Bachelor Thesis

NATO Membership in a More Secure World

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Abstract

This paper deals with the changes in the difficulty of accession to NATO and will attempt to explain these through the level of security stability on the international level. Therefore the main research question is: ‘Why did the difficulty of accession to NATO (not) change since 1952?’.

In this comparative case study, qualitative data from the accession of the states that joined since 1952 will be compared and analysed with respect to the change in the level of security stability on the international level. This allows me to draw conclusions on which enlargement strategy is followed when the level of security changes. The strategy most likely aligns itself with the predictions of realism, liberalism, constructivism or a mix of those.

Accession processes of states who have successfully joined NATO, as well as criteria used for the assessment of applicants will be the fundamental basis for the research.

*Keywords: NATO, NATO Enlargement, Constructivism, Collective Security, Structural Realism, Model of Trust*
**Introduction**

Security is an issue that has always been crucial for states, with the end of the 2nd World War and the Cold War being an especially important lesson for the relevant actors in regards to dealing with it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an institution that was created with the purpose of maintaining the security of its members. Although since its creation on the 4th April 1949 there have been numerous disagreements between the states in Europe, large-scale military conflicts could be prevented. Throughout the past six decades a lot has changed within the international landscape and this does not leave security unaffected. Enlargement of security institutions, such as NATO, has become a difficult task in which every move requires careful consideration as it may provoke conflicts that can have great consequences for the maintenance of peace, yet it is deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace.

Researchers have been active in this field and attempted to describe and predict the behaviour of security institutions and its members. Eventually theories based on structural realism and constructivism with influence of liberalism came into focus. Especially the latter became increasingly relevant since the end of the Cold War and the change this meant for the orientation of NATO. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat there was not as much left to guard the European states from and therefore the role of NATO had to be adjusted with new aims that would guarantee this institution a place in the world. There is general agreement in the literature that realism is the most relevant theory concerning state behaviour (see Mearsheimer 1994; Kydd 2001; Waltz, 2000), and that the end of the Cold War triggered great changes for security institutions (see Wallander 2000; Schimmelfennig 1998; Kydd 2001; Caddis 1998; Epstein 2005; Kelley 2004; Gheciu 2005; Waltz, 2000). Mearsheimer, Kydd and Kupchan & Kupchan have attempted to explain NATO enlargement with theories and models originating from realism or purely based on realism. Schimmelfennig opposes this view and delivered explanations from a constructivist point of view.

With more member states deciding over the enlargement, great changes in the environment and a trend among scientists to deem realism as less fit in today’s environment, the accessibility to NATO can be expected to have changed. The paper will reveal if it changed at all and if yes, how and why it did, looking for concrete reasons and the theoretical basis for these changes in the accessibility. The accession process directly reflects the underlying aims and thought that drives the actions of the institution. Identifying this fundamental thought can allow future predictions on the topic of enlargement and thereby potential missteps can be prevented.

This is relevant in the current situation between the West and Russia over Ukraine, where tension is increasing since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. If NATO has followed a certain strategy,
but does not act according to it, this change will signal a change in the aims of enlargement. Such a change, which cannot be fully identified immediately, will be seen as potentially dangerous for the security of non-members and threatens to disturb the current balance. The paper will allow the identification and prediction of enlargement in connection to the level of threat and stability in the security environment. Such insight reassures non-members and can prevent drastic reactions.

**Research Question**

In order to identify the underlying logic of NATO’s enlargement, the following explanatory research question is asked:

‘*Why has the difficulty of accession to NATO (not) changed since 1952?’*

The accessibility to NATO has clearly changed as the recent admittance of numerous states has shown. Answering ‘why’ the accessibility changed in terms of the underlying ideological thought can have a great impact on the future.

In order to do so the following sub questions are of great importance:

1. *How has the security stability on the international level changed since 1952?*
2. *How has the process of accession changed since 1952?*
3. *How has the amount of accession criteria change since 1952?*
4. *Which criteria have been used to assess accession requests since 1952?*
5. *Did accession to NATO become easier or more difficult?*

First of all the process of accession has to be examined and described over time, especially before and after the end of the Cold War which marks a great change in its environment. Criteria that have been set out for those states and the process of bonding can be identified through documents on the participation in the Partnership for Peace, Individual Partnership Action Plan, Intensified Dialog and the implementation of a Membership Action Plan. However these tools did not exist since the creation of NATO.

The aims of NATO and its members, which I assume have the greatest impact on any change in the accession of states, are determined by the changing level of security. Environmental changes in the international landscape mean great change for NATO as an institution and thereby its tasks and aims. Eventually the changes in the environment and accession (procedures and criteria) have to be related and the change examined from different perspectives (see theory). Like this the most relevant theory can be determined and used for future predictions.
Unsuccessful cases are largely excluded because joining NATO is not always a straightforward progress in which cooperation on a certain issue will lead to membership, nor does it imply that states who cooperate desire to join.

**Theory, Concepts and Hypothesis**

The security environment dictates the need for security institutions and thereby its expansion or downsizing as well. All hypotheses relate to the change in the security environment in a general or specific way. Clearly the greatest change in the security environment, since the creation of NATO, has been the end of the Cold War, which allowed the establishment of peace and more freedom to all states, especially the ex-Soviet ones. Not all hypotheses manage to explain the enlargement since the first round in 1952, but are more fitting for the cases of 1999 and later. In this context an ‘improved security environment’ is characterized as an environment in which peace prevails and cooperation as well as support between the states is exchanged constantly. Besides this no state should be overpowered by other states and therefore limited in its freedom to act, unless it has contractually and by free will agreed to such conditions.

In the current literature, realism has been identified as the theory closest to the reality of state behaviour in security institutions. However there exist many different theories that diverge from the purely realist thought and offer up other ideas about the drivers of enlargement in security institutions such as NATO. Collective security and constructivism are divergences that seem to be able to explain changes in the accessibility and enlargement strategy of such institutions. Although this is a topic of an ongoing debate, which generally seems to be in favour of the thought that the aims of states are the aim of security institutions (especially NATO) it can only be positive for the research to also formulate a hypothesis on grounds of this perspective.
Structural Realism

Mearsheimer emphasizes structural realism as best explanation for the state behaviour on the international landscape concerning security issues, refuting other theories that emphasize institutions as a central tool for the maintenance of security, namely liberal institutionalism, collective security and critical theory. These, respectively, deny the ideas of structural realism to an increasing extent and offer up other visions based on realism, for the maintenance of peace, not accepting that war is seen as inevitable and a simple extension of politics.

Structural realists remain sceptical of such a position, such as the one of institutional liberalism as they believe in the existence of the selfish desire of states. In the world of structural realism the international system is seen as an arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of one another (Mearsheimer, 1994). Peace and an absence of competition for power are impossible as every actor constantly tries to improve its relative position of power in order to ensure one’s own survival and sovereignty. Since states fear each other, there is little room for the establishment of trust and reliance on others will be avoided as much as possible. Alliances are only temporary in such a self-help world and serve the maximization of the power of its members (Mearsheimer, 1994). Restrictions on membership stem from a materialistic point of view that does not take into account any norm convergence or values. Lacking funds or imposing costs on current members is major criteria.

Cooperation therefore is a difficult task as it will only occur if the (perceived) relative gain of the participants is bigger than that of others. Besides this the fear that the other actor is cheating makes states reluctant to cooperate. Therefore institutions merely reflect the self-interest of states and are created and shaped by the most powerful ones. To Evans and Wilson they essentially are “arenas to act out power relationships” (as cited in Mearsheimer, 1994), an intervening variable in the shadow of the independent variable, the balance of power.

The views of Waltz are quite similar to those of Mearsheimer and supports that the NATO will “dwindle at the Cold War’s end and ultimately [...] disappear” (Waltz, 2000, p.19). To him NATO as a ‘treaty of guarantee’ does not exist anymore and it initially simply persisted because institutions are difficult to create, while finding a purpose is easy (Waltz, 2000). Although, in Waltz’ view, expansion pushes Russia towards China, weakens the support of Russians who favour a liberal democracy and a market economy and creates a new dividing line between the West and the East, it proceeds due to economic reasons among the states (e.g. sale of arms that will be required for modernization) (Waltz, 2000). However in the greater context no real change has taken place in the difficulty of accession, as such reasons have always prevailed.
This means in the context of NATO that as soon as enlargement does not support the self-interested goals of the member states (maximization of power) it is going to adjust its accessibility. Goals of the states are the driving force behind the invitation of other states and as long as further enlargement does not enhance their power or welfare, especially that of the most powerful states, they are going to attempt to restrict others from joining NATO. In Realism the level of difficulty of accession is not really influenced by what happens in the outside world.

**Hypothesis one:** No matter if the security environment improves or gets worse, the difficulty of accession is unaffected and remains the same.

**Model of Trust**

A dilemma, created by the threat of cheating, puts states in the situation of a prisoner’s dilemma which is to be resolved by institutions. Mearsheimer claims that institutions fail to push states towards the Pareto optimum (Game theory) by catching, punishing and jeopardizing cheaters and increasing the costs of cheating through the creation of interdependence and transparency. (Mearsheimer, 1994). Kydd (2001) has developed a game rhetoric model for this trust dilemma between Russia, NATO and potential member states.

He describes the dilemma of enlargement as having to make the decision between reassurance of Russia (cooperation with outsiders) and the strengthening of the benefits for insiders through further enlargement (cooperation with insiders). Therefore enlargement has to be conducted carefully in order to maintain the optimum. Granting states easy access to NATO will break the trust with Russia while difficult access will exclude potentially useful members. The author uses realist methods to reach a constructivist goal, which is the socialization of other states, as fostering democracy equals fostering peace (Kydd, 2001).

This theory divides states into two categories: revisionist states, who want change and do not exclude war as means to achieve it, and status quo oriented states who prefer to maintain the current balance of power (Kydd, 2001). In the context of NATO this means that the major aim of it has become the identification of the applicants’ status in order to build a community of states who want to maintain peace. If the potential member is status quo oriented, then it is going to accept extensive membership criteria, with which NATO in return can socialize the applicant. Socialization of the applicant leads to strengthening democracy in that particular political unit.
However, in order to maintain the balance of power the revisionist oriented states (e.g. Russia) also have to be reassured that NATO is not seeking to encircle others and at some point act aggressively (since revisionist states do not view others as status-quo oriented). Therefore the bigger the alliance becomes, the more transparency in the accession process is needed in order to maintain trust of the revisionist states into the peaceful intentions of the status quo ones. This includes increasingly clear and strict membership criteria, especially for states geographically close to Russia and China.

**Hypothesis two:** If the security environment improves, accession becomes more difficult.

**Collective Security**

Collective security theory originates from realism as well and incorporates constructivist elements. The use of force is central to collective security (Frederking, 2003) but at the same time the international community has to act according to certain ‘global security rules’. These rules originate from an interplay of agents with structures who create one another and materialize in the social structures which help to constitute the identities and interests of the actors (Frederking, 2003). However, institutions, although acting in line with these global security rules, are not seen as the solution to security problems, yet having institutions to react upon aggressors is more ideal than a world in balance under anarchy as structural realism describes it (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995). An institution that acts according to this theory would include as many actors as possible in order to tackle the ‘lone aggressor’ in the event of war. All members would be contractually bound to aid the victim and this would effectively prevent the emergence of an aggressor. In order to become a collective security institution the inclusion of Russia would be a future aim of NATO, because, unlike an alliance or a coalition, collective security is directed towards not just external but also internal threats (Clark, 1995).

The idea of collective security in the context of NATO was countered by Mearsheimer due to the fact that two decades ago the intention to expand was not great. However as we can see today, this intention changed and due to this and a response-article to Mearsheimer, formulated by Kupchan & Kupchan, I consider collective security as a possible option. The NATO was built on balance-of-power considerations and has to expand into central and eastern Europe in order to avoid drawing a new dividing line that would create opposing power blocs once again (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995).
If a basic compatibility among the great powers in a system exists, collective security is achievable (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995). The only requirement is that the military capacity is overwhelming and that members can be absolutely certain to receive support in case they fall victim to a new aggressor. In the best case scenario (if NATO is to take the role of a collective security institution) NATO would even include Russia, unless it expresses the preference of living independently in a self-help world (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995).

According to Clark (1995), who cited several researches on this issue, the threat of war and instability in the security environment are a major obstacle to expansion of a collective security organization. Hostile relations between the US and the Soviet Union did not allow the implementation of collective security provisions (as cited in Clark, 1995), security cooperation between the “antagonistic political systems proved illusory” (Flynn & Scheffer, 1990, para. 18). Therefore only in the right international environment a collective response towards aggression can be formulated (as cited in Clark, 1995).

Furthermore as Kupchan & Kupchan pointed out the ‘basic compatibilities’ have to exist, eventually leading to the invitation of more states to the collective security organization. Since the emergence of another aggressor is seen as inevitable, the institution will attempt to invite all states that possess basic compatibilities. Furthermore the security institution and its members will encourage and grant assistance to outsider states in order to help them to develop the necessary compatibilities.

**Hypothesis three**: If the security environment improves, accession becomes easier.

**Constructivism**

Schimmelfennig approaches NATO enlargement from a constructivist perspective, saying that the international socialization of states to the basic norms of an international community of values is the aim of NATO enlargement (since the end of the Cold War) (Schimmelfennig, 1998). This means that applicants cannot pose a threat to the current values by introducing their own into the community; NATO will ‘defend’ against such and minimize the threat by demanding adoption of fundamental norms in form of the creation of domestic law, making the community’s beliefs and practices become an integral part of the actor’s identity (Schimmelfennig, 1998). Therefore accession to NATO depends a lot on the applicant’s willingness and own initiative until it reaches the point of being ‘one of us’ in the eyes of NATO. Restricting membership only is based on grounds of idealistic reasons and not based on materialistic shortcoming, which makes constructivism quite the opposite to realism. The current members do not follow egoistic motives and chose ‘appropriate’ over ‘efficient’ potential partners and furthermore the goals and procedures, including the accession process, have to be
legitimate (Schimmelfennig, 1998). Additionally the accession process defends the set of values of the institution by shaping the applicant, through the teaching the values, interests and constitutive belief of the institution, eventually changing their identity as a nation. As a result the potential member state receives approval for its change and thereby legitimacy on multiple levels when finally joining the institution.

The North Atlantic Treaty offers evidence for different reasons of enlargement. Article 2 states that parties contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations and maintenance of peace though trade and democracy.

However Schimmelfennig does not exclude rationalist explanations, especially for the behaviour of individual state actors, since every actor may have different motives.

In the context of enlargement constructivism predicts that a more stable security environment will lead to more states joining NATO although its criteria do not change. It is therefore an indirect result of potential members having the possibility to spend more resources on the adoption of values and norms, to europeanize themselves and “return to Europe” (Schimmelfennig, 1998. p216). More specifically during the more peaceful situation that has been established since the end of the Cold War, especially valid for the Eastern European states, a norm reorientation is easier because of the lack of influence from Russia. In a more unstable and dangerous environment such a reorientation could shift a state into the focus of two or more opposing forces, forcing an individual state to invest into its defence.

Therefore, unaffected of the situation of the security environment, NATO would promote the value of its members and allow applicants to join as soon as they have fulfilled the requirements. This, however, is only valid in times of peace as furthering the democratic values of the alliance is seen as a measure to stabilize peace. If war would break lose it is likely that norm convergence is not the main priority anymore, as stabilization has clearly failed at this point.

**Hypothesis four:** No matter if the security environment improves or gets worse, the difficulty of accession from side of the institution is unchanged but more states join in times of peace.

**Research Methodology**

**Research Design**

Answering my research question requires data on similar cases over a period of about sixty years. This research design means the paper is a longitudinal comparative case study. On the one hand information about the criteria of the invitation is going to be essential, while on the other hand it has to be clarified how the process of accession worked for the different cases. The membership criteria and
changes in the accession procedure should clarify whether it has become more difficult or easier to access NATO and thereby hint at what theory best describes the current and future behaviour of NATO on this issue. In order to do so these types of information have to be compared over time in order to measure what impact the environmental changes had, eventually confirming or refusing the hypotheses.

In the first step the criteria will be examined directly through official documents of NATO and indirectly through documents of discussions and recommendations. Since 1952 there have been seven rounds of enlargement, each with unique statements that allow the extraction of explicit and implicit membership criteria for the individual state.

In the second step, information has to be gained about the accession process at that time by looking at the individual states that have joined and how the procedure worked. Here mainly the length of the process is of importance. What institutions have the states been part of? In what areas have NATO and the state cooperated? Eventually a pattern for the different time periods will materialize. However the time period only is important from the moment on when NATO or the aspiring state has mentioned the possibility of membership.

The underlying assumption is that changes in the pattern of accession are a result of a changing level of security on the international environment. Therefore I expect that at least three patterns to materialize in the time periods; 1952-1990, 1990-2001 and 2001-2010 as decisive events have influenced the security stability in those years.

Case Selection

In order to analyse the accession process case selection is taking place to a limited extent. As there have only been seventeen successful cases I am going to deal with almost all of them. This means that I will analyse the accession process of five rounds of enlargement (fifteen states). First of all, Turkey and Greece in 1952, then Spain in 1982, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999; then in the biggest round of enlargement: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004 and lastly the invitation of Albania and Croatia in 2009. States that currently can be considered to be in the process of accession will not be analysed in detail since cooperation with NATO can lead to membership but it does not imply that this is the state’s intention to do so.

However I will include cases of states that have directly attempted to join NATO but have been rejected in the final vote. The one case that meets this is Macedonia which has been refused due to issues with Greece. Besides this Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia have explicitly stated the wish to join NATO but did not yet progress far enough to be considered as refused applicants. Although Georgia has entered the process in 1994.

I exclude the invitation of West Germany in 1955 as this has been the result of end of the Second World War in order to keep the Germans down. Germany’s reunification led to the invitation of East Germany, whose accession has been much different due to the fact that West Germany has already been a part of NATO at this point in time and is therefore not representative either.

The aims can be drawn from documents (statements, recommendations, plans, status reports) conducted by NATO in the same period as the round of enlargement. Besides this other authors have worked on this issue before and their work will be used to explain inconsistent behaviour towards states of the same enlargement wave.

Operationalization

The research question requires the measurement of the difficulty of accession to NATO, which is, once determined, explained through the hypotheses. However in order to do so first of all the difficulty of accession has to be conceptualized. The relative time period is one indicator for this, however it is important to determine at what point in time the possibility of an eventual membership arose for that particular state, meaning the point at which simple cooperation gave away to the beginning of an accession process. Many states solemnly use institutions and agreements such as the Partnership for Peace to cooperate and communicate with NATO and its members on certain issues. Although this is a fundamental step towards membership, formally membership is first approached the moment a MAP is adopted.
Besides the time period the fulfilment of membership criteria that have been laid out in the MAP and the Study on NATO Enlargement is critical. Although many criteria exist they are not all taken equally serious in the eventual consideration about extended an invitation or not. Mainly the change in quantity of these criteria is a factor that can be measured over time. Furthermore other factors that cannot be measured also play a role.

Stability of the international security environment and system is also important for the research questions, however an exact measurement of this variable will not be undertaken by myself and will rather be based on the conclusions of existing literature. My assumption is that the stability has gradually increased especially since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. This assumption has been confirmed by Solana who states that the current century is less stamped by violence and promotes more openness (Solana, 2003). Rynning, who analysed the involvement of NATO in the Middle East, found that after the end of the Second World War, up until the 1980s, involvement of NATO in the Middle East was important mainly with the aim of preventing the Soviet Union to gain power (Rynning, 2007). This involvement decreased with the fall of the Soviet Union until the terrorist attacks in 2001 which demanded more involvement once again. Looking at these two events dialogue was more important than military intervention in this area.

When the UN failed to maintain peace in the Yugoslavian Wars, especially Bosnia (1992-1993), NATO’s command structure and organization of troop deployment was not yet well prepared. In 1999 (Kosovo) however, NATO proved that it could deal with the new security issues (Wallander, 2000). The threats to international security has lessened throughout the years and thereby stability of the international security environment has increased. Between 1945 and 1990 there has been a low level of security due to the instability that followed the Second World War and the emergence of the Soviet Union, as well as great disagreement about security policy among western powers (e.g. France seeking legitimate action, while U.S. seeking the enforcement of justice). After this, a period of uncertainty about the aims of the security institutions and a lack of a new structure followed. During this period NATO had to restructure as well as keep others in check in order to prevent the re-emergence of an aggressor. At the beginning of the new millennia however NATO had found its new role with the emergence of the ‘War on Terror’ and thereby terrorism became the new great threat to security. Although this threat is not to be underestimated the chance of a full scale war is much lower. The view that “the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed”, has also been confirmed by the Study on NATO Enlargement (NATO, 1995).
As previously indicated, the hypotheses that best explains NATO’s enlargement can be drawn from data on the accession processes of states that joined and the criteria of NATO that have been followed in the past. In a combination of these two the intentions of enlargement become clear and a change in it is what I am attempting to identify and explain. The two concepts are drawn, relatively straightforward, from official documents of NATO and the states as well as reports and scientific analyses, making my data collection method a non-verbal and unobtrusive one, a content analysis.

The NATO usually formulates ‘Communiques’ and other documents at the end of meetings, in which it is stated what decisions have been taken, what issues have been discussed and also what arguments have been brought up during the discussions. Besides this researchers from national governments, especially the U.S., have dealt extensively with the creation of reports on the status of applicant states. From these sources specific information can be taken. Additionally, information can be derived from the position applicants had before accession in the international framework overall and how long cooperation has taken place through these.

The accession patterns (meaning the criteria and accession period) of the different waves of enlargement then have to be compared to one another. At the same time the changes in the security environment have to be taken into account in order to eventually determine the relevant hypothesis.

**Limitations to These Studies**

A threat to this research design is the deductive approach which may threaten validity. Theories always have flaws and can be refuted or confirmed only to a certain extent. Furthermore it is possible that the selected theories do not cover all possible options, including the one that may be most realistic.

Besides this the causality of my approach is difficult to prove as there are numerous factors that influence the dependent variable. It is possible that other third variables are better fit to explain the change in the accession processes and these have yet to be discovered. The currently presented model
cannot be seen as perfect. Furthermore the possibility of inconsistency in NATO’s behaviour threatens the reliability of this analysis. In case applicants of the same wave of enlargement have been approached entirely differently it is going to be very difficult to determine a single hypothesis as the correct one. The greatest threat however is the internal validity of this study. Assuming that the level of stability is the only important independent variable for the difficulty of accession is dangerous. It is highly possible that other variables influence the dependent variable of this study, although those are most likely to be related to the selected independent variable.

It also has to be noted that excluding cases that clearly struggle with gaining membership influences the study by creating the risk of ignoring criteria that may restrict access to NATO but were not applicable for any other state that has joined. However such a criteria would only be in-official in its nature as all official criteria are included through other sources (e.g. the case of Macedonia’s name).

Analysis

Accession Procedure

At the first glance it would seem that accession is easier in times of instability and crisis as the membership of West and East Germany was a result of exactly such reasons. On second glance however it becomes clear that the higher number of states have joined in more stable times, (in the last twenty years). However before reaching any conclusions, the criteria of the selected cases and the accession procedure should be examined closely.

Throughout the years the accession procedure has become much more defined and explicit than it has been in the very beginning shortly after the creation of NATO. Turkey, Greece and Spain cooperated with NATO through the exchange of information and assistance, eventually reaching the conclusion that membership would be beneficial for both sides. In such an informal way the membership was approached very quickly for Greece and Turkey but rather slowly for Spain.

Followed by the invitation of Spain in 1982 and the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has attempted to develop a more concrete enlargement procedure. This first materialized in 1991 with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which was supposed to be a forum for dialogue and cooperation between the former Warsaw Pact members and NATO. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is the successor of the NACC and was created in 1997 for the discussion of views on current political and security issues among its 50 members. Furthermore in 1994 the Partnership for
While participation in the rest of the framework is seen as very beneficial for membership, the participation in the PfP and NACC is unofficially seen as necessity to raise military standards to that of NATO.

Aside the participation outside NATO, the Study on NATO Enlargement has also defined the accession procedure. After a formal application from the potential member state, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) informs about a favourable tendency to begin accession talks. Followed by the, often lengthy, process of consultation about the protocol of accession which mostly includes reforms, the protocol is being signed (consent) by the NAC. Eventually all states will ratify that the new state is now a part of the Alliance and finally a formal invitation is extended (NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement*, 1995). Although the consultation process has changed substantially, this procedure has persisted throughout the existence of NATO.

Consultation was, up until 1999, a relatively unstructured process but just after the invitation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic there were additions to change this. The Membership Action Plan (1999), Individual Partnership Action Plan (2002) and Intensified Dialogue (2005) are crucial for accession to NATO as these consultation mechanisms help set up the terms of membership as well as enable reforms and implementation of already existing documents and agreements. Consultation happens on an individual basis and is classified, meaning that although broad criteria exist, the applicant will receive an individualized MAP (see Appendix). However compliance with the established criteria does not guarantee membership as it is only decided in a final consensual vote, where even bilateral disagreements between an insider and the applicant may lead to a veto on the accession. Finally the question of whether structuring the consultation process and granting more assistance in reforming the national system has actually made accession easier or more difficult has to be answered. In order to do so the duration of the accession process of the individual states will be
examined.

As NATO declared that membership is open to all democracies who seek it (NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995) it is important to pin down at what moment the basis for membership has been created. Therefore the time period analysed here, begins with the moment membership became a possibility and ends with officially signing the protocol of accession. The ratification process is little more than a formality, which is why the period between signing the protocol and the extension of a formal invitation is not included.

For the case of Spain this meant that all the military cooperation before the establishment of a democracy did not have a great impact on NATO’s considerations to invite Spain, although some members have supported membership before political change. Similarly all the states who were involved in the Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union could not consider membership a possibility until these structures broke up. For Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia the moment membership became possible was the day they achieved independence from Yugoslavia. Table 1 and Figure 3 visualize the time period and the amount of time certain steps towards membership took.

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<th>First Cooperation</th>
<th>Protocol of Accession</th>
<th>Time (in days)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>16-Sep-50</td>
<td>17-Oct-51</td>
<td>396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>16-Sep-50</td>
<td>17-Oct-51</td>
<td>396</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>6-Dec-78</td>
<td>10-Dec-81</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>25-Feb-91</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>6224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1 – Accession Time Periods (Sources: NATO Archives; Press Releases, Reports; Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document; Baltic Defense Review – MAP On the road towards NATO; Governmental Websites and other, www.nato.int ; www.rferl.org ;

Three points in time are important in the accession process: When the possibility of membership arose, when actual adjustment began and when the Protocol of Accession was finally signed. While the first time period is relatively constant, taking about three years, the second period varies significantly over time.
Greece, Turkey and Spain clearly are special cases in the history of enlargement. Since there existed no consultation through programs such as the PfP or the MAP, consultation was undertaken during accession talks. While Greece and Turkey simply passed them, Spain needed adjustments which caused the accession talks to last several years. The norm however is that the accession talks are used to bargain for promises and last-minute adjustments to the domestic systems. Most changes happen after joining the PfP which signifies willingness to cooperate more closely, up until the beginning of the MAP at which point the states clearly expresses a desire for eventual membership. When comparing this over time it is visible that Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary required much less time to make adjustments than all countries that joined later on. For Greece and Turkey it is questionable if any change was demanded at all, but this is worked out in more detail in the next stage.
Croatia joined the PfP much later and was simply pushed along when the MAP talks with Macedonia and Albania began, yet it still needed more time than the previously mentioned states. Also the overall length of the accession period greatly increased and is likely to last even longer for current and future aspirants.

However it cannot be concluded that the period lasts longer because of the new mechanisms but rather that the criteria are monitored more seriously through these. Almost all of the members that joined since 1999 have taken part in the PfP and MAP the moment it has been created, just like future applicants have done. Therefore the mechanisms do not necessarily make it much more difficult as it is rather about the capability to fulfil the new standards, for which obviously some states need much longer than others. Yet in terms of costs the aspiring states face an increase as more cooperation demands more time investment as well as resources. All in all it has therefore become more difficult to join NATO in terms of the accession period. More work and cooperation is required and failure is detected much easier than it has been decades ago. Beyond all this the final vote is still based on consensus despite the greatly increased number of participants and although NATO commands that new states do not unnecessarily block the invitation of others, fulfilling the demands for consensus becomes increasingly difficult when the amount of actors rises.

**Criteria of NATO Enlargement**

The foundation of membership is the commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the Washington Treaty as well as the ability to contribute to the Alliance’s full range of missions including collective defence (NATO, 21st November 2002). All states that may further Article 10 of this treaty are welcome to join. Criteria beyond those broadly described in the Washington Treaty from 1949 have been defined more closely in 1995 in the Study on NATO Enlargement and for the first time concretely in the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Although NATO is a military organization, not only military criteria are crucial for membership. The criteria have been divided in five categories (in the MAP document) namely: Political and Economic Issues, Military and Defence Issues, Resource Issues, Security Issues and Legal Issues (NATO, Membership Action Plan, 1999) (See Appendix).

**The pattern of 1952 to 1990.** The period of 1952 to 1990 is stamped by a low level of security with the constant threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle between communism and capitalism. Turkey, Greece and Spain are the only states that have joined NATO during this period and this was seemingly easy as there were not many mechanisms they had to deal with. Does this mean the difficulty of accession was actually easier? In order to answer this question a look at the informal and formal criteria of membership has to be undertaken.
Turkey and Greece were the only case in the history of NATO enlargement where the potential member states have been approached by NATO and did not have to initiate the process themselves. According to Rynning (2007) NATO required manpower in the Mediterranean East and in the event of this promoted Italy as a founding member and guided Greece and Turkey to membership. In 1950 containing the Soviet Union was seen as an important task and especially in the Middle East NATO lacked influence. At first, in 1950, it was planned to merely involve Turkey and Greece on a military level and not grant membership (NATO, 16th September 1950), however in 1951 Italy suggested the invitation of these two states as full members (NATO, June 25th 1951). The aims, brought up during this invitation were the addition of strategically important points that would ensure best possibilities of defence in case of an attack. Turkey is geographically in a protective position for the defence of the Mediterranean sector and important for involvement in Iran, Persia and the Arab-Israeli conflict (NATO, June 18th 1951). Although it was clear that there would be constitutionally difficulties NATO members tried to rush to extend an invitation to these two states as it was clear that Russia did not accept neutrality of states in this geographical position and further involvement in the Mediterranean was deemed impossible without political association (NATO, 10th September 1951). Eventually accession talks began and the existing documents show that it was rather easy to join NATO. The only criteria for their accession were of military nature. Most importantly the agreed command structure had to be accepted which gave NATO members the rights they desired (NATO, 17th November 1951). Beyond this the striking power, rather than the defensive capabilities which were more important in later enlargement waves That Turkey and Greece brought into the Alliance was seen as important as an attack from the Soviet Union was expected in the Northeast or East of Europe (NATO, 26th March 1952). Political criteria and the convergence of norms were certainly left out of the considerations when discussing the extension of invitations. Fascism was popular in Greece and the Civil War during the 1940s and political unrest followed during the 1950s. Turkey could not match those criteria either, as it had just moved to a multi-party system, and up until today does not meet the political criteria for EU membership, which is taken as a guideline nowadays.

Spain has ever since the creation of NATO been on good terms with the institution and constantly received information, especially on military action. Numerous documents, more than any other state has ever received, in the archives named ‘Release of Information to Spain’ prove this positive working relationship has been maintained since 1952. Therefore for the case of Spain it may be argued that NATO took political criteria more seriously as it was not invited early on despite favourable military conditions. The death of the king Francisco Franco in 1975 was the beginning of a period of reorientation towards a democratic government, which was somewhat completed by the time Spain joined NATO.
It must be concluded that political criteria where not ignored but certainly not seen as strict as nowadays. The creation of a democracy and a beginning of norm convergence has been seen as sufficient during this period as other concerns pressed for the extension of military capacities. Besides that there had been no formal consultation provided from NATO to aspiring states, although cooperation clearly has to be established before accession talks, similar to the later cases. Overall the inclusion of states was less of an aim of NATO.

**The pattern of 1990 to 2001.** With the conduction of the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 broad criteria were formulated that should be followed, yet no precise consultation existed at this point in time. Furthermore the PfP and NACC (later EAPC) highlighted what military standards and procedures are favourable and trains participant’s military together to reach similar standards.

With time passing by NATO increasingly promotes values on the international level and even uses violence as means to do so (in Kosovo and Bosnia). This is due to the fact that security issues have been internationalized and along with that other political issues such as minority rights have also become more than a national problem (Agh, 1999). For the case of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic however political criteria have still not been as important as in the later stages of enlargement. It has been heavily criticized that NATO enlargement was unfocused and dealt rather with the questions of “who” and “when” instead of asking “why” and “how” enlargement should proceed (Pellerin, 1997).

Researches have foremost analysed the military capacities of these new members, judging that not even here the new states excel. In contrast to the later enlargements the states have merely made promises of reaching targets and making reforms, while later NATO would only invite after such reforms have become reality.

However the criteria for the three applicants of this period have been assessed in light of the relatively undefined criteria set out of the Study on NATO Enlargement. The study is divided into six chapters and discusses enlargement as a whole, including the principles and the purpose of enlargement (NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement*, 1995). Values have clearly been set out with the promotion of purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, safeguarding freedom, common heritage, civilization, the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Besides that disputes have to be settled in a peaceful manner and all principles, policies and procedures previously accepted have to be overtaken (NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement*, 1995). By stating that large scale military threats are further declining, it is hinted at the decreasing relevance of the military capacity of aspiring states. Of course military budget contributions, participation in missions and the sharing of tasks...
remain essential. Most importantly however was that the applicant would fit the purpose of NATO enlargement.

For all states the criteria of GDP investment into the military has been taken seriously, resulting in investments between 2 and 2.3% of GDP, although economies were shrinking in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Simon, 1999). Aside from this the military capacities of Hungary and the Czech Republic were barely large enough to defend their own territory, not to mention their readiness for NATO missions. This is related to the amount of conscripts which were greatly reduced due to a conscription period of 6 months in Hungary and 12 months in the Czech Republic, while both previously had this period at least twice as long (Simon, 1999). Poland maintained a 12 months conscription period with an extended-service of an additional 15 months on a voluntary basis. However the capacities were deemed similar to those of Belgium, Portugal and Greece (for Hungary and Czech Republic) and to Spain (for Poland) (Simon, 1999).

Aside the direct criteria, participation in the European security architecture was and is deemed as fundamental for healthy cooperation preceding accession. Especially NACC and PfP participation are deemed important in order to get involved in the security structure of Europe.

**The pattern of 2001 to 2009.** After the MAP as a consultation mechanism was introduced, quickly followed by the Individual Partnership Action Plan and Intensified Dialogue, membership criteria became much more explicit and effectively incorporated other than purely military elements. Especially driven by the U.S. enlargement was promoted after the event on the 11th September 2001. It was deemed important to “strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come” (NATO, 21st November 2002, para. 3). Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004 and Albania, Croatia (and almost Macedonia) in 2009. These states have been guided by individual MAPs with regular communication and updates on the progress. Criteria have been addressed that previously were not taken as seriously but even at this point many criteria seemed to have been ignored. In the following part the criteria that have been applied in this wave and the following will be examined in terms of how strictly applied they were. It is not being ignored, however, that states were judged based on their performance overall and not on that of single criteria. Furthermore other factors besides the accession criteria play a great role, as the case of Macedonia proves.

By taking a close look at reports (Woehrel, Kim & Ek, 2003 and Morelli, Belkin, Ek, Nichol, & Woehrel, 2008) on the development of these states, the criteria that have actually been implemented and do not just exist on paper become clear.
The criteria that have been analysed by the authors of the reports can be categorized quite similar the MAP categories: Political and Economic Factors, Foreign Policy and Defence Factors, Armed Forces, Civilian Control over the Military

For the political and economic factors the EU is often taken as a guideline for fulfilment of those criteria for NATO. Generally the human rights, free and fair elections and the maintenance of a free market economy play a crucial role. Concrete political problems in applicant states typically are; too much control over the media, violation of privacy rights, discrimination and mistreatment of minorities, failure to fight drug and human trafficking, excessive use of force by the police, the treatment of prisoners and conditions of prisons. Besides this corruption, often related to a weak judiciary, has been a great problem for almost all of the applicants of these two enlargement waves. Common economic problems are the living standards, amount of foreign investment, unemployment, control of the government on spending and growth of the economy. For all of these problems NATO develops reforms in cooperation with the state, however these are not always implemented in a timely manner.

Concerning the Foreign policy and defence factors it is important to have institutional connections and cooperate in military actions (typically abroad) with NATO, quite similar to how it has been in earlier enlargement waves as well. Participation in the institutions; OECD, EU, Council of Europe, PfP and EAPC and the military missions e.g. Afghanistan, Kosovo and ISAF as well as NATO-led forces e.g. SFOR and KFOR are quite beneficial for membership. Affairs with neighbours is another factor that can disrupt a successful accession to NATO. Especially territorial disputes have to be solved through peaceful means in order to join. Besides this, public support has to exist for the decision to join the Alliance.

Thirdly the Armed Forces have to possess capabilities that allow the state to contribute to the missions of NATO. Here usually the downsizing of armed forces in order to make them more professional and mobile is deemed important, although the quantity of forces that can contribute to missions is not to be neglected. Furthermore the states are encouraged to reach NATO military standards by modernizing equipment and reforming procedures and command structures as well as investing at least 2% of their GDP into their military. Small states are supposed to develop niche capabilities, such as medic, engineer or explosives specialist platoons, as they will not be able to contribute quantitatively.

The last category is Civilian Oversight with civilian control over the military, involvement of civilian experts, transparency in defence planning, management of defence resources and compatibility with NATO as the main factors. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are often taken as a standard and basis for comparison.

Like this all criteria that have been set up in the official MAP document, besides the legal ones, are examined in those reports. However several criteria seemed to have been largely ignored, reducing the
actual amount of criteria.

On the one hand Bulgaria had made slow progress in democratic reforms, weak civilian oversight over the military, problems with corruption as well as not providing sufficient resources to its judiciary. Although reforms had been worked out the report noted a lack of implementation of those, hinting that these problems would not disappear quickly. This is confirmed by the fact that Bulgaria acceded EU membership in 2007. On the other hand Bulgaria had promising military capacities and a relatively high investment into the armed forces along with very ambitious reform timetables. Similarly Romania, who also failed to meet the political criteria for EU membership at this point in time, had major problems with corruption and was urged to take action instead of analysing the problem. Besides this human rights have been violated through the mistreatment of detainees, discrimination and violence against women, no freedom of the press and discrimination against religious minorities and the Roma. Beyond this border issues with the Ukraine and Hungary were not yet concluded. The United States has expressed support for Romanian membership and is funding modernization of the military, probably as a result of receiving their support in various missions.

Additionally the public support for NATO membership was very high (88%) and the relatively large military forces are seen as highly motivated.

These two examples make it seem like the political and economic criteria are not as important if the armed forces provide a good addition to that of NATO. Yet there are examples that demonstrate the opposite.

The states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovenia and Albania could not provide high quantities of forces or great financial resources to the military force of NATO states, yet they were all invited. All of these states had passed the political criteria for EU membership (some have even joined the EU before accession to NATO) and also the criteria of NATO. Most of these states can provide some use to NATO, however for Slovenia fails in this respect. While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania clearly have a strategically useful (geographic) position, Slovenia merely provides a land bridge between Italy and Hungary. It has a quite low investment into its military (just 1.5% while 2% is the recommendation of NATO) and is reluctant to increase this, which has been criticized by NATO officials. Beyond that it is not excelling in its efforts to develop niche capabilities. A positive aspect for Slovenia is that it is striving to be involved in more military missions and security institutions than other states. Likewise Albania has a position with little strategic usefulness, yet public support is very high (96%), spending on military is at the recommended level and good progress on military reforms is apparent.

Beyond ignoring failure in an entire category of the criteria a few single criteria are clearly not deemed as critical for membership either. In Slovakia public support for NATO membership was at 40% shortly before accession. In Latvia this number was at 54.7% and in Croatia at 50%. Relations with the neighbour countries and territorial disputes have also not been settled in several countries and
especially Estonia and Latvia have a difficult relationship with Russia due to their large Russian minorities. Besides that Russia clearly opposed NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Despite the failure in critical areas, invitations have been extended to all the states discussed here, which leads to the conclusion that it is more important that overall the aspirant “furthers the principles of [the] Treaty” that has been signed by the founding members in 1949 (NATO, 1949). In fact this mixed picture represents the vagueness of NATO enlargement very well. It is always mentioned that participation, cooperation and fulfilment of reforms does not lead to a guaranteed membership and that the final decision is always undertaken in the consensual vote. Subjectivity is a great factor and gaining favour with important members, such as the U.S., can greatly help to access NATO. An example for this is the rejection of Macedonia which could not join because of a dispute about its name with Greece. So although the amount of criteria (officially) has greatly increases, the reality shows that the actual increase in accession criteria is far lower than that.

**Conclusion**

This paper attempted to shed light on the relation between NATO enlargement and the level of security over the past sixty years, allowing conclusions on the reasons for the extension of invitations and changes in the difficulty in accession. Hypotheses derived from the most relevant international relations theories deliver concrete explanations for the potential results. Combined the Model of Trust and the Constructivist hypotheses explain the reality. The difficulty of accession has changed only slightly into a less favourable direction to new applicants. With an overall longer process and closer monitoring of the fulfilment of criteria, it has become increasingly difficult for new states to join. Furthermore exceptional cases, such as the invitation of West and East Germany, where any principles were almost entirely ignored for the purpose of maintaining peace, are very unlikely to occur nowadays. Table 2 hints are the two most relevant hypotheses for each of the enlargement waves.
Based on this only the Collective Security hypothesis is clearly not one of the potential explanations, not just because of the wrong direction it pointed at but also because of the underlying logic that could not be observed in reality. Although what the theory suggests is clearly logical and useful, the rapid expansion of NATO is not related to the enhancement of military capacities. While many states did not contribute to the military capacities of NATO at all and some of those did not even possess the ability to defend themselves in the event of an attack, they were invited based on other factors that fall in line with the constructivist argument.

Similarly, Structural Realism does not seem to be as relevant as it might have been when NATO was created. States were invited to join NATO despite an increase in risk and costs for themselves, which is something that would not happen if the relative power gain is the most important factor for every actor.

As the only hypothesis that predicted that accession would become more difficult in a more peaceful environment, the Model of Trust hypothesis appears to make the correct prediction. Clearly the criteria and processes have become more and more transparent to outsiders and although a lot of data is classified, outsiders can see limits to the enlargement which reassures them. Yet the theory itself is largely based on the maintenance of relations with outsider and the actual enlargement is not

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Environmental Pressures</th>
<th>Drivers of Enlargement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Greece, Turkey</td>
<td>Structural Realism</td>
<td>Stabilization after WW2</td>
<td>Military Capacity, geographically strategic position for action in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Structural Realism</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Military capacity, stabilize democracy, natural ‘next step’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic</td>
<td>Model of Trust</td>
<td>Reunification of Europe, Stabilization after Cold War</td>
<td>Military capacity, promote Western values and democracy, strong pressure for enlargement,</td>
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<td>Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>Model of Trust</td>
<td>Reunification of Europe, Terrorism</td>
<td>Promote Western values and democracy, (partly) geographically strategic positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania, Croatia, Macedonia</td>
<td>Model of Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Promote Western values and democracy</td>
</tr>
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Table 2 – Visualization of Relevant Theories, Pressures and Factors by Enlargement Wave
undertaken as carefully as it should be according to the theory. Caution towards Russia is not strongly undertaken by NATO. Especially the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania prove that NATO does not consider disapproval of Russia as a major factor for membership. Those states were allowed to join NATO which means that it is no priority to build up trust with outsiders. The hypothesis derived from Constructivism still holds some truth as it predicted certain results despite no change in the level of security. Besides this result of an increased amount of states joining, the reasons for this also seem applicable. In constructivism the convergence of norms and values are deemed the only relevant criteria for enlargement. This is clearly not the case, since, especially in the past, states could join simply by enhancing the military capacity without any political convergence. However the relevance of the political criteria has steeply increased over time.

With this knowledge the research question ‘Why did the difficulty of accession to NATO (not) change since 1952?’ can be answered in relation to the level of security. The security has steadily increased since the Second World War and especially the end of the Cold War boosted this once again. Along with this the difficulty of accession has increased slightly from a process with very little demands towards one that is monitored closely, taking several years and demanding a lot of change from the applicants. Reasons for this are on the one hand the promotion of values and norms and on the other hand the reassurance of outsiders with a steady decrease of the importance of military capacities. The capability to overwhelm a potential threat is not essential anymore, although military is still relevant for missions abroad. Through diplomatic measures peace can be maintained without risking lives and this is easier if norms and values are similar among the actors.

From the findings it can only be predicted that military capabilities will be more important as a criteria for membership, in case war threatens the international community and political aspects will remain more important until such an event occurs.

A flaw of this study is that the independent variable is still quite broad and narrowing this down would help to explain in more detail what factors increased the difficulty of accession. This could also lead to a more defined explanation for the underlying strategy of enlargement. Therefore attempting to define the independent variable more precisely or even finding entirely new ones would clearly be a useful follow up study. The broad conclusions drawn here can be complemented by more detailed studies that have dealt with much narrower time frames or just a single enlargement wave or applicants.
References


NATO (16th November 1950). *Fourth Meeting – Summary Record.* (NAC-C1 to C9-C/5-R/4)

NATO (29th November 1950). *Association of Turkey and Greece with NATO Military Planning.* (MC-SG-SG-SG 080/2)


NATO (26th March 1952). *Study of Existing Documents in the Light of the Accession of Greece and Turkey*. (MC-SG-SGM 260352)


Appendix

Membership Action Plan Criteria derived from the official document (24th April 1999)

- Political and Economies Issues
  - (a) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;
  - (b) to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights;
  - (c) to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations;
  - (d) to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces;
  - (e) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN;
  - (f) to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and well-being;
  - (g) to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
  - (h) to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.

- Defence/Military Issues
  - (a) to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security;
  - (b) to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance through the sharing of responsibilities, costs and benefits;
  - (c) to commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus on all issues;
  - (d) to undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance;
  - (e) to commit themselves to the continued openness of the Alliance in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Madrid and Washington Summit Declarations

- Resource Issues
  - (a) to allocate sufficient budget resources for the implementation of Alliance commitments;
  - (b) to have the national structures in place to deal with those budget resources;
  - (c) to participate in the Alliance’s common-funded activities at agreed cost shares;
  - (d) to participate in Alliance structures (permanent representation at NATO HQ; military representation in NATO command structure; participation, as appropriate, in NATO Agencies)

- Security Issues
  - 1. Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy

- Legal Issues
a) New members, upon completion of the relevant procedures, will accede to: The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4th April 1949)

(b) Upon invitation, new members should accede to:
   - The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) (London, 19th June 1951)

(c) It is expected that new members accede to the following status agreements
   - The Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20th September 1951)
   - The Agreement on the status of Missions and Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels Agreement) (Brussels, 14th September 1994)

(d) It is expected that new members accede to the following technical agreement
   - The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of information (Brussels, 6th March 1997)
   - The Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relation to defence and for which applications for patents have been made (Paris, 21st September 1960)
   - The NATO Agreement on the communication of technical information for defence purposes (Brussels, 19th October 1970)

(e) For possible eventual access to ATOMAL information, new members would be expected to accede to:
   - The "Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information (C-M(64)39 - Basic Agreement);
   - The "Administrative Arrangements to Implement the Agreement" (C-M(68)41, 5th Revise);

(f) Domestic legislation of aspirants should, as much as possible, be compatible with the other arrangements and implementation practices which govern NATO-wide cooperation

NATO Study on Enlargement Criteria derived from the official document (3rd September 1995)

- Purpose of Enlargement
  - “the aim of an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security for all the euro-atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines”
  - Security: embrace politics, economics and defense
  - Basis of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty
  - Extend to new members the benefits of common defence and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions
    - To protect democratic development
  - Integrate new members into existing community of values & institutions, consistent with objectives of Washington Treaty
  - Safeguard freedom of the members (accordance with principles of the UN Charter)
  - Concrete:
    - Support democratic reforms, inc. civilian & democratic control over military
    - Foster new members to align with patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building
• Promote ‘good’ neighborly relations
• Common defense, increased transparency in planning & budget
• Reinforce integration & cooperation based on shared democratic values ➔
  discourage disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines
• …

• Principles of enlargement
  o Chapter 1
    o Promote purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
    o Safeguard freedom, common heritage, civilization, principles of democracy,
      individual liberty, rule of law
    o Washington Treaty Art. 10
    o Conform principles, policies and procedures
    o Increase effectiveness
    o Settle disputes through peaceful means (in accordance with OSCE principles)
    o NATO decides about enlargement itself
      ▪ No explicit criteria
      ▪ No admittance based on belonging to some group, case-by-case invitations
      ▪ Consensus
      ▪ No country from outside can have veto or droit de regard
  o Chapter 2
    o Enlargement as element of European cooperation and security development
    o Enlargement only one part of a broad European security architecture that defeats the
      idea of “dividing lines”
    o Realizes that “the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s
      European fronts has effectively been removed”
    o The risk of a re-emergent large scale military threat has further declined
    o Risks to European security remain which are multi-faceted and multi-directional and
      thus hard to predict and assess
    o Architecture of European security:
      ▪ EU, Western European Union (WEU), NATO, OSCE (which is most
        inclusive organization), CFE Treaty, Pact on Stability
      ▪ Cooperation agreements: NACC and the PfP (important role in enlargement
        and in strengthening relations
    o Attempt to cooperate as much as possible with those who do not join
    o Russia’s Individual Partnership Programme under the PfP, renew and extend
    o OSCE should be strengthened independently of NATO enlargement, complementary
      role
    o The Pact on Stability for resolution of neighbor conflicts
    o Parallel process to EU enlargement, common strategic interests, but autonomous
      ▪ Basically means that EU membership is easier NATO membership
    o Full member of WEU are NATO members, maintenance of this linkage is essential
    o CFE treaty as cornerstone of European security, ensure implementation
    o Russia
      ▪ NATO-Russia cooperation should ensure no new opposing camps like in Cold
        War
      ▪ No “surprise” decisions on either side should be undertaken
Commitments in UN Charter, OSCE, Code of Conduct, CFE Treaty, and full respect for sovereignty of other independent states

- New members cannot “close the door” for other aspiring states
- Chapter 3
- Key cooperation programs for insiders and outsiders
- Should be maintained
- PfP in preparation should:
  - Help democratic control over armed forces, transparency in defence planning and budgeting
  - Adapt to new security environment
  - Develop cooperative features
  - Involve in planning and peacekeeping operations
- PfP in membership preparation
  - Cooperation intensity freely decided (aspirants should take part in activities)
  - Commentment to shared principles and values of the alliance will be indicated by their international behavior and adherence to relevant OSCE commitments
  - Defence management reforms (democratically controlled military organization)
- Chapter 4
- Contribute to missions, budgets
- Considerations of risk, challenges, strategic advantages, mobility, stationing, accessibility of forces to new territory
- Participation in a high range of actions (intelligence, finance, force structure, nuclear forces, collective defense, command structure, interoperability)
- Decision making in the future based on consensus
- ...
- Chapter 5
- Political expectations
  - Conform basic principles of Washington treaty (democracy, individual liberty, rule of law)
  - Collective defence, preservations of peace and security
  - Commit to consensus
  - Commit to principles, objectives, undertakings (including PfP)
  - Contribute to budgets
  - No “close the door” for others
  - OSCE norms
- Military expectations
  - Share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, burdens
  - Subscribe to Strategic Concept (Strategy of alliance)
  - Standardization, interoperability
    - Active through PfP
    - Standardization in: Operations, administration, commonality doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications, major weapon systems, interchangeability of ammunition, primary combat supplies
  - Ability to contribute important
There are 1200 agreements and publications to comply with

- Chapter 6
- “previous accessions need not to be considered precise models for future accessions, since the general political and security context of future accessions, will be different as well as the number, individual circumstances and characteristics of new acceding members”
- Information briefings prior to any formal negotiations
- Official Procedure to join NATO:
  - The NAC overtakes initiation role
    - Inform of favor for accession talks
    - Formal notification of commitment to join alliance should be provided from state
    - Consultation about the protocol of accession
    - Formulation by the Allies of the protocol of accession
    - Approval and signature of accession protocol by the NAC
    - Ratification in states
    - Formal invitation
- Page 32, what exact documents have to be accepted (See MAP “Legal Issues”)

Reports Criteria

- Political and Economic Factors
  - EU as standard
    - Human rights
      - Influence on media, privacy rights, discrimination, human trafficking, drug trafficking, mistreatment of minorities, excessive force by police, treatment of prisoners, corruption
      - free and fair elections
      - free market economy
  - Strong judiciary
    - Resources
  - Implementation of MAP measures
  - Wealth / Free Market Economy
    - Privatization of the economy for faster growth
    - Living standards
    - Foreign investment
    - Unemployment
    - Control on government spending

- Foreign policy and defense factors
  - Institution membership
    - E.g. OECD, EU, Council of Europe, PfP, EAPC
  - Support in NATO affairs
    - E.g. Afghanistan (US), Kosovo War (1999), ISAF
    - Military cooperation in other fields
  - Affairs with neighbors
    - Russian criticism
- Territorial disputes
  - Public Support
- Armed Forces
  - Amount of active and reserve forces
    - Downsizing and professionalization
    - Deploy ability
  - Standards
    - Modernization of equipment
  - Weaponry and Armory
    - Artillery, tanks, mortars, vehicles
  - Niche capabilities
  - GDP as investment (2% recommended)
  - Military action and networks
    - E.g. BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTDEFCOL, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF
- Civilian Oversight
  - Civilian control, transparency, management of defense resources, compatibility with NATO
  - Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic as standard
  - Concrete MAP reforms (classified most of the time)
- Other factors
  - Macedonia Name dispute with Greece