Bachelor thesis
Responsiveness of Right-wing Populist Parties in Germany, France and Britain to Public Anti-immigration Attitudes

To what extent do the party manifestos of right-wing populist parties in France, Germany and the UK reflect public attitudes on immigration?

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The elections for the European Parliament in 2014 have been marked by the strong results of right-wing populist parties in many countries. In France, the Front National (FN) became the strongest party with 24.86% of votes, a success reproduced by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which gained 26.77% of the votes in the UK. In Germany, the newly created Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) obtained 7.10% of votes for its first participation in the European elections. Various scholars have investigated on the rise of right-wing populist parties in recent years and came to different explanations. On the one hand, this rise of right-wing populist parties can be seen as a sign for euro-skepticism in many member states of the EU. On the other hand, it can also be an image of increasing levels of anti-immigration attitudes in many European societies and some scientists suggest that there is a relationship between euro-skepticism and anti-immigration attitudes (cf. de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005, Lubbers & Scheepers 2007). Consistently, all three mentioned parties not only oppose to the European Union, but also refer to immigration as one of the salient issues of current politics and claim stronger regulations on immigration.

This study focuses on the immigration related reasons for people to vote for right-wing populist parties. These reasons are diverse again, but many scientists point out that (socio-)economic considerations, including both the fear of labor competition and pressure on the welfare state can lead to anti-immigration attitudes (cf. O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Spier 2010, Bridges and Mateut 2014). Another reason for people to vote for right-wing populist parties is perceived cultural threat through immigrants (Chandler and Tsai 2001, Sides and Citrin 2007). Next to these explanations, politics also matter. As Loxbo (2014) has demonstrated for the Swedish case, voter’s perceptions of convergence between mainstream parties on immigration can create political opportunity structures for right-wing populist parties to represent themselves as an alternative to mainstream parties and thereby cast votes. Rydgren (2004) has shown for the Danish case that right-wing populist parties can be successful when exploiting a political niche. As a combination of both aspects,
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) argue that both socio-economic conditions and political opportunity structures matter. Further reasons for people to vote for anti-immigration parties are perceived insecurity through and a connection between immigrants and crime (Dinas and van Spanje 2011) as well as increased mediatization of immigration (Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2007). These findings suggest that there are multiple reasons for people to consider immigration as a threat and to be afraid of it. This offers right-wing populist parties the opportunity to catch people’s fears and respond to them via their policy propositions in order to gain voters.

The present study deals with the way right-wing populist parties take on these fears and respond to levels of anti-immigration attitudes in their countries. Different scholars have dealt with the emergence of a new right-wing party family in Europe (cf. Thränhardt 1995, Rydgren 2005, Grabow and Hartleb 2013) or had a look at the specific parties this assignment will compare (cf. amongst others Schmidt 2003, Balent 2013 for the FN; Häusler 2013, Kemper 2013 for the AfD; Abedi and Lundberg 2009, Ford et al. 2012 for UKIP), but also examined the relationship of national identity and attitudes towards immigration (cf. Betz 2003, Heath and Tilley 2005, Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005). However, there are few studies on the relationship of voter’s attitudes towards immigration and parties’ positioning on this topic, especially concerning the AfD and regarding recent trends in Europe. The subject is therefore not only of general relevance, but also has a connection to topical political issues. More particularly, as immigration remains a current phenomenon in many European countries that people are concerned about, it will be important for political and societal actors to know about people’s attitudes and to be aware of the potential for right-wing populist parties to exploit these concerns. This can help them defining strategies for coping with people’s fears and facing the challenge of populism.

1.2 Research question

In the following, the theoretical framework underlying this study, as well as the research question and hypotheses derived from it will be exposed. The assumption fundamental to this assignment is based on Anthony Downs’ work on the dynamics of party ideologies from his *Economic Theory of Democracy* (Downs 1957). According to Downs, political parties want to attract voters and they will adopt an ideology
following voter’s preferences in order to do so. If we think of a spatial left-right dimension covering issues related to immigration, ranging from total denial to total approval of immigration, voters will be placed on this dimension according to their preferences. In our case, we have different dimensions for each specific issue we are investigating on. We should expect the analyzed right-wing populist parties to position themselves somewhere on the right end of each dimension, depending on the distribution of their potential voters on this dimension.

Further, a party’s ideology has a certain spread and may cover different, more and less extreme preferences, as long as another party does not capture them. This means that the success for a given party also depends on the ideological position of other parties right and left from it. Right-wing populist parties may be successful in attracting voters who reject increasing levels of immigration by adopting extreme positions that other parties do not cover at all or not as convincing as right-wing populist parties.

In addition to this, I refer to the political opportunity structures model as described by Arzheimer and Carter (2006; cf. Kitschelt 1986, Van Der Brug et al. 2005, Loxbo 2014) to explain the rise of right-wing populist parties. More particularly, I rely on what Arzheimer and Carter (2006) describe as short-term contextual variables. In this case, they can be categorized as high levels of immigration and negative economic conditions that may lead to a feeling of “competition between immigrants and the indigenous population” (Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 424). This means that people are afraid of immigrants and economic pressure, which provides right-wing populist parties with the possibility of attracting votes by taking on people’s fears. I therefore expect the examined right-wing populist parties in this study to respond to people’s feelings and base their success upon them. Following the approach of Loxbo (2014), I argue that levels of immigration and economic competition do not necessarily have to be high de facto, but that voters’ perceptions about these phenomena matter¹. If many people fear high levels of immigration and/or economic competition and

¹ In addition, Citrin and Sides (2008) have shown that people tend to overestimate the number of immigrants in their country.
therefore evolve negative attitudes towards immigration, this can be regarded as a political opportunity structure for right-wing populist parties.

As populists who display themselves as the representatives of the people (cf. Taguieff 1998, Taggart 2000, Decker 2004, Priester 2012, Hartleb 2013), I expect parties to absorb feelings about immigration and to integrate them into their discourse. As anti-immigration attitudes are higher within the population, right-wing populist parties will propose stronger measures to regulate or stop immigration, while their postulations should be less severe as anti-immigration attitudes are weaker in the population. Following these ideas and given the underlying data sources, my research question is:

To what extent do the party manifestos of right-wing populist parties in France, Germany and the UK reflect public attitudes on immigration?

On the grounds of this question and the underlying theory, I propose two hypotheses that will be tested through the analysis of the party documents at hand. My first hypothesis (H1) displays my fundamental assumption that right-wing populist parties should adopt an immigration position following the degree of refusal in their respective country. It can be formulated as follows: right-wing populist parties will be more strongly opposed to immigration if the public in their respective country is. I will test this hypothesis by comparing the overall immigration attitude for each country with each party’s position on immigration in general.

Although the first hypothesis should already generate some insightful results, we can get more specific outcome by using a second hypothesis (H2): right-wing populist party positions on particular immigration-related issues are defined by the salience of the issue in their country. This hypothesis follows the idea that not all immigration related issues may have the same relevance in all analyzed countries. This hypothesis will be tested by analyzing the party positions for particular issues as displayed in their manifestos.

In the following, I will present an overview on right-wing populism for a better understanding of the type of party we are dealing with. This will enable us to see whether the three chosen parties can actually be compared with each other. I then
explain how I linked people’s attitudes to party positions and which themes I used to investigate on party positions concerning immigration. The last part of this assignment consists of the analysis of the party documents and people’s attitudes and the relation between both, followed by a conclusion and implications.

2. Contextualization: Right-wing populism

The purpose of this thesis is to compare right-wing populist parties from France, Germany and the United Kingdom. As the concept of right-wing populism is quite controversial (cf. Decker 2004, Spier 2010, Grabow and Hartleb 2013, Pelinka 2013), it has to be defined in a first step before comparing the three cases. Not only do we have to explain the meaning of right-wing populism, but we also have to distinguish the associated parties from other forms of right-wing parties. Finally, we have to check whether the compared parties, AfD, FN and UKIP, can be attributed to the same category of right-wing populism, as a comparison between their behaviors towards immigration is only plausible if they have similar characteristics and can be assigned to the same type of party.

As Decker describes it, the term populism has made its way into the public debate and is used as a “swearword” (2004: 21, see also Rensmann 2006: 59) to depreciate political rivals. The word populism, partly used synonymously or confused with demagogy, includes a negative judgment without being precise with regards to content, which makes its use problematic from a scientific point of view (see also Taguieff 1998, Mudde 2004). Due to its impreciseness, many scientists do not use the term right-wing populism and prefer terms such as right-wing extremism, right-wing radicalism or radical right-wing populism or even use all of them synonymously (cf. Rydgren 2003, Decker 2004, Spier 2010). However, Decker argues that populism and extremism don’t tap the same concept (Decker 2004: 162) and according to Grabow and Hartleb, the difference between right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties is that the latter “don’t make use of militias or bunches of thugs” (2013: 19), so they are missing the violence element common to many extremist or radical parties.
Instead of using violence, the type of party we are looking at uses populism to gain voters’ attraction and to get elected. While Taggart (2010) points out that “it is very difficult to see a consistent pattern” (10) to define populism, it is often referred to as a political strategy or style, which is used to link a political leader, party or movement with the people. These are seen as a single unit with certain values and needs whom the populists will claim to defend against the establishment or the elite (cf. Taguieff 1998, Taggart 2000, Decker 2004, Mudde 2004, Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Spier 2010, Priester 2012, Pelinka 2013). This anti-establishment attitude is very common to right-wing populist parties and can be seen as a key characteristic of them. The targeted establishment is defined as corrupt elites and a political system that is perceived as not serving the people, but rather representing “special interests” (Taggart 2000: 93) of minority groups such as feminists, environmentalists or immigrants. Cas Mudde (2004), who refers to populism as an ideology rather than a political style considers this dualism of the elite and the people as constitutional to populism. Across Europe, right-wing populist parties blame the EU for being “bureaucratic, undemocratic and centralized” (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 33) and for constituting a threat to national sovereignty. They perceive the EU as the establishment and therefore make it their enemy.

The concept of representing the people includes the assertion that populists say the truth about political issues and break taboos, while the establishment is lying about these issues or not even talking about them (cf. Kallis 2013, Ramonaitė and Ratkevičiūtė 2013). We can find this self-portrayal as ‘telling the truth’ and being the people’s advocate in the analyzed parties’ manifestos and other public documents. As an example, UKIP claims being “the only party being honest about immigration, [...] the only one offering a real alternative” (UKIP 2014: 3).

In order to achieve that the ‘voice of the people’ is heard and that ‘the people’s will’ is implemented against the elites, right-wing populist parties often claim direct democracy (cf. Taggart 2000: 103, Decker 2004: 225 ff., Rydgren 2006, Pauwels 2013, Raunio 2013). The AfD, for instance, claims referendums and public opinion polls following the “Swiss example”, which can be seen as a reference to the issues of

However, not only right-wing populist parties use the strategy of defending the people against the establishment. Similar strategies can be found among left-wing parties, such as the German party Die Linke. The difference between left- and right-wing populism is whether they are inclusionary or exclusionary (Pelinka 2013: 7, Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 17). Left-wing populism is “predominantly inclusionary” (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 17) and, based on a critique of capitalism, argues in favor of the social inclusion of the underprivileged. Right-wing populism, on the other hand, is exclusionary by creating the idea of ‘us’ as the in-group, which is opposed to ‘them’ or ‘the other’ as the out-group (cf. Priester 2012, Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 18, Pelinka 2013: 6). For most right-wing populist parties today, the out-group consists of the European Union on a vertical dimension and asylum seekers, ethnic minorities and (mainly Muslim) immigrants on a horizontal dimension (Spier 2010: 21). Geert Wilders’ Party For Freedom in the Netherlands is one of the most known examples for this type of parties. It is both highly critical on the European Union and multiculturalism and immigration, especially from Muslim countries. But at the same time, the party dissociates itself from traditional right-wing or fascist ideologies, including open racism and anti-Semitism (Romeyn 2014). On the contrary, it claims defending freedom, democracy and human rights, which is why it would refuse the entry of Muslim immigration it blames to be a threat to these values (Häusler 2013: 14). Given these characteristics, Häusler (2003) describes the party as the modernized right, as distinguished from the traditional extreme right (16). Table 1 shows the characteristics of the former in comparison to the latter.

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2 Switzerland recently had two major referendums: the ban on the construction of minarets in 2009 and the restriction of immigration from EU-countries in 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional extreme right</th>
<th>Modernized right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive reference to fascism</td>
<td>Proclaimed renunciation from the extreme right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open refusal of democracy</td>
<td>Tactical support for “direct democracy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proclaimed fall of the system</td>
<td>Transformation of democracy to the right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascist racism (&quot;völkischer Rassismus&quot;), anti-Semitism</td>
<td>Economization, culturalization and religious euphemism of racism; renunciation from open anti-Semitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies: Jews, foreigners, the left, EU</td>
<td>Enemies: Muslims, multiculturalism, political correctness, EU-bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference points: race, nation, Europe of the nation/people</td>
<td>Reference points: tradition, culture, religion, homeland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: differences between the traditional extreme and the modernized right (according to Häusler 2003; translation by the author)

If we look at these characteristics, we can conclude that neither the FN nor UKIP or AfD can be considered as parties of the traditional extreme right, although the FN has for a long time shown aspects of traditional right-wing extremism. Since the election of Marine Le Pen as the new president, though, the party has faced a modification of its ideology in several ways (Beauzamy 2013: 182). While under her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party was openly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic, today it presents itself in a different light. Islam is now the main enemy, as well as the political establishment, especially the EU (Balent 2013: 162).

Another characteristic that is often attributed to right-wing populist parties is the existence of a prominent party leader, playing a prominent role in the perception of the party and its success (Taggart 2000, Decker 2006, Spier 2010). All parties in the scope of this study have such a charismatic leader. The FN’s leader is its president Marine Le Pen, while Nigel Farage is UKIP’s party leader and the AfD is under the lead of Bernd Lucke.

What is also common to right-wing populist parties is the demand for a strong rule of law (Spier 2010: 25; cf. Hartleb 2013, Heinisch 2013, Pauwels 2013, Ramonaitė and Ratkevičiūtė 2013). The request for strict law enforcement is a symbol for a strong and self-determined state and, as the party documents show, is often linked to immigration via the bias of national security. We can find this call for a strong state in all three party manifestos. Thus, the FN declares wanting to increase the judiciary’s
budget by 25% within five years and claims “zero tolerance” in matters of security (FN 2012a: 7), the AfD wants to provide the judiciary with more materiel, financial and staff means and increase police presence, “especially in rural regions and those close to the border” (AfD 2014a: 21), while UKIP wants to “scrap the misconceived Human Rights Act [to enable the] deportation of dangerous Imams, terror suspects and criminals to countries where they are wanted for trial” (UKIP 2010: 6).

Based on the above, we can draw a list of characteristics defining right-wing populism. Table 2 regroups these characteristics and shows whether AfD, FN and UKIP, based on an analysis of their party manifestos and websites, fulfill them and can therefore be regarded as right-wing populist parties. As we see, all three parties show attributes that mark them as right-wing populists. Based on this finding, we can draw a comparison of their strategies and positions on immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>AfD</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of populism as a style/strategy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong party leader</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment attitude/anti-EU</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim for ‘direct democracy’</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Telling the truth’, representing ‘the people’</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing immigration, claiming restricted immigration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conserving ‘national identity’</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and order policy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: characteristics of right-wing populist parties and classification of AfD, FN and UKIP

3. Methodology

3.1 The case selection

Choosing France, Germany and the United Kingdom as cases for my comparison is plausible for reasons that go beyond the fact that I speak all of the three languages. Lying at the core of the European Union, these countries have political and economic power and one might suggest that their political actions will impact other member states of the EU, whether it is indirectly as examples for other countries or directly via EU policies. More importantly, the fact that they are and have been leading nations in economic terms after the Second World War has made them attractive to and, at
times, depending on immigration. They are not only the biggest European Economies, but also important countries of immigration (Algan et al. 2010). All three countries have faced repeated periods of immigration, starting from the 1950s until today (cf. Fassmann and Münz 1992, Hansen 2003). While immigrants initially came to work in the growing economies after the Second World War, a more recent phenomenon are asylum seekers (Hansen 2003). Today, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, are still among the ten countries with the largest number of international migrants, as the International Migration Report 2013 of the United Nations (2013a) shows. The UK had a total number of 7,8 million international migrants in 2013, which accounts for 12,4 % of the total population. France hosted 7,4 million international migrants, which was 11,4 % of the population, and Germany had 9,8 million migrants, equal to 11,9 % of the total population (United Nations 2013b). An important aspect in the analysis of migration into the selected countries as well as their immigration policies and the political discussion on immigration is that they have all developed “comparatively advanced welfare states since the late nineteenth century which delimit themselves outwardly” (Dörr and Faist 1997: 402). Despite differences in the conception of nationality and citizenship as well as the institutional arrangement of their welfare states, the countries’ welfare states play an important role in the context of immigration (cf. Dörr and Faist 1997, Hansen 2003). As the analysis will show, the national welfare state is at the core of the discourse about immigration and its presumed surcharge is a point that right-wing populist parties like to emphasize.

Put together, all three countries have a history of immigration since the 1950s and they still continue to be attractive to immigrants due to their economic power. At the same time, they have all faced opposition against immigration from the public, as well as political actors (Hansen 2003: 27 ff.). In this context, a comparison of the discursive strategies of right-wing populist parties in these three countries is relevant and can be insightful for further research on right-wing populism and anti-immigration attitudes.

Once the countries have been chosen, the choice of the parties is logic. The idea of this study is to compare right-wing populist parties in all three countries and their
behavior in response to anti-immigration attitudes within the population. The three present parties - AfD, FN and UKIP - have been the most successful parties from this category in their respective countries during the last elections. The German AfD has not only made it into the European Parliament as a political newcomer in 2013, but also entered three German regional parliaments in 2014 with about 10 % in each case. The French FN was even more successful in recent elections: party leader Marine Le Pen obtained almost 18 % in the 2012 presidential elections and the FN got more than 13 % in the parliamentary elections that same year. UKIP, founded in 1993, has had rather little success in British national elections so far\(^3\), but has gained 6,2 % in the 2013 regional elections in England and Wales and, more importantly, won almost 28 % in the elections for the European Parliament in 2014.

### 3.2 Methodological approach

This assignment compares strategies of different parties in different countries as a response to people’s attitudes concerning immigration in these countries. The aim is to distinguish different degrees of immigration denial and investigate on different party strategies to approach the issue. This will be done in a qualitative way, following the idea that the party propositions “are not expressed in numbers or proportions” (Sivesind 1999: 364). A qualitative analysis allows me to understand the “intentions, norms, and values that the actors [the parties; note from the author] use as a basis for their utterances and actions” (Sivesind 1999: 363). The analysis of the party statements on different issues will be based on the theme-coding technique as described by Sivesind (1999), using a hand-coding technique. Sentences from the different manifestos will be attributed to different issues or themes and will then be compared.

### 3.3 Data collection

The study of party positions on immigration is done using party manifestos. Advantages of election manifestos in the analysis of party positions are their objectivity as well as the displayed salience of issues, but also a clear and simple

\(^3\) One might argue that this is due to the British electoral and party system, which benefits to mainstream parties.
language and the representation of the party as a single actor (cf. Budge 2001, Marks et al. 2007, Gemenis 2012). However, considerable variation in their volume being a shortcoming in comparing manifestos from different parties and countries⁴ (Marks et al. 2007), I decided to include not only national, but also regional manifestos in case of the AfD and UKIP, and national party guidelines for the AfD. This approach is not without any risk, though, as a discussion on the data underlying the Comparative Manifestos Project⁵ shows (cf. Hansen 2008, Gemenis 2013), because their might be differences in national and regional party positions. However, regional manifestos are part of a party’s public self-representation and one can expect them to display the general party positions. As parties would want to convince their voters on all levels, there is no reason to assume that the content of regional manifestos should significantly differ from what is represented in the national party manifestos. A restriction might be, of course, that regional authorities have different competencies than national authorities and parties will therefore mention different issues in their regional manifestos than they would in national manifestos. Yet, if we find statements about the issues we are looking for, we should expect them to be in line with the national party program. In addition, as Fabre (2013) has shown for the case of Spain and Britain, federal parties are often involved in the adoption of regional election manifestos. Thorlakson (2013) confirms these findings with a broader analysis, including Britain and Germany. She shows that there is a considerable degree of ideological congruence and shared goals between national and regional parties, and this is particularly true for populist parties (Thorlakson 2013: 723).

The counterpart of the party manifesto analysis is the measurement of people’s attitudes towards immigration, which is done using quantitative data from the European Social Survey 2012 (ESS). It contains six questions dealing with peoples’ attitudes towards immigration. The first one is whether immigration is considered

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⁴ For instance, the AfD was founded only month before the latest German federal elections in 2013 and its national party manifesto contains only 4 pages, while its regional manifestos are way more elaborated.

⁵ The Comparative Manifestos Project is a program analyzing party manifestos from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945 (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/).
good or bad for a country’s economy. A second question asks whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, followed by a third question about the country’s cultural life and whether it is undermined or enriched by immigrants. These three questions are measured on an 11-point scale ranging from bad/worse/undermined (equal 0) to good/better/enriched (equal to 10). These general issues are followed by some more specific questions about who should be permitted to enter the country. Subsequently, a fourth question asks whether many/few immigrants from poor countries outside Europe should be accepted. Question five is whether many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority should be granted entry and questions six is whether many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group from majority should be allowed to come to the country. The answers to these questions are displayed on a four-point scale, ranging from many, few and some to none.

### 3.4 Selection of themes

An inductive approach will be used to generate the themes under investigation. This means that I will analyze the party manifestos, searching for similar statements related to immigration to compare the party positions concerning different issues. However, as Laver et al. (2003) point out, it is impossible to do purely inductive analysis of political texts, as one always makes assumptions about “the substantive meaning of the underlying policy dimensions” (313). I wouldn’t have chosen the present parties if I were without any expectations regarding their positions on the immigration issue. Moreover, the choice of my themes is conditioned by the questions of the ESS, as I want to make a connection between party positions and peoples’ attitudes as measured by the ESS. Therefore, the themes are based on the party manifestos, but are also affected by the ESS questions.

Unfortunately, the issues covered by the party documents do not completely match with those investigated by the ESS. For example, the ESS only asks about poorer countries outside Europe, while the parties are also concerned with those within Europe. This is well displayed by politicians worrying about immigrants coming from Romania and Bulgaria, a quite recent matter as media coverage shows (cf. Bran et al. 2013, Roser 2013, Roßmann 2013, Syal 2013, Morris 2014). More generally, the
wording of the ESS questions differs from how the parties approach the same or nearly the same issues. In order to compare both data sources, the themes from the party manifestos will be matched with the ESS questions as far as possible, trying to achieve plausible congruence.

The aforementioned matching procedure led to the creation of four themes. The first theme (1) is *Overall immigration attitude*, which regroups all party statements that couldn’t be assigned to a more specified theme and that talk about immigration in general. As there is no ESS question that deals with overall immigration acceptance or refusal, I calculated the average scores for refusing attitudes towards immigration from all six ESS questions. In case of the 4-point scaled questions, I considered the pre-formulated answer *allow none* as an expression of immigration refusal. For the 11-point scaled questions, the purpose was to transform the 11 answers into 4, so they would be comparable to the 4-point questions. Though 11 is not divisible by 4, I considered values 0, 1 and 2 (more than \( \frac{1}{4} \)) as expressions for anti-immigration attitudes. The sum of the values of these answers constitutes the percentage of negative attitudes towards immigration for each question and each country, from which I then calculated the average score of overall immigration refusal (see table 3).

The second theme (2) is immigration and *the economy, the welfare state and public services*, which is related to the ESS question about whether people consider immigrants as being good or bad for the economy. Although this question does not explicitly include the welfare state or public services, it relates to immigrants as a potential threat to the economy, which can also be understood as a financial burden on the welfare state and public services.

As for the third theme (3), it can be described as immigration in the context of *security, rule of law and the country as a good place to live*. This theme is based on the analysis of party statements on the one hand, and the ESS question whether immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live on the other. There is no

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6 One could criticize this choice, but as I am studying populist and not extremist parties, I suggest that only including values 0 and 1 (less than \( \frac{1}{4} \)) would exclude respondents with moderate instead of extreme anti-immigration attitudes.
specific ESS question about security and rule of law, but in the party documents these issues are frequently mentioned in a context that can be understood as relating to the country as a good place to live, and the chosen question is hence used as a proxy.

A fourth theme (4) is asylum seekers and immigration from poorer countries. Asylum seekers are mostly from poorer countries and this fact leads some politicians to refer to them as “refugees driven by poverty” (Tretbar and Dernbach 2013). Against this background, it is plausible to link the ESS question about immigration from poorer countries outside Europe with the parties’ concern about asylum seekers. It seems worth noting though, that the analyzed parties do not only seem to fear immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, but also from those inside Europe. Although these countries are not within the scope of the ESS question, it can be argued that it is the fact that these countries are poor that people are afraid of, regardless of their geographic location. Otherwise, one could also imagine including immigrants from poorer countries into the economic theme, as parties might consider them a threat to the welfare system. However, asylum seekers constitute a distinct issue in the party manifestos and I therefore decided to assign them to an autonomous theme. This will allow me to obtain more specific results within the scope of the second hypothesis.

These four themes will be the background of the analysis of the party documents. As they tap different issues and respond to different questions of the ESS catalogue, I will deal with each theme separately and examine whether different issues are of different salience in different countries and whether these differences in public opinion are displayed in the respective party statements.

3.5 Limitations

The present assignment does not allow for definite statements about how right-wing populist parties in general respond to public opinions, as it comprises only three countries and three parties and therefore has only limited informative value for other cases. Moreover, there is only one observation point (2012) for measuring public opinions, which makes it difficult to make statements about causality due to a missing longitudinal design. In addition, the used party manifestos are not from the
same year, as national elections take place at different times in different countries. Moreover, I have included party manifestos from different points in time for the different parties to obtain a better overview of the party’s ideology. For instance, UKIP’s last national election manifesto dates from 2010, while its local manifesto dates from 2014. The idea was to include both in order to get a better understanding of the party’s ideology. However, the party’s ideology might have changed over time due to a change in public attitudes. A comparison between the ESS data for 2010 and 2012 shows, though, that there hasn’t been a major change in public attitudes in Britain during this time, and neither has it in Germany or France. Therefore, what was true in 2010 should still be true in 2014, and there has probably neither occurred a major shift in public and party attitudes in Germany and the AfD between 2013 and 2014. While we cannot make assumptions about causality on the grounds of this data, we can still make statements about congruence and use this as a further step for a more elaborated study with the goal to find out more about causal inference.

Another shortcoming of this assignment lies in the fact that the ESS questions do not entirely match with the issues raised in the party manifestos and that the connection made between both via the selected themes might be different than expected in reality. Although the selection of the themes is based on theoretical assumptions, particular questions could be interpreted in one sense or another and respondents might think about them in a different way than I suppose.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigration good or bad for country’s economy</th>
<th>Immigrants make country worse or better place to live</th>
<th>Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants</th>
<th>Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe</th>
<th>Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority</th>
<th>Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority</th>
<th>Average score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accumulated refusal (%)</td>
<td>Most open refusal (%)</td>
<td>Accumulated refusal (%)</td>
<td>Most open refusal (%)</td>
<td>Accumulated refusal (%)</td>
<td>Most open refusal (%)</td>
<td>Refusal (%)</td>
<td>Refusal (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19,8</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>18,5</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
<td>16,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>23,7</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>21,8</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>23,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Accumulated and averaged scores for immigration refusal based on ESS data (2012), author’s calculation.
4. Results

4.1 Overall immigration attitude (H1)

If we look at the overall attitudes towards immigration, we find noticeable differences between the three countries. In Britain, the overall refusal of immigration is the highest, with 19.63 % on average (Table 3). Moreover, 12.2 % of the respondents show entire refusal of immigration, which means that they consider immigration as totally bad for their country’s economy, cultural life and living conditions and they want to allow no immigrations at all, regardless of their origins or economic status. France shows the second highest refusal, with an overall 15.02 % and 9.38 % on average concerning total refusal. Germany is quite far away from these scores, with an average of 6.53 % and some 3.73 % for total refusal. If we have a closer look at the distribution for the first three questions, we see that the curve generally rises from the left to the center, which means that the majority of all respondents does not have negative attitudes about immigration. However, the scores for answer 0 are regularly higher than those for 1 (see appendix 7.1). We can conclude from this that there is a part of the population in every country that could be considered as extreme, being totally against immigration and willing to show this openly. Interestingly, France has higher scores on answer 0 than the UK in the first three questions, although its average refusal of immigration is lower than in Britain. Generally, a bigger number has rather negative, but still quite moderate attitudes on immigration, as shown by the distribution between values 1 and 3. The question is whether parties will try to catch both those voters with extreme and those with more moderate opinions, although this isn’t a distribution in Downs’ sense, with a peak in the middle and declines to the left and right side (1957).

I will now match the country level scores with the party positions, considering the first theme Immigration in general. UKIP wants to “end mass, uncontrolled immigration” via an “immediate five-year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement” with the ambition to ensure that “any future immigration does not exceed 50,000 people p.a.” (UKIP 2010: 5). In addition, “any future immigration for permanent settlement will be on a strictly controlled, points-based system similar to
Australia, Canada and New Zealand” (idem). This rather rigorous postulation fits well with the fact that 19.63 % of UK respondent have negative attitudes on immigration. UKIP perfectly responds to these sentiments by proposing an ideology that is clearly against immigration, without any room for interpretation. Nevertheless, there is a certain breadth in UKIP’s statements, which could be a sign that the party addresses to both those with extreme and those with rather moderate, but still negative attitudes. This is displayed by the claim for an immediate freeze on immigration on the one hand and the mention of a possible, but strictly regulated and controlled immigration in the future on the other hand.

The FN adopts a quite similar rhetoric on this issue. In line with UKIP, it wants to “put an end to massive and uncontrolled immigration that hits our country [which should be achieved by stopping both] legal and clandestine immigration” (FN 2012b: 11). It also proposes concrete figures as it wants to reduce legal immigration “from 200 000 entries per year to 10 000 entries per year (a division by 20)” within 5 years (FN 2012b: 12). Likewise its British counterpart, the French party adopts an open ideology concerning immigration, calling for a stop and a severe cut down in entries. As both parties make very similar claims, it is difficult to make a distinction between UKIP’s and FN’s rhetoric regarding their degree of severity. Still, FN’s ideology reflects the strong anti-immigrant attitudes amongst French respondents and the request for stopping it can be seen as a reaction to the 9.38 % that are totally against immigration.

The German AfD shows a considerably more moderate overall immigration attitude. Given the demographic trend in Germany, it says to “approve the arrival of immigrants willing and capable to integrate” (AfD 2014d: 5). However, it states “the uncontrolled immigration via family reunification, tolerance mechanisms and a lax interpretation of asylum law increases” (AfD 2014a: 17). As a consequence it claims an “immigration law with a ‘points-based system’ following the Canadian model, which respects both the German interests and the chances for immigrations of a successful integration into our society” (AfD 2014d: 5). In addition, AfD says that, due to its commitment to the rule of law, it claims an immigration policy following clear criteria (AfD 2014d: 6). The German party neither wants to totally stop immigration
nor does it refer to concrete numbers. It portrays immigration as an issue that needs to be controlled more strongly as it causes problems and adopts a position that is critical without being extreme. Given the average distribution of voters on the immigration dimension in Germany, there is little demand for very extreme policies and hence a rather moderate position is probably more appropriate for gaining more voters and to not discourage potential voters who might be reluctant to vote for a party they perceive as xenophobic.

As a conclusion for the first hypothesis, we can argue that right-wing populist parties propose stronger measures against immigration and use a harsher language in countries with higher general anti-immigration attitudes. Anti-immigration attitudes in Britain and France are clearly higher than in Germany and this is reflected in the respective party manifestos, as parties do not hesitate to talk about “mass immigration” that needs to be stopped and underline their ambitions with figures where voters seem to be more opposed to immigration. This seems to be a confirmation of the hypothesis, based on Downs’ theorem of party ideology dynamics. What remains unclear though, is the difference between France and Britain. While FN and UKIP use nearly the same rhetoric, there are slight differences in the attitudes of respondents from both countries. While Britain has a higher overall refusal, France’s respondents show more extreme tendencies for at least some questions. We could probably explain the resemblance in the respective party statements with the idea of ideological spread (Downs 157: 133). Both parties want to appeal to both more and less extreme voters and they can potentially do this by adopting an ideology that goes neither exclusively into one nor into the other direction. That could be why both parties have almost same ideologies on overall immigration despite differences in the detailed distribution of respondents on the dimension.

4.2 Issue salience (H2)

This part focuses on whether party manifestos reflect the salience of different issues related to immigration in different countries. This will be done examining the different themes and the corresponding ESS questions.
4.2.1 Immigration and the economy

The first theme is immigration and the economy, the welfare state and public services, related to the ESS question whether immigrants are bad or good for the country’s economy. In the UK, 23.7% of the respondents think that immigrants are rather bad for the economy, 7.3% think they totally are (answer 0). Britain therefore has the highest score on this question, followed by France with 19.8% of negative attitudes and 9.8% of most extreme attitudes. In Germany, 9% consider immigrants as a threat to the economy, while 2.9% think they are exclusively bad for it.

Remaining true to its style, UKIP uses alarming figures and wordings to address the issue of immigration in the context of the economy and the welfare state. Evoking the fear of labor market competition and pressure on the welfare state, UKIP avers that “immigration out of control [would lead to a] sharp rise in the number of EU migrants without a job living in Britain to more than 600,000” and an increase of 73% “in the number of job-seeking EU immigrants in our country” (UKIP 2014: 2). The party also worries about the housing market under pressure due to “open-door immigration” (UKIP 2014: 9) as “100,000 new homes a year will be needed to accommodate them [the immigrants; ed.]” (UKIP 2014: 2). This dramatic rhetoric is also used to address the recent Eastern enlargement of the EU, which UKIP uses to provoke fear:

“On 1st January 2014, the UK opened its doors to people from both Romania and Bulgaria. Up to 29 million more people are, therefore, entitled to come here, to take advantage of our benefits, social housing, primary school places and free health care, having contributed nothing to them.” (UKIP 2014: 3).

In line with this, UKIP claims that British benefits “under pressure” (UKIP 2014: 4) should be “only available to UK citizens or those who have lived here for at least five years” (UKIP 2010: 9) and warns that “open-door immigration is crippling local services in the UK”, asking how they will deal with an increase in demand (UKIP 2014: 1). In the same sense, the party claims that “Immigration must be controlled to relieve pressure on our health, education, housing and welfare services” (UKIP 2014: 4), as these “cannot cope with constantly rising numbers of people coming to live and work here” (UKIP 2014: 8). UKIP goes even further, saying that “we must end benefit
and health tourism and give priority to local people for housing, education, health and social services” (idem).

The analysis of UKIP’s statements on the first theme has illustrated the emphasis UKIP puts on this issue. The party uses a dramatic and alarming rhetoric, garnished with high figures to create the impression of a veritable threat through immigration for economic reasons and a considerable pressure on the British welfare system. As a response to the perception of economic pressure, the party proposes protectionist measures, referring to a policy of national priority.

The FN also adopts a startling mode of expression to mention this issue so important for French respondents. According to the party’s manifesto, immigration “is used by the big business to press on the lowering of wages and deeply destabilizes our society and its balances” (FN 2012b: 11). Referring to the economic situation in France in recent years, the FN also states:

“La progression très sensible de l’immigration professionnelle est particulièrement condamnable en pleine crise économique, alors que le chômage explode dans notre pays et que le pouvoir d’achat des salariés s’effondre” (FN2012b: 11).

Continuing in this drastic style, FN also asserts that “immigration is not a humanistic project, but a weapon serving the big business” (idem). In order to protect French citizens from the presumed threat through immigration, FN wants to establish “national priority for employment, housing and social aid” (FN 2012a: 16). In addition, public housing, as a sign for “national solidarity” (FN 2012b: 75), should be for French citizens and only available to immigrations in legal situation, otherwise it would be a “pseudo generosity [constituting a] suction pump of immigration” (idem) according to the FN. As another measure to protect the French welfare system, the party plans encouraging “foreigners in legal status who don’t find labor […] to return to their countries after one year of inactivity” (FN 2012a: 6). Moreover, the party wants to remove the right to minimum pension for foreigners who have not worked in France for at least 10 years (FN 2012a: 4).

The Front National adopts an ideology and terminology that describes immigration as a threat to the national economy and welfare system. Claiming protectionist and
nationalist measures, it responds to the large number of respondents who think immigration is bad for the country’s economy.

The AfD, as shown above, has a divided stance on immigration. Although it approves immigration under certain circumstances, it emphasizes that “it must neither lead to a further decline in real wages, nor to a withdrawal of skilled employees from the developing and emerging countries” (AfD 2014a: 17). This phrasing suggests that the party is not only concerned about the labor situation in Germany, but has also moral commitments towards other countries and is therefore skeptical about immigration. However, a closer look at the party’s program reveals that it is mainly worried about the German welfare state. In the European context, it stresses that “the freedom of establishment must not be abused through false self-employment to obtain the right for social benefits [and that] in the long term, there will be a risk of excessive demand of the social budgets and an erosion of the welfare state” (AfD 2014e: 14). Repeated a number of times, the AfD strictly refuses an “immigration into the German welfare system” and therefore wants immigration from non-EU-workers to be “exclusively” in accordance with local demand (AfD 2014e: 15). In addition, the AfD postulates that those social benefits free of contribution should only be disbursed to EU-citizens in case they have their actual residence in Germany and have been subject to social insurance contribution or self-employed within at least five years (AfD 2014b: 8).

Visibly, immigration related to the economy and welfare system is highly important for the AfD and this perfectly reflects the salience of this issue for German respondents, amongst whom this issue has relatively high rates of refusal.

4.2.2 Immigration and the country as a place to live

The second theme is immigration in the context of security, rule of law and the country as a good place to live. Here again, respondents from the UK are most likely to see immigrants as a threat and hence some 21,8 % think immigrants rather make a country a worse place. 6,9 % totally agree with this. Both scores are high, but less than for the first question. In France, second again, more people have extreme views (7,5 %) than in Britain, but the overall score is lower again (19 %) and the issue is also less important than immigration from an economic perspective. Germany is situated
at third place again, but the issue is slightly more salient for German respondents than the first one. Scores are 9.5% for accumulated refusal and 3.5% for maximum refusal. Following this, I expect the AfD to put a lot of emphasis on this topic, while for the other parties, it should be very important, but not more than the first one. It has to be said, though, that the difference in refusal between both issues is only small in all three countries.

UKIP keeps its alarming rhetoric style concerning crime, security and rule of law. Evoking the EU eastern enlargement again, it describes immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria as a threat to national security:

"28,000 Romanians are held for crimes in London. Romanians come second on the list of foreign nationals arrested by police for serious crimes. This includes 142 rapes, 10 murders, 666 sex crimes, 303 robberies, 1370 burglaries, 2902 acts of violence" (UKIP 2014: 2).

Regarding immigration from the EU, UKIP also wants that “all EU citizens who came to Britain after 1 January 2004 are treated in the same way as citizens from other countries (unless entitled to ‘Permanent Leave to Remain’)” (UKIP 2010: 5). Furthermore, in order to control immigration better, it proposes to increase UK Borders Agency staff and to record all entries or exits of non-UK citizens travelling from or to the UK.

The party also raises the issue of Islamization, saying that “Sharia courts must not override UK law” (UKIP 2010: 14) and planning to remove “obstacles that prevent the deportation of dangerous Imams, terror suspects and criminals to countries where they are wanted for trial” (UKIP 2010: 6). In this sense, UKIP wants to "scrap the misconceived Human Rights Act" to “make Britain safer” (idem). Moreover, for the party “there can be no question of an amnesty for illegal immigrants” and they should hence be returned to their country of origin (UKIP 2010: 5).

All in all, UKIP adopts a harsh style again to approach immigration in the context of crime and security. One might argue that, both qualitatively and quantitatively, it puts less emphasis on this issue than on immigration in an economic context, but it
still adopts an ideology strong enough to embrace the more than 20 % of British respondents who feel concerned about this issue.

The FN is also very clear about immigration in the context of law and order. It refers to “soaring insecurity” (une flambée de l’insécurité; translation by the author) that would largely originate from an ongoing increase in immigration. Moreover, FN denounces that “the map of insecurity corresponds widely with that of immigration” (FN 2012b: 18). As a response to this, FN proposes to expel everyone who is illegally in France and to challenge the Schengen Agreement in order to give back France the control over its borders (FN 2012b: 12).

As another way to tackle crime in the context of immigration, FN demands to expel all sentenced foreigners to their country of origin and beyond that, seeks bilateral agreements with those countries who’s citizens figure most frequently in French criminal statistics with the goal to execute penalties of these foreigners in their home countries (FN 2012a: 6). Presumably as an attempt to give French citizens the feeling that the party cares about them, it also claims that “anti-French racism as a motivation for crime” will be considered as particularly aggravating and leading to a heavier punishment (idem).

As we see, the FN keeps its alarming style, using strong words an images and proposing strict measures to tackle immigration-related crime. This can be seen as a way to attract the high number of respondents who feel insecure or uncomfortable with immigrants around them. However, the issue earns slightly less attention than immigration in an economic context, which could be regarded as a reaction to the lower importance of this issue among the respondents. The difference is marginal, though, and doesn’t allow for a final interpretation.

According to the ESS data, German respondents put a lot of emphasis on this issue. AfD’s ideology seems to fit to these feelings, as it proposes strict measures to deal with immigration-related crime. Thus, it proposes to register nationality and, if necessary, migration background of delinquents (AfD 2014c: 24). Furthermore, it wants to publish the results of crime statistics and make the nationality and migration background of criminals transparent (AfD 2014c: 25). It also seeks to
improve the judicial frame conditions for fighting foreign national crime, as a reaction to its diagnosis that “the portion of foreigners in total crime rates exceeds the portion of foreigners in the total population [and] in some fields, foreigners clearly dominate as offenders” (idem). The criminal burden through foreigners being “much more than worrying [according to the party, the] halfhearted attitude of the state towards criminal foreigners and their stay in Germany encounters incomprehension in the population” (AfD 2014c: 26), wherefore there would be an urgent need for combating this phenomenon. The party also proposes several measures to achieve this, mainly by facilitating the expulsion of criminal foreigners, such as searching for third countries willing to receive persons who cannot be deported for humanitarian or other reasons (idem).

Besides these statements dealing with immigration-related crime, AfD demands national polls on the “nature and extent of immigration” (AfD 2014b: 8). This is clearly meant to show potential voters that the party takes their feelings concerning immigration seriously and supports them. Moreover, probably as a reference to Islamic law and fear of growing Islamization, the party says “resolutely [confronting] any attempt [to establish] a parallel legal order within our legal order that contradicts applicable law in Germany” (AfD 2014d: 3).

Altogether, the party is very clear about this issue, contrary to its ambivalent stance on immigration in general. It makes an explicit association between immigration and crime and proposes precise and severe measures to tackle this issue. This can be regarded as a reflection of the importance German respondents attribute to this issue, and the propositions for concrete actions seem as a commitment towards the 9,5 % who feel uncomfortable with immigrants in their country and the 3,5 % with the most extreme attitudes on this subject. Yet, the core issue of the party’s immigration policy remains the concern about “immigration into the welfare system”, which gains still more attention. However, the issue is important to the AfD, which openly shows its perception about immigration-related crime and proposes severe measures to combat it in an attempt to convince voters.
4.2.3 Asylum seekers and immigration from poorer countries

This third theme is related to the ESS question about immigration from poorer countries outside the EU. The issue is highly salient in the UK, where 23,9 % say they do not want any immigrants from poorer countries outside the EU. In France, 16,2 % share this view, while in Germany, 6,8 % do not want to allow any of these immigrants. We see that this issue is particularly important in Britain, but it also reaches scores above the average in France and Germany. That is why one would expect it to be prominently discussed in the party manifestos.

In an attempt to reduce the number of asylum seekers, UKIP wants to “repeal the 1998 Human Rights Act and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (UKIP 2010: 6) to regain power over British asylum policy. In this sense, “existing asylum seekers who have had their application refused will be required to leave the country, along with any dependants” (UKIP 2010: 5) and to avoid disappearances, “asylum seekers will be held in secure and humane centres until applications are processed, with limited right to appeal” (idem).

As seen before, UKIP worries about immigration from poorer countries and considers it as a threat to Britain’s political autonomy. As a reaction, the party proposes strict measures to cope with asylum seekers. The way the party approaches the issue is less alarming, though, and from a quantitative perspective, the issue gains clearly less attention than one would expect, considering the 23,9 % who refuse to accept immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe.

The FN proposes rigorous measures and remains in its rhetoric style concerning this issue. Marine Le Pen’s camp considers the establishment of a reinforced cooperation with especially African countries to control immigration, subordinating future development aid to a cooperation with French authorities concerning migration flows and deportation procedures for clandestine immigrants to their country of origin (FN 2012a: 6). Furthermore, FN envisages a “drastic reduction of the number of asylum seekers admitted to stay in France” and a renegotiation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its article 8, as it blames pro immigration associations to use it to increase the number of immigrants to France (FN 2012b: 12). In addition, the party wants to diminish clandestine immigration to zero and reduce the maximum duration
for a residence permit from 10 to 3 years, with the possibility to renew it under strict conditions (idem). In line with this, FN plans the abolishment of the “suction pumps of immigration” such as the state medical assistance for clandestine immigrants (FN 2012a: 6). Moreover, demonstrations in support of clandestine immigrants would be forbidden and the possibility to regularize clandestine immigrants repealed (idem).

As we see, asylum seekers and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe are an important matter for the FN. The party emphasizes this issue less than others, but still adopts an ideology reflecting the 16,2 % of French respondents who refuse to allow more immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. More particularly, the party maintains its rhetoric style and refers to strong measures as a solution for the issue.

In case of asylum seekers, the AfD represents mixed opinions again. On the one hand, it stresses that asylum has to be granted to those politically persecuted and that asylum seekers have to be treated humanely, which includes the right to work and to have a secure habitation (AfD 2014d: 6). On the other hand, the party contests whether asylum seekers are actually politically persecuted. This is portrayed by its claim for a “strict application of asylum law” (AfD 2014a: 17), which would not be meant for the purpose of immigration. In this sense, the party stresses the importance of a rapid execution of asylum procedures and the deportation of rejected candidates in order to ensure that the fundamental right for asylum is not abused as “a gateway for a purely economically motivated migration” (AfD 2014c: 8). Moreover, delinquent asylum seekers should lose their right for asylum according to the party. While the AfD denunciates that asylum centers are overstaffed and municipalities cannot cope with the arrival of asylum seekers, the party wants to give local authorities and citizens the possibility to decide over the placement of asylum seekers (AfD 2014c: 9), which can be understood as a direct reaction to the refusal of some people to accept people from poorer countries. Referring to the EU-level, the AfD claims that “an uncontrolled immigration into the EU member states has to be prevented [and] the support for the Mediterranean neighboring countries of Africa in fighting people smuggling criminality has to be extended [...]” (AfD 2014e: 15).
The AfD’s stance on asylum seekers is marked by a certain ambivalence. While the party generally supports the possibility to obtain asylum, it presents several doubts about the actual reasons for people to seek asylum and claims a stricter asylum policy. It thereby endorses the 6,8 % of German respondents who refuse immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. At the same time, the party’s mixed position could be perceived as an attempt to gain support among the 26,1 % of respondents who only want to allow few immigrants from poorer countries, a number less far from the 30,6 % who share this view in France and the 35,7 % who do so in Britain.

Put together, the results are less evident for the second than for the first hypothesis. The three parties vary in the attention they attribute to different issues, but this is not necessarily a consequence of their potential voter’s attitudes on each particular issue. For example, while immigration in an economic context is clearly very relevant for all three parties, as it is for the different groups of respondents, the salience of immigration from poorer countries is not displayed in all three parties’ manifestos, as the case of UKIP shows. Moreover, the differences between both the party positions and respondent’s attitudes on particular issues are generally very small and it is difficult to make clear statements about which issue gains more attraction in the party statements.

The findings rather suggest that right-wing populist parties do not distinguish considerably between different issues. What we find instead is that they generally display the overall anti-immigration attitudes of their potential voters, without a distinction between single issues. Hence, we find recurring patterns in the way the parties approach the different issues, concerning their style and the severity of the proposed measures to tackle them. The different approaches display the general degree of anti-immigration attitudes in each country. Accordingly, UKIP and FN, given the high numbers of respondents with negative attitudes towards immigration in their countries, propose very severe measures and adopt a drastic and alarming rhetoric on each dimension, creating the impression of a real threat coming from immigration. The AfD is less dramatic in its style and proposes less explicit solutions in most cases, as there are generally less negative and especially less extremely negative attitudes among German respondents. This might be an attempt to gain
those who do have negative attitudes towards immigration, but also those who are less concerned with this issue and who do not want to vote for a party that is too openly against immigration.

5. Conclusion and implications

The purpose of this assignment was to examine the extent to which right-wing populist parties in France, Germany and the United Kingdom are responsive towards negative public attitudes about immigration. Based on the theoretical framework of Anthony Downs (1957) and the political opportunity structures model as presented by Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and referring to the concept of right-wing populism, I argued that these parties would adopt an ideology reflecting voters’ distribution on the immigration issue. In countries with higher rates of immigration refusal and more tendencies towards extreme attitudes, I expected right-wing populist parties to adopt a more openly critical stance on immigration and propose severe measures to tackle the issue, while the opposite should be the case in countries with lower rates of refusal and less extreme tendencies. This assumption has been tested on the grounds of two hypotheses.

As for the first hypothesis - right-wing populist parties will be more strongly opposed to immigration if the public in their respective country is - we see that parties adopt a harsher rhetoric and propose stronger policies where a larger part of the population is critical on immigration and tends more towards extreme attitudes. This is demonstrated by the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party and the Front National. On the other hand, the German Alternative für Deutschland adopts an ideology that is less openly against immigration and includes rather balanced policy propositions. This can be understood as a reflection of the public opinion in Germany, where support for anti-immigration attitudes is less strong and where the party cannot expect attracting a large number of voters adopting extreme positions.

The test of the second hypothesis - right-wing populist party positions on particular immigration-related issues are defined by the salience of the issue in their country - has not generated sufficient evidence for the idea that parties put more emphasis on issues that are more important in their respective country and accentuate less on
issues that are less salient for potential voters. In contrast, the results do not support this hypothesis, but rather provide additional support for the first one. The results show that the analyzed parties do not considerably differentiate between particular issues, but rather display the overall attitudes of their potential electorate on immigration. This is probably due to the fact that right-wing populist parties are political actors instead of political researchers. It is not their function to detect public opinions in detail and to propose precise positions following their voter’s attitudes. Moreover, the differences between voter’s opinions on particular issues are mostly small, which makes it even more difficult for right-wing populist parties to respond to them in detail. Instead, the role of these parties and their potential factor of success are to propose a general anti-immigration frame that attracts all those who reject immigration and who can relate to this frame. These voters can expect right-wing populist parties to generally propose regulatory measures on immigration, while the degree to which they are more or less severe on single issues probably does not matter.

Despite the rejection of the second hypothesis, I find strong congruence between public attitudes on immigration and right-wing populist party positions. It can be said that the analyzed party manifestos reflect the potential of voters with negative attitudes towards immigration, despite slight differences in the degree of how voters emphasize particular issues and how parties cover them. As a response to the research question, I can say that party manifestos of right-wing populist parties in France, Germany and the United Kingdom reflect public attitudes, or more precisely negative attitudes on immigration to a large extent. This can be regarded as a confirmation of both Downs’ theory about party ideology dynamics and the political opportunity structure model.

The results of this assignment can have different implications. From a scientific point of view, they constitute a first step into a further analysis of the reaction of right-wing populist parties to their potential voters’ attitudes. A broader study over a longer time period with multiple observations would be needed to get more significant findings and to make reliable statements about causality, which would allow it to rule out possible other explanations.
The findings can also have meaning from a political point of view. First of all, the given success of populist parties might be caused by problems of the political system in the chosen countries. As Taggart (2000) states, “where populists, as inherently politically reluctant, mobilize as movements or parties, there are strong grounds for examining the functioning of representative politics and for suspecting that all may not be well” (115). This should be an incentive for other political actors, especially the governing parties, to reconsider their strategies and their responsiveness towards the public. However, this involves the risk that other political parties, especially the mainstream parties, simply adopt stances likewise right-wing populist parties in order to regain their former voters. As Downs’ (1957: 131) has argued, conservative mainstream parties might be tempted to take on some populist positions and thereby move closer to the right. A prominent example for this phenomenon is former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who adopted more rightist positions when the Front National became a successful rival to his party, the UMP, in 2010.

In order to avoid the pitfall of following right-wing populist parties and adopting their positions, mainstream parties and other political actors should find a way to respond to fears about immigration by investigating on their underlying reasons, providing and communicating evidence about immigration on the one hand and by proposing measures to deal with these fears and solve possible problems linked to immigration on the other hand. This is true for the national level as well as for the European Union, where the “the scope and complexity of representative politics are increased [which is why] the possibility for populism as a reaction to these new forms of representative politics is higher” (Taggart 2000: 117). An answer to this could be reinforced European immigration politics, which are not only fair and effective, but also transparent and comprehensible for European citizens.
6. References


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- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013a) ‘International Migration Report 2013’

- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013b) ‘International Migration 2013’, Wall chart
7. Appendix

7.1 Country scores for each ESS question

Question B38: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?

![Bar chart showing country scores for ESS question B38](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bad for economy</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Good for economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>27,4</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>3,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23,9</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question B40. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

![Bar chart showing country scores for ESS question B40](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Worse place to live</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Better place to live</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34,5</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question B39. And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question B31. How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allow many migrants from poorer countries outside Europe</th>
<th>Allow some</th>
<th>Allow few</th>
<th>Allow none</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question B30. How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?

B29. Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?
### 7.2 Themes and party statements regrouped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Overall immigration attitude   | AfD   | - Die AfD setzt sich für ein Einwanderungsrecht mit „Punktesystem“ nach kanadischem Vorbild ein, das die Interessen Deutschlands und die Chancen der Zuwanderer auf erfolgreiche Integration in unsere Gesellschaft gleichermaßen berücksichtigt. (AfD 2014d: 5)  
- Da wir demographische Nachhaltigkeit ernst nehmen, bejahen wir die Zuwanderung integrationswilliger und integrationsfähiger Einwanderer nach Deutschland. (AfD 2014d: 5)  
- Weil wir uns der Rechtsstaatlichkeit verpflichtet fühlen, muss die Einwanderungspolitik nach klaren Kriterien gesetzlich geordnet werden, z. B. in Anlehnung an entsprechende Kriterien wie in Australien oder Kanada. (AfD 2014d: 6)  
- Vielerorts machen gut ausgebildete und integrationswillige Einwanderer negative Erfahrungen mit deutschen Behörden, während die ungesteuerte Einwanderung über Familiennachzug, Duldungsmechanismen und durch laxe Auslegungen des Asylrechts zunimmt. (AfD 2014a: 17)  
- Wir fordern eine Neuordnung des Einwanderungsrechts. Deutschland braucht qualifizierte und integrationswillige Zuwanderung. (AfD 2014c: 2) |
|                                    | FN    | - L’immigration légale sera réduite de 200 000 entrées par an à 10 000 entrées par an en privilégiant les talents qui permettront le rayonnement de notre pays et l’innovation. (FN 2012a: 6)  
- Stopper l’immigration et instaurer la priorité nationale pour l’emploi, le logement et les aides sociales. (FN 2012a: 6)  
- Des mesures d’ordre constitutionnel, législatif et réglementaire doivent être prises au plus vite pour stopper aussi bien l’immigration légale que clandestine. (FN 2012b: 11)  
- Suppression du regroupement familial. (FN2012b: 12) |
|                                    | UKIP  | - End mass, uncontrolled immigration. UKIP calls for an immediate five-year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement. We aspire to ensuring any future immigration does not exceed 50,000 people p.a (UKIP 2010: 5)  
- Ensure that after the five-year freeze, any future immigration for permanent settlement will be on a strictly controlled, points-based system similar to Australia, Canada and New Zealand (UKIPUK2010: 5) |
Reintroduce The ‘Primary Purpose Rule’ (abolished by the Labour Government), whereby those marrying or seeking to marry a British citizen will have to convince the admitting officer that marriage, not residence, is their primary purpose in seeking to enter the UK (UKIPUK2010: 6)

Labour Betrayed Working People “The huge increase in migrants over the last decade was in part due to a politically motivated attempt by ministers to radically change the country...Labour’s relaxation of controls was a deliberate plan to ‘open up the UK to mass migration’, but ministers were nervous and reluctant to discuss such a move publicly for fear it would alienate its core working class vote”. (UKIP 2014: 2)

(2) Immigration and the economy, the welfare state and public services

- Sie darf allerdings weder dazu führen, dass die Realöhne weiter sinken, noch dazu, dass den Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern die dort dringend benötigten Fachkräfte entzogen werden. (AfD 2014a: 17)
- Die Niederlassungsfreiheit darf nicht durch Scheinselbstständigkeiten dazu missbraucht werden, Anrechte auf Sozialleistungen zu erlangen. (AfD 2014e: 14)
- Langfristig drohen eine Überforderung der Sozialbudgets und die Erosion des Sozialstaates. (AfD 2014e: 14)
- Eine Einwanderung in deutsche Sozialsysteme lehnt die AfD strikt ab. (AfD 2014e: 15)
- Die Frage der Aufnahme von Armutsflüchtlingen kann nur im Rahmen eines modernen europäischen Einwanderungsrechts geregelt werden, nicht aber durch das Asylrecht. (AfD 2014a: 17)
- Kein Missbrauch von Sozialleistungen durch EU-Ausländer (AfD 2014a: 17)
- Wir fordern, dass beitragsunabhängige Sozialleistungen wie Kindergeld und ALG II grundsätzlich nur dann an EU-Bürger ausgezahlt werden, wenn sie ihren tatsächlichen Wohnsitz in Deutschland haben und mindestens fünf Jahre einer sozialversicherungspflichtigen bzw. Selbständigen Beschäftigung nachgegangen sind. (AfD 2014b: 8)
- Eine Zuwanderung in die deutschen Sozialsysteme muß unbedingt unterbunden werden, ebenso der Mißbrauch von Sozialleistungen. (AfD 2014b: 8)
- Entscheidend sind Sprachkenntnisse, Ausbildung, berufliches Wissen und die
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FN</strong></td>
<td>- elle [l’immigration] est utilisée par le grand patronat pour peser à la baisse sur les salaires et déstabilise en profondeur notre société et ses équilibres (FN 2012b: 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- La progression très sensible de l’immigration professionnelle est particulièrement condamnable en pleine crise économique, alors que le chômage explose dans notre pays et que le pouvoir d’achat des salariés s’effondre. (FN 2012b: 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- L’immigration est utilisée par les puissances d’argent et le grand patronat pour peser à la baisse sur les salaires et les droits sociaux des travailleurs français. Voulue et sans cesse réclamée par le MEDEF, la Commission européenne et les grands groupes du CAC 40, l’immigration n’est pas un projet humaniste, mais une arme au service du grand capital. (FN 2012b: 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Les étrangers en situation légale qui ne trouvent pas de travail seront incités à retourner dans leur pays au bout d’un an d’inactivité et leurs cotisations retraites leur seront restituées sous forme de capital. (FN 2012a: 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Stopper l’immigration et instaurer la priorité nationale pour l’emploi, le logement et les aides sociales. (FN 2012a: 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- L’immigration est […] une source de coûts très importants ; elle est utilisée par le grand patronat pour peser à la baisse sur les salaires et déstabilise en profondeur notre société et ses équilibres. L’assimilation n’est plus possible dans un tel contexte d’immigration de masse. (FN 2012b: 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- On assiste à l’échec de l’intégration des Français de 2e, 3e et 4e générations suite à une immigration massive et incontrôlée voulue par les gouvernements de la Ve République sous le haut patronage du MEDEF qui voyait dans cette immigration la possibilité de baisser les salaires. (FN 2012b: 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Le droit au minimum vieillesse (ASPA, d’un montant mensuel de 750 €) pour les étrangers n’ayant pas travaillé ni cotisé en France pendant au moins dix ans sera supprimé. (FN 2012a: 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- La priorité nationale sera appliquée à tous les Français, quelle que soit leur origine. (FN 2012a: 6)
- Les allocations familiales, réservées aux familles dont un parent au moins est français, seront revalorisées et indexées sur le coût de la vie. (FN 2012a: 11)
- L’immigration est pourtant une source de coûts très importants (FN 2012b: 11)
- L’immigration représente un coût important pour la communauté nationale, évaluée à 70 milliards d’euros par an (FN 2012b: 11)
- La priorité nationale pour le logement social. Le logement social a pour finalité de faciliter temporairement la vie des Français en difficulté et faisant fonctionner la solidarité nationale à leur profit. Cette assistance peut être étendue, dans des situations précisément définies par la loi, des immigrants en situation régulière mais elle ne doit en aucun cas être étendue aux étrangers en situation irrégulière ni à tous les immigrants en situation régulière. Non seulement les citoyens français s’en trouveraient lésés, mais cette pseudo générosité constitue l’une des pompes aspirantes de l’immigration. Le principe de priorité nationale doit donc être posé concernant l’accès au logement social. Nos compatriotes doivent être les premiers à profiter de la solidarité nationale. (FN 2012b: 75)

UKIP

- Immigration Out Of Control: There has been a sharp rise in the number of EU migrants without a job living in Britain to more than 600,000 - the equivalent of a city the size of Glasgow. According to the European Commission there was a 73% increase in the number of job-seeking EU immigrants in our country. (UKIPLC2014: 2)
- Green Spaces Under Attack “Vast swathes of the countryside will have to be sacrificed to build new homes for immigrants … migrants accounted for almost half of the housing boom and 100,000 new homes a year will be needed to accommodate them” (UKIP 2014: 2)
- Reduce the pressure on housing by ending open-door immigration. (UKIPLC2014: 9)
- On 1st January the UK opened its doors to unlimited numbers of people from Romania and Bulgaria. (UKIP 2014: 2)
- On 1st January 2014, the UK opened its doors to people from both Romania and Bulgaria. Up to 29 million more people are, therefore, entitled to come here, to take advantage of our benefits, social housing, primary school places and free health care, having
- Ensure British benefits are only available to UK citizens or those who have lived here for at least five years. Currently, British benefits can be claimed by EU citizens in their arrival year (UKIP 2010: 9)
- Open-door immigration is crippling local services in the UK. Our local authorities are under increasing pressure to deliver more services for less. How will they cope with another major increase in demand? (UKIP 2014: 1)
- Immigration Out Of Control: There has been a sharp rise in the number of EU migrants without a job living in Britain to more than 600,000 - the equivalent of a city the size of Glasgow. According to the European Commission there was a 73% increase in the number of job-seeking EU immigrants in our country. (UKIP 2014: 2)
- Immigration must be controlled to relieve pressure on our health, education, housing and welfare services (UKIP 2014: 4)
- Our housing, education, health and social services cannot cope with constantly rising numbers of people coming to live and work here. (UKIP 2014: 8)
- We must end benefit and health tourism and give priority to local people for housing, education, health and social services. (UKIP 2014: 8)

(3) Immigration in the context of security, rule of law and the country as a good place to live

AfD

- Da wir unseren Rechtsstaat bejahen treten wir entschlossen jeglichem Versuch entgegen, innerhalb unserer Rechtsordnung parallele Rechtsordnungen zu etablieren, die dem geltenden Recht in Deutschland widersprechen. Kriminalität darf weder geduldet noch bagatellisiert, sondern muss bekämpft werden. (AfD 2014d: 3)
- die Ergebnisse der Kriminalitätsstatistik zu veröffentlichen und die [...] Staatsangehörigkeit und Migrationshintergrund der Täter für die einzelnen Städte und Gemeinden des Landes transparent zu machen. (AfD 2014c: 25)
- Verbesserung der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen zur Bekämpfung der Ausländerkriminalität. Der Anteil der Ausländer am Gesamtaufkommen der Kriminalität übertrifft den Ausländeranteil an

- Die Alternative für Deutschland wird sich daher für folgende Änderungen der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen zur Bekämpfung der Ausländerkriminalität einsetzen:
  - Ausweitung der Fälle zwingender Ausweisung,
  - Vollziehbare Ausweisungsverfügung durch Strafurteil,
  - Präventive Ausweisungstatbestände für Täter aus dem Bereich der organisierten Kriminalität,
  - Einschränkung des besonderen Ausweisungsschutzes Jugendlicher durch Herabsetzung der dafür erforderlichen Höhe der Jugendstrafe,
  - Verschärfung der Strafandrohung zur Bekämpfung illegalen Aufenthalts,
  - Suche nach Drittstaatenlösungen für Personen, die aus humanitären und sonstigen Gründen nicht abgeschoben werden können,
  - Verschärfung der kriminalitätsbezogenen Ausschlussgründe für die Einbürgerung (AfD 2014c: 26)
  - Wir fordern Volksabstimmungen zu Art und Umfang von Einwanderung. (AFDTH2014: 8)

FN
- Le racisme anti-Français comme motivation d’un crime ou d’un délit sera considéré comme une circonstance particulièrement aggravante et alourdira donc la peine encourue. (FN 2012a: 6)
- Les peines d'emprisonnement prononcées contre des étrangers seront exécutées dans leur pays d'origine grâce à des accords bilatéraux passés avec les pays dont sont originaires les ressortissants les plus représentés dans les statistiques françaises de
la délinquance. Dans tous les cas, rétablissement des expulsions dans leur pays d’origine des étrangers condamnés pénallement. (FN 2012a: 6)
- flambée de l’insécurité, qui trouve en grande partie son origine dans la hausse continue de l’immigration vers la France, de l’échec d’une assimilation (FN 2012b: 18)
- La carte de l’insécurité recoupe largement celle de l’immigration : il faut donc agir en amont (FN 2012b: 18)
- Toute personne qui entre ou se maintient illégalement en France sera expulsée. (FN 2012a: 6)
- Remise en cause des accords de Schengen sur la libre circulation des personnes : la France reprendra le contrôle de ses frontières. (FNPR2012: 12)
- Réduire la durée maximale de la carte de séjour de 10 ans actuellement à 3 ans renouvelable avec un strict contrôle des conditions d’obtention. (FN 2012b: 12)
- Lutte contre l’immigration clandestine, qui doit être ramenée à zéro. Expulsion systématique de toute personne qui entre ou se maintient illégalement sur le territoire national. (FN 2012b: 12)

UKIP

- Scrap the misconceived Human Rights Act. This will make Britain safer by removing obstacles that prevent the deportation of dangerous Imams, terror suspects and criminals to countries where they are wanted for trial. This policy is in line with the UK’s current prisoner exchange and extradition treaties. UKIP will also halt European moves to give prisoners the vote (UKIP 2010: 6)
- An Open Door To Crime 28,000 Romanians are held for crimes in London. Romanians come second on the list of foreign nationals arrested by police for serious crimes. This includes 142 rapes, 10 murders, 666 sex crimes, 303 robberies, 1370 burglaries, 2902 acts of violence. (UKIP 2014: 2)
- We should overhual the system to make sentences meaningful, [...] deport foreign criminals [...] [UKIP 2014: 9]
- Tackle extremist Islam by banning the burqa or veiled niqab in public buildings and certain private buildings. UKIP will deport radical preachers calling for violence or the overthrow of democracy and reintroduce a proper Treason Act to prosecute British Citizens found guilty of attacks on the British people or armed forces. Religious school materials must
not teach hatred of the western world and must be congruent with British values. Sharia courts must not override UK law (UKIP 2010: 14)
- Ensure all EU citizens who came to Britain after 1 January 2004 are treated in the same way as citizens from other countries (unless entitled to ‘Permanent Leave to Remain’). Non-UK citizens travelling to or from the UK will have their entry and exit recorded. To enforce this, the number of UK Borders Agency staff engaged in controlling immigration will be tripled to 30,000 (UKIP 2010: 5)
- Return people found to be living illegally in the UK to their country of origin. There can be no question of an amnesty for illegal immigrants. Such amnesties merely encourage further illegal immigration (UKIP 2010: 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(4) Asylum seekers and immigration from poorer countries</th>
<th>AfD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Eine unkontrollierte Zuwanderung in die EU-Staaten muss durch Kontrolle der EU-Außengrenzen verhindert werden. Die Unterstützung der Mittelmeer-Anrainer Afrikas bei der Bekämpfung der Schlepper-Kriminalität muss ausgeweitet werden, was sich nicht nur auf Schulung und Training der Behörden vor Ort beschränken darf. (AfD 2014e: 15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Humanitäre Hilfe und Hilfe für Kriegsflüchtlinge ist unbedingt zu gewährleisten und zu verbessern. Dies sollte nach Möglichkeit heimathnah geschehen, da so mit den verfügbaren Mitteln mehr erreicht werden kann und die betroffenen Menschen weniger stark entwurzelt werden. (AFD 2014e: 15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Auch Asylbewerbern ist das Recht auf Arbeit zu gewähren, da es der Ghettoisierung vorbeugt, Kosten vermeidet und im Falle eines positiven Entscheides eine schnellere Integration befördert. (AfD 2014e: 16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Entsprechende Heime sind überbelegt, Kommunen überfordert; teilweise werden Asylbewerber schon kostenintensiv in Hotels und Pensionen untergebracht. Wir wollen das Asylrecht so sachgerecht anwenden, dass bereits existierende Regelungen (z.B. Dublin 2 Abkommen) wirksam werden und die europäische Errungenschaft offener Grenzen im Schengen-Raum eine gemeinsame Lastenverteilung nicht konterkarieren. (AfD 2014a: 17)

- Durch eine zügige Durchführung von Asylverfahren und unverzügliche Abschiebung abgelehnter Bewerber ist zu gewährleisten, dass das Grundrecht auf Asyl nicht als Einfallstor für eine allein wirtschaftlich motivierte Migration missbraucht wird. (AfD 2014c: 8)


- Ernsthaft politisch Verfolgte müssen in Deutschland Asyl finden können. Zu einer menschenwürdigen Behandlung gehört auch, dass Asylbewerber hier arbeiten können. (AFD 2013: 2)

FN

- Une politique de cooperation renforcée sera mise en œuvre, notamment avec les pays d’Afrique. Les aides au développement seront subordonnées à une coopération étroite avec les autorités françaises, s’agissant des flux migratoires et des procedures d’expulsion des clandestins vers leur pays d’origine. (FN 2012a: 6)

- Réduction drastique du nombre de demandeurs d’asile admis à rester en France. (FN 2012b: 12)

- Renégociation de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, et notamment de son
| UKIP | - Enforce the existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees until Britain replaces it with an Asylum Act. To avoid disappearances, asylum seekers will be held in secure and humane centres until applications are processed, with limited right to appeal. Those seeking asylum must do so in the first ‘designated safe country’ they enter. Existing asylum seekers who have had their application refused will be required to leave the country, along with any dependants (UKIP 2010: 5)  
- Repeal the 1998 Human Rights Act and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In future the British courts will not be allowed to appeal to any international treaty or convention that overrides or sets aside the provisions of any statute passed by the UK Parliament (UKIP 2010: 6) |

| article 8 qui est utilisé par les associations de promotion de l’immigration pour accroître l’immigration vers la France. (FN 2012b: 12) |