Institutional Overlap in European Security: profound cooperation or rhetoric in civilian missions?
The case of NATO and the EU

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 Matthijs Louwrens Leeuw, s1361104

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 University of Twente
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1st Supervisor: Prof. dr. R.A. Wessel
2nd Supervisor: Dr. S. Donnelly

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Abbreviations

ANP  Afghan National Police
ANSF  Afghan National Security Forces
AU  African Union
CA  Comprehensive Approach
CEECS  Central and Eastern European Countries
CEP  Civilian Emergency Planning
CEPC  Civilian Emergency Planning Committee
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC  Civilian and Military Cooperation
CIVCOM  Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD  Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CONOP  Concept of Operation
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP\(^1\)  Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA  European Defence Agency
EEAS  European External Action Service
ESDI  European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU  European Union
EUSS  European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC  European Military Committee
EUMS  European Military Staff
EUSR  European Union Special Representative
HR  High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy
IMS  International Military Staff
IO  International Organization
IPCB  International Police Coordination Board
IR  International Relations
IRT  International Relations Theory
LMA  Lessons Management Application
MoI  Ministry of Interior
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NAT  North Atlantic Treaty
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
OPLAN  Operation Plan
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP  Partnership for Peace
PRTs  Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSC  Political and Security Committee
PSCD  Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence
SAA  Stabilization and Association Agreement
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOFAs  Status of Forces Agreements
SoR  Statement of Requirements
SSR  Security Sector Reform
UN  United Nations
USA  United States of America
WEU  Western European Union
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction

\(^1\) For the sake of consistency I use CSDP throughout the paper. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the CSDP was referred to as the ESDP
Summary

The relation between the EU and NATO is under pressure, terms as ‘frozen conflict’, ‘beauty contest’ and ‘turf wars’ pointed to a critical understanding between the two. I argue that dissonance within both organizations, as both NATO and EU’s CSDP external matters are intergovernmental models, prevent enhanced cooperation from happening on formal level. Deadlocks and the dated and underused Berlin plus agreement as thread of the relation suggest that cooperative behaviour is constrained. There are consultations and discussions at bureaucratic level, but the willingness to adjust policies is abstinent and withholds compatibility. Informal contacts and ‘lunch meetings’ are becoming increasingly important but lack effective capacity. Cooperation on the ground happens primarily through coordination. Moreover, recognizing the strengths from each other causes an operational division of tasks in areas subject to civilian crisis. Are attempts made to adjust policies? Yes, but not sufficiently. Do actors’ policies become significantly more compatible? No. There are way too many bottlenecks preventing effective cooperation in civilian crisis management. Both IOs monitor the security environment and develop planning strategies independently from one another. Besides, classified security information is not shared between the two which can lead to duplication of security agenda’s. The relation should replace the ‘Berlin plus’ by other prime arrangements, that not solely prevents the ‘D’ of duplication, but also the ‘D’ of discrimination of non-EU NATO and non-NATO EU members. To prevent discrimination, informal meetings are necessary for tuning national interest and the role organizations have in their security policy, since member states remain in the driving seat.
1. Introduction

The central contention of this search is the arguably changing cooperative relationship between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a changing security environment. The establishment of the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) in 2003 raises questions about what Kashmeri refers to as ‘intersecting trajectories’ (Kashmeri, 2011). He implies that the inclusion of military capabilities to European level on the one hand and NATO’s desire to broaden its security and defence mandates on the other, needs to be faced and dealt with in one way or another. The Berlin plus Agreement (2002) is widely considered as the cornerstone of the relation under scrutiny, however this agreement embodies a rather military character\(^2\). The absence of a civilian counterpart or ‘Berlin in reverse’ is predominantly the reason why Varwick and Koops do not observe effective multilateralism (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 123) between both International Organizations (IOs). Besides, the division-of-labour debate, which is based on the distinction between military and humanitarian tasks, between NATO and the EU got refed. This search is centred on the following research question:

To what extent are NATO and the EU cooperating in civilian missions since the establishment of the CSDP in 2003?

This question contains two international actors that deal with global security and defence affairs. Assessing NATO’s position in the post-Cold War era is a frequently examined topic as well as the concept of ‘multi-speed Europe’. Considering the neorealist prediction that alliances will waver when the common threat disappears and EU’s attempts to foster integration in the realm of security, triggers questions about the positions those IOs hold on the international stage. The drivers for EU’s defence and security integration are manifold, but those drivers congregate around EU’s ambition to strengthen its international actorness (Möttölä, 2007; M. E. Smith, 2012). Many contributors in the field of International Relations (IR) in general and security studies in particular, have examined developments of both IOs per se, or in relation to one another. Nonetheless, by realizing rapid changes in its CSDP since 2003, the EU profiles itself as a global security actor. Besides those rapid changes, NATO’s struggle to retain its relevance in a unipolar world system triggers questions about their relation. Because the “existence of CSDP cannot be understood without reference to the [complex] institutional environment within which it is located” (Stéphanie C Hofmann, 2011, p. 101), this analysis aims to clarify this relationship and the positions both IOs hold vis-à-vis one another forasmuch civilian means. Starting point is the neorealist prediction that alliances will waver or even perish when the major threat disappears (Dorman & Kaufman, 2010; Holsti, Hopmann, & Sullivan, 1973; Wallander, 2000). This prediction has yet not become reality as NATO still operates, however its strategic role has changed since the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War resulted in ‘operational task vacuum’ for NATO to which it had to respond by rethinking its raison d’être, changing its strategies to retain its relevance and even legitimize its existence. Critical neorealist scholars understand alliances typically as a response to an external threat and thus fecund in bipolar conditions, while multipolarity and unipolarity suggest uncertainty which inter alia creates inter-alliance division and undermines cohesion. Since, both IOs share twenty-two members and communicate their common main values, principles and norms in the realm of international security; it is not surprisingly that both organizations are engaged in entrenched cooperation. However, many discrepancies exist between both IOs in analyses of the creation, functioning and perceived trajectories. The rapid progression in EU’s CSDP as such is oftentimes explained by political events, neo-functionalism and its accompanying spill over dynamics. For instance, Arita Eriksson argues that integration in EU’s defence and security policy is mainly driven by economic and functional dynamics, that is internal factors (A. Eriksson, 2007, p. 2). While a major threat, which embodies an external factor, contributes to NATO’s internal cohesion according to realist reasoning (McCalla, 1996, p. 450). Moreover the concept of institutional overlap raises concerns about redundancy and subsequently whether cooperation might turn into competition. Both – the abovementioned theoretical discrepancies and targeted entrenched cooperation – deserve a

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\(^2\) Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
depth and comprehensive analysis forasmuch “we do not know enough about their cooperation, which is why it is vital to look at the EU-NATO relationship more deeply” (Schleich, 2014, p. 183).

My search is guided by an inductive approach in which official published policy documents of both organizations are foundational. This topic fits perfectly well in academic debate concerning the relation under investigation, which is currently dominated by policy questions, that is, questions related to how both organizations should organize cooperation or whether cooperation is desired at all. By applying a content analysis to relevant policy documents I will reveal coherence and differences in both organizations’ propositions concerning civilian aspects of crisis management in general and their perceived tasks in particular. So, language – as primary expression of social meaning – demand my focus (Larsen, 2002, p. 287). My content analysis covers relevant policy documents from both organizations since 2003. This implies that – in an inductive fashion – I will construct statements based on observations. My approach is characterized by latent content coding which requires some subjective assessment regarding the contextual and underlying meaning. This approach has many interfaces with that of a discourse analysis, since both approaches deal with communications and their meanings (Herrera & Braumoeller, 2004, p. 17). Based on hypothetical reasoning – key concepts or patterns are reviewed and redefined, so that consequently comprehensive, plausible statements can be made about these concepts or patterns in relation to their contexts.

This research topic is a considerable one, since the relation is underexplored in scientific sense. Critical questions have been post whether NATO should be shut down and IRT suggest different outcomes. Besides, many academics have explored the struggles both IOs passed through the past decade. Moreover, the absence of an inter-institutional theory (Schleich, 2014, p. 184) in IRT confirms the new dimensions in the realm of international security policy. My search aims to explore what both IOs consider essential elements of civilian crisis management and to which extent they jointly strive to approach such crises, how they deal with potential overlap, and consequently whether both IOs align their tasks. From a social point of view, NATO still is the institutional embodiment of the Atlantic-Euro relation in the realm of security, but its internal cohesion crumbles arguably due to the absence of a major explicit threat. For some generations, NATO means the safeguard during four decades of international tensions. For others, NATO has served its goal and has no legitimate reason to activate any kind of missions anymore.

Both IOs have been subject to internal and external threats, though one can hardly argue that both IOs have undergone matching dynamics. NATO’s establishment – as a military alliance – and the creation of the European Community as a “civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne, 1973, pp. 19-20) were fundamentally different. However, the EU made rapid advances in its CSDP ever since 2003, and can be considered as a global military actor. NATO on the other hand, seeks to include civilian capabilities in order to remain a relevant global security actor. However, until the present day, it is the absence of a ‘Berlin plus in reverse’ – which could allow NATO to draw on EU’s civilian assets in crisis management operations – as a counterpart of the actual Berlin plus Agreement that raises question about the veracity of the relation. The question that guides this paper is: To what extent are NATO and the EU cooperating in civilian missions since the establishment of the CSDP in 2003? What need to be known in order to answer this question are the definitions, and thus the boundaries, of the concepts: ‘cooperation’ and ‘civilian means’. This search stems from EU’s main label as being a ‘civilian power’ and NATO’s desire to gather more civilian capabilities; and the way in which IOs communicate their relationship to the world, namely cooperative, which will be critically assessed.

1.1. Research Methods

My study aims at elaborating whether and how the EU and NATO cooperate in civilian crisis management and thus demands a qualitative approach. I will start by observing relevant policy documents published by NATO and the EU concerning its CSDP and will look for civilian missions in particular. Since I start by observing relevant documents, my approach can be classified as inductive. However, my research topic fits in a current academic debate, many scholars deal with policy questions, that is, questions related to how both organizations should organize cooperation or whether cooperation is desired at all. The question I will address is descriptive and covers the time period from 2003 until the present. In sum, I deal with an inductive trend study aiming to describe cooperative
efforts in civilian crisis management missions between the EU and NATO. By applying a content analysis to relevant policy documents I will reveal coherence and differences in both organizations’ propositions concerning civilian missions.

My research design brings various threats. Since I deal with policy documents – and thus structured, qualitative data – my study requires interpretation. So interpretation bias is a common mentioned threat. The threat of representativeness will not endanger my study, because policy documents clearly amplify what both organizations intentions are. Likewise, policy documents are published by the organizations themselves as way of communicating its strategies. So, language – as primary expression of social meaning – demand my focus (Larsen, 2002, p. 5). I will primarily use primary data, since policy documents can be considered as the foundation of my search. These essential policy documents will provide me insights that help me to develop questionnaires. Doing structured interviews in a natural setting – as primary data collection method – enables me to focus on specific subjects. In contrast to secondary data, primary data is more difficult to obtain, more expensive and time-consuming which might threaten my planning. Another threat is a low response rate due to sensitivity, loyalty and subjectivity towards an organization’s position, since I deal with a study centred on organizations’ status. Besides, gathered data might be futile after a while, because of policy decisions that could have implications for one or both organizations. Finally, respondents maintain certain conditions, as for example many agencies refuse to answer hypothetical, personal or provocative questions.

1.1.1. Case selection and sampling

My research question includes two main actors, NATO and the EU. Those two IOs communicate their collaboration efforts since 2003. Sampling is simply to decide what to observe and what not, and thus basically it means the process of selecting observations. I will apply a flexible non-probability sampling method, namely purposive/judgemental sampling since I am interested in a specific field: civilian missions. For instance, my attention will be triggered by publications of CSDP institutions, which include the HR, PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM, CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, ISS and the EDA. The most recent publications are considered to be significant. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty, which refers somewhat little to NATO, is the main source for exposing the legal framework in which the EU finds itself concerning CSDP, e.g. Status of forces agreements (SOFAs) (Sari, 2008, pp. 72-73). The current legal condition in which the EU finds itself in relation with NATO is summarized in Article 47 (2) TEU that says that commitments and cooperation in CSDP shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. Besides, NATO communicated its perceived role – in a changing security environment – by publishing its Strategic Concepts in 2010. NATO’s Strategic Concept is its main soft law instrument, which thus clearly amplifies what it considers as main security threats and envisioned approach.

1.1.2. Data collection methods

What need to be known, in order to answer my research question, are the perceived tasks and competences of both IOs in the changing security environment. Those tasks, competences and their constituting aims are communicated by the IOs themselves forasmuch the principle of transparency. Official published policy documents can be considered as reliable sources, because they are produced by qualified agencies, committees or experts that are connected to NATO or EU. Those documents can be found on the official websites of the agencies and committees of interests. Obviously, I will deal with primary qualitative data.

1.1.3. Data analysis

I deal with a qualitative research project in which dimensions such as contexts, organizations, structures and interaction are of importance, and thus is my sampling technique based on theoretical reasoning. Initially, I will apply a content analysis of all collected relevant policy documents from both organizations since 2003. This approach has many interfaces with that of a discourse analysis,
since both approaches deal with communications and their meanings (Herrera & Braumoeller, 2004, pp. 20-21). Various distinct, inductive steps must be taken. When starting with analysing relevant policy documents, certain language and concepts will be noticed. These concepts are political or legal related and will be looked for and found in other documents, this is what Glaser and Strauss call ‘coding’, and will be repeated some times in a comparative fashion in a chronological order, that is from 2003 onwards. Consequently, these key concepts observed in the policy documents will be placed in its context, i.e., exposing which concepts are related to the key concepts and how these are related. Then, the key concepts and their related dimensions constitute to my concluding arguments, which is a product from a chronological case-after-case analyses.

To sum up, I would label my data analysis technique as an ‘inductive content analysis’. The main advantage is certainly that it allows me to study the process which occurs over a long time, say from 2003 to the present. Independently of my intensions to conduct several interviews, my content analysis contains unobtrusive measures.
2. Background

2.1. NATO-EU discourse since 2003

The intensification of the relation between NATO and EU since 2003 has been subject to quite a lot of academic attention. Inter-institutional relations can be considered as a new dimension to classical IRT, and thus explanations how and why IOs and International Institutions cooperate are rather new-fledged (Ojanen, 2011). Even though, since formal IOs increasingly manage everyday interactions between states as well as the contemporary trend that IRT are widely considered as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, it is unclear whether inter-institutional theory must build on existing theoretical frameworks, and if so on which one. As IOs are more and more important in every day’s decision-making – be it in monetary, health or security issues – one cannot understand contemporary international life without formal organizations. From a rational-institutionalist perspective, Abbott and Snidal consider centralization and independence as main functional characteristics that explain why states present-day prefer collective action over decentralized modes. Centralization allows IOs for collective action, which is believed to be necessary for IOs’ ability to efficient carrying out its mandate, while “independence means the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres” (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 5). The centralization of decision-making means reduced autonomy for member states (Menon, 2011, p. 93). It is this rational-institutionalism theory that Caja Schleich – along with the principal-agent theory – uses in her attempt to explain the EU-NATO relationship. Both theories are complementary and centred around the functionality of IOs in achieving states’ goals (Duffield, 1994; Keohane & Martin, 1995). Abbott and Snidal affirm that strong, rationally acting, states influence IOs decisions in such ways that fits their interests the most. In the same fashion, Schleich argues that those stronger states are able to force inter-institutional cooperation, especially when IOs deal with institutional overlap. This possibility for inter-institutional cooperation stems from both organizations’ institutional overlap, which involves three dimensions, namely common memberships, intersecting mandates and shared resources (Stéphanie C Hofmann, 2011, pp. 103-104). Institutional overlap can be considered as a matter of degrees; however, the EU-NATO relation arguably satisfies all three above mentioned dimensions. With a total of twenty-two common members, common tasks, strategies and similar commitments towards the UN Charter and ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (Stephanie C Hofmann, 2009), and common resources – the gist of the Berlin Plus Agreement – confirm the claim.

It is exactly Abbott and Snidal’s claim, that strong states have major impacts on IOs functioning and direction, which can be observed post 9/11. The problem of terrorism became obviously the most important security threat for Europe and the United States of America (USA) in particular. In previous decades the self-definitions and main principles of both NATO and the EU were predominantly defined pertaining to the totalitarian Eastern neighbours, which in turn reinforced their own identities (Fierke & Wiener, 1999, p. 726). Consequently, the end of the Cold War and the emerging terrorist threat influenced both IOs identity. How to approach this threat exposed the main difference in foreign security policy between ‘the Atlantists’ and ‘the Carolingians’ (Ricci, 2014). This ideological split concerning foreign and security policy was, and actually still is highlighted by several dimensions. If we follow Abbott and Snidal’s argument that more powerful states have more influence on IOs actions, one cannot deny that the USA is the impellent of NATO. First and foremost, the use of force is an act and idea that differs fundamentally between both IOs (Duke, 2008, p. 35). It is this ‘hard power, soft power complex’ that signifies the different nature between both organizations. While the USA seems to maintain a ‘military pre-emption’ plight, the EU prefers a rather civilian approach to threats. Second, the acceptance and importance of multilateral institutions is an issue on which the USA and European States disagree. Whereas for the European countries multilateral commitments seems to be ordinary modes of approaching global problems, the USA prefers ‘coalitions-of-the-willing’ (Duke, 2008; Matlary, 2006). Of importance here is the notion of an alliance as multilateral concern. An alliance is an intergovernmental vehicle aimed at combining military resources by a group of states in order to be able to or prepare for “some assumed contingency

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3 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
usually defined by reference to an external threat posed by another state or group of states” (Webber, Sperling, & Smith, 2012, p. 22). Intergovernmental affairs may constrain nations’ freedom for action to some degree. This process of transferring some sovereignty to an IO or such a body seems to be a tradition for European countries, while the USA is rather reluctant to do so. But national prerogatives prevail which is the main exigency for the USA that consider itself as the main superpower on the international stage. This brings us the third dimensions on which both sides of the Atlantic disagree, namely the amount of ‘great powers’ the international system should count. As well the USA and European countries acknowledge that a bipolar world system – such as during the Cold War – is not to be favoured as it likely results into military balancing. The current state of the international system is widely considered as unipolar acknowledging that the USA is the sole super power forasmuch military capabilities and expenditures (Monteiro, 2012). Even though, many European countries, and China (Men, 2007, p. 8) and Russia too, are tend to encourage a multipolar system, in which multiple superpowers live through side by side. The fourth and last dimension is the legitimacy issue concerning military action: the difference between the modern, Hobbesian USA and the post-modern European view (Reichard, 2006). Whereas for the USA national interests are the main pillars on which military interventions predominantly are based (Gnesotto, 2003), international law is the main pillar for the EU (ESS, 2003; Matlary, 2006). Whenever a CSDP mission or operation in a third country is launched, it is in line with a request by the host state and a UN Security Council Resolution. All EU action is based upon international law, notably human rights law, and in line with the UN Charter. It is in Europeans nature that military intervention is an act of last resort and only an option when the humanitarian rewards are high, the costs in blood low and all states are able to reach consensus about the case (Toje, 2008, p. 206). In short, the use of force, the significance of multilateral institutions, the ‘polarity’ of the world system, and source of legitimacy are the most profound differences between the EU and NATO in which the USA is definitely a dominant factor.

Despite those abovementioned differences, one can imagine that with twenty-two shared member states several converging forces result in common ground too. Rifts between both IOs were oftentimes tucked away by means of the traditional common transatlantic value base, which seems to make NATO and EU partners by default. Many commentators seem to agree that this value base can be understood as the ends to which Europe and America strive, though it are the means on how to achieve the ends that differ between the two sides of the Atlantic. Both IOs were established in totally different political contexts, but the ends – and thus value base – are identical. Common threats and the value base both have explanatory potency forasmuch defence integration; however it is the value base of NATO that needs a little more pronouncement. The founding charter of NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) which was concluded on 4 April 1949 in Washington, and thus also referred to as Washington Treaty. The process of agreeing upon and writing of the only fourteen articles containing treaty was fast which in turn explains the commonly perceived necessity of a mutual defence commitment at the time (McCalla, 1996). This necessity, as it is oftentimes argued, was embodied by the threat from the Soviet Union. Others claim that the shared Western, liberal, democratic norms and values of the founding states are the main reasons why the Alliance was established (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Schlag, 2009). Unravelling the foundational principles and fundamental political-laden motivations for establishing this treaty is significant in the sense that this treaty is still legally in effect. Moreover, the current international stage is subject to quite different security dynamics than that of the second half of the 20th century. Importantly, the preamble and also Article 2 sum up several principles which are the core of what Reichard calls a ‘Western community based on values’ (Reichard, 2006). These principles are that of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, which in turn are believed to contribute to stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. NAT’s preamble and its Article 1 state NATO’s commitment to foster international security and peace in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations (UN). Article 2, 3 and 4 are legally rather cloudy, as those articles modestly sum up the implicit means all contracting parties will undertake to foster collaboration, collective capacities and territorial integrity. Article 5 is obviously the cornerstone of NATO, which sets out the mutual defence commitment, that is, an armed attack to one member state, shall be

4 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
5 Interview EU official (Political Administrator), 01/02/2016
considered an attack to them all. So, the main principle of the NAT can be argued, is that of the ‘one for all, all for one’ provision. Article 5 is founded based on article 43 and 51 of the UN Charter; these articles provide member states the right to collective defence employments. These agreements entail the types and numbers of forces, degree of readiness, geographical location and the character and nature of assistance, which ought to be approved and ratified by the Security Council and all constituting member states. The NAT conflicts by no means with the UN Charter or undermines the role of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Both, the UN and NATO mention that the UN Charter enjoys primacy, respectively in Article 103 (UN Charter) and Article 7 (NAT). This Article 7 thus elucidates NATO’s reliance and acceptance of UN’s normative framework and functioning. However, NATO members agreed, in Article 8, that international engagements that might conflict with the NAT must be avoided. Engagements, from a legal perspective, also represent non-binding commitments, which in turn leaves NATO’s members very little room to get engaged with third parties as long as it could conflict NATO’s core mission. So, Articles 7 and 8 notice NAT’s conflict clauses, in which respectively, UN’s primacy is respected while NATO reserves primacy vis-à-vis possible international engagements that could complicate NATO’s functioning. Nowadays, almost seven decades after the NAT was signed, Article 8 has had its effects on its member states and other IOs. Besides NATO’s conciseness regarding its legal culture, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the only institutional body that was created in 1949 by means of Article 9. The NAC is the highest organ of NATO and therefore deserves a few comments forasmuch the Council’s functioning and powers. The NAC is the main political decision-making body within the NATO and is composed of high representatives of all member states who discuss all security related issues that might require collective action. Decisions taken by the NAC arise from consensus which implies that every involved high representative, on behalf of its member state, has the right to veto. This procedure assures that the collective will of all member states is respected and contributes to the harmonisation national defence plans at the same time. Moreover, Article 9 provides the NAC the possibility to establish a defence committee when deemed necessary. However, the fact that only one organ was established by the ratification of the NAT in 1949 can be explained as a decisive choice to prevent any form of bureaucratic organizational structure that might complicate decision-making and consequently negatively affects NATO’s core mission and the timely implementation of such decisions. NAT’s 10th Article states that a European State which is able to conform to the principles of the NAT and capable to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area could be invited by the parties and accede to NATO. NATO’s main principles seem straightforward, as they are listed in the preamble. Furthermore, the UN Charter serves as normative framework in which NATO finds itself. What is meant by contributing to the security is a matter of subjectivity, which leaves room for discussion within the NAC. It was not until 1995 that NATO communicated its accession criteria in the ‘Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995’. What can be said is that enlargement has been on NATO’s agenda ever since 1949. However, it is not surprisingly that NATO defined the material requirements for accession only in 1995. Key issue for NATO was accomplishing its task as an alliance by “protecting the sovereignty of individual states” (Fierke & Wiener, 1999, p. 722) and thus drawing clear boundaries between the ‘us’ and ‘them’. With the end of the Cold War, the status of ‘enlargement’ ambitions changed considerably due to the shifting focus from security to stability, which explains NATO’s study on enlargement at that time. NATO’s changed trajectory began with the London Declaration in 1990 that declared that NATO did not see the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact as rivals anymore. It even invited Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to establish diplomatic relationships with the alliance. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, in which NATO and CEECs declared their commitment to nonaggression, is formally seen as the end of the Cold War in 1990. Even though, security remained the key concept in NATO’s functioning, this concept got broadened by a political and economic dimension. This ‘study on enlargement’ document deserves some further analysis as to the purposes and principles of enlargement. NATO believes that enlargement contributes to enhancing security and stability within the Euro-Atlantic area, or at least security in its broadened scope. The organization sees enlargement as mutual beneficial, that is, accession brings positive effects for as well NATO as new member states. NATO benefits, can be said, are related to stability while new members’ benefits are obviously centred on security affairs, i.e., the vantage of the common defence and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Moreover, it is believed that stability and security are mutually reinforcing as long invited countries comply with the
shared values, accept NATO’s institutional procedures and Washington Treaty as such. The ‘study’ sums up some straightforward enlargement-related issues, including civilian and democratic control over military provisions, convergence of national defence policies by means of cooperation, consultation, consensus building among allies and transparency regarding defence planning and military budgets. Prior to an invitation, candidates are screened along various criteria. Reichard recite these criteria as follows, candidate countries ought to have a functioning democratic, political system based on a market economy; treat ethnic or religious minorities according the OSCE standards; solve disputes and make commitments to peaceful settlements; be able and willing to contribute to the Alliance’s military and achieve interoperability with all contracting parties; respect democratic civil-military relations and NATO’s institutional structures and relations (Reichard, 2006). Even though NATO’s enlargement vision and communication of the main values provides interesting insights of the organizations’ core principles, these visions and communications must be viewed from a political perspective, because this value base will remain but the means how to achieve them are subject to the international arena, e.g. the disunity between NATO allies concerning the Iraq war.

However, common ground is the roots for mutual respect between the two. Moreover, many commentators point to the economic interdependence between Europe and America (Kagan, 2007), which inter alia results in cooperation in other fields. Especially policy fields, in which violations towards democracy, individual freedoms and human rights are possible, are matters where common ground is oftentimes found (Gompert, 2003). First, after the Cold War the world became arguably even more unpredictable because the two adversaries mediated their relation towards one another, which resulted in a vacuum forsooth opposing powers for the West. This unpredictable world, which was the main topic of NATO’s Strategic Concept from 1991, improved the relation between the United States and the EU because they had hardly any other power to turn to. Second, “The EU needs NATO because, for the foreseeable future, it will remain militarily impotent without it. The USA needs NATO to legitimize its ongoing presence and influence in Europe” (Howorth, 2003, p. 236). In this sense, NATO can be considered as the ‘transmission belt’ between interests of the USA and EU. Third, the cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic relationship is economics. Both sides of the Atlantic are economic superpowers and profound economic cooperation might contribute to improve the relation as a whole, and consequently NATO’s position could benefit from this. Moreover economic growth is triggered by technological developments and investments, especially in the military. The unity of the military and industrial complex explains the relation between economic neo-liberal partnerships and military spending. Since, NATO – as an intergovernmental organization – is highly dependent on national contributions makes this interconnectedness or vicious circle between economic growth and military spending highly important.

2.1.1. Institutionalization and Formalization

Institutionalization is “the degree to which [an organization’s] norms and practices are formalized within a particular structure and process” (McCalla, 1996, p. 462). Institutions are thus formally, humanly devised structures and rules that stipulate expected behaviour (Menon, 2011). Only sporadic contacts between both Brussels based IOs were to be observed during the 1990s. It was not until the EU took over WEU’s Petersberg tasks with competences in military missions that cleared the way for more consultation with NATO. The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks is widely considered as the first step towards direct EU-NATO cooperation, since the EU could not conceive itself as a pure civilian actor anymore. The second step can arguably be found in Javier Solana’s appointment as first EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and “his successor as NATO Secretary General, George Robertson” (Blockmans, 2013, p. 250), who – as former British Defence Secretary – was one of the crucial factors in architecting the St-Malo agreement. These two established some sort of inter-institutional connection – albeit informal – because both were well-known with the other party’s visions and structures. Since EU’s Helsinki Summit in 1999 the institutional EU-NATO link became inevitable as the Council strived to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. From the moment the EU decided to foster its CSDP, it acknowledged that several institutional bodies were necessary. From as well NATO as EU
officials it was clear that CSDP’s institutional design should be modelled on that of NATO. CSDP’s replicated institutional framework, in which the PSC is the equivalent of NATO’s NAC, must be considered as an approval from EU’s side. Moreover “the EU Military Committee (EUMC), as well as the EU Military Staff (EUMS), became close replications of NATO’s Military Committee and International Military Staff (IMS), respectively” (Blockmans, 2013, p. 250). The inter-organizational – as well political as legal – relation between NATO and the EU involves several characteristics of institutional isomorphism (Juncos, 2007). Globalizing societies are institutionalizing due to pressure on cultural and associational grounds. These developments are observable between states and also between IOs. Institutional isomorphism can be sub-divided into various types based on the underlying dynamics. So far, normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and coercive isomorphism provide interesting insights with regard to the institutional overlap under investigation. First, normative isomorphism is simply based on common norms and beliefs. The base reasoning of normative isomorphism is that, due to common norms, individuals are linked with organizations, or organizations are linked with other organizations. ‘Inter-hiring’ occurs oftentimes and is motivated by securing legitimacy (Radaelli, 2000). A salient detail is Javier Solana’s career switch from Secretary General of NATO to EU’s HR for CFSP in 1999. Second, mimetic isomorphism is the tendency that one organization almost copies the entire organizational structure of another – very successful – organization. This copying is based on the rationality that mirroring successful structures guarantee a safe foundation. CSDP’s institutional set-up truly embodies mimetic isomorphism, as CSDP’s institutions are chiefly equivalents of that of NATO’s. Third, coercive isomorphism is the product of external pressure and possibly other international organizations. This pressure is based on cultural and societal expectations. With regard to EU’s legal commitments – in CSDP matters – to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to NATO, the EU is definitely located in a certain normative framework.

Strengthening the link between NATO and EU caused some hesitancy among several EU members and France in particular. France feared that – due to NATO’s perceived primacy – NATO’s structures, procedures and policies would paralyze EU’s performance in defence and security matters. At the beginning of the 21st century various informal meetings between European ad hoc joint working groups and NATO were arranged in which cooperation structures were discussed with regard to the security agenda, capabilities, sharing assets and permanent consultation mechanisms for those countries that were member of one of the two organizations. The PSC, which was created in the Amsterdam Treaty and replaced the Political Committee, consisted of Brussel-based ambassadors instead of national representatives and should meet at least three times per six months with the NAC. Even though, the PSC consist of representatives of the member states, it “constitutes an internationalized collective, with individuals possibly developing preferences divergent from their own governments” (Mayer, 2011, p. 323). The exchange of letters on ‘permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation’ between the EU and NATO outside times of crisis was considered as a major step forwards in institutionalizing EU-NATO cooperation. The very first meeting between both bodies, on 12 June 2001, is widely perceived as the first formal arrangement between NATO and the EU. These developments were followed up by the ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’, which highlighted the strategic partnership between both organizations. One year later, the Berlin plus Agreement was signed: the EU was promised to have access to NATO military and planning capabilities and authority for autonomous operations where NATO as a whole was not engaged. One can imagine that from the moment EU-lead missions became reality – while NATO ran missions as well – a growing overlap emerged, enforcing a stronger need for cooperation (Schleich, 2014, p. 186). EU’s operation Concordia was EU’s first ever military operation made possible by the Berlin plus framework. Concordia was widely considered as a successful mission, but above all it proved the actual advancement of the relation between both IOs in practice (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 106). Some division of labour as to the degree of intensity could be observed, though not formalized6. NATO performed tasks in the higher range of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, while the EU performed mainly lower intensity conflict prevention operations (Mayer, 2011). NATO and EU exercised competing models of security provision, as we observe differences in cultures, functions, instruments and fundamental institutional structures and logics (Ojanen, 2006).

6 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
Besides this division-of-labour, EU’s learned lessons from experiences and CSDP missions contributed to adaptions. Smith conceptualized institutional learning as a process of deliberate reform consisting of (M. E. Smith, 2012):

1. Benchmarking existing principles, rules, values and purposes in a policy domain on a regular basis;
2. Generating field-specific lessons as a consequence of actively engaging in new missions;
3. Transforming those lessons into cumulative knowledge through observations, dialogues, monitoring and evaluation processes on a deliberate basis;
4. Institutionalizing and concretize that knowledge for application to future operations.

Adaptions and reforms are – as Smith argues – results of new information, observations and experiences. Consequently, institutions’ functions, value base, resource base and skill set changes. Classifying these changes into responsibilities, rules and resources simplifies, but explicates EU’s progression concerning its CSDP. Responsibilities refer, for instance, to EU’s own perceived position or place in the world as a security actor and thus contain an external dimension. Moreover, an actor’s perception might not be shared among other international actors which complicate matters, especially in the field of security. Rules then are organizational structures on which a particular policy domain is built, and thus are internal matters. Resources refer to material – such as personnel and equipment – and non-material – such as reports, data and knowledge in general – assets which the EU and its constituting member states make available to ensure that the CSDP operates as an efficient policy tool.

Both IOs consist of member states, and whenever an IO does not serve the interests of member states anymore, adaptions ought to be made. Institutions are generally considered as useful is several ways. First, they overbear obstacles to cooperative efforts such as communication, uncertainty of intentions, high transaction costs and above all mistrust. Second, institutions are important means to address shared dilemmas “such as free-riding, the relative-gains problem, defection, and the ‘tragedy of the commons’” (Webber et al., 2012, p. 38). And third, institutions serve the practical benefits of policy coordination, i.e., hierarchical orders, procedures and information sharing. What follows – from the above mentioned advantages of institutions – is that the degree of an institution’s effectiveness is based on:

1. Institution’s raison d’être, its ability to actually address the set of problems it ought to tackle and the implementation of effective policies;
2. Institution’s ability to assure coherence and compliance among its members concerning the main pillars, principles and rules of the institution; and
3. Institution’s ability to ensure its consistence and survival when the environment demands to transform its provisions.

The acceptance and satisfaction of member states with such adaptions and the resulting functioning of institutions is an elite explanatory variable for IOs persistence after hard times, because “an institution will not persist if it no longer serves the interests of its members” (Wallander, 2000, p. 705). On the other hand IOs, as concerts of nations have to reach common ground, that is, the member states have to agree upon institutional assets. Wallander distinguishes specific and general assets, however the mix of both determines whether security threats can be faced or not. The specificity of assets determines whether it will be successful in facing security threats. Though, defense and security is a multidimensional sphere in which certain assets are not suitable for all security threats. Therefore, it is the set of assets on which member states have to agree. For instance, specific assets established for coping with nuclear proliferation differ fundamentally with specific assets created for dealing with the negative consequences of failing states. Wallander her main argument insist that organizations with general institutional assets can adapt less costly and more easily to new a new security environment (Wallander, 2000, pp. 706-707). This argument builds on the rational-institutionalist claim that when existing institutions outweigh the costs of creating new institutional arrangements, states will sustain the existing one. In this sense we can consider the degree of institutionalization as starting point for examining an organization’s persistence, adaptions and consequently roles. What follows is that the more an organization is institutionalized, the more it is likely that it will persist and is able face changing environments. In short, institutional adaptability is a function of relative costs and the functions of the institution. Relative costs and functional effectiveness in turn are dependent on asset
specificity. Assets’ specificity can be ordered along some dimension and is never fixed, but are rather perceived as suitable for one, some or a range of transactions. Specific assets are only suitable for peculiar transactions, but in turn are highly efficient for those peculiar transactions. Specific institutional assets are thus idiomatic and very well suited for the purposes it serves. General assets, on the other hand, are not specific but useful for a wide array of transactions. These assets are more common and convenient and thus more flexible. However, general assets are – without specification – not as efficient as specific assets in fulfilling a particular transaction. From the above stems that the more specific an asset is, “the less it can be adapted for different uses or when conditions change” (Wallander, 2000, p. 708). This argument is in line with the rationale behind the creation of international institutions, because cooperation between states becomes more interesting when costs are reduced. From here, institutional adoptions are more interesting when it saves explicit and implicit costs in comparison with creating new ones. On the other hand, we can expect that states that form an alliance as a response to threats or coercion, design institutions that enable the states to cooperate specifically in facing the threat by credible defence and deterrence. So, the security dilemma the NATO faced during the Cold War and the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union forced NATO to develop specific political and military assets to counter the threats. However, not only its external core mission was institutionalized. The alliance also aimed for bringing its members closer to one another and subsequently converging defence policies. Even though, NATO’s raison d’être is formalized in its Article 5, one should not ignore NATO’s Article 2 that sums up its internal intentions to promote conditions of stability and well-being. For instance, NATO already seems to have incorporated more functions than strictly military ones from the beginning. These functions include mechanisms for coordinating and consulting practices, which are labelled as non-military functions (Stuart, 1993). For instance, prevention of mistrust, competition and instability within NATO or between member states were taken care of by developing specific assets. These specific assets included mechanisms of converging political-military integration, supranational defence policy and above all the procedures and principles of civilian democratic control in defence affairs. So, besides establishing specific assets for coping with the external threat, NATO also created specific assets for coping with internal affairs that in the long-term enabled NATO to adapt more easily to the changed security environment i.e., NATO was able to adjust to the new post-Cold War order. In 1991, NATO adopted its ‘Declaration on Peace and Cooperation’ in which it pleaded for a framework of ‘interlocking institutions’. At the time, NATO already acknowledged that it should find allies that could “offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes” (NATO, 1991, p. 12). These developments contradict the neorealist prediction that the alliance would be disintegrate after the Cold War. Neorealism adherents envision that the greater the threat or power which ought to be balanced, the greater the internal cohesion of the alliance (Snyder, 1991). In the same fashion, analysts have claimed that the absence of a serious existential threat will increase divergence within the organization, which in turn leads to indications of NATO as an ‘alliance à la carte’ (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009, p. 211). The essence of this development can be reduced to the decreased essence of collective defence, which undermines the principle of solidarity among its member states. NATO has constantly promoted the ideas of enlargement and the associated norms of transparency and democratic civilian control on which CEECs must satisfy (Caparini, 2003). The broadening of its security concepts, inviting new member states, reorganizing its bureaucratic structures and stationing troops to a variety but different theatres across the globe display NATO’s strategic change (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009). If NATO wants to remain a relevant global security actor, it should adapt to the security environment in which it finds itself. This proposition is a typical liberal institutionalists’ one, since liberal institutionalists recognize states as rational actors. When states decide to join IOs, liberal institutionalists will argue that states’ memberships increase their own benefits. So IOs increase effective cooperation between states. Incentives for states to pool sovereignty are based on the rational logic of two-level games (Matlary, 2006). Moreover, the idea of burden sharing – that might be financially or pressure stemming from responsibilities – satisfies states. Currently, institutionalists warn NATO about the functional use of the IO and its institutional design forsmuch the changing security environment. In order to stay a significant player on the international stage, NATO has to adapt to these changes (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993). NATO should reform its
institutional design and adapt its functional abilities to remain interesting for its member states. And to remain relevant, NATO should increase its civilian capabilities.

The institutionalization of the CSDP differs from other socio-economic spheres of integration in that consultation is done on a case-by-case basis and entirely depends on the input of member states and the Commission. The outputs – as explicit CSDP missions – are believed to embody a rather instrumental function to EU’s attempt in being recognized as a competent global actor. Some go even further and suggest that the EU is engaged in ‘soft balancing’ practices against the USA (Jones, 2007; Menon, 2011). If we follow Smith’s conception of institutional learning as deliberately redefining functions, resource base, skill sets and information processing, certain changes are to be observed within the CSDP since 2003. The lessons-learned systems, and consequently the institutionalization of responsibilities, rules and resource stem from experiences from various levels. Expertise in legal, military, policing and monitoring affairs as such arise from experiences, but – in EU’s case – institutional learning also arises from getting involved with multilateral cooperation. Getting used to UN’s system and NATO’s organizational structure and functioning certainly contributes to maximizing skill-sets. One striking example is the ‘Battlegroup concept’ which was introduced after Artemis in the DRC. This is a typical case of institutional learning in that the Helsinki summit in 1999 did not mention any kind of a ready-response force like this. Another example is EUMS’ database ‘Lessons Management Application’ (LMA). This knowledge base provides updated information about learned lessons from missions, it improves planning procedures and enables member states to collectively and adequately anticipate to potential hotspots (EEAS, 2015). Experiences in the field are the main sources for learned lessons. But the EU does not want to make the same mistakes others have made in the past. In this sense, the EU learned lessons from other major international security players, particularly the USA (M. E. Smith, 2012). The EU developed and gained experience in negotiating Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) (Sari, 2008) and Host Nation Support Arrangements with governments in countries where the CSDP operates. Consultation with legitimate governments in order to reach common ground is a highly important dimension in order to succeed in missions.7

So, independently from one another, NATO and the EU enhance their responsibilities, rules and resources. However, formal arrangements between both IOs have been created since 2003, which were deemed necessary. Officials of both Brussels-based IOs meet regularly at various levels, as foreign ministers, military representatives, ambassadors, advisors and most importantly, between the PSC and NAC. What can be said is that formal meetings primarily take place at the military level; the NATO Military Committee and EU’s Military Committee meet regularly. Liaison arrangements have been established too, the NATO Permanent Liaison Team operates at the EU Military Staff. Moreover an EU Cell was created at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) (Græger & Haugevik, 2011). The formal ‘cornerstone’ of the relationship, the Berlin plus Agreement contains a paradoxical side. Article 47 (7) TEU sets out that NATO remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation for those who are member of it. Then, NATO’s decisions whether it wants to be involved in a mission suggest that there is some primacy in favour of NATO. The Berlin plus Agreement, or the Combined Joint Force Mechanism, based on ‘divisible, but not divided’ forces is ultimately the way to prevent duplication (ATA, 2014). The Berlin Plus framework has not worked as it initially was intended to, due to the Turkey-Cyprus conflict. Even though, Berlin plus arrangements has been successfully applied, it seems that the EU considered this mechanism now more as an impediment in its development as a security actor than an auxiliary. The comparative advantage of NATO over the EU in military capabilities on the one hand, and EU’s advantage in civilian capabilities and post-conflict regulations has two faces. Those two faces are exactly why a ‘Berlin in reverse’ never has become a reality. Acquiring NATO civilian capabilities would challenge EU’s role as a crisis manager. The other way around, NATO seems not to feel for dependency on CSDP’s resources. Dependency as such is something IOs prefer to prevent (Brosig, 2011, pp. 148-149). One salient detail is EU’s published its Civilian and Military Headline Goals for 2010. The EU referred a dozen times to NATO in its Military Headlines document while no single

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8 Ibid.
time in its Civilian one. The EU was proud to announce that it “has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats” (Council, 2004, p. 1).

Formalization has certainly been hampered by the Turkey-Cyprus conflict. Informal meetings seem to be organized more often than formal ones and instead of preventing any of the three D’s to become reality, both IOs created parallelization (Græger & Haugevik, 2011). The formal relation is rather defunct and deadlocks are common, but the relation in the field is much better9. “Informal channels to exchange information coordinate and cooperate with each other as well as to support one another” (Schleich, 2014, p. 189) can be observed ‘on-the-ground’. “‘Formal non-cooperation’ restricts formal relations but practical ad-hoc solutions facilitate cooperation at the operational level” (S. J. Smith, 2015) or “further cementing the build-up of parallel and separate NATO-EU practices” (Græger & Haugevik, 2011, p. 749). A striking example is the proposal to establish an autonomous CSDP Headquarters. In 2010 proposed the ‘Weimar Triangle’, consisting of Germany, Poland and France, the creation of a permanent civil-military EU Headquarters for CSDP operations. Yet, there is no decision taken on this proposal, however it proves the willingness to transfer some fragmented national competences to the EU level by three major EU members (Mayer, 2011). Furthermore, the establishment of autonomous EU headquarters may be considered as backstabbing NATO theoretically, and potentially undermining, NATO practically. Informalization – as a product of functional interdependence – is widely considered as tool to bypass any form of inflexible bureaucratic structures that complicates progress in times of rapid change (Frieden, 1999). Caja Schleich contents that post-2003 a situation emerged in which de jure both IOs were able to perform all types of missions in the spectrum of conflict regulation. De facto, however, a division of labour on the ground was developed by the specific capabilities made available by the member states. Member states are believed to be the drivers of inter-institutional cooperation, in an agent-principal fashion ‘interlocking institutions’ became ‘interlocking institutions’ with little room for agency slack. What can be said is that both IOs are institutionalized from within, and also vis-à-vis another, concerning role specialization, because even in the realm of security do international bureaucracies enjoy some leverage. But one should remind that informality and state power remain powerful inputs for architecting transnational security politics.

2.2. ‘Hard Power, Soft Power Nexus’ and intersecting trajectories

The EU is widely considered as a civilian actor, which is an actor that uses soft-power tools like diplomacy and building profound relations instead of using or threatening with force (Delcourt, 2006; Duke, 2008; Krohn, 2009; Manners, 2002). The EU has thus been regarded as an actor that does not have access to, or do not use military means in approaching international questions. The EU rather used persuasion than coercion; and positive conditionality instead of negative conditionality (Larsen, 2002). There is vagueness about the clear break between the use of armed forces and civilian means. Often, the use of military forces for peace keeping missions is regarded legitimate because they are embedded in a civilian context, that is the focus lies to pursue civilian ends, even with non-civilian means (Krohn, 2009; Larsen, 2002).

“Identity is not something an [organization] inhabit but a set of re-productive practices and structures of signification which are able to change” (Schlag, 2009, p. 2). Those practices and structures change, as organizations adapt to new circumstances. The changing nature of threats and subsequently the changing threat perceptions demands for well-thought responses. The security continuum – being a framework to assess security threats – changes due to the dual blurring of the bureaucratic dimension and geographical dimension of threats. The geographical dimension or the internal-external security nexus and the bureaucratic dimension, that is, civilian or military, determine security provider’s response. Ever since 2003 the EU broadened its scope and instruments within its CSDP, the EU gathered a more profound position in the international system regarding promoting shared norms and values. Since the geographical scope broadened, one can argue that the EU focuses more on ‘milieu goals’ than on ‘possession goals’. But, this does not imply that ‘possession goals’ are second rank goals, since one can hardly promote liberty, rule of law, human rights and democracy

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9 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
while one cannot protect these values for sake of itself. In order to protect the main values, the EU envisions that coercive responses are sometimes necessary. From here, it is not hard to understand that the distinctiveness between the internal and external security threats begin to erode (Shepherd, 2015). The EU envisions that a new line of defence emerged after the Cold War, since back then this line was simply embodied by the threat of invasions and thus explicitly geographical. Organized crime, terrorism and failing states which can possibly spread, are way more dynamic. Another difference in threat characteristics is that none of the threats listed in the ESS can be considered as purely military. A mixture of instruments are required to tackle the new threats which might contain intelligence sharing, policing, judicial support, humanitarian means, border controls or economic support (ESS, 2003). On the other hand, NATO also considers broadening “its functional remit to include counterterrorism, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and expeditionary combat operations. There have even been suggestions that NATO should branch out into ‘soft power’ activities such as post-conflict nation-building” (Cornish, 2004, p. 64). This ‘hard power, soft power nexus’ is a recurrent issue in both IOs main strategic documents, namely NATO’s Strategic Concept from 2010 and EU’s ESS published in 2003. As of now, “the evolution of both the EU and NATO in recent years underlines the fallacy that NATO is solely a military alliance or that the EU is purely a soft or civilian power par excellence” (Duke, 2012, pp. 340-341).

NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010
In 2010, the Heads of State and Government agreed upon a new Strategic Concept for the NATO in Lisbon. The title of this main soft law instrument of NATO is ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ which can be considered as an attempt to continue as an active player. Moreover, the Alliance finds itself at the crossroads of important decisions concerning new threats, new capabilities and new partners. The Alliance adopts a mere proactive attitude as it tries to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations. It also clearly states that the UN and EU are the most important international partners with which cooperation ought to be fostered. As well the proactive attitudes as the significance of partnerships are two dimensions that are altered compared with the Strategic Concepts from 1991 and 1999, which respectively primarily should be read in the light of the stabilization of Eastern Europe and the aftermath of the Yugoslavian war.

Even though, the world is changing and so is the security environment, NATO reaffirms its core mission: “to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values” (NATO, 2010). In the Strategic Concepts, NATO distinguishes political and military capabilities, which could be used alongside one another in a full spectrum, and during different phases, i.e., before, during and after crises. Furthermore, NATO is acquainted that in order to carry out all of its missions, the Alliance must be flexible and able to engage in ongoing processes of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The underlying reason for the creation of new Strategic Concepts is obviously the new security environment, and how NATO perceives itself within this new environment. In this section, NATO acknowledges that the Euro-Atlantic is at peace and that conventional threats are fundamentally lower than during the second half of the 21st century i.e., NATO ‘de-securitized’ Russia’s aggression. In military sense, two main statements must be mentioned, as these impersonate NATO’s core function. First, NATO considers its Article 5 commitment still as greatest responsibility, even though the Alliance has no explicit adversary. Second, the possession of nuclear capabilities is NATO’s main dimension of deterrence. NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as such weapons exist. It is the ‘Security through Crisis Management’ section in which the Alliance sets out its role in preventing and managing crises, stabilizing post-conflict situations and supporting reconstruction. The inclusion of civilian aspects of security management can stems from the idea that conflict beyond NATO’s borders actually can put threats to the security of NATO’s territory and its citizens. What differs from the Strategic Concept from 1999 is that NATO has been able to more accurately analyse and evaluate the operations in Afghanistan and the Western Balkan which provided new insights forasmuch the necessity of the civilian approach next to military intervention. It explicates that coherence is necessary, as well between military and civilian approach as between the active practices of other international actors. From here, two arguments from NATO must be cultivated. First, NATO communicates that “the best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening” (NATO, 2010). Second, NATO perceives itself in a position that it will provide continued support in post
conflict situations, to create the necessary conditions for lasting stability. However, NATO appeals quite a lot to other international actors for cooperation and consultation in reconstruction and stabilisation missions. The most prominent phrase – to be a more effective actor in the crisis management spectrum – is NATO willingness to “form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors” (NATO, 2010).

NATO thus considers partnerships as an essential element in its trajectory to remain a respected global actor. Indeed, concrete cooperation among allies makes significant contribution in order to enhance international security. In this sense, the most important difference with NATO’s Security Concept from 1999 is the rapid progression of EU’s CSDP. NATO highly welcomes the EU, since a decisive EU contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, by sharing the majority of members and preserving common security-related values, partnership is almost undeniable. NATO embraces also the Lisbon Treaty, which lays the foundation for improving EU’s capacities to approach security challenges. The Lisbon Treaty refers somewhat little to the NATO but sees the NATO as a highly important partner. Article 47 ((7) TEU) that says that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”. In addition, it clarifies that any “commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. From NATO’s point of view, the EU and NATO should not enforce roles independently from one another, but instead complement one another. This idea of complementary roles triggers an idea of division of labour, which in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations should be visible. The idea of complementary applies to the practical cooperation throughout all phases of crisis management operations, that is, from planning and coordination to support in the field. Furthermore, NATO strives for more consultations about all relevant and common concerns in order to define strategies and approaches. Consultation should also lead to a better aligned capability development, to prevent duplication and to maximize cost-effectiveness.

The European Security Strategy to a secure Europe in a better world
EU’s European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, highlights EU’s vision to enhance security in a cohesive way. The Iraq crisis that dispersed the relation with the USA was certainly a crucial incentive for the EU to reach common ground concerning security affairs. Its base reasoning is that “European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions” (ESS, 2003, p. 1). Europe recognizes the USA as a crucial factor in integrating Europe and for shaping security, within and without NATO. The nature of conflicts changes, as conflicts are more often within states than between states (Kaldor, 2005) which thus demands a new approach. The complexity of today’s security challenges, the EU believes, cannot be tackled by one single country and therefore the strengthening of mutual solidarity makes the EU a more credible security actor. From here, the split between EU’s preferred multipolar system and USA’s preferred unipolar system reinforces EU’s desires to strengthen its internal cohesion. The idea that security is a precondition of development and being aware of the internal-external security nexus makes the EU a vulnerable group of states. The linkage – and mutual reinforcement – between economic failure, political unrest and violent conflicts is what is meant by the cycle of conflict. In its framework, the EU highlights five key threats, namely terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. What stems from mentioning these core threats is that there are very thin lines between them, that is, regional “conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD” (ESS, 2003). So, the new threats are considered as dynamic and thus prevention of conflict and consequently threats cannot start too early. The EU has previously many times been referred to as a civilian actor that embraces proactive approach and prefers positive conditionality over negative conditionality. The EU
or sometimes single member states have intervened when states were about to fail, for example in Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban. The idea that civil or ethnic conflict corrodes states from within triggers EU’s requisite to think globally, but to act locally. Re-establishing legitimate governments in the Balkans, fostering democratic principles and training the executive authorities to fight organized crime embodies EU’s prime example on how to fight organized crime and its consequences within the EU.

The means by which the EU strives to operate in fulfilling its security mandate is dependent on effective multilateralism, unity-minded international community and legitimate functioning international institutions. To act and operate in out-of-area places should be in line with International Law and the UN Charter. Moreover, the transatlantic relationship, and NATO in particular, is to the utmost important to strengthen the international community. In addition, the quality and coherence of the international community is dependent on the quality of the governments. The EU is clear in stating that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (ESS, 2003, p. 10).


With the above in mind, the EU allocated a great set of responsibilities to itself. Furthermore, EU’s enlargements since 2003 have influenced its near neighbourhood, among others with the inclusion of former CEECs. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are now contributing to sustain EU as an anchor of stability. From the missions it has deployed, the EU observed that timely and coherent approaches are necessary in addition to suitable capabilities and public support (Solana, 2008). Some commentators warned for new divisions in Europe along the ‘we’ and the ‘others’ line of reasoning, and as some regard EU’s congregating ambitions as ‘the myth of Yalta’ (Sjursen, 2002), new tension in Europe could be fostered. Though, Solana reported that enlargements have contributed to democracy and prosperity in Europe. Besides EU’s concerns about terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organized crime and climate change, it included cyber and energy security to its strategy. Even though, the report sees that conceptions of missions actually form the need to combine military and civilian expertise, it also differentiates between the two forasmuch improves which ought to be made in both spheres of crisis management. Civilian missions’ successfullness depends highly on trained and expertized personnel, flexible and quick deployments, and the feasibility of long term employability. Moreover the assembling national contingents of personnel increase the interoperability in the field. The quality of the required interoperability depends on member states commitment towards sharing national strategies, making experts available for deployments and also agreeing upon the available budgets and procurement. On the other hand, military missions’ successfullness depends on the strength of capabilities, mutual collaboration and trust (Das & Teng, 1998), and the burden-sharing collocation. Every mission is one of its kind and demands particular key capabilities. Conformity among all member states is essential forasmuch the use of specific capabilities. Furthermore, the EU must strive to increase its competitive and robust defence industry, in which investments and research development are the key priorities.

In the ESS and also in its ‘Report on the Implementation of the ESS’, the EU acknowledges the UN, USA and NATO as the main partners in efforts to address international crises. Though, successful operations have been led by NATO in consultation with the EU: e.g. Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the formal arrangements have not much advanced (Solana, 2008). What can be said is that the EU observes room for improvement within its own organization as to interoperability between its member states; it as well acknowledges that the strategic partnership with NATO must be strengthened.

The EU already accepted that it should – in order to protect internal security – enhance its capacity to act externally in 2003. The Working Group on Defence already suggested that pooling of military civil protection and civilian capabilities is necessary to improve effectiveness in out-of-area missions (Shepherd, 2015). The Crisis Platform brings relevant institutions together so that adequate and timely responses can be effectively coordinated. As well internal as external security actors exchange information and is offtenimes considered as the first step towards the Comprehensive Approach (CA). Both, the NATO and UN find difficulties with combining the internal and external
dimensions of threats, while the EU has – at least theoretically – capabilities to actually enforce a CA\(^{10}\). Being able to do so makes EU a distinctive security actor which in turn in crucial for its autonomy (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). Besides, being able to include its normative base in civil-military missions, the EU takes care of ‘possession goals’ rather than ‘milieu goals’ which strengthens its legitimacy. While NATO is widely considered as an USA driven vehicle, aggressive and focussed on ‘milieu goals’, which undermines its legitimacy and thus functioning on the ground.

NATO’s Strategic Concept regards the alliance as a defence organization and a security organization. The way NATO re-invented tasks and goals is associated with its successful ‘securitization moves’ along with ‘silencing’ behaviour of alternative institutions as the UN or OSCE (Schlag, 2009). “NATO faces, however, particularly in its role as a security organization, criticism from many audiences both internally and externally” (Holmberg, 2011, p. 229). Moreover, since NATO wants to be recognized as a security organization too, it is dependent on inter-organizational cooperation and recognition in lieu of self-authorizing practices. Civilian actors organized in IOs, regional or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civilians themselves maintain rather pessimistic view on NATO as a security actor\(^{11}\). Legitimacy “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1963, p. 64). What has been observed in completed missions – in Afghanistan particularly – is that the considered appropriateness of actor is a momentous variable in missions. NATO’s experience with civil society participation has not been very successful so far. What implicates matters for NATO is that it still is conceived as an ‘Article 5’ organization, which generates its legitimacy from within, that is, member states are formally equal in decision-making processes and decide about internal security. The EU has internationally a reputation as a concert of democratic countries. It has a more appealing character than NATO for many states, as NATO is oftentimes associated with an aggressive USA. This highlights the main difference as to legitimacy between NATO as a defence organization and security organization. If NATO aspires to produce security externally, it ought to satisfy input and output legitimacy. It is this output legitimacy, the acceptance of the local ‘receivers’ of NATO as mediator, that can be considered as major obstacle. Another obstacle is the already mentioned difficulties in achieving inter-organizational cooperation, with a view to increasing privatization of security actors (Krahmann, 2003). NGOs, in particular, are hesitant to work with NATO because reckoned impartially is not desired at all (Rasmussen & General, 2009). The fact that NATO’s external and internal roles are disputed from within and outside complicates its legitimacy and decisiveness. This in turn, leaves many commentators to state that NATO’s Strategic Concepts contain a rather rhetoric character. Furthermore, claims that “NATO has evolved from a defence into a security organization” (Shea, 2012, p. 1) are disputable.

2.2.1. The ‘Comprehensive Approach’

This CA is “derived from the recognition that military means, although essential, are not sufficient to meet current complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security” (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 6) which means that cooperation between different actors, say political, civilian and military in the theatre are essential. The CA stems from the broadened concept of ‘security’, which ought to be faced from different angles, i.e., societies are tensely connected in political, social and economic sense that affects multiple actors across the world. Some states’ security is highly interdependent on others states’ security, which is what Eriksson and Rhinard refer to as the ‘security complex’ (J. Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009, p. 250). It is their argument that this security complex reinforces the internal-external security nexus because a certain degree of interdependence among states results in similar threat perceptions and actions, which provides motives for regional intergovernmental relations in approach security questions. The security nexus has prevalence on, what Eriksson and Rhinard calls the five P’s, namely problems, perceptions, policies, politics and polity, because “the ‘Realist’ perspective in which external and internal security are considered as essentially separate domains” (J. Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009, p. 252), cannot contribute to a fruitful understanding of the nexus. One has to consider a

\(^{10}\) Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
situation as threat. Perceiving a situation as dangerous, and accepting the transboundary nature of the situation demands an international approach on the one hand, but means loss of national sovereignty on the other hand. Consequently, IOs sit in the driving seat as to framing security issues, which in turn has implications on how such issues are addressed, which brings us to the second ‘P’. Policies are structured plans of action fabricated to achieve particular outcomes, based on certain ideals and principles. In theory, both organizations communicate their ‘structured plans’ to achieve certain outcomes. However, the gap between policies and politics, as decisive interest-based actions, stems from bureaucratic politics and public expectations. Then, polity as “the institutional structures that shape how governments act” (J. Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009, p. 256) is another ‘P’ that influences inter-organizational cooperation. For example, Finland confirms in a constitution affiliated document that military action will only take place when the UN renders a mandate. The EU has oftentimes been referred to as a sui generis or at least as a distinctive security provider. The conceptualisations of notions like civilian, soft, ethical or normative power are nowadays more or less outdated, due to the blurring division between the internal-external security divide (J. Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). EU’s holistic CA is arguably something NATO and the UN struggle with. However, perfect coordination is not always easy to attain due to differing legal bases for civilian/military action, but significant progress is being made.

The disunity, predicted by realists, within NATO is highlighted by what Noetzel and Schreer call a ‘tier-system’. They distinguish the ‘reformists tier’, ‘status quo tier’ and ‘reversal oriented tier’. This ‘tier formula’ can be applied to NATO’s security transformation (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009). The reformists, led by Washington, desire a broader mandate for NATO and thus a more prominent global role. In this sense reformists are proponents of intercontinental enlargements. The status quo oriented tier contains the two great European states Germany and France, which warn for a globalized NATO. They prefer to strengthen the CSDP instead of NATO, because a rising NATO could alienate Russia or China. The reversal oriented tier – primarily consisting of former CEECs, states that joined NATO in the sake of Russia’s aggression – prefers to centre stage Article 5 and thus make provision for military capabilities. Which road NATO should follow is to be seen, but by allowing and executing missions in a ‘coalitions of the willing’ fashion will undermine NATO’s internal cohesion. Moreover, the EU is widely considered to be more advanced when it comes to the CA, which pushes pressure on NATO. What stems from the ‘tier system’, which can be observed within NATO, is that member states find it difficult to reach consensus about the nature of missions and subsequently strategies. NATO’s comprehensive approach does not treats civilian and military means as mutually exclusive, but envisions that strategies ought to integrate as well military as civilian lines of operational practices. “Enhance integrated civil-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum” (NATO, 2010) has yet to become reality. Whereas in 1998 Albright warned for the famous three D’s, namely discrimination, decoupling and duplication, both the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative have stated more integration between EU and NATO capabilities is needed. Consequently, the creation of parallel structures, capabilities and mandates are continuing. One primary example is NATO’s new Strategic Concept which establishes a NATO civilian capacity. This more or less implies that NATO’s functioning personnel will gather civilian competences which in turn enhance cooperation with other international actors. Because in order to respond successfully to complex emergencies and operations, NATO professes that it needs to create strong bonds with other civilian crisis managers. “How the new civilian capacity will be integrated or coordinated with EU civilian capabilities, however, remains unspecified. While a NATO civilian capacity may enhance EU-NATO cooperation in the field, the risk of duplication of non-military capabilities is also present. By establishing a civilian capacity, NATO is moving into the EU’s traditional area of competence” (Grager & Haugevik, 2011, p. 748). This is something Germany and France in particular do not aspire. Because a ‘Berlin plus in reverse’ might also imply the D of duplication in civilian capabilities. “The comprehensive approach is therefore not just about improving functionality; it has also much to do with the EU’s conception of itself as a responsible global actor” (M. E. Smith, 2012, p. 266). Contemporary new and challenging security threats are transboundary, which implies that those security threats have an internal as

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12 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
13 Interview EU official (Political Administrator), 01/02/2016
external dimension. However, this division between ‘the internal’ and ‘the external’ is problematic because this division is hard to make since the Cold War (J. Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). Originally, the notion of ‘external security’ encompassed the defence and deterrence between sovereign states, while ‘internal security’ contained national crime, maintaining the rule of law and ultimately civil protection within the state. Nowadays, security threats differ fundamentally with previous ones in view of source, trajectory and effects and are subsequently harder to unscramble (Castells, 1996). One must not only acknowledge that the security environment changed rapidly the last couple decades, one must also take future developments into account that might have in one way or another implications for security. In this sense, security organizations ought to act proactively, that is, they have to be aware of the key developments that might trigger insecurity. Developments such as shifts in regional and global economic and military power distributions, for instance in Asia; the rapid progression of disruptive technologies and the diffusion of power of non-state actors such as companies; demographics in combination with scarcities of food, water and the like which in turn ensures that regional tensions could get heated; geopolitical conflict concerning energy supplies; and economic malaise and austerity in security and defence spending which cause reduced resources and inter alia decreased military decisiveness globally (Pavel, 2014). NATO now also acts against a wide set of new emerging spectrum of threats, ‘risks’ and ‘security challenges’. Military security was obviously the foundational task of NATO during the Cold War, while NATO has rigorously broadened its security concept: it now includes, among others, the protection of human rights, cyberspace and energy infrastructure (Schlag, 2009). From the above reasoning, one can imagine that organizations with a wide array of functions and mandates around its core mission are less vulnerable to changing threats. Furthermore, such organizations are way more likely to adapt when its environment transforms. However – with the continuing overlap of mandates, duplication of means and common value-base in civilian crisis management in mind – do we observe cooperation between the two?
3. Theoretical Considerations

In the background section, I outlined the ‘new security’ problems, the perceptions of both IOs that is the securitization of problems, and polity’s institutional structure that shape IOs actions. This section includes the three concepts ‘institutional overlap’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘civilian means’ and thus functions as a conceptual framework. In order to conclude whether the EU and NATO profoundly cooperate in civilian aspects of crisis management, on both bureaucratic and operational level, we need to understand where both IOs overlap, what cooperation in maximal sense means and where to draw the line between civilian means and military means. I refer to practices as the sixth ‘P’, assessing cooperation in the field.

3.1. Institutional Overlap

In order to assess the relation under scrutiny concerning redundancies, competitiveness or cooperative efforts one must understand where and to what extent overlap can be observed. As already outlined before, with a total of twenty-two common formal members, common tasks, strategies and similar commitments towards the UN Charter and ‘Petersberg Tasks’, and common resources validate institutional overlap. In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty can be analysed as a major advance in integrating EU’s CSDP. An accessory concern from this treaty is the redundancies which it creates with the NATO. As several commentators argue, redundancy can be healthy, although the line between healthy and unhealthy redundancy can be thin since competition is lurking (Mayer, 2015; Winter & Anderson, 2011). Even though at the time the EU included military components to its defence and security communications, it was still widely perceived as a civilian actor. Its military ambitions were from a rather rhetorical nature as the EU as a whole was not ready to operate militarily. At that time – say between St. Malo and the publication of the ESS – the EU primarily focussed on institution-building. The institutional design of EU’s CSDP is based on NATO’s template due to the perception that NATO has been successful. From here, an opening was created for more interdependence between both IOs. This interdependence first resulted in a division of labour trajectory, in which NATO concentrated on military dimensions and the EU carried primarily responsibility for civilian elements of operations. So, both IOs maintained different understandings of ‘security’ at large. This, however, changed by years of operating side-by-side in the security field. Both IOs consider both elements – the military and civilian – as essential components of the security concept.

Moreover, since both share twenty-two member states and the security concepts seem to accord more and more tensions are not uncommon. With twenty-two shared member states, there are twenty-two possibilities of forum shopping i.e., “to seek out the forum most favourable to their interest” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 280), which causes ‘fragmentation of security authority’ 14. Stephanie C. Hofmann distinguishes four different types on how double or single membership can influence the relation between the EU and NATO. First, ‘turf wars’ envisions a tense relationship that also has characteristics of rivalry. Turf wars could be about competences, mandates, scope and reciprocity. Second, ‘obstructionism’ happens when a state uses its single membership to obstruct cooperation between both IOs. This phenomenon is primarily based on the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, which inter alia blocked several formal meetings. Third, ‘muddling through’ implies that meetings are frequently postponed, delayed or hindered by one of the two. When major formal meetings are suspended for some reason, it will create aversion or even mistrust which also obstruct cooperation. Fourth, ‘ignoring the politicians’ means that those experts ‘on the ground’ simply ignore Brussels’ bureaucratic gridlock. Those officials of both IOs cooperate on a day-to-day basis without any top-down consent (Stephanie C Hofmann, 2009), because officials have complained that their operational work certainly is constrained due to political discord in Brussels 15. The creation of the CSDP as such, is not entirely unrelated to already existing institutions in the field. The ‘multiplication of security actors’ must have some sort of motivations, because institution-building cannot be accommodated without reference to already existing institutions in the field. One reason might be that new institutions

14 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
15 Ibid.
are able to overcome collective action problems which could not be tackled by other institutions in the field. Other reasons might be that newly created institutions strengthens, weakens or even competes with the old one. It suffices here to say that the creation of new institutions and its functioning have implications for other international actors in the field. For instance, national and international actors are enabled to play out their preferences, which could result in a meeting of the minds or obstructionism. Since both institutions are based on unanimity, ‘single member states’ can influence cooperative interactions between institutions by using their veto power. This is – in a nutshell – the main obstacle that negatively affects inter-institutional efficiency. The academic literature oftentimes refers to the Turkey-Cyprus conflict or to France being pertinacious towards NATO. It are exactly France and Cyprus that have blocked a couple proposals from the USA initiating that NATO would be assured to have access to EU civilian crisis management assets (Stéphanie C Hofmann, 2011).

Albright’s three D’s stem from the EU’s adoption of the Petersberg Tasks and the St. Malo Declaration, as those rapid advances of the CSDP could duplicate, discriminate and decouple respectively NATO assets, members and the USA from Europe. Besides, the Balkan tragedies roused France and Great-Britain to transform EU’s military to a more respectable force (European Parliament, 2006). The impacts of the Lisbon Treaty are considerable for the CSDP in three ways, namely its strategic role and global orientation, the institutional structure of the CSDP, and the procedural framework for capability development under the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) responsibility. First, CSDP’s role was modified by the Lisbon Treaty as the EU adopted the extended version of the Petersbersgs Tasks. These now include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization” (Winter & Anderson, 2011, p. 70). Second, the institutional arrangements have changed as the European Council now is chaired by a full-time President, the position of the High Representative has changed, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been established as the diplomatic service. Third, the improved status of the EDA and the introduction of the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) aim at harmonizing, sharing, pooling and specializing means and capabilities.

By strengthening its legal personality and global actorness (Wessels & Bopp, 2008) and adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks, the EU obviously turned into a more active and capable player. What can be said about the main changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty is that it not necessarily duplicates capabilities, discriminates states or decouples from the USA, but the line towards unhealthy redundancy becomes arguably closer. Although the NATO still enjoys primacy, Article 222 TFEU set out the ‘solidarity clause’ which has a lot interfaces with NATO’s Article 5. Then, tasks such as conflict prevention, military advice and assistance were already part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. Neither does the adoption of ‘the extended tasks’ necessarily result in competition, since the ‘European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations’ document from 2003 enables NATO as a whole not the get engaged. However, this explicit duplication of tasks could either result in better and more frequent consultations or into a ‘beauty contest’ between both IOs. The ‘new’ role of the HR and the establishment of the EEAS – as diplomatic service – are certainly beneficial for the cooperation with NATO. From within the EU, the HR and EEAS are able to unify member states positions. In short, the HR and EEAS strive to gather member states to develop joint positions wherefore it can communicate in a more consistent and coherent way to externals. Hypothetically, this adds to more transparency and enables closer cooperation with NATO. However, so far EEAS’s monitored classified information has not been shared with NATO.

There is not just the institutional overlap regarding mandates, member states and resources. There is evidently a certain mutual observing trend visible between both organizations. As already outlined before, CSDP’s institutional set-up is primarily based on that of NATO; this does not mean that CSDP is by definition NATO’s little brother. “The impact the EU has had on NATO is however more an intangible one” (ATA, 2014). NATO has followed EU’s initiatives more than once, e.g., concerning the European Rapid Reaction Force, the Maritime Directive and most prominently the Eastern European enlargement. The democratization and accession of CEECs has helped NATO to legitimize its existence.

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3.2. The Concept of ‘Cooperation’

Cooperation is the product of coordination and collaboration, since cooperation happens when actors collaborate and adjust their own preferences by reason of those of others. Moreover, cooperation happens through policy coordination, because pre-existent to cooperation organizations must find conformity by a process of negotiation which is often referred to as “policy coordination” (Keohane, 2005, p. 51). Gulati et al. define inter-organizational cooperation as “joint pursuit of agreed-on goal(s) in a manner corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and payoffs” (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012, p. 533). Keohane provides a clear division between harmonies, cooperation, and discord. NATO and EU are willing to adjust policies to make situations more compatible for one another, and thus stimulating their partnership. Both IOs formal commitments towards the UN is the sole hierarchical structure visible, there is no higher authority; which makes harmonies impossible in our current anarchical international system. Harmonies require the full exposure of interests and identity, while cooperation involves a mixture of complementary and conflicting interests. The question ‘do actors’ policies become significantly more compatible with one another’ is the essential question in this sense, because it insinuates prior discontent. When this is the case, we can label this relationship as cooperative, while when this is not the case, the relationship is discord. However, this definition of ‘cooperation’ is a rather minimal one, as it only identifies two bare essentials (Gerring & Barresi, 2003). Cooperation can be rank-ordered along some spectrum, forasmuch acceptance and satisfaction towards the adjustments made by the other. Thus, as well the adjustments made by the EU, as the satisfaction or effect on NATO – or the other way around – determines whether cooperation is successful. In this, successful closed negotiations imply cooperation, while ‘muddling through’ highlights discord.

Figure 1: Harmony, cooperation or discord

(source: (Keohane, 2005))

Cooperative efforts are affected by both IOs overlap or as Axelrod and Keohane say, ‘the mutuality of interests’, the shadow of the future, and the number of players (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). It is obvious that cooperation brings pay-offs, and whenever the difference in interests between involved actors increase, so will the likelihood of an actor to defect. Since, both IOs communicate their cooperative efforts and the absence of a clear visible structure between them, the relation suggests yielding a symmetric character. As NATO communicated that its “relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect” (NATO, 2010), and the presence of ‘mutuality of interests’ minimally paves the way for cooperation. The EU contemplates the UN, USA and NATO as
the main partners in efforts to address international crises, and strives for effective multilateralism. ‘The shadow of the future’ does not hinder cooperation. At least concerning the factors ‘long time horizons’, ‘reliability of information about others’ actions’, and ‘quick feedback about the changes in others’ actions’ are components that both IOs take care of. One major case is the ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ debate, a debate centered on NATO’s willingness to get access to EU’s civilian means, which the EU has blocked so far. EU gained more from NATO than it has given. With regard to EU’s concept of ‘effective multilateralism’, the NATO-EU relation lacks two important features, namely ‘diffuse reciprocity’ and ‘generalized principles of conduct’. To sum up, ‘effective multilateralism’ is rhetoric and to a very modest extent visible in the collaboration between the organizations under investigation. Varwick and Koops would rather call it ‘shrewd interorganizationalism’ in the making, as the EU strives to ascertain its “own international actorness, capacities and strategic identity” (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 123). As these developments continue, the authors forecast that the relation will be dominated by rivalry and competition rather than collaboration. Cooperation as such is a broad concept and used anywhere and anytime. In this case, cooperation must be able to be applied to, among other, compliance with an organizations rules and norms, processes and procedures towards mutual adjustments, interagency coordination and comprehensiveness of service delivery and joint action. Cooperation is nothing like a one-dimensional concept, but rather an end of the continuum opposing conflict. As Axelrod and Keohane already contended, “cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests” (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 226). The minimum idea of cooperation is combined, concerted, conjunct or united behaviour, that is, act jointly with two or more. Other senses of cooperation are accommodative and helpful which insinuates a sense of sympathizing between two or more. Cooperation is always subject to unique dynamics and therefore one-off. Svedin classifies thirteen different types of cooperative behaviour – in times of crises –, which she ranks from strongest to weakest as follows.

Table 1: Operationalization of cooperative behaviour source: (Svedin, 2013, p. 28)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yield</td>
<td>To give way, give up, defer, give in, or cede something to the partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come to agreement</td>
<td>Agreements being concluded signed or made between cooperative partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request/propose</td>
<td>One party suggest involving one or more outside actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decide to cooperate</td>
<td>Initiating, resuming, improving or expanding relations. An act of showing credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express approval</td>
<td>Expressing approval is less committal than actively and practically doing so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult/discuss</td>
<td>Active communication and consultation between two or more organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment on</td>
<td>Passive and indirect communication, e.g., to external actors or the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make demand</td>
<td>One organization is issuing orders, making commands rather than requesting and suggesting. This indicator involves a powerful and dominant actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express disapproval</td>
<td>Negative communication from one organization about another organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject</td>
<td>Rejecting actions, statements, positions, rules and/or norms of another organization. This is actively showing disapproval through direct communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten</td>
<td>Expressing threats or coercive warnings in an aggressive manner towards the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce relations</td>
<td>Cooperation significantly diminishes due to conflictual behaviour. New cooperative possibilities or actions become more and more difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use structural violence</td>
<td>Expects oppression against rights, property or other assets of the other organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This typology of the concept cooperation differentiates thirteen kinds of cooperative intensities. What can be said is that the EU-NATO relation as such has been characterized by a variety of cooperative forms. Another implication of the above typology is that none of the cooperative kinds is mutually exclusive, because the relationship between both IOs is a multidimensional one. This means that disapproval could be expressed on one proposal while another might be approved. However the interconnectedness between different spheres of competences and the CA, suggest that the overall cooperative behaviour between NATO and the EU will congregate around one or a couple sorts. As the above embodies a continuum from cooperation on the one end and conflict on the other end, a distinction ought to be made which forms belong to cooperative behaviour. I draw the line between ‘consultation/discussion’ and ‘comment on’ since I agree with Svedin that here the ‘collaboration’ or
co-action dimension of cooperation separates actual cooperation and other modes of working jointly, albeit with a third party. Moreover, the ‘comment on’ form – which Svedin conceptualized as behaviour that “involves an organization making a verbal statement concerning the crisis or situation to outside stakeholders such as the public or media” (Svedin, 2013, p. 29) – reminiscent of a statement made by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer back in 2007, referring to the relation as a ‘frozen conflict’ (De Hoop Scheffer, 2007).

The concept of multilateralism is important here and needs some further clarification, as the EU prefers such modes of policy coordination. The presumption here is that the larger multilateral arrangements, in number of members, the more difficulties IOs face in promoting international cooperation with other IOs. This because the more members an IO holds, the greater the likelihood of diverse preferences among members. As well the NATO as EU count twenty-eight member states, and thus more or less identifies the same struggle homogenizing preferences. Though, off course stronger member states might have bigger impacts on issues by sharing bigger shares of expertise, intelligence or financial resources. The costs – such as free-riding states – of multilateral modes are likely to be higher than those in bilateral arrangements, but the functional efficiency on the other hand is oftentimes greater when issues are tackled multilaterally. Negotiation monitoring in multilaterally is thus harder when an IO contains both, more in numbers and more in diverse members. “This is commonly known as the broader–deeper tradeoff: organizations with a broader set of member preferences may be less likely to reach deep agreements than organizations with a narrower set of member preferences” (Gilligan & Johns, 2012, p. 11). This corresponds with EU’s and NATO’s enlargements after 2003, as both IOs enlarged respectively with thirteen and nine new member states. And even though both IOs deal with fragmentation from within, it is the inter-institutional relation that reached a deadlock. This broader-deeper tradeoff however is subject to an organization’s growth and performances, which generates trust (Hoffman, 2014). Generalizing trust takes time, but it is the way to ameliorate the broader-deeper tradeoff. All members of the NATO and EU have to commit to a certain common policy, before inter-organizational cooperation can be effectuated. Though, Noetzl and Schreer’s tier system along with discrepancies towards ‘milieu goals’ are major contributors to block inter-organizational cooperation. The unanimity rule rules out pro-integrational ambitions and evolution. For example, Turkey formally applied for EU membership in 1987. Schneider and Urpelainen state that future members of any IO will make more policy concessions if they feel welcomed and gain the full support of all members rather than a majority (Schneider & Urpelainen, 2012). Off course, Turkey is a case per se, but a divided EU towards Turkey obviously does not promote cooperation between two intergovernmental organizations. In this sense, both enlargements waves since 2003 has been problematic for inter-institutional cooperation. Screening new member states, according to Kydd, should have followed two criteria. First, candidate states should support institutions’ goals; second, candidate states must have amiable intensions to other states who might fear negative externalities (Kydd, 2001). It is primarily this second criterion point that has been neglected, misprized or devaluated by the EU, when it granted Cyprus membership in 2004 (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012). From here, the EU omitted – for the sake of its relation with NATO – to impose “conditionality and accession costs on new members can be essential in building effective institutions” (Gilligan & Johns, 2012, p. 12).

As I already stressed, the EU prefers multilateral modes of cooperation and therefore mentions effective multilateralism as ideal. In doing so, it aims theoretically at strengthening international partners. Strengthening partners can be done by equipping them with financial resources, tools or simply supportive behaviour. The recent past however, paints a different picture; primarily the lack of a ‘Berlin plus in reverse’ is a missed opportunity to strengthen an international partner. However, the relation between both IOs abated after operation EUFOR Althea, the military operation launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. The main source of this tendency is obstructing actions by France and Turkey, not to widen inter-organizational cooperation following Berlin plus arrangements. From NATO’s perspective, co-acting with the EU – as newcomer in the field – has not showed to be very efficient. Though, NATO being considered as an EU mentor shed positive lights on the alliance, when it needed to seek a new raison d’être. In an agent-principal fashion, the USA has – by means of NATO

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17 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
– influenced EU security architecture and so NATO’s impact on the EU has been decisive. USA’s dominance within NATO and indirectly on the EU has deterred several European member states to establish direct and material links with NATO. Another reason for the Europeanization of security and defence policies is that EU’s member states were evidently not the means, nor the interests to transform NATO according their preferences. The EU is arguably the only IO that can effectuate and enforce missions following a CA. In this sense, it seems that the EU lives up its sui generis status. However, the relationship with NATO has been called a ‘frozen conflict’ or a ‘beauty contest’ in the past for a reason. Even though, the EU has given NATO a reason to persist when it faced a task vacuum, the EU has gained more than it has given. ‘Berlin Plus’ has been used narrowly, but any form reciprocity has been refused. The relationship as such has never been symmetric. However, the EU communicates to aim for effective multilateral modes of cooperation, it seems to have totally neglected what Keohane calls ‘diffuse reciprocity’ (Keohane, 1986). This means that all involved actors – maybe not in the short run, but surely in the long run – should benefit in whatever dimension from the relation. So far, the EU benefited a lot, while the current obstacles are likely to prevent NATO from gaining in the near future. A second feature of multilateralism is the ‘generalized principle of conduct’ (Ruggie, 1993). As both IOs ensured a partnership based on mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency from the beginning, one can hardly argue these visions has been generalized. The above suggests that until now, the relation has been unidirectional concerning institutional framework and providing instruments. An option to satisfy the ‘diffuse reciprocity’ feature of effective multilateralism “would be by equipping NATO with the support and tools it needs to act as an effective organization. However, key EU member states prevent the European Union from providing NATO with access to the European Union’s civilian instruments” (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 124). Even though, terms as the ‘hard power-soft power nexus’, the comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are more and more popular in policy documents and in academic literature as well, it is important what the counterpart of military means actually entails. Means that NATO strives to include to its capabilities arsenal.

3.3. The Concept of ‘Civilian Means’

NATO is oftentimes considered as a military power, which is not very unsurprisingly forasmuch its establishment and mandates, and the EU as civilian power. However, due to the changing security environment NATO had to rethink its raison d’être and seeks to include civilian means to its mandates in order to remain a relevant security actor. On the other hand, the EU made rapid advances in the realm of security and defence policies since the creation of the CSDP in 2003. The Berlin plus Agreement is widely considered as the current cornerstone of the NATO-EU relation; however this agreement embodies a rather military character as it enables the EU to use NATO’s military assets and planning capabilities. The concept ‘civilian’ is widely used to describe EU’s practices and therefore is the term contested as well. “Civilian is non-military, and includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments; military is, well, military, and involves the use of armed forces. There is, however, considerable fuzziness in the literature over where to draw the line between civilian and military power” (K. E. Smith, 2005, p. 1). However, the difficulty is that civilian means can be used coercively which complicates matters as to where to draw the line between civilian and military means. However, as Hill argues civil powers use civil means as negotiation, persuasion and attraction (Hill, 1990). Since the EU included a military component to its foreign and security policy, it is no longer considered as a solely civilian power. This however does not imply that the EU as an international actor cannot effectuate pure civilian missions anymore. For NATO and EU, military missions are means of last resort. As Stavridis contends, the EU in one way or another needs to obtain military capabilities in order to be a civilian power, because only by maintaining military power, civilian ends can be pursued (Stavridis, 2001). For my search, I will use the conceptualization of civilian means from Smith, which in turn is built on Hill’s notion. In short, civilian means are economic, diplomatic, cultural or political instruments that, by negotiation, persuasion and attraction, aim to provide security. Even though the EU is not entirely clear about the distinction between military and civilian missions, the one key attribute that distinguishes military missions from civilian ones is force, that is, coercion or
compulsion, especially with the use or threat of violence. In fourteen of the total number of thirty-nine operations, force was used in order to execute civilian crisis management practices.

Shepherd argues that, unlike EU’s former notions of security provider, the EU finds itself in a security continuum in which geographic and bureaucratic boundaries begin to erode. This process brings with it that security policies are transcending the original internal-external divide. It is these two dimensions, geography and bureaucracy, of security that undermine traditional lines of providing security. Traditionally, security capabilities, be it internal or external, were based on the European state model. This simply implied that security threats from within defined borders were tackled by civilian means while external threats were fought by the military (Shepherd, 2015).

It is the complex nature of reconstruction, peacebuilding and humanitarian missions that increasingly demand the inclusion of military forces to operate alongside civil experts. Having as well civil experts and military officials in the field complicates matters for civilian tasks concerning its perceived impartiality, neutrality and independence towards the relevant folk subjected to conflicts. The connectedness between peace and security, and thus between civilian and military means became more and more apparent. The UN broadened its conception of the instruments required “in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations” in several Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII (Franke, 2006, pp. 6-7). This broadened range of instruments blurred the distinction between the civilian and military, as the challenges immediately brings both together demanding interaction and tensions too. The respected authority of the UN administration has thus certainly engendered that pursuing for better collaboration between civilian and military officers is necessary. CIMIC is a product of the assemblage of traditional ‘external’ and ‘internal’ to be able to collectively protect human needs. Successful CIMIC in the field depends on three core aspects: mutual liaison between the civilian and military actors about operational issues, respect and assistance towards the civilian environment, and assistance to the military force that functions better when it feels respected. Military functioning is highly dependent on assistance and a sense of respect, so that it feels legitimized to actually conduct operations.

“Unarmed civilian peacekeeping is the work of trained civilians who use nonviolence and unarmed approaches to protect other civilians from violence and the threat of violence as well as to support local efforts to build peace” (Julian & Schweitzer, 2015, p. 1). Peacekeeping as such – be it in a civilian or military way – is aimed at deter violence and separating armed forces (Schirch, 2006). A major difference between civilian and military missions is that civilian peacekeeping teams use their visibility as a tool. They aim to get in touch with all involved actors and incrementally strengthen relationships with locals. Subsequently, by using good communication and linking networks regions are exposed. If civilian experts are actually able to protect civilians from violence or force, by breaking the cycle of violence, then civilian experts are as well be able to rebuild relationships. Civilian missions do not seek to resolve or moderate the underlying conflict directly. It rather aims to provide a situation in which conflict resolution, mediation and dialogues are possible. Besides IOs are NGOs – such as the Nonviolent Peaceforce, the Peace Brigades International, and the Meta Peace Team – active in field operations. Impartiality is very important for civilian experts as their work involves traumatized individuals. This is exactly why “many NGOs on the ground keep their distance from the military, because they worry that cooperating with people in uniform will compromise their impartiality in the eyes of those they are trying to help” (Rasmussen & General, 2009). NATO has, for instance, attempted to arrange informal information exchange, coordination and even field work with NGOs in theaters as the Balkans and Afghanistan (Holmberg, 2011). During the Feira Summit in 2000, the Council classified – in its Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management the following four missions as civilian, in which no force component is intended (European E. Council, 2000):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy assistance/training</th>
<th>The EU aims to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting to local police forces.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the rule of law</td>
<td>Efforts deployed on an international scale to reinforce and if necessary restore credible local police forces can only be successful if a properly functioning judicial and penitentiary system backs up the police forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Civilian administration and protection

As regards civilian administration, a pool of experts has been created, capable of accepting civilian administration missions in the context of crisis-management operations, and if necessary, being deployed at very short notice.

Monitoring

Monitoring capability is proving a generic tool for conflict prevention/resolution and/or crisis management and/or peace-building. An important function of monitoring missions is to contribute to ‘prevention/deterrence by presence’ and they also enhance EU visibility on the ground, demonstrating EU engagement and commitment to a crisis or region.

At that time, it is unsurprisingly that the Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management only mentioned the UN and OSCE as leading agencies in responding to crises. Another, unspringing feature is that the Council demands a pragmatic bottom-up approach, and relies primarily on member states’ contributions. In how to come about planning civilian missions now differ fundamentally, as new bodies and agencies have now coordinating and planning functions. Civilian missions differ from military ones – that are based on NATO’s model – within the CSDP. For missions with a pure civilian nature, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) create the Concept of Operation (CONOP) in which it sets out the situational context, ends or civilian strategic options and financial arrangements, which ought to be approved by a Council Decision. When a CONOP is approved, the Head of Mission will develop an Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Statement of Requirements (SoR) in which an overview with necessary resources and means are listed. When as well the OPLAN and SoR are defined, the Council can launch an operation formally (Mattelaer, 2010). Figure 2 lists all CSDP missions so far, being classified as civilian, military or military/civilian.

Figure 2: CSDP missions classified as civilian, military or military/civilian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUMM (Western Balkan)</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Dec-07</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM (BiH)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Jun-12</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA (Macedonia)</td>
<td>Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Dec-03</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS (DRC)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sep-03</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL PROXIMA (fYROM)</td>
<td>former Yugoslav R. of Macedonia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Jun-05</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jul-05</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (BiH)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL (Kinshasa)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dec-07</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD (CONGO)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX (Iraq)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU support to AMIS (DAFUR)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dec-07</td>
<td>Military/Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM (Aceh)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dec-06</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR BST (Georgia)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Feb-12</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM (Rafah)</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM (Ukraine/Moldova)</td>
<td>Ukraine/Moldova</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>May-09</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT (Macedonia)</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Jun-14</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPT (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Jun-08</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DR (CONGO)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Nov-06</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL DR (CONGO)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sep-14</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURPOL (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR (Tchad/RCA)</td>
<td>Chad/Central Africa</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mar-09</td>
<td>Military/Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Sep-10</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM (Georgia)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVCO replaced by: EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (Somalia)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM (Somalia/Uganda)</td>
<td>Somalia/Uganda</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOFOR (Libya)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU CAP (Sahel Niger)</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the EU included a military dimension to its foreign and security policies, less academic attention has been given to civilian missions. In both civilian and military missions, staffs come from member states and the costs are shared. Both IOs only have a few assets for themselves, but possess planning capacity for civilian missions. The fact that civilian missions are under the authority of the EU Council is oftentimes considered as beneficial, as the EU acts with one voice and under an EU flag. Besides police assistance/training, strengthening the rule of law, civilian administration and protection and monitoring – classified as civilian missions during the Feira Summit in 2000 – the EU also added supporting EU Special Representatives and security sector reform (SSR). Of those, most were police missions aimed at “confidence building, often between ethnic groups, helping local police develop professionalism of its police forces” (Chivvis, 2010, p. 12). The most prominent police missions have been EUPM and EUPOL PROXIMA in the Balkans, EUPOL in Kinshasa, EUPOL COPPS in Palestinian territories, and off course EUPOL in Afghanistan. Rule of law missions then, are primarily carried out in reforming states, that is, rule of law missions strive to support the democratization process. Rule of law missions such as EUJUST LEX in Iraq and EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia were focused on training judicial officials and prison personnel. Rule of law missions are widely well received by the indigenous community, because those missions primarily “take place inside the EU rather than in the field” (McFate, 2008, p. 11). Monitoring missions – from the original Westphalian state notion – bring more security concerns, as it often deals with territorial disputes.

EUBAM in Rafah, EUBAM at the borders between Ukraine and Moldova, EUMM in Georgia and AMM in Aceh are the most prominent monitoring missions the EU has launched. And because monitoring missions deal with territory, cooperation with other IOs is problematic due to opposing visions concerning deterrent effects. Moreover, the uncertainty assumption in IRT (Mearsheimer, 2006) towards others intentions and integrity withhold actors to get involved in monitoring missions. This principle was made visible in EEUM Georgia in which “an European conflict was ended by Europeans themselves” (Kashmeri, 2011, p. 28), without USA’s involvement due to their envisioned reaction by Russia. Civil administration missions are smaller in scale and also involve less EU civilian or military staff. These missions main objective is to obtain clearer visions about how ministries function and consequently how ministry payroll systems work, because that might have a “major impact on the behaviour of soldiers and situation on the ground” (Chivvis, 2010, p. 14), especially in unstable fragmented states. Civil administration missions are thus to the utmost preventive in nature. SSR missions are employed when a dysfunctional security sector is not able to provide security to its people, by means of “inefficiency, unprofessionalism, inadequate state regulation, corruption or human rights violations” (Caparini, 2003, p. 237). EUSSR in Guinea-Bissau attempted to advice and help with restructuring Guinea-Bissau’s armed forced and police according to democratic principles and good governance, in this way also strengthening the relation between the police and Interpol.

If we turn back to NATO’s Strategic Concept, it states NATO’s ambition to “form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors” and to “identify and train civilian specialists from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP NESTOR (Horn of Africa)</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAVSEC (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Jan-14</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM (Mali)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM (Libya)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR (RCA)</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP SAHEL (Mali)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM (Ukraine)</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM (RCA)</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED (Mediterranean)</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions” (NATO, 2010). Initially, NATO considered civilian emergency planning (CEP) a national responsibility, though in its Strategic Concept from 1999 it first acknowledged that the nature and complexity of security threats no longer could solely rely on national solutions. The Civilian Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) is the top advisory body in this regard, in which NATO focuses on the following five areas:

1. Civil support in Article 5 missions;
2. Support in non-Article 5, crisis response operations;
3. Support for national authorities in civil emergencies;
4. Support for authorities and protecting populations against effects of WMD; and
5. Cooperation with partners in preparing and dealing with disasters

The CEPC can be considered as the CIVCOM of the EU, as it “provides NATO with essential civilian expertise and capabilities in the fields of terrorism preparedness and consequence management, humanitarian and disaster response and protecting critical infrastructure” (NATO, 2016) and reports – like the CIVCOM to the PSC – directly to the NAC. The CEPC meets regularly and consists of national delegations and is originated from 1950s when NATO already developed a program on CEP. The idea behind the CEP was that “civilian assets can be very useful parts of military operations. For example, provision of civilian or commercial air and sea lift capabilities frequently provides a more cost effective and readily available means of strategic transport for military operations than by purely military means” (NATO, 2006). The CEPC in turn is advised by four different technical planning groups which are specialized in specific areas, namely civil protection, transport, public health, and industrial resources and communication. These technical planning groups bring together national government experts, military representatives and industry experts.

The so-called spirit of complementarity and partnership is among others to ensure that capability development efforts are mutually reinforcing. It is widely believed that preventing duplication of means is an important element for cooperation as such, and establishing a comprehensive approach in particular. From here, it is hard to interpret the creation of EU Battle Groups and NATO Response Force. Moreover, duplication of effort should be minimalized at the organizational level. As already mentioned above, NATO seeks sources to integrate civilian capabilities in order to enforce the comprehensive approach effectively. The most obvious source would be national contributions, just like the military assets are owned by nations themselves. Another possible source could be IOs – be it NGOs or multinational ones – that are specialized in civilian crisis management, which self-evidently leads to the EU. However, unlike military capabilities, are civilian resources rarely available. Moreover, deployments of civilian resources can take considerable time. There are barely explicit ideas on how NATO should gather civilian means. One idea is that “allies should consider organizing a standing civilian corps for international crisis response. Such a capability could be used under NATO or the EU so long as was available to both organizations” (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2008, p. 3), and could realize the comprehensive approach. If ever, NATO will have access to a civilian capabilities base similar to that of the EU, then double duplication lurks which inter alia suggest beauty contests in the future. This triggers debates about whether the original functional division of labour – in which NATO took care of the high-end tasks and the EU dealt with the low-end tasks – should be re-entered. Whether this division along the high-low end tasks line is the prefer framework for cooperation is an issue of functional efficiency. Proponents of such a division point to the nature of IOs, their qualities, strengths and shortcomings. This division of labour was visible during operation Concordia in Macedonia, before the EU took over the mission under the Berlin plus arrangement. Opponents, mainly those who argue that EU should be able to tackle all types of crisis management operations, see a functional division of labour as an obstacle that keeps away EU’s global actorness. They consider a demarcation between low and high-end tasks as problematic, because of the absence of an EU twin of NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’. Moreover, opponents argue that burden-sharing will be disproportional because long-term stabilisation, humanitarian assistance, nation-building and economic aid are less appreciated and more time-consuming than military

19 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
Cooperative efforts between both IOs in civilian crisis management are to be observed on the ground. The ‘P’ of practices in CSDP missions and operations are the real parameters to assess EU’s actorness. The idea “that peace needs to be home-grown and cannot be imposed from the outside” (EUISS, 2015, p. 12) calls for diplomatic expertise and dialogues. In EU’s jargon, military activities are called ‘operations’ while civilian activities are being referred to as ‘missions’. Originally CSDP activities were either classified as military operations or civilian missions. The CMPD, created in 2009, suggest that civil-military integration and thus deeper cooperation between military and civilian officials is essential. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in its provisions on the CSDP, does not discard deployments of civilian and military activities next to each other. However, integrated military-civilian seem to become more frequently the modus operandi in the future. At the time of writing, the EU is on the job in six military operation and eleven civilian missions.

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<th>Military operation</th>
<th>Civilian missions</th>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
<td>EUBAM RAFAH (Palestinian Territories)</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (Gulf of Aden)</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)</td>
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<td>EUTM (Somalia)</td>
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<td>EUMAM RCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>EUMM (Georgia)</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR MED (Mediterranean)</td>
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The EU has launched two particular civilian missions in which NATO played a key role, namely the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan, 2007) and the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo, 2008). Especially EULEX Kosovo was ambitious concerning a larger nation-building effort and stabilizing the Balkans per se.

EUPOL Afghanistan

The purpose of this mission is to assist and establish a decisive Afghan police force. During the first two years after the mission was launched, EUPOL performed rather poorly due to technical difficulties and the size of the mission. Moreover, corrupt police personnel in the post-Taliban regime did not simply cease to exist. Ever since the invasion of the Soviet Union, Afghan police forces took over a paramilitary role to fight the mujahedeen. It suffices here to say that since 1979, the Afghan police forces did little to develop civil policing (Wilder, 2007, p. 7). The failure of German Police Project team (GPPT) and USA’s pressure for more ‘Europe’ in Afghanistan resulted in a European Council Joint Action to launch EUPOL in June 2007. EUPOL is led by the PSC which points out the strategic direction and the EU special representative in Kabul maintains communication with EU’s HR in order to provide political guidance to the mission. To establish an effective autonomous civilian police system in Afghanistan, four criteria must be satisfied. First, the overall police reform strategy must be approved by the concerned international community. Second, the implementation of this strategy by the Afghan government must be supported by this international community. Third, these police reforms must be optimized by improving coordination and cohesion between international polices and Afghan polices. Fourth, the overall reform must fit in the broader rule of law framework of Afghanistan. This fourth objective explicates the interconnectedness between police missions and rule of law missions. For example, improving police command, communication proactivity by intelligence-led policing and criminal investigation can hardly be realized if there is space for corruption within the police. Besides advising and monitoring, the EUPOL mission actually aims to train police staffs and to coordinate police reform through the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). All though

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20 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
21 Ibid.
individual European states already provided humanitarian assistance, NATO explicitly requested the EU to launch a police mission; this encouragement signified a shift in USA policy towards the EU and CSDP in particular (Brattberg, 2013, p. 5). NATO already led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 2003. ISAF Afghanistan was one of NATO’s most challenging missions. Whereas EUPOL assisted the Afghan National Police (ANP), ISAF assisted the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to counter insurgency. The prime mission of ISAF was to increase the capabilities for the ANSF, while later on from 2011 onwards; it shifted from a military role to training, assisting, advising and monitoring. On the ground, both ISAF and EUPOL deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which cooperated as long mandates overlapped, so especially in training and monitoring practices. However, this cooperation got hampered when Turkey refused to allow Cyprus classified information, blocking an EU-NATO security agreement (Chivvis, 2010, p. 27) and thus depriving EU civilian contractors of NATO protection. EUPOL PRTs were more or less national assemblies, consisting of legal experts and police officers of the same nationality. The EU and the lead countries in each PRT signed bilateral agreements, meaning that states protected their own staff in Afghanistan. During 2016, EUPOL concentrates primarily on two objectives, namely reforming the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and professionalizing the Afghan National Police (ANP). “The Afghanistan engagement has taken a heavy toll on transatlantic solidarity” (Brattberg, 2013, p. 22). Disagreements about strategies, burden-sharing, but above all staff shortages on EUPOL’s side have damped the relation. Mutual support has been primarily symbolic.

EULEX Kosovo

The rule of law mission in Kosovo, approved by the European Council in February 2008, differs fundamentally with EUPOL in Afghanistan. It is widely considered as the most ambitious civilian mission as it integrated staff for the rule of law, police, customs and border patrol. The importance of EULEX Kosovo stems from the idea that the CSDP actually was born in the Balkans and that the EU should manage conflicts on its own continent. Though, the USA provided a couple dozens of staff who operate under EU authority. Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 resulted in boisterous situations on the ground. EULEX Kosovo can be considered as a part of EU’s broader efforts to promote peace and stability in the Balkans. The integration of police and rule of law in one single mission can be inferred from the stated objectives. Those objectives are mentoring, advising and monitoring Kosovo authorities; reversing operational decisions made by those authorities when it serves the rule of law; verifying that judicial and political authorities are independent from one another; investigating war crimes, corruption and terrorism; and improving cooperation between rule of law authorities. Strategic control is the responsibility of the Civilian Operational Commander which is based at the CPCC in Brussels. The Civilian Operational Commander reports to the PSC and EU’s HR for CSDP and also communicates directly with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Pristina, Kosovo. It is the Head of the Mission who is responsible for the mission on the ground “including liaison with other international organizations and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in particular” (Chivvis, 2010, pp. 33-34). The civilian mission included three subcomponents, namely policing, justice and customs. The policing component is the largest one forasmuch deployed personnel. Policing consisted of three teams, namely a strengthening team carrying out monitoring and advisory tasks; an executive team dealing with criminal matters as war crimes; and a special police team like a gendarmerie preserving order when disorder lurks. The justice component consists of judges and prosecutors enforcing monitoring and executive functions. The paradoxical challenge of this justice component is that ought to report to the Head of Mission, while it should also maintain an independent judiciary power. This internal challenge could run counter the overall targets of the mission when judges wield different methods. Customs then, is the smallest component but crucial for the Kosovo economy. NATO has already been leading its peace-support operation: KFOR, stemming from NATO campaign against Milosevic. KFOR, just like EULEX, aims to stabilize and democratize Kosovo as well as providing a secure environment for multi-ethnic modes of living. Whereas NATO prior 1999 executed an air campaign, it co-facilitated the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations in 2013. This agreement was signed by Belgrade and Pristina, while the

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22 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
EU hosted these high-level talks. Political dialogues are believed, by the EU and NATO, to be the best instrument to improve relations. This in turn helped to integrate the Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic structures of approaching crises. The European Council and Serbia opened accession negotiations, while Kosovo signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in November 2015. EULEX Kosovo is widely considered as one of EU’s most successful missions so far. The main obstacle was the de facto recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state due to resistance by Serbia and Russia23. Some formal problems arose as a consequence of the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, though the operational relationship on the ground was considered as strong. Arrangements and joint operations were very closely developed.

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23 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
4. Conclusion

4.1. Findings

My search aimed to qualify cooperative behaviour between the EU and NATO in civilian missions since 2003. I tried to explore what both IOs consider essential elements of civilian crisis management and to which extent they jointly strive to approach such crises, how they deal with potential overlap, and consequently whether both IOs align their tasks. I doing so, I strived to understand the civilian problem definitions of the EU and NATO and subsequently their policies, politics and practices in order to approach their ‘securitized’ civilian problems.

The ‘Europeanist view’ and ‘Atlanticist view’ used to be the main source of disconformity between both organizations, blocking effective cooperation. However, both sides acknowledged that strengthening the CSDP would be beneficial for European security at large. The idea that strengthening Europe’s security and defence policy would be a perquisite for better cooperation is overrated. It rather enhanced inter-organizational rivalry as to equipment procurement, since many European states are member of both. Dialogues about capabilities are for example not on the agenda when the PSC and NAC meet\(^{24}\), as both committees are just authorized to discuss ‘joint EU-NATO operations’. One striking example of non-cooperative behaviour is NATO’s very first mission in Africa, assisting the African Union (AU) during the Darfur crisis in 2005, without consulting the EU. Many hoped that the French reintegration to NATO’s integrated military structure in 2009 would reverse the tension between both organizations, and would invoke discussions as to quid pro quo; however such negotiations have become yet not reality. Another obstacle is EU’s staffing problem. Member states can agree with missions while not committing any resources or personnel. Member states’ hesitancy to make civilian experts available impairs missions and causes vexation at EU level, as missions are heavily dependent on national contributions. The shift from civilian to the ‘comprehensive approach’ therefore, should not result into a chief focus on military capability attainment. EU-NATO impasses at the bureaucratic level will have to be resolved. The Turkey-Cyprus conflict impacts or prevents joint actions and causes friction between both organizations. However, as EULEX Kosovo has shown, cooperation on the ground between willing commanders of both organizations can be effective. “Common goals are not sufficient for actors to cooperate. Actors need to perceive each other as legitimate partners” (Holmberg, 2011, p. 542). This can be considered as one of the main obstacles obstructing cooperation between the EU and NATO in civilian crisis management. Both IOs raison d’être and consequently their functional division of labour has its reflections on other IOs, NGOs, states and civilians as to legitimate practices. Furthermore, one of the main challenges for both IOs is to avoid duplication. The idea of a complementary relationship is originated from EU’s political, economic and diplomatic means of pressure, while NATO holds considerable military capabilities. To achieve their common goals and ends together, the relation holds a powerful combination of hard and soft power. There is arguably a discrepancy between the targeted strategic partnership and cooperative operational practices. As the relation has recently been characterized by political impasses, persistent contradictions, inherent inconsistencies, and underlying inter-organizational rivalries (Koops, 2010), visions that both IOs are actually unstrategic partners are common. There is no strong one-sided political will concerning defence spending, role definitions and partnerships. Two major occasions suggest that the relation is stymieing. First, the Berlin Plus arrangements have not been used for over an decade, which might imply that EU’s dependency on NATO resource-base is diminishing which in turn invoke ‘frozen conflict-like’ tensions. Second, the non-conclusion of a Berlin in reverse induces NATO to gather its civilian capabilities from somewhere else, as NATO is seeking to broaden its horizon (NATO, 2010). These two occasions do not really embody strong cooperative efforts, it even shapes strong incentives to operate along one another instead of with one another. It is the absence of a clear delineation of both IOs responsibilities, that caused duplication and confusion about IOs position vis-à-vis one anoter. Another set of controversies center around NATO’s maturity and EU’s being an infant and inexperienced security actor. Shortages in military capabilities, no clear homogenic strategic vision and divided attitudes of its member result

\(^{24}\) Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
in member states’ preference for NATO. Heterogeneity within the EU arguably makes the CSDP not a very reliable partner. Heterogeneity concerning military and defence spending (EuroStat, 2013) and thus idea of Pooling and Sharing – in concert with EU’s global reputation as normative power (Nielsen, 2013) – are the main sources of the infamous capability-expectation gap. Both IOs’ alignment to the UN Charter on the one hand, and NATO’s primacy concerning military defence tasks on the other, is for many commentators an incentive for the EU to be parsimonious on their civilian capabilities. As EU’s staff cell at SHAPE suggests, working relations are pretty well institutionalized, however interactions at this level, “and therefore so is any serious collaboration in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management” (Goldgeier, 2010, p. 17) are rather minimal.

Are attempts made to adjust policies? Yes, but not sufficiently. Do actors’ policies become significantly more compatible? No. There are way too many bottlenecks preventing effective cooperation. At bureaucratic level, during formal PSC-NAC meetings only Berlin plus arrangements are discussed. Berlin plus, however, is dead which puts pressure on Albright’s D of duplication, common resources in general and civilian capabilities per se. For instance, the political-military group experts are the ones that participate in the EU-NATO Capability Group, at least from the EU side. Informal meetings between staffs are the new modus operandi, which actually is an efficient mode of consultation between both IOs. However, those informal contacts are primarily held between the IMS and EUMS and thus contain a military character. Informal consultation are not constrained by formal deadlocks, however lack decisive outputs. In the field, coordination is visible between NATO and EU staff concerning aligning tasks, while actual collaboration is far from reality. Coordination in the field can be observed merely in long-term missions, because adjusting the military to civilian needs takes time. “The informal cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, Afghanistan and Kosovo may be nice illustrations of bottom-up cooperation but are ad hoc in nature” (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2015, p. 16). How cooperation could be improved, primarily by bypassing formal deadlocks, are informal modes of dialogues.

4.2. Evaluation

Both IOs were founded in different circumstances and their nature differ forasmuch approaching crises and capabilities used. The relationship cannot be assessed as mutually beneficial so far, concerning institutional learning and capability availability. What can be said is that the modest implementation of the Berlin plus arrangements, the absence of a civilian counterpart on the one side, and the tendency of mutual irrelevance makes the current relation enigmatic.

4.3. Discussion

Discussions on how the relation should be organized are manifold, covering a wide array of areas, as the division of labour debate, the ‘Berlin in reverse’, and even merging the two has been suggested. In order to assess whether cooperation with NATO is necessary or desired at all should not only be based on geopolitical motivations. The functional use of institutions, according to rationalists and liberal institutionalists, is beyond doubt. However, the absence of an inter-institutional theory suggests our current incomplete understanding on how both IOs interact. There are indications that both IOs are self-fulfilling actors. Assisting the EU by institutionalizing its CSDP after the Balkan missions complied as new task to NATO’s post-Cold War void. EU’s hesitance to satisfy NATO with civilian capabilities can be considered as EU’s ambition to remain the main civilian aid provider, which is beneficial in its road towards becoming a global actor. A clear delineation of tasks should trigger an imbalanced security environment, not merely in geographical sense, but with regard to technical abilities to address threats. This in turn would lead to a redefinition of those states that are member of either one of the IOs, states that are engaged in special agreement frameworks or the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The multiplication of security actors – with overlapping mandates – on the one

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25 Interview EU official (Political Administrator), 01/02/2016
26 Ibid.
27 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag
hand, and subsequently the fragmentation of security providers stems partially from NATO’s inability to address civilian crises in a European way. NATO has been the safeguard of Europe during the second half of the 21st century, that is, the USA has been visible in Europe for quite a long time. Now NATO is at crossroads partially due to EU’s rapid progression in its CSDP, but whether a more European NATO is desired must be seen. As ‘Berlin plus’ is still considered as the formal cornerstone of the relation, a new agreement might freshen up the relation. First both IOs have to recognized that both sides have evolved, that is EU must consider NATO not solely as a military Alliance driven by USA’s interests, while NATO must acknowledge EU’s capacity to enforce ‘higher end tasks’ (Roncevic & Mrvelj, p. 26). The principle of indivisibility of security should motivate both organizations to strengthen one another in the first place. Repudiating Berlin plus would be a bold action, especially for the former CEECs and the ‘reversal oriented tier’ as such. However, accepting Berlin plus to perish, paves the way for more informal modes of cooperation between staffs, and possibly an informal ‘Berlin in reverse’ mechanism on a case-by-case basis. Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty propose a “formal establishment of a council, including all EU and NATO members, as well as the EU itself, would create the appropriate forum for the discussion of the critical challenges to the 21st century Euro-Atlantic community” (Kramer & Serfaty, 2008, p. 3) and consequently the coordination of personnel, resources, mandates and strategies. However, the willingness to establish such a formal forum is hard to effectuate among EU and NATO members. In order to strengthen cooperation in civilian means, the CIVCOM and CEPC must learn from the EUMS-IMS link28. More focus should be given to horizontal modes of cooperation between staffs, instead of the vertical decision-making structures within both organizations that eventually end up in the paper-basket at PSC-NAC level. In general, both sides envision that a clear division of labour, i.e. NATO military and EU civilian, should be avoided and that the two organisations must seek synergies and complementarity in pursuing these endeavours. This ideal has been repeatedly confirmed by Ministers in relevant Council Conclusions on CSDP and also by the European Council29.

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28 Interview Dick Zandee (Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute for International Relations) Security Expert, 27/01/2016, Den Haag

29 Interview EU official (Political Administrator), 01/02/2016
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