**Abstract**

The purpose of this research was to identify the motives of states to participate in armed humanitarian intervention. Previous research mainly focused on the selectivity of the international community with regards to intervention. In addition, most of the case studies analysed intervention through one theoretical lens. This study's basic assumption was that studying armed humanitarian interventions only from one perspective does not do justice to the causal complexity of mixed motives behind the decision of whether to intervene. In this study, seven conditions were derived from three different theories: realism, constructivism, and liberalism. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) proved to be a suitable method to measure the extent to which these conditions interacted. Eighteen states were selected and analysed to determine the extent of the presence of these conditions in each of these states. Subsequently, the QCA software calculated the interaction effects between the conditions. The findings of the QCA study were checked in three case studies in order to increase the inferential value. For most states, the willingness to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Libya was determined by their national strategic culture, reinforced by the pressure of public opinion, on key decision-makers that wanted to be re-elected. These results proved that norms do play a significant role in international relations and provided counterevidence to the realist claim that states only intervene when it is in their self-interest. The results also demonstrated that a multi-theoretical approach is needed in future research to explain the phenomenon of armed humanitarian intervention.

Keywords: Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Motives, International Relations Theories, Norms, Self-interest, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), post-QCA case study.
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my first supervisor Dr. A.K. Warntjen. His assistance was crucial for completing this thesis. The way he supervised me suits me perfectly. In the earliest phase of writing this thesis he was very actively involved in putting me on the right track. He prevented me from getting lost in a labyrinth of possible topics. Throughout the course of the thesis his guidance was a great support for me.

I also want to thank my second supervisor Prof. Dr. S.B. Gareis. He is a person with whom it is very easy to communicate. Things were arranged very quickly when I contacted him.

I want to thank my family for their love and support while I was writing this thesis. I want to thank my sister Marleen for checking spelling and grammar. I want to thank my parents, in particular, for everything they have done for me. They have always instilled in me that life is not about me, but about God and other people. Sometimes I may believe that it is He from who all good things come.

July 11th, 2015,

Geert Olthuis
# Table of content

Chapter 1: Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1  
1.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1  
Chapter 2: Literature review .......................................................................................................... 3  
2.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 3  
2.1. Literature review....................................................................................................................... 3  
2.2. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 5  
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework ................................................................................................. 7  
3.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 7  
3.2. Justification for theory selection ............................................................................................ 7  
3.3. Realism .................................................................................................................................... 7  
3.3.1. In general ............................................................................................................................. 7  
3.3.2. Realism and intervention .................................................................................................... 7  
3.3.3. Conditions .......................................................................................................................... 8  
3.4. Constructivism ....................................................................................................................... 9  
3.4.1. In general ............................................................................................................................. 9  
3.4.2. Constructivism and intervention ....................................................................................... 9  
3.4.3. Conditions .......................................................................................................................... 11  
3.5. Liberalism ............................................................................................................................... 12  
3.5.1. In general ............................................................................................................................. 12  
3.5.2. Liberalism and intervention ............................................................................................... 13  
3.5.3. Conditions .......................................................................................................................... 13  
3.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 14  
Chapter 4: Research design and operationalization ...................................................................... 15  
4.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 15  
4.2. Research strategy .................................................................................................................... 15  
4.3. Sample and case selection ...................................................................................................... 15  
4.4. Data analysis .......................................................................................................................... 16  
4.5. Data collection method .......................................................................................................... 17  
4.6. Validity and Reliability .......................................................................................................... 17  
4.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 18  
Chapter 5: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Libya) ................................................................... 19  
5.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 19  
5.2. Overview of fsQCA .............................................................................................................. 19  
5.3. Define Outcome ...................................................................................................................... 22  
5.4. Case selection ......................................................................................................................... 23  
5.5. Operationalization of the conditions .................................................................................... 23  
5.5.1. Introduction........................................................................................................................ 23  
5.5.2. Participation in humanitarian military intervention ........................................................... 23  
5.5.3. Security interest ............................................................................................................... 24  
5.5.4. Energy dependency .......................................................................................................... 25  
5.5.5. Economic interdependence .............................................................................................. 26
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHL</td>
<td>Bernard-Henri Lévy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Central Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Causal Process Tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CsQCA</td>
<td>Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FsQCA</td>
<td>Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MvQCA</td>
<td>Multi-value qualitative comparative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Permanent Five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTS</td>
<td>Transatlantic Trends Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables and Figures

Tables
Table 1: Example of a truth table ................................................................. 22
Table 2: Raw data table for military participation in Unified Protector .................. 35
Table 3: Truth table for military participation in Unified Protector .......................... 37
Table 4: Analytical results for fsQCA on military intervention in Unified Protector ........ 37

Figures
Figure 1: Analytical procedure of fsQCA .......................................................... 20
Figure 2: Example XY Plot necessary conditions ................................................. 36
Figure 3: XY plot pubop*nsc →MP ................................................................. 39
Figure 4: XY plot nsc* endep*secint →MP ...................................................... 40
Figure 5: XY plot (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)→~MP .............................................. 41
Figure 6: XY plot (pubop)*(nsc)→~MP ........................................................... 41
Figure 7: XY plot (nsc)*~(endep)*(secint)→~MP .............................................. 42
Figure 8: QCA and CPT combined ................................................................... 46
Figure 9: Example of XY plot for post-QCA case selection .................................. 47
Figure 10: XY plot case selection pubop*nsc →MP ............................................. 48
Figure 11: XY plot case selection nsc*endep*secint →MP .................................. 48
Figure 12: XY plot case selection (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)→~MP ............................ 49
Figure 13: Theoretical model for future research .................................................. 82
Figure 14: Theoretical model for future research .................................................. 83
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

“The recent pattern of humanitarian interventions raises the issue of what interests intervening states could possibly be pursuing. In most of these cases, the intervention targets are insignificant by any usual measure of geostrategic or economic interest. Why, then, do states intervene?” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 561).

“Anyone who believes that the real motivation for outside governmental military intervention (UN endorsed or otherwise) is the alleviation of civilian hardship is suffering from a serious delusion of benevolence” (Bennis, 1996 as cited in Sarbu, 2009, p. 16).

When the cold war came to an end, there was a sudden rise in humanitarian interventions (Krieg, 2013). In the cold war, most of the proposed resolutions on humanitarian interventions were vetoed by one of the permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). With the fall of the Soviet-Union, the UNSC became less polarized. However, the international community is quite selective with regards to intervention. Many scholars search for a reason for this selectivity (Krieg, 2013; Sarbu, 2009). Self-interest is often seen as the main explanation for the inconsistent behaviour of the international community (Davidson, 2012, p. 154; Krieg, 2013, p. 123; Pattison, 2011, p. 276). Rwanda and Syria are notorious examples of the alleged double standards of the international community. Most of the research compares cases of non-intervention with cases of intervention (Krieg, 2013; Sarbu, 2009). However, there are some plausible explanations for the selectivity of the international community; resources of states are limited, and inaction is often the result of a veto, or threat of a veto, by one of the P5.

Not only the international community is inconsistent with regards to intervention in humanitarian crisis, but individual states are selective in participating in humanitarian interventions as well. This phenomenon is not often researched. In this study, different theories will be used to explain why states do (not) participate in armed humanitarian intervention. Armed humanitarian intervention, in this study, is defined as “the use of force, with the alleged purpose of preventing or putting halt gross and massive violations of human rights, with or without the consent of the receiving state” (Krieg, 2013, p. 9).

Thus, the research question is as follows: How can (non-)participation of Western countries in armed humanitarian interventions be explained?

The international relations theories of realism, constructivism, and liberalism will be used to explain (non-)participation. Hypotheses derived from these theories will be tested with cross-case analysis and within-case analysis. For the cross-case analysis, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be used and for the within-case analysis, Causal Process Tracing (CPT) will be used.

QCA is an appropriate method because it does justice in the case of complex causality. Previous research shows that it is difficult to detect only one variable that explains why states do (not) participate in a humanitarian intervention, but that it is often a combination of variables. Because only cross-case analysis, by itself, is not sufficient to prove causality, QCA will be complemented with CPT. Using CPT, an in-depth study will be conducted of a smaller amount of cases in order to
corroborate and update the findings of the QCA by unveiling the causal mechanisms between the conditions (independent variables) and the outcome (dependent variable). The goal of the research is to investigate the reasons for why states do (not) participate in humanitarian intervention.
Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the state of the art literature on the motivations of armed humanitarian interventions will be presented. First, an overview will be given on the three most important international relations theories, explaining the theories’ stands on the motivations causing states to participate in armed humanitarian intervention. In the closing paragraph, an explanation will be provided showing how this study can contribute to the existing literature.

2.1. Literature review
When the number of humanitarian interventions rose quickly in the early 1990s, scholars started to research this phenomenon extensively. It became a popular topic in international relations theory. Scholars from different backgrounds started to reflect on the causal mechanisms behind humanitarian intervention (Fixdal & Smith, 1998, p. 284). An ongoing issue within this debate is the determination of what motivates states to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. Three theories are often used to explain why states undertake interventions: realism, constructivism, and liberalism (Tyler, 2014, p. 6). Realism and constructivism are, by far, the most applied theories on this subject (Fixdal & Smith, 1998, p. 284).

The consensus among realist scholars seems to be that, starting with the presumption that states are rational actors that always pursue their self-interest, humanitarian intervention is only a way to preserve their national interest (Krieg, 2013, p. 30; Regan, 1998, p. 754; Tyler, 2014, p. 6; Van der Maat, 2011, p. 203). This is, according to Morgenthau, because states are not willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in intervention purely for humanitarian objectives (Choi, 2013, p. 122). Lip service may be paid to norms, but it is used as a disguise to intervene in other states for self-interested reasons (Choi, 2013, p. 123; Finnemore, 1996, p. 4; Krieg, 2013). The claim that humanitarian interventions are undertaken for altruistic purposes is severely doubted by realist scholars (Krieg, 2013, p. 31).

Most other scholars involved in research on this topic, are constructivist. According to constructivist scholars, the behaviour of states is determined by norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). For a very long time, the norm of self-determination prevailed; but for the past couple of decades, the norm of humanitarian intervention overruled the sovereignty norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 2). This new norm of humanitarian intervention allows for intervention in cases of human rights violations. This norm considers multilateral intervention as the only legitimate intervention (Finnemore, 1996, p. 15). One of the most powerful norms, present day, is the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). A lot of constructivist scholars argue that in recent interventions, such as in Libya, R2P played a significant role (Dunne & Gifkins, 2011). The constructivist consensus is that states largely conduct humanitarian intervention for altruistic motives (Krieg, 2013, p. 8).

In the liberalist tradition it is argued that democratic states do not fight each other. This is because of the accountability that political leaders have towards their peace-loving citizens and the domestic national structure of checks and balances (Layne, 1994, p. 9; Rosato, 2003, p. 587). Most of the
liberalist scholars that research humanitarian intervention, focus on whether this also applied to non-democratic regimes (Kegley & Hermann, 1996). The consensus seems to be that democracies are as much involved in military interventions, as non-democratic regimes (Gleditsch, Christiansen, & Hegre, 2007; Kegley & Hermann, 1996, p. 318; Pickering, 2002, p. 317). Most research uses statistical analysis in order to find a correlation between democracy and military intervention. Other scholars use more fine-grained models, trying to connect specific characteristics of democracies to military intervention. To research the accountability aspect of democratic peace theory, some scholars study the link between public opinion and military intervention (Mello, 2014b, p. 20). Others focus on particular characteristics of the governmental structures of democracies that can explain the likelihood of humanitarian intervention. There is also a branch in the liberalist literature which argues that states will not intervene in other states because of their economic interdependence (Sarbu, 2009, p. 23). Lastly, some liberalist scholars see humanitarian intervention as a way to promote democracy. Disagreement remains in the literature as to what extent these factors contribute to the likelihood of humanitarian intervention (Mello, 2014b, p. 19).

What most liberals do agree, though, is that the choice of intervention is based on cost-benefit calculations by the ruling elite (Mello, 2014b, p. 20). In general, it can be stated that there are a lack of studies that research the use of military force by democracies against nondemocratic regimes (Mello, 2010, p. 1). This gap is partly filled by an extensive study of Mello (2014a), who researched the connection between a wide variety of liberal theory variables with military intervention. His presumption before he started the research was that the likelihood of military intervention could be explained by intra-democratic differences, such as government placement on left-right scale, parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, and public support. His data supported evidence for a link between constitutional restrictions, government placement on left-right scale, and public support (Mello, 2014b, p. 125).

It can be concluded that realism and constructivism are the theories that seem to dominate the debate concerning the motives of humanitarian intervention. Among realist scholars, the consensus is that states intervene only if their national interest is at stake. Humanitarian justifications are masquerades. Constructivists say that conformance to humanitarian norms explains why states intervene, and liberals argue that domestic politics explain (non)intervention. Realists and liberals share the notion that states are rational calculating actors. The strength of these different theories is their explanatory power for the behaviour of states. The weakness of realism is that it does not always give strong empirical evidence for its claims. According to Finnemore (2004), p. 4 realist studies are often loosely informed. The difficulty with constructivism is that research relies on the statements of states, which might be unreliable (Finnemore, 2004). It also has difficulties explaining the obvious selectivity of humanitarian interventions by the international community. The case of Syria especially provoked a lot of critique on the constructivist explanation of humanitarian intervention (Morris, 2013, p. 1280). The weakness of liberalism is that, based on the democratic peace theory and the increased economic interdependence in the world, one would expect that less intervention would be conducted.

What is missing in most of the studies is research that acknowledges the causal complexity of the motivations for humanitarian interventions. This gap in the literature is noted by Finnemore
there is an overwhelming tendency in analysis of intervention (and of politics in general) to treat motivations or interests as obvious and to take for granted the context that gives rise to them” (Finnemore, 2004, p. 4). Several scholars argue, instead, that it should be taken into account that motives for participating in a humanitarian intervention are almost invariably mixed (Coady, 2002, p. 11; Finnemore, 2004, p. 4; Weiss, 2012, p. 8). Therefore, in this study, the presumption will be that states have mixed motives for participating in humanitarian interventions. In order to do justice to the causal complexity of the motivations for humanitarian intervention, a research strategy must be used that takes complexity into account.

QCA is a research strategy that is useful when researching phenomena that are characterized by “multiple conjunctural causations.” It has a conception of causality that most often a combination of causally relevant conditions generate a particular outcome, different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome, and an outcome may occur both when a condition is present and also when it is absent, depending on the context (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 8). Applying this method to the research of the motives for humanitarian intervention, might prove way more fruitful than either simplistic causal reasoning that isolates variables, or, case studies in which only specific cases are selected that lack the systematic investigation of broader patterns in medium to large N-studies (Vis, 2012, p. 4).

2.2. Conclusion

As shown in this chapter, different theories provide valuable insights about motives for states to intervene. Researching this only through the lens of one theory does not do justice to the high complexity of the motives for intervention. In this study, international relations theories will not be seen as rivals, but will be used complementary. Therefore, a method will be used that is developed to account for complex causality. In the next chapter, first the explanatory factors suggested by the literature will be transformed into testable hypotheses.
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

3.1. Introduction
In this chapter the theoretical framework of this study will be presented. First a general introduction will be given of the international relations theories of realism, constructivism, and liberalism. Then will be narrowed to what the theories consider to be the motives for armed humanitarian intervention. Hypotheses will be derived from these theoretical expectations. The goal is to extract the most important explanatory factors for armed humanitarian intervention from these theories.

3.2. Justification for theory selection
There are several methods for selecting cases for QCA. They are aimed at inductive or deductive research. In this study, a more deductive approach is chosen. The strategy of the perspective approach is to select mixed conditions that represent two or three theories (Jordan, Gross, Javernick-Will, & Garvin, 2011, p. 1163). In order to limit the amount of possible conditions, Rihoux and Ragin (2009) advise to include only core theories (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 25). Therefore, I selected only those theories that appear most relevant. Based on the literature review, realism, constructivism, and liberalism seem to have the most explanatory power.

3.3. Realism

3.3.1. In general
According to realist theory, the international system is anarchic; this means there is no authority that can maintain order in the international system. States rely on themselves for their survival. The acquisition of power is essential for survival in the anarchic nature of the international system. Power is, in the realist tradition, defined as the resources available for building up military force. Key elements of power are wealth, number of inhabitants, technological sophistication, and other resources (Collins, 2013, p. 4; Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 213). Because of the constant threat of other states, the main interest of a state is security, which can be best safeguarded by increasing power (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 232; Roach, Griffiths, & O’Callaghan, 2014, p. 293; Robinson, 2014, p. 15). These theoretical notions might have explanatory power for the dynamics of the international system, but they are less suitable for explaining small-scale operations that cost little. These operations do not detract from “a great power’s prospects for survival” (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 15). For that reason, realist scholars tend to couple the broader assumptions of realism to intervention.

3.3.2. Realism and intervention
Realists are sceptical about the motives of humanitarian interventions. They consider humanitarian justifications for an intervention as paying lip service to norms. States are not willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in overseas intervention purely for humanitarian objectives (Choi, 2013, p. 2; Mearsheimer, 2001). They only intervene when it is in their national interest to do so (Finnemore, 1996, p. 4; Hasler, 2012, p. 43; Jakobsen, 1996, p. 206; Sarbu, 2009, p. 16; Van der Maat, 2011, p. 2013; Welsh, 2003, p. 58). The national interest of a state, as defined by realist, comprises security and material interest (Gilligan, 2003, p. 39; Jakobsen, 1996, p. 206; Krieg, 2013, p. 30, 37; Tyler,
Security is top priority, but wealth is a means to that end (Sarbu, 2009, p. 44). Humanitarian crises could threaten both security and material interest.

3.3.3. Conditions

Security interest
Humanitarian crises could be threatening for the national security of another country, because such crises create geopolitical destabilization. First, the territorial integrity, or the citizens of a state, could be violated with a humanitarian crisis next door (Davidson, 2013, p. 312). In addition, the crisis increases the change of massive refugee flows, the spread of crime, terrorism, and weapons (Junk, 2011, p. 105) (Biehl, Giegerich, & Jonas, 2013; Davidson, 2013, p. 312). Refugees are not a direct security threat, but they enable the transitional spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies which contribute to a further escalation of the violence (Pattison, 2010, p. 257; Sarbu, 2009, p. 18). Refugees also “alter the ethnic composition of the host state which might lead to political and ethnic conflicts in the long run, and additionally, exacerbate economic competition” (Sarbu, 2009, p. 18). Mainly states that are geographically proximate to the affected state will feel more inclined to intervene, according to realist theory; but other threats, such as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, might trigger states from farther away to intervene as well (Davidson, 2011, p. 16; Diehl, 2004, p. 153; Krieg, 2013, p. 66; Regan, 1998, p. 766; Sarbu, 2009, p. 18; Yoon, 1997, p. 582). It would be expected that when humanitarian crises threatens the security of a state, it will more likely intervene.

H1: If the security of a state is threatened by a humanitarian crisis, it will more likely intervene.

Energy dependency
Material interest can also be threatened by a humanitarian crisis because it can cause economic destabilization in the affected region. One of the consequences could be that the supply of natural resources will be disrupted (Junk, 2011, p. 106). According to realist scholars, and many journalists, humanitarian interventions are used to secure the supply of resources that are vital for the economy (Choi, 2013, p. 124, p. 126; Davidson, 2011, p. 16; Fineman, 1993; Fisher, 2002; Krieg, 2013, p. 113; Stokes, 2007; Woodward, 2007). The most important resource is oil. The Gulf War and the intervention in Iraq in 2003, are especially considered to be motivated by protection of the vulnerable oil fields (Jhaveri, 2004, p. 2; Woodward, 2007) This is called the “blood for oil-thesis” (Stokes, 2007). According to these scholars, the willingness to intervene can be largely determined by the extent to which states are dependent for their energy from the affected state (Yoon, 1997, p. 582). Therefore, we would expect that states that are highly dependent for their oil supply on the region affected by a humanitarian crisis, will more likely intervene.

H2: If states are highly dependent for their oil supply from a state affected by a humanitarian crisis, they will more likely intervene.

Economic interdependence
Economic interdependence between states is a variable that is used in different international relations theories. Classical liberalism says that economic interdependence discourage states from
waging war against each other because it would harm their economies (Sarbu, 2009, p. 21). However, humanitarian intervention differs from warfare. Contemporary liberalist scholars disagree whether economic interdependence increases or decreases the chances that a state will intervene. Many realist scholars do include economic interdependence in their research as well. Although realist theory says that the security of state is a top priority, wealth is a means to that end (Sarbu, 2009, p. 44). Humanitarian crises can pose a threat to economic interest because it often disturbs market access (Junk, 2011, p. 105; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008, p. 15). This might harm the economy of state. States do intervene to restore economically beneficial trade flows, to secure Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s), and to secure market access for domestic companies (Krieg, 2013, p. 66).

H3: If states have strong economic ties with the affected state, they will more likely intervene.

### 3.4. Constructivism

#### 3.4.1. In general

Constructivist theory is a reaction to neorealism. Instead of a materialist view, constructivists claim that significant aspects of the international relations are socially constructed. From an ontological perspective, the international system is not objective reality outside the consciousness of a person's mind, but something that comes into existence through the intersubjective awareness, or a common understanding of people (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2013). Decision-makers are not rationally calculating, but behave in line with norms about foreign policy that are present in a state. Norms are standards “of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Norms are not static, but are developing constantly (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 209). They have a domestic and an international origin. Humanitarian interventions are explained by the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention.

#### 3.4.2. Constructivism and intervention

The constructivist’s ideas about intervention can be summarized in the simple statement that says, intervene when international norms and standards of right conduct are violated (Finnemore, 1996). For a very long time (since the Peace of Westphalia), the norms of sovereignty and self-determination had prevailed (Kardaş, 2001, p. 4). After the cold war, these norms were, in Western countries, overruled by the norm of humanitarian intervention. In these countries, it became increasingly acceptable to violate the sovereignty norm to protect human rights. Between 1990 and 1994, twice as many resolutions for humanitarian interventions were passed in the UNSC, as in the previous 45 years together (Weiss, 2004, p. 136). Constructivists argue that the rise in humanitarian intervention can only be explained by the emergence of this norm of humanitarian intervention. In many cases, states did not have significant interest in the states in which they were intervening (Finnemore, 1996).

The most recent norm that has emerged is the Responsibility to Protect. Because the norm of humanitarian intervention had become controversial by the end of the 1990’s, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established. This ad hoc commission published its report, called the Responsibility to Protect, in 2011. All discussion on when a humanitarian intervention should be conducted has been dominated by this term ever since (Hehir,
The starting point of R2P is not so much that states have the permission to intervene in other states when humanitarian rights are violated, but that states first have the responsibility to protect their own citizens from human rights violations. The sovereignty of the state also comprises its responsibility to protect its people against "genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing" (Hasler, 2012, p. 45). When the states fails to protect its own citizens, the international community should take over this responsibility (Homan, 2011, p. 2).

This norm has a lot of overlap with the norm of humanitarian intervention, but is broader. R2P rests on three pillars: prevention, protection, and rebuilding (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011a, p. 4). The responsibility to prevent means that states must "address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk" (Novak, 2013, p. 7). The responsibility to react means the international community has the obligation to, eventually, intervene if a state cannot protect its citizens from human rights violations. The responsibility to rebuild means that states must assist with the recovery of a state after the intervention (Novak, 2013, p. 8).

Although most states in the world have embraced R2P, it is still an emerging norm (Badescu & Weiss, 2010; Brockmeier, Kurtz, & Junk, 2014; Kuperman, 2009, p. 27; Negrón-Gonzales & Contarino, 2014; Prantl & Nakano, 2011, p. 204; Rotmann, Kurtz, & Brockmeier, 2014). Broad consensus exists on non-military pillars of R2P; but the use of force to react to human rights abuses, remains highly controversial (Negrón-Gonzales & Contarino, 2014). R2P has to compete with existing domestic norms. Non-Western countries are, especially, often opposed to the use of force because norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are persistent (Kurowska, 2014; Prantl & Nakano, 2011, p. 207; Rotmann et al, 2014, p. 361; Sarbu, 2009, p. 86; Wu, 2010, p. 207).

Humanitarian norms might explain why some states intervene; but as shown previously, R2P is not fully internalized in every state. Domestic norms, such as norms on non-intervention and sovereignty, can restrain the willingness to use force. Most of the literature focuses on the timid reception of R2P in non-Western countries, but there is also a small branch of literature that has researched to what extent the domestic norms on the use of force in Western countries influence how R2P is received and interpreted. Western countries have different opinions about the appropriateness of using military force. The whole set of ideas and norms on the use of force within a state, is called national strategic culture in constructivist literature.

National strategic culture is shaped by past experiences of societies (Brockmeier et al., 2014, p. 432). Societies have collective experiences that constitute the way they think about security and defence policy. Policy elites have socialized the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns into a particular mode of thought: a strategic culture (Lantis, 2002, p. 104). This strategic culture generates specific expectations about the behaviour of a particular country in their security and defence policy (Biehl et al, 2013, p. 12). So, the historical processes in a state shape the way a society thinks about the use of force and affects policy choices (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 9).

Diverging strategic cultures are the reason that European countries “have never had a truly consensual position on R2P” (Brockmeier et al., 2014, p. 430; Nowak, 2013, p. 3). European states
interpret R2P in the light of their national strategic culture. Because most of the scholars see R2P still as a norm under construction, and point at the diverse positions that states have towards R2P, it is assumed—for purposes of this study—that international norms can explain why states intervene in humanitarian crises, but national strategic culture determines whether countries see military force as a suitable solution for a humanitarian crisis (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011b, p. 22).

3.4.3. Conditions

National strategic culture
Research on the way in which national strategic culture affects policy choices has become increasingly popular in the last decade (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 9). Within this branch of literature, discussion remains as whether to use strategic culture as an independent, intervening, or dependent variable (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 11). In line with Johnston's approach for this study, strategic culture is used “as an independent variable that determines a specific actor's foreign and security behaviour” (Biehl et al., 2013). The most elaborate conceptualisations of national strategic culture are conducted by Meyer (2005) and Biehl et al. (2013). They distinguish four elements that constitute a strategic culture: goals for the use of force, manners in which force is used, orientation of foreign policy, and scope of action of the executive in decision-making.

The goals for the use of force are what objectives a particular state holds for its military. Some states only want to use their military for defence purposes, while others want to use it for out-of-area operations (for international security or the protection of human rights) in other states, as well (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 14; Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015, p. 7; Meyer, 2005, p. 10). Related to the goal of the use of force is the willingness to use force. The willingness to use force refers to the willingness of a state to use force as a foreign policy instrument. These two closely related elements, taken together, determine whether countries maintain an active or a passive strategic culture.

At the one end of the spectrum, there are states that only have defensive and peacekeeping objectives with its military, and are reluctant to use military force as a foreign policy tool. At the other end of the spectrum, are states that use its military for international security operations and view military force as a suitable foreign policy tool. Germany is traditionally placed on the first side of the spectrum (Bucher, Engel, Harfensteller, & Dijkstra, 2013, p. 524; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011b, p. 16; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 393). France and the United Kingdom are placed on the latter.

States with an active strategic culture will probably turn very swiftly to the use of force when humanitarian norms are violated, while states with a passive strategic culture emphasise non-military measures to deal with a humanitarian crisis (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011b, p. 17). Therefore, we would expect that Western countries with active strategic cultures, to be more likely to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, than states with passive strategic cultures. (Non-Western countries mostly oppose humanitarian interventions because they violate the sovereignty of states.)

H4: If a Western country has an active strategic culture, it will more likely intervene in a humanitarian crisis, than a state with a passive strategic culture.

Alliance preference
Another important domestic norm on the use of force is alliance preference. Alliance preference means that states have a preferred mode of cooperation. The two most important alliances of European states are the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Other modes of cooperation are the United Nations (UN), a coalition of willing, bilateral, cooperative states; or, some states might prefer to intervene unilaterally. States have preferences for a particular alliance for several reasons. The most important reason is that states consider one alliance more capable of providing security than other alliances. Preferences for NATO are often inspired by the idea that the US, the largest member of NATO, is the only state that can provide security in Europe. Therefore, it is expected that states will more likely intervene when cooperation takes place in the in the mode of cooperation preferred by that state.

H5: A state will more likely participate in a humanitarian intervention when cooperation takes place in the mode of cooperation preferred by that state.

3.5. Liberalism

3.5.1. In general
The most important notions of liberalism are democratic peace, economic interdependence, and international organizations. The democratic peace theory says that democratic states behave differently towards each other than towards non-democracies. It is claimed that democracies do not wage a war against each other. Most of the statistical studies that have been conducted seem to support this theory (Rosato, 2003, p. 585). The absence of war between democracies is attributed to the institutional constraints that decision-makers face when they elect to wage a war. Democratic institutions make leaders accountable to their citizens (Rosato, 2003, p. 593). The classical liberalist's thought is that public opinion in democracies has an inclination towards pacifism. Because the political elite want to remain in office, they will accommodate influential groups and the public (Doyle, 2005, p. 464; Layne, 1994, p. 9). Also, democracy states share democratic norms and cultures which prevent them from waging a war against each other (Layne, 1994, p. 6).

Economic interdependence among states is another pacifying factor. Trade between states is economically advantageous for both parties. States will, therefore, refrain from harming the mutual beneficially cooperation by waging a war (Layne, 1994, p. 10). War disrupts international trade and investment (Rosato, 2003, p. 587). This idea was already developed by Kant. He argued that a “commercial spirit” of international trade would establish commercial relations “that draw states into a web of mutual self-interest that constrains them from using force against one another” (Oneal & Russett, 1999, p. 3). Kant also emphasized the benefits of international organizations for peace.

According to liberals, international organizations constrain decision-makers in waging war by promoting peace in several ways (Oneal & Russett, 1999, p. 5). International organizations can help to prevent conflicts because they serve different peace-enhancing functions. They “coerce norm breakers, mediate among conflicting parties, reducing uncertainty by conveying information, solve problems, expand states’ conception of their self-interests to be more inclusive and long-term, shape norms, socialize states, and generate narratives of mutual identification” (Russett, Oneal, & Davis, 1998, p. 444). These notions all focus on explaining why democratic countries do not wage wars against each other. However, war is a different type of conflict than armed humanitarian
intervention. Therefore, most of the classical liberalist notions do not apply to armed humanitarian intervention, or have been slightly altered to make them applicable.

### 3.5.2. Liberalism and intervention

Liberalist scholars most often try to connect elements of democratic peace theory or economic interdependence theory with humanitarian intervention. A majority of the scholars that apply democratic peace theory to humanitarian interventions seem to agree that democracies do not intervene less often in humanitarian crisis than non-democratic regimes (Gleditsch, Christiansen, & Hegre, 2007; Kegley & Hermann, 1996, p. 318; Pickering, 2002, p. 317). This appears to indicate that the democratic peace theory does not apply to humanitarian interventions. However, this does not mean that domestic institutional characteristics of democracies do not influence the foreign policy of states. The main argument of the democratic peace theory is that decision-makers please their electorate in order to remain in office. This would mean that decision-makers act in accordance with public opinion, even if this does not necessarily lead to “peace.” Therefore, liberalist scholars argue that institutional characteristics of democracies can either constrain or push a government to intervene. Public opinion is the most widely applied variable by liberalists that try to explain humanitarian interventions (Davidson, 2011; Mello, 2014b; Yoon, 1997, p. 588). Another institutional characteristic of a democracy is that the executive is accountable to the parliament. The parliamentary war powers might prevent the executive from participating in a humanitarian intervention (Mello, 2014b, p. 19). Lastly, some liberalists argue that economic interdependence leads to non-intervention. Opinions diverge whether this connection can be made because it could also be argued that states will actually be more willing to intervene when their trading partner faces a humanitarian crisis that blocks trade flows (Sarbu, 2009, p. 23). As already mentioned in this study, the latter theoretical expectation will be tested.

### 3.5.3. Conditions

**Public opinion**

Public opinion is the most important variable used by liberalist scholars to explain (non)intervention. In democracies, the government is accountable to its citizens. Because of their desire for re-election, they will act in accordance with public opinion. In classical liberalist theory, it was expected that this mechanism would produce a reluctance to use military force. However, humanitarian intervention differs from the conflicts that classical liberals had in mind. Few people of the intervening state are affected if an intervention will be conducted and the same pacifist inclination of the public might even trigger them to push the government to intervene (Mello, 2014b, p. 35). Based on this theory, it is expected that when the public supports intervention, this will increase the likelihood that the government will intervene, while public opposition towards humanitarian intervention will most likely lead to non-intervention (Bucher et al., 2013, p. 525; Davidson, 2013, p. 311; Jakobsen, 1996, p. 206; Mello, 2014b, p. 35).

H6: If there is public support for humanitarian intervention, it is more likely that a state will intervene.

**Domestic threshold on use of force**
Another institutional constraint is the process of democratic decision-making itself. In recent years, liberalist scholars have increasingly focused on the connection between parliamentary war powers and (non-)participation in humanitarian interventions (Hummel, 2007, p. 5; Mello, 2012, p. 422). Parliamentary involvement in military intervention decision-making differs per state. In some, parliamentary approval is a precondition for authorizing troop deployments, while in other states, the government has much discretionary power to intervene. The strongest form of parliamentary control is when parliament has an “ex ante veto over all types of military operations” (Mello, 2012, p. 423). A much weaker form of parliamentary control is ex post veto which “grants parliament a veto on operations that have already been initiated” (Mello, 2012, p. 423). Apart from parliamentary war powers, states may also have constitutional provisions which determine the scope of operations in which the state is allowed to engage (Mello, 2012, p. 424). Constitutional restrictions can refer to “international law and the requirement of UN authorization, multilateral organizations frameworks as necessary for participation, and the scope of permissible tasks that the armed forces are allowed to engage in”(Mello, 2012, p. 424). It is thought that extensive parliamentary involvement and strong constitutional provisions on the use of force will have a constraining effect on the use of force (Peters & Wagner, 2011).

H7: If the domestic threshold to intervene is high, it is less likely that a state will intervene in a humanitarian crisis of another state.

3.6. Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to find the most important factors explaining why states participate in armed humanitarian intervention. The explanatory factors suggested in the literature have been transformed into testable hypotheses. In the next chapter, an explanation will be provided of how these hypotheses will be tested.
Chapter 4: Research design and operationalization

4.1. Introduction
This chapter describes how the hypotheses that are introduced in the previous chapter will be empirically tested. First the research strategy will be introduced. Then will be explained in what way cases are selected to arrive at a representative sample. The data analysis and collection method will only be explained briefly because a more elaborate explanation will be given in the analysis chapters. The last section of this chapter a reflection of the validity and the reliability of the chosen research strategy will be presented.

4.2. Research strategy
The purpose of this study is to find out how the conditions, that are derived from the three most important international relations theories, can contribute to explain the outcome: (non-)participation of states in military intervention. In order to investigate this connection, QCA will be conducted on a medium number of cases, complemented by a CPT study of three cases.

Different methods have been developed to conduct cross-case analysis. The most used methods are statistical analysis and case studies. In this study QCA will be used because statistical analysis produces unreliable results with a small amount of cases and case studies results are hardly generalizable. QCA is more effective in accounting for complex causality than statistical analysis and comparative case studies. The latter two are focused on the net effects of individual variables, while previous research indicates that states are driven by a combination of interacting motives for participating in armed humanitarian intervention (Krieg, 2013; Mello, 2014b, p. 40; Sarbu, 2009). QCA’s emphasis on conjunctural causation, as opposed to correlational causation, will probably do more justice to the complex interaction of conditions (Avdagic, Rhodes, & Visser, 2011, p. 23; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 2).

QCA will be complemented with CPT. Scholars do not ‘regard mere observation of a co-variation between the independent variable as a sufficient proof of a causal relationship’ (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 212). QCA can only reveal which (combination of) condition(s) produce the outcome. CPT can add inferential value by tracing how this (combination of) condition(s) affect the outcome. For this reason QCA scholars see CPT as a valuable addition to a QCA (Vis, 2012, p. 2).

4.3. Sample and case selection
The units of analysis of this study are states, because the characteristics of states are explained (Babbie, 2010, p. 121). The units of observation are in this study the same as the units of analysis, because the units that will be observed in the analysis are states as well. Case selection in this study have to be conducted for two things: armed humanitarian interventions and states.

Case selection for armed humanitarian interventions
In this study will be researched why states are participating in armed humanitarian interventions. Therefore some conditions have to be set in order to select appropriate cases for this study. First peacekeeping missions are excluded from the population of potential cases. In peacekeeping missions the use of force is only used for self-defense (Krieg, 2013, p. 9). Second, warfighting
operations will not be included because they are about territorial conquest and differ as such from armed humanitarian interventions (Finnemore, 2004, p. 9). And most important of all, the operation has to be justified by the reference to humanitarian norms. With this scope of conditions the universe of potential cases is quite large. Due to limited amount of time and data it is beyond the scope of this study to research more than one operation.

In this study is chosen to investigate the case of Libya for three reasons. In the first place operation Unified Protector meets all the above-mentioned conditions. In the second place all the data that is necessary to test the hypotheses is available. In the third place because this operation is conducted quite recently and therefore less well researched than other major armed humanitarian interventions.

**Case selection for states**

Purposive sampling will be used to select states for QCA (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 294). Criteria for the cases that are selected for QCA are ‘sufficient homogeneity of the universe of cases considered and maximum heterogeneity within this universe’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 24).

To ensure that the cases that are selected are sufficiently homogeneous it is necessary to define an area of homogeneity. An area of homogeneity means that criteria are established that ensure that cases selected within these borders parallel each other sufficiently to make a comparison (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 20).

The first criterion is that only states are selected that are committed to the norm of humanitarian intervention, because most non-Western countries tend to favor the traditional interpretation of state sovereignty over armed humanitarian intervention they will not be included in this study (Kurowska, 2014; Prantl & Nakano, 2011, p. 207; Rotmann et al., 2014, p. 361; Sarbu, 2009, p. 86; Wu, 2010, p. 207). Another criterion is that cases have to be democracies otherwise the claims of liberalism will not apply to the cases (Mello, 2014a, p. 55). At last, only states with a military that is big enough to make a meaningful contribution to an intervention will be included.

Within this area of homogeneity cases are selected that exhibit maximum heterogeneity of condition and outcome values. This will increase the change of finding combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome (Gross, 2010, p. 42).

For case selection for the CPT study a post-QCA case selection procedure will be used. With this procedure the findings of the QCA study will be used to find typical and/or deviant cases. Typical cases and deviant cases are used to respectively corroborate and update the theoretical model.

4.4. **Data analysis**

**Quantitative comparative analysis**

QCA is aimed at determining what combinations of conditions lead to a particular outcome. First individual conditions are operationalized into fuzzy sets. These fuzzy sets are scales that determine to what extent a case is a member of a set. Subsequently, cases are coded on the basis of these fuzzy sets. The scores of the cases are entered into QCA-software. This software calculates which
configurations are sufficient and/or necessary for the outcome to occur. A sufficient condition is when the outcome is always present when the conditions occurs. A necessary condition is a condition that always occurs when the outcome is present (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).

There are three different forms of QCA. CsQCA (crisp set QCA), mvQCA (multi-value QCA) and fsQCA (fuzzy set QCA). In this study fsQCA will be used because with fsQCA cases can be assigned very precise scores that correspond to the degree in which a condition is present in that case and fsQCA allows for equifinality (more than one configuration leading to same outcome) (Mahoney, 2007, p. 136). In the chapter containing fsQCA will be further elaborated on this method.

Causal process tracing
The analysis with CPT comprises three activities: the development of a comprehensive storyline, identifying smoking guns and the detection of confessions. A comprehensive storyline is a detailed reconstruction of the events aimed at finding empirical evidence that X caused Y. When the storyline reveals a temporal contiguity between a condition and a outcome the researcher will start to dig deeper to find pieces of empirical evidence to prove that X really caused Y. To rule out any alternative conditions the researcher should try to find confessions from the key actors involved in the events under scrutiny. Confessions can give deeper insights in the motivations of the actors that are investigated. As the terminology already indicates, the CPT method resembles the way in which a detective investigates a crime (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 111). In the chapter of Causal Process Tracing will be further elaborated on this method.

4.5. Data collection method
The data which is needed for fsQCA is observational data. Most of the conditions will be measured by using existing statistics, scientific literature and newspaper articles.

The data that is needed for CPT is observational as well: scientific literature, newspaper articles, journal articles, press releases, public statements, interviews and speeches.

4.6. Validity and Reliability
With the combination of QCA and CPT this study could yield sufficiently valid and reliable results. This is because two methods are used that are complementary with regards to methodological strengths. In the following sections it will be explained how external, internal and construct validity in this study are established.

The advantage of QCA is that it improves the external validity of this study. The external validity of CPT studies is weak, because ‘the population to which findings from a few cases can be generalized is rather small’ (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 69). With QCA a bigger sample is used and it is therefore better generalizable to the whole population. The risk of a selection bias is relatively low because the sample is very large in comparison with the population. A weakness in the external validity of this study is that only one armed humanitarian intervention is researched. This is not a representative sample for the whole population of armed humanitarian interventions.

CPT has the advantage of improving the internal validity of this study. QCA is good at detecting whether a relationship between a (combination of) condition(s) and an outcome exist, but it only
‘infers causation form a cross-case association’ (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013, p. 560). CPT can be used to bolster the ‘claim that it was indeed X and not Z or W that has caused Y’ (Blatter, 2012, p. 25). CPT enhances the internal validity of the causal claim that X caused Y by tracing the process that leads from the condition(s) to the outcome (Blatter, 2012, p. 8).

With QCA and case studies high levels of construct validity can be achieved. Complex concepts can be measured more accurately because QCA allows for a ‘detailed consideration of contextual variables’ (Sprinz & Wolinsky, 2004, p. 42). The only threat to the construct validity is with measuring national strategic culture, which is a quite abstract concept. In this study only public statement are analyzed to measure to what extent they contain references to strategic cultures. A good way to improve construct validity is to use multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2014, p. 43). Interviews with key policy makers would have contributed a lot the construct validity of the study.

QCA studies are reliable because measurable indicators are developed that can be replicated easily. CPT is based on interpretative analysis and is therefore less reliable. In this study is tried to make logical deductions on the basis of publicly available information. This makes the research strategy transparent and therefore enhances its reliability.

4.7. Conclusion
In this chapter an explanation is given what research strategy will be used to arrive at valid and reliable answers on the research question. The main argument which made in this chapter is that this is best achieved by using methodologies that can account for complex causality. Another argument that is made is that using CPT, in combination with QCA, will add inferential value to the study. In the next chapter first the fsQCA study will be conducted.
Chapter 5: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Libya)

5.1. Introduction
In this chapter the hypotheses that are introduced in the theory part will be tested by applying fsQCA on the case of Libya. Before the actual analysis will be conducted an overview of the QCA method will be given in the first section. Then the conditions will be operationalized and the cases will be coded. When all the data is quantified, the data will be entered into the QCA software. In the last section of this chapter the results of the analysis will be interpreted and presented in the conclusion.

5.2. Overview of fsQCA

Introduction to fsQCA
FsQCA is a social sciences research method that is developed by Ragin (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). QCA is aimed at the middle ground between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In the past decade, social science from different disciplines are increasingly turning to QCA. QCA is a research method that ‘possesses several comparative strengths that allow to fill the void between case studies and statistical analyses’ (Mello, 2014b, p. 41). The major advantages of QCA over case studies and statistical analysis is that this research method does justice to complex causation.

Causal assumptions
FsQCA is based on three methodological assumptions: equifinality, conjunctural causation, and causal asymmetry (Mello, 2014a, p. 42). Equifinality means that ‘QCA accounts for the possibility that alternate pathways toward an outcome exist’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 42). Conjunctural causation means that ‘combinations of conditions can jointly cause an outcome to occur’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 42). Causal asymmetry means that ‘an identified relationship between a condition or combination of conditions and the outcome does not mean that the inverse relationship must also be true’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 42). Social mechanisms, to which these causal assumptions apply, cannot be unraveled by estimating the average effect of conditions. Instead of expressing causation in terms of correlation in fsQCA causal relations are expressed in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions.

Consistency and coverage
For the measurement of sufficiency (and necessity) of conditions, or combinations of conditions, the measures of consistency and coverage are used. The main goal of fsQCA is testing for sufficiency (Mello, 2014a, 44). Consistency ‘assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combination of conditions (e.g., democratic dyad) agree in displaying the outcome in question’ (Ragin, 2006, p. 292). This is done by calculating the degree to which a condition, or combination of conditions is a subset of the outcome. If all scores of the conditions are lower than their corresponding scores on the outcome consistency is 1 (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1166). The formula for determining consistency is:

\[ \text{Consistency} = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i} \]
Coverage measures the relevance of the detected consistency relationship. It indicates the ‘size of the empirical overlap or the proportion of instances of the outcome that are explained by that combination’ (Devers, 2013, p. 28; Mello, 2014a, p. 44).

**Analytical procedure**

In this section the analytical procedure of fsQCA will be explained. In Figure 1 the analytical procedure of fsQCA is presented.

![Analytical procedure of fsQCA](image)

The analytical process starts with defining the outcome. This should be done in the earliest stage of the study because the information on the outcome is necessary to select cases that vary in outcome (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1162). After that a preliminary set of cases are selected that vary as much as possible in the outcome. The next step is to establish conditions that might be the explanation for the outcome, based on the theory (Gross & Garvin, 2011, p. 147). These conditions are turned into fuzzy sets. Once all the cases are coded on the basis of this fuzzy sets, the actual fsQCA can start. For the analysis, fsQCA 2.0 is used. Before testing the conditions for sufficiency it is a common practice to check for necessity of the conditions. If necessary conditions are found they should be removed from the truth table analysis because the truth table analysis only tests for sufficiency. The consistency threshold for necessity is 0.90 (Mello, 2014a, p. 44, 45). Once the necessity analysis is done, the truth table analysis, which is the core of fsQCA, can be conducted.

**Coding procedure**

In order to quantify the data, the conditions are operationalized into fuzzy sets. The idea behind fuzzy sets is to make a set from 0 to 1 (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 43). Cases can hold degrees of membership in this set. Before the cases are coded, qualitative anchors are set ‘to determine when a case is “fully in” a given set (fuzzy score 1), when it is “neither in nor out” (fuzzy score 0,5), and at which point a case is “fully out” of a set (fuzzy score 0)” (Mello, 2014a, p. 43). The establishment of the qualitative anchors are based on substantive or theoretical knowledge (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 94). There are three different coding procedures. The first approach starts with constructing fuzzy
sets with different degrees of membership. Subsequently a qualitative assessment is made of the membership score of the cases. The direct and indirect method of calibration are used to transform interval-scale conditions into fuzzy-set scores.

With the direct method of calibration qualitative breakpoints are set. At these qualitative breakpoints a particular value on the interval-scale is connected with a certain fuzzy set score. The reason for establishing breakpoints is that not all the variation in the data is considered to be equally relevant. With the indirect method of calibration, the cases are first grouped on the bases of qualitative analysis and based on these groupings fuzzy sets are made (Mello, 2014a, p. 43).

The coding procedure of fsQCA distinguishes itself from statistical operationalization, because cases are not simply ranked relative to each other but by setting qualitative breakpoints try to capture meaningful variation and not just any variation in the conditions and outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 90). When the fuzzy sets are created, cases can be coded based on these fuzzy sets. When all the cases are coded the data can be entered in the fsQCA software.

**Truth table analysis and logical minimization**

When the data is entered into the fsQCA software the first step of the analysis is the creation of a truth table. A truth table contains rows for all the possible combinations of conditions with its corresponding consistency rate. The truth table represents a multidimensional vector space with $2^k$ corners. K stands for the number of conditions. Only the combinations of conditions that are highly relevant will be analyzed; therefore a cut-off point has to be determined. This threshold should be at least 0.75 (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 118).

After the truth table has been created, logical minimization helps to identify the sufficient conditions. Logical minimization is the minimization of the truth table with the help of Boolean algebra. This algebra is based on the work of the mathematician George Boole. This deviates from elementary algebra with regards to the basic operators. The conditions are stated in capital letters. A tilde (~) refers to logical NOT as the negation of a condition. Multiplication (*) refers to logical AND, as the combinations of conditions. Addition (+) refers to logical OR, as alternative pathways. Arrows (→) refers to a sufficient outcomes. If for example condition A and B or conditions C and D lead to outcome E this would be expressed as: $(A*B) + (C*D) \rightarrow E$ (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1160; Mello, 2014a, p. 41).

To illustrate how it works a simple example will be given. In this example there are three conditions (A, B, C) that lead, in combination or individually, to a particular outcome (Y). In Table 1 the truth table containing all possible combinations are shown. The table shows that only the first two rows lead to the outcome. $(A*B*C) + (A*B\sim C) \rightarrow Y$. With logical minimization this expression would be reduced to $(A*B) \rightarrow Y$. Because, regardless the absence or presence of C, the presence of A combined with B leads to the outcome Y (Mello, 2014a, p. 46).
The software calculates, on the basis of the truth table algorithm and the consistency cut-off, three solution terms. These solutions terms are Boolean expressions of combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome and have been to a process of minimization which is described in the previous section. The solution terms differ in their treatment of logical remainders. Logical remainders are the rows in the truth table rows without cases with a higher score than 0.50 in the combination of conditions. Some solution terms include this logical remainders in the calculation of sufficiency for combinations of conditions while other don’t (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 182). The complex solution contains minimal formula derived without the aid of any logical remainders. The parsimonious solution includes logical remainders in the calculations without evaluating its plausibility. The intermediate solutions allows the researcher how the logical remainders should be treated, based on theoretical expectations (Mello, 2014a, p. 46, 47; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 182, 183, 184). Logical remainders are included because, even though they do not have a set-membership higher than 0.5, they can be theoretically interesting (Mello, 2014a, p. 47). The last step of fsQCA is the interpretation of the results provided by the fsQCA software. In the conclusion will be reflected whether the outcome theoretically makes sense.

5.3. Define Outcome
The first step in fsQCA is defining the outcome. It should be conducted before the case selection because it is important for the case selection to ‘identify a set of cases exhibiting a range of these outcomes during the analysis’ (Jordan, Gross, Javernick-Will, & Garvin, 2011, p. 1162). By using fsQCA the outcome has multiple values. The definition of the outcome enables to select cases that clearly vary in outcome. The analysis will be more robust if the conditions under consideration exhibit a relatively balanced combination of all possible values (Gross & Garvin, 2011, p. 147). There are lot of different interpretations for military intervention (Choi, 2013, p. 123). Mello (2014b) defines military participation in intervention as the ‘deployment of combat-ready, regular forces across international borders to engage in the use of force inside or against a target state as part of a multilateral military operation’ (Mello, 2014b, p. 14). In this study this definition will be used as well. With this definition different kind of operations are excluded. In the first place peacekeeping missions are excluded as most of the scholars that study the motives of military intervention do (Finnemore, 2004, p. 12; Krieg, 2013, p. 9; Mello, 2014b, p. 14; Weiss, 2012, p. 9). In peacekeeping missions the use of force is only used for self-defense. Moreover, peacekeeping missions are often

Table 1: Example of a truth table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Mello, 2014b, p. 46)
conducted after a conflict (Krieg, 2013, p. 9). This is theoretically less interesting because peacekeeping missions are less suitable for states as a tool to secretly pursue their self-interest. At the other side of the spectrum lies war fighting. Humanitarian military intervention differs from war fighting because they ‘do not include territorial conquest and absorption’ (Finnemore, 2004, p. 9). This is not interesting for the purpose of this study as well, because the motive for war fighting is obvious. Therefore in this study will be focused on armed intervention in another state that is justified by humanitarian reasons (Choi, 2013, p. 123; Finnemore, 2004, p. 12; Mello, 2014b, p. 14; Weiss, 2012, p. 8).

5.4. Case selection

In the chapter ‘research design and operationalization’ the case selection criteria for QCA are already explained. Cases must be sufficiently homogeneous to compare and should exhibit maximum heterogeneity in the condition and outcome. The universe of cases is therefore limited to states that have accepted the norm of humanitarian intervention (Western countries), that are democracies and that have a military sufficiently large to make a meaningful contribution to operation Unified Protector. As many cases as possible were included that meet this conditions. Data was found for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, USA and the United Kingdom.

5.5. Operationalization of the conditions

5.5.1. Introduction

FsQCA permits ‘membership scores in the interval between (0) and (1)’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 89). This means that different degrees of necessary and sufficient causation can be measured (Mahoney, 2007, p. 136). Before the hypotheses can be tested in the analysis the categorical concepts have to be translated into measurable conditions. ‘Qualitative anchors’ are set that determine ‘when a case is ‘fully in’ in a given set (fuzzy score 1), when it is ‘neither in nor out’ (fuzzy score 0.5), and at which point a case is ‘fully out’ of a set (fuzzy score 0)’ (Mello, 2014b, p. 43). These criteria have to be set with the help of ‘substantial and in-depth theoretical knowledge’ (Carlsen, , p. 26). After these qualitative anchors have been set up, cases can be assigned the appropriate score bases on empirical evidence (Carlsen, , p. 27). In this last section the outcome participation in armed humanitarian intervention will be operationalized. The conditions: security interest, energy dependency, economic interdependence, national strategic culture, alliance preference, public opinion and domestic threshold on the use of force will be operationalized.

5.5.2. Participation in humanitarian military intervention

In this study, participation in armed humanitarian intervention is defined as participating in a intervention that is justified with humanitarian reasons. A lot of scholars operationalize military intervention in a dichotomous way (Hammarström & Heldt, 2002; Sarbu, 2009). In this analysis a more fine-grained operationalization of humanitarian military intervention will be applied instead.

The first indicators for participation in armed humanitarian operations are the deployment of combat personnel or non-combat personnel. Combat contributions coincide with a higher risk of casualties and are often more costly. The second indicator will be the size of the contribution made
by a state. The indicators are measured by analyzing scientific literature, newspaper articles and press releases.

The values of fuzzy-membership are (partly) taken from a previous fsQCA study conducted by Mello (2014b). Full membership (1.0) will be assigned to states that participated with combat troops and contributed sizable deployments. Full non-membership will be assigned to states that didn’t participate at all. Only cases that deployed combat troops will be considered to more in than out the set (fuzzy score higher than 0.5) (BBC, 2011d; Mello, 2014a, p. 55).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military participation</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>No participation at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Small deployment of non-combat personnel and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Medics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Mine clearance units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Specialist for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Logistical experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Aircraft, navy and personnel for supportive purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Sizable deployment of non-combat personnel and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Participation with combat troops, but with a more supportive role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Participation with combat troops, but deployments are of limited scale compared with the next group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full participation with combat troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployments are sizable in relation to capabilities of states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.3. Security interest

Security interest of states comprises security risks such as refugee flows, spread of weapons and safe havens for terrorist. This condition is often operationalized with the indicator geographical proximity (Bove & Sekeris, 2011, p. 4; Choi, 2013, p. 582; Davidson, 2011, p. 16; Krieg, 2013, p. 66; Regan, 1998, p. 766; Sarbu, 2009, p. 47; Yoon, 1997, p. 587). A security threat occurs when the state’s territorial integrity or its citizens are threatened (Davidson, 2011, p. 16). Geographical proximity plays an important role ‘given that conflicts generally produce considerable negative spillovers including refugees and economic-cum-political instability in regions where the country is located’ (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008; Sarbu, 2009, p. 18). So basically states that are geographically proximate to the humanitarian crisis will more likely intervene in humanitarian conflicts because of the contiguous nature of humanitarian crisis (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008, p. 12). For this study the indicator of geographical proximity will be slightly adjusted, because it does not capture accurately the exposure to refugee flows in the case under investigation.
The first indicator to measure security interest will be the risk of a state of receiving huge refugee flows. The second indicator will be the popularity of a state as a destiny for asylum seekers. Most refugees entering the European Union (EU) are heading towards other European countries because they are more prosperous and have less strict immigration laws. The first indicator will be measured by doing an analysis of press releases of refugee agencies and newspaper articles. The second indicator will be measured by the amount of asylum applications this state gets each year. Statistical data from Eurostat will be used to measure this.

States that are close to the humanitarian crisis and that are the main initial destination of refugees will be assigned full membership (1). Since most refugees are heading towards northern Europe once they have passed the Southern European borders, popular destinations in Northern Europe that receive more than 20000 asylum applications each year will be considered more in than out the set (fuzzy score higher than 0.5). For the threshold of 20000 is chosen because there seems to be a natural break in the statistics at the point of 20000, which indicates that there is a clear division between popular and unpopular European states as a destiny for refugees. States with less than 10000 asylum application will be assigned full non-membership (0).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security interest</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not a popular destiny for refugees. Less than 10000 asylum application a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>Medium popular destiny for refugees. Between 10000-20000 asylum applications each year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>Popular destiny of migrants once they arrive in Europe. More than 20000 asylum applications a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Close to humanitarian crisis. Expectation of high influx of refugees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.4. Energy dependency

Energy dependency on a state that is affected by a humanitarian crisis is expected to increase the likelihood of an intervention by the dependent state. The most important resource is oil. Humanitarian crises often result in supply disruptions and oil shocks (Bove, Gleditsch, & Sekeris, 2015, p. 3). Intervention might be used ‘as a means of inhibiting or reducing the risks of conflict spillovers and economic turmoil’ (Bove et al., 2015, p. 3).

The indicator for energy dependency will be the amount of oil that is imported from the affected state. Import and export flows are broadly used indicators of economic interdependence (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996, p. 16). In order to be able to compare among states a calculation will be made what the oil import from the affected state is, as percentage from the total oil import in a particular state. For the statistic on oil imports, documents of the International Energy Agency (IEA) will be used.

For the calibration of this condition the method of direct calibration will be used. Full membership is assigned to states that import more than 15% oil import from Libya. This estimate is based on scientific and newspaper articles that contain statements that indicate what is considered to be a high energy dependency. In 15 articles an oil import of 15% (or higher) of total import is considered
high (Berrigan, 2004; Davidson, 2013; Engelhardt, 2004; Frynas & Paulo, 2007; Glaser, 2013; Hasler, 2012; Klare, 2002, 2005, 2006; Krauss, 2011a; Léger, 2013; Lombardi, 2011; Omeje, 2015; Stokes, 2007, p. 256; U.S. Department of Energy, 2013). Crossover threshold (0.5) will be 5%. This estimate is based on 4 articles that consider 5% of total oil import as a low energy dependency (Erichsen & Lecomte, 2013, p. 14; Hasler, 2012, p. 142; Krauss, 2011a; Satterlee, 2003). Less than 2% oil import is considered to be insignificant in the literature and will therefore be scored with full non-membership (0) (Hasler, 2012, p. 135; Krauss, 2011a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy dependency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0-2% or less import of total oil consumption from affected state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5% import of total oil consumption from affected state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15% import of total oil consumption from affected state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.5. Economic interdependence
Economic interdependence between two states might lead to intervention when trade flows are disrupted and FDI’s are in danger.

The indicator to measure the economic interdependence is the amount of trade between two states. Because of the strong connection between FDI’s and regular trade flows we are confident that measuring the trade flow will capture the concept of economic interdependence (Oneal et al, 1996, p. 16). Because the interest of oil companies is often attributed much significance this will be taken into account as a second indicator (Sarbu, 2009, p. 86).

The first indicator will be measured by calculating the trade between states as a percentage of total trade Barbieri (1996). Statistics of Eurostat will be used to measure trade flows. The second indicator will be measured by looking to what extent the oil production of the company depends on the affected state for their whole oil production, how big these companies are and to what extent they are important for the economy of the home state. Newspaper articles will be used to measure this indicator.

The values of fuzzy-membership are taken from a previous fsQCA study conducted by Van der Maat (2011). Full membership will be assigned to states of which more than 8% of their trade is with the affected state. The crossover threshold (0.5) will be 3%. Non-membership (0) will be assigned if trade is less than 0.5% (Van der Maat, 2011, p. 207). The states that have significant economic interest via oil companies will be coded 0.25 higher.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic interdependence</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0-0.5% trade, as a percentage of total trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2% trade, as a percentage of total trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8%-and more, as a percentage of total trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.6. National strategic culture
According to constructivist the behavior of states is largely determined by norms. International norms have to compete with national norms. In the theory part it was argued that international
norms on humanitarian intervention are interpreted in the light of national norms on the goals of its military and the willingness to use force by a particular state. It is expected that states which see their military solely for defense or peacekeeping missions and prefer non-military tools, such as diplomacy, over military force as an instrument of foreign policy will intervene less likely than states that see armed humanitarian interventions as an important task of their military and have a preference for military force as a foreign policy instrument.

The first indicator for the goals, that a state has with the use of its military, is how states define the role of their military in security and defense policy documents. The second indicator is to what extent the military equipment is suitable for armed humanitarian intervention. The first indicator for the willingness to use force, is how states think about the use of force as a foreign policy instrument. The second indicator is the percentage of GDP spend on defense. The third indicator is past behavior with regards to participating in armed humanitarian intervention. These indicators are taken from a book containing the profiles of strategic cultures of all European states edited by Biehl et al. (2013). They have measured most of the indicators by analyzing security and defense policy documents (Biehl et al., 2013, pp. 14-16). The coding of the states will rely on this research.

Full membership (1.0) will be assigned to states that have a high willingness to use force for which the goals of the military goes beyond the scope of territorial defense and peacekeeping. States will be assigned non-membership (0) when they have a low willingness to use force and when they only want to use force for territorial defense or peacekeeping. Crossover threshold (0.5) will be when states are neither reluctant nor willing to use force and when they are neither very willing nor very reluctant to use their military for armed humanitarian interventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National strategic culture</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reluctant to use force and use military solely for territorial defense or peacekeeping missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>Reluctant to use force but willing to use military for out-of-area operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>Reluctant to use of force but willing to participate in combat operations to stop humanitarian crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High willingness to use force and willing to participate in combat operations to stop humanitarian crises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.7. Alliance preference

Alliance preference means that states have a preferred mode of cooperation. CSDP, NATO and coalitions of the willing are the most common modes of cooperation. The first indicators for a particular mode of cooperation are preferences expressed in security and defense policy documents (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 15). Another indicator is the troop contributions to the different modes of cooperation in the past. The first indicator is measured by an analysis of security and defense policy documents. The second indicator is measured by an analysis of all kind of sources that provide information about troop contributions by states. As with the previous condition the coding of the states will rely on the book edited by Biehl et al. (2013). Full membership (1.0) will be assigned when an armed humanitarian intervention is conducted under
the preferred mode of cooperation. Full non-membership (0) when an armed humanitarian intervention is not conducted under the preferred mode of cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance preference</th>
<th>Intervention under umbrella of preferred mode of cooperation.</th>
<th>Intervention not under umbrella of preferred mode of cooperation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.8. Public opinion
Liberalist scholars argue that public opinion can determine whether politicians decide to intervene or not, because leaders that are accountable to citizens want to get re-elected.

The indicator to measure public opinion is an opinion poll. Surveys are used to measure the opinion of a representative sample of the whole population. Different polls will be used to measure the public support for intervention. For the Libya case the Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS), the Danish Gallup Poll, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, a poll of Abacus Data and a poll of Market are used.

Fuzzy-set membership values are derived from previous research on the relationship between public opinion and humanitarian intervention. Full membership (1.0) is assigned to states to states in which more than 75% favors intervention. The crossover threshold (0.5) is set at 45%. States with less than 15% public support are fully out the set (0) (Mello, 2014b, p. 61).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public opinion</th>
<th>0-15% of the citizens favor intervention.</th>
<th>45% of the citizens favor intervention.</th>
<th>75% of the citizens favor intervention.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.9. Domestic threshold on use of force
According to liberalist, parliamentary war powers and constitutional constraints can have a constraining effect on the freedom of maneuver of the executive branch of the government.

The first indicator for domestic thresholds on the use of force is the presence of ex ante or ex post veto on the use of force. The second indicator is the presence of constitutional provisions that limit the scope of interventions that states allow themselves to participate in (Mello, 2014b, p. 58). These indicators are taken from the study of Mello (2014b). He has measured the first indicator by using states studies conducted by other scholars and surveys of parliamentary war powers (Mello, 2014b, p. 58). The coding of the states will rely on this research.

States will be assigned full membership (1) if there is no parliamentary involvement in decision-making on the deployment of troops and the absence of any constitutional limitations (Mello, 2012, p. 433). States are fully out the set (0) if the executive needs parliamentary approval for all military deployments and where comprehensive restrictions are in place for military deployments (Mello, 2012, p. 433; 2014b, p. 58). Crossover threshold (0.5) will be when parliamentary power is partly present and when there are strict constitutional constraints.
### Domestic threshold on the use of force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Ex ante veto for parliament and/or constitutional restrictions on the use of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Ex post veto for parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Legislator have to be informed about intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No parliamentary involvement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.6. Coding of cases

#### 5.6.1. Security interest

At the end of February when the Libyan conflict worsened, the UNHCR warned for a refugee exodus from Libya (CNN, 2011). By the end of February it was estimated that 61,000 refugees had fled to Egypt and 40,000 to Tunisia (Xinhua, 2011). Numbers increased every hour (Kuwait News Agency, 2011). Especially Tunisia was struggling to absorb the influx of refugees (Chick, 2011). Tunisia was unstable by itself as well at that time (Ward, 2011). The refugees that fled Libya were mostly migrant workers. They were attacked by opposition forces because they were accused of being mercenaries of Gadhafi (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2011c). Expectations were that the big amount of refugees in Tunisia, mostly Tunisians and Egyptians, would lead to a humanitarian crisis in Tunisia as well (Kuwait News Agency, 2011; The Times, 2011). In early March, Tunisians were, with 18000, by far the biggest group that had fled Libya (UNHCR, 2011b). Egyptians that had fled to Tunisia were repatriated to Egypt with European airplanes (Heilprin, 2011b). In the meantime the amount of refugees in Tunisia had risen to 90,000 people (Peterson, 2011). The situation in refugee camps got worse because of the threat of racially charged violent clashes (Heilprin, 2011a). Apart from fleeing to neighboring states, a lot of Libyan refugees were expected to cross the Mediterranean. Lampedusa and Malta are closest to Tunisia and Libya so most of them were expected to flee to these islands (Barry, 2011b; Daley, 2011). According to the Italian government 5,600 refugees had reached Lampedusa, on 2 March fleeing the unrest due to the Arab spring (Pignal, 2011; UPI, 2011). Because Italy and Malta were the main destination for refugees that were heading to Europe and Italy saw the flow of refugees as a threat, Italy will be coded 1.

France was concerned about the ‘destabilizing effects of the ‘massive flight’ of foreigners in Libya towards the Tunisian and Egyptian borders’ (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). Tunisia the neighbor state of Libya and main recipient of refugees was not a stable state as well at the time that the Libyan crisis started. Many Tunisians had fled to Lampedusa and the huge amount of refugees from Libya further destabilized the state (UNHCR, 2011a; Winfield, 2011). An even more destabilized Tunisia and Libya would increase the chance of refugees fleeing to Europe. Sarkozy said about the Libyan refugees that they most probably would try to cross the Mediterranean Sea and that France, as a ‘geographical neighbor’ would be ‘among the first impacted and affected’ (Davidson, 2013, p. 316).

So, the refugee flows triggered by the Libyan conflict was considered to be a security threat by France. Therefore France will be scored 1 as well.

Other popular destinies in Europe will be coded with 0.75. Although refugees officially have to apply for asylum in the state of arrival (Dublin II regulation) a lot of them continue their “journey to
northern European countries” without being challenged by Italian authorities’ (Mayr, 2011). Northern European states see this as a threat. This can be proven by the fact that a lot of northern European states complained about Italy for not blocking migrants from leaving Italy to seek asylum in northern European states and some of them even reintroduced border checks. Statistical data show that Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland are by far the most popular destinies of asylum seekers (Eurostat, 2015). This is also confirmed in newspaper articles (Steiniger, 2011). These states are chosen because they are richer, have more flexible family reunification policies and changes of getting an asylum request accepted are higher (The Times, 2015). States with more than 20000 asylum applications in 2010 will be scored with 0,75. States with 10000-20000 asylum applicants: 0,25, and states that had less than 10000 asylum applicant 0. Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Belgium will be coded 0,75. Austria and the Netherlands will be coded 0.25. Denmark, Slovakia, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, Poland, Canada and the United States are coded 0. Although Greece and Spain are among the most important gateways of Europe for irregular immigrants, they will be coded 0, because Libyan and Tunisian refugees were mainly entering Europe via Lampedusa.

5.6.2. Energy dependency
Austria, Ireland, Italy and France imported more than 15% of their oil from Libya in February 2011 (IEA, 2011a). Germany, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the United Kingdom imported between 5-15% of their oil from Libya (IEA, 2011a). Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Slovakia, Poland, United States, Sweden and Canada imported less than 2% of their total oil import from Libya (Bank, 2011; IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b). The only data available for Swedish oil imports was from 2012. However, it is expected that the composition of the Swedish oil imports had not change a lot.

5.6.3. Economic interdependence
Trade statistics of Libya show that the volume of trade was rapidly dropping from the moment the Libyan uprising began (Eurostat, 2014). Therefore the trade data of the previous year, 2010, will be used to get an indication of the average amount of trade with Libya. Greece and Italy will be scored high because their trade with Libya, as a percentage of their total quantity of trade, exceeds 2%. Spain, Portugal, France and Malta’s quantity of trade with Libya, as a percentage of their total quantity of trade, exceeds 0,5%. Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Slovakia, The Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland, Canada and the United States’ quantity of trade with Libya as a percentage of total trade is lower than 0.5% (Eurostat, 2014; International Trade Administration, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2015).1 When the turmoil in Libya started, especially the investments and profits of big oil companies were at risk. Production went down, shares dropped and equipment was damaged. Revenue loss for some companies was about 100 million a day (Makan, 2013). Eni, OMV, Marathon and Hess were the oil companies that produced most in Libya in terms of their total production (Barron's, 2011).

1 For the Canadian statistics on trade with Libya a government trade database is used. Because the trade volumes were expressed in Canadian dollars the website http://www.x-rates.com/ was used to convert it to euro’s by the exchange rates of 2010. For the America statistics on trade with Libya a government database is used as well. Because the trade volumes were expressed in US dollars the website http://www.x-rates.com/ was used to convert it to euro’s by the exchange rates of 2010.
The Italian oil company, Eni, was the biggest oil producer before the conflict broke out (Graham, 2011; Krijgsman, 2011; McQuaile, Perkins, & Elliott, 2011; Schoen, 2011). Approximately 12-15% of its total production came from Libya (Barron’s, 2011; Reuters, 2011a). It is one of the largest companies of Italy and the Italian government holds a share of more than 30% of all the shares of the company (OpenOil, 2011, p. 89). In 2009 there were working 40,192 Italians for ENI (EurWORK, 2009). Its total assets were worth US $131.86 billion in 2010 (OpenOil, 2011, p. 89). For this reason Italy will be coded with 0.78 instead of 0.53.

Three American companies, Marathon, Hess and ConocoPhillips, were respectively for 12%, 5% and 3.3% dependent on Libya for their total production (Barron’s, 2011; Seeking Alpha, 2011). These firms form together a joint venture called Waha Oil Co. Together they are the largest foreign oil producer in Libya (UMCI, 2011). Total assets of Marathon were worth US $50.02 billion in 2010. Total assets of US $35.396 in 2010 and ConocoPhilips US $156.314 (OpenOil, 2011). ConocoPhillips is the third-largest U.S. oil company (Reuters, 2011b). Based on this data it can be stated that the US had at least some economic interest in Libya (Anderson, 2011) Therefore US will be assigned a score of 0.27 instead of 0.02.

OMV is an Austrian, partly state-owned, oil company. 10-12% of its total production came from Libya before the outbreak of the civil war (Barron’s, 2011; Kindergan, 2013; Krijgsman, 2011; Reuters, 2011a, 2014; Seeking Alpha, 2011). The total assets value of OMV is €26.40 billion in 2010. It is one of Austria’s largest companies. Therefore Austria will be assigned 0,29 instead of 0,04.

5.6.4. National strategic culture

US, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Denmark will be coded 1. The characteristics that are shared by these states are that they the goals of their armies go far beyond the traditional purpose of defending territory, as shown in their security and defense policy documents. Their military is organized in such a way that it is suitable to participate in international operations. These states are not reluctant to use force and have participated in a lot of combat operations in recent history. Especially the United States, United Kingdom and France are among the highest spenders on defence worldwide (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 9, 85, 93, 127, 133, 195, 202, 379; Ellwood, 2013, p. 69; Tang & Long, 2012, p. 511, 519).

Canada will be coded 0.75. It is a very active peacekeeper. It participated in more than 50 operations after WO II. Canadians see peacekeeping as a top priority for Canadian armies, even more important than defending territory (Gravelle, Scotto, Reifler, & Clarke, 2014, p. 118; Massie, 2010, p. 120). With regards to the willingness to use force there is some ambivalence though. In Canada several regional subcultures are present (Massie, 2010, p. 118). The strategic culture that is in force largely depends on the government that is in power. When the conservative government of Harper came to power Canada extended the combat mission in Afghanistan even though a lot of Canadians opposed it (Massie, 2014, p. 13). This government had a strategic culture that did not have a problem with combat and peace enforcement operations (Massie, 2014, p. 9). Because this government was still in power with the Libyan intervention, Canada will be coded 0.75.

Belgium and the Netherlands will be coded with a 0.75 as well. The emphasize of the Belgium army lies on international operations. Belgium has participated in all major operations in which Western
countries have been involved. It is willing to use force, but putting Belgium’s soldiers live at risk is controversial. However, participation in combat operations with air and navy components is uncontroversial because of the ‘relatively low level of risk entailed for Belgian troops’ (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 39). The tasks of the Dutch army also goes beyond territorial defense. It also includes ‘protecting and promoting the international rule of law and international stability’ (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 257). However, in recent years the use of force as a foreign policy instrument has become less important relative to non-military foreign policy instruments. The military remains an important instrument though, and Dutch forces have contributed to a lot of armed humanitarian interventions. Dutch contributions are considered to be above average (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 263).

Poland and Portugal will be coded 0.25. In the security and defense policy documents of Poland the main role of the military is defined as taking care of territorial defense. Operations with an humanitarian motive remain debated. Especially after the Iraq war strategic culture made a swift turn and in 2012 only 42% of ‘Poles agreed that the international community had the responsibility to protect civilians in other countries from violence’ (Nowak, 2013, p. 13). There is a high willingness to use force though and Polish people have a high tolerance for casualties. Portugal’s goals with their military go beyond territorial defense. They also include cooperative security and collective security. Efforts have been made to improve the deployability of its forces. But its military equipment still falls short to make a meaningful contribution to armed humanitarian interventions. Moreover, Portugal is restrictive in the use of force. It is seen as an instrument of last resort although Portugal does not have a strong bias against the use of power per se (Biehl et al., 2013).

Austria, Slovakia, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Spain and Greece will be scored 0. Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland are neutral states. These states define the role of their military broader than territorial defense, they contribute to peacekeeping missions and their military has a high deployability. But these states are very reluctant to use force. They see military force as an instrument of last resort (Biehl et al., 2013). Even though Spain is not considered a neutral state it shares the abovementioned attributes of neutral states.

In Germany’s strategic mindset the use of force is viewed mainly in terms of territorial defense. It has not been very active with regards to foreign deployments of troops in the past. Germany has a culture of military restraint which is the result of the prevailing pacifist mindset in Germany that developed after the second world war (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 139).

Greece sees its military as an instrument to protect its territory; mainly, against Turkey. Greece is not proactively involved into international interventions, but only participates when it is requested to do so. Its military equipment is suitable for defense purposes and not for armed humanitarian interventions. Greece is reluctant to use force and the Greek population is sensitive towards casualties due to war (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 154).

Slovakia used to have a national strategic culture solely aimed at defending its territory. In recent years this has changed and the Slovak army also started to participate in humanitarian interventions. Most Slovak deployment are aimed at stabilizing post-conflict regions though. There is still a prevalent norm that the use of force is only justified ‘for self-defense in case of an imminent threat to the soldier's life or to the life of persons under their protection’ (Biehl et al., 2013).
5.6.5. Alliance preference

United States, Denmark, Canada, United Kingdom are among the staunchest members of NATO, therefore they will be coded 1 (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 91, 376; Massie, 2010, p. 123). Finland and Poland will be coded 1. As a lot of states in the east of Europe they are Atlanticist. They see NATO as an alliance that has a stabilizing effect on Europe (Biehl et al., 2013, 118).

Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, The Netherlands and France will be coded 1. Although these states take a middle position, all of them choose a framework depending on the situation at hand. When it comes to more robust military intervention they prefer NATO (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 37, 132, 145, 159, 200, 339). France is often considered to be a clear proponent of EU cooperation on defense matters, but under Sarkozy it fully reintegrated into NATO and they now have a more pragmatic stance toward alliances (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 131, 132).

Sweden, Austria and Ireland are neutral states. They have in common that they have a preference for the UN and/or the EU (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 26, 185, 248, 350). Therefore they will be coded 0.

5.6.6. Public opinion

Denmark’s public support for the intervention in Libya exceeded 75%. Data is derived from a Danish Gallup Poll which is conducted between March 24 and 29. Danes were asked whether they supported Danish military involvement in the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya (Poole, 2014). United States, United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Canada and Spain’s public support was between 45% and 75%. These percentages are derived from the 2011 Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS) conducted by The German Marshall Fund of the United States around 19 may. People were asked if they approved the military action in Libya (Nyiri, 2011). The percentage of public support in Spain was derived from a Financial/Times Harris poll which was conducted in March/April 2011. People were asked to what extent they supported the military intervention in Libya. They could answer ‘support’, ‘neither’, or ‘oppose’. The group of ‘neither’ is split in halve in order to make the outcome of the poll comparable with the other polls (Clements, 2013). Mestres (2011) also thought that public support in Spain would be high because of the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians that voted in favor of intervention and the protest in the streets that requested intervention. For Canada a national poll of Abacus Data was used which was conducted from June 23 to 24. Respondents were asked whether Canada was right or wrong to take military action in Libya. They could answer ‘right’, ‘wrong’ and ‘unsure’. The last group was split in half as well (Coletto, 2011).

Italy, Germany, Austria, Finland and Poland’s public support for the Libya intervention fell between 15% and 45%. Data about public support in Italy was derived from Ipsos poll conducted between 5 and 7 April. People were asked whether they supported the action in Libya (Ipsos, 2011). Data for Germany and Poland is derived from the Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS). Data for Austria is derived from Market, a polling institute in Austria (Seidl, 2011). The group that was ‘unsure’ is split in half. For Finland there were no statistics available of the public support of the Libya intervention. However, on the basis of the following evidence it can be assumed that it was quite low. In the first place Finland’s public debate was extremely anti-interventionist with regards to Libya (Sunnuntaistrategisti, 2012). In the second place most parties in the parliament seem to have opposed the Libya intervention (Doeser, 2014, p. 208). The last piece of evidence that seems to indicate that public support was low is the fact that with previous armed humanitarian intervention
the public support for intervention was extremely low as well (Mello, 2014a). Therefore Finland will be coded 0.25, which means that Finland is more out than in the fuzzy set of public opinion.

For the other states there was no data available. Therefore the level of support of these states will be set at 45 %, yielding a fuzzy score of 0.5 to indicate that these are “neither in nor out” of the fuzzy set of public support’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 85)

5.6.7. Domestic threshold on the use of force
Austria, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Sweden will be coded 0. In these states parliaments have ex ante veto on all military deployments (Mello, 2014a, p. 109). Italy’s parliament has a weak ex ante veto and an ex post veto on the use of force and will be coded 0.25. The parliaments of Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Poland, and the United States, The Netherlands have to be informed after the intervention (in case of The Netherlands before) within a certain timeframe and will therefore be coded with 0.75 (Mello, 2014a, p. 58). The executives of France, Greece, Spain, Malta and the United Kingdom have a prerogative over foreign policy and will be coded 1 (Biehl et al., 2013, p. 250; Mello, 2014a, p. 9). Because the intervention was authorized by the UN ‘few countries faced constitutional restrictions that barred them from participation’ (Mello, 2014a). The only state that had relevant constitutional provisions that could affect the decision to (not) intervene in Libya is Austria. It is ‘constitutionally allowed to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE, or EU auspices’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 110, 111).

5.6.8. Military participation
France, Denmark, Canada, United Kingdom and Belgium will be coded 1. These states voluntarily contributed to the air strikes (Benitez, 2011; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Mello, 2014a, p. 127; Rogers, 2011). The United States and Italy will be assigned 0.8, because they were initially evidently reluctant to participate in the intervention (Agence France Presse; Baltrusaitis & Duckenfield, 2012, p. 27; Burnett, 2011; Engelbrekt, Mohlin, & Wagnsson, 2013, p. 29; Giacomello & Verbeek, 2011, p. 5). Sweden, Spain and The Netherlands will be coded 0.6. These states helped to enforce the no-fly zone (Benitez, 2011; Daalder & Stavridis, 2011, 2012). Enforcing a no-fly zone is in itself not a combat role, but military force is needed if the no-fly zone would be violated (Zaman, 2011). Greece will be coded 0.2. It only helped to enforce the arms embargo which is considered a less substantial contribution than enforcing a no-fly zone (Serrano & Weiss, 2014). Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia Portugal and will be scored 0. They did not participate at all.

5.7. FsQCA

5.7.1. Introduction
In the analysis part the conditions will be tested for necessity and sufficiency. A condition is necessary for an outcome if ‘it is always present when the outcome occurs. In other words, the outcome cannot occur in the absence of the condition. A condition is sufficient for an outcome if the outcome always occurs when the condition is present. However, the outcome could also result from other conditions’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. xix). Conditions are rarely individually necessary for an outcome (Mello, 2014a, p. 42). In the first paragraphs conditions will be selected. Then the condition will be tested for necessity. When the data is entered in the software the truth table will be
constructed and conditions will be tested for consistency and coverage. In the last paragraph’s the results will be evaluated and conclusions will be drawn.

5.7.2. Selection of conditions

With regards to the selection of conditions there is the principle that more conditions add complexity to the logical model and can thwart the identification of reliable patterns (Gross, 2010, p. 42). Therefore a balance should be found between the number of cases and the number of conditions (Gross, 2010, p. 42). For an intermediate-N analysis (10-40 cases) it is good practice to select from 4 to 6 conditions (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1162). Especially in small N studies it is important to limit the list of possible conditions, because each condition that is included adds complexity to the analysis which results in less reliable results. There are different strategies for case selection. In this study the perspective approach is followed where ‘a set of conditions representing two or three theories are tested in the same model’ (Gross, 2010, p. 43). The conditions that have been selected are security interest, energy dependency, economic interdependence, national strategic culture, alliance preference, domestic threshold on the use of force, public opinion. Before starting with analyzing the conditions they have to be checked if they are suitable for fsQCA. Table 2 shows the raw data table which includes the fsQCA membership scores of all cases on all the conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>secint</th>
<th>endep</th>
<th>ecoin</th>
<th>nsc</th>
<th>alpref</th>
<th>pubop</th>
<th>domuf</th>
<th>milpart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,99</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,96</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,95</td>
<td>0,59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,99</td>
<td>0,78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,38</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,88</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,27</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,86</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,77</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,89</td>
<td>0,09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>0,74</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For fsQCA it is required that conditions vary across cases, otherwise it is a constant (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1164, 1171; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 28). If conditions do not vary they should be dropped from the list (Basurto & Speer, 2012, p. 164; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 28). In this dataset economic interest and alliance preference could be considered as nearly constant conditions. It is impossible
to show a relation between a condition and outcome if the condition does not vary across cases. Therefore economic interest and alliance preference are dropped from the list of conditions.

5.7.3. **Analysis of necessary conditions**

Necessary conditions are measured by analyzing if all values of Y are equal to or less than their corresponding values for X. If that is the case X is a necessary condition for Y. Sufficient conditions are traced by analyzing if all values for X are equal to or less than their equivalent values for Y. If that's the case X is a sufficient condition for Y (Mello, 2014a, p. 43, 44).

We will start with the analysis of necessary conditions, because their presence might distort the analysis of sufficient conditions (Mello, 2014a, p. 44). Analysis for necessity is done by plotting all the separate conditions against the outcome in a X-Y plot. If all the cases fall on or below the diagonal, in the sprinkled area, this indicates necessity as shown in Figure 2 (Legewie, 2013). In the fsQCA software, the degree is shown to what extent the plotted data is consistent with Y ≤ X (Ragin et al., 2008). The consistency threshold for necessity is 0.90 (Mello, 2014a, p. 90). None of the conditions exceeds this threshold, thus it can be safely said that in this dataset there are no necessary conditions. Among the negated conditions there was no necessary conditions either.

![Figure 2: Example XY Plot necessary conditions](source)

5.7.4. **Analysis of sufficient conditions**

Before analyzing which combinations of conditions are sufficient for the outcome, first the individual conditions that are sufficient for the outcome will be calculated. If the outcome is military participation, only national strategic culture is sufficient on its own with a consistency of 0.864516 and a coverage of 0.779070. If the outcome is non-intervention both national strategic culture and public opinion are sufficient, with respectively a consistency of 0.814634 and 0.799207. Coverage was respectively 0.869792 and 0.617347.

5.7.5. **Truth table analysis**

In the following part of the analysis will be attempted to find out which configurations (combinations of conditions) lead to a particular outcome. The first step is the construction of a truth table based on the states’ fuzzy-set membership scores. Table 3 shows the truth table for the outcome military participation and the conditions: security interest, energy dependency, national strategic culture, public opinion and domestic thresholds on the use of force. Because the model has 5 conditions, the truth table comprises 2^5 = 32 rows. Table 3 only displays the rows that are filled with empirical cases (Mello, 2014a, p. 64).
Table 3: Truth table for military participation in Unified Protector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>secint</th>
<th>endep</th>
<th>nsc</th>
<th>pubop</th>
<th>domuf</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,834043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0,825806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,700637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,472727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,425641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,239726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,020408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the scores on consistency a cut-off point is determined ‘to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not’ (Mello, 2014a, p. 64). QCA experts recommend a consistency threshold of at least 0.75 (Devers, 2013, p. 28; Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1166). All configurations with a consistency below 0.75 will be excluded from the analysis.

5.7.6. Logical minimization

The second step of fsQCA is logical minimization and the identifying of combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome (Mello, 2014a, p. 74). With logical minimization, complex expressions of combination of conditions are reduced to a minimal formula through Boolean algebra (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 1165). The fsQCA yields three different outcomes, which differ in their treatment of the logical remainders. In Table 4 the outcome of the fsQCA is presented.

Table 4: Analytical results for fsQCA on military intervention in Unified Protector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive outcome</td>
<td>Individual sufficient conditions</td>
<td>nsc</td>
<td>0.864516</td>
<td>0.779070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td>~secint<em>~endep</em>nsc*pubop +</td>
<td>0.868613</td>
<td>0.415116</td>
<td>0.327907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secint<em>nsc</em>pubop*domuf +</td>
<td>1,000000</td>
<td>0.317442</td>
<td>0.201163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secint<em>endep</em>nsc<em>~pubop</em>~domuf →MP</td>
<td>1,000000</td>
<td>0.074419</td>
<td>0.043023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
<td>nsc →MP</td>
<td>0.864516</td>
<td>0.779070</td>
<td>0.779070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
<td>pubop*nsc +</td>
<td>0.897314</td>
<td>0.660465</td>
<td>0.441861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nsc<em>endep</em>secint →MP</td>
<td>0.929889</td>
<td>0.293023</td>
<td>0.074419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negated outcome²

Individual sufficient conditions

² The parentheses around the abbreviated names of the conditions in the rest of the tables and text indicates that these are negated conditions.
Interpretation truth table

Outcome intervention
As already is mentioned three solution terms are offered by the fsQCA software. They differ with respect to how the logical remainders are treated. The most preferred solution is the intermediate solution (Carlsen, p. 39; Elliott, 2013, p. 39). The intermediate solution has the advantage that 'it incorporates only the logical remainders that are consistent with theoretical and substantive knowledge' (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 118). It is simpler than the complex solution but it does not include unjustified assumptions as the parsimonious solution does (Elliott, 2013, p. 9). With the intermediate solution two configurations are identified that are sufficient for military participation to occur.

\[ \text{pubop} \times \text{nsc} \rightarrow \text{MP} \]

Public opinion and national strategic culture combined have a consistency of 0.897314 and a coverage of 0.660465. A short reflection on the cases that are covered by the solution is necessary to test 'whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization make sense, both theoretically and empirically' (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 14). Because the solution terms are rather abstract on their own, an XY plot is constructed that displays the position of each country with regards to its membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome. The cases that are above the main diagonal have a higher score on the outcome than in the solution. When most of the cases lie above the diagonal, this indicates that the configuration is sufficient for the outcome to occur (Mello, 2014b).

The XY plot can be divided into six distinct zones that differ in theoretical relevance (Figure 3). Zone 4 and 5 are irrelevant cases. Because these cases do not hold membership on the condition and on the outcome, they are not considered to be relevant for this configuration. Zone 6 contains deviant cases for coverage. These cases do not undermine the theoretical argument, but they indicate that

\[ \text{nsc} \times \text{secint} \rightarrow \text{pubop} \]

\[ \text{nsc} \times \text{secint} \rightarrow \text{domuf} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(nsc)</th>
<th>0.814634</th>
<th>0.869792</th>
<th>0.869792</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(pubop)</td>
<td>0.799207</td>
<td>0.617347</td>
<td>0.617347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complex solution

\[ (\text{secint}) \times \neg(\text{endep}) \times \neg(\text{nsc}) \times \neg(\text{pubop}) \times \neg(\text{domuf}) + \]

\[ \neg(\text{secint}) \times \neg(\text{endep}) \times \neg(\text{nsc}) \times (\text{pubop}) \times (\text{domuf}) + \]

\[ (\text{secint}) \times (\text{endep}) \times \neg(\text{nsc}) \times (\text{pubop}) \times (\text{domuf}) \rightarrow \neg \text{MP} \]

Parsimonious solution

\[ \neg(\text{endep}) \times \neg(\text{nsc}) + \]

\[ (\text{nsc}) \times (\text{pubop}) \times (\text{domuf}) \rightarrow \neg \text{MP} \]

Intermediate solution

\[ (\text{nsc}) \times \neg(\text{endep}) \times (\text{secint}) + \]

\[ (\text{domuf}) \times (\text{pubop}) \times (\text{nsc}) \rightarrow \neg \text{MP} \]

\(^3\) (* means AND (+ means ‘OR’ and (~) specifies the negation/absence of the condition
alternative explanations might better explain why they have an high outcome (Mello, 2014b, p. 117). Zone 1, 2 and 3 are most important for this configuration. Cases that are placed in zone 1 are typical cases of the configuration. Cases that are placed in zone 3 are deviant cases of the configuration. Cases in zone 2 are neither typical nor deviant cases. The consistency of a configuration is determined by the amount of typical cases relative to the total amount of cases in zone 1,2 and 3.

Figure 3 shows that 7 of the 18 cases hold membership in the solution term. Of this 7 cases, 6 are typical cases. The Netherlands is the only state that is placed below the diagonal, but 'it shows the outcome and holds substantial membership in the solution term' (Mello, 2014b, p. 116). There are no deviant cases for this configuration (zone 3). This means that all the cases that had an active strategic culture combined with high public support for the intervention did intervene. There are only three states that did intervene without sharing these characteristic's (zone 6). However, these countries did not contribute substantially to Unified Protector.

\[ nsc*\text{endep}*secint \rightarrow MP \]

Another combination of conditions with a high consistency is national strategic culture, energy dependency and security interest. It has a consistency of 0.929889and a coverage of 0.617347.
Figure 4 shows that 3 of the 18 cases hold membership in the solution term. Of this 3 cases, 2 are typical cases. Italy is the only state that is placed below the diagonal. This is strange because Italy has the most interest of all states in Libya, so one would expect, based on the realist theory that it would be the state that is most willing to intervene. Italy has to be considered a deviant case in this configuration. There are also many cases that show a high outcome but that do not hold membership in the solution term. This indicates that for most of the cases an alternative explanation accounts better for the outcome in these cases (Mello, 2014b, p. 117).

**Outcome non-intervention**

The results of the negated outcome of the fsQCA will be interpreted as well, because sufficient combinations that lead to non-intervention cannot automatically be inferred from sufficient combinations that lead to participation. With the intermediate solution two configurations are identified that are sufficient for non-participation in military intervention.

\[(domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)\rightarrow \neg MP\]

Domestic threshold on the use of force, public opinion and national strategic culture combined have a consistency of 0.896480 and a coverage of 0.441837.
Figure 5 shows that 5 of the 18 cases hold membership in the solution term. All these cases are typical cases. There are also some cases that show a high outcome but that do not hold membership in the solution term. However, if domestic threshold on the use of force would be left out of the solution consistency will rise to 0.919 and coverage to 0.577. In an additional XY plot national strategic culture combined with public opinion will be plotted against military participation to see what happens if domestic threshold on the use of force will be left out.

Figure 6 shows that Greece and Poland are now typical cases as well. This means that these states did not intervene even though they were not constrained by domestic threshold on the use of force. This seems to indicate that national strategic culture and public opinion are mainly determining whether states do intervene. Only for some states the effect of these conditions on the outcome are reinforced by domestic thresholds on the use of force.

\[(nsc)\rightarrow\neg(\text{endep})\rightarrow\neg(\text{secint})\rightarrow\neg\text{MP}\]
A passive national strategic culture and the absence security interest combined with the presence of energy dependency have a consistency of 0.889423 and a coverage of 0.377551.

Figure 7 shows 4 of the 18 cases hold membership in the solution term. Of this 4 cases, 2 are typical cases (zone 1). The two others are close to being a deviant case (zone 2). So this solution does not have a strong empirical bases. Theoretically is does not make sense as well. It is hardly imaginable that the presence of energy dependency combined with the absence of security interest could have a constraining effect on decision-makers to intervene.

5.8. Corroboration and falsification of hypotheses: fsQCA

5.8.1. Intervention

Corroborated conditions: national strategic culture, public opinion, energy dependency, security interest

National strategic culture and public opinion combined, proved to be the best explanation for the occurrence of the outcome of intervention. Most of the states that participated in Unified Protector had an active strategic culture and a public opinion that was in favor of the intervention. The connection that is found between national strategic culture and public opinion does not necessarily mean that national strategic culture and public opinion are reinforcing each other's effect on the outcome. It might be that public opinion is only the product or an expression of national strategic culture without having an affecting the willingness to use force separately. In that case public opinion would only be a confounding variable. The way these combinations interact will be researched in the second part of this study.

National strategic culture, energy dependency and security interest were the other conditions that were together sufficient for the outcome to occur. Three states that participated in Unified Protector had, apart from having an active national strategic culture, substantial energy and security interest in Libya. This seems to indicate that energy and security interest in the affected country reinforces the effect of an active national strategic culture on the willingness to use force. However, the
coverage for this configuration was low and Italy proved to be close to being a deviant case. In the second part of this study will be attempted to corroborate (or falsified) these findings.

**Falsified conditions: alliance preference, economic interest**

Alliance preference and economic interest did most likely not play a role in the motives of Western countries to intervene in Libya, because both conditions do nearly not vary among cases. This makes a causal relationship with the outcome implausible because the outcome did vary significantly.

**None: domestic threshold on the use of force**

Domestic threshold on the use of force will more likely be a constrain on intervening than a motive to intervene. It is unlikely that states will intervene because there are no thresholds on the use of force.

**5.8.2. Non-intervention**

**Corroborated conditions: domestic threshold on the use of force, public opinion, national strategic culture**

National strategic culture and public opinion combined, proved to be the best explanation for the outcome of non-intervention. Most of the states that did not participate in Unified Protector had a passive strategic culture and a public opinion that was not in favor of the intervention. Many of them also had high domestic thresholds on the use of force, which might have reinforced the reluctance to use force. Again, in the second part of the study will be researched in what way these conditions are interacting.

**Ambiguous: security interest and energy dependency**

A passive strategic culture and the absence of security interest combined with the presence of energy dependency is a configuration that also leads to non-intervention. This configuration has the lowest coverage of all configurations detected by fsQCA. This means that it only explains why the outcome did occur in a small amount of cases. Thereby, it is very difficult to theoretically make sense of this configuration. It is not very likely that the absence security interest combined with the presence of security interest would have a reinforcing effect on a passive strategic culture. The most probable explanation for this outcome is that this pattern coincidentally occurred in the data.

**5.9. Conclusion**

The most important result of the fsQCA is that national strategic culture predicts very accurately whether a state will (not) intervene. It is also part of every sufficient configuration detected by the fsQCA software. This means that most probably all the other conditions only reinforce the effect already produced by national strategic culture. Even though national strategic culture did not have a sufficiently large consistency rate, it seems to be close to being a necessary condition.

National strategic culture and public opinion combined is the most important configuration that was detected by the fsQCA for the outcome of intervention. However, it is unclear whether this is only because public opinion is part of national strategic culture, or if it is separately increasing the willingness of policy makers to use force because it does increase chances of getting re-elected.
Energy dependency and economic interest on their own are not sufficient reasons for a state to intervene. But the fsQCA software seems to indicate that the presence of these conditions increase the chance that states with an active strategic culture will intervene.

National strategic culture and public opinion combined is the most important configuration that was detected by the fsQCA for the outcome of non-intervention. In addition, the analysis indicated that for some states high domestic thresholds on the use of force reinforces reluctance to intervene.
Chapter 6: Case studies

6.1. Introduction
In the following chapters, the findings of the QCA will be corroborated and updated by conducting a CPT analysis on three cases. Typical cases will be used to corroborate the findings and deviant cases to update the findings. Before the actual analysis, an overview of the CPT method will first be given.

6.2. Overview of Causal Process Tracing

Introduction to CPT
Blatter and Haverland (2012) define case studies with the following four characteristics. A case study has a “small number of cases, a large number of empirical observations per case, a huge diversity of empirical observations for each case, and an intensive reflection on the relationship between concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical concepts” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 19). Different approaches can be taken when one is conducting a case study. Blatter and Haverland (2012) distinguish three types: co-variational analysis, CPT, and congruence analysis. In this study, CPT is chosen because it factors in complex causality (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 27-29).

Causal assumptions
The ontological assumptions of CPT are different than the assumptions underlying Mill’s method (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 79). CPT is based on configurational thinking. It is based on conjunctural causation, equifinality, and causal heterogeneity (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 80; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 306). This makes CPT suitable as a follow-up to QCA. Another assumption about causality that CPT takes into account is that “causality plays out in time and space” (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 81). That means that causality plays out “differently depending on the spatial and temporal setting” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 91). The combination of configurational thinking with temporality makes CPT “especially suited to complement QCA” (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 9).

Combination of QCA and CPT
The combination of QCA with case studies adds inferential value in comparison to the application of one method alone (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013a, p. 588). Post-QCA within-case analysis is aimed at corroborating and/or updating the cross-case model (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 306). Case studies are more effective in unveiling the causal mechanisms that are behind the social phenomena under investigation (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013a, p. 588). CPT is especially suited to complement QCA (Blatter, 2012, p. 3). Blatter (2012) explains with a metaphor why this is so: only CPT is able to transform a list of necessary and sufficient conditions (ingredients) that a QCA study reveals into a full-fledged explanation (recipe) by adding information on when and how the causal conditions (ingredients) have been working together (have to be mixed together) in order to explain (produce) the outcome (meal/cake) (Blatter, 2012, p. 3). Figure 8 shows how QCA and CPT could be combined.
Analytical procedure

Analysis with CPT comprises three activities: the development of a comprehensive storyline, the identification of smoking guns, and the detection of confessions. All three actions can provide empirical evidence for a causal relation between the condition(s) and the outcome. With the comprehensive storyline, observations of the case are ordered in a temporal sequence (Mörner, 2014, p. 15). Causal conditions are closely monitored; and, the goal is to identify turning points. These turning points in conditions are the moments in which the pace or direction of the developments change, affecting the future path of the causal process. If there is a close temporal contiguity between a turning point in a condition and a turning point in the outcome, this might serve as initial important evidence that there is a connection between the condition and the outcome. More evidence is needed to ensure that the identified condition, indeed, caused the outcome. A central piece of evidence that the condition caused the outcome is the previously mentioned smoking gun. In order to find a smoking gun, the period of time over which the turning points happen are more closely examined. Actions, interactions, and consequences, at these critical moments, are analysed to determine if the variable X actually triggered Y. Smoking gun observations do not always reveal the motives of actors. If not, then the only way to discover the real motive is through the confession of the actor. Confessions are “explicit statements of key actors in which they reveal why they acted the way they did” (Blatter & Haverland, 2014, p. 117).
6.3. Case selection

6.3.1. Introduction

Schneider and Wagemann (2012) have developed a post-QCA case selection procedure for choosing cases for within-case analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 306). The aim of case selection procedure is to find typical and deviant cases. Typical cases are cases that are consistent with the results of the fsQCA (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013b, p. 222). Deviant cases are those that are inconsistent with the results of the fsQCA. The goal of within-case analysis of typical cases is to unravel the causal mechanisms that link the condition to the outcome in order to confirm that X did indeed lead to Y (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 308). The purpose of within-case analysis of deviant cases is to identify what condition is missing (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 309). So, in general, the aim of post-QCA CPT is to "corroborate or to update the cross-case model" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 306).

In order to strengthen inferential claims, it is advisable to compare at least two cases with each other. There are three different types of comparative within-case studies: a within-case analysis of two typical cases, a deviant case compared to a typical case, and a deviant case compared to an individually irrelevant case. The first type is aimed at finding causal mechanisms that link X to Y. The second one is targeted at updating the theoretical model. The last one is aimed at identifying a new combination of conditions that led to the outcome (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013, p. 20; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 309).

Typical and deviant cases are detected with the help of an X/Y plot. In the plot, Figure 10, a configuration (X-as) is plotted against the outcome (Y-as). All cases above the main diagonal are consistent with the statement of the combination of conditions being sufficient for the outcome to occur. Not all cases above the diagonal are typical though. Because set relations are expected to be asymmetrical, only the cases in area 1 are typical cases. These cases align with the statement of
sufficiency, providing good empirical examples were the conditions and the outcome actually present (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 307). Cases in area 3 are deviant cases because they contradict the statement of sufficiency of the combinations of conditions for the outcome to occur. Cases will only be selected from configurations that have a high consistency and a high coverage (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013a, p. 273).

6.3.2. Plotting of relevant configurations
Before the actual case selection can be started, it should be defined from which configurations cases will be selected. In principle, all configurations deemed theoretically relevant can be verified with CPT. Due to causal asymmetry, a separate analysis must be made for non-intervention. The combinations of conditions that were sufficient for participation in intervention were as follows: pubop*nsc + nsc*endep*secint →MP. The combinations of conditions that were sufficient for non-intervention were as follows: (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)+ (nsc)*~(endep)*secint) →~MP. Because the last configuration could not be accounted for in the literature, and because of its low consistency and coverage, it will not be included in the CPT analysis.

Typical and deviant cases for military participation

Typical cases for this configuration are Denmark, France, Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom. There are no deviant cases.
Typical cases for this configuration are France and the United Kingdom. Italy is close to being a deviant case.

**Typical and deviant cases for non-intervention**

Figure 12: XY plot case selection \( (\text{domuf})*(\text{pubop})*(\text{nsc}) \rightarrow \sim \text{MP} \)

Typical cases for this configuration are Austria, Slovakia, Finland and Germany. There are no deviant cases for this configuration.

### 6.3.3. Case selection

Because the amount of time and data for this study are limited only three cases are selected. France will be selected as a typical case for the configuration: \( \text{pubop} * \text{nsc} \rightarrow \text{MP} \). There were no deviant cases for this configuration. France will also be selected as a typical case for: \( \text{nsc} * \text{endep} * \text{secint} \rightarrow \text{MP} \). The case that was closest to being a deviant case in this configuration was Italy. Italy scored highest of all the cases in the sample on the conditions of this configuration, but was initially reluctant to participate in the intervention. This case might be useful in updating the theoretical model. Germany will be selected as a typical case for the configuration: \( (\text{domuf}) * (\text{pubop}) * (\text{nsc}) \rightarrow \sim \text{MP} \). There were no deviant cases for this configuration.

### 6.4. Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, it is shown that the combination of QCA and CPT adds inferential value to the findings of the QCA findings. This is mainly because the methodological toolkit of CPT is more suitable in unveiling causal mechanisms, while QCA only measures whether a causal relation is present between a condition and an outcome. In the second part of the chapter, a case selection procedure is introduced that is aimed at selecting cases that are best suited to corroborate and/or update the configurations that are detected by the QCA. With the help of this procedure, the cases of France, Germany, and Italy are selected. Before these cases are analysed, a chronology of the events that led to the Libya intervention will be presented.
Chapter 7: Chronology of events

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, a chronology of events will be presented. The development of the conflict, the humanitarian situation, the actions taken by the international community, the role of oil production, and the refugee flows will be closely monitored. The data that is generated can be used as evidence for the temporal order of the conditions and outcome, as well as provide an introduction to the cases studies.

7.2. Chronology of events

15 February to 27 February (2011)

Development of the conflict

The roots of the uprising in Libya can be found in the Arab Spring protests (Fermor; Hehir & Murray, 2013). The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt especially lifted the veil of fear in Libya (Kuperman, 2013). In mid-February, peaceful protests began, demanding Gadafi to step down (UN, 2011). When the uprising spread to other cities, protesters were met with increasingly heavy force (Pape, 2012). Gadafi used airplanes to attack civilians (The Guardian, 2011). By the end of February, more than a thousand civilians had been killed (Pape, 2012, p. 63). Despite Gadafi’s violence, the opposition forces enjoyed rapid successes (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 838).

Actions taken by the international community

In this phase, the reaction of the international community, in general, was a unanimous condemnation of the use of force that Gadafi was using (Fischer, 2011, p. 32). International organizations, such as the UNSC, the EU, the African Union (AU), the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League, all called for an immediate end to the violence (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 838; Brockmeier, 2013, p. 66; Fischer, 2011, p. 33; Payandeh, 2012, p. 374, 375). Western countries began to call for sanctions against Libya (Watt & Wintour, 2011).

Oil production and refugee flows

Oil production declined very rapidly because most of the oil companies had stopped producing oil (The Guardian, 2011). It was estimated that, by the end of February, production was lowered by 500 thousand barrels per day, meaning a normal production day of 1.65 million barrels had dropped to 1.00 million barrels per day (Krauss, 2011b; Petroleum Economist, 2011; Ycharts, 2011). Oil prices rose quickly, mainly due to Libya’s disruption in oil supply (Krauss, 2011b). On 24 February, prices had risen by 15%, reaching $120 per barrel. Libya accounts for 2% of the world’s oil production and provides approximately 10% of the European oil market (BBC, 2011c). Saudi Arabia said that it was willing to replace the production of Libya (The Economist, 2011a).

27 February

Development of the conflict

At this stage, the expectation of the uprising was that the fall of Gadafi’s regime was imminent (The Guardian, 2011). Opposition forces had conquered the east of the state and captured most of the Western cities, as well (Black, 2011b; The Guardian, 2011). Preparations were made to attack
Tripoli (Chulov, 2011). Despite his weak position, and the request made by the international community to stop the violence, Gadhafi continued to use heavy force against civilians (Fischer, 2011).

**Actions taken by the international community**

France and Britain started to push for more concrete measures against Gadhafi (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 10-12; Fischer, 2011). This resulted in the unanimous adoption of resolution 1970 at the UNSC (26 February). The resolution “referred the situation to the ICC and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze against the Libyan authorities” (Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 5). The UNSC considered if the violence used by Gadhafi could qualify as crimes against humanity, which would trigger the applicability of R2P (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 12; Berman & Michaelson, 2012, p. 350). The whole international community agreed on measures taken against Gadhafi so far; probably because the resolution was backed by regional organizations and did not include more coercive measures (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 12; Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 840). Russia declared that it was not prepared to endorse more coercive measures, and it was widely thought that China shared this view (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 840).

**28 February to 6 March**

**Development of the conflict**

At the end of February, the advances of the opposition forces came to a halt. It became clear that Tripoli remained firmly in Gadhafi’s hands. In the meantime, Gadhafi was recruiting mercenaries from other states in Africa; and expectations of a counterattack rose. Media reported that the conflict was slowly approaching a stalemate (BMI, 2011a; Chulov, Beaumont, & Doward, 2011; MacAskill, Beaumont, & Watt, 2011; Tisdall, 2011a; Wintour, 2011). In this period, the opposition forces were shaped into one unified movement, with a head council called the National Transitional Council (NTC). On 5 March, the NTC announced that it considered itself the only legitimate power in Libya (Fischer, 2011, p. 41). Despite the pressure that was put on Gadhafi, the humanitarian situation worsened. Estimates by the World Health Organization (WHO) were that on 3 March, the death toll had risen to more than 2000 people (Pape, 2012).

**Actions taken by the international community**

This number evoked discussion in the international community on further actions against Gadhafi (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 67). On 1 March, Western countries had talks about the possible imposition of a no-fly zone (Broder, 2011). The United Kingdom was considering a plan to arm the opposition forces and had already ordered its military commanders to begin planning for the no-fly zone on 28 February (London Evening Standard, 2011; Mulholland, 2011; Tisdall, 2011c). The US was not very enthusiastic about Cameron’s proposal because they thought an intervention could be counterproductive (MacAskill & Borger, 2011). On 6 March, the US held the position that it would only vote in favour of a no-fly zone if it would be backed by a significant part of the international community, and by Arab states in particular (Agence France Presse). China and Russia remained sceptical about a no-fly zone (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 840; London Evening Standard, 2011; Mulholland, 2011). In the meantime, international organizations and individual states implemented
the sanctions agreed upon in Resolution 1970. The UN General Assembly suspended Libya's membership of the Human Rights Council (UN, 2011).

**Oil production and refugee flows**

In the last days of February, the amount of people that fled Libya, into the neighbouring states of Tunisia and Egypt, rose quickly (Cowell & Meyers, 2011). On 1 March, around 140,000 had fled Libya (Borger, 2011b; UN, 2011). On 2 March, the amount of people that had reached the borders had risen to 180,000 people (Batty & Owen, 2011b). And by 9 March, 225,000 people had fled Libya (Pape, 2012, p. 64). On 3 March, Libya's oil production was lowered to somewhere between one third to one half of normal production, but the price had dropped to $116 a barrel, mainly due to the promise of Saudi Arabia to replace Libya's oil production (IEA, 2011d, p. 20; The Economist, 2011a). The IEA helped to defuse tensions in the market by saying that the world had "the tools at hand to deliver adequate oil to the market" (Krauss & Mouawad, 2011).

**7 March to 16 March**

**Development of the conflict**

On 7 March, Gadhafi commenced a massive counteroffensive (Kuperman, 2013), raising concerns that Gadhafi would secure power in Libya (Clark & Maynard, 2011; McGreal, 2011d; Tisdall, 2011d; Tisdall, Wintour, & Norton-Taylor, 2011). On 10 March, the US national intelligence director informed the US Senate that Gadhafi would prevail due to his superior military equipment (BBC, 2011b). By 10 March, Gadhafi had regained a firm grip on West-Libya (Neely, 2011). He then started to reconquer, one by one, key coastal towns (Adams; Tisdall, 2011d). On 13 March, Gadhafi's forces were fighting in Ajdabiya, the last town before Benghazi (McGreal, 2011a; McGreal & Tisdall, 2011). The prospect was that he would soon move towards Benghazi, the last stronghold of the opposition forces (McGreal, 2011c; McGreal & Tisdall, 2011). The only town held by the opposition forces in the West, Misrata, was doomed because they had no access to supplies (Kuperman, 2013, p. 117). On 16 March, Gadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, declared: “Everything will be over in 48 hours” (Kuperman, 2013, p. 117; Tran & Siddique, 2011).

During this period, the violence used by Gadhafi escalated (Hollinger & Spiegel, 2011; Quinn, 2011). He used tanks, artillery, and airstrikes to crush the opposition forces (McGreal, 2011d). The humanitarian situation was quickly deteriorating. The biggest concern was what would happen if Gadhafi would retake Benghazi. When Gadhafi’s forces approached Benghazi, he vowed “to show no mercy” (Pape, 2012, p. 64). Expectations were that Gadhafi would commit a massacre there (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 840). Numerous “independent observers from policy institutions and the media predicted a bloodbath of major proportions” (Pape, 2012, p. 64). Therefore, the opposition forces called upon the international community to assist them by establishing a no-fly zone (McGreal, 2011b, 2011d, 2011e).

**Action taken by the international community**

France and the United Kingdom began to draft a resolution at the UN calling for a no-fly zone (Tisdall et al., 2011). However, at the NATO meeting on 10 March, a no-fly zone did not gain the support of the majority of the NATO members (MacAskill & Traynor, 2011). At the European Council meeting on 11 March, France and the United Kingdom failed to win support for a no-fly zone from
their European counterparts as well (Traynor & Watt, 2011). The crucial turning point was when regional organizations joined the call for a no-fly zone. On 7 March, the Gulf Cooperation Council asked the UNSC to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 841). On 8 March, the Organization of the Islamic Conference joined the Gulf cooperation in its call for a no-fly zone. The request to the UNSC to approve a no-fly zone submitted by the Arab League especially proved to be a game-changer (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 841).

Members of the UNSC, who initially were openly sceptical about the establishment of a no-fly zone, began to consider it as a serious option because with the request of the Arab League would give the operation regional legitimation (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 12; Bellamy, 2011, p. 266; Berman & Michaelsen, 2012; Black, MacAskill, & Watt, 2011; Borger, 2011c; Kinsman, 2011, p. 85) (Engelbrekt et al., 2013, p. 6). The US only changed its position when they were assured that the Arab League was serious about a no-fly zone. Secretary of State Clinton had a meeting with the Arab leaders in Paris and Cairo on 14 and 15 March. After the meeting, she contacted Obama to inform him that the Arabs were serious about backing the idea of a no-fly zone (Brockmeier, 2013; Cooper & Myers, 2011). In a subsequent meeting with the US National Security Council at the White House, Obama instructed Susan Rice, ambassador of the US to the UN, to negotiate a resolution that would authorize a no-fly zone and, in addition, to "lean forward" on a resolution that would authorize NATO to strike targets on the ground and take "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians (Hastings, 2011). Senior advisors of Obama thought that a no-fly zone, alone, would not be sufficient to protect civilians from the massacre that was feared (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 70). Due to the call of the Arab League, Russia and China changed their positions as well. Otherwise, they would have certainly vetoed resolution 1973 (Bellamy, 2011, p. 266; Borger, 2011a; Kinsman, 2011, p. 85).

**Oil production and refugee flows**

On 11 March, oil production came to a halt (El-Tablawy, 2011). Oil prices had been declining, and reached $99 per barrel again by 15 March (El-Tablawy, 2011). The number of refugees had risen to 320,000 by March 20 (Pape, 2012).

**17 March**

*Development of the conflict*

On 17 March, Gadhafi was converging on Benghazi (MacAskill, Watt, Black, Pilkington, & Harding, 2011). Gadhafi declared: “There will be no mercy. Our troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight” (MacAskill, Watt, et al., 2011).

*Actions taken by the international community*

Meanwhile, negotiations intensified in New York where the UNSC would vote on resolution 1973 that same day. The resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire, authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone, and mandated “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. In the resolution, the no-fly zone was justified with a reference to the responsibility to protect civilians (Brozus, 2012, p. 61; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012, p. 2; Payandeh, 2012, p. 378). Later that day, the resolution was passed with ten votes for the resolution and five abstentions: China, Russia, Germany, Brazil, and India (Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 5). Russia, China, India, and Brazil probably abstained because they
tended to see the intervention as an infringement on national sovereignty (Borger, 2011a). Germany abstained because it was sceptical about the use of military force as a solution of the conflict (Borger, 2011a).

19 March to 21 October
Development of the conflict
Following the adoption of the resolution, the Libyan government declared a ceasefire. The ceasefire was almost immediately violated when Gadhafi’s forces attacked Benghazi.

Actions taken by the international community
On 19 March, a coalition of Western countries intervened in Libya; they started by destroying air defence systems and flying air strikes against military units threatening Benghazi (Payandeh, 2012, p. 379). Initially, the military action was led by the US, France, and the UK; but, the operation was handed over to NATO on 24 March (Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 5). The initial goal of operation Unified Protector was to protect civilians; but when it became clear that the opposition forces were not able to overthrow the Gadhafi government, the aim of the intervention became regime change (Engelbrekt et al., 2013, p. 23; Hehir & Murray, 2013). Air fighters began to attack retreating Libyan forces, and France secretly started to provide the opposition forces with weapons (Kuperman, 2013, p. 114). On 15 April, the US, France, and the UK openly declared they were willing to actively contribute to regime change. In a joint letter from Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy, they stated that “it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power” and that it is “unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government” (Payandeh, 2012, p. 382). China, Russia, and South-Africa publicly criticized NATO for overstepping its mandate. With the help of NATO, the opposition forces were able to defeat Gadhafi. On 31 October, operation Unified Protector ended; and NTC replaced the Gadhafi government (Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 5, 6).

7.3. Conclusion
In the development of the conflict three stages can be distinguished. Until 27 February, the expectation was that Gadhafi would be defeated soon. From 28 February to 6 March, a stalemate began to emerge; although, the expectations of a counterattack by Gadhafi rose. This counteroffensive was commenced on 7 March; and it soon became clear that if the opposition forces were not assisted, they would be crushed by Gadhafi’s forces. The intervention by France, the United Kingdom, and the US, authorized by the UN on 17 March, prevented Gadhafi from reconquering Benghazi. During the subsequent weeks, a stalemate emerged again. Only when NATO started to actively support the opposition forces in defeating Gadhafi’s military, would the opposition forces gain control, securing a win in October 2011. A crucial turning point proved to be the moment that the Arab League called for a no-fly zone, which provided that much needed legitimacy to the operation in Libya.
Chapter 7: Case study (France)

7.1. Introduction
In this chapter, a CPT analysis will be conducted for the case of France. France is a typical case for the configurations: pubop*nsc →MP and nsc*endep*secint →MP. A typical case scores high on both the conditions and the outcome of the configuration. This means typical cases are good examples of the configuration. The goal of conducting a CPT analysis on a typical case is to corroborate the causal connection that is found by the QCA software. This is done by unravelling the causal mechanisms that link the conditions to the outcome. If the process that led from the conditions to the outcome can be traced, this would improve the plausibility of the causal connection detected in the QCA. The hypothesis for this case study is that France intervened in Libya because of its national strategic culture, public opinion, energy dependency, and security interest.

In the first paragraph, a comprehensive storyline will be presented. The main focus of this comprehensive storyline is to identify the moment when France decided to intervene in Libya. If this moment is detected, it can be researched as to whether there is close temporal contiguity between the moment that the condition occurred and the moment that France decided to intervene. After the construction of the comprehensive storyline, a smoking gun observation will be sought for each condition that contributed to the outcome. Evidence for the connection between the conditions and the outcome will be complemented by confessions of key actors when they are available.

7.2. Comprehensive storyline
On 21 March, France made the first announcement regarding the uprising in Libya. It condemned the use of force and demanded political dialogue (Fischer, 2011, p. 37). On 23 February, Sarkozy announced that France would work towards EU sanctions (Davidson, 2013, p. 317). By this time, Sarkozy also suggested the imposition of the no-fly zone (Dreyfuss, 2011; Watt & Wintour, 2011). On 24 February, Sarkozy called Obama to discuss the need for sanctions against Gadghafi (Fischer, 2011, p. 38). On 25 February, Araud, the Permanent Representative of France to the UN, said that military action, at that time, was not an option, but that the UNSC was aiming to apply sanctions against Gadghafi, establish an arms embargo, and refer Gadghafi to the International Criminal Court (Fischer, 2011, p. 38). On 25 February, Sarkozy said in a press conference on the G8 in Turkey, that Gadghafi “must go... the violence toward the people is unacceptable and should be punished” (Fischer, 2011, p. 39). On February 27, Sarkozy said that the historic movement toward democracy in Libya should be supported. On the same day, Bernard-Henry Lévy (BHL), the French philosopher born in Algeria with a long public history in conflict states, offered to arrange a meeting between the representatives of the NTC and Sarkozy, to which Sarkozy agreed (Fischer, 2011, p. 40). On 1 March, a spokesman of the government said the establishment of a no-fly zone was not a priority (Smith, 2011, p. 2). On the same day, Juppé said that a no-fly zone could only be considered with a clear mandate from the UNSC, and that it could be counterproductive because he did not know the positions of the Arab States (Lachevre & Laserre, 2011). On 2 March, Juppé, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed scepticism towards military intervention in the Libyan crisis because it could provoke a negative reaction in the Arab world; but the next day, Juppé announced France’s support for NATO’s plan of a no-fly zone (Davidson, 2013, p. 318). On 3 March, Cameron and Juppé held a shared press conference after a lunch meeting. They said that they would make bold
proposals for the EU summit on Libya that would take place on 11 March. In addition, they announced that they agreed on planning a no-fly zone if Gadhafi would not put an end to the violence (Agence France Presse). On 4 March, the French government started to issue stronger statements in favour of military action (Smith, 2011, p. 2). On 5 March, BHL managed to contact Abdul-Jalil. Without consulting Sarkozy, BHL said that he would be willing to arrange a meeting with Sarkozy as a first step towards recognition of the NTC. When Levy called Sarkozy after the meeting with Abdul-Jalil, the French president agreed to meet the NTC in Paris (Von Rohr, 2011). However, Abdul-Jalil demanded full diplomatic recognition before sending anyone to Paris. France agreed; and later that day in a press release, France greeted the formation of NTC as the only legitimate power in Libya (ibid., 2011). On 6 March, Juppé said that a military intervention was only conceivable with Arab League and AU participation (Davidson, 2013, p. 318). On the same day, Juppé had a meeting with the secretary-general of the Arab League which convinced him that the Arab League supported the idea of a no-fly zone (Agence France Presse). On 7 March, the Gulf Cooperation Council called on the UNSC for a no-fly zone. On the same day, France, together with the United Kingdom, began drafting a resolution mandating the enforcement of a no-fly zone (Tisdall et al., 2011). On 9 March, Juppé repeated that it was not France's desire to conduct military action unless the UN mandated it, and the AU and Arab League supported it (Fischer, 2011, p. 43, 44). On 10 March, France recognized the NTC as the only legitimate power in Libya (Davidson, 2013, p. 318). On 14 March, France sent, together with the United Kingdom and Lebanon, a draft resolution to the UNSC proposing to implement a no-fly zone (Fischer, 2011, p. 46). The UNSC voted on 17 March in favour of the implementation of a no-fly zone. France had played an active role in the preparation and passage of the resolution (Davidson, 2013, p. 318; Fischer, 2011, p. 47). On 19 March, France launched the first airstrikes against Gadhafi's forces near Benghazi (ibid., 2011, p. 49).

7.3. Conditions that explain the outcome of France intervention

7.3.1. Norms: humanitarian norms and national strategic culture

The most important condition that was detected by the QCA was national strategic culture. Based on theory, it would be expected that France wanted to intervene because it did see military force as a suitable tool to stop the violations of humanitarian norms. The aim of this section is to find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that France's primary motive for intervention was due to humanitarian norms.

The first indicator that France did intervene with humanitarian objectives is that they justified all measures taken against Gadhafi by referring to the humanitarian crisis in Libya—in particular the participation in operation Unified Protector (Fischer, 2011, p. 56). However, these justifications should not be blindly accepted. In the following paragraphs, the reliability of these justifications will be assessed (Blatter, 2012, p. 21).
The first argument, that humanitarian reasons were indeed the motivation for French participation in the intervention, is that France began to call for an intervention when the position of the humanitarian situation was worsening. France commenced this call on approximately 4 March. Davidson (2013) correctly observes that this is well in advance of the threat of a massacre in Benghazi. This does not mean, as Davidson (2013) argues, that humanitarian concerns did not play an important role in France’s call for a no-fly zone. It should considered that the international community, from the beginning of March, began to realize that Gadhafi would not step down in the near future, and the conflict could end up in a “bloody stalemate” (Buel, 2011). Gadhafi started to use airstrikes against areas occupied by the opposition forces. He started mobilizing his forces for a counteroffensive; and, it was feared that he would use his aircraft to crush the opposition forces (BMI, 2011b; Cordon, 2011; Goodspeed, 2011; The Badger Herald, 2011; Watt, 2011). Therefore, the general feeling, by this time, was that the situation could worsen very quickly; and, the call for a no-fly zone was motivated by the intention to prevent extreme violence by Gadhafi. This is a strong indication that the call for a no-fly zone was a reaction by France to the imminent threat of extreme violence by Gadhafi.

Another argument that the intervention at this time was justifiable on humanitarian grounds is that the Arab League, on 6 March, indicated it would support a no-fly zone (before the major counteroffensive of Gadhafi on 7 March). The Gulf Cooperation Council called for a no-fly zone on 7 March, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference called for a no-fly zone on 8 March. That Arab nations requested involvement of Western countries in the Arab world was unprecedented and could only be explained if there was really the need for an establishment of a no-fly zone, because Western interference in the Arab region is extremely sensitive.

The last argument supporting that the intervention was motivated by humanitarian objectives is that, initially, the operation was only aimed at protecting civilians against the violence of Gadhafi. It only attacked Libyan forces that were approaching Benghazi to prevent a bloodbath from occurring (Engelbrekt et al., 2013, p. xvi; Kuperman, 2013, p. 113; Pattison, 2011, p. 272). It was not until the middle of April that NATO changed the intervention’s primary aim to that of regime change.

### 7.3.2. Public opinion

The second most important condition detected by the QCA was public opinion. Together with national strategic culture, it constituted a configuration with a high consistency and coverage. Based on theory, two possible explanations can be given. The first is that, in a way, public opinion constitutes national strategic culture and does not influence the outcome on its own. The second explanation is that, even though public opinion is an important part of national strategic culture, it also has an impact of its own on the outcome. The causal mechanism behind the latter would be that key decision-makers want to get re-elected and, therefore, act in accordance with the public opinion to please the electorate. The aim of this section is to find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that public opinion has a reinforcing effect of national strategic culture on outcome.

A strong argument that Sarkozy’s motivation of re-election was the reason for pushing the intervention is that he was very unpopular by that time and had reason to think that an intervention could increase his chances for a win in the upcoming presidential elections. On 3 March 2011, only 21% of the French voters intended to vote for Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential elections (Erichsen
& Lecomte, 2013, p. 12). An opinion poll at 19 March, showed that 58% of the French citizens supported an intervention (Nyiri, 2011). It is likely that this is seen as a tempting opportunity for an unpopular president facing re-election. In the media and scholarly literature, the conviction was widely held that Sarkozy was driven by electoral purposes (Ash, 2011; Dickey, 2011; Economist, 2011; Erichsen & Lecomte, 2013, p. 12; Fabbrini, 2014, p. 185; Financial Times, 2011; Forbes, 2011; Kinsman, 2011, p. 85; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 21).

However, there are also reasons to believe that Sarkozy was not solely driven by re-election desires. First, the political gains were uncertain. The war could have developed in a way unforeseen and become very unpopular. Second, it is unsure if Sarkozy’s intervention would matter in people’s consideration to vote for him. It might have been, as a journalist put it: “The French did not ask him (Sarkozy: G.O.) to free Libya. They asked for jobs for their kids” (Hollinger, 2011). The last argument against Sarkozy’s motives being only politically self-serving was that he was not distinguishing himself from the opposition with his stance towards Libya, because they also strongly supported military intervention in Libya (Davidson, 2013, p. 320).

The first reason is not very plausible because NATO had explicitly ruled out boots on the ground from the beginning of the conflict (Ackerman, 2011). Thereby, the intervention was so popular that Sarkozy might have taken the risk. According to liberalist scholars, governments that score very bad in the opinion polls “are prepared to risk a war” because “the government expects to be replaced anyway” (Smith, 1996, p. 134). With regards to the second reason, the French people actually did want Sarkozy to free Libya as reflected in the opinion polls. There might be some truth in saying that a lot of voters are less concerned with foreign policy than with domestic issues, which affect them more directly. However, this does not disprove that Sarkozy did intervene to get re-elected. It is “commonly asserted that state leaders, when faced with poor domestic political conditions, have an incentive to engage in divisionary foreign policy behaviour” (Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach, & Young, 1993). If the “foreign policy event overshadows domestic problems, then the government avoids being removed from power” (Smith, 1996, p. 134). The last reason simply does not seem logical. Even though Sarkozy might not have distinguished himself from the opposition by intervening, he would be the one that could claim to have intervened to protect the Libyan people.

7.3.3. Security interest
Other conditions detected by the QCA for France were security interest and energy dependency. Together with national strategic culture, security interest and energy dependency constituted a configuration with a high consistency and a relatively high coverage. Based on the realist theory, it would be expected that France wanted to intervene because they needed to safeguard their security interest and energy imports. The aim of the following two sections is to find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that security interest and energy dependency were among the motives for France to intervene in Libya.

Refugee flows were perceived to be the largest security threat of the Libyan crisis. France had a warranted fear for massive refugee flows as well. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, thousands of people had fled the unrest in their states. Most of them escaped to neighbouring states, but many of them migrated to Europe as well. In the first months of 2011, thousands of refugees landed on Lampedusa, mainly (French-speaking) Tunisians. By the beginning of March, approximately 10,000
Tunisians had landed on Lampedusa (Lombardi, 2011, p. 40). When the Libyan conflict started, the amount of refugees in the region grew exponentially. The instability in Libya and Tunisia, which was exacerbated by these refugee flows, made it impossible for the governments to prevent people from crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Estimates were that somewhere between 300,000 to 2.5 million Africans would come to Europe (Novinite, 2011). France was concerned that these developments would lead to a huge inflow of refugees (Blanchard, 2011; Davidson, 2013, p. 316; English People Daily, 2011). They expressed their anxiety in several public statements.

In a press conference on 25 February after a G20 meeting, Sarkozy “expressed his concerns about the destabilizing effects of the ‘massive flight’ of foreigners in Libya towards the Tunisian and Egyptian borders” (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). On the same day, Fillon said that they had to work to create stability in Libya as a response to the refugee flows (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). On 27 February, Sarkozy said on television that if the situation in Libya would deteriorate, this could result in “flows of uncontrollable migration and terrorism” (Daily, 2011; Fischer, 2011, p. 40). On 2 March, the European Affairs minister, Laurent Wauquiez, warned that up to 300,000 illegal immigrants could enter the EU due to the Arab Spring; and, he said that the influx of immigrants from Libya is a “real risk for Europe that must not be underestimated” (Kern, 2011). On 11 March, Sarkozy stated that 200,000 people had fled Libya, and then asked the rhetorical question: “What would be the temptation of these displaced persons? They would not have a choice: it would be to cross the Mediterranean…” [and] “…because we are geographical neighbours … we are, therefore, among the first impacted and affected” (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). These statements prove that refugee flows produced by the conflict in Libya were considered a security threat by France. However, for several reasons, it is not very likely that this was the reason for France to intervene in Libya.

First, ousting Gadhafi was not something that would improve the security of France. The status quo in Libya was quite satisfactory for France. In the years preceding the Arab Spring, Gadhafi had stopped financing terrorism, suppressed terrorist groups in his own state, and controlled the outflow of irregular immigrants (Pack, 2011). From a security perspective, the best strategy for France would have been to help Gadhafi restore order in Libya (Davidson, 2013, p. 316; Grünwald, p. 21). It is, therefore, unlikely that security interest was the main motive for France’s intervention into Libya.

Second, if security interest was the main reason for France’s intervention, it would have been more likely to push for an intervention when the number of refugees started to increase rapidly, which was at the end of February.

It is possible that security interest might have played a role later in the conflict. After 17 March, when the UN approved the establishment of a no-fly zone, it was extremely unlikely, if Gadhafi remained in power, that there would be a return to “business-as-usual.” Diplomatic relations had worsened, and expectations were that Libya would return to its “rogue-state glory days” with Gadhafi still in power (Datta, 2014, p. 386; Pack, 2011). He might use refugees as weapons to take revenge on the Western countries, as he had threatened to do earlier (Kern, 2011; Squires, 2011). The alternative, the NTC, was more desirable. France did believe that the Arab Spring could lead to a more democratic North-Africa. When BHL called Sarkozy on 5 March, he said: “These people hold the same values as we do” (Keating, 2011). The prospect of a democratic Libya with the ouster of
Gadhafi became strategically interesting. So, it might have played a role in France, but only later in the conflict.

7.3.4. Energy dependency

In 2011, Libya produced 2% of the world’s total oil. It provided approximately 10% of the European Market with oil. At the beginning of March, Libyan oil production came to a halt. Saudi Arabia had said that it was willing to replace Libyan oil, but Libyan oil was difficult to replace (Leonard, 2011). According to Armand Hammer, the late founder of Occidental Petroleum, Libya’s oil is even irreplaceable (Pack, 2011). Libya is very close to Europe. The oil is easy to extract; and the sweetness of its crude makes it very popular in Europe. Because many refineries were built to process Libyan crude, and not the heavier Saudi crude, it must have been very inconvenient for oil importing states, such as France, who imported 15.7% of its oil from Libya. Another inconvenience was that, due to Arab Spring and particularly unrest in Libya, the oil prices had risen quickly which affected economic growth negatively (Leonard, 2011).

This situation was, for some journalists and scholars, the reason to claim that Western countries, including France, were intervening to restore access to Libya’s oil reserves and to restore order to the world energy markets, or to gain access to the Libyan oilfields (Datta, 2014, p. 386; Erichsen & Lecomte, 2013, p. 22; Fermor, , p. 341; Leonard, 2011). Because political leaders would never admit this to be a reason for an intervention, it is difficult to discover if this claim is true. But, because huge interests are involved, there is no doubt that this issue was in the back of Sarkozy’s mind when trying to resolve the Libyan crisis (Davis, 2011, p. 2).

The idea was obviously false that oil interests were the sole reason for France to intervene. As many authors rightly indicate, Western countries—including France—already had a great share in exploiting Libyan oil (Chomsky, 2011; De la Brethonière, 2013, p. 66); so, the idea that Western countries used human norms as a pretext to access to Libya’s oil cannot be true. The idea that a military intervention was the best way to restore order in the world’s energy market might actually contain some truth; but, it was certainly not the best way to approach it at the conflict’s start. The quickest way to restore order in the beginning of March was not interference, but instead, to allow Gadhafi to continue crushing the opposition forces (Davidson, 2013, p. 319; Davis, 2011, p. 2; Homan, 2011, p. 6; Lévy, 2011; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 23). Later in the conflict, when relations between France and Libya had worsened, France might have feared that Gadafi would stop exporting oil to France and give oil contracts to other states, as he threatened to do on 18 March. From that moment, it would have made sense for France to intervene to secure oil supply (Russia Today, 2011b).

7.3.5. Alternative explanations

As an alternative to the previous explanation of why France did participate in the Libyan intervention, some argue that it was about regime change. Humanitarian concerns were a pretext to get into Libya and overthrow the Gadhafi regime (De la Brethonière, 2013, p. 62; Hughes, 2011). This argument has a lot of overlap with the realist explanation that France did intervene to safeguard its security interest and energy import.
Regime change has received a negative connotation in the past because it is often used as a tool to advance the strategic, economic, or ideological agenda of a regime changer, while pretending to intervene for the sake of suffering people (Payandeh, 2012, p. 357). According to some, France, the United Kingdom, and the US saw the situation in Libya as an opportunity to overthrow the Gadhafi government and install a regime with whom it was easier to do business (Fermor, , p. 341). There are several arguments that regime change could not have been the aim of the intervention, from start to finish.

First, the Gadhafi regime had given France, and other Western countries, everything they wanted from a security and economic perspective. Western oil companies had a great share in exploiting Libya's oil. Terrorist groups were suppressed; and, Gadhafi was actively preventing migrants from going to Europe (De la Brethonière, 2013, p. 62). It would, therefore, have been in France's best interest to maintain the status quo, rather than to push for regime change (Davidson, 2013, p. 319; Davis, 2011, p. 12; De la Brethonière, 2013, p. 62; Homan, 2011, p. 6; Lévy, 2011; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 23).

Second, there are strong arguments to support that the intervention started for humanitarian objectives. France only began to consider an intervention seriously when the humanitarian situation of the opposition forces got worse. When the intervention started, it was initially only aimed at protecting civilians. If “regime change was the primary objective initially, the coalition would have bombed Qaddafi’s troops wherever they were likely to be found, with less regard for civilian casualties” (Pattison, 2011, p. 273). Only when Gadhafi continued to be a major threat to Libyan civilians, and when it appeared that opposition forces were not able to topple the Gadhafi regime, did NATO change the operation’s goal to that of regime change (Maessen, 2012, p. 35).

The last indication that France, and the other intervening states, did not see the humanitarian crisis as just an opportunity to get rid of Gadhafi, is because they explicitly ruled out that regime change was the aim of the intervention. Even though France, the United Kingdom, and the US had stated that Gadhafi had to go, Obama explicitly said that regime change was not the goal of the operation (Etzioni, 2012, p. 49). Sarkozy said that the only goal of the intervention was to protect civilians against Gadhafi, and he pledged to ensure compliance with all of the requirements of resolution 1973 (Payne, 2011).

Later in the conflict, it became increasingly beneficial for France if Gadhafi were to go, because it became obvious that, if Gadhafi remained in power, it would be impossible to do business with him since he felt “betrayed” by Western countries.

7.4. Conclusion

The best explanation for the motives of France to intervene were humanitarian norms. First, because France called for an intervention when the humanitarian situation was precarious, their claim to a humanitarian objective becomes more credible. Another indication is that the operation was clearly meant to protect civilians.

The results are inconclusive as to whether the condition of public opinion reinforced Sarkozy's willingness to use force. However, it is evident that the high public support provided an electoral
incentive for Sarkozy to push even harder for the intervention. The widely held claim that Sarkozy was partly acting to get re-elected is, therefore, not baseless.

Less evidence is found for security interest and energy dependency as reasons for France to intervene. If France was acting out of self-interest in the Libyan conflict, the most logical choice would have been to avoid the conflict and let Gadhafi defeat the opposition forces. Order would be restored, and oil production could restart. It might have played a role later in the conflict when, strategically, it became increasingly less attractive for Gadhafi to stay in power.

The alternative explanation of regime change suggested in the literature and media did not prove to be convincing. There was no reason for France to want regime change. Only later in the conflict does regime change became more attractive.
Chapter 9: Case study (Germany)

9.1. Introduction
In this chapter, a CPT analysis will be conducted for the case of Germany. Germany is a typical case for the configuration: (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)→~MP. As with the case of France, the aim of this CPT analysis on a typical case is to corroborate the causal connection that is found by the QCA software. The causal connection that is discovered with the QCA software is the combination of high domestic thresholds on the use of force, low public opinion, and a passive national strategic culture, leading to the outcome of non-intervention. The hypothesis for this case study is, therefore, that Germany did not intervene because of national strategic culture, public opinion, and domestic thresholds on the use of force.

In the first section, a comprehensive storyline will be presented. Following, smoking gun observations will be sought to prove that the conditions found by the QCA software indeed led to the outcome. Evidence for the connection between the conditions and the outcome will be complemented by confessions of key actors when they are available.

9.2. Comprehensive storyline
When Gadhafi began to suppress the protest that started in mid-February, Germany instantly condemned the use of force against civilians. On 23 February, Westerwelle agreed with Sarkozy that sanctions would be inevitable if the violence continued (Watt & Wintour, 2011). On 22 February, Gadhafi gave a speech in which he pledged to “cleanse Libya” so that “the country is purified from the unclean” (Spencer, 2011). Westerwelle said that he found the speech “very frightening,” and he called for clearer language from other European countries (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 24). On 26 February, Germany voted for resolution 1970. Wittig, the German Permanent Representative to the UN, said the resolution was historic and welcomed “the council’s swift, decisive, united, and strong message” (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 13). Diplomats at the UN described German participation in the drafting and passing of resolution 1970 as “supportive,” and even “pushy” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 66). Germany’s UN mission was especially supportive for the sanctions part of the resolution (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 67). When the international community started to talk about a no-fly zone in the first week of March, Germany became less supportive. On 28 February, Westerwelle said in a radio interview that he did not exclude a no-fly zone; but, on 3 March, Germany publicly opposed foreign intervention (Batty & Owen, 2011a; Brockmeier, 2012, p. 15). Westerwelle suggested an alternative approach. He said that a no-fly zone would be only legitimate with both a mandate of the UNSC and the approval of the states in the region (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 15). When the Arab League called for a no-fly zone, Germany suddenly had an additional requirement. They “now requested the active participation of Arab states in the implementation of any UNSC resolution” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 67). On 10 March, he reiterated that Germany’s position was that it was opposed to military intervention (MacAskill & Traynor, 2011). On 11 March, Angela Merkel, together with other states, blocked the proposal for a no-fly zone by France and the United Kingdom in the extraordinary EU council meeting on Libya (Tisdall, 2011b). On 16 March, Westerwelle spoke in the Bundestag and again expressed his scepticism about a no-fly zone (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 67). Until then, Germany assumed that the US was also against a no-fly zone; and only after Westerwelle’s speech did Germany receive the news that the US had changed its position (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 73). According
to Brockmeier (2013), Westerwelle might have been less sceptical in his speech towards the Bundestag if he had known about the changed position of the US. That would have allowed him greater flexibility in changing Germany’s position (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 72). On 17 March, Westerwelle reaffirmed in a radio interview that he opposed German participation in a military intervention (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 76). Later that day, Germany abstained from voting for resolution 1973 (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 25).

9.3. Conditions that explain the outcome of Germany’s non-intervention

9.3.1. Norms: national strategic culture
The most important condition that was detected by the QCA was national strategic culture. Based on the constructivist theory, it would be expected that, even though Germany did care about human rights violations, it did not see the use of force as a suitable tool to solve the crisis. The aim of this section is to find empirical evidence that Germany’s main reason for non-intervention was its national strategic culture.

Most scholars and journalists seem to agree that Germany’s pacifist strategic culture best explains why it did not participate in Unified Protector. The argument goes that the baggage of two world wars “has made Germany conscious of its sensitive position in the international system” (Bucher et al., 2013, p. 528). Therefore, Germany is reluctant to use force and follows a non-militaristic approach in foreign policy. It puts emphasis on non-military foreign policy tools when faced with a crisis (Bucher et al., 2013, p. 528). According to Herf (2011), the government that was in power at the time of the Libyan crisis, was “steeped in this intellectual consensus” (Herf, 2011). Most of the scholars and journalists that have attempted to interpret Germany’s abstention on resolution 1973, point to Germany’s reluctance to use force (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 25; Erichsen & Lecomte, 2013, p. 15; Lehne, 2012, p. 22; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 30; Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 95; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 15)

A strong indication that Germany's non-participation can be explained by its national strategic culture is that it has repeatedly and publicly expressed its scepticism towards the use of force. Already on 3 March, Germany expressed that it was against foreign military intervention (Batty & Owen, 2011a). On 10 March, Westerwelle said: “One thing for the German government is absolutely clear: we do not want to get sucked into a war in North Africa. So we have to decide wisely and carefully that we do not get the opposite of what we want—peace and freedom” (MacAskill & Traynor, 2011). At the EU summit on 11 March, Merkel said: “What is our plan if we create a no-fly zone and it doesn't work? Do we send in ground troops?” and “We have to think this through. Why should we intervene in Libya when we don't intervene elsewhere?” (Tisdall, 2011b). On the G8 top on 15 March, Westerwelle said his state had remained very sceptical about the prospect of a no-fly zone. He recommended the use of more political pressure—instead of intervention (Tisdall, 2011b). On 17 March, Westerwelle reiterated in an interview for the Guardian that Germany was strongly opposed to any military intervention in Libya. He warned of the consequences of intervention and, instead, pointed again to non-military alternatives, such as sanctions, political pressure, and international isolation (MacAskill, Watt, et al., 2011). Wittig, Germany’s UN ambassador, declared on 17 March, that Germany saw great risks in using military force because it could turn out to be ineffective, which could result in the large-scale loss of life and the danger of being drawn into a
protracted military conflict (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 392). Later, Westerwelle justified the abstention on resolution 1973 by saying that "there can only be a political solution in Libya" and "we cannot threaten military action against every state in North Africa where there is injustice" (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397). A common thread in these justifications is strong scepticism towards the use of force and the presentation of non-military measures as an alternative (Brozus, 2012, p. 62; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397). German decision-makers acted perfectly consistent with their national strategic culture (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, p. 9).

There are strong reasons to suggest that these justifications were not disguising more self-interested motivations for not participating in the Libyan interventions. Already, before the Libyan crisis, Westerwelle and Merkel were known to be staunch advocates of military constraint. Westerwelle, who played a prominent role in the decision-making on Libya, had “made a point of highlighting the German culture of restraint on many occasions since taking office” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 74; Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, p. 15). In a keynote address in 2010, with no elections in sight, he stated: “Germany will continue to advocate a culture of military restraint with regard to the use of military force” (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, p. 9). In a 2009 cable to Washington, American diplomats summarised Westerwelle's attitude towards the use of force as follows: “(former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich) Genscher's 'culture of restraint' had a profound influence on Westerwelle's thinking, thus making him very sceptical about committing Germany's armed forces to overseas military operations” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 74).

Westerwelle was known for his distant relationship with the military, described by some as “almost neurotic” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 74). Westerwelle's conception on the use of force was shared by Merkel and de Maziere (Herf, 2011; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 403). Decisive decisions on Libya were made by these three (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 78). It can be concluded that Westerwelle, the central figure in the abstention on resolution 1973, acted consistently with his beliefs on the appropriate way to use force, which were steeped in Germany's national strategic culture (Herf, 2011; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 396; Wiesböck, 2014, p. 33).

### 9.3.2. Public opinion

The second most important condition that was detected by the QCA was public opinion. A low public opinion was, in itself, a sufficient condition for non-intervention. Together with national strategic culture and domestic threshold on the use of force, the consistency was even a bit higher, which might indicate that public opinion and domestic threshold on the use of force reinforce the unwillingness to intervene caused by the national strategic culture. In this section, the effect of public opinion on the decision to intervene will be investigated. Based on the liberalist theory, two possible explanations can be given. The first one is that public opinion, in a way, constitutes national strategic culture and does not influence the outcome on its own. The second explanation is that even though public opinion is an important part of national strategic culture, it also has its own impact on the outcome because key policy makers are trying to act in accordance with the public opinion for re-election purposes.

The FDP, the junior partner of Angela Merkel’s coalition government, was doing very poorly in the opinion polls at the beginning of 2011. At the time of the Libyan crisis, regional elections were approaching in Baden-Württemberg. These elections were important for the CDU and crucial for the political prospects of the FDP, as well as for the overall stability of the coalition government (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014; Ischinger, 2012, p. 49). For the FDP, because there was fear that they would not pass the five percent electoral threshold (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 399). For Westerwelle, because he “was in danger of losing both the party leadership and maybe even his cabinet position depending on the outcome of the regional elections” (Ischinger, 2012, p. 49). And, there were rumours that FDP officials were so discontented that this might lead to a breakup of the coalition (Ischinger, 2012, p. 49).

Westerwelle would have calculated that an abstention in the UNSC on resolution 1973 would prove useful during election times because he was convinced that the German electorate opposed military intervention in Libya (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 73; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 399). Although the claim that Germany’s policy makers were acting to get re-elected is not falsifiable, the upcoming elections certainly would have created incentive for them to act consistently with the public opinion.

Hansel and Oppermann (2014) do doubt that the Merkel government only abstained in order to become re-elected. They argue that Germany would have abstained anyway. “Foreign minister Westerwelle’s prominent role in coalition decision-making on this issue and his long-standing foreign policy beliefs, which have been shared by other key representatives of the FDP, would have strongly pushed government policy in this direction, and there would not have been serious challenges to such a course on the level of intraparty and coalition politics or as regards the anticipated international costs of the policy” (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, p. 15). Brockmeier (2012) agrees that it is too simplistic to see Westerwelle and Merkel’s decision only as a result of upcoming elections. More likely, it is that the elections were “reinforcing the other reasons that contributed to the decision not to participate in the intervention” (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 34).

9.3.3. Domestic threshold on the use of force
The third condition that was part of the configuration identified by QCA is domestic threshold on the use of force. Based on the liberalist theory, it would be expected to see that parliamentary war powers somehow reinforced the reluctance of the executive to use force.

There is, indeed, evidence that the Bundestag played a constraining role on the use of force by the German government. Opposition to the intervention was strong in the Bundestag. Previous governments had always been extremely careful to ensure that there would be sufficient support for an intervention before the government would submit it to a vote in the Bundestag (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 31). In interviews conducted by Brockmeier (2013), several German officials emphasized that German decision-makers were reluctant to ask the Bundestag for a mandate in Libya (Brockmeier, 2013). There were two reasons why the government wanted to avoid this. First, they would have had to ask the Bundestag to vote for an intervention which they, themselves, opposed (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 31). The other reason was that, if the request was rejected, this could have created more instability in the already vulnerable governing coalition (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 67). One of the interviewed senior foreign-office officials stressed: “One also has to consider what happens if the government loses such a vote. That can cost you the government. And is that really
worth it—to risk the government?” (Brockmeier, 2013, p. 76). Another constraining factor was that the Bundestag could not keep up with the speed of the decision-making process with regards to Libya. When Westerwelle gave a speech in the Bundestag on the morning of 16 March, he assumed that the US did not back a no-fly zone. The expectation was that the passing of resolution 1973 was unlikely (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 38). Earlier knowledge of the American change “would have created the change for an informed discussion of the matter by the Bundestag and its Foreign Affairs Committee” (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 38). Extensive deliberations in the Bundestag are typical for the policy making process on military intervention. Voting in favour without these deliberations “could have likely resulted in a failed ratification in the Bundestag, thereupon risking an immense loss of voters” (Wiesböck, 2014, p. 29). If Germany had not needed to request a mandate from the Bundestag, it would have had more discretion to change its position after it learned that the US had changed its position.

9.3.4. Alternative explanations

No economic and security interest

Realists simply say that Germany did not intervene in Libya because they had no interest in doing so.

They argue that Libya was not vital to the German economy, and it was not critically dependent on Libya’s oil (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 15). It might be true that Germany would have behaved differently if Libya had posed a bigger threat to their strategic interest, but that does not mean that this is the reason why they did not participate.

First, Germany did not have less interest in Libya than many states that did intervene in Libya. Germany imported 7.7% of its total oil imports from Libya. The trade between Germany and Libya was worth 4 billion (import + export). It was one of the most important destinies of refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea. As such, Germany did not have less strategic interest in Libya than some other states that did intervene, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the US, and Belgium.

Another indicator that this is a weak explanation for Germany’s behaviour is that, even though Germany’s had no strategic interest in Afghanistan it did intervene in this state. From a realist perspective it would be very difficult to explain this inconsistent behaviour (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 15).

The last reason why this explanation is, in itself, not plausible is because Germany could have known that non-participation would bring about significant international costs with regards to Germany’s standing towards its Western Allies (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, p. 13). Not participating would most likely hurt the long term collaboration with their closest allies; it would lose credibility at the UN and NATO, and it would make a permanent seat at the UNSC less likely (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 52; Brozus, 2012, p. 62; Erichsen & Lecomte, 2013, p. 21; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 25; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 396). If Germany did not want to get involved in a war in which it had no interest, it would have made more sense strategically to have voted yes in the UNSC, and then taken a back seat in the operation, like many other European states did. This would have been a smarter approach, pragmatically, towards the Libyan crisis, by which realists try to explain Germany’s stance towards Libya.
Inexperience of Westerwelle
An explanation for Germany’s abstention from resolution 1973 is, according to some, due to the inexperience of Westerwelle. Westerwelle would not have fully grasped the consequences of abstaining from voting on resolution 1973. He did not realize the message this would send to his allies (Brockmeier, 2012, p. 40; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 27; Miskimmon, 2012, p. 393). This explanation focuses only on the reason why Germany abstained from voting. Because, in this study, explanations are sought as to why Germany did not participate, the question whether Westerwelle acted correctly and diplomatically is less relevant. On the broader issue of non-participation, there was a clear consensus between the key decision-makers.

9.4. Conclusion
The best explanation for the motives of Germany not to intervene is national strategic culture. Key decision-makers in Germany were advocates of the culture of restraint. In public statements, they justified their abstention by referring to their scepticism of the usefulness of military force. Instead, they pushed in accordance with their national strategic culture for non-military measures to solve the conflict.

Whether the condition of public opinion reinforced the German government’s reluctance to use force can neither be proven nor disproven, but it is clear that the low public support provided an electoral incentive for the German government to be more reluctant to intervene. The claim that the German government was partly acting to get re-elected is, therefore, not baseless.

There is strong evidence that German parliamentary war powers made it even more unlikely that the German government would decide to intervene. Previous governments had always been extremely cautious to ensure that there is sufficient support for an intervention before it would ask the parliament to vote on participation in an intervention. Interviews with German officials reveal that this also was one of the reasons why the German government was reluctant to ask the parliament to authorize the intervention. The risk of losing the vote could bring danger to the stability of the coalition government. Another constraining factor was that decision-making in the parliament was too slow to keep up with the pace of the decision-making process in the UNSC.

Realists suggest that Germany did not participate because it had no interest in Libya. It might be true that, if Germany had a crucial interest in Libya, it would have intervened; but, this was clearly not the reason why they did not intervene.
Chapter 10: Case study (Italy)

10.1. Introduction

In this chapter, a CPT analysis will be conducted for the case of Italy. Italy is a case that is closest to being a deviant case for the configuration: nsc*endep*secint →MP. A deviant case is a case that, given its "low membership in Y, have a too high membership in A*B*C" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 309). This means that they are counter-examples of the configuration. Italy has an active strategic culture; and it had a substantial security interest, as well as economic interest, being very dependent on Libyan oil and gas. However, initially they were very reluctant to participate. This seems to be counterevidence for the configuration: nsc*endep*secint →MP. The goal of a CPT analysis on a deviant case is "identifying a condition that is missing from the sufficient path under study" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 309). This missing condition explains why a deviant case displays a low score on the outcome, while scoring high on the conditions of the configuration. The hypothesis of this case study is that Italy's reluctance to intervene can be explained by a condition that is missing from the sufficient configuration detected by the QCA.

In the first section, a comprehensive storyline will be developed. Following, it will be investigated whether the combination of conditions detected by the QCA really did contribute to the outcome. In addition, missing conditions will be sought that explain why Italy was initially reluctant to participate in Unified Protector, but later became an active participant of the operation.

10.1. Comprehensive storyline

17 February – 21 February (2011)

The Italian government initially perceived the Arab Spring as a movement that could bring about Islamic fundamentalists and international terrorism (Varvelli, 2012, p. 2). The main goal of Italy was to support the "status quo, and consequently, the existing dictatorial regimes" (Varvelli, 2012, p. 3). Therefore, the Italian government was initially reluctant to condemn Gadhafi, even opposing measures against Gadhafi (Barry, 2011a; Coticchia, 2015, p. 70; Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 24; Lombardi, 2011, p. 35; Varvelli, 2012, p. 3). On 17 February, Frattini, Italy's minister of foreign affairs, told the press that the first priority for Western countries was to prevent fundamentalism and terrorism in Libya (Varvelli, 2012, p. 2). Berlusconi refused to use his personal contacts with Gadhafi to urge him to stop the violence (Barry, 2011a; Lombardi, 2011, p. 35). When reporters asked him whether he did have contact with Gadhafi, he said: "No, I haven't been in contact with him. The situation is still in flux and so I will not allow myself to disturb anyone" (Babington, 2011; The Economist, 2011c). Meanwhile, the whole international community condemned the extreme use of force by Gadhafi, so Italy was isolating itself from the international community (Lombardi, 2011, p. 35). Italy's European partners found Italy's position to be a “nonsensical defence of the dictatorship” (Varvelli, 2012, p. 3).

21 February – end of March

It was only on 21 February that the Italian government issued the first official statement in which it expressed its concern about “unacceptable use of violence against the civilian population” (Barry, 2011a). But, on the same day, Frattini expressed his concern about the possible civil war and the
breakup of the state. He feared that an Islamic state could be set up (Barry, 2011a). And, when France, Germany, and the Netherlands proposed sanctions against Gadafi shortly after the meeting of the Foreign affairs council on 21 February, Italy was not willing to endorse the proposal (Lombardi, 2011, p. 35; Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2014, p. 93; The Economist, 2011c). Italy only later agreed to implement sanctions under heavy lobbying by the US and European governments (Lombardi, 2011, p. 35). On 22 February, Berlusconi finally called Gadafi and told him that a peaceful solution was needed (Barry, 2011a; Black, 2011a). His criticism was subdued. He excused “the excesses occurring in the country by the claim that the regime was no longer in control of the events” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 35). In the meantime, Italy was trying in vain to broker a ceasefire between Gadafi and the opposition forces (African Press Organization, 2011b). On 23 February, the Italian government seemed to have changed its position. Frattini, who had previously considered accusations of human right abuses against Gadafi as “useless,” now said: “There is nothing that can justify mass slaughter on the streets” (Coticchia, 2015, p. 71; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Italy agreed to discuss EU sanctions on Gadafi (The Economist, 2011b). On 26 February, the Italian government took its first measure against Gadafi by suspending the Treaty of Friendship between Italy and Libya (Varvelli, 2012, p. 13). On 27 February, Frattini said on television that Gadafi had to step down; he also said that Gadafi’s fall was only a matter of time (Leigh, 2011; Review, 2011). After the approval of the resolution 1970, Frattini said that “when the head of a regime shoots his own people, the international community has to react, and it has reacted” (Al Alarabiya News, 2011). On 28 February, Italy agreed with a package of sanctions against Libya, adopted by the European Council. On this day, there were discussions in the international community about implementing a no-fly zone. Frattini told Reuters that he considered a no-fly zone a useful measure. Italy would consider allowing its enemies to use its bases, but the Security Council had to approve it first (Golovnina, 2011).

On 3 March, Italy ruled out any possible military participation, but it still offered its bases to its allies (USA Today, 2011). Frattini said that Italy "will not participate in air strikes on Libyan territory" (Jacinto, 2011). On 5 March, Frattini reiterated that Italian air bases were available. He also said that a no-fly zone was only possible with a clear UN mandate (Varvelli, 2012, p. 3). On 8 March, Italy demanded breathing space for the Libyan regime. Italy claimed that Gadafi had sent emissaries to the EU and Cairo ahead of NATO and the Brussels meeting on Libya. Frattini said that with this initiative, “NATO and the EU should not take ‘premature’ action against Gadafi until diplomacy had been exhausted” (Waterfield & Kirkup, 2011). On 11 March, Berlusconi spoke after the extraordinary European Council meeting and said that “the hard-line stance taken by major powers against Muammar Gadafi may have backed the Libyan leader into a corner and prevented a quiet exit” (Reuters, 2011c).

On 14 March, Frattini said that a no-fly zone could be one of the options, but that it was against unilateral actions by its allies: “We cannot imagine that the major responsibility for a serious operation can be undertaken only by a group of countries” (Caprara, 2011). He also said that the Libyan crisis required “an immediate cease-fire accompanied by international measures” (NPR, 2011). On 15 March, Gadafi said that he felt betrayed by Western European countries, especially by Berlusconi (Adnkronos International, 2011a). On 16 March, Italy reiterated that it opposed “unilateral action of military nature” in Libya unless it has the UNSC approval and is within “a
framework of regional legitimacy” (BBC, 2011a). Although Italy said it stood open for all options under the condition that it would happen in a multinational framework, the support for a no-fly zone was “half-hearted” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36). Berlusconi “kept Italy out of the forefront of the no-fly zone debate” (Dinmore, 2011). Italy seemed to work to keep Libya’s options open (Dinmore, 2011). Prior to the passage of resolution 1973, Minister Ignazio La Russa discounted the military option (Lombardi, 2011).

After resolution 1973 was passed in the UNSC, the Italian government interpreted this as “a positive development” (Mangasarian & Fattah, 2011). Italy said that it was willing to offer its air bases when the enforcement of the no-fly zone started (Dinmore, 2011). It is part of the NATO obligations to allow other members to use its bases, so Italy did not have much choice (Batty & Murray, 2011). The military contribution of Italy itself was subject to very significant restrictions (Lombardi, 2011). Frattini assured Clinton that they would not participate in any military operation (Varvelli, 2012, p. 13). They only participated in patrols over Libya’s airspace (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10).

Soon after the US, the United Kingdom and France started to bomb Gadhafi’s forces on 19 March, Italy became nervous about the eagerness with which France was leading the bombing (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 18). Italy feared France dominance over the operation, worried that France would especially dominate in Libya in the subsequent peace (Latza Nadeau, 2011a; Speciale, 2011). On 22 March, Italy demanded that NATO should be required to take over the operation. They threatened to no longer authorize the use of its air bases (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 18). Initially, France kept insisting that NATO remain removed from the operation, which caused a lot of tension within the alliance. “It nearly broke up the coalition,” according to an anonymous, European diplomat who was present at the meetings (Warrick, 2011). Thanks to Hillary Clinton’s lobbying, disagreements were resolved; and, on 25 March, NATO announced it would gradually take over command (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 55; Warrick, 2011). The operation came under NATO’s full command on 31 March (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012, p. 55).

On 22 March, the Italian jets began to fly. The Italian government emphasised that its jets, enforcing the no-fly zone, did manage to jam Libyan air defence radar networks “without firing a single shot” (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10). The Italian jets did not take part in any combat activities, but only conducted flyovers “without actually pinpointing targets” (Latza Nadeau, 2011a). Frattini described the mission as humanitarian in nature “to make Gaddafi fully respect the cease-fire” (Latza Nadeau, 2011a).

**End of March – mid-April**

At the end of March, Italy’s policy pivoted. The main goal of Italy became to contribute substantially to the measures aimed removing Gadhafi (Varvelli, 2012, p. 6). On 4 April, Italy, after France and Qatar, recognized the NTC as the only legitimate power in Libya (Koenig, 2011, p. 21; Oliveri, 2013, p. 98; Varvelli, 2012, p. 4). Later in April, they also pushed other states to recognize the NTC (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2011a). Italy now endorsed regime change. Frattini said, “Any solution for the future of Libya, has a precondition: that Qadhafi’s regime leaves...that Qadhafi himself and his family leave the country” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36). On 14 April, Italy confirmed that it no longer had official relations with Gadhafi (Stratfor, 2011a). In the meantime, Italy was trying to broker a ceasefire. Precondition was that Gadhafi had to leave (Adnkronos International, 2011b).
Mid-April – October
At the end of April, Italy’s foreign policy towards Libya changed again. Until mid-April, they explicitly ruled out the use of force in Libya. On 15 March, Italy once again said that it would not participate militarily in the intervention (Dinmore & Blitz, 2011). But, on 20 April, La Russa announced that Italy would send military advisors to help the opposition forces (Miranda, 2011, p. 17; Stratfor, 2011a). On 25 April, Berlusconi announced that he would comply with NATO’s request for more intensive participation with other NATO members (Day, 2011; Lombardi, 2011).

10.2. Conditions that explain the outcome of Italy’s initial reluctance to use force (mid-February – end-March)
The chronology of events shows that Italy changed its position during the course of the events happening in Libya. Roughly said, Italy was reluctant to use force until the end of March and became increasingly willing to use force during April. In the first part of this case study, an explanation will be given for Italy’s reluctance to take a firm stance towards Gadhafi. The second part will provide an explanation as to why Italy changed its position and eventually made sizable contributions to Unified Protector. The result of the fsQCA was the configuration of national strategic culture, security interest, and energy dependency as sufficient conditions that led to an intervention by Italy in Libya. In this chapter, the connections between conditions and the outcome will be researched, beginning with security interest and energy dependency. This will be followed by exploring the national strategic culture and finished with a discussion of some alternative explanations. This analysis will cover the period of mid-February until the end of March, and then for the period of end-March until mid-April, continuing through October.

10.2.1. Security and economic interest
In the literature, there seems to be a consensus that Italy was driven by self-interest in their stance towards Libya (Loon, 2013). There are several arguments that support this view about Italy’s behaviour during the Libyan conflict.

Italy had significant economic and security interests in Libya when the uprising started. The most important security interest was preventing irregular immigration from crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Before 2008, many sub-Saharan Africans used Libya as a transit state before entering Europe. In 2008, approximately 40,000 Africans tried to enter Italy via Libya (Forbes, 2011; Lombardi, 2011, p. 39). That same year, Italy and Libya signed a Friendship Treaty which agreed that Italy would invest in the Libyan economy and, in return, Libya would stem the flow of migrants (Forbes, 2011). Gadhafi started to monitor Libya’s coastlines; and Italy started to push boats with irregular immigrants back to the Libyan coast (The Economist, 2011c). This proved to be very "effective." The number of irregular immigrants declined were 98 percent over the subsequent two years (Lombardi, 2011, p. 39). In addition to the security interest, Italy also had a large economic interest in Libya, as 22% of Italy’s oil imports and 12% of its gas imports came from Libya (IEA, 2011a; Lombardi, 2011, p. 38). Italy also had a very good economic relationship with Libya, especially in the energy sector. Through ENI (Italian oil company), Italy was deeply involved in the exploitation of Libya’s oil. Libya accounted for 15% of ENI’s total production (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10). Italy and Libya were also large trading partners of each other, as Italy was the source of 20% of Libya’s
imports and 40% of its exports (Lombardi, 2011, p. 38). Italy’s investments in Libya were worth $11 billion and, conversely, Libya’s sovereign wealth fund had sizeable investment in the Italian economy (Lombardi, 2011, p. 38; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10). Lastly, Italy was one of Gadhafi’s major arms suppliers since the arms embargo had been lifted in 2004 (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10).

A strong indication that the Italian government was acting out of self-interest, was that their public statements were mainly about the security (and to a lesser extent economic) threat posed by the conflict, while less attention was paid to human rights concerns (Miranda, 2011, p. 13). This was especially true early in the Libyan uprising. Italy not only stressed the threat of refugee flows to be expected due to the Libyan uprising, but they also emphasised that the fall of the Gadhafi regime would result in an especially huge amount of refugees. On 23 February, Frattini said: “We know what to expect when the Libyan national system falls—a wave of 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants. These are estimates, and on the low side .. It is a problem that no Italian should underestimate” (Spiegel, 2011). The Italian government feared that with Gadhafi’s loss of control, “and perhaps, ultimately loss of power, the boat-people will take to the sea once more” (The Economist, 2011c).

Another argument that Italy was acting to preserve its own interest in Libya is that the Berlusconi government initially was very cautious about condemning Gadhafi (Miranda, 2011, p. 13). When the whole international community had already condemned the violence used by Gadhafi against the protesters, Italy first took a line very close to that of Tripoli that “at times bordered on the pro-Gadhafi” (Forbes, 2011; Stratfor, 2011a). As described in the previous paragraph, it was only on 21 February that the Italians condemned the use of force for the first time while, by then, hundreds of people had already been killed (Barry, 2011a; Lombardi, 2011, p. 35; Pape, 2012, p. 63). The most logical explanation for this caution is that Italy wanted to preserve its relation with Gadhafi because of the security and economic interests they had in Libya (Miranda, 2011, p. 17). This is also how it is interpreted by other European countries, some opposition parties in Italian’s parliament, the press, and scholarly debate (Babington, 2011; Barry, 2011a; Koenig, 2011, p. 20; Lombardi, 2011, p. 33; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 13; Varvelli, 2012, p. 3).

In the period from 21 February until the end of March, Italy took a firmer stance towards Gadhafi; but, it “was still cautiously hedging its position” (Stratfor, 2011a). Italy had started to condemn Gadhafi by giving their support for sanctions against Gadafi and the no-fly zone, offering (reluctantly) their airbases for its allies. However, at the same time, Italy took its time with implementing the sanctions. Also, Berlusconi said publicly that he considered the referral of Gadhafi to the ICC a mistake; and, Berlusconi kept Italy out of the forefront on the discussion of the no-fly zone. Italy’s contribution to the enforcement of the no-fly zone was subject to very significant restrictions, as they emphasised that they did not use any force against Gadafi. And last, they threatened to no longer authorize the use of its air bases to France, the United Kingdom, and the US, if NATO would not take over command (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 18; Dinmore, 2011; Erlanger, 2011; Lombardi, 2011, p. 36; Stratfor, 2011a; 2011b, p. 10).

By this time, it was unclear whether Gadafi would stay in power. Italy was unsure if the opposition forces had the capacity to overthrow Gadafi so it was risky for Italy to pick sides (Miranda, 2011, p. 13; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 13). If Italy would have openly sided with Gadafi, and not participated in
enforcing the no-fly zone, they would have risked being excluded from doing business by the new regime, and they would have fallen out of the Western mainstream (Miranda, 2011, p. 14; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 13). If Italy would have participated too aggressively, they would have risked its energy assets in Western Libya, Italian companies could lose billions of dollars of investment; and, there would be the danger of Gadafi’s retaliation (Giacomello & Verbeek, 2011, p. 5; Russia Today, 2011b; Stratfor, 2011b, p. 13). Berlusconi’s most important coalition partner, the Northern League, especially feared Gadafi’s retaliation (by sending migrants or terrorism), and even put pressure on Berlusconi not to participate in the enforcement of the no-fly zone (Flanagan, 2011; KPBS, 2011; Lombardi, 2011). As long as Gadafi was “likely to stay in power, and NATO defined its mission goal as humanitarian relief, Rome could not wholeheartedly support the Anglo-French approach” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 43). At this stage of the conflict Italy “simply had too many interests in Libya to pick one side and stick with it” (Stratfor, 2011b, p. 10).

10.3. Alternative explanations

Public opinion
Another explanation for Italy’s reluctance to participate militarily in Unified Protector could have been the low public support in Italy for an intervention. As of 12 April, only 40% of Italians backed a military intervention in Libya (Lombardi, 2011, p. 33). This might have influenced the minds of Italian decision-makers (Lombardi, 2011, p. 33). Although it might have reinforced Italy’s reluctance to use force, it was probably not the main concern of the key decision-makers.

First, Italy did not face upcoming elections, such as that of Germany and France. This makes the issue of re-election less pressing for policy makers (Loon, 2013, p. 46).

Second, if the Italian government was acting in order to get re-elected, it probably would have done more to stop the violence of Gadafi because the "entire country" asked itself why Berlusconi did not “try to mitigate the conflict precisely because of his ‘close ties’ with Gaddafi” (Russia Today, 2011a). This might also have been the reason why, by 12 April, that 70% of Italians were dissatisfied with the way Berlusconi handled the crisis in Libya (Ipsos, 2011). According to Alessandri and Matarazzo (2011), the dissatisfaction of the Italian people is “most probably due to the flip-flopping of the government during the first months of the conflict, and to Prime Minister Berlusconi’s reluctance to ask Gaddafi to relinquish power” (Alessandri & Matarazzo, 2011, p. 4). This appears to indicate that the policy of the Berlusconi government was not directly aimed at pleasing the electorate.

10.4. Conditions that explain the outcome of Italy’s activism (end-March – mid-April)
At the end of March, Italy’s policy pivoted (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36). By this time, it became clear that it was unlikely that the stalemate would be broken by the opposition forces, but Western countries remained reluctant to escalate the military involvement (Karon, 2011). Expectations were that the states would be split up. Of the Italians, 55% thought that the outcome in Libya would be a stalemate between Gadafi’s forces and opposition forces (Ipsos, 2011). As will be shown in this chapter, it was wiser strategically to develop closer ties with the NTC, as Italy did. Their policy made
a U-turn, and they started to side openly with the NTC. Because of the presence of the Northern League, and because Libya is a former colony of Italy, they did not start air strikes in Libya yet.

10.4.1. Security and economic interest
The main reason for Italy to change its position towards Libya seems to be due to its security and economic interests.

In late March, the opposition forces possessed about two-thirds of the state's oil reserves. The opposition forces also controlled key oil-export terminals in the eastern ports of Zuteina and Tobruk (Walt, 2011). By the end of March, the opposition forces announced that they would begin selling oil (White, 2011). Qatar, an active participant in the intervention, was the first state with whom the opposition forces made an oil contract on 27 March (Aljazeera, 2011). The day after the oil contract was signed, Qatar recognized the NTC as the only legitimate power in Libya (White, 2011). On 29 March, Frattini also spoke with representatives of the NTC about oil contracts at a conference in London. In the statement he made after the meeting, he noted that it was NTC’s intention to honour “agreements entered at the international level,” including those with ENI; and, they had ensured “continuity in economic action” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36). At the beginning of April, Scaroni, CEO of ENI, was sent to Benghazi, and on 4 April, Italy became the third state that recognized the NTC as the only legitimate power in Libya (Stratfor, 2011a).

Italy now publicly endorsed the regime change. Frattini said that “any solution for the future of Libya has a precondition: that Qadhafi’s regime leaves” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36). Italy’s main goal “then became to contribute substantially to political and military activities in order to gain, as payoff, equal opportunities in the crisis management” (Varvelli, 2012, p. 4). The close temporal proximity of the talks between ENI and the opposition forces, and Italy’s policy change, is a strong indication that Italy saw a chance “to regain its 'special relationship' with Libya by definitely adopting a perspective of regime change” (Giacomello & Verbeek, 2011, p. 5; Varvelli, 2012, p. 4).

Another reason that Italy now openly sided with the opposition forces was that there was nothing to lose anymore. The relationship with Gadhafi had become irreparable. Gadhafi felt betrayed by Western countries, especially by Berlusconi (Erlanger, 2011); and said that he would not do business anymore with oil companies from Western countries (Russia Today, 2011b). Italy even feared that Gadhafi would retaliate for Italy's involvement in enforcing the no-fly zone (Latza Nadeau, 2011b). It became clear that if Gadhafi were to remain in power, Italy “would pay a high price in terms of economic costs. This is not to mention the difficulty of re-establishing cooperation on sensitive issues such as control of migration from Africa” (Lombardi, 2011, p. 36).

10.4.2. Domestic politics
Even though Italy’s foreign policy towards Libya changed at the end of March, Italy did not participate in air strikes. An important reason for this was that the Northern League opposed air strikes. Berlusconi was “under pressure from the Northern League, his hardline coalition partners, not to give way to France and the UK” (Dinmore & Blitz, 2011). After a political attempt to remove Gadhafi failed, Frattini started to push for an air strike in mid-April. But, if Berlusconi and Frattini would have decided to participate without the consent of the Northern League, it would put the coalition in danger of dissolving. The Northern League was serious about this issue. This became
clear one week after Italy’s decision to participate in the air strikes. The Northern League threatened Berlusconi to bring down the government if parliament was not allowed to vote on the military participation of Italy (Day, 2011). Without the resistance of the Northern League, Italy might have decided to participate in the air strikes at an earlier stage (Dinmore & Blitz, 2011).

10.4.3. Colonial ties
Another reason why Italy was reluctant to use force, even though it was eager to remove Gadhafi, was due to Italy’s colonial history in Libya. In the past, there was much resentment in Libya about Italy’s colonial history in Libya. This was formally settled with the signing of the Friendship treaty in 2008 (The Economist, 2011c). Italy justified its reluctance to participate in air strikes by saying that taking part in a combat operation was too sensitive (Miranda, 2011, p. 17). On 15 April, Berlusconi said, as his Foreign and Defence Minister had already done earlier, that Italy “will not take part in the air strikes as Italy is a former colonial power in Libya” (Cenciotti, 2011).

10.5. Conditions that explain the outcome of Italy’s participation in the air strikes (end-April – October)
In late April, after a failed attempt to oust Gadhafi through negotiations, Italy started to assist the opposition forces with military advisors. And on 25 April, the Italian government announced that it would start air strikes in Libya (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015, p. 9; Lombardi, 2011). The reasons why it waited so long to conduct air strikes are that Italy’s colonial ties made it sensitive to play a combative role in Libya and because the Northern League was opposed to air strikes. The reason why they did intervene, despite these thresholds, is that NATO and the opposition forces put pressure on Italy and because Italy became increasingly willing to get rid of Gadhafi.

10.5.1. International pressure
The most important reason why Italy decided to intervene, despite the opposition of the Northern League, is that France and the United Kingdom were putting pressure on other NATO allies to participate in the air strikes in Libya (Dinmore & Blitz, 2011; Dombey, 2011). In late April, Italy yielded to this pressure. The announcement that they wanted to join forces followed a personal plea from Obama to Berlusconi to participate (Day, 2011). Italy justified the decision to join its allies in the Libyan air strikes by referring to the pressure put on them by NATO, other allies, and the NTC (African Press Organization, 2011a; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2011b; Miranda, 2011, p. 18; Yemen News Agency, 2011). In the literature, there seems to be consensus that this was the main reason why Italy decided to participate.

10.5.2. Security and economic interest
The first reason why Italy decided to participate in the air strikes is that they did not want “to lose ground to other international actors (i.e. France and the UK) and not lose credibility with the NTC, on which Italy is betting for the future of Libya” (Miranda, 2011, p. 18). Italian politicians feared that France and the United Kingdom would dominate the subsequent peace if Italy would not intervene (Della Sera, 2011; Speciale, 2011). That would harm their economic position in Libya.

10.5.3. Alternative explanations
Norms: humanitarian norms and national strategic culture
Some scholars argue the role of humanitarian norms played a significant role for Italy to engage militarily (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015, p. 12). Evidence for this argument is that La Russa referred to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Misrata as a reason to become militarily engaged (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015, p. 12). However, it is not likely that humanitarian concerns were the most important reason for Italy’s military engagement in Libya.

First, Italian officials openly admitted, as it is shown in the previous paragraph, that pressure put on them by NATO, other allies, and the NTC, convinced them to participate in the intervention. This, at minimum, proves that the humanitarian situation was not the only reason for their participation in the air strikes.

Second, Italy had been silent during the initial weeks of the Libyan uprising when Gadhafi’s crackdown resulted in hundreds of dead people; and, Italy had shown reluctance to use force when a humanitarian disaster was expected to occur in Benghazi in mid-March. In the time leading up to the passage of resolution 1973, Italy—whose spoken aim was to prevent a massacre in Benghazi—did not seem very enthusiastic about the military option, while that would have been the moment for a state to intervene which was truly committed to humanitarian norms. Italy’s reluctance to participate at this critical moment makes it less plausible that only a few weeks later they were suddenly driven by humanitarian motives.

10.6. Conclusion
The theoretical expectation was that Italy was willing to intervene because there would be an extra configuration: nsc*endep*secint →MP. However, it is strange that even though Italy, of all states, had the highest energy and security interests in Libya, initially showed reluctance to intervene. The CPT analysis of Libya was aimed at detecting the condition that would explain why Italy was reluctant to do so. However, the result was that Italy was reluctant to use force precisely because it had so much energy and security interests in Libya. It was the inverse of what was theoretically expected. Based on this case study, the theoretical model must be slightly changed. If the interests of a particular state are very high, it will be reluctant to intervene because it could harm their interests in the affected state. Only at the moment when it is certain that the old regime will be dissolved, is it strategically more interesting to side with the new regime.

Because Italy had so much interest in Libya, norms did not seem to play a big role. Italy usually has a very active strategic culture and perceives the use of force as a suitable tool to resolve a humanitarian crisis. This seems to indicate that Italy is only led by norms when there are not huge interests at stake. But once their interests in the affected state do reach a certain level, foreign policy is no longer driven by norms, but by the protection of their interests.

Other conditions that influenced Italy’s position were domestic politics, colonial ties, and international pressure. In Berlusconi’s government, the Northern League (a coalition partner) did put pressure on Berlusconi not to intervene. Due to colonial ties, it was too sensitive to intervene in Libya. This reinforced their reluctance to intervene. But because of the intensity of the international pressure, Italy overcame its reservations towards the use of force in Libya. These three conditions should be included in the theoretical models of future research on this issue.
11. Corroboration and falsification of hypotheses: CPT analysis

11.1.1. Intervention

Corroborated conditions: national strategic culture, public opinion

The CPT analysis of France showed that the condition of national strategic culture played an important role for France to intervene in Libya. There are strong indications that public opinion is not only shaping national strategic interest, but also has a reinforcing effect on the willingness to use force. Therefore, the configuration pubop*nsc → MP is corroborated with the CPT analysis.

Falsified conditions: security interest, energy dependency

The CPT analysis of France also shows that it is highly unlikely that security interest and energy dependency were primary motives for France to intervene. Because the status quo was satisfactory for France from a security and energy interest perspective, it would have been more logical for France to have remained out of the conflict, and allow Gadhafi to defeat the opposition troops. This is the strategy that was initially pursued by Italy. The reason why Italy was driven by more self-interested motives than France is that Italy had far more interests in Libya than all the other states. There seems to be enough evidence to state that the configuration nsc*endep*secint → MP is falsified with this CPT analysis.

Updates of the model

The CPT analysis on the deviant case of Italy was aimed at finding a missing condition that explains why it displays a low score on the outcome while it scores high on the conditions of the configuration nsc*endep*secint → MP. Although it resulted that energy dependency and security interest initially prevented Italy from intervening in Libya—instead of vice versa—the CPT analysis of Libya did reveal some new conditions that can influence the willingness to use force. Constraining factors on the use of force can be domestic politics and colonial ties. A stimulating factor can be international pressure from allies.

11.1.2. Non-intervention

Corroborated conditions: domestic threshold on the use of force, public opinion, national strategic culture

The CPT analysis of Germany showed that the national strategic culture was the main reason why Germany did not intervene in Libya. There are strong indications that public opinion is not only shaping national strategic interest, but also has a reinforcing effect on the willingness to use force. Lastly, the high domestic threshold on the use of force made it even more unlikely that Germany would participate in the intervention. Therefore, the configuration (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc) → ~MP is corroborated with the CPT analysis.
12. Conclusion

12.1. Summary
This study was aimed at finding an answer to the question: How can (non-)participation of Western countries in armed humanitarian interventions be explained? Previous research studies on this topic often used only one theory to explain armed humanitarian intervention. The underlying assumption of this study was that only one theory cannot capture the mixture of motivations that lead to an intervention. Therefore, the goal of this research was to test if this assumption is true.

The best research method to test this assumption proved to be QCA. Statistical analysis would produce unreliable results with a small amount of cases, and cases studies are not useful for purposes of generalization. Moreover, QCA is better in accounting for complex causality. For the analysis, seven conditions were selected. These conditions were derived from the three most important international relations theories: realism, constructivism, and liberalism. Security interest, energy dependency, and economic interest were derived from the realist literature. National strategic culture and alliance preference were derived from the constructivist theory. Public opinion and domestic thresholds on the use of force were derived from the liberalist theory.

National strategic culture proved to be the most relevant condition in explaining why states did (not) participate in the intervention. The analysis indicated that if national strategic culture was combined with public opinion, this would increase the likelihood that a state would intervene. Another pathway to intervention was national strategic culture combined with security interest and economic interdependence. For the outcome of non-intervention, the most important configuration was national strategic culture combined with public opinion and domestic thresholds on the use of force. Because only a causal connection was detected with the QCA, further research was needed to corroborate these findings.

CPT was the most suitable research method to corroborate and update the findings of the QCA. By conducting within-case analysis of typical and deviant cases, the findings of the QCA study could be corroborated and/or updated. The result of this study was that for the outcome of intervention, the configuration pubop*nsc → MP was corroborated, and the configuration nsc*endep*secint → MP was falsified. It happened that security interest and energy dependency prevented, instead of stimulated, Italy from intervening in the early stage of the conflict; and, evidence was found that it did not play a major role in France’s decision to intervene, as well. For the outcome non-intervention, the configuration (domuf)*(pubop)*(nsc)→~MP, was corroborated.

12.2. Research findings
The final results of this study are that, in the case of Libya, national strategic culture was the most important determinant of why states did (not) intervene. States with an active strategic culture saw the use of force as an appropriate means to stop the humanitarian crisis, while states with a passive strategic culture preferred non-military tools. Public opinion reinforced the willingness to (not) intervene. In the case of non-intervention, the domestic threshold on the use of force put an extra constraint on the executive to intervene. Only one state did not fit this pattern: Italy. As the case study revealed, this was because Italy had vital interests in Libya. This seems to indicate that only if substantial interests are at stake, do states no longer behave consistently with international and
domestic norms; but, instead, act in their own self-interest. It can be concluded that the results of this study strongly indicate that states were mainly norm-driven, rather than interest-driven.

12.3. Future research

National strategic culture and public opinion
The interaction effects of national strategic culture and public opinion have not been studied extensively in the literature. In constructivist literature, public opinion is only perceived as the entity that shapes national strategic culture (J. S. Lantis, 2002, p. 6; Sondhaus, 2006, p. 127; Toje, 2005, p. 25). From the constructivist angle, public opinion only has an indirect effect on the willingness to intervene. In the liberalist literature, public opinion is detached from national strategic culture. Electoral incentives are the reason why politicians act in accordance with public opinion (Mello, 2014). Liberalists do not take into account the interaction effects between public opinion and national strategic culture; so, only the direct effect on the willingness to intervene is measured, without factoring in the important role that national strategic culture plays. The findings of this study seem to indicate that public opinion is shaping strategic culture. But, in addition, also has an independent effect of politicians that wish to be re-elected, especially during times of approaching elections. It might prove fruitful for future research to study public opinion as a reinforcing factor, in addition to national strategic culture (Figure 14).

\[\text{Figure 13: Theoretical model for future research}\]

Source: own elaboration

Norms, material interest and domestic politics have all explanatory power
Much of the research on armed humanitarian interventions are analysed through the lens of constructivism, realism and (to a lesser extent) liberalism. Most of the realist literature simply maintains that states only intervene when it is in their interest to do so (Sarbu, 2009, p. 17; Welsh, 2003, p. 58). But this case, and many others, have shown that this view is too simple (Finnemore, 1996, p. 1). In many cases, states that participated in an intervention had only insignificant, or no, interest in the state in which they were intervening (Finnemore, 1996, p. 1). In constructivist literature, the behaviour of states is mainly explained by international and domestic norms. However, this study has shown that when substantial interest are at stake states act in their own self-interest. Lastly, liberalism tries to explain the behaviour of states by their domestic politics. This explanation proved to be too limited to explain the behaviour of decision-makers. The presumption of this study was that states have mixed motives for participating in humanitarian intervention. The findings of this study seem to indicate that all three international relations theories contribute to explain the behaviour of states with regards to armed humanitarian intervention. Although the composition of conditions might vary among of armed humanitarian interventions and states that
participate in these interventions, it might prove fruitful for future research to include conditions from all three different theories (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Theoretical model for future research

12.4. Limitations of this study
The major limitation of this study is that only one case is researched. The causal relationships found in the Libya case might not apply to other cases of armed humanitarian intervention.
13. Bibliography


Adnkronos International. (2011b, March 29). Libya: Italy may not have "international credibility" to mediate Gaddafi’s departure, *Adnkronos International* Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


BMI. (2011b, March 2). Western Intervention: Challenges Assessed, BMI. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


Chick, C. (2011, February 28). Libya crisis: neighbors brace as tide of refugees rises; Nearly 50,000 people have crossed Libya's eastern border into Egypt, but the real crisis is on the western border with Tunisia, where refugees keep arriving as fighting intensifies, The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


Eurostat. (2015). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyapctza].


Financial Times. (2011, April 10). French president’s military interventions are logical, *Financial Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e3541de-63b7-11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.html#axzz3bLixFhOg](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e3541de-63b7-11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.html#axzz3bLixFhOg)


Grünewald, F. *The UN Security Council and Libya, 2011: At the Crossroads of Realpolitik and Idealism*. (Unpublished Bachelor dissertation) Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom


Peterson, S. (2011, March 4). Libya preventing refugees from leaving as fighting escalates; &apos;Libya no good!&apos; chanted refugees who had already made it across the Tunisia-Libya border. The flow of refugees has suddenly dropped 80 percent, *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


OMV's quarterly profit halves as Libya unrest cuts output, Reuters. Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/omv-results-idUKL6N0LO0NI20140219


An Integrated Neoclassical Realist and Constructivist Approach to the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy: Canada’s Response to the 2011 Intervention in Libya


Case Studies Nested in Fuzzy-Set Qca on Sufficiency: Formalizing Case Selection and Causal Inference. Available at SSRN 2366088.


The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. American political science review, 97(04), 585-602.


‘The West is to be forgotten. We will not give them our oil’ - Gaddafi. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/libya-oil-gaddafi-arab/

Drivers of the UN humanitarian interventions: Going beyond Human Rights Violations (Unpublished Master dissertation) The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland.


Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. Comparative Sociology, 9(3), 397-418.


Steiniger, M. (2011, May 12). Arab refugee influx causes Europe to rethink its open borders; France wants to overhaul the Schengen agreement, which allows free movement across European borders. A key issue: including large groups of immigrants among the potential 'threats to public order' that allow temporary internal border controls, *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


UN. (2011, April 14). Timeline of Key Events Since February 2011 [analysis], *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (Nairobi)*. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic database


