Resource Curse and Human Security

Consequences of rich natural resource deposits for the local population in areas of conflict and implications for European bodies and institutions

supervisory committee

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## Contents

Introduction 5

1 Research question 6

2 Defining (human) security 7
   2.1 The classical approach 8
   2.2 The UNDP approach 8
   2.3 Freedom from fear and freedom from want 9
   2.4 Securitization 10
   2.5 Narrow or broad definition? 11

3 The resource curse 13
   3.1 Curse or blessing? 14
   3.2 Stagflation 15
   3.3 Patronage 16
   3.4 Corruption 17

4 Impact of resources onto human security 18
   4.1 Positive Environment 18
   4.2 Negative Environment 19

5 Methodology and research approach 20
   5.1 Appropriate resources 21
   5.2 Appropriate regions 21
   5.3 Choice of the Kivu provinces 22
   5.4 Human rights violations and acts of lesser violence 23

6 Case study: exploitation of resources in eastern DRC 24
   6.1 The Kivu provinces 25
   6.2 Case study data 26
   6.3 Case study findings 27
   6.4 Assessment of findings 29
I hereby declare that this document and the accompanying code has been composed by myself, and describes my own work, unless otherwise acknowledged in the text. In case of literature written in languages other than English I have translated the appropriate parts correspondingly. All verbatim extracts have been distinguished by quotation marks, and all sources of information have been specifically acknowledged.

Münster, 06/08/15
Introduction

With the rising number of people and the increase in the level of industrialization especially in Asia, the world's need for resources is constantly rising. While the exhaustion of critical resources does not seem to be a real problem at the moment the rising scarcity is indeed likely to lead to higher prices and also to increase the efforts of all parties to satisfy their needs. Even if scholars hesitate to talk about 'resource wars' right now, conflicts for resources are already present and will deteriorate in the near future.

While some research has been conducted on how this may affect states in the coming years the people themselves are often disregarded. Therefore, the thesis aims to cast some light on the relation between the existence of natural resources and human security. It is argued that large natural resource deposits are likely to decrease the level of human security as they serve as accelerator for conflicts over their control. Comparable to the 'resource trap' of countries which is described by Paul Collier (see Collier 2007, 38f) the thesis assumes that such a trap does also exist for the local population in resource rich areas.

The underlying mechanism is expected to have both direct and indirect implications. While the indirect implications which arise from violent conflict over resources such as casualties and destruction are obvious the direct link is not. As Andrews-Speed et al. point out valuable natural resources often lead to local benefits but these are unevenly distributed in most cases which is most likely to fuel local conflicts (see Andrews-Speed 2015, 80). The paper argues that the presence of resources is also effecting the close surroundings of the mining sites and therefore the human security of mining communities. These potential effects are distinguished in positive and negative effects while the institutional framework is assumed to be the decisive factor.

Focusing on the negative effects and based on existing literature stagflation, patronage and corruption are identified as three negative implications which may occur according to the respective structure of the society. While stagflation may always occur and has to be countered by economic policies the worse effects can be prevented by strong democratic institutions and civil bodies.

The Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)¹ are used as a case study within a most-likely case design to verify the theoretical assumptions which

¹ Also referred to as 'Congo' or 'the Congo' within this paper.
are then transferred to concrete policy recommendations for European bodies and institutions.

The paper is structured as follows: The chapters 1-3 review existing literature about both human security and the resource curse. Chapter 4 merges both concepts in order to develop theoretical assumptions about the effects which resources are likely to have on human security under predefined conditions. Methodological issues are discussed in chapter 5, while the case study of the Kivu provinces in chapter 6 is used to test the theory developed in the previous chapter. Chapter 7 deals with the implications of the findings for European bodies and institutions with a special emphasis on 'due diligence' mechanisms and chapter 8 concludes.

1 Research question

Regarding the potential impact of resources onto human security the first impression is one of a riddle. On one hand valuable resources such as gold, copper, coltan, and diamonds reach high prices on the international market and should therefore contribute to wealth and economic development. On the other hand it seems that most countries with large resource deposits seems to perform worse than countries with a lack of such which shows that they apparently fail to make use of their advantage.

This phenomenon is already widely discussed and generally referred to as 'resource curse' or 'resource trap' by scholars like Huntington or, more recently, Paul Collier (see Collier 2007, 38f). His main argument is that resources hinder economic development by bolstering a life “on unearned income from wealth” (ibid., 38) while the lack of a governmental need for taxation reduces its responsivity. This coalesces to an extend with the findings of other scholars like Michael Brzoska who has recently shown the importance of governance for the consequences of resource existence on the national level (see Brzoska 2014, 1).

Obviously both Collier's and Brzoska's perspectives do not contribute sufficiently to the understanding of human security issues as they are focused on states instead of individuals. However the basic argument that a lack of 'good' governance structures will turn the blessing of valuable resources into a curse of greed-driven conflict bears potential for the concept of human security as it is arguable that a similar mechanism also exists on the individual level.

If the amount of good governance is little which includes a lack of legal certainty and
also weak law enforcement the situation can be described as partly anarchic in the
sense that a single authority is missing. This might than lead to a situation in which
the wealth of a resource allocation is not shared in order to maximize the society's
welfare but instead occupied by individual rent seekers, leading to a (violent)
competition for control over the deposits. If this is the case resources would not
increase human security by boosting economic development but rather decrease it as
a consequence of a conflict for control. As this would be in line the argument of
Collier it seems to be possible and should be assessed in this paper. The underlying
research question to be dealt with in is therefore: Does the existence of valuable
natural resources have an impact onto human security? In this context positive aswell
as negative impacts will be accessed on the base of existing literature. Nevertheless,
concerning the paper's design the negative aspects will have priority.

2 Defining (human) security
In order to analyze the impact of natural resources onto human security it is
necessary to look closer to the concept of security itself and briefly define the term
for further usage. Security is first and foremost a contested term with several
meanings and understandings. It is not a good in itself and can hardly be defined
without any further approximation. Most notably the definition of security is closely
linked to the definition of insecurity and threats and also based on personnel values,
experiences and anxieties. Rolf Uesseler defines security as “estimation of the
likeliness of the espousal of future events” (Uesseler 2008, 68). In this concept
security is closely linked to insecurity as both appear as “complementary patterns”
(ibid.). Security can only be defined in terms of insecurity while both aggregate to
100 percent. A security issue is thereby composed of a threat, a threatened object and
an observer which can but does not have to be identical with the threatened object
(see Schulze 2012, 29). This definition is of almost infinite flexibility and allows to
define security as the absence of insecurities to several predefined goods. In other
words the creation of security is in fact the protection of different goods which are
consensually perceived to be valuable.
While the politological usage is rather new the roots of the human security concept
can be found in the foundation of the International Labor Organization in 1919
“whose founding document (...) explicitly linked peace with social justice”
(Andrews-Speed et al. 2015, 80). However it have been the theories of Joseph Nye
and Robert Keohane who prominently brought up the first theoretical grounds of the new concept by questioning the basic assumptions of the at that time dominant Neorealism and shifting the focus towards non-state actors. Their approach included a different perception of security which was moved beyond the purely military level and more importantly expanded onto institutions.

This idea was extended by Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde and especially Barry Buzan by introducing the concepts of multidimensional security as well as Securitization which both shaped security as a fluid and influenceable concept. The main innovation of their work was to “conceptualize security with a view to the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sector” (Fröhlich/Lemanski 2011, 3) which led to a broader understanding and allowed to shift security towards the individual level.

From there on the authors Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy identified three main phases from the upcoming of the term over the engagement of Canada and Japan to form political agendas up to the linkage between security and development which led to today's broad range of human security definitions.

2.1 The classical approach
This 'classical' definition of security dominated the debate for years and is still widely accepted. In the realm of International Relations, security was (and is) understood as the security of states from other states. Even if armed groups played a marginal role as a threat to inner security for most of the time an individual perspective was at best disdained. While this perspective bears a strength when it comes to explain 'classic' wars between states it lacks the individual perspective which makes it also impractical for the purpose of this thesis. This shortcoming was addressed by a rising number of scholars who tackled the narrow and state focused understanding of security, especially since the end of the Cold War. This movement then brought up a number of alternatives of which human security is one of the most common next to Securitization.

2.2 The UNDP approach
The first widely discussed definition of human security was given by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and its Human Development Report of 1994 which broadly defined the term human security as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' by setting up seven categories of security and which furthermore stated
that “the world can never be in peace unless people have security in their daily lives” (UNDP 1994, 1).

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<th>Main categories of human security by the UNDP</th>
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<td>- Economic security</td>
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<td>- Food security</td>
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<td>- Health security</td>
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<td>- Environmental security</td>
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<td>- Personal Security</td>
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<td>- Community Security</td>
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<td>- Political Security</td>
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source: UNDP 1994, 27f

This statement was taken up several times most prominently by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ten years later who bolstered the idea that states have to serve their population and not vice versa.

That statement can be seen as the opposite of the traditional security approach as it is placing the individual instead of the state in the center of attention. The political consequence of this point of view was to understand threats to individuals as threats to the whole society and the nation state itself. Instead of putting the state in the middle of the security debate, human security is about “recognizing human beings, as individuals, to be the principal bearers of rights and, therefore, the central focus of security.” (MacFarlane 2014, 154). The logical conclusion of this point of view is to regard the state not as a principle agent but as entity which is responsible for guaranteeing the ultimate goal of individual security.

This main characteristic of human security was transferred into concrete policies by institutions such as the Human Security Network (HSN) which was formed by a number of countries in 1999 and which became famous for its ad hoc campaigns, leading to the Ottawa Convention against anti-personal landmines and the formation of the International Criminal Court (see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009, 23). Just as the UNDP, the HSN followed a broad definition of human security with the main thought being that “the true rights-holders in our world are not states and governments but rather the individuals for whose benefit they exist” (Rock 2013).

2.3 Freedom from fear and freedom from want

Following the HSN’s argumentation the idea to hold states responsible for their citizens' well-being became famous among a number of states. Especially Canada as head of the 'International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)' became leading when it came to the formulation of the 'responsibility to protect'. The main novelty of this responsibility was that a violation of a state's sovereignty by the
international community could be justified in order to guarantee a minimum of human security. What was acclaimed as a concrete policy to increase human security by some countries was harshly rejected by others. Especially governments of developing countries feared that the responsibility to protect would become an excuse for ongoing regime changing military deployments.

The Japanese lead 'Commission on Human Security (CHS)' chose another path and brought up the 'responsibility for development' stating that “(human security) requires sustained attention to processes of development and to emergency relief activities, as well as to the outcome.” (CHS 2003, 11). This understanding which is commonly referred to as 'freedom from want' was crucial for expanding the focus of the human security concept in order to counter “all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009, 29).

While the Canadian model aimed at quick and resolute (military) interventions in order to stem urgent crises, the Japanese model sought to improve crisis resistance by medium- and long-term (financial) development measures.

Nevertheless both freedom from fear and freedom from want also included a geopolitical dimension. While the first was at least partly designed to transport western ideas and to frame development accordingly, the latter was set up to push back exactly that influence by creating an Asian definition of human security. Especially the industrialized countries mostly appreciated the new dimensions of human security, whereas the concept was explicitly criticized by developing countries, most notably the G77 states, which addressed concerns that human security might just be a nicely packed form of legitimization for interventions in their national affairs. Furthermore it was criticized that human security standards would only be applied to the 'weaker' countries while the originators are not measured against their own concept (see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009, 35).

2.4 Securitization

Strong criticism of the idea that almost everything is somehow related to security was also addressed by the theoretical work on Securitization which is based on the Copenhagen School around Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan. While Securitization also rejects the classical approach to security it differs from human security by defining security as a social process, composed of threat, threatened object and observer (Schulze 2012, 29). The main argument is that security and therefore threats are
constructed within the society. “The issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.” (Buzan/Weaver/de Wilde 1998, 24)

The Copenhagen School stresses the relevance of speech acts which may “have a performative function” (Schulze 2012, 29). The thesis of Securitization is that several actors try to achieve some sort of dominance to legitimize a political agenda. This approach raises the question who is able to present issues as a threat how successful and under which circumstances. Ralf Emmers points out that “Securitization tends to be a process dominated by powerful actors that benefit from privileged positions (…) which as a result often happens to be the state and its elites (Emmers 2007, 112).

2.5 Narrow or broad definition?

While scholars of the Copenhagen School tend to criticize the concept of human security because of its gateways to Securitization other researchers reject the concept because of its vagueness. Some authors like Mack and Paris argue that the whole concept is politically driven and therefore impractical for research purposes (see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009, 60). Others like Keith Krause welcome human security as useful in order to set a powerful agenda but only if it is limited to ‘freedom from fear’ as everything broader is likely to lead to human security as a “loose synonym for 'bad things that can happen'” (Krause 2004, 367).

The advocates of this minimalist or narrow setting follow the Canadian model and define human security in terms of threats by force and violence. While other problems such as poor health or education are not denied it is argued that linking them to security does not provide a surplus of value but is only increasing confusion. Concerning the seven categories defined by the UNDP (see page 7) these authors would argue that Personal- and Community security against violence are the categories which matter while the others should not be mixed up with security at all in order to sustain a certain clarity.

Another group of academics around Axworthy, Leaning and Uvin favors the broad or maximalist setting in which human security is described in terms of both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, introducing the term of 'human dignity' as the ultimate goal (see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009, 49). This perspective is to an extend based on the widely discussed work of Amartya Sen who describes development as “the removal of major sources of unfreedom” (Sen 2001,3). Freedom is thereby
understood as ‘freedom of choice’ which is to say that a person's level of freedom is given by the available range of potential choices. Sen emphasizes the intrinsic value of choice which is partly different from the economic perspective of economists such as Milton Friedman who perceived choice only as valuable as far as it is a necessary prerequisite for functioning markets (see Sen 1988, 270f). While monetary implications are not ignored, according to Sen money as well as economic activity are first and foremost means to enable people to choose certain options and are insufficient if alone. Instead Sen defined a group of five types of freedoms which all have to be combined to guarantee full freedom (see Sen 2001, 10).

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<th>Five types of freedom by Amartya Sen</th>
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<td>- political freedoms</td>
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<td>- protective security</td>
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source: Sen 2001, 10

This broad perspective is also shared by a number of international bodies and organizations such as the Human Security Commission or the UNDP by now which links security to both international law and the human development concept, going much further than the traditional peace-keeping concept of human security. Comparing the UNDP's categories of human security with Sen's types of freedom they are found to be widely consistent while 'freedom' and 'human security' happen to be quite similar and equally extensive. Regarding the multitude of interests within the United Nations it is not surprising to find that it played an active role in establishing human security in its broadest definition, allowing for numerous agendas to fit in the overall concept (see MacFarlane 2014, 159f).

While it is arguable that it takes more to live a decent life than being protected from violence it is also true that a concept's practicability is proportional to its clarity. Most people in conflict zones face not one but many problems which are often interlinked to an extend. Nevertheless linking as much as possible to a vague term of security does not seem convincing especially when it comes to practical research. Therefore this paper will be based on a narrow definition of human security which is limited to freedom from fear as it includes the main advantage of human security (placing the individual in the center of attention) but is still precise enough to be handled.
3 The resource curse

Valuable resources such as gold, diamonds, or since the Industrial revolution coal and oil have been perceived to be a blessing for their owners for most of the time. It was not until the second half of the last century that scholars began to question the almost law-like assumption that scarce resources will always lead to growing prosperity and well-being. In 1970 Mahdavy analyzed Iran as a typical 'Rentier State' and found as one conclusion that a state which is in possession of natural resources might be able to “expand its services without resorting to heavy taxation (and therefore) acquires an independence from the people seldom found in other countries.” (Mahdavy 1970, 466f). The underlying argument which is still widely discussed today is that countries with resources have no need to acquire taxes from their people and may therefore violate Mayhew's rule of 'no taxation without representation', leading to a negative correlation between resource possession and democracy. In other words, as Huntington points out in his treatise on democratization in 1995, “(resources) reduce the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence of the public to taxation” (Huntington 1991, 65).

During the last decade the theoretical implications of the resource curse experienced a constant refinement, as new findings were included. Bulte, Damania and Deacon found that while democratic institutions of checks and balances matter the kind of resources involved also seems to have an impact. While high-rent resources such as oil and valuable minerals trigger the implications of the resource curse, basic agricultural resources does not seem to have this effect (see Bulte et al. 2005, 1038). Isham et al. could in general approve this by their own findings and added that valuable and merely exported agricultural resources such as coffee and cocoa, also referred to as 'cash crops', are actually related to the resource curse aswell (see Ishan et al. 2005, 158f). Furthermore there is strong evidence that illegal drugs are also a potential trigger of the resource curse because of the high prices they achieve which, as Evans points out, is especially true within an 'Enclave economy' (see Evans 2014, 14f).

In general, both access and needed investment are linked to the potential of any resource to trigger the implications of the resource curse. Within this framework it can be said that the easier a resource is acquired the more likely it is to cause a resource curse, given all other factors constant. This is to say that easy access aswell as little need for investment do both increase this chance. Regarding for example the
extraction of scarce metals in many of the poorest countries the business is largely defined by artisanal mining which is personal but not capital expensive. Because 'only' human workforce and no complex machines are needed this is more likely to have negative consequences than for example offshore oil production, even if this does not mean that the latter case would be immune.

3.1 Curse or blessing?

Today the existence of a (strong) correlation between valuable natural resources and institutional performance is widely accepted but dispute remains concerning its concrete elaboration. The majority of scholars is following the 'classical' argumentation stating that whether resources are a curse or a blessing is “determined by legal and cultural institutions” (Haber & Menaldo 2011, 2). In other words, the main difference between Botswana and Nigeria in terms of resources is that Botswana’s institutions are capable of investing and distributing the revenues just and future orientated while the according institutions of Nigeria are not. This is to say that the same value is used to finance education and infrastructure in the first case and personal interests and well-being of elites in the second.

A concrete example of institutions which help to turn resources into a blessing is Botswana’s Pula fund. The fund was set up in 1994 “with the aim of preserving part of the income from diamond exports for future generations” (Bank of Botswana 2015). In practice, the fund is a major source for long-term investments but also used for revenue and currency stabilization (see Natural Resource Funds 2013, 3). What makes the Pula fund different from most other resource funds is the fact that it is embedded in a larger policy concept which is not only limiting governmental spending to 40 per cent of the GDP but also binding the government to spend a decent amount for health, education and public investment (see ibid., 5). The combination of these measures is not only transferring short-term revenues into long-term investments but also impeding the misuse of the resource money as well as personal enrichment. Although the Pula fund is one of the most successful examples other countries such as Norway, Canada, Australia, Chile and Indonesia also managed to realize respective gains by implementing (more or less) similar measures which can be seen as a strong argument for the importance of such structures (see Clark 2011).

Against the classical argumentation some critics doubt that the impact of resources is
as strong as perceived by the advocates of the resource curse theory. With their own model of a country by country time series Haber and Menaldo found Zambia the only case to have suffered from a resource curse while their main evidence is even suggesting an opposite effect for most countries (see Haber & Menaldo 2011, 25).

Nevertheless most scholars agree with the image of resources as “a double-edged sword, with both benefits and dangers” (Frankel 2012, 15) while governance and institutions are the main determinants over a country's loss or gain by resources. In contrast to positive effects such as long-term investments and financial stability which are more likely to occur if measures such as the Pula fund are in place there is a vast array of possible negative effects as well. These potential negative impacts of valuable resources are also partly linked to the institutional framework and can be grouped in three categories which are stagflation, patronage and corruption.

3.2 Stagflation

One of the more likely negative effects which is also closely linked to the so called 'Dutch disease', stating that income from resources will strengthen the national currency and therefore lead to an increase of the country's export prices which is then damaging the economy, is called 'stagflation'. This portmanteau word of stagnation and inflation describes an economic dilemma in which a low economic growth rate co-occurs with both high unemployment and inflation rates (see Oxford Dictionaries 2015). The two main reasons for the occurrence of this phenomenon are inflation causing macroeconomic policies as well as large cash inflows. Even if stagflation is not exclusively linked to valuable resources the Dutch disease shows that a focus on resource extraction can lead to a situation in which the rest of the economy is severely damaged. This is to say that even if the respective people in charge try their best to support prosperity resources might turn out to be a curse if the implemented policies are inadequate.

These findings depend heavily on Sachs and Warner who academically disassembled the positive image of natural resources in 1995. When they compared the economic growth rate of resource-rich countries with countries without natural resources they surprisingly found that on average countries which 'benefited' from resources performed poorer than their counterparts (see Sachs & Warner 1995, 2). While they were unable to provide a specific explanation for all cases Sachs and Warner stated that government and in particular trade policies seem to be a key variable.
Furthermore the Dutch disease model could also be supported by their findings to an extent (see ibid., 22). While the focus has already shifted from resources to institutions in this example other scholars such as Ramsay even go a step further and ask whether or not the incoming cash acquired by resource exportation instead of the resource itself is the relevant part (see Ramsay 2011, 524). What might seem like sophistry at first view becomes relevant upon closer examination as the implication made by Ramsay is that there is no real difference between resources and other forms of large cash inflows such as remittances or foreign aid.

Even if this argument is contested, the economic implication is not as almost all scholars agree that large cash inflows have to be managed by respective policies in order to avoid economical damages such as a high inflation rate, stagnation and unemployment.

3.3 Patronage

Despite the potential economical consequences the existence of valuable natural resources can also have social impacts of which patronage is one of the most common. While people exerting patronage are not necessarily taking bribes they are still damaging the institutional as well as the economical system by promoting their friends, relatives or favored organizations. This leads to a situation in which not knowledge and capabilities but acquaintances becomes the decisive factor when it comes to personnel decisions and career opportunities. The result of such a situation are often suboptimal decisions which would not occur if they had been based on facts. Although most decisions are somehow influenced by 'personal taste' and trust is also an important value there is certain limit beyond which deviant decisions become damaging, which is definitely given by patronage.

The potential link between mining activities and a patronage system was brought to wide publicity by Collier in 2007. Originally analyzing the desperate economical situation of the poorest sixth (today seventh) of the world's population ('bottom billion') Collier found that mineral wealth is undermining and eventually impeding democratic structures and institutions by creating incentives and allowing for patronage (see Collier 2007, 45ff). Taking up the theoretical work dealing with resources and governance Collier argues, that autocratic states tend to get more growth out of their resources than democratic states, unless they have implemented sufficient measures of checks and balances (see ibid., 47).
These measures which include transparency as well as a separation of powers and competencies are exactly what is needed in order to impede patronage. While neutral supervisory instances are able to play a crucial role, a general need to justify decisions is already very helpful. In this context it seems that a strong civil society is important as it is able to “prevent the growth of local patronage channels” (Berenschot 2011, 228) if the capacity to negotiate access to resources is given.

3.4 Corruption

Compared to both stagflation and patronage, corruption can be described as the most severe consequence which the existence of valuable natural resources might have. The underlying concept can be described as ‘resource-governance’ and is fully shifting the point of view from a merely economical perspective to politological and sociological findings, dealing with institutions and (social) structures. Scholars like Frankel argue that large mineral reserves can have a negative effect on political institutions by creating “social structures in which autocratic or corrupt political elites finance themselves through physical control of the natural resources” (Frankel 2012, 2).

The main difference to the before mentioned situation of patronage is the fact that the people in charge are widely exploiting the system for their personal gain by both taking bribes and enriching them with governmental or enterprising capital. Accordingly the economical and social consequences are comparable to the ones occurring in a patronage system but much worse. While patronage is allowing unqualified personal to reach vital positions in the worst case, corruption may subordinate the whole system under different personal interests. This is not only causing severe damages to the system itself but also disproportionately affecting the most needy as they generally do not posses the means to reach their goals within a corrupt system.

Within the spectrum of corruption a distinction between several severities of corruption can be made. While in the 'best' case corruption is generally condemned and only present in a very limited number of cases the worst case is given by a system in which corruption is the norm and literally nothing can be acquired without personal networks and bribes.

Regarding the DRC as object of investigation is it clear that especially the eastern part given by the Kivu provinces show one of the worst cases of corruption, if not the
worst case at all (see Herbst and Mills 2013, 1). Bribing and illegal fee-collecting activities are the order of the day which makes it almost impossible to avoid these structures. This implicates, that the Kivus can be described as the most likely case when it comes to the assessment of the hypothesis which is further discussed in chapter 5.

4 Impact of resources onto human security

While the implication of valuable resources on the nation states level is widely explored, the individual perspective remains mostly untouched. Despite the difference in relevance this might also be the case due to the matter of feasibility as most data is only aggregated on the national level. The question is therefore how human security and the theoretical ground of the resource curse can be linked to each other.

As outlined earlier the main implication of the concept of human security is to move the individual in the center of attention. Regarding individual security as the stipulation of all security is also the starting point when it comes to the relation between resources and human security. The first and most important question is: What implications could resources have for individual (human) security? As within the concept national security is merely the sum of individual security within its borders, it follows that the expected relation between human security and resources is close to the mechanism of the resource curse, even if on a much smaller scale. Following the prevailing opinion of ambivalent resources and the importance of social structures and institutions I argue that resources can affect human security both positive and negative, depending on the concrete circumstances given by (local) political and social structures and institutions.

4.1 Positive Environment

In a positive environment given by strong democratic institutions aiming for mutual benefit and good governance one would expect to find an increase of personal well-being in the presence of valuable resources. Their extraction would provide employment for a number of people, creating a significant amount of wealth which would eventually trickle down and support even those who have no direct part in the resource sector. As rising incomes typically lead to a surplus in consumption groups like merchants, craftsmen and service provider would all benefit to an extent.
Furthermore the community itself would increase its income by taxation and eventually attract additional inhabitants which (good governance given) further boosts the development.

4.2 Negative Environment

In a negative environment given by weak or missing democratic institutions which are dominated by rent-seeking interests and the main concern of this paper, one would expect almost the exact opposite. Unreliable structures are known to fail when it comes to law enforcement as they may be unable or unwilling to aim for mutual benefit or, even worse, solely look after their own interests. The result of such a situation may reach from solely economic implications such as stagflation over social impacts such as patronage up to a fully corrupt system in the worst case, as outlined in the previous chapter.

Failed law enforcement also leads to a lack of property rights as they are either irrelevant or do not exist. This creates a situation in which whoever has physical possession over resources has a strong incentive to exploit them as fast and extensive as possible, because it can not be assured that the gains missed today are still feasible tomorrow as someone else might assume control (cf. Frankel 2012, 5). While a civil war is the most obvious situation in which this mechanism is at work, countries known to nationalize enterprises by force face the same problem which is excessive depletion. The result is a depreciation of middle- and long-term strategies in favor of short-term gains which are maximized by all available means. In contrast to the earlier outlined situation of a positive environment a negative environment would lead to an increased well-being of only a few powerful individuals in possession of the resources while the major group including the ones working to extract the resources would end off worse. As they could not rely on structures or institutions to protect their tenure the owner of the resources would have to use a significant amount of the incoming wealth to invest into security, for instance by setting up their own armed militia. The lawless situation would allow them to enforce people to work for them in a setting of modern slavery while other groups who could compete with the resource owners would not act to change this situation but only to get in possession of the resources themselves. The classical example of this situation is a greed-dominated civil war in which the aim of the individual factions is to seize control over assets which allow them to increase their consumption. While these
wars can be quite lucrative for a few, most people involved suffer from severe loses of human security in both a broad and a narrow definition. While both settings include valuable resources the actual outcome could not be more different, solely because of a different institutional frame.

While it is true that both of the outlined environments are constructed archetypes which are unlikely to be found in reality most countries could still be located on the scale in between. Back on the national level one could for example argue that Botswana and the Congo are quite close to one of the sides each, as both have large amounts of diamonds while their performance is fundamentally different (see Frankel 2012, 14).

5 Methodology and research approach
In order to cast some light onto the relation between valuable resources and human security the hypothesis is constructed that given an environment in which democratic institutions and legitimate authorities are weak, the existence of valuable resource within a region triggers violent conflicts over their control and therefore decreases the level of human security. The underlying negative mechanism comprises both economical and social implications as outlined in chapter 3. While a system of strong democratic institutions and a strong civil body can prevent the worst
impacts solely economic problems such as the Dutch disease may still occur. On the other end of the spectrum are systems totally undermined by corruption in which bribing is the norm and a civil war-like situation emerges from violent conflict over the control of mining sites.

To assess the hypothesis mining areas will be compared with non-mining areas with regard to their level of human security. If the hypothesis is true, I should find that the level of human security in the resource-rich areas is actually lower than in the regions without resources. It is important to point out that the group of valuable resources does not only include rare earth, energy resources and jewelry but also the other parts of the resource nexus described by Andrews-Speed et al., which are water, food, and land (see Andrews-Speed 2015, 9). Nevertheless, concerning the limited length of this thesis and the finding that the resource curse is not triggered by classical basic resources such as crops and firewood (see Ishan et al. 2005, 158f) it is inevitable to focus on specific resources and a limited number of regions. Regarding the theoretical assumptions made in the previous chapter, both resources and regions need to meet a number of criteria if they are to be used to assess the hypothesis.

5.1 Appropriate resources
Concerning the resources, the main criteria is their ability to trigger the consequences of the resource curse. While there is hardly a finalized list, evidence is strong that valuable minerals such as tantalum, coltan, or gold, as well as diamonds and (illegal) drugs are somehow ideal for this purpose while some cash crops also seem to comply. Furthermore, easy access and the corresponding small need for large investments increase the risk that negative consequences occur. As the evidence concerning cash crops is not as straightforward as for the other resources, a focus on either valuable minerals or drugs is regarded to be the strongest approach.

5.2 Appropriate regions
When it comes to regions which are suitable to test the hypothesis, the most obvious criteria is that the valuable resources defined in the previous paragraph have to be present. Furthermore, the theoretical findings suggest that the institutional environment matters. While strong democratic institutions and bodies are likely to let resources improve the level of human security, they are assumed to have a negative influence when they are weak, as stated as a precondition for the hypothesis.
The emerging question is how either strong or weak institutions can be defined. For the purpose of this paper I will make use of the 'Foreign Policy Fragile States Index', which is classifying the level of democracy for a country by a number of elaborated indicators and widely used within academia (see Foreign Policy 2014). To test the hypothesis only countries at the top of this index are feasible. Furthermore it is arguable that the strength of (governmental) institutions differs from region to region in many countries which is especially true for those states classified as 'failed' or 'failing'. Therefore the focus shall be on the regions with the weakest democratic institutions which in terms of the Fragile States Index is to say the worst of the worst. Given the criteria valuable resources and weak democratic institutions as defined by the Fragile States Index, several regions in countries like South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, DRC, Chad or Afghanistan seem to be the most promising (see Foreign Policy 2014).

5.3 Choice of the Kivu provinces
For a number of reasons I have decided to focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo as object of analysis. This country is suitable as it shows the outlined contradiction between the existence of resources and its impact. Especially the eastern part of the Congo is rich of valuable natural resources which should in fact lead to an emerging export economy and therefore contribute to the regions stability by providing jobs and incomes for a high number of people. However the DRC is also one of the least developed countries of the world in terms of the Human Development Index which raises the question how this dissent can be solved. The hypothesis that the existence of valuable resource within a region bolsters conflicts over their control and therefore decreases the level of human security, especially when the legitimate authority is weak has some explanatory potential which is to be tested. While political and ethnic motives have launched the conflicts in the first place these grievances soon got mingled with greed-dominated motivations which might even have become the primary source of conflict for some groups (see Global Witness 2009, 15). However this paper is not about the reasons behind the existing conflicts but about the impact of resources onto the security of the local population which, although interlinked, are two different topics. It is necessary to distinguish between the grievance motivated fight for control and the greed motivated fight for resources at this point.
While it is obvious that in most cases any sort of fighting will lead to numerous casualties which are often civilian the question which is to be answered here is whether these casualties simply occur at the front lines of fighting or if a significant number can be directly linked to resources. While the link to resources is merely indirect in the first case, the second case would suggest a direct implication of valuable resources onto human security and therefore verify the hypothesis of this paper to an extend. As both cases are interlinked in reality the only distinctive factor which is feasible is spatial proximity. If resources are directly linked to human security one should be able to measure a difference in human security for different distances to deposits. To be totally clear, the purpose of this thesis is not to provide another document about human rights violations perpetrated by armed groups which are financed by resource extraction as this has been reported far and wide (see ibid., 25) but to spot if there is a significant different level of human security close to mining sites.

5.4 Human rights violations and acts of lesser violence
In order to gain resilient data it is necessary to narrow down the vast concept of human security as outlined in the previous chapter. The research will therefore both test the link between human rights violation and resource extraction aswell as 'acts of lesser violence' and resource extraction in eastern DRC. Within this research design violations against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights committed by armed groups or individuals serve as a proxy for a narrow definition of human security. Acts of lesser violence are defined as violent acts affecting the personal security which still fall within the narrow definition even if they are not as severe as human rights violations. To give a concrete example cases of rape and murder fall into the first category, while crimes such as illegal taxation by force comes under acts of lesser violence. While it is true that the severity of a crime depends on subjective perception to an extend most people would agree that there is a qualitative difference between the two groups which should not be confounded.

For further clarity the following chart displays the two categories with a number of suitable examples:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>category</th>
<th>definition</th>
<th>examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>severe violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
<td>- murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- illegal detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- violent displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts of lesser violence</td>
<td>violent acts affecting the personal security but not falling in the first category</td>
<td>- illegal taxations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- forced labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- abduction for ransom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of this is twofold. First unlike human security, both human rights as defined by the United Nations and acts of lesser violence as defined above are limited concepts which allows for a more precise answer as an act of violence is always a threat to human security (but not vice versa) and second, thanks to a large number of institutions the surveillance of violence works quite well which allows to gain usable data.

Furthermore having two related but not identical categories is also suitable for a comparative design. Assuming that violence is not exerted arbitrary but with a purpose in most cases it is interesting to ask whether a difference between the occurrence of both levels of violence can be found.

As this paper is some sort of pilot study and the available time for research is rather limited the number of cases is accordingly small. In order to steer a middle course between both the explanatory potential and the hours to invest, a limit of fifty cases was set for each category. While this amount is too small to use statistical methods it is still sufficient in order to get a glimpse on potential correlations, especially if most of the results point in the same direction.

6 Case study: exploitation of resources in eastern DRC

As outlined in the chapters 3 and 4 the theoretical conjunction of human security and the resource curse indicates a potential impact of the existence of valuable resources onto the level of human security. In this context resources are perceived to create incentives to extract them in order to gain wealth which makes the resource sites contested goods. In absence of a strong institutional framework which is to say that law enforcement is weak and the state's monopoly on legitimate use of force not given this potential conflict is escalating, leading to violent clashes and eventually civil war. This situation is severely affecting the human security of the people living
in the respective area, while the poor and needy are expected to be the most aggrieved as they are the most vulnerable. The argument was raised that despite the indirect implications given by violent conflicts resources also trigger threats to human security directly. This idea was taken up by the hypothesis, stating that the existence of valuable resource within a region triggers violent conflicts over their control and therefore decreases the level of human security.

6.1 The Kivu provinces

In order to assess this hypothesis the following section shall deal with the Kivu area of eastern Congo as a case study. The provinces of both North- and South Kivu are suitable for a number of reasons. First of all numerous mines are located within the area which is obviously a necessary condition. Second governmental control and governance are rather weak within the area, which is defined as a prerequisite of the hypothesis in this most likely case design and third, the area is controlled and occupied by various factions (see IPIS, interactive webmap) which allows to test for non-mining related influences. Furthermore the Kivus are known for a large number of human rights abuses in recent years which are often said to be directly or indirectly linked to resource extraction (see Global Witness 2009, 4). All these factors combined create some sort of ‘ideal’ case which is very likely to support the hypothesis. On one hand this does limit the transferability of the results but on the other hand this most likely case design allows to reject the hypothesis with sufficient certainty if the results do not fit the concept, which is clearly outweighing the disadvantages.

The conflicts within the region did not start as struggle over resource possession but in fact date back to the genocide in Rwanda and even beyond. Nonetheless once armed groups had seized control over a mineral rich territory they soon started to exploit the resources in order to finance their fight which has become a million dollar business during the last decade (see Global Witness 2009, 38). This might include a small bias as the Eastern Congo is definitely one of the areas most likely to support the hypothesis. However this is also true for the other regions which fulfill the requirements outlined in the previous chapter and is therefore negligible. Nevertheless it holds the implication that the findings of this case study are only transferable within close borders. While they certainly point out whether the hypothesis is true or false to an extend, the generalizability remains limited.
6.2 Case study data

The case study relies heavily on the data provided by the 'interactive map of artisanal mining areas in Eastern DRC (interactive webmap)' which was set up by the 'International Peace Information Service' (IPIS) in cooperation with Congolese locals, authorities and mining institutions and is therefore one of the most detailed and actual sources of information for this topic. In order to assess the hypothesis this data is linked with information about human right abuses aswell as acts of lesser violence from various sources such as 'Amnesty International', 'Human Rights Watch', 'Global Witness', 'MONUSCO', the 'Research Project C2 of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood"' of the 'Freie Universität Berlin' or the 'United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. At this point it has to be emphasized that although the data sources themselves are all reliable they do not have access to all areas (see IPIS 2014) and the number of cases is still rather small. However given the fact that at least most of the territory is under surveillance and the cases have been chosen randomly a decent amount of certainty concerning the findings could be achieved.

While the data provided by the Research Project C2 did already include geographic coordinates the other sources only named the concrete place of a recorded violent act in most cases. To link the acquired information to the mining sites the mapping tools 'Google Maps' and 'Citipedia' were used to examine the exact locations. Concerning the data provided by the Research Project C2 the data was reduced to cases which are located within the Kivu provinces or close to their borders, while unclear of vague information was also deleted. As the mining sector in the region is changing constantly no data older than 10 years was used to assure a certain level of validity. All location data was then transferred to the 'IPIS interactive webmap' manually which allowed to measure the distance of the location to the closest mining site and to enrich this information which further details.

Because of the tediousness of this process it was not possible to acquire a number of cases which would be sufficient for a quantitative analyses and therefore a qualitative research design was chosen. The underlying question is whether any form of correlation between mining site, operator and human rights violations or acts of lesser violence can be found. If the hypothesis is true one should find a higher

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2 see IPIS, interactive webmap
3 https://www.google.com/maps
4 http://www.citipedia.info
number of human rights violations and/or acts of lesser violence within close range of the mining sites and also a distance decay effect. To assess this expectation the distance of both human rights violations and acts of lesser violence is used as the main decisive criteria.

6.3 Case study findings

Looking closer at the edited data which consists of 100 cases in total it becomes clear that they do not indicate any correlation between the distance to the next resource location and human rights violations but a strong correlation between the distance to the resources and acts of lesser violence for the area of the Kivu provinces.

Out of the 50 cases of human rights violations only seven are located within a close range of five kilometer to mining sites which make up for not more than 14 per cent (see Appendix I). Even if the distance is doubled to ten kilometer which is reducing the validity a lot, only four more cases would be covered which is out of proportion to the loss of accuracy. On the other side also 14 out of 50 cases are located more than 50 kilometer from the closest mining site which again indicates that no correlation is existing. This finding is even more supported by the arithmetic mean which is at 40,8 kilometer and therefore far outside out of close proximity. The data used for this paper suggests that large violations of human rights such as murder or rape do not occur more often in close range to mining areas but rather in conquered cities and villages during military operations. A potential explication is that violent acts are used as a (more or less planned) measure to frighten and punish the civil society, a perception which is supported by the findings of Human Rights Watch (see Human Rights Watch 2009, 42).

Concerning acts of lesser violence such as illegal taxation and forced work the result is fundamentally different. Out of the 50 cases all but one are located in a close range of five kilometers to the mining sites with 46 cases recorded directly from a mine (see Appendix II). Accordingly 98 per cent of the cases happened in the five kilometer range and still 92 per cent directly at the mining sites. The arithmetic mean of all distances is at 0,3 kilometer which is almost the opposite of the findings based on human rights violations. The analysis of acts of lesser violence indicates that they take place almost exclusively at mining sites and surrounding villages but not in parts of the country which are distant to mines. One might assume that the data could be biased in the sense that cases of lesser violence are simply reported more often in the
surrounding of mines. However given the fact that a large number of sources with different emphases was used this impact seems to be negligible. Furthermore these findings do not only comply with the theory but also with the findings of Global Witness that many high ranking military officers and also some civilian leaders enforce miners to work for them without salary by collecting shares or even assigning their 'own' mine shaft which has to be quarried on specific days (see Global Witness 2009, 26f).

Nevertheless the question remains why the armed groups do not perform the same acts of lesser violence against non-minding communities, at least not as much as within mining sites. While the FDLR has build up governmental structures in some parts of their territory they do not run large taxation campaigns in most of their regions (see Global Witness 2009, 39). One explanation which follows Mahdavy's 'Rentier State' argument could be that there is simply no need to tax non-mining regions if revenues from recourses are present. This is bolstered by the fact that the M23 movement, having no resources in 'their' territory, actually implemented a large taxation strategy far beyond the efforts of other armed groups. This is not to say that there is not taxation of non-mining communities at all but it seems that the focus of all armed groups is on taxing resource areas if existent. This coalites somehow with Huntington's findings that “(resources) reduce the need for the government to solicit...
the acquiescence of the public to taxation” (Huntington 1991, 65). If armed groups are perceived to have a governmental-like function when it comes to money acquisition it can be argued that the resource rich areas are so lucrative that it does not make any sense to move to villages far away to acquire the little which could be gained there. Given the fact that many areas of the Kivus remain in a war like status the cost for movement is even higher, as threats are imminent. The armed groups therefore weigh the potential gains by taxing non-mining villages against the cost in terms of time, fuel and potential attacks and decide not to go for it.

6.4 Assessment of findings

All things considered the case study suggests that while resources do not seem to have a direct impact onto human rights violations they indeed have a large impact onto acts of lesser violence such as forced work and illegal taxation. Regarding the concept of human security resources seem to not only have an indirect impact as a reason for conflict but also a direct one, as they encourage rent-seeking by armed groups, leading to direct threats for the everyday life of mining communities due to illegal taxation, forced work and looting.

It is important to mention that these findings occur in a special environment which is defined by mundane corruption and civil war. In this context a social system based on corruption and violence is understood as the worst potential setting for the presence of valuable natural resources. Governmental institutions are absent, weak and/or undermined by corrupt elites and officials which is tipping the scales towards the curse site of resource related implications while mutual benefits can not be achieved. This situation is depicted by the Kivu provinces of the DRC in which both corruption and violence are daily occurrences.

Regarding the implications of human security, violence as understood within this thesis has to be analyzed on the micro- as well as the meso level, while the macro level is excluded because of its large divergence from the individual perspective. In both cases the center of attention around which the environment is grouped are the respective mining sites. While each mine is analyzed solely on the micro level the meso level covers the Kivu provinces themselves with the mining sites being only one factor.

On the meso level one finds the human rights violations which emerge only indirectly from the presence of valuable resources as these resources are a major source of the ongoing war, as outlined earlier. The finding that human rights
violations are mostly committed in order to threaten or punish the respective enemy. The armed groups do normally not commit these acts of violence in their 'own' mining sites but only in regions which they cannot control directly. The state of corruption and the correspondingly weak institutions which define the present situation in the Kivus enable a multitude of actors to enforce their will by means of violence. This systemic corruption is ultimately linked to resources as they are the main source of income as well as a major target for almost all armed groups and therefore keep the system alive.

The acts of lesser violence such as illegal taxation are almost exclusively found on the micro level. This can be explained by the according revenues which are much higher in contrast to non-mining areas and therefore provide a high return on investment. In order to maximize their gains armed groups use methods of exploitation which affects both the resources and the miners negatively. This can only take place because of the institutional framework which is again the state of corruption and civil war. The findings indicate that human rights violations do normally not occur at the mining sites, which is somehow logical as none of the armed groups can afford to destroy their basis of existence. Nevertheless the impact of lesser acts of violence should not be underrated as they are not only causing severe economical damage but also posing a direct threat to the human security of mining communities (see Global Witness 2012, 16f).

Given human rights violations on the meso- and acts of lesser violence on the micro level as one of the main findings of this paper, the question of their linkage remains. As both kinds of human security threats are closely linked to the widely corrupt system and are also committed by the same type of actor a conjunction of both seems reasonable. The link from the micro to the meso level is quite clear as resource exploitation is a major source of income for most of the armed groups. This is to say that terminating the armed group's control over the mining sites is fundamentally undermining their financing structure and ultimately impeding arms purchases. While the example of the M23 movement shows that resource possession is not a necessity this group is some sort of exception as it was not only highly connected with local elites but also heavily funded by Rwandan money (see Wroughton 2013).

Regarding the majority of armed groups which lack such extensive support any major financial drawback is likely to shrink their ability to excess violence.
Furthermore transforming the exploiting regimes into legal companies would provide reliable non-violent income sources for a number of people and therefore eventually prevent them from joining armed groups. Although stopping the micro violence at the mining sites is unlikely to totally end the ongoing civil war it nevertheless seems to be well suitable to cool down the ongoing conflict remarkably. Concerning the link from the meso to the micro level the mechanism is less obvious than the reverse case. If human rights violations on the meso level are primarily understood as means to terrorize the opponent, ending these violations could also put an end to the acts of lesser violence on the micro level as the actors are often the same. This is to say that if the operational forces of an armed group are broken up it is likely that this particular group can no longer control 'their' mining sites as well. An armed group's innocuousness could either be achieved by military force or eventually also by more diplomatic means such as disarming campaigns with both ways being difficult and dangerous (see Sandner 2014).
Comparing both perspectives it seems to be more feasible to stop the meso violence by stopping the micro violence than the other way around for a number of reasons. First of all, mining sites are more or less clearly located while the operational structures of armed groups are normally not. Furthermore, mines are bound to a certain area while armed groups themselves are not. Both facts make it easier to control a mining site than to control a whole area which is vital as the number of personal of for instance the peace-keeping forces is limited. Secondly, facing armed groups directly often means to face them at their conditions. Large offensives in the past have shown that armed groups tend to be quite persistent if they can rely on their financial sources, setting a high prize for their disbandment which is further increase by large civil casualties (see Holmes 2010, 4f). This is to say that it is not only more feasible to stop the human security threats on the micro level, but it is also more efficient in terms of both money and personal. Although a joint approach which is comprised of actions on the meso as well as the micro level could provide good results, the focus should be set on the latter.
In this context it is vital to address the system of corruption as a major aim as it is the decisive factor which turns the resources into a threat to human security as outlined in chapter 4. In order to tackle the violence arising from the system of corruption on the micro level a number of measures are necessary. While local institutions as well as the government of the DRC all have their part to play the industrialized countries
and particularly the European Union are also partly responsible as their resource requirements are fueling the conflict, which is analyzed in the following chapter.

7 Implications for European bodies and institutions
When it comes to the European perspective questions might emerge about the relevance of this topic. As Europe is not in possession of large amounts of valuable resources (except for oil to an extend) and more important European regions do not show the vast lack of democratic institutions which is defined as a precondition of the hypothesis one might ask why European institutions such as the EU should care at all. However, regarding the fact that the European union is importing roundabout 7200 tonnes of gold, 150 million tonnes of iron ore and 95000 tonnes of tungsten per year (see British Geological Survey 2015, 229f/242f/333) this assessment is proven forejudged for at least two major reasons. The first argument is the moral implication. As the NGO 'Global Witness' points out “to source raw materials in a way that exposes Congolese (or other) citizens to rape, murder, enslavement and impoverishment is morally indefensible” (Global Witness 2012, 19). While the evidence that natural resources are actually directly boosting human rights abuses is not strong enough to make a claim, even the weaker threats to human security such as illegal taxation or forced labor deny artisanal miners a life in dignity and the economic prosperity they deserve, while indirect consequences such as fightings over control impose even greater threats to the most vulnerable (see Jentzsch et al. 2015, 4). As the European Union is praising itself to promote democratic rights and has also set up a subcommittee which has to “ensure coherence between all the Union’s external policies and its human rights policy” (European Parliament 2015b) ignoring the moral implications would stand against the basic principles and convictions of the EU. Furthermore, it would harm a number of norms agreed upon by the United Nations which, although non-binding, provide rules of common understanding which should not be breached (see OECD 2013, 3).

While one could argue from a (neo)realistic perspective that given the ongoing crisis and economical stagnation the European Union could not afford to rely on ethical principles a second argument is likewise convincing. There is strong evidence that the large increase in security won by the liberation of mining sites from armed groups ultimately results in a rising production of up to a tenfold increase (see Global Witness 2012, 14). Combined with the improved conditions for investment and the
abolition of illegal taxation the resource prices are most likely to decrease noticeable while the production volume becomes more predictable. Given the large demand for resources within the European Union a steady import of minerals for a low price is crucial for numerous industrial enterprises which guarantee prosperity due to the European exportation. Furthermore civil control over valuable resources improves the situation of the miners and may cause additional wealth in the medium term which can also be perceived as foundation for new sales markets for European products.

7.1 Due diligence

Mostly for the first reason especially non-governmental organizations of the development sector have lobbied for an implication of measures which could prevent or at least impede the trade with resources which are likely to come from mines in possession of armed groups. Referring to common capital market law the concept of 'due diligence' was transferred to the mineral sector, formulating the basic principle that all parts of the value chain have to ensure the credible origin of their resources.

Back in 1976 the 'Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)' adopted their 'Guidelines of for Multinational Enterprises' as a number of recommendations to companies operating from OECD countries. Originally meant to bolster the economic harmonization of the member states the guideline was revised as from 2000 with the last update dating back to 2011. In order to account for the onward globalization this chapter was also “including a new chapter on human rights and provisions on an enterprise's due diligence regarding its supply chain” (Swiss Confederation SECO, n.d.). Recognizing both the moral implications and also the economical arguments in favor of due diligence the OECD provides a five-step framework which should be integrated into the respective companies' management systems. While an adaptation to the concrete circumstances could be necessary the framework provides a general guideline for companies willing to implement due diligence measures. Even if the propositions made by the OECD are non-binding their wide scope gained by a high number of stakeholders made the guidelines a fundamental document for other organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union (see OECD 2013, 1).
7.2 The Dodd-Frank Act

Due diligence was transferred into policy as US president Barack Obama signed the 'Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act' also abbreviatory referred to as 'Dodd-Frank Act' in July 2010, which is perceived to be “the most far reaching Wall Street reform in history” (White House 2015). Being the government's response to the financial crisis of 2007/08 and the subsequent 'Great Recession' in the first place, the law also implemented due diligence measures. Section 1502 of the act demands that companies which use mineral resources from the DRC or surrounding countries have to provide an annual report which includes “a description of the measures taken by the person to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody” (Congress of the USA, 2010), while section 1503 obliges mine operators to comply with a number of safety measures.

Industrial stakeholders opposed the law in general and the sections 1502-1504 in particular because of the costs of a due diligence audit which have been estimated by the 'National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)' to be at a charge between 1,5 and 25,5 million US dollar (see NAM n.d., 9f). However, NGOs aswell as a number of academic institutions have taken serious issues with these numbers which are perceived to be exaggerated. As an example the environmental consultancy 'Claigan Environmental' estimated costs between roundabout 20000 and 850000 US dollar in relation to a company's size (see Claigan Environmental Inc. 2011, 2) and 'Global Witness' worked out that some US companies even expected to face slightly positive economic impacts because “the regulations will tend to level the playing field” (Global Witness 2012, 18). While the difference between the existing estimations can be explained by different methods and to an extend by different political agendas, the development since 2011 does not indicate a major drawback as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act as the costs are manageable by the respecting companies and are

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**Five-Step Framework for Risk-Based Due Diligence in the Mineral Supply Chain**

1. Establish strong company management systems
2. Identify and assess risk in the supply chain
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks
4. Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due diligence at identified points in the supply chain
5. Report on supply chain due diligence

**source:** OECD 2013, 17ff
outnumbered by the medium term gains of reliable mineral sources.

7.3 The European Union's policy
Following a European Parliament's call of 2010 the European Commission finally reacted to due diligence demands in early 2014 by setting up “an integrated EU approach to stop profits from trading minerals being used to fund armed conflicts.” (European Commission 2014). While the proposition by the 'High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy', Catherine Ashton, and the 'EU Trade Commissioner' Karel De Gucht did only include voluntarily measures and ignored processed resources within devices such as mobile phones completely it eventually set the issue on the European agenda. Focused on tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, also referred to as 3TG the Commission's approach followed both the OECD Guidance and the Dodd-Frank Act but lagged behind the more binding rules of the latter, even if a more binding character was demanded by a number of lawmakers (see Jamasmie 2015).

The proposal was transferred to the European Parliament and revised by the 'Committee on International Trade (INTA)' which made a number of amendments such as the recognition of refined materials and obligatory due diligence measures for some companies (see European Parliament INTA 2015, 7-16). However NGO's from the development and human rights sector led by 'Amnesty International' and 'Global Witness' attacked the amended proposal and demanded binding due diligence standards for all companies active in the respective countries. They argued that the document under discussion was largely influenced by the businesses it would affect and therefore launched a campaign encouraging European citizens to send word to the Parliament, leading to “more than 200,000 messages” (Global Witness 2015).

At the 20th of May in 2015 the European Parliament discussed the Commission's proposal during the first reading. While the concrete impact of the NGOs' lobbying remains unclear the Parliament's decision followed the alleged criticism most widely. With a total of 402 out of 691 votes the Parliament adopted a number of amendments and referred the question “back to the competent committee for re-consideration” (European Parliament 2015a) which includes a new vote in the future. The amendments agreed upon include measures such as a European certification instead of a self-certification by the companies and also an extension of responsibility down the value chain, thereby strengthening the original aim of “eliminating the financing
of armed groups by means of controlling trade of minerals from conflict regions” (European Parliament 2015a). Furthermore the European Parliament recommended a strict monitoring system and expanded the OECD Due Diligence Guidance to all European importers sourcing the respective minerals. Especially the last impact is considered to be crucial as a voluntary or limited obligation is unable to reach the aspiration. Given the fact that due diligence compliance occasions higher costs at least in short-term range, for-profit organizations are de facto unable to comply as they would impose competitive disadvantages on themselves.

While an updated version of the proposal is yet to come, this paper's findings suggest that although resources bear a large potential for the people living in areas of conflict they are more likely to worsen the situation. As it seems to be the case that resources boost illegal taxing and forced work directly and even more severe violations of human rights indirectly, the recent amendments are a necessary first step in order to decrease the control of armed groups over mining sites and to eliminate them eventually.

7.4 Recommendations for European Institutions

Given the complex situation in the Kivus aswell as in other parts of the world a single European law is unlikely to make a major change. Nevertheless, it is a very important step but should rather be accompanied by a number of measures which do not only bind companies to strict due diligence standards but also help them and their respective mining partners to accomplish them. As investments contributing to a safe and predictable environment pay off within medium term the European Union should increase their cooperation with the governments of resource exporting countries if they are aiming at the same target, such as the government of the DRC.

Nevertheless it is also necessary to support genuine European interests which by implication means to encourage other governments to do the same. To stay within the example of the DRC it is more than time that the national law interdicting the army's involvement into the mining sector is strictly enforced. As long as the FARDC has to be described as a de-facto government which is providing a smokescreen for rebel commanders and individual rent-seeking the desperate situation of the DRC is unlikely to change (see UNJHRO 2013, 15ff).

As outlined in the previous chapter, the findings of this thesis indicate that threats to human security should be analyzed on both the micro and the meso level. While
these levels are largely intertwined they are still different concerning the concrete from of threats to human security which are human rights violations on the meso- and acts of lesser violence on the micro level. The analysis suggest that one can be dealt with by tackling the other and furthermore that it is more feasible to end the micro violence in order to end the meso violence than the other way around. Concerning the limited resources of the European Union it seems advisable to focus on the mining sites themselves to shrink the financial means of armed groups. While mining sites could be occupied by force it might be more efficient to dry out conflict mines by implementing strong due diligence standards as a mine which can not sell its resources is most likely to collapse.

To form a strong alliance in favor of due diligence it is crucial to convince companies to follow medium term goals instead of short-term revenues. By mounting the argument of reliable and ultimately cheaper supply chains the European institutions should be able to provide convincing arguments, especially if the ubiquitous free-riding dilemma is solved by obligatory due diligence standards for all areas of conflict.

Nevertheless due diligence alone might not be sufficient and should therefore be accompanied by additional means which fall in the realm of European development policy. The aim of the current support period of the European Commission for the DRC which is set from 2014 to 2020 is to “fight poverty by promoting inclusive and sustainable growth, strengthen democracy and human rights and contribute to peace and stability” (European Commission 2014). Funded with 620 million Euro the agenda has a special focus on the security sector and human rights but is also aiming to provide sustainable growth and good governance. Given the fact that the systemic corruption is identified as the main reason for the negative implications of the resources onto human security this approach is promising but still has to prove its accomplishment. This is especially important as the measures undertaken during the last support period dating from 2003 to 2011 are criticized by the European Court of Auditors to have been both too complicated and inefficient (see Euranet Plus 2013).

Concerning this papers findings it seems suitable to attach a part of the European money to projects which are likely to reduce the micro violence at the mining sites in order to ultimately reduce the macro violence committed by armed groups as well. This could be achieved by projects which aim to support the 'mining site validation process' as well as the Congolese mining police which both aim to prevent the control
of armed groups over mining sites (see Global Witness 2012, 12). Although both are in danger of being undermined by the ubiquitous corruption they have shown remarkable results and take place in cooperation with the DRC's government as well as the local population, which is important for the success of such attempts.

Another attempt is focused on the artisanal miners themselves who are endangered by both armed groups and international mining companies which are often privileged by the government (see Geenen 2013, 97f). As many of these miners do oppose armed groups but are unable to resist against violent force, strengthening their resilience could help to overcome the armed group's control. Due diligence measures are likely to contribute to this goal but education- and health programs are likewise important. If the mining sector becomes both secure and attractive to the local population this is likely to decimate the ranks of armed groups as they become less attractive and it would furthermore provide the positive side effects of economic prosperity which is especially necessary in one of the poorest regions of the world.

**Conclusion**

Unlike the rich literature dealing with the potential of resources to ignite and fuel violent conflicts the amount of material dealing with its direct impacts remains relatively small. This paper adds to the relief of this demand by linking the theory of the recourse curse to human security which moves the concept to the individual level. The hypothesis is formulated that given weak democratic institutions resources are likely to decrease human security, while strong democratic institutions are expected to show the opposite effect. The potential negative impacts of the existence of resources onto human security are identified as stagflation, patronage and corruption, depending on the institutional framework. In this context strong and transparent democratic institutions as well as fixed means to guide resource money have proven to be most resilient against debauching attempts.

A case study of the Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo using both human rights violations and lesser acts of violence as a proxy for negative impacts onto human security sets these threats in relation to the proximity to the next mining site. The case study partly verifies the hypothesis in the sense that even if no hint for a correlation between human rights violations and recourses could be found a correlation between resources and lesser acts of violence is more than likely. Coinciding with both existing theory and the findings of NGO's such as Global
Witness armed groups seem to force some miners to work and also to raise illegal taxes in and around mining sites while severe violations of human rights occur first and foremost as a penalty against the population in the territory of the respective enemy.

In this context acts of lesser violence can be defined as micro violence while the larger clashes which cause severe human rights violations happen on the meso level. The analysis shows that both levels are closely interlinked which is to say that one can be dealt with by solving the other. Further analysis suggests that it is more promising and also more efficient to begin on the micro level. Measures undertaken in order to contain the ongoing conflict should therefore aim to rise the level of human security for mining communities by preventing acts of lesser violence such as forced work or illegal taxation. Following this paper's findings this will close an important financial source of many armed groups and thereby impede their ability to use violence. While this could be achieved by military force other measures such as strong due diligence standards and support for artisanal mining communities could be likewise effective and less costly in terms of both resources and casualties.

These findings are relevant to European bodies and institutions as they contribute to the ongoing due diligence debate and provide new insights into the capabilities and boundaries of stabilizing means. Despite the local benefits of cutting financial sources of armed groups due diligence measures are also likely to secure value chains and to decrease the prizes of resources on medium term which provides direct revenue for European companies and therefore adds an economical argument to the moralistic pressure to provide strong due diligence standards. While it is shown that the European Union has brought up the rear in setting due diligence policies it could now take a leading role in defining strong and obligatory criteria. The United States’ Dodd-Frank Act shows that due diligence measures are feasible and to not cause severe damages to the economy and can therefore serve as an example for the European debate. Although the last statement of the European Parliament can be called promising more effort is necessary if results shall be presentable on the coming UN summit for the post-2015 development agenda at the end of this year.

Concerning the research question it can be said that resources seem to have an impact onto human security. Furthermore the case study suggests that this impact differs according to the institutional framework. This framework given by both governmental institutions aswell as civil bodies is likely to be decisive when it comes
to distinguish between positive and negative impacts of resources which both might occur.

Nevertheless, further research is necessary in order to assess the findings of this thesis. While a research design including a higher number of cases should be the first step it is also necessary to set up case studies of other regions to provide a more general understanding of the relation between resources and human security. As this thesis used a most likely case design in order to provide a first hint onto a potential causality a least likely case design would provide a stronger test for the hypothesis. An according case study could for instance assess the estimated positive impacts of resources onto human security in institutionally stable countries such as Botswana or even Norway. Furthermore the implication that strong democratic institutions are likely to increase human security in the presence of resources needs to be assessed, which calls for an adapted research design and cases from the other end of the Foreign Policy Fragile States Index.
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### Appendix I: Human Rights Violations

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**total:** 1265

**arithmetic mean:** 31,625

**distance to closest mine (km):** 2039.5

**possessor of closest mine:** 40.79
## Appendix II: Lesser illegal acts

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### arith mean:
- Arith mean distance to closest mine: 14.3
- Arith mean distance to closest mine: 0.286