greens/EFA coherence

The third most coherent group is the Greens/EFA group, with an overall coefficient of agreement of 0.59. A first surprising element is the relatively low agreement on the topic of environment (0.45). However, this should not be misinterpreted: the Greens/EFA are the most pro-environment in the European Parliament, and there is a broad agreement on the importance of this issue. The methodology (only one question on the topic) makes the information on this dimension less reliable than on other dimensions, but the explanation that appears is that most parties strongly favor environment over growth (a specific feature to the Greens) while a few outliers refuse to dissociate environment and growth (most notably, the French and French-speaking Belgian Greens) (Q14). One can also assume that there is a gap on this topic between Green parties and EFA parties.

Once we separate the left-right and EU dimensions, we observe a pattern similar to the GUE/NGL: a strong coherence on the Left-Right (0.71) and a relatively lower coherence on sovereignty-integration (0.48).

Once again, the relatively low coherence on the EU dimension should not be misinterpreted: the Greens/EFA are one of the most pro-integration group of the Parliament. However, if the group contains the most Europhile parties of the EP (such as the German and French Greens), a few smaller member parties are moderate Eurosceptics, such as the British and Swedish Greens, or more centrists on this dimension (such as the Scottish National Party). It is therefore not surprising to observe, at the individual question level, that the most divisive issues are related to the EU, for example on the euro (Q1) or a common EU foreign policy (Q5). But if there is a slight disagreement on the soundness of deeper integration (Q28), most of the member parties support it and there is an unanimous agreement on the

benefits of the EU so far (Q7). Like the GUE/NGL, the Greens/EFA stand for a more democratic European Union, as highlighted by their support for the use of referendums (Q8).

The Greens/EFA lean strongly on the left, they are the second most left-wing group after the GUE/NGL. On economic issues, they are situated between the GUE/NGL and the social-democrats. There is a very strong agreement in favor of state intervention in the economy (Q12), wealth redistribution (Q13) and opposition to facilitating layoffs (Q17).

There is also very strong agreement on the law and order dimension (0.84). Anti-authoritarianism is widely shared among the Greens as shown by the strong opposition to restrictions of civil liberties (Q20, Q21) and the support for alternatives to imprisonment (Q22). The Greens are also the most progressive group on social issues as shown by their unanimous support for abortion (Q24), and almost unanimous support for same-sex wedding (Q23), only opposed by the Latvian Russian Union and the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union. Like the GUE/NGL, the majority of the group also favors the legalization of cannabis (Q25), however there is a clear divide within the group on this issue, Western European Greens supporting it, while Nordic and Eastern European Greens are against.

The Greens are also the most pro-immigration group of the European Parliament and are very coherent on this topic (0.75), supporting unconditional free movement of workers within the EU (Q4) and a tolerant attitude towards Islam (Q26). They are also the less demanding groups on the integration of immigrants (Q19, the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union and the Hungarian Politics Can Be Different being the only mild outliers).

The Greens/EFA is one of the most pro-EU groups of the EP. The most pro-integration parties of the EP are found in this group, but it also contains a few moderate Eurosceptic parties. Despite small disagreements on specific issues, all members lean strongly to the left, whether on the economy, immigration, social issues or law and order. All parties are environmentalists, albeit at different levels.




Figure 22: EPP coherence

The EPP is a relatively coherent group with an overall Van der Eijk's coefficient of 0.55. There is more coherence on the EU dimension (0.65) than on the Left-Right dimension (0.51). The EPP is strongly pro-EU and pro-integration; with the S&D, ALDE and the Greens, it is one of the four groups that falls unequivocally on the pro-EU side of this dimension. On figure 22, the only party appearing as moderately Eurosceptic is the Christian Social People's Party of Luxembourg. There are of course nuances among these parties, with for example the Italian Forza Italia, the Danish Conservative People's Party, or the Dutch and Swedish Christian-Democrats being wary of further integration (Q28) and more critical of the EU, but the group is very coherent on agreeing that the EU is a good thing (Q7, coefficient of agreement 0.85). The EPP is the most coherent on EU-related questions, such as Q7 previously cited, or on support for the euro (Q1) or redistribution of resources among EU regions (Q6). There is also a broad support for unrestricted movement of workers (Q4) and a common foreign policy (Q5). There are however some rifts on the future direction of the EU, with no agreement on allowing or not the EU to borrow money (Q2) or on allowing a single member state to veto a treaty change (Q3).

The EPP is strongly implemented on the right and indeed appears as the most right-wing party of the Parliament. However there are important differences, unavoidable in such a broad group (the EPP is the largest group of the EP), and a few oddities, such as the center-left Christian-Democrat CDH of Belgium. The group is the most right-wing on two subdimensions: economy and social issues. It is generally the most pro-market and pro-business group. There is broad agreement in favor of reducing the size of the state (Q11) and its role in the economy (Q12), and limited government spending (Q17). Most EPP parties also favor free competition in the healthcare system (Q12) and want to make it easier for companies to fire employees (Q17). Here again there are exceptions, the most notable being Fidesz, the current leading party in Hungary, which favors state interventionism on economic issues.

On social issues, it does not come as a surprise that the group generally agrees on conservative positions, with a broad opposition to same-sex marriage (Q23, with the exception of the Dutch and Flemish Christian-Democrat parties), or cannabis legalization (Q25). The question of abortion is the most divisive issues within the EPP, with roughly half of the members against free-choice for women on abortion, and half in favor (Q24, coefficient of agreement 0.25).

The group is most divided on the law and order dimension (0.40). It is more authoritarian than the EP average, but there is no agreement on issues such as restrictions of citizens' privacy and freedom when deemed necessary (Q20, Q21). However most parties support alternative measures to imprisonment, with notable exceptions such as Fidesz, the French Union for a Popular Movement or the Spanish People's Party. Interestingly, the latest appears as both the most authoritarian and the most socially conservative party of the group.

There is also broad agreement on environment, where most members consider growth as more important than the environment (Q14), as well as on immigration where they generally oppose restrictions within the EU but request integration efforts from the migrants (Q19), and do not see Islam as a threat per se (Q26).

The EPP is a pro-integration group with a strong coherence on this dimension. It is the largest group of the Parliament, and almost all parties are on the right side of the left-right spectrum, albeit at different levels. It is the most right-wing group on economic and social issues. However, given the size of the group, it is not surprising to find on every issue some outliers, such as Fidesz (Hungary), Forza Italia or the Dutch CDA.




Figure 23: ALDE coherence

The ALDE is also a relatively coherent group with an overall Van der Eijk's coefficient of 0.52. There is a balance between the two main dimensions, with a 0.54 coefficient of agreement on the EU and 0.51 on the Left-Right dimension. The ALDE is strongly pro-integration. Two parties appear as exceptions on the pro-anti EU scale: the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), currently the ruling party in the Netherlands, and the Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) of Slovakia. These findings are in agreement with the theory since both parties have taken moderate Eurosceptic stances during the last years. Even if there is a unanimous agreement within the ALDE parties that the EU membership has been a good thing for their country (Q7, agreement 0.81), the two party previously cited along with the Swedish Centre Party are opposed to further integration (Q28). The VVD is also an exception within the ALDE when it supports restriction of the right of EU citizens to work in another country (Q4), and is joined by other parties such as the German Freedom Democratic Party (FDP) or the Danish Venstre in its opposition to further transfers between the richest and poorest regions of the EU (Q6).

On the Left-Right scale, the ALDE is very close to the center and is indeed the most centrist group of the European Parliament. The coherence on this dimension is relatively high, similar to the coherence of the EPP. There are however differences between parties seen as centre-right and conservative-liberals such as the VVD and more center-left social-liberals parties such as the British Liberal-Democrats, Danish Social Liberal Party or the Dutch D66. These differences can be witnessed in the economy subdimension, which is the least coherent for the ALDE ($A=0.46$). Being liberal, the party is mostly on the right side of the L-R spectrum on this dimension (VVD, Flemish Open VLD, or German FDP), but a few parties are more left-leaning, such as the Estonian Centre Party or the Spanish Union Progress and Democracy (UPyD). At the level of individual questions, we observe that economic issues are among the most divisive within the

group, such as the role of the State in the economy (Q12, coefficient of agreement 0.22), free market in the healthcare system (Q10, A=0.24) or wealth redistribution (Q13, A=0.35). On the other hand, it is worth noting that one of the most consensual point within the ALDE is opposition to the nationalization of banks rescued by the state, which makes sense from a liberal point of view (Q16, A=0.75).

On social issues, the group is near the center as well, with a lower coherence (0.49) compared to other dimensions, with parties ranging from the very progressive pro-abortion, pro-same sex marriage and pro-drugs legalization D66 to the Green-conservative Portuguese Earth Party (MPT). However, the large majority of parties support abortion (Q24), same-sex marriage (Q24) and oppose cannabis legalization (Q25).

There is more coherence on the law and order dimension where the ALDE is similar to the left-wing groups and is in the vast majority against authoritarian measures, despite the few unavoidable exceptions. On immigration the group is mainly pro-immigration, with a middle position between the S&D and the EPP. It opposes restriction of the free movement of workers (Q4, at the exception of the VVD again) and does not see Islam as a threat (Q26), however the group is split on the necessity for immigrants to adopt the values and culture of the host country (Q19, A=0.35). The group is coherent on environment, most parties mildly favor growth over protecting the environment or are neutral on the question, with the notable exception of the MPT, which promotes Green politics.

The ALDE is generally pro-EU, centrist on the Left-Right spectrum and relatively coherent, albeit less than the other pro-EU groups, in particular on the economy dimension. Being a liberal party, it mostly favors right-wing economic policies but the group also contain several social-liberal center-left parties. The group is also centrist on social issues, environment and immigration and is more left-wing on the law and order dimension. It is worth noting that one of the main parties of the group, the Dutch VVD is an outlier with a more Eurosceptic and right-wing stance than the rest of the group.




Figure 24: ECR coherence

The ECR is the second less coherent group of the European Parliament, with an overall Van der Eijk's coefficient of 0.46, balanced between the two dimensions (0.45 on sovereignty-integration and 0.47 on left-right). The relatively low agreement on the EU scale should not hide the fact that the group is mostly moderately Eurosceptic. However there is a wide range of positions on this issue, from the very Eurosceptic Danish People's Party (DPP) to the pro-EU Fianna Fail (FF) in Ireland or the New Flemish Alliance (NVA). Several parties consider that EU membership is a bad thing for their country such as the DPP and the True Finns (PS), but the vast majority do not oppose EU membership (Q7). A majority considers that the European integration has gone too far, with a few exceptions such as the Fianna Fail previously cited. This is in agreement with the position of the British Conservatives, around which the ECR was created, and who wish to take back powers from the EU but not leave it entirely. There is strong agreement on the right for a single member state to veto treaty changes (Q3, $A=0.71$) and on the opposition to a EU common foreign policy (Q5). However the group is deeply split on other European issues, such as the euro (Q1) or transfers from richer to poorer regions (Q6). On the euro, Alternative for Germany (AfD) along with parties from countries that do not use it are mainly against its adoption (Conservatives, DPP, the Polish Law and Justice –PiS–) while most parties from countries already using it are in favor of keeping it (such as the NVA). On redistribution, we can notice a rather predictable pattern where parties from richer countries generally oppose it, while parties for poorer countries (mainly eastern Europeans) support it.

On economic issues, the center or gravity of the ECR is near the center and there is a low agreement within the group ($A=0.42$). This gap is symbolized by the opposition between the two biggest parties: the PiS supports economic interventionism, while the Conservatives are strong supporters of economic

liberalism. The rest of the group is also divided, with parties such as the DPP or the Independent Greeks (ANEL) on the interventionist side and parties such as the AfD or the NVA on the liberal side. At the questions' level, we can observe the same divide on all economic issues such as the reduction of the number of public employees (Q11) and of government budgets (Q15), or the liberalization of the health care system (Q10).

On Law and Order the ECR is also quite divided ($A=0.39$). It is however the less authoritarian of the three right-wing groups (EPP, ECR, EFD), a majority of members are opposed to limitations of citizens privacy or civil rights while a few accept it if deemed necessary (the Conservatives are one of them). As a symbol, the ECR is almost evenly split between supporters and opponents to alternative measures to imprisonment ($A=0.33$).

The group is slightly less divided on social issues ($A=0.48$), however this is due to the unanimous opposition to cannabis legalization. While most members oppose same-sex marriage, a few support it such as the NVA and the Conservatives, and abortion is one of the most controversial issue within the group ($A=0.28$), notably opposed by several Eastern European parties (such as the PiS), the AfD or the Dutch Christian Union.

The most unifying dimensions within the ECR appear to be immigration ($A=0.61$) and environment ($A=0.67$). The party is generally not pro-immigration, the EFD being the only group more right-wing on this dimension. The DPP and the Conservatives support restrictions on the free movement of workers within the EU, but the rest of the group opposes it. There is an almost unanimous agreement on the need for immigrants to adapt to the values and culture of the host country, and most parties see Islam as a threat (except for the Conservatives, interestingly). On environment there is a broad agreement to support growth over protection of the environment

The ECR is the second less coherent group of the European Parliament. It is generally moderately Eurosceptic (one could say "Euroreformist") but there is wide range of positions on the EU. While almost all members oppose further integration, there is a deep divide on issues such as the euro or resources redistribution. The ECR is a right-wing group, being generally conservative on social issues, opposed to massive immigration and favoring growth over the environment, but economy is a controversial topic, with an important divergence between economic interventionists and liberals.




Figure 25: EFDD coherence

The EFDD is the least coherent group of the European Parliament, with an overall coefficient of agreement of 0.37 (0.32 on the pro-anti EU dimension and 0.36 on the Left-Right dimension). It is also the most Eurosceptic group, and all of its members consider themselves as Eurosceptics. Why then, does it appear as the least coherent? First, it should be noted that given the small size of the group (6 member parties), a single party disagreeing with the others is enough to create a low coefficient of agreement. Second, as with the ECR, there are different levels and types of Euroscepticism. Third, if rejection of the current EU is shared by these parties, there is no common strategy on what to do with it.

For example, looking at question 7, we see that Order and Justice (TT) in Lithuania and the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) in Latvia consider that the EU has been a good thing for their country, contrary to the rest of the group. If there is no agreement on whether or not to leave the EU, there is, however, agreement on less “extreme” questions: the group is generally opposed to the euro, strongly favors the right of a single member state to veto treaty change (Q3, $A=0.8$) and wants EU treaties to be decided after a referendum rather than by the national parliaments (Q8, $A=0.75$). On the other hand the EFDD is completely divided on the free movement of workers (Q4, $A=0.17$) and redistribution of resources at the European level (Q6, $A=-0.42$). Not surprisingly, the UKIP and the Sweden Democrats (SD) coming from the “rich” United-Kingdom and Sweden oppose both, while TT and ZZS support both, with the Italian Five Stars Movement (M5S) and the Czech Free Citizens' Party (SSO) adopt middle positions. It seems that these parties generally favor what they consider to have been good for their country rather than adopting positions based on ideology.

The EFDD is mostly composed of right-wing parties, but the presence of the Five Stars Movement raises questions on the coherence of the group on the left-right spectrum. Indeed, if the M5S claims to be outside of the left-right paradigm, it supports nonetheless many left-wing policies that put it at odds with the rest, and when included on the traditional left-wing spectrum, it stands firmly on the left.

On economic issues, the group is positioned on the center-right, but the very liberal and pro-business positions of the UKIP and the SSO are not necessarily shared by other members. For example, all parties agree that the number of public sector employees should be reduced (Q11, $A=0.75$), but the M5S and the Sweden Democrats consider that the state has a role to play in the economy, in opposition with the rest of the group. Another clear example of disagreement is free market in the health care system (Q10, $A=0.17$) were, roughly, half of the party supports it and the other half opposes it.

The EFDD is rather centrist on social issues, but not more coherent. Here again the M5S stands out by being more progressive than the others. For example, it is the only member supporting same-sex marriage and, together with the SSO is rather open to legalization of cannabis (Q25, $A=0.03$). Abortion is also a divisive topic, with the Baltic TT and ZZS less favorable than the rest.

The group appears as the most authoritarian of the EP on the law and order dimension, but the coherence is low ($A=0.30$) and the SSO and the M5S appear much less authoritarian than the others. It is also the most right-wing group on immigration, and this is the dimension where it is the most coherent ($A=0.44$). As already mentioned, the EFDD is however divided on migration within the EU and the free movement of workers. This issue being one of the favorite themes of the UKIP, we can expect some tension among members on that topic. The group is much more united on the integration of migrants and all members want them to adapt to the values and culture of their host country (Q19, $A=0.83$). The Sweden Democrats are strongly anti-Islam but the other parties more moderate.

Finally there is no common position on environment ($A=0.17$), the M5S and the agrarian ZZS being strongly in favor of the protection of the environment, while the pro-business UKIP and SSO consider it as less important than economic growth.

The EFD is the most Eurosceptic group of the Parliament, but there is no agreement on what should be the future of the EU. One explanation could be that its members defend their national interests, putting them at odds with each other. The group is generally right-wing, however the M5S leans on the left and, as one could expect, is often in disagreement with the rest. There are also many differences between the libertarian SSO and UKIP, the agrarian ZZS, or the interventionist and anti-immigration SD. The EFDD gathers parties opposed to the current functioning of the European Union, but there is no common ground on other issues.




Figure 26: Non-attached members coherence

Finally, I will say a few words about the non-attached members of the Parliament (NI). There is a very strong coherence among them on the EU dimension ($A=0.69$). They are also much more anti-EU than any group of the EP. They are generally sovereignists and the extreme Eurosceptics of the Parliament. They strongly agree that the EU has been a bad thing (Q7, $A=0.8$) and that European integration has gone too far ($A=0.85$). Logically, they also oppose the euro (Q1, $A=0.68$), do not want to allow the EU to borrow money (Q2, $A=0.75$) and want member states to be able to veto EU treaties (Q3, $A=0.75$). In general, they oppose a EU common foreign policy as well as the redistribution of resources at the European level, and want to restrict the free movement of workers (except for the communist KKE). The group is thus very coherent on this dimension and opposes much of what the EU does.

The non-attached parties are generally right-wing, the only exception being the far-left KKE. The coherence on the left-right dimension increases significantly when the KKE is not taken into account (from 0.36 to 0.45). However the methodology used in this research fails to position the far-right parties where one would expect them. On the Left-Right scale, many parties usually considered as the most extremes, such as Jobbik, Golden Dawn or the FN indeed appear more centrist than they are usually positioned. Several hypotheses can be made to explain that: for example there is not any question measuring nationalism in the Left-Right spectrum, while it is a characteristic of the far-right parties. The rejection of the EU and very strong support for sovereignty could be considered as nationalism, but these questions are put in the EU dimension and thus are not taken into account in the Left-Right dimension. Since this research is based on what parties declare in their manifestos, another hypothesis may be that extreme parties soften their stances in their manifestos to preserve their public image. To give an example, some

of these parties are sometimes accused of being anti-Semitic, but we do not expect them to write in their manifestos. Therefore, the position of non-attached parties on the Left-Right axis does not seem very accurate. However, it is still interesting to look at the different dimensions and the individual questions to observe what opposes or unites them.

First, the KKE is very left-wing, and this on almost all dimensions. Being the only of its kind among the NI, it is not really interesting to compare it with the others. I find it more interesting to compare the (far-) right parties among themselves to see whether they would be able to work together.

Even without the KKE, the non-attached parties are not coherent on the economy dimension ($A=0.24$). Indeed, there is an important gap between protectionist and interventionist parties such as the FN, Jobbik or XA and the liberal parties such as the PVV or the Congress of the New Right (KNP). The former favor economic policies often considered as left-wing. It is worth remembering that these parties often reject the left-right paradigm, claiming to be nationalist before anything. We thus observe disagreement on questions related to the role of the state in the economy (Q15, $A=0.12$). The same divide is found in other questions related to the economy such as free market competition within the health care system (Q10, $A=0.15$), nationalization of banks (Q16, $A=0.19$) or the protection of workers (Q17, $A=0.11$). It is therefore difficult to see how this parties could work together on economy questions.

These parties also exhibit a relatively low coherence on the law and order dimension ($A=0.39$), even if they are in general quite authoritarian, as shown by the shared opposition to alternatives to imprisonment (Q22, $A=0.61$). They are however divided on restrictions of citizen privacy (Q20, $A=0.15$).

There is less ambiguity on the other dimensions where the non-attached members share much more coherent stances. They are, not surprisingly, very coherent in their rejection of immigration ($A=0.71$). They almost unanimously condemn the free movement of workers within the EU (except the KNP, probably because it comes from Poland, a country of emigration), and are all strongly pro-assimilation of immigrants (Q19, $A=0.75$) and anti-Islam (Q26, $A=0.78$).

They also have in common a relative opposition to environmentalist policies ($A=0.72$) and are coherent ($A=0.61$) in their conservative positions on social issues, with a few exceptions reflecting the debate in their own country. They oppose same-sex marriage (except for the PVV, a party from the Netherlands where same-sex marriage is a 'closed issue'), cannabis legalization and want to limit abortion (the FN is the only outlier).

The non-attached members are not expected to work together since they are not part of any group. However, they are very coherent in their opposition of the EU. They are, indeed, the hardcore Eurosceptics. They are right-wing and far-right parties, at the exception of the Communist Party of Greece. These right-wing parties have in common anti-immigration and social conservative policies, and tend to favor relatively authoritarian policies. However there is a major gap on the economy between right-wing liberal parties and 'left-wing' statist and interventionist parties.

Discussion

In this thesis, I positioned the different groups of the European Parliament on several dimensions and measured their coherence. The most important results can be found in figure 13, where the groups are positioned on a two-dimensional representation of the political space, and in table 2, presenting the ideological coherence of these groups. From figure 13, one can observe that three groups of parties belong to the Eurosceptic side of the anti/pro-EU dimension: the ECR, the EFDD and the non-attached parties. Moreover, the three of them are on the right side of the left-right axis. This first finding confirms the *a priori* definition of the Eurosceptic right made at the beginning of my research: it is composed of the ECR and the EFDD groups, plus the non-attached parties, at the exception of the KKE that belongs to the Eurosceptic left. However, if one goes into the details at the parties' level, there are more exceptions. One of them is the VVD: even if it is a member of the ALDE, it also belongs to the Eurosceptic right. Within the EFDD, the M5S can be considered Eurosceptic, but is not right-wing. Finally, within the ECR, several parties such as the NVA or ANEL cannot be considered as part of the Eurosceptic right either. It is not really surprising to find exceptions within these groups since, as one can observe in table 12, the EFDD and ECR are the less ideologically coherent groups of the Parliament.

Conti and Memoli (2012) stated that Euroscepticism is generally found among parties considered as radical, and more markedly within the radical right than the radical left. My findings confirm this statement, in particular when looking at the non-attached parties and the EFDD. The most radical parties on the right of the European Parliament such as the FN, Jobbik, the FPÖ or the Sweden Democrats are also among the most Eurosceptic. The KKE, who left the GUE/NGL group because it was not radical enough, is also a hardliner opponent of the EU. However, the radical left is as expected more divided than the radical right. While there is a broad rejection of the EU within the latter, the former is divided between hardcore Eurosceptics and reformists such as Die Linke or Syriza. On the other hand, it must be noted that several non-radical parties can be considered as Eurosceptic and right-wing such as the Conservatives, the VVD or the Polish Law and Justice. Therefore, it is true that radical parties, and in particular the radical right tend to be Eurosceptic, but Euroscepticism is not limited to them.

What, then, are the common characteristics of the Eurosceptic right? From my results, ***what unites the Eurosceptic right from the VVD to Golden Dawn is an opposition to further European integration and an overall right-wing position on a left-right axis that includes several issues such as the economy, law and order, immigration and social issues.*** A consequence is that these parties oppose a common EU foreign policy and defend the right for a single member state to veto treaty changes. On the 'subdimensions' of the left-right axis, they all agree to limit or reduce immigration.

On the other hand, what divides these parties? First, except on immigration, there is no agreement on the issues that compose the left-right dimension. On the economy, there is a large range of positions with an opposition between parties supporting free-market policies (such as the Conservatives, UKIP, PVV, VVD, AfD) and parties supporting state interventionism (for example PiS, FN, Sweden Democrats). This in agreement with the theory: economic policies tend to be irrelevant. Social issues are divisive as well. There is no agreement on policies related to abortion and same-sex marriage. This is partly due to the presence

of libertarian parties, in particular within the EFDD. On law and order, as well as on environment, these parties generally adopt right-wing positions but at different levels and there is no distinction between them and the pro-EU EPP. Even on immigration, if there seems to be a shared position on immigration from outside the EU, intra-EU migration is divisive: in general parties from countries of immigration (such as the United-Kingdom or the Netherlands) would like to restrict it, while parties from emigration countries (mostly Eastern European) oppose any restriction.

Second, on issues related to the EU, there is no shared position besides opposition to further integration. For example, only some of them consider that the EU is a bad thing. This position is widespread among non-attached parties (FN, PVV, Golden Dawn), it is adopted only by some within the EFDD (UKIP, Sweden Democrats) and is in general not found within the ECR. On the euro, non-attached members and the EFDD tend to oppose it. The ECR is divided, however most of the few parties that do not oppose the euro are the ECR parties that are not considered Eurosceptic, such as the NVA, Fianna Fail, Bulgaria Without Censorship or the Slovak Ordinary People and Independent Personalities party (OL'aNO). There are very few parties that can be considered Eurosceptic but still support the euro: the Dutch VVD and CU-SGP are two examples, Poland Together is another one.

How then, can we divide Eurosceptic right-wing parties in relatively ideologically coherent groups? As discussed in the theoretical section, researchers have tried to divide them in two or three groups, according to their level of Euroscepticism. Here I decide to divide them in three groups. The first of them is composed of the 'EU-rejecting' parties. These one are the 'real' Eurosceptics: they consider the EU a bad thing and are opposed to everything it does, because they consider that EU integration should not happen. It includes the non-attached members of the Parliament (FN, Golden Dawn), as well as some EFDD members, such as the UKIP, the Sweden-Democrats or the SSO. They are also anti-immigration, tend to be authoritarian, and there is a real divergence among them on economic policies. They are the parties generally consider as far-right, or radical right. A second group could be called 'eurocritical' parties. These ones are opposed to the practice of EU cooperation but not to its principle. They include smaller members of the EFDD (TT, ZZS), and the majority of the Eurosceptic parties of the ECR (Conservatives, PiS, AfD, True Finns, DPP...). They oppose the euro, and support more centrist economic policies than the 'rejecting' group. Finally, there is small group of parties that is pro-euro but is still Eurosceptic. These are less opposed to the practice of EU cooperation than the 'eurocritical'. They merely oppose further integration in the current context. I call them 'eurorealists', and the main party of this group is the VVD. This different types of Euroscepticism are represented graphically in Figure 27.




Figure 27: Three types of right-wing Euroscepticism

As one can directly observe from this figure, this division of the Eurosceptic right does not correspond to the actual political groups of the European Parliament. It is not totally surprising since I found these groups (the ECR and the EFDD) to be the least ideologically coherent of the Parliament. Different assumptions can be made on why they do not associate in order to maximize the coherence of the groups. A first thing is that there are other motives than ideological coherence to form a group: financial funding and other resources can encourage parties that do not really fit anywhere else to associate with each other and to form relatively dubious alliances. It could be the reason why the M5S joined the EFDD. Second, parties and their leaders may seek to optimize their power in a group. It would make sense ideologically for the UKIP to associate with the FN, but the two parties have similar strength in the Parliament and both have quite strong leaders. Thus it is preferable for the UKIP and Nigel Farage to have a group where they clearly dominate. Finally, there are parties that may be considered too risky electorally to associate with, such as XA or Jobbik.

Finally, I want to say a few words about possible improvements and future work. First, as I already mentioned, the two main dimensions are not exactly orthogonal, and the 'subdimensions' are actually not exact subdimensions of the left-right axis. Also, building dimensions comprising both very general and precise statements can create problems. Furthermore, while the position of most parties is accurate, there is a problem with far-right parties that appear more centrist than expected. I think it would be worth rethinking the theory behind the dimensions as well as the methodology to try and correct these problems.

Concerning future research, it would be interesting to use inductive methods instead of a priori definition of the dimensions, and to compare the results. Finally, comparing the findings of this thesis with a study

of roll-call votes in the European Parliament would allow to observe whether actual voting happens along the theoretical dimensions.

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Annex 1: Composition of the political groups of the Parliament

ALDE

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
NEOS – The New Austria	Austria	NEOS	NEOS – Das Neue Österreich	1
Reformist Movement	Belgium (FR)	MR	Mouvement Réformateur	3
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Belgium (NL)	Open VLD	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	3
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Bulgaria	ДПС	Движение за права и свободи	4
ANO	Czech Republic	ANO	ANO	4
Danish Social Liberal Party	Denmark	B	Det Radikale Venstre	1
Venstre	Denmark	V	Venstre	2
Centre Party	Estonia	K	Eesti Keskerakond	1
Reform Party	Estonia	RE	Eesti Reformierakond	2
Centre Party	Finland	KESK	Suomen Keskusta	3
Swedish People's Party of Finland	Finland	RKP	Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue	1
UDI-MoDem – The Alternative	France	UDI-MODEM	UDI-MoDem: L'Alternative	7
Free Democratic Party	Germany	FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei	3
Liberal Democrats	Great Britain	LIBDEM	Liberal Democrats	1
Fine Gael	Ireland	FG	Fine Gael	4
Labour Party	Lithuania	DP	Darbo Partija	1
Liberal Movement	Lithuania	LRLS	Liberalų Sąjūdis	2
Democratic Party	Luxembourg	DP	Demokratesch Partei	1
Democrats '66	Netherlands	D66	Democraten '66	4
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Netherlands	VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	3
The Earth Party Movement	Portugal	MPT	Movimento o Partido da Terra	2
Freedom and Solidarity	Slovakia	SaS	Sloboda a Solidarita	1
Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	Slovenia	DeSUS	Demokratska stranka upokojencev	1
Basque Nationalist Party – Convergence and Union	Spain	PNV-CiU	Partido Nacionalista Vasco	1
Union Progress and Democracy	Spain	UpyD	Unión Progreso y Democracia	4
Centre Party	Sweden	C	Centerpartiet	1
Liberal People's Party	Sweden	FP	Folkpartiet	2

ECR

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
New Flemish Alliance	Belgium (NL)	NV-A	Nieuw Vlaamse-Alliantie	4
Bulgaria without Censorship	Bulgaria	Бълг. без ценз.	България без цензура	2
Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević	Croatia	HSP-AS	Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević	1
Civic Democratic Party	Czech Republic	ODS	Občanská demokratická strana	2
Danish People's Party	Denmark	O	Dansk Folkeparti	4
Finns Party	Finland	PS	Perussuomalaiset	2
Alternative for Germany	Germany	AfD	Alternative für Deutschland	7
Conservatives	Great Britain	CON	Conservatives	19
Independent Greeks	Greece	ANEL	Anexartitoi Ellines	1
Fianna Fail	Ireland	FF	Fianna Fail	1
National Alliance	Latvia	NA	Nacionālā Apvienība	1
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	Lithuania	LLRA	Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija	1
Christian Union/Reformed Political Party	Netherlands	CU-SGP	Christenunie-Staatskundig	2
Ulster Unionist	Northern Ireland	UUP	Ulster Unionist	1
Law and Justice	Poland	PiS	KW Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	19
Poland Together	Poland	PR	KW Polska Razem	4
Coalition NOVA-KDS-OKS	Slovakia	NOVA	Koalícia strán NOVA - KDS - OKS	1
Ordinary People and Independent Persons	Slovakia	OL'aNO	Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osoby	1

EFD

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
Free Citizens' Party	Czech Republic	SSO	Strana svobodných občanů	1
UK Independence Party	Great Britain	UKIP	UK Independence Party	24
Five Star Movement	Italy	M5S	Movimento Cinque Stelle	17
Union of Greens and Farmers	Latvia	ZZS	Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība	1
Order and Justice	Lithuania	TT	Tvarka ir teisingumas	2
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	SD	Sverigedemokraterna	2

EPP

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
Austrian People's Party	Austria	ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei	5
Christian Social Party	Belgium (DE)	CSP(BE)	Christlich Soziale Partei	1
Humanist Democratic Centre	Belgium (FR)	CDH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste	1
Christian Democratic and Flemish	Belgium (NL)	CD&V	Christendemocratisch & Vlaams	2
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Bulgaria	ГЕРБ	Граждани за европейско развитие на България	6
Reformist Bloc	Bulgaria	Реф. блок	Реформаторски блок	1
Croatian Democratic Union	Croatia	HDZ	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica	5
Democratic Rally	Cyprus	DISY	Dimokratikós Sinayermós	2
Christian and Democratic Union – Czech Republic	Czech Republic	KDU-ČSL	Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá	3
Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09	Czech Republic	TOP09	Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita	4
Conservative People's Party	Denmark	C	De Konservative	1
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	Estonia	IRL	Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit	1
National Coalition Party	Finland	KOK	Kansallinen Kokoomus	3
Union for a Popular Movement	France	UMP	Union pour un Mouvement	20
Christian Democratic Union of Germany	Germany	CDU/CSU	Christlich Demokratische Union	34
New Democracy	Greece	ND	Nea Dimokratia	5
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union	Hungary	Fidesz-KDNP	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség	12
Forward Italy	Italy	FI	Forza Italia	13
New Centre-Right – Union of the Centre	Italy	NCD-UDC	Nuovo Centrodestra – Unione del Centro	3
Unity	Latvia	UNITY	Vienotība	4
Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats	Lithuania	TS-LKD	Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys	2
Christian Social People's Party	Luxembourg	CSV	Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei	3
Christian Democratic Appeal	Netherlands	CDA	Christen-democratisch Appèl	5
Civic Platform	Poland	PO	KW Platforma Obywatelska	19
Polish People's Party	Poland	PSL	KW Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	4
Alliance Portugal: PSD/CDS-PP	Portugal	PSD/CDS-PP	Aliança Portugal: PSD/CDS-PP	7
Democratic Liberal Party	Romania	PDL	Partidul Democrat-Liberal	5
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	Romania	UMDR	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară	2
National Liberal Party	Romania	PNL	Partidul Național Liberal	6
People's Movement Party	Romania	PMP	Partidul Mișcarea Populară	2
Bridge Party	Slovakia	Most-Híd	Most–Híd	1
Christian Democratic Movement	Slovakia	KDH	Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie	2
Party of the Hungarian Community	Slovakia	SMK	Magyar Közösség Pártja	1
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union –	Slovakia	SDKÚ-DS	Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia	1
New Slovenia – Christian People's Party	Slovenia	Nsi	Nova Slovenija – krščanska ljudska	1
Slovenian Democratic Party	Slovenia	SDS	Slovenska demokratska stranka	3
Slovenian People's Party	Slovenia	SLS	Slovenska ljudska stranka	1
People's Party	Spain	PP	Partido Popular	16
Christian Democrats	Sweden	KD	Kristdemokraterna	1
Moderate Party	Sweden	M	Moderaterna	3

Greens/EFA

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
The Greens – The Green Alternative	Austria	Grüne	Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative	3
Ecolo	Belgium (FR)	Ecolo	Ecolo	1
Green	Belgium (NL)	Groen	Groen	1
Croatian Sustainable Development	Croatia	OraH	Održivi razvoj Hrvatske	1
Socialist People's Party	Denmark	F	Socialistisk Folkeparti	1
Green League	Finland	VIHR	Vihreä liitto	1
Europe Ecology/The Greens	France	EELV	Europe Écologie Les Verts	6
Alliance '90/The Greens	Germany	B'90/Die Grünen	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	11
Green Party	Great Britain	GREENP	Green Party	3
Plaid Cymru	Great Britain	PC	Plaid Cymru	1
Scottish National Party	Great Britain	SNP	Scottish National Party	2
Politics Can Be Different	Hungary	LMP	Lehet Más a Politika	1
Latvian Russian Union	Latvia	LKS	Latvijas Krievu savienība	1
Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union	Lithuania	LVŽS	Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga	1
Greens	Luxembourg	Greng	Déi Gréng	1
Green Left	Netherlands	GL	Groenlinks	2
Equo – Commitment Coalition	Spain	EQUO-Compromís	Equo – Coalició Compromís	1
Republican Left of Catalonia	Spain	ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	2
Green Party	Sweden	MP	Miljöpartiet	4

GUE/NGL

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
Progressive Party of Working People	Cyprus	AKEL	Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazomenon	2
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	Czech Republic	KSČM	Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy	3
People's Movement against the EU	Denmark	N	Folkebevægelsen mod EU	1
Left Alliance	Finland	VAS	Vasemmistoliitto	1
Left Front	France	FG	Front de Gauche	3
The Left	Germany	LINKE	Die Linke	7
Coalition of the Radical Left - Unitary Socialist Party	Greece	SYRIZA	Synaspismós Rizospastikí	6
Sinn Féin	Ireland	SF	Sinn Féin	3
The Other Europe with Tsipras	Italy	TSIPRAS	L'Altra Europa con Tsipras	3
Party for the Animals	Netherlands	PvdD	Partij voor de Dieren	1
Socialist Party	Netherlands	SP	Socialistische Partij	2
Sinn Féin	Northern Ireland	SF	Sinn Féin	1
Democratic Unitarian Coalition	Portugal	CDU: PCP/PEV	Coligação Democrática Unitária	3
Left Bloc	Portugal	BE	Bloco de Esquerda	1
Galician Nationalist Bloc – Gather	Spain	BNG-Bildu	Bloque Nacionalista Galego	1
United Left	Spain	IU	Izquierda Unida	4
We Can	Spain	Podemos	Podemos	5
Left Party	Sweden	V	Vänsterpartiet	1

S&D

Social Democratic Party	Austria	SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei	5
Socialist Party	Belgium (FR)	PS	Parti Socialiste	3
Socialist Party Different	Belgium (NL)	sp.a	Socialistische Partij Ander	1
BSP – Coalition for Bulgaria	Bulgaria	БСП	БСП – Коалиция за Бълга	4
Democratic Party	Cyprus	DIKO	Dimokratikó Kómma	1
Movement for Social Democracy EDEK	Cyprus	EDEK	Kinima Sosialdimokraton E	1
Czech Social Democratic Party	Czech Republic	ČSSD	Česká strana sociálně dem	4
Social Democrats	Denmark	A	Socialdemokraterne	3
Social Democratic Party	Estonia	SDE	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erak	1
Social Democratic Party of Finland	Finland	SDP	Suomen Sosialidemokraat	2
Socialist Party	France	PS	Parti Socialiste	13
Social Democratic Party of Germany	Germany	SPD	Sozialdemokratische Parte	27
Labour	Great Britain	LAB	Labour	20
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	Greece	PASOK/EL	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kini	2
The River	Greece	RIV	To Potami	2
Hungarian Socialist Party	Hungary	MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	2
Democratic Coalition	Hungary	DK	Demokratikus Koalíció	2
Democratic Party	Italy	PD	Partito Democratico	31
Social Democratic Party "Harmony"	Latvia	SDPS	Saskaņa - sociāldemokrāti	1
Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	Latvia	LSDSP	Latvijas Sociāldemokrātisk	2
Social Democratic Party of Lithuania	Lithuania	LSDP	Lietuvos socialdemokratų p	2
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	Luxembourg	LSAP	Lëtzebuerger Sozialistescl	1
Labour Party	Netherlands	PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid	3
Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union	Poland	KW SLD-L	KKW Sojusz Lewicy Democ	5
Socialist Party	Portugal	PS	Partido Socialista	8
Social Democratic Party	Romania	PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	
Direction–Social Democracy	Slovakia	SMER-DS	Smer–sociálna demokraci	4
Social Democrats	Slovenia	SD	Socialni demokrati	1
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	Spain	PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero E	14
Swedish Social Democratic Party	Sweden	S	Socialdemokraterna	5
Feminist Initiative	Sweden	FI	Feministiskt initiativ	1
Kukuriku coalition	Croatia	Kukuriku	Kukuriku koalicija	4

NI (non-attached)

Party name (English)	Country	Abbreviation	Party name	EP seats
Freedom Party Of Austria	Austria	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österre	4
Flemish Interest	Belgium (NL)	VB	Vlaams Belang	1
National Front	France	FN	Front National	23
Communist Party of Greece	Greece	KKE	Kommounistiko Komma EL	2
Golden Dawn	Greece	XA	Chrysi Avgi	3
Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary	Hungary	Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mo	5
Northern League	Italy	LN	Lega Nord	4
Freedom Party	Netherlands	PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid	1
Democratic Unionist	Northern Ireland	DUP	Democratic Unionist	4
Congress of the New Right	Poland	KNP	KW Nowa Prawica	3

Annex 2: Issue statements and dimensions

For all the questions the response scale is:

- 1: Completely agree
- 2: Agree
- 3: Neither agree nor disagree
- 4: Disagree
- 5: Completely disagree

Sovereignty (anti EU)- integration (pro-EU) dimension:

- Q1: Country should never adopt the Euro
- Q2: To address financial crises, the EU should be able to borrow money just like states can
- Q3: A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other members states agree to it
- Q4: The right of EU citizens to work in [country] should be restricted
- Q5: There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of [country] to act independently
- Q6: The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions
- Q7: Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for [country]
- Q28: European integration has gone too far

Left-Right dimension:

- Q4: The right of EU citizens to work in [country] should be restricted
- Q10: Free market competition makes the health care system function better
- Q11: The number of public sector employees should be reduced
- Q12: The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy
- Q13: Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the poorest
- Q14: Protecting the environment is more important than fostering economic growth
- Q15: Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the economic crisis
- Q16: When a state rescues a bank it should take control over it (*removed later*)
- Q17: It should be easy for companies to fire people
- Q19: Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of [country]
- Q20: Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to combat crime
- Q21: To maintain public order, governments should be able to restrict demonstrations
- Q22: Less serious crimes should be punished with community service, not imprisonment

Q23: Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry

Q24: Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion

Q25: The recreational use of cannabis should be legal (*removed later*)

Q26: Islam is a threat to the values of [country]

Q27: Downloading copyright protected material from the internet should be allowed for private use

The left-right dimension can be further divided:

Law and Order:

Q20: Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to combat crime

Q21: To maintain public order, governments should be able to restrict demonstrations

Q22: Less serious crimes should be punished with community service, not imprisonment

Economic and fiscal issues:

Q10: Free market competition makes the health care system function better

Q11: The number of public sector employees should be reduced

Q12: The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy

Q13: Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the poorest

Q15: Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the economic crisis

Q16: When a state rescues a bank it should take control over it

Q17: It should be easy for companies to fire people

Social issues:

Q23: Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry

Q24: Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion

Q25: The recreational use of cannabis should be legal

Q27: Downloading copyright protected material from the internet should be allowed for private use (*removed later*)

Environment:

Q14: Protecting the environment is more important than fostering economic growth

Immigration:

Q4: The right of EU citizens to work in [country] should be restricted

Q19: Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of [country]

Q26: Islam is a threat to the values of [country]

These questions are not used on any dimension:

Q8: EU treaties should be decided by (name of national parliament) rather than by citizens in a referendum.

Q9: The EU should impose economic sanctions on Russia, even if this jeopardises gas supplies to EU countries

Q18: External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a good solution to crisis situations.

Annex 3: Coefficients of agreement per question

ALDE	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28		
	Completely agree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	6	4	10	1	1	4	0	2	0	1	0	4	13	11	2	0	1		
	Agree	0	7	3	2	12	14	1	5	12	8	15	6	11	4	14	3	12	14	14	1	4	13	5	10	1	5	1		
	Neither agree nor disagree	1	2	3	1	4	6	1	5	4	6	4	3	5	8	5	6	7	4	2	8	5	4	2	6	4	7	3		
	Disagree	11	7	12	11	4	4	5	11	9	5	3	6	9	14	15	4	15	2	10	12	14	1	5	11	13	12	10		
	Completely disagree	14	5	2	13	1	2	20	1	2	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	4	3	0	1	7	5	1		
	Total	27	23	21	27	27	27	27	27	24	25	26	27	27	27	27	24	25	25	26	26	23	23	27	25	27	23	25	27	
	Van der Elks's A	0.66	0.07	0.95	0.62	0.44	0.56	0.81	0.48	0.43	0.24	0.6	0.22	0.35	0.65	0.54	0.75	0.5	0.56	0.37	0.56	0.55	0.65	0.46	0.58	0.42	0.65	0.6	0.57	
	ECR	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
Completely agree		5	0	4	2	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	3	0	1	1	4	0	0	2	0	0	1	3		
Agree		1	4	8	3	4	9	2	2	3	4	6	5	8	7	6	7	6	4	3	10	5	2	5	3	2	3	1		
Neither agree nor disagree		3	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	3	5	2	4	2	4	7	3	4	5	4	7	4	3	5	3	2	5	2		
Disagree		7	5	5	8	6	3	10	6	5	1	6	5	1	6	5	4	5	4	5	5	1	4	7	4	6	4	4		
Completely disagree		18	16	17	18	18	18	18	17	14	17	18	17	18	17	18	18	15	18	18	15	13	17	18	17	17	14	11	18	
Total		47	40	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	
Van der Elks's A		-0.02	0.64	0.71	0.66	0.61	0.15	0.54	0.53	0.23	0.44	0.38	0.35	0.49	0.67	0.3	0.49	0.5	0.3	0.57	0.37	0.47	0.33	0.42	0.28	0.75	0.61	0.71	0.32	
EPDP		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
	Completely agree	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		
	Agree	1	2	1	1	4	3	1	3	1	3	3	2	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	4	0	3	0	1	0	2	0		
	Neither agree nor disagree	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	3	2	3	2	0	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	
	Disagree	1	2	5	1	1	3	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	3	1	3	0	1	2	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	
	Completely disagree	3	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	2	5	1	1		
	Total	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	4	5	6	
	Van der Elks's A	0.47	0.5	0.8	0.17	0.67	-0.42	0.11	0.75	0.6	0.17	0.75	0.22	0.42	0.17	0.42	0.37	0.42	0.5	0.3	0.57	0.37	0.47	0.33	0.42	0.28	0.75	0.61	0.71	0.32
	EPP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
Completely agree		3	6	3	1	8	11	4	0	3	2	5	1	22	13	3	9	1	1	1	1	1	2	7	25	13	0	5	4	
Agree		7	4	3	1	15	2	7	3	16	1	6	3	4	6	1	9	4	4	8	4	1	1	3	2	2	2	6	3	
Neither agree nor disagree		12	7	12	15	10	1	7	3	6	1	6	2	5	18	3	14	12	20	19	15	2	4	4	11	13	5	12	12	
Disagree		14	3	1	17	5	1	17	15	4	19	14	15	0	3	15	1	16	12	7	9	15	0	4	2	7	18	3	12	
Completely disagree		40	29	35	40	39	40	39	40	38	34	40	40	40	39	40	36	39	36	38	38	38	36	40	39	38	35	35	40	
Total		75	63	68	69	67	67	68	61	57	49	6	54	0.51	0.63	0.58	0.32	0.58	0.42	0.54	0.51	0.42	0.29	0.46	0.25	0.62	0.63	0.51	0.65	
Van der Elks's A		0.75	0.33	0.51	0.68	0.69	0.7	0.85	0.61	0.57	0.49	0.6	0.54	0.51	0.63	0.58	0.32	0.58	0.42	0.54	0.51	0.42	0.29	0.46	0.25	0.62	0.63	0.51	0.65	
GreensEFA		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
	Completely agree	2	1	2	0	4	5	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2		
	Agree	0	7	4	3	10	11	1	6	6	4	4	1	6	5	3	7	2	6	5	4	2	10	4	7	3	2	4	0	
	Neither agree nor disagree	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	10	3	4	3	4	6	5	3	2	1	0	2	1	4	0	
	Disagree	5	6	8	10	1	1	1	1	6	9	11	1	3	8	5	5	11	3	8	7	11	1	2	0	1	7	1	0	
	Completely disagree	10	1	5	1	1	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Total	16	17	19	19	19	19	19	17	16	19	18	19	19	19	19	19	17	19	19	18	18	18	19	19	17	17	17	19	
	Van der Elks's A	0.27	0.19	0.43	0.74	0.24	0.76	0.74	0.72	0.44	0.68	0.42	0.82	0.76	0.45	0.7	0.38	0.78	0.78	0.58	0.63	0.88	0.82	0.83	0.69	0.78	0.11	0.88	0.47	0.45
	GUE/NGL	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
Completely agree		1	0	2	0	0	5	2	1	0	1	1	5	2	7	2	2	2	1	0	7	1	1	4	5	8	0	3	0	
Agree		6	1	3	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7	1	1	4	5	8	0	3	0	
Neither agree nor disagree		2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Disagree		6	1	4	5	7	1	8	7	4	3	6	5	4	3	2	4	0	5	8	6	6	4	3	2	6	4	4	5	
Completely disagree		4	5	0	5	3	2	5	4	3	6	3	9	1	7	1	0	7	1	6	2	1	3	1	3	1	5	1	3	
Total		18	10	14	17	17	15	18	17	11	17	16	18	18	18	18	18	15	16	13	18	17	13	13	17	16	15	18	12	17
Van der Elks's A		0.38	-0.11	0.8	0.38	0.34	0.62	0.24	0.75	0.55	0.94	0.66	0.8	0.94	0.61	0.83	0.64	0.94	0.88	0.55	0.45	0.69	0.69	0.8	0.83	0.21	0.75	0.53	0.31	
S&D		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
	Completely agree	6	1	5	0	3	3	6	0	2	4	4	4	5	7	1	4	2	3	1	8	0	3	3	6	6	3	5	3	5
	Agree	4	6	5	8	4	12	5	4	4	9	2	8	5	7	8	3	2	7	6	9	5	5	3	2	4	5	5	5	
	Neither agree nor disagree	3	1	4	3	3	3	3	5	1	2	3	5	3	10	4	4	3	6	1	4	2	3	3	2	1	0	5	5	
	Disagree	8	6	9	8	2	6	8	2	6	8	6	7	5	8	5	5	8	10	8	12	9	5	6	2	5	10	2	4	5
	Completely disagree	21	6	20	24	22	17	17	17	13	17	25	23	16	1	0	4	4	2	16	2	24	6	1	8	4	7	3	0	5
	Total	25	20	26	24	22	26	26	24	17	25	23	25	24	24	24	24	23	25	23	25	24	22	19	22	22	22	24	26	26
	Van der Elks's A	0.7	0.55	0.69	0.65	0.66	0.83	0.84	0.52	0.29	0.65	0.38	0.75	0.75	0.67	0.3	0.56	0.8	0.43	0.4	0.53	0.46	0.78	0.51	0.82	0.5	0.67	0.43	0.68	0.68

	N																												
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
Completely agree	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	3	2	3	2	0	2	1	2	1	3	0	2	3	2	2	2	1	0	1
Agree	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	3	1	5	2	3	2	2	2	2	4	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	1
Neither agree nor disagree	0	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	5	1	3	0	3	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	3	4	1
Disagree	2	2	3	3	4	4	2	3	4	3	5	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	5	3	0	0	1	3	4	6	1	1
Completely disagree	5	2	0	3	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	5	0	3	0	2	1	2	3	1	0	1	3	1	2	0	0	3	1
Total	10	9	8	10	9	10	9	10	9	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	10	10	10	9	7	8	9	8	9	8	4	10
Van der Elj's A	0.68	0.75	0.75	0.44	0.68	0.68	0.63	0.8	0.65	0.67	-0.05	0.35	0.23	0.11	0.48	0.2	0.27	0.2	0.8	0.61	0.04	0.31	0.38	0.73	0.33	0.68	0.65	0.44	0.85
	NI without KKE																												
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	
Completely agree	7	0	4	5	0	0	0	6	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	3	2	0	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	7
Agree	1	0	5	3	1	1	2	1	1	0	3	4	4	3	0	2	3	3	0	2	3	3	0	1	1	1	2	1	1
Neither agree nor disagree	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	0	3	2	1	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	1	3	1	1
Disagree	0	3	0	0	2	2	6	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Completely disagree	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	8	9	9	9	9	9	7	9
Total	0.83	0.72	0.78	0.59	0.65	0.67	0.78	0.61	0.69	0.15	0.5	0.26	0.12	0.72	0.33	0.19	0.11	0.83	0.75	0.15	0.42	0.61	0.7	0.48	0.65	0.78	0.5	0.83	
Van der Elj's A																													