Master Thesis

‘Thank you for Smoking!’: a multi-level study on the policy impact of anti-tobacco movements, tobacco industry’s countermovements and political opportunity structure on tobacco control policies in 22 European countries

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Abstract

Based on a cross-national study of 22 European countries, we conducted a multi-level assessment of the impact of societal, political and industry factors on the strictness of tobacco control legislation for the period 1980-2012. Specifically we framed tobacco control policy processes as taken place in the realm of the triad formed by the state on top and anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement on both base corners. Our main question concerns the separate influence of these parties in tobacco policy processes and its resulting consequences in terms of policy outcomes. We draw on political opportunity structure (POS) theory and policy diffusion theory to assess the possibilities a political system provides for grassroots participation in policy processes. Corporate Political Action (CPA) theory is used to evaluate tobacco industry’s countermobilization efforts to impede policy reform. Finally, we draw on resource mobilization (RM) theory to indicate anti-tobacco movements abilities to impact policy processes. We found that a population’s likeness to participate in politics negatively relates to the strictness of tobacco control policies. Potentially because policymaking processes become more complex as a multitude of grassroots interests are released on policymakers which constrains more radical policy decision-making. In accordance, we found that state’s repression of grassroots participation in politics, is positively related to the strictness of tobacco control legislation. In such case, state public health concerns or international legislative pressure, outweigh grassroots interests in policy decisions. No evidence was found that POS, and specifically the openness of political systems and the presence of allies, enabled the anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement, to impact policy outcomes. Moreover, we found no evidence that tobacco industry’s countermovements impacted domestic tobacco control policies. Our main contribution are integrating state, social movement and corporate countermovement in one framework and study these parties influence on policy processes in a simultaneously manner. Moreover policy processes are complex and could only partly be explained by the multi-level factors included in our study. Clustering our data within countries, revealed that there are unobserved characteristic nested within countries that do impact the strictness of tobacco control policies but we did not control for. We encourage researchers to include more factors in our suggested triad framework and test their impact on policy processes, in order to further unravel the complex phenomena policy processes are.

Keywords: tobacco control; political mobilization; corporate countermovement; Political Opportunity Structure; Resource Mobilization Theory; social movement; international legislative pressure; WHO FCTC

1. Introduction

While the risks and consequences of smoking are increasingly unraveled and communicated to European citizens (see: Schotanus, 2014), still 28 percent of European citizens smoke on daily basis. Among which 29 percent of European youth aged between 15 and 24. Every year, in Europe, 650.000 people die from the consequences of tobacco usage and another 13 million are suffering from smoking related diseases. Moreover an estimated 100.000 non-smoking European citizens die each year by inhaling other people’s smoke, which also causes millions to suffer from illnesses (European Commission, n.d.). Therefore the European Commission regards tobacco consumption as the ‘largest avoidable health risks’ in the European Union (European Commision, n.d.).

Concerning these numbers, transnational organizations both governmental (European Union, World Health Organization (WHO)) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are putting pressure on European countries to discourage domestic tobacco consumption, restrict advertisements for tobacco products and to create smoke-free environments. We could expect that under these pressures, domestic tobacco control legislation is cross-nationally driven toward isomorphism (see: DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). However analysis of tobacco control legislation cross-national revealed domestic differences in the strictness of tobacco control legislation. Next to transnational-

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level factors explaining the adoption and strictness of domestic tobacco control policies, also factors operating on lower levels may be relevant in discussing tobacco policy differences. As Studlar, Christensen, and Sitasari (2011, p. 729) note, ‘tobacco control policy in Western Europe operate at multiple levels, including one above that of the state’.

Within European countries domestic tobacco policymaking is contested by two opposing movements. These two movements are putting grassroots pressures on policymakers to decide on their interests. The first movement is the ‘anti- tobacco movement’ and consist of those actors and organizations supporting further tobacco control legislation. The other movement is the ‘tobacco movement’, or what we call ‘corporate countermovement’, which comprises those actors and organizations that oppose tobacco control restrictions, including the tobacco industry (see e.g.: Borland, 2010; Cairney, Mamudu, & Studlar, 2015; Cooper & Kurzer, 2003; Hastings & Angus, 2004). The possibilities and potential political results of both movements forwarding their interests into policymaking processes, is constrained by the broader political context (e.g.: Sato, 1999) and their ability to acquire necessary resources to take a political stand.

A way to frame such domestic tobacco control policy processes is to represent policymaking taking place in the realm of a triad formed by “the state at the top and corporations [corporate countermovement] and activists [social movements] on the base” (p. 380). Policymaking does not take place in a vacuum but is sensitive to grassroots pressures posed by both movement and countermovement. Although the link between social movements and the state is well document, countermovement are generally understudied in social movement research (Isaac, 2002; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Specifically, studies including corporate countermovements into policy research is rare (for exceptions see: Fridell, Hudson, & Hudson, 2008; Ingram & Rao, 2004; Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008) while corporate countermovements can seriously impede policy processes (see e.g.: Fridell et al., 2008). Therefore Luders (2003) calls for the integration of (corporate) countermovements as third party in social movement policy studies (Rao et al., 2011).

In social movement research it is common practice to integrate the state, or broader political context, into policy research, by using political opportunity structure (POS) theory (e.g. Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1995, 2004). Although the theory is not undisputed (see e.g., Goldstone, 2004; Goodwin & Jasper, 1999) most scholars do agree on its explanatory power in policy outcome studies. The state is integrated into policy research by pointing at the ‘openness’ of- and ‘political allies’ within political systems, that contribute to grassroots policy impact possibilities (e.g. McAdam, 1996). Scholars especially include POS in studies on social movements challenging the state (see e.g.: McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003; Meyer, 2004) but neglect inclusion in corporate countermovement- state settings. While scholars do agree that countermovements face POS in similar ways to social movements (e.g. Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996) and therefore seems also applicable to consider the possibilities, countermovements face to impact policies. Moreover POS relationship with policy outcomes is rarely tested in cross- national settings (see for exemptions e.g.: Beyeler & Rucht, 2010; Dalton, Recchia, & Rohrschneider, 2003; Osa & Corduneanu-Huci, 2003) as we intend to do. Consequently, we aim to contribute to literature in a twofold manner. Firstly, we include the ‘top of the triad’ into policy analysis by using POS as underlying mechanisms to grassroots- state policy interactions to take place. Note that we place POS at the heart of studying both movement and countermovement policy impact possibilities. Secondly, we empirically test the relationship between POS and policy outcomes in a longitudinal and cross- national research design.

Turning to the base of the triad, one corner is formed by the (corporate) countermovement. In the case of the tobacco dispute, the tobacco industry has countermobilized in the form of a corporate countermovement, in response to legislative threats posed by anti- tobacco movements. As social movement research rarely include corporate countermovements into studies, these provide less directives to approach corporate countermovement policy impact. Turning to Corporate Political Action (CPA) theory seems fruitful to start our exploration, as the theory specifically concentrates on underlying determinants of corporate influence in policymaking processes (see
for a review: Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). In other words, the theory enables to study grassroots pressure on state policymaking, posed by a corporate countermovement. We aim to contribute to social movement policy research, by including corporate countermovements as party in policy making processes. Moreover we promote to extend social movement research by the integration of CPA theoretical insights.

The other base corner of the triad framework is formed by social movements and within the tobacco dispute the anti-tobacco movement. Resource Mobilization (RM) theory, originated from social movement research, seems applicable to explore social movement- state policy interactions. The basic assumption of RM theory is that the availability of resource increase prospects of mobilization and collective actions (see e.g.: Cress & Snow, 1996; Zald, 1992), which scholars relate to movement’s policy impact (e.g. Rucht, 1999; Zald & McCarthy, 2002). Our intentions lie in explaining cross-national tobacco legislative differences by using RM principles. More specifically we intend to test whether the availability or lack of resources influenced the anti-tobacco movement to impact policies. Again our contributions here are twofold. Firstly, we place social movement in the triad where policy processes can be analyzed from. Secondly, we aim to broaden social movement theory by testing RM principles in cross-national settings which is, to our knowledge, rarely done (see for an exception e.g.: Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 2011).

Consequently the main question addressed in this study is; “How can European country’s strictness of tobacco control policies between 1980-2012, be explained by policy participation of anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement in context of the political opportunities (POS) enabling such participation provided by the state?”. We frame tobacco policy outcomes as forthcoming from policy process negotiations among policymakers, anti-tobacco movements and tobacco industry corporations. In other words, we empirically test multi-level, sometimes conflicting, factors that influence policy processes and consequently the strictness of tobacco control legislation. We study the three party’s separate impact on policy outcomes by three main theories. Firstly, we include the state by drawing on POS theory and specifically focus on the opportunities political systems provide for grassroots policy process participation. Secondly, we assess tobacco industry’s – state interactions by using CPA theory. Finally we draw on RM theory to analyze the grassroots pressures on policy processes posed by anti-tobacco movement.

The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. In section 2 we review existing POS, RM and CPA-literature and formulate our hypothesis. In section 3 we discuss our methodology used in this study. In section 4 we present the results of this study. In section 5, we discuss and conclude the main theoretical and practical implications of this research. Moreover we will suggest interesting starting points for further research and discuss the limitations of our study.

2. Theoretical background and hypothesis

2.1 Explaining tobacco control policies through POS

2.1.1 Decentralization political systems

Drawing on Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory, scholars point at the relation between ‘openness’ of political systems and possibilities for movements to impact politics2. In other words, institutional structures have an enduring influence on the ability to participate in politics by opening and closing contingent opportunities (Obach, 2010). A country’s political system comprises these formal institutions, informal procedures to respond to grassroots imputations and configuration of power (Kriesi, 1995). Consequently, the time-bound dynamics of political system’s dimensions could than explain the relative openness of the political system at a certain moment.

Note: the operationalization of movement’s political impact in itself is disputed in literature (see for a literature review: Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010). In the remaining of this paper, we operationalize political impact as movement’s impact on policies (see also: Amenta, 2006; Olzak, Soule, Coddou, & Muñoz, 2013) and use both terms interchangeably.
in time. While most scholars agree that political systems openness offers possibilities for movement’s political impact, others doubt this presumption. For instance, Giugni (2004) notes that a country’s bureaucratic capacity – policymakers ability to include grassroots imputations in policy decisions – is determined by the dispute itself rather than higher order political system dynamics.

The openness of a country’s political system is determined by the degree to which political authority is centralized. In other words, the number and accessibility of veto players – actors and institution of whom agreement is required to change the status quo (Tsebelis, 1995) – within a political system. The more a political system is decentralized, the more veto players providing ‘access points’ for grassroots imputations. Hence, decentralization of a political system goes at the expense of single veto players power to act in forwarding movement’s interests (Koopmans, 1999; Koopmans & Kriesi, 1995; Kriesi, 2004). Decentralization implies an increase in the variation of represented viewpoints among policymakers³, providing movements with increased possibilities to find supportive policymakers on basis of shared interests. Which results in decentralized countries to have slow; less decisive and; less effective policymaking processes in comparison to more centralized countries (see e.g.: Koopmans & Kriesi, 1995; Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2008; Tsebelis, 1995). Consequently, the link between POSs ‘openness’ and political system’s decentralization degree seems easy to establish.

Political system’s decentralization takes form in two ways; vertical (territorial)- and horizontal dispersion of power. As Kriesi (1995) argues these are the ‘general structural parameters’ (p. 25) in considering a country’s political system degree of decentralization. First, territorial decentralization is a manner of federalism that disperses power over country units on local-, regional- and national level. In federalist states (e.g. Germany), openness or ‘access points’ could be found on these three levels, whereas in territorial centralized states (e.g. Netherlands) ‘access points’ on local level are insignificant (Kriesi, 2004). Secondly, horizontal decentralization implies the dispersion among and within the legislature (parliamentary arena); the executive (government and public administration) and; the judiciary (Kriesi, 2004). On the same principles, in countries where power is horizontally centralized, openings to gain political impact are limited in comparison to decentralized countries.

From this discussion we can expect higher grassroots movement policy participation, in countries where a political system is decentralized in comparison to a centralized organized system ( see e.g.: Beyeler & Rucht, 2010; Dalton et al., 2003; McAdam, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Snow, Soule, & Cress, 2005; Vrábliková, 2013 ). We expect that decentralization of political system’s results in more complex policy processes as policy makers are facing a multitude of grassroots imputation, which constrain to make radical policy decisions. In our case we expect that both anti- and pro- tobacco pressures more easily find its way to policy processes in decentralized- in comparison to centralized countries. More specifically, in decentralized states policymakers are more likely constrained to make drastic tobacco control decision for two reasons. First, policymakers are facing imputations from both ‘camps’ which could form a burden on personal policy decisions. Secondly, policy processes in itself is more difficult as policy makers are dispersing on tobacco control views, making policy decision compromises difficult to achieve. Our discussion results in the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1a** The more decentralized a country’s political system, the less strict tobacco control policies of that country is.

### 2.1.2 Political allies

Social movement theorist consider the “presence or absence of elite allies” (McAdam, 1996, p. 27) as dimension of POS⁴. In studying the effect of POS on social movement outcomes, scholars mostly concentrate on

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³ *Note:* in this paper we use the terms political actor and policymaker interchangeably.

⁴ *Note:* the POS dimensions; openness political systems and presence of allies, are closely related to each other. Hence power dispersion – structural element of POSs openness – strongly relates to the accessibility of political actors and thus the presence of allies. We therefore recognize that our discussion might intertwine both constructs.
political allies and include concept as actor configuration and ideology (see e.g.: Cress & Snow, 2000; Dalton et al., 2003; Jenkins, Jacobs, & Agnone, 2003; Olzak & Ryo, 2007; Osa & Corduneanu-Huci, 2003). However, allies can also be interpreted as a broader construct, comprising non-political actors along political actors. For instance, Pichardo (1995) studied the associated farmers of California movement and moved beyond political allies by including corporate- and industrial allies in analyzing movement’s outcomes (see also: Almeida & Stearns, 1998). For this research purposes, we take only political allies in account and follow herein common social movement study practices besides our triad-framework intentions.

Horizontal dispersion within the parliamentary arena is a function of a political system’s electoral- and party system which are interrelated (Kriesi, 2004). The degree of proportionality of an electoral system is positively related to the number of political parties in the party system. In most extreme form, highly centralized countries have a two- party system in which two parties (sharply) differentiate on the basis of socioeconomic issues. In contrast, decentralized countries have multiparty systems as they accommodate larger numbers of parties that differentiate on a variety of issues (Lijphart, 1999). The representation of heterogeneous political stances, increases the likeliness for movements to have political allies and to gain political impact. Indeed, the number of parliamentary parties is positively associated with grassroots participation in policy processes (Beyeler & Rucht, 2010; Kriesi, 2004; Walgrave & Rucht, 2010). However Crepaz and Moser (2004) argue that participation in multiparty systems is limited as political actors are strongly interdependent by the necessity to form coalition governments.

Party systems are not static because every election brings realignments within party systems. These changes affects movements abilities to find political allies for two reasons. First, realignments create uncertainty among political actors that may trigger them to actively seek support from ‘outsiders’ such as movements (see; Kriesi, 2004). Secondly, realignments imply a shift in political stance representation which may align political actor’s views vis-à-vis movement’s interest. Both consequences of elections can enhance or limit movement’s ability to have political allies through which participation in policy processes can be achieved.

Following earlier social movement research (see e.g.: Dalton et al., 2003; Johnson, 2008; King, Cornwall, & Dahlin, 2005; Olzak & Ryo, 2007; Soule & Olzak, 2004) we consider the distribution of political stances among political systems, as proxy of the presence of political allies for movements. The logic holds that the likeliness of movement’s political impact increase when the movement faces a favorable political actor configuration. If we relate these insight to the tobacco dispute we can expect more pro- tobacco political allies as right- wing parties makes the larger share in a political system. We expect this relationship for two reasons. Firstly tobacco usage can be seen as matter of personal life in which government should not intervene, which is a more right- liberal ideological viewpoint. Secondly, as tobacco control legislation can seriously impede industries (see e.g.: Hahn, 2010) it is less likely that a right- wing politician – associated with holding a pro- industry stances– will support restrictive tobacco control measures. That opposite can be expected for left oriented political systems as they are regarded to be more concerned with the public health of citizens (Cairney, 2007). Note we control for the effect of elections through a longitudinal research design taking in account all changes in political actor configuration.

**Hypothesis 1b** The larger share of right- wing political system a country’s political system, the less strict tobacco control legislation of that country is.

2.2.1 *International legislative pressure*

Policy making is not taking place in a domestic vacuum, rather policy diffusion theory points at the transnational- level influence of institutions on domestic- level policy making. In other words, policy diffusion theory concentrates on: “the process by which knowledge about policies (...) in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies (...) in another political system” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5). Potentially these international legislative pressures may constrain policymaker’s decisions to translate grassroots
imputations into policies. As such grassroots possibilities to participate in policymaking processes may be reduced. In other words, international legislative pressures can also be considered to form the context in which (counter) movements operate and therefore could be included in POS research. However, to our knowledge, little social movement research have integrated international legislative pressure into research design. Inclusion of international legislative pressure into our study, could therefore move social movement research forward.

Moreover, scholars focusing on tobacco policy research, frequently include international pressure as explanatory factors of domestic tobacco legislation (e.g. Cairney, 2009; Cairney et al., 2015), which makes exclusion doubtful.

Following work of (Marsh & Sharman, 2009), four mechanisms underlying policy diffusion can be distinguished. Firstly, ‘coercion’ explains policy adoption in a certain country, as established through forced policy decisions by other powerful countries or transnational institutions. Secondly, ‘competition’ among countries could drive policymaker’s policy decisions. The basic argument is formed by the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon, whereby policymakers take economical (capital) impact of potential policy changes into account (see e.g.: Konisky, 2008). Thirdly, ‘learning’ considers policy adoption as resulting from policymaker’s consideration of other country’s knowledge and experience with comparable policy changes. Finally, the fourth mechanism ‘mimicry’ –also referred to as emulation or imitation- is highly comparable to the learning- approach. The difference is that the learning mechanism regards policymakers as focusing on the actual ‘action’ (i.e. policy adoption in itself). While the mimicry mechanism assumes policymakers to concentrate on the actor adopting the policy (i.e. other country in itself) (see e.g.: Shipan & Volden, 2008).

Whether through; coercion- ; competition- ; learning- or; mimicry mechanisms, from a policy diffusion perspective, policymakers can be influenced by factors lying outside domestic boundaries. Or in other word, policymaking decisions are embedded in transnational structures. Concerning specifically the tobacco dispute, such important transnational structure is the WHOs Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC was WHO initiated in 1999 by starting international negotiations on an agreement to reduce tobacco health risks through legislative means. Scholars (e.g. Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Toshkov, 2013) considering WHO FCTC as platform for policy diffusion because it enables policymakers to share policy ideas, knowledge and domestic tobacco control experience. Although WHO FCTC does not have enforcement mechanisms to force policy adoption among its members, country’s ratification of FCTC does signals country’s commitment and prioritization of tobacco on legislative agenda’s.

From a policy diffusion lens we argue that the WHO FCTC allows the four mechanisms, underlying policy diffusion, to take place. Thus country’s ratification of WHO FCTC is likely to influence policymaker’s decisions as it can constrain their ability to transform grassroots interests into legislation. In other words, policymakers embedness in transnational structure may reduce policy decision complexity as grassroots pressure ability to impact policy processes could be limited. As WHO FCTC concerns public health by provoking more stringent tobacco legislation, we can than hypothesize the following.

**Hypothesis 1c**   
*A country’s ratification of WHO FCTC results in more strict tobacco control legislation of that country, in comparison to WHO FCTC non-ratified countries.*

### 2.2 Explaining tobacco control policies through corporate political activity

#### 2.2.1 Corporate countermovement

Social movements turn to the state because the state can regulate a market and as such influence the competitive dynamics and market growth (e.g. Dobbin, 1994; King & Pearce, 2010). This could have a positive impact by enabling new organizational forms to arise and market growth (Ingram & Rao, 2004; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Sine & Lee, 2009). But at the same time could seriously threat organizations and coerce corporative change. For instance, Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert (2009) found Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) responsible for increased legislative pressure on the brewing industry,
enabling the soft drink industry to flourish at the costs of the brewing industry. Corporations within industries are not defenseless to legislative threats but can influence policymaking to moderate potential legislative consequences (e.g. Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; King & Pearce, 2010; Murphy, 2006).

Although corporations within industries can inherently hold different ideologies and interests (e.g. Quadagno, 1984), whenever they establish to act in a unified front, they can seriously impede policy change. Fridell et al. (2008) argue that a counter mobilized ‘industry bloc’ (p. 26) or corporate countermovement, worked effective against legislative threats posed by social movements (see also: Ingram & Rao, 2004; Schneiberg et al., 2008). In this research we consider the tobacco industry to have counter mobilized in a corporate countermovement, responding to legislative threats posed by anti-tobacco movements. It seems legitimate to assume the tobacco industry had the resources, infrastructure and organizational capacity to mobilize, given its high market concentration, market share, sales volume among European countries (see: Atlas, 2015). The main question than is; what conditions contribute to the policy impact of corporate countermovements and specifically the counter mobilized tobacco industry?

2.2.2 Corporate countermovement’s political activities

Research on countermovements, and specifically corporate countermovement, is generally an understudied research domain in social movement research (e.g. Isaac, 2002; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Social movement studies seem therefore to offer less of a starting point in order to explore mechanisms underlying corporate countermovement’s political impact. Corporate Political Action (CPA) theory seems more applicable as research in this theoretical domain intends to explain corporate acts to impact policies in ways favorable to corporate interests (Hillman et al., 2004). To our knowledge little social movement studies have integrated CPA theoretical insights into research designs (see for exceptions: Ingram & Rao, 2004; Schneiberg et al., 2008). As already discussed our intentions lie in showing that this integration could yield in new ways to study corporate countermovements and specifically its political impact.

From a corporate perspective, CPA are practiced in order to create or maintain corporate profits by; reducing environmental uncertainties; limit transaction costs and; increasing long-term sustainability (e.g. Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Legislative threats posed by social movements would than result industries to fortify their CPA practices for the purpose of attenuating or eliminating potential unwanted policy changes. We do not intend to discuss the political impact of single CPA practices (see for a review: Walker & Rea, 2014). Rather we want to concentrate on exploring industry-level determinants that underlie the strength of forwarded CPA practices to impact politics.

CPA scholars found three determinants underlying the strength of CPAs political impact. First, as policies provide non-rivalrous and non-excludable advantages to corporation, fragmented industries could encounter ‘free ride’ problems to collectively mobilize. Consequently, policymakers may need to review a multitude of CPA practices in comparison to collective CPA associated with concentrated industries (see e.g.: Holburn & Bergh, 2008; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011; Schuler, Rebhein, & Cramer, 2002). The lack of a unified ‘voice’ could than hamper corporate policy impact. Secondly, international competition could fortify CPA practices as industries intend to protect domestic markets by endeavoring protective legislative barriers to foreign competitors (e.g. Hersch & McDougall, 2000). Finally, economic opportunities presumes CPA as forthcoming from rational investment decisions (e.g. Mitchell, Hansen, & Jepsen, 1997). From this logic, in growing markets it is more likely industry resources are spend on facilitating growth rather than political actions. However, studies testing this relationship yielded in different results (e.g. Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Lux et al., 2011)

As the tobacco industry in European countries is highly concentrated, face comparable threats of foreign competitors as well as economic opportunities (see: Atlas, 2015), these determinants seem not applicable for cross-national comparison. Shifting attention to single-firm level determinants of CPA can brings us further, especially firms size (Hillman et al., 2004). The logic holds that the larger the firm size, the more resources can be deployed
to impact politics. As Barley (2007) notes, it are these large resource pools that enhance corporations political impact vis-à-vis the impact of interest groups as social movements. Transforming the genuine firm-level determinant into the industry-level determinant ‘industry size’, is likely to be a proxy of industry’s CPA practices and consequently political impact (see also: Grier et al., 1994). Another argument for this assumption is given by tobacco policy research, in which industry size is commonly associated with tobacco industry’s influence on tobacco control policies (see e.g. Gilmore & McKee, 2004). As industry size is different per European country, we can than hypothesize the following.

**Hypothesis 2** The larger tobacco industry in a country, the less strict tobacco control policies in that country is.

### 2.3 Explaining tobacco control policies through population’s political mobilization

#### 2.3.1 Political action likeliness

In literature some research indicate that social movements strongly influence politics (e.g. Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2005; Berry, 1999; Piven, 2006), while others (e.g. Burstein & Linton, 2002; Burstein & Sausner, 2005) argue for more modest political influence in comparison to the influence of other stakeholders in politics. Notwithstanding this discussion, scholars extensively studied the conditions under which social movements impact politics (e.g. Amenta, 2006; Amenta, Caren, Fetner, & Young, 2002; Olzak & Soule, 2009; Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, & Su, 1999). Studying these conditions, scholars concentrated on; strategies and framing (see for a literature review: Benford & Snow, 2000); political context (see for a literature review: Meyer & Minkoff, 2004) and; its mobilization structure. The underlying principle holds that political impact is determined through movement’s resources and strategies (including framing) embedded within a political context. As we concern the impact of population’s political mobilization on tobacco policies and we already discussed the political context (POS), we will not put attention to movement’s strategy/ framing. We first explore the relationship between resource distribution, mobilization structure and political impact, before formulating our hypothesis.

Although not undisputed (e.g. Jenkins, 1983; Shin, 1994; Snow, Cress, Downey, & Jones, 1998; Walsh, 1981) resource mobilization (RM) theory seems applicable to explore the relationship. The basic assumption of the RM approach is that the availability of resources increase prospect of mobilization and collective action (see e.g.: Cress & Snow, 1996; Zald, 1992), which scholars relate to movement’s political impact (e.g. Rucht, 1999; Zald & McCarthy, 2002). However others found a less strong relationship between mobilization and political impact. For instance; Cornwall, King, Legerski, Dahlin, and Schiffman (2007) found that the women’s suffrage movements, despite sufficient resources to mobilize, had no significant political impact in the U.S. Moreover, Amenta (2006) found that the Townsend Plan movement adequately mobilized resources while political impact remained limited.

From this viewpoint, it is interesting to consider those entities that may provide resources to movements and as such affect its political impact. Following Edwards and McCarthy (2004) there are three mains sources; government; organization and; individuals. Concentrating on individuals: “SMOs [social movement organizations] provide constituents and adherents opportunities to contribute money and labor, resources that would quite likely remain individual unless they were transformed into collective resources through the agency of representatives of SMOs” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 117). Individuals resource distribution is crucial for movements as they provide both intangible resources; organizational skills, expertise and experience (e.g. Cress & Snow, 1996; Van Dyke & Dixon, 2013) and more tangible resources; such as monetary funds (e.g. Somma, 2014).

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5 *Note:* the resemblances of CPA- and Social Movement literature in recognizing the availability of resources underlying political impact possibilities.

6 *Note:* organization category includes philanthropic foundations; religious organizations; movement mentoring organizations and; corporations (see: Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).
Consequently, individuals willingness to distribute resources may enhance movement’s prospects to gain political impact. In literature we found support for this statement. For instance Giugni (2007) found that public provided resources positively moderated ecology- antinuclear- and peach movement’s political impact, between 1977-1995. Moreover, McAdam and Su (2002) attribute the marginal political influence of the anti-Vietnam War movement to its lack to simultaneously threat political elite and capture support from public. Also McAdam (1999), in studying the development of black insurgency between 1930-1970, found comparable results.

Conclusively it seems legitimate to assume that population likeliness to engage in political actions, may provide both ‘camps’ –pro- and anti- tobacco legislation– with easier access to resources that enhance political mobilization and potentially political impact7. In such situation, policymakers may face stronger grassroots pressure which makes policymaking more complex, resulting in policy decisions being less drastic (see also: Johnson, 2008; King et al., 2005; Olzak & Soule, 2009). Note that we expect that population’s likeliness in itself constrains policymakers in radicalness of policy decisions, without distinguishing whether grassroots pressure predominantly forwards pro- or against tobacco legislation attitudes (this discussion is saved for section 2.3.3). From our discussion we can formulate the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3a**  The more a country’s population is willing to engage in political actions, the less strict tobacco control legislation of that country is.

### 2.3.2 Repression of political actions

Following the RM line of thinking, we can than expect that whenever a population is retained from distribution resources, movement’s ability to impact politics may weaken. The logic holds that repression increase the costs of individuals to distribute resources to movements which than puts constraints on the use of those resources by movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Despite the attractiveness of representing affairs in this way, repression works in more complex way on movements. Both single- country (e.g. Della Porta, 2013) and cross-national studies (e.g. Blomberg, Engel, & Sawyer, 2009) found that movements mobilized despite governmental efforts to repress mobilization. Scholars explained movements mobilization in situations of governmental repression by concentrating on; e.g. shared recognition of threats (Maher, 2010); loyalty to movements (McAdam, 1986); grievances (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010); honor (Einwohner, 2003) and; identity (Wood, 2006). However as Finkel (2015) note these studies focus on initial mobilization and do not explain sustained mobilization in order to impact politics. In other words, repression in itself does not necessarily impede movement’s mobilization but does affect movement’s leverage to impact politics.

Nevertheless, some scholars found that movement’s impacted policies despite being repressed by government. For instance, Andrews (2001) found that the Civil Right Movement between 1965-1971 impacted policies while being severely repressed by government. Amenta (1998) argues that repression of movement mobilization may actually open the policy process for movement’s imputation by generating sympathetic policymakers. However, we adopt the logic that repression limits grassroots policy participation and that the absence of these constituencies have an effect on policies (see e.g.: Sawyers & Meyer, 1999). Repression implies more difficulties for movements to obtain resources and therewith weakens its political position vis-à- vis policymakers. In other words, policymakers experience less complexity in tobacco control legislation decisions as facing more univocal

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7 Note: we recognize that we assume here that both anti- tobacco- and pro- tobacco movements exist. However this seems legitimate as most European tobacco movements developed in 1970s and 1980s (see: Davis, 1992). Moreover both anti- and pro- tobacco movements actively seek for resources in order to mobilize and find support for their cause (see e.g.: Cooper & Kurzer, 2003; Hastings & Angus, 2004).

8 Note: the operationalization of movement’s political impact in itself is disputed in literature (see for a literature review: Amenta et al., 2010). In the remaining of this paper, we operationalize political impact as movement’s impact on policies (see also: Amenta, 2006; Olzak et al., 2013) and use both terms interchangeably.
(undisputed) representation of tobacco public health concerns, nurtured by international legislative pressure or own government public health concerns.

**Hypothesis 3b**  
The more a country’s population is restricted to engage in political action, the more strict tobacco control legislation of that country is.

2.3.3 Support for anti-tobacco policies

Drawn on RM literature, we have put attention on movement’s necessity to capture resources in order to provoke political impact. Although we related overall population’s politically mobilization willingness to political impact, we neglected to control for individual’s stances toward a disputed issue. This might be trivial as the disputed issue in itself fragmentize population in terms of personal ideology and as such affects movement’s ability to obtain resources. Obviously it is more likely that individual’s distribute resources to a movements that proclaims interests in accordance with personal interests. Scholars found that individuals decision to distribute resources is determined through someone’s personal ideology (e.g. Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), social ties with movement actors (e.g. Diani, 2004) and biographical availability (e.g. McAdam, 1986). A ‘favorable’ population may than enhance movements mobilization and political impact as policymakers are confronted with stronger political positions of grassroots participants.

From this presumption, tobacco control policies could then be explained by exploring whether movements faces a ‘favorable’ population or not in terms of acquiring resources. We expect a population holding a prevalent liberal orientation, reflects favorable conditions for pro-tobacco mobilization. Building on work of Toshkov (2013) we do so for two reasons. First from a liberal perspective, tobacco usage can be seen as matter of personal freedom in which a regime should not intervene. Secondly, concerning public health regimes fulfill a paternalistic role by adopting subsequent regulations, which push liberals in one corner and regulation supporters in another. Conclusively, we expect that anti-tobacco movements find less support from a liberal oriented population. The bargaining power of tobacco countermovements in policy processes may consequently enhance, which could result in less radical policy decision (strict legislation).

**Hypothesis 3c**  
The stronger liberal orientation of a country’s population, the less strict tobacco control legislation of that country is.

2.4 Causal model

The model presented in figure 2.1. illustrates the expected relationships between the include multi-level factors and the strictness of adopted tobacco control policies between 1980-2012.

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9 Note: in social movement research, ‘biographical availability’ is referred to as ‘(...) the absence of personal constraint that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage and family responsibilities’ (McAdam, 1986, p. 70)

10 Note: Huisman, Kunst, and Mackenbach (2005) found tobacco usage being more widespread among lower-educated and poorer societal classes, which less likely hold liberal ideologies. However we expect ‘personal freedom’ viewpoints to outweigh someone’s tobacco usage.
3. Methodology

3.1 Data sampling; countries

The dataset underlying this study contain the data for 22 European countries between the period 1980-2012\(^\text{11}\) (see figure 3.1). The countries are selected on the following conditions. First we intend to capture a variety of political system’s in research to test the effect of differences in POS. Secondly, we sampled on the condition to capture different cultures and historical backgrounds among the population-level political mobilization measures. Thirdly, we sampled on the condition to capture different economic systems because of the industry-level measures. Finally, the validity of research depends on the availability of complete, reliable and detailed English translation of tobacco control legislation. Regrettably this forms another condition of our sampling which rejected: Austria; France; Finland; Slovakia and Switzerland, out of the original pool of 27 countries.

![Fig. 3.1. Research sample European countries (n=22)](image)

3.2 Measures and data collection

3.2.1 Dependent variable; strictness of tobacco control legislation

First English translations of tobacco legislation per country between 1980-2012 were collected from the Tobacco Control Database (WHO, 2015) provided by the WHO for most European countries\(^\text{12}\). A second source of English policy translations was the Tobacco Control Laws database (Consortium, 2015). The latter complemented data captured from the WHO- database and enabled triangulation. Secondly a categorization framework is established to derive the strictness of legislation. The framework consists of four categories; direct and indirect

\(^{11}\) Out of data constraints, for the following countries the period 1990-2012 was included in the study; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Germany; Poland; Romania, for the following the period 1991-2012 was included in the study; Croatia; Czech Republic; Slovenia; Ukraine, and for the period 1989-2012; Hungary.

\(^{12}\) The WHO database offers English policy translations for the following countries; Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; Montenegro; Netherland; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Republic of Moldova; Romania; Russian Federation; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Tajikistan; The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; United Kingdom and; Uzbekistan.
advertisment; distribution and; public accessible places. Each category is divided into three or more subcategories (see table 3.1). For the operationalization of categories and subcategories, we refer to the ‘codebook’ (Appendix II). Afterwards per country, all policy changes are chronologically coded for whether they involved; no changes or restrictions (coded ‘0’) or total ban/prohibition (coded ‘1’) per subcategory. Note that every policy change is recorded in the year the policy was adopted by government. The coding is carried forward between policy changes. The strictness of legislation is operationalized as simply the cumulative number of prohibitions/bans (coded ‘1’) of subcategories as a certain moment in time \( t \). In a formula: \( \text{Leg. Strict. at } t = \sum (\text{Nr. bans direct adv. } (t); \text{Nr. bans indirect adv. } (t); \text{Nr. bans distribution } (t); \text{Nr. bans pub. places } (t)) \)

In this way the variable LG_TC arises which provides both insights in the strictness and the evolution of this strictness over time per country. The variable can theoretically range between 0 and 21. Whereby ‘0’ indicates the least strictness since there are no bans/prohibitions for categories included. A ‘21’ signals maximal strictness of legislation since there are bans/prohibitions for all categories included.

**Table 3.1 Tobacco control legislation coverage categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Coding decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Advertising</td>
<td>National TV and radio</td>
<td>Subcategory coded ‘1’ (prohibition) if specific form of direct advertising is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local magazines and newspapers</td>
<td>completely banned by tobacco control legislation at point ( t ). For instance; outdoor advertising of tobacco legislation is completely prohibited; coded ‘1’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billboard and other forms of outdoor advertising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At point of Sale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publications exclusively for tobacco industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Advertising</td>
<td>Promotion discounts</td>
<td>Subcategory coded ‘1’ (prohibition) if specific form of indirect advertising is completely banned by tobacco control legislation at point ( t ). For instance; promotion discounts for tobacco products is prohibited by tobacco legislation; coded ‘1’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brand Sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Product Placement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National sponsored events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Display of tobacco products at point of sale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Vending machines</td>
<td>Subcategory coded ‘1’ (prohibition) if specific form of distribution is completely banned by tobacco control legislation at point ( t ). For instance; vending machines in any form are completely prohibited; coded ‘1’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Sales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free distribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Accessible Places</td>
<td>Healthcare facilities</td>
<td>Subcategory coded ‘1’ (prohibition) if tobacco usage in specific public places, including their premises, is banned by tobacco control legislation at point ( t ). For instance; tobacco usage in healthcare facilities including its premise is completely prohibited; coded ‘1’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educational facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indoor office and private workplace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catering facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drinking facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: only complete and/or total bans provided by tobacco control legislation is coded. For instance, whenever tobacco usage in public places is allowed in specifically for this purpose equipped areas or rooms, this counts as restriction and coded ‘0’. Theoretically the maximum strictness value of tobacco legislation is ‘21’= 5 (direct adv. category) + 5 (indirect adv. category) + 3 (distribution category) + 8 (Public acc. places. category).*
3.2.2 Independent variable: political opportunity structure (POS)

The purpose of this study is to examine among others, the state through POS theory, as explanatory factor to the strictness of tobacco control legislation. We made a distinction into two ‘openings’ within POS; political system decentralization and; political system’s ideological composition. First political decentralization is a function of (territorial) centralization of power; the (functional) separation of power and; the heterogeneity of party systems (Kriesi, 2004). Territorial decentralization is calculated from money dispersion among local and regional authorities and captured in the ‘Territorial decentralization Index’. The index is retrieved from the Democracy Time- Series Data Base (Norris, 2008). Functional decentralization captures formal and effective power dispersion among legislature-; executive- and judiciary institutions (Kriesi, 2004). The Political Constraint Index (POLCON) is specifically developed for this purposes (see Henisz, 2002, for elaboration) and is retrieved from the POLCON- database (Henisz, 2013). Since we are concerned about combined effect, our decentralization variable; GOV_DEC, is constructed as the multiplication of territorial- and functional decentralization. The value for GOV_DEC can ranges between 0-1. In which a value closer to 1 indicates are higher decentralized political system.

The ideological composition of a regime, POS ally dimensions, forms the second opening of POS included in this study. The Schmidt- Index developed by Schmidt (1992) and elaborated by Armingeon and colleagues, captures the ideological composition of cabinet for European countries. The index indicates whether a regime resembles a (1) left hegemony; (2) left dominance; (3) right dominance or; (5) right hegemony. The data is retrieved from the Comparative Political Dataset I (Armingeon, Weisstanner, Engler, & Knöpfler, 2014a) and Comparative Political Dataset II (Armingeon, Weisstanner, Engler, & Knöpfler, 2014b).

We argued to include international legislative pressure into research to test higher hierarchical impact on domestic policy making. More specifically the extent to which policymakers’ decisions are constrained by international legislative pressure. The WHO FCTC is an international treaty developed to restrict tobacco usage through legislative means, but lacks any formal enforcement mechanisms. International treaties are domestically adopted in two steps. First the treaty is signed by which country’s express intentions to commit to the treaty. The intentions alone are not binding. Secondly, after domestic parliamentarian approval, the treaty is ratified which bounds countries to commit the treaty. Signing the treaty may raise international legislative pressure already. However in this research we take the adoption year of WHO FCTC ratification to time-lag legislative pressure. The adoption year of ratification is coded ‘1’, a ‘0’ suggest a country did not or signed the WHO FCTC.

3.2.3 Independent variable: corporate political activity

Previous studies measure industry- level political activity through; industry concentration (e.g. Schuler et al., 2002); international competition (e.g. Hersch & McDougall, 2000; Kim, 2008) and; economic opportunities (Kim, 2008). Out of data constraint, we are forced to elevate firm- level determinants of political activity to the industry level. Firm size is in all probability the most trustworthy predictor of a firm’s political action (Hillman et al., 2004). The logic holds the larger the firm, the more sufficient resources to engage in political action (see e.g. Drope & Hansen, 2006; Kim, 2008; Schuler et al., 2002). By raising this logic to industry- level we assume industry size to be a proxy of an industry’s political engagement (see also: Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994). Different measures are suggested to compute firm (industry) size (see for a review: Lux et al., 2011) but are not applicable since data availability constrains us. Hence domestic tobacco product sales could be a proxy of tobacco industry size per country. However tobacco sales data is not available for the period 1980-2012 ans per country. The same holds for other proxies of domestic tobacco industry size, such as; number of establishments, number of employees; value added et cetera.

Therefore we measure tobacco’s political engagement as total tobacco export value (in $) divided by population size to allow cross-national comparison. The resulting variable TOB_EXP indicates export value/capita as proxy of political activity.
3.2.4 Independent variable: social political mobilization

Another purpose of this study is to explore social political mobilization as explanatory factor in the strictness of tobacco control legislation. Social political mobilization is separated into three variables. First we measure the societal likeliness to engage in political action (SOC_PA) as proxy of potential political pressure posed by society. Through a social movement lens, the likeliness of a population to support (counter)movements attempts to participate in policy processes. Data is collected from the European- and World Value Survey in which cross-national population are questioned on a variety of issues under which political viewpoints. First an integrated dataset 1980-2012 is computed out of the two surveys. Eventual missing data between points is estimated through linear interpolation techniques. Missing data before points is estimated by bringing the first point value backwards (see codebook, Appendix II). Than the construct is composed as the mean answer to five question asked within the surveys (see codebook Appendix II for elaboration). The resulting 1-3 scale is reverse coded and transformed in a 0-2 scale, in which value closer to ‘2’ imply stronger social willingness for political action.

Secondly, we indicate whether population is formally restricted in political mobilization. We use the ‘freedom of assembly and association index’ (ASSN) developed by the Cigranelli- Richards Human Right Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014). The SOC_ASSN variable indicates whether a population was; ‘0’ severely restricted; ‘1’ moderate restricted or; ‘2’ not restricted in political mobilization (see codebook Appendix II for elaboration).

Thirdly we indicate a population’s support for anti- tobacco movements and stringent tobacco legislation by measuring the liberal ideological orientation of population. By using the same dataset as previously described, the variable SOC_LIB is computed as the mean answer to one question asked within the surveys (see codebook Appendix II for elaboration). This question asks whether people find personal freedom more important than equity. The resulting 0-1 scale is reverse coded, in a way that a value closer to ‘1’ implies a more liberal population.

3.2.5 Control variables

Previous studies have associated population’s smoking rate with tobacco control policies (see for a recent paper: Nagelhout, Zhuang, Gamst, & Zhu, 2014). We control for the potential effect of smoking rate on control legislation through control variable CON_SM. The variable indicates the percentage of adult (>15 year old) smokers of population. The data is retrieved from two databases; the Non-Medical Determinants of Health Database (OECD, 2015) and; country profile reports provided by the WHO.

Secondly, governmental public health concerns is linked to tobacco control policies (see for a recent paper: Shickle, 2009). In order to control for this effect, we included life expectancy (CON_LEXP) as proxy of overall public health concern. Data is retrieved from the ‘World Development Database’ provide by the World Bank (WorldBank, 2015).

Thirdly left/right ideological placement of population is controlled for by including CON_LRP into research. Since literature associate political ideology and support for tobacco control legislation (Toshkov, 2013). The data is retrieved from the integrated EVS- WVS survey dataset which is discussed earlier. The measure is composed as the mean answer to one question asking people to place themselves on a left- right ideology scale. For further elaboration see the codebook (Appendix II).

4. Results

Before we turn to the descriptive statistics of our independent variables included in our study, we first turn to report our findings on differences in the strictness of tobacco legislation among our sample countries. Notable differences appeared when studying the strictness of policies and the evolution of that strictness in the period 1980-2012 (LG_TC). Three categories of countries within our sample can be distinguished on terms of legislative
strictness in 2012\textsuperscript{13}. Low scoring countries had less than 6 prohibitions/bans out of the maximum of 21. These countries are; Italy; Romania; Sweden and; Germany. Moderate scoring countries had between 7 and 15 prohibitions/bans in our categorization framework. Finally, high scoring countries had more than 15 prohibitions/bans, which were; Turkey; Spain and; Ireland. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relative strictness of legislation of our sample countries in 2012.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strictness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Mod.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4.1: relative strictness of tobacco control policies per country (year=2012).

Interesting finding can be derived by turning to the diffusion patterns of legislative strictness of our sample countries (see figure 4.2). Taken the diffusion patterns per country together, a s-curve line can be fitted, which fits the diffusion theory developed by Rogers (1995). The logic holds that state policy makers retain policy reform in anticipation of the effects of policy adoption in other countries. The theory allows to distinguish ‘early adopting countries’ (e.g. Norway, Portugal and Ireland) and more ‘laggardy’ countries (e.g. Spain, Romania and Italy). These findings indicate that the strictness of tobacco legislation is no natural consequence of being an early adopter. In general, Eastern European countries were lagging behind Western European countries before the turn of millennium. Since 2000, Eastern European countries were overtaken Western European countries in terms of tobacco control strictness.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for both continuous and categorical variables under study. Clearly no sample country reached the theoretical maximum legislative strictness score of 21 (see also table 4.1). The observed strictness in 2012 for the sample countries scored maximal 19 in Turkey. The legislative strictness per country and the evolution of this legislative strictness in the period 1980-2012 can be found in Appendix I.

In terms of extreme values, Tobacco export was non-normally distributed, with skewness of 7.89 ($SE= .101$) and kurtosis of 69.75 ($SE= .201$). Before running further analysis the tobacco export variable is logarithmic transformed resulting in an acceptable skewness of -3.13 ($SE= .102$) and kurtosis of 1.00 ($SE= .204$). In further analysis these logarithmic transformed values are included.

\textsuperscript{13}The categories are created as follows; the mean of legislative bans in 2012 was M=10.45 with S.D.= 4.18. The low and high categories are created by mean bans ± 1SD, rounded to whole numbers.
Interestingly, all sample countries overall did not formally restrict political mobilization for 71.1% (n=443) of the years in the period 1980-2012. At the other end of the spectrum, complete restrictions for inhabitants political mobilization, took place in 4.4 % (n=28 ) of the years in the period 1980-2012. Turkey accounted for 3.5% (n=22) of the years in which political mobilization was formally restricted.

On transnational- level, as this research concerns, we found no distribution problems for the other variables included. Turning to the country- level statistics we found that political system’s ideological composition is sticky, resulting in skewed distributions on country-level. In other words whenever a political system is ideological left oriented it is likely to continue that way, despite elective impacts. For further descriptive statistics on country-level, we refer to Appendix I.

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics; cases, minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and frequency for the dependent and independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco legislative bans (0-21)</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco export per capita in $ (log)</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization political system (0-1)</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood political actions (0-2)</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal society (0-1)</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology*</td>
<td>623</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left hegemony (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left dominance (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right dominance (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right hegemony (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom political mobilization***</td>
<td>623</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Restrictive (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Restrictive (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage smokers (0-100%)</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>50.50</td>
<td>29.99</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left- right placement society (1-10)</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy in years (0-100)</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>75.61</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: the descriptive statistics indicate the percentage of years for all 22 European countries included, a certain political ideology was present in one or more political systems.

**Note: the descriptive statistics indicate the percentage of years for all 22 European countries included, society’s political mobilization was repressed by one or more political systems.

4.2 Correlation analysis

A Pearson product- moment correlation matrix was computed to assess the correlation among pairs of variables under study, in order to test hypothesis in a bivariate manner. Out of conservative consideration, two- tailed testing is used despite our hypothesis inherently hold directions. The bivariate correlations are presented in table 4.3.

The Pearson correlation explored the relationship between political system’s decentralization and the strictness of tobacco legislation. This relationship is found to be statistically not significant with r=-.008, p=.84 and even in the opposite direction as expected. The same holds for the relationship between a right oriented political regime

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14 Note: for some countries we had no data for the complete period 1980-2012 but only from 1989, 1990 or 1991-2012. These countries were mostly countries that were restructured after the ‘fall of the Berlin wall’ and indicate frequently no formal political mobilization restrictions for the period included in this research. However it is legitimate to assume that before the ‘fall of the wall’ these countries heavily restricted political mobilization and potentially could change our data drastically if were available.
and strictness of legislation, with \( r=-.009, p=.829 \). The strongest correlation is found between a country’s ratification of WHO FCTC and tobacco strictness, \( r=.633, p=.000 \). Tobacco export turns out to be significant and positively correlated with the strictness legislation, \( r=.156, p=.000 \). A negative significant correlation was found for population’s likeliness to engage in political action and legislative strictness (\( r=-.116, p=.004 \)), in the expected direction. Moreover, a negative significant correlation was found between population’s liberal orientation and the strictness of legislation, with \( r=-.143, p=.000 \). There is no significant correlation between formal freedom for political mobilization and strictness of legislation (\( r=-.0744, p=.069 \)).

In terms of the control variable a negative significant correlation was found for percentage of adult smokers and strictness of legislation, with \( r=-.400, p=.000 \). A positive significant correlation was found between: life expectancy (\( r=.285, p=.000 \)), society’s left/right placement (\( r=.088, p=.029 \)) and the strictness of legislation. Because of control variables’ significant correlations with the dependent variable, they were included into the multivariate analysis. Note that one could argue that left/right placement could act as synonym proxy of political regime ideological composition as it is legitimate to assume regime composition mirrors societal ideological placement. Correlation analysis indeed indicated that left/right placement and regime composition are significantly correlated with \( r=.224, p=.000 \). However the correlation is not as strong to support the assumption that political ideological compositions mirrors ideological composition of society. In other words, society can hold a different ideology vis-à-vis political regimes composition at a certain moment in time, which makes inclusion into analysis legitimate.

### 4.3 Regression analysis

To test the hypothesis in a multivariate manner, a multiple OLS regression was conducted. The coefficients, standard errors and significant levels of the seven predictors included are presented in table 4.4. Note that the statistical significance of all three control variables justifies inclusion in our models (see also 4.3). Regression analysis were run for four models. Model I runs all independent and control variables as predictors of tobacco legislative strictness (dependent variable) into analysis. Model II is an adjusted version of Model I by including ‘time’ into the regression analysis. Our data is nested in countries which potentially hamper the ‘independence of residual assumption’. Therefore in Model III and VI data is clustered in country before running regression analysis. In which Model III excludes and Model VI includes ‘time’ into analysis. In other words these latter two models account for within-country correlations (unobserved population characteristics) that might result in the underestimation of standard errors.

The four models were checked for eventual collinearity problems\(^{15}\). VIF values ranging between 1.1- 4.3 suggested that multicollinearity was no concern. The F- test per model indicated that the model’s specifications are suitable (\( p<.01 \)). Finally ANOVA was run to check how many variance our models explain, reporting for all models \( R^2 \) scores ranging between .54 and .60. The specific regression testing results of these tests per model are reported in table 4.4.

Hypothesis 1a expected a negative relationship between the political system’s decentralization and strictness of legislation. All models except Model VI found political system’s decentralization to be a significant predictor of legislative strictness. Clustering data and adding time to regression analysis in Model VI, results in \( b=-2.84, p=.134 \). No prove was found in support of hypothesis 1b which expected a negative relationship between a right

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\(^{15}\) The models are also tested for functional misspecification by running the Ramsey’s reset test. The results of the test indicated that one or more explanatory variables are incorrectly not included within the models. However the intention of research was not to fully explain the strictness of tobacco control legislative processes by a full model, but rather test whether a few political and social factors have an effect upon such process. The theoretical part of the paper suggested that policy reform processes are embedded in complexity, which makes capturing and adopting all significant explanatory predictors a complicated matter. As already argued, doing so would transcend current research goals. The next section puts attention to the results of the regression analysis for hypothesis testing.
oriented regime and legislative strictness. Support was found in favor of hypothesis 1c which predicted a positive relationship between the ratification of WHO FCTC covenant and the strictness of legislation. All models indicate a significant positive relationship except for Model IV. Clustering data and adding time to the regression analysis turns the alleged significant relationship into a not significant one, with b=1.33, p=.107.

A negative relationship was expected (hypothesis 2) between tobacco export and legislative strictness. In contrast, Model I and Model III found a significant positive relationship, respectively b=.42, p=.002 and b=.43, p=.000. The predictive power diminishes when adding time to the regression analysis in Model III, b=.17, p=.192 and additional cluster data in countries (Model IV), b=.17, p=.550.

Hypothesis 3a expected a negative relationship between a population’s willingness to engage in political action and the strictness of legislation. All models found significant support for the expected relationship. Adding time to the regression analysis in Model II and Model IV, decreases the b- coefficient marginally. Prove was found for the expected positive relationship between a formally restricted society and strictness of legislation in hypothesis 3b. However, only when time is added to the analysis in Model II and IV the relationship is significant with respectively b=.69, p=.016 and b=.69 and .049. Support for hypothesis 3c, expecting a negative relationship between a liberal oriented population and strictness of legislation, is only found in Model II with b= -.426, p=.016.

Finally in terms of the control variables. All models indicate a negative relationship between percentage of smokers and legislative strictness, except for Model IV. Clustering data in countries and adding time to analysis results the relationship to become not significant with b= -.04, p=.282. All models suggest a positive relationship for life expectancy and left/ placement of society with the strictness of legislation.
Table 4.3 Correlation matrix of dependent, independent and control variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Tobacco legislation</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Decentralization political system</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Political right- wing orientation</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ratification WHO FCTC covenant</td>
<td>.633**</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tobacco export (log)</td>
<td>.085*</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.092*</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Likelihood political actions</td>
<td>-.116**</td>
<td>.175**</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Formal freedom engaging in political action</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.110**</td>
<td>.391**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Degree of societal liberal orientation</td>
<td>-.143**</td>
<td>.329**</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.236**</td>
<td>.203**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Percentage of adult smokers</td>
<td>-.400**</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>-.373**</td>
<td>-.096*</td>
<td>-.373***</td>
<td>-.245**</td>
<td>.080*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Life expectancy</td>
<td>-.285**</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>-.103*</td>
<td>.341**</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.656**</td>
<td>.511**</td>
<td>.224**</td>
<td>-.534**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Left- right placement of society</td>
<td>.088*</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.224**</td>
<td>-.079*</td>
<td>.085*</td>
<td>-.223**</td>
<td>-.221**</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.232**</td>
<td>-.390**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Year</td>
<td>-.700**</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>-.701**</td>
<td>.158**</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.112**</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-.542**</td>
<td>-.392**</td>
<td>-.141**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) ** significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)

Table 4.4 Regression Coefficients predicting the strictness of tobacco control legislation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. (b)</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Coef. (b)</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Coef. (b)</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Coef. (b)</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Coef. (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-39.73</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>-379.59</td>
<td>39.21</td>
<td>-39.72</td>
<td>15.36</td>
<td>-382.75</td>
<td>90.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization political system</td>
<td>-5.02**</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-2.83**</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-5.02*</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political right-wing orientation</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.609</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.789</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification WHO FCTC covenant</td>
<td>2.81**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.81**</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco export (log)</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood political actions</td>
<td>-7.62**</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-6.23**</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-7.62*</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-6.24*</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal freedom engaging in pol. action</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.890</td>
<td>.69*</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of societal liberal orientation</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>-4.26*</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>-4.26</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of adult smokers</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.04*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.381*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left- right placement of society</td>
<td>2.50**</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.52**</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.50**</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>2.53**</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.6363**</td>
<td>14.75**</td>
<td>22.59**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is the cumulative number of tobacco control bans. *P<0.05. (two-tailed) ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)

* OVtest F (df 3, 469)= 2.84**; * OVtest F (df 3, 468)= 12.33**; * OVtest F (df 3, 469)= 2.84**; * OVtest F (df 3, 468)= 12.33**
Fig. 4.1 Cross-national diffusion of tobacco control legislation; cumulative number of bans to time.
5. Key findings and discussion

5.1 Key findings

Scholars rarely simultaneously studied the impact of state, social movement and countermovement on policy processes and policy outcomes. Therefore the main question addressed in this study dealt with explaining strictness of tobacco control policies though policy process participation of anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement in context of the political opportunities (POS) provided by the state. The simultaneous impact on policies from triad parties; social movement, corporate countermovement and state, are integrated in one framework and are tested by running regression analysis in four models. Our results indicate that within-group correlation, accounted for by clustering our data (Model III and Model VI), impact the b-coefficient, standard errors and significance level of predictors included. Also adding time to the regression analysis impact the b-coefficients, standard errors and significance levels of predictors included. Out of conservative considerations, we use Model IV, to accept or reject hypothesis and consequently report findings (see table 5.1).

Our first three hypothesis specifically focused on the opportunities a state provided for grassroots policy participation, by drawing particularly on POS theory. All three hypothesis are rejected. Both the openness of political systems and political allies, do not explain the strictness of tobacco control legislation. In other words, the widespread assumption that the openness of political systems and political allies enhance (counter) movements prospects in influencing policy outcomes, does not hold in case of the tobacco dispute under research. We also found no support for our expectations that international legislative pressure (WHO FCTC) constrained policymakers to implement grassroots interests in legislation.

The next hypothesis concentrated on the tobacco industry in itself. Drawn on CPA theory we expected that tobacco industry size enhanced prospects to influence policies to own interests. However we found no support for this presumption. The last three hypothesis focused more on the societal level. Without directly controlling for society stances toward tobacco control legislation – whether in favor or against -, we found a negative relationship between society’s political engagement and strictness of legislation. Grassroots pressure from society seems to make policy processes more complex, resulting in policymakers to be constrained in making drastic policy decisions. This assumption is strengthened as we found that state’s repression of grassroots mobilization relates to more strict tobacco control legislation.

Overall, government’s decision to adopt tobacco control policies seems to be surrounded by a tangle of multi-level factors that can be framed in the triad: state; social movement and; (corporate) countermovement. Our results suggests that (tobacco) policy processes call for further disentangling of these factors to enhance our understanding. We never intended to explain tobacco control adoption by a full model but rather test the impact of a number of multi-level factors in the triad-framework. We hope the discussion in the next section, gives suggestions for further research and encourages researchers to further explore the interesting tobacco policy domain. We also hope, we provide practitioners with useful advise and insights.

Table 5.1 Results hypothesis testing; hypothesis rejected or accepted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Political system’s decentralization has a negative relationship with legislative strictness</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>The larger share of right- ideology within a regime the less strict legislation</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Country's ratification of WHO FCTC is positively related to strictness of tobacco legislation</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tobacco export has a negative relationship with legislative strictness</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>The more population’s willing to engage in political action the stricter legislation</td>
<td>-6.24*</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>The more formal restrictions to society’s political action, the less strict legislation</td>
<td>.69*</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c</td>
<td>The more liberal society the less strict legislation</td>
<td>-4.26</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *significant at the 0.05 level. (two-tailed) , proceeded on the basis of Model IV.
5.2 Discussion

5.2.1 Impact POS and international legislative pressure on strictness of tobacco legislation

Social movement theorists regard the decentralization of political systems as dimension of POS (Kriesi, 2004). The basic argument is that decentralization implies multiplication of political actor’s enhancing ‘accessibility’ to policy participation by (counter) movements. We expected that a decentralized political system complicated policy processes, as both anti-tobacco- and pro-tobacco movements access the political system, resulting in less stringent tobacco legislation. In contrast to hypothesis 1a, we found no evidence for the supposed relationship between decentralization and strictness of legislation. A multiplication of political actors within a political system, both horizontal and vertical, does not explain the strictness of tobacco legislation.

Political opportunity models expect a left political regime to be ‘open’ for left movement activities and ‘closed’ for right movement activities. The opposite holds for right political regimes and right movement activities (McAdam, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). We assume that tobacco industry’s countermovement find right regimes more accessible, which could enhance its bargaining power in policy processes and results in less stringent tobacco legislation (hypothesis 1b). However we observed no significant relationship which suggests the strictness of tobacco legislation cannot be explained by ideological composition of a regime.

Finally, we argued that international legislative pressure may influence possibilities of grassroots participation in policy processes. International legislative pressure could than result in cross national policy convergence (see for a literature review: Klingler-Vidra & Schleifer, 2014; Knill, 2005). In studying the adoption of tobacco control policies, scholars found a positive relationship between international legislative pressure and domestic tobacco legislation (see e.g.: Cairney, 2009; Toshkov, 2013). Therefore we expected that a country’s ratification of WHO FCTC would limit policy bargaining possibilities, which in turn results in more strict tobacco control legislation. However we did not find a significant positive relationship in order to accept ours hypothesis.

From the triad perspective we studied the possibilities a country’s political system offered for grassroots policy participation. Our results showed that POS and international legislative pressure were no significant proxies of participation possibilities and as such do not explain the strictness of tobacco legislation. This could be explained through the following suggested explanations. First concerning POS dimension, our measures indicated the extent to which political support for (counter)movement policy preferences was present but did not measure the levels of support. The level of political support for (counter)movement preferences is also a function of; (counter)movements political actions; actor’s membership of the dominant political party and; actor’s political power given the position within government (Olyak et al., 2013). Note that these factors go beyond the number of potential supporters (decentralization) and political ideology of these actors.

Secondly turning to international legislative pressure, our methodology could not have captured the right mechanisms through which international pressure is exercised. Since tobacco control is a policy domain surrounded by governmental (e.g. EU, WHO) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), WHO FCTC tells only a small part of the story. WHO FCTC ratification may not result in countries to adopt comprehensive tobacco legislation because it is conducive to the country specific political way the tobacco legislative dispute is outplayed (see also: Cairney et al., 2015).

5.2.2 Impact of tobacco industry’s size on strictness of tobacco legislation

Previous studies found positive relationships between industry size and corporate engagement in political action (e.g. Drope & Hansen, 2006; Grier et al., 1994; Kim, 2008; Lux et al., 2011; Schuler et al., 2002). In light of the tobacco industry Gilmore and McKee (2004) found a positive relationship between tobacco industry’s political investments and policy influence. In hypothesis 3 we therefore expected a negative relationship between tobacco industry size and strictness of legislation. However we found no evidence to accept our hypotheses. We suggest two potential explanations for this effect. First despite being highly unlikely, we could contradict the wide-spread paradigm that the counter mobilized tobacco industry actually has influence on the adoption of tobacco policies in European countries (see for a discussion on policy impacts of movements: Burstein & Linton, 2002). Secondly, ‘tobacco export value’ incorrectly reflects tobacco industry size and as such
political influence. It is likely that export value is an indication of globalization and specifically tobacco industry’s contribution herein. If his is the case, we test the relation between ‘globalization’ and the strictness of legislation which seems trivial.

Interestingly, testing the relationship between tobacco legislation strictness and tobacco export in a bivariate way, revealed a positive relationship. This may raise the presumption that the tobacco industry increase export of its tobacco products in response to more stringent legislation. In other words, whenever the tobacco industry is not able to protect its market against legislative threats, the industry could respond by increasing exports of tobacco products to compensate for market loss associated with the policy change. For instance, Drezner (2001) argues that corporation deliberately locate their operations on places surrounded with favorable political environments (see also; Murphy, 2004).

5.2.3 Impact of social political mobilization on strictness of tobacco legislation

Scholars associated the adoption of policies with population’s political mobilization (see for a literature review: Amenta et al., 2010), and specifically in case of tobacco legislation (see: Nathanson, 1999). The exact mechanisms through which mobilization influence policies is disputed. However we argued that it is legitimate to assume that population’s political actions may intensify policy process complexity. The main idea is that policymakers’ confrontation with a multitude of policy interests intensifies, when a population is more likely to advance interests through political actions. Which may constrain policymakers in their decision to adopt more radical policies. Therefore in hypothesis 3a we expected a negative relationship between the likeliness of political action and the strictness of tobacco legislation. In our research we observed the negative relationship as expected16.

Previous scholars suggest that regime repression ‘closes’ POS resulting in political mobilization difficulties because gaining access and participate in policy processes is limited (see for a literature review: Davenport & Inman, 2012). From this logic we can than expect that when population’s political mobilization is restricted, policymakers are confronted with less complexity in policy processes. In line with hypothesis 3b we found support for this expected relationship between repression and strictness of legislation. This implies that whenever political participation is repressed, policymaking decision were likely to be more strict in comparison to situations of no repression of political mobilization whatsoever. We suggest two possible explanations for this finding. First, whenever policymaking processes became less complex by excluding participants, policymakers had more freedom and ease to translate public health concerns in legislation. Secondly, as grassroots participation was repressed, international legislative pressure may proceed more easily in domestic legislation.

Drawn on RM theory, we suggested that a population’s liberal orientation would decrease public support for tobacco control legislation and therewith provide the anti- tobacco movement with difficulties to acquire resources in order to impact politics. This would than yield in less strict tobacco legislation in comparison to a country were public is more socio-democratic oriented which increases anti -tobacco movements possibilities to acquire resources. In contrast to our expectation, we found no support for this expected relationship of hypothesis 3c. There are three possible explanations for the lack of finding this supposed relationship. The first comprise our measurement in itself. It could be that a person’s liberal ideology is no proxy of that person’s stance toward tobacco control legislation. Secondly, the availability of resources does not indicate whether these are actually addressed to gain political impact. Thirdly, a favorable population for tobacco industry interests does simply not have a severe influence on policy processes.

5.3 Academic contributions

Our intensions were to explain the strictness of tobacco control through empirically test multi- level factors from the triad formed by the state on top and anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement on both base corners.

\[16\text{Note: we made no distinction in whether political actions were predominantly pro- or against tobacco legislation driven. Thus population’s political action likeliness seems to impact tobacco legislation notwithstanding people’s stance toward tobacco control. Another explanation for negative relationship can then be that cross- nationally people are predominantly against tobacco control policies making political actions overall against- tobacco control driven, however this seems very unlikely.}\]
Concerning the top of the triad, possibilities for grassroots policy participation does not unconditionally enhance both anti-tobacco movement and tobacco industry’s countermovement to gain possibilities of policy impact. This implies that POS theory and policy diffusion theory principles may not work in the tobacco (or other public health) policy domains. Concentrating on the tobacco industry’s countermovement, we found that industry size is possibly no proxy of its bargaining possibilities in policy processes. Finally we draw on RM principles and found political mobilization and repression to be positively related to policy participation. However, our main contribution transcends the contribution to the main theories drawn from in our study. To our knowledge, we are the first to study policy outcomes as taken place in the realm of the triad formed by state, social movement and (corporate) countermovement. Although we did not found all multi-level factors attributed to these parties significantly related to policy outcomes, we think framing policy processes in such way provides a starting point for further cross-national policy studies by providing a reference to do so.

We recognize policy processes are complex phenomena and are as such difficult to capture in a single framework. As domestically policy process analysis is complex, cross-national comparison of policy outcomes is potentially even more complex. We hope to have provided a framework to reduce complexity by empirically test those multi-level factors that have a role in policy processes, at least in terms of the tobacco control dispute. Clustering of our data before running regression analysis, showed that unobserved factors within countries did impact the adoption of tobacco control legislation but we did not account for these. Our framework enables to simply add transnational and country-level factors into policy analysis, which hopefully encourages scholars to do so. For instance, factors concerning cultural dynamics and strategic choices of (counter)movements, which could enhance understanding of political mobilization, collective action and consequently participation in policy processes (see: Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). These recommendations concerns the two base corners of the triad, but the same holds for the top of the triad; the state. More political system factors can be included in the framework and empirically tested, in order to further assess the development of policies.

5.4 Practical contributions

A first practical contribution of this study concerns the political mobilization of society as it showed to seriously impede policy processes. For corporations to countermobilize against imputations posed by legislative threats, it seems a good tactic to try to make citizens willing to mobilize in order to fight for corporative cause. It is even not necessary to persuade the whole population with corporate interests, but just enough to bring complexity in policymakers decisions. In other words, corporations could bring disagreement among society and encourage political mobilization by providing the resources to do so. This may than result in less radical policy outcomes and consequently weaken effects on corporative operations and markets. In contrast to not interrupted policy processes where the opposite can be expected.

A second practical contribution is for policymakers to understand the grassroots possibilities to impact their decisions. Without falling into the discussion to what extend grassroots policy participation is desirable, for policymakers these insights may turn their decisions to be more rational as being less conducive to the strongest grassroots voice posed to them.

A third practical contribution concerns transnational organizations such as the European Union and World Health Organization. They could accelerate the adoption of strict tobacco control by forcing countries to repress grassroots public health policy participation through legislative means. Hence, our research showed grassroots political mobilization negatively impacts the strictness of tobacco control legislation. The same holds when turning to the country-level. If a government intends to implement tobacco control legislation, it could be useful to repress grassroots policy interference. In doing so, a state could avoid that the strictness of actual adopted tobacco legislation does not deviate from intentions.

5.5 Limitations and future research

In this study we operationalized the strictness of tobacco legislation as the cumulative number of prohibitions/bans for four main categories. This operationalization may lead to under- or overestimation of the strictness of tobacco policies for four reasons. First our categorization framework does not allow to capture the full dispersion of tobacco legislation. As such the framework does not enable to indicate the strictness of comprehensive tobacco legislation. Secondly, we neglect to credit
policy prescribed restrictions as indicator of legislative strictness. Hence tobacco legislation that prescribes more restrictions can be considered more strict in comparison to legislation with less or none restrictions whatsoever. Thirdly, we recorded legislative change in the adoption year of legislation by parliament which differs from the actual implementation of legislation. Which may result in an overestimation of the strictness of legislation. Finally, interrelated with the latter, we neglect the actual implementation of legislation and the effectiveness hereof. Legislation may formally be considered strict while in practice is relatively mild. For instance, in The Netherlands, the majority of small- bars neglected smoke-free hospitality regulations and forced exemption from legislation between 2008-2011 (see: Gonzalez & Glantz, 2013). A logical next step for researchers is to bring more nuance in the operationalization of legislative strictness and simultaneously study the actual implementation effectiveness.

Our research concentrated on differences in strictness of tobacco legislation among Eastern- and Western European countries. Although falling outside the scope of research, we saw interesting differences in adoption patterns of tobacco legislation between Eastern European countries and Western European countries. These Eastern European countries share in common that they acceded the European Union (EU) later than Western-European countries. Than accession of the EU could form the incentive to adopt strict tobacco policies in fast rates. We encourage researchers to study this presumed relationship and its role in policymaking decisions.

Moreover our study focused on the adoption of tobacco legislation and relate these to social, political and corporate factors. However, scholars did show that these factors have different effects at different steps of legislation processes such as bill acceptance et cetera. The main idea is that each step provide leverage points for grassroots pressure to work on legislative processes (see e.g.: Johnson, 2008; King et al., 2005; Olzak & Soule, 2009). We encourage researchers to consider these different legislative steps in research and specifically include (corporate) countermovements in analysis. Because this could further broaden understanding of the impact of movement/countermovement dynamics on policy processes.

In this study we focused on POS and specifically the ‘openness’ a political system provides in terms of the degree of decentralization and regime ideology. Whereas POS is defined as a broader concept (see: Meyer & Minkoff, 2004) comprising factors beyond political systems that impact (counter)movements ability to: “affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” (pp. 1457-1458). Our research is limited to a few dimension of POS but neglects a bunch of others. We therefore encourage researchers to extend international policy research by incorporating the POS concept, as completely as possible, in cross-national settings which may strengthen the triad- framework.

We assessed international legislative pressure by including country’s WHO FCTC ratification in analysis, and we found no relation with the strictness of legislation. Now the question arises whether other transnational organization impact domestic legislation. We therefore encourage researchers to include other transnational organization; EU, Anti- tobacco organization, into research. We recommend the simultaneous consideration of a multitude of transnational organization impacting domestic legislation. Potentially, international legislative pressure as the combined impact of transnational organizations on domestic legislation, significantly predicts legislative strictness. Another interesting question to study is what country- level factors enhance resistance to international tobacco control pressures.

It also need to be pointed that tobacco industry size, specifically as derived from export numbers, may not captured actual tobacco industry’s political actions. There are two main problems. First industry size is an indirect proxy of actual posed political actions by counter mobilized industry. Secondly, export value did potentially not reflect tobacco industry size correctly. For these reasons, we encourage scholars to develop and include measures that more closely reflect actual political actions performed by e.g. using media content analysis or analyzing tobacco internal documents. Although our results may fall short, we do encourage researchers to incorporate CPA theory into social movement research as it allows for

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17 Note: we took only full bans/ prohibitions per category; direct advertisement; indirect advertisement; distribution and; public accessible place in account. While fully neglecting restrictions per category imposed by legislation. For instance; prohibition of tobacco use in buses is accounted for as restriction in the public transport subcategory. While prohibition of tobacco use in any form of public transport is accounted for as prohibition within the public transport subcategory.

18 See for a comprehensive databases; ‘legacy tobacco document library’ http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
simultaneously studying social movements and corporate countermovements. Moreover, doing so would give a more complete picture on the grassroots disputes among proponents and supporters of issues, impact politics.

As our data is nested in countries it is recommendable to cluster data before running regression analysis. Regression results indeed showed differences when data was clustered or not. A major problem is that clustering results in a respective smaller sample size of sometime \( n < 22^{19} \) which could be insufficient to test our seven hypothesis. We therefore encourage researchers to develop other statistical methods to empirically test multi-level data in these settings.

Finally we test our triad framework only in case of the tobacco policy domain. As disputes are differently outplayed we encourage researchers to test the framework in different policy domains.

Acknowledgement

Koen Kuijpers would like to thank the supervisors of this research project: Dr. M.L. (Michel) Ehrenhard; Drs. Ir. T.A. (Tijs) Van Den Broek and Prof. Dr. A (Ariana) Need, for their critical remarks and support. Their supervision raised this research to a higher level. Moreover, many thanks to Mrs. C.G.M. Röring for her support. Finally, many thanks to the University of Twente for providing all possible opportunities to conduct this research.

\[19\] This holds for; Poland; Croatia; Czech Republic; Slovenia; and Ukraine. Also for other countries \( n \) is limited (with \( n=23 \)); Bulgaria; Cyprus; Germany; Greece; Romania and for Hungary (with \( n=24 \))
References


