Bachelor Thesis

Politicization, Centralization and the Adequacy of Crisis Management – Causal Mechanism underlying the Refugee Crisis in Germany 2015

Moritz Carl Fromageot
s195822
29 June, 2016

Supervisors:
prof. dr. René Torenvlied
dr. Irna van der Molen

Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences
University of Twente
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
Abstract
Mechanisms underlying politicization were identified as important factors driving crisis management. To what extent and how do they affect its adequacy? Which effects do mechanisms of centralization have in crises characterized by a high degree of politicization? These questions are addressed in this case study of the refugee crisis in Germany 2015. The method used is Causal Process Tracing (CPT). The study identifies underlying causal mechanisms of politicization and centralization in a wicked problem. In doing so, the study shows the workings of blame games, framing contests and crisis exploitation and their potential impact on the adequacy of crisis management. It is demonstrated how framing contests hinder adequate crisis recognition and how centralization is a product of blame using an in-depth analysis it shows how these mechanisms determined crisis management in the refugee crisis. The findings show the concept of adequacy reaches its conceptual limits in wicked problems.

Keywords: Politicization, mechanism, centralization, adequacy of crisis management

refugee crisis
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

Contents

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... V

TABLE OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... V

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. VI

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1

RESEARCH QUESTION ................................................................................................. 3

THEORY, CONCEPTS AND HYPOTHESES .................................................................. 5

Crises. ............................................................................................................................... 5

Refugee Crisis. .................................................................................................................. 5

Rational Choice Theory. ............................................................................................... 5

Adequacy of Crisis Management. ................................................................................ 6

Politicization. .................................................................................................................. 7

Centralization. ................................................................................................................. 11

HYPOTHESES .................................................................................................................. 13

METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 15

TERMINOLOGY & CAUSAL MECHANISMS ............................................................... 15

THE BASIS FOR CAUSAL INFEERENCE ..................................................................... 16

Causal inference. ............................................................................................................. 16

Confessions. .................................................................................................................... 16

VALIDITY ......................................................................................................................... 17

CASE SELECTION .......................................................................................................... 17

DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................................ 18

OPERATIONALIZATION ............................................................................................... 18

The Adequacy of Crisis Management. ......................................................................... 18

Politicization & underlying mechanisms ....................................................................... 18

Centralization. ................................................................................................................. 19

CASE PRESENTATION .................................................................................................. 19

CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION ...................................................................................... 19

STAGE 1 ......................................................................................................................... 22

First Signals. .................................................................................................................... 22

STAGE 2 ......................................................................................................................... 23

1st half of 2015 - louder signals. .................................................................................. 23

STAGE 3 ......................................................................................................................... 24

August 2015: The crisis breaks out. The BaMF released a ......................................... 24

17th of September 2015 - Sacrificing a Scapegoat. ..................................................... 26
List of Tables

Table 1: Political Crisis Exploitation Game (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 83) ....................... 10
Table 2: Political Crisis Exploitation Game (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 84) ....................... 10
Table 3: Central Stakeholder in the Refugee Crisis ......................................................... 21
Table 4: Signals of severity vs. Governmental measures ................................................. 36
Table 5: Effects on the adequacy of crisis management .................................................. 47
Table 6: Course of events, development & politicization hotspots ................................. 69

Table of Figures

Figure 1: The constructed nature of Crises (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 84) ......................... 8
Figure 2: Blame Games - Construction of Blame in Framing Contests (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003, p. 302) ................................................................. 9
Figure 3: Causal Diagram ............................................................................................... 12
Figure 4: Number of applications for asylum from 2011 – 2015 .................................... 22
Figure 5: Framing contests and Crisis Recognition ......................................................... 37
Figure 6: Centralization on the agency dimension .......................................................... 38
Figure 7: Centralization on the governmental dimension ............................................... 40
Figure 8: Crisis Exploitation and Crisis Policies ............................................................. 43
Figure 9: Crisis management politicises ........................................................................ 44
Figure 10: Centralization and adequacy of crisis management ....................................... 45
Figure 11: Centralization on the government dimension ............................................... 46
List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal MOI</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal IM</td>
<td>Federal Minister of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>German Chancellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChefGC</td>
<td>Minister of the German Chancellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLCM</td>
<td>Bundeslaender und Kommunen [the Federal States and the Communes]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union [Christian Democratic Union]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Union [Christian Social Union]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland [Social Democratic Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>Patriotische Europa Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlanden [European patriots against the Islamization of the occident]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This study presents an in-depth analysis of mechanisms driving the crisis management of Refugees in Germany 2015. 2015 marked an all-time high of refugees worldwide and was characterized by the ubiquity of this crisis. The “Refugee Crisis” is regarded as an overarching term, involving a variety of dimensions and sub-crises. On a Worldwide and European dimension, the crisis concerns questions about the nation states’ responsibilities and burden sharing. On the other hand, pressing crises emerged on the nation-state level. The level this thesis will focus on can be called the institutional and national level of the refugee crisis. On this level, the crisis materializes in the form of overstrained municipalities, welfare organizations and governmental agencies. Besides, it is marked by a high degree of political polarization and the rise of right-wing populist parties. This thesis focusses on the German federal government’s crisis management, which tried to prevent the complete collapse of German institutions in the wake of 2015.

Crisis management research ultimately attempts to answer the question, how an adequate crisis management can be ensured. However, there is no such thing as a universal remedy to crises, as they come in a variety of forms and shapes. Managing crises adequately become especially difficult, when crises take the form of wicked problems. Wicked problems are characterized by a low level of agreement on core values and high uncertainty on knowledge (Koppenjan et al., 2004). Thus, the Refugee Crisis in Germany is a prime example for the wickedness of problems. There is little agreement on the values Asylum Policy should be based on. This results in even less agreement on the question, how the crisis should be managed. Unlike in crises with a strong technical nature, the solution to wicked problems cannot be made in a social vacuum but is the result of a strategic game between powerful stakeholders (Koppenjan et al., 2004). Accordingly, crisis management becomes subject to an uncertain strategic political game, driven by the maximization of each actor’s utility. From its onset, the Refugee Crisis was characterized by the constant negotiation between status quo and change-oriented actors.

These strategic games are no novelties in crisis management. Important components of these strategic games were conceptualized as Framing Contests, Blame Games and Crisis Exploitation by Boin et al. (2009), as well as Brändström et al. (2003). They identified these

POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

concepts as important mechanisms driving the construction of crisis and crisis management itself. However, prior research limits the analytic scope of Politicization on organizational learning, crisis communication or limited themselves to the description of the mechanisms as such (Boin, 2005; Brändström et al., 2003; Dekker et al., 2004). This study explores its impact during the entire process of crisis management. It adds to the scientific knowledge, by the identification of causal mechanisms connecting these processes of politicization to the Adequacy of Crisis Management.

These mechanisms of politicization will furthermore be put into context with the common crisis-reflex of centralization. Scholars disagree on the question whether centralized decision making can be regarded as an asset or potential liability. Boin (2005) emphasize the potential threats centralized crisis decision-making pose. It has the potential to jeopardize implementation of new policies, by widening the central-field and appreciative gap (Boin et al., 1996), creates insufficient crisis policies and blocks the flow of information (Boin, 2005). In contrast, Peters (2011) emphasizes that the citizens expect crucial decisions to be made by their elected leaders and not faceless bureaucrats.

The Refugee Crisis presents a suitable case for a scientific contribution on Politicization and centralization for two reasons. (1) The strategic processes of framing, blaming and crisis exploitation are observable over time and in different compositions of powerful and less powerful actors. These strategic games did not only involve parliamentary forces but were at the beginning driven by the emergence of an anti-Islam and anti-migration movement, named *Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA)* and the revival of the right-wing populist Party *Alternative fuer Deutschland (AFD)*. During the crisis climax also critical actors from within the government engaged in this political game and substantially shaped crisis management. Accordingly, the study helps to fill the scientific gap described by Boin et al. (2009) in showing how and why incumbent office holder become advocates for change. (2) The case shows the crisis-reflex of centralization. Chancellor Merkel’s asylum policies were subject to turbulences, just as her popularity.\(^2\) In the course of the crisis, competence was centralized from the Federal MOI to the GC in October 2015.\(^3\) The study will give account to the effect of this upscaling of competences and elaborate on it in the light of the


presented theory. Thus, it also contributes to the ongoing scientific debate about the potential harms and benefits of centralization during crises.

This study makes a third important contribution, by assessing important factors in crisis management research concerning their relationship to the Adequacy of Crisis Management. However, the aim is not to simply find relationships between factors, but to open the black-box between the factors of politicization, centralization and the adequacy of crisis management. Ultimately, the question about the underlying mechanisms, and their implications for the adequacy of crisis management shall be answered. While exploring new causal mechanisms, existing frameworks, as Boin (2005) Boin et al. (1996); (Brändström et al., 2003; Peters, 2011) will be put to the test.

Besides, the scientific relevance of the study, it gives valuable insights into a societal debate, which dominates political and social life all over Europe. The study has practical implications, as it outlines tactical behavior of political actors and shows potentials for crisis exploitation. Knowledge on crisis exploitation is valuable for policy-makers to evaluate the threat to their policies, coming from change-oriented actors. Further decisions have to be made, also on the issue on how centralized decision making should be in the Refugee Crisis. Last but not least, it contributes to the management of wicked problems.

The study's research design consists of four components: (1) Methodology (2) Case Description (3) Analysis (4) Discussion & Conclusion. Causal Process Tracing (CPT) is the applied method. CPT is used to look at the variables. Research that uses CPT identifies causal mechanisms, rather than describing the association between variables. CPT offers the possibility to connect the explanation for an association it to basic social theory, such as Rational Actor Theory (Allison et al., 1971; Lovett, 2006). The distinct asset a qualitative approach as CPT has, is that causality plays out in time. Thus the researcher can be sure of time-order, which increases the strengths of causal claims.

**Research question**

The first set of questions refers to mechanisms of politicization. Accordingly, mechanisms underlying politicization will be assessed concerning their relationship with centralization and the adequacy of crisis management. Questions that will be addressed are:

1. To what extent did mechanisms underlying politicization drive the Adequacy of Crisis Management on the national institutional dimension, in Germany from 2014 to March 2016?
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

1.1. To what extent were mechanisms of politicization observable during the Refugee Crisis?

1.2. How did these mechanisms of politicization affect the Adequacy of Crisis Management?

The second set of questions concerns the issue of centralization. Centralization of competences is generally regarded, as decision-making authority migrating upwards in the hierarchy (Peters, 2011). However, the effects of centralized decision-making in the wake of crisis are contested. While some identify centralization as potential liability for the adequacy of crisis management (Boin et al., 2011), others argue in favor of its necessity under specific conditions (Peters, 2011). Also for centralization, the underlying mechanisms will be analyzed.

2. To what extent and how did the process of centralization of decision-making, within the German government and the responsible agencies, affect the adequacy of German national crisis management, during the refugee crisis in Germany from 2014 to March 2016?

2.1. To what extent could a centralization of decision making be observed?

2.2. To what extent did the process of centralization affect the adequacy of crisis management?

The third question assesses a moderating effect and combines the former two questions:

3. How did politicization affect the relation between the process of centralization and adequacy of crisis management?

The research questions addressed are of explanatory nature. They deal with the mechanisms that drive the relationship between the core concepts.
Theory, Concepts and Hypotheses

This section contains the conceptualizations, followed by a presentation of the causal diagram and the hypotheses that can be derived. The theoretical and argumentative background for each hypothesis is formulated before each hypothesis.

**Crises.** There is a variety of crisis definitions and it is commonly accepted that crises come in a variety of forms (Boin, 2005). Crises are unexpected, undesirable disruptions of societal and political order, where “normal ways of operating no longer work” (Boin, 2005). They are “events or developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent threats to core community values and structures” (Boin et al., 2009, pp. 83-84). This study emphasizes their constructed nature (Boin et al., 1996), as the perception of problems is highly subjective (Koppenjan et al., 2004).

**Refugee Crisis.** The refugee crisis in Germany, is an excellent example for the constructed nature of crisis. For what this thesis conceptualizes as refugee crisis it is central that for the existence of a crisis, powerful stakeholders need to agree on its very existence. While activists argue that there is a refugee crisis ever since refugees drown in the Mediterranean, the existence of a crisis was only widely accepted with the institutional crisis Germany faced during the unexpected increased influx of refugees from 2015 onwards. Thus, this thesis conceptualizes the refugee crisis, as the commonly accepted crisis the Federal MOI and the Communes had to face in form of overloaded agencies, who were unable to fulfill their essential functions. Bade (2015) argues that the entire refugee crisis in Germany can be narrowed down to a crisis within the Federal MOI and the subordinated agencies dealing with migration (Bade, 2015).

**Rational Choice Theory.** Rational Choice Theory (RCT) constitutes the overarching behavioral theory. As argued by Lovett (2006), it contributes to straightforward causal explanations. RTC approaches can be used to open the black-box, by showing the entire causal process. RCT bases on three core assumptions: (1) the discrete purposeful actor assumption, which states that actors, individuals or groups of individuals are capable of purposeful action. (2) Utility theory, which constitutes that actors’ behavior aims at maximizing utility. (3) Actors pursue their goals so rationally and do whatever it takes to maximize their utility function.

For the management of wicked problem it must further be noted that stakeholders act within a political game (Koppenjan et al., 2004). Thus, crisis management for wicked crises, is subject to a strategic game played in networks. Concerning decision-making in groups Shepsle et al. (1997) conclude that outcomes are determined by the salience actors attach to an issue and the influence they have on decision-making.
Adequacy of Crisis Management. For the concept of the adequacy of crisis management, Torenvlied et al. (2015) used the components, identified by Inspectie voor Veiligheid en Justitie [Inspection for security and justice] that need to be properly executed for adequate crisis management. These components are: (1) preparation, (2) recognition and signaling of crisis, (3) provision of information within the organizations involved, (4) analysis, judgement and preparation of decision-making, (5) decision-making and steering (6) crisis communication.

In order to limit the scope of the paper and because of limited access to reliable information, component (3) and (6) will be excluded. Components (2) and (4) will be combined in one component. The following components remain for the analysis:

Preparation. Crisis preparation describes all actions that have the goal to prepare an entity for unexpected contingencies. Furthermore, effective crisis management means to install mechanisms that will detect crisis in the making(Mitroff et al., 2000).

Crisis Recognition & Analysis. Crisis-recognition concerns the interpretation of crisis signals. Boin (2005) describes barriers to crisis recognition. Actors fail to recognize crises because of the ability to explain aberrations in such a way that they conform to their worldview. Short-term threats have the potential to keep long-term threats off the agenda. Also, the constructed nature of crises is important for crisis recognition. Resourceful claim makers are needed, to construct a sense of severity and signal that there is a crisis. Boin (2005) argues that often all necessary information for crisis-recognition is available, but that top policy makers cannot put the pieces together before it is too late.

Crisis analysis describes the process of sense-making. During this process the questions how could this happen and what should we do next are asked? An important factor for sense-making in crises, is the impact stress has. Under stress, individuals tend to focus on short-term effects and neglect long-term considerations, fall back on deeply rooted behavioral patterns, narrow their span of attention to central issues, while neglecting peripheral ones, be more likely to rely on stereotypes and are more easily irritable (Boin, 2005).

Decision-making and steering. During decision-making and steering, the performance of the entire crisis network is more important for adequacy than individual performance. Boin et al. (2005) write that a main problem of crisis decision-making bodies is that they do not share information effectively. There are two pillars between which decision-making groups interact: conflict and conformity.

According to Boin (2005) successful decision making can be ensured by creating deliberative processes within the crisis management team and create a “courtroom-like setting
where proponents of different policy proposals get an opportunity to argue their case before an as yet uncommitted “magistrate-leader”” (Boin, 2005, p. 50). However, this mode of decision making is in sharp contrast to the general expectation that the top policy maker should provide a direction. Significant threats for this crisis decision-making are phenomena, such as false cohesion and self-censorship (Boin, 2005).

The following theoretical concepts and underlying mechanisms describe core aspects of strategic games in crisis management, who will be analyzed as underlying mechanisms in this study.

**Politization.** Politization is conceptualized as political disagreement. It is a process, where actors draw political and social attention to an issue, by connecting it to core values and thus construct a sense of severity (Dekker et al., 2004). Mechanisms of politicization, which will be presented in this section, serve the maximization of an actor’s utility function. As one can see in Figure 1, not all failures are politicized, because they might be in the “zone of indifference” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 85). Accordingly, with greater disagreement, the potential for politicization increases. “The degree to which political actors frame a series of events as violations of core public values, determines to what extent these events become a matter of political and societal debate [...] The more severe the events are depicted to be, the more actors will get involved” (Brändström et al., 2003, p. 291). Accordingly, for any crisis with wicked problems, politicization and the following underlying mechanisms pose central challenge.

**Framing contests.** In a framing contest, different interpretations of an event, situation or issue compete for popularity. Crisis and crisis management are characterized by sequential framing contests. The first framing contest is closely connected to the constructed nature of crises, as it concerns the significance of an event and the question whether it will become a crisis or not. Figure 1 shows how an event can be framed in three different ways: (1) denial minimizes the significance and argues that the events are nothing more than unfortunate incidents, which do not need any major political discussion. (2) Framing a situation as critical threat to the status quo, acknowledges the significance - the threat to the status quo needs to be fought. (3) Framing the events as a critical opportunity, maximizes the significance. The event is a change to change the status quo. Frames (1) and (2) are often used incumbent office-holders, while oppositional forces would use frame (3) (Boin et al., 2009).
**Politization, Centralization and Adequacy**

**Figure 1:** The constructed nature of crises (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 84)

---

**Blaming Games.** When the crisis was constructed, another framing contests allocates blame by asking: How could this happen and who is responsible? (1) Actors can frame the event as an operational incident and deem the cause as identifiable by single actors or agencies. As long as the crisis is argued to have an immediate cause, the discourse remains on an operational level and focuses the blame on identifiable individuals. (2) Actors can frame the events in a broader context and exogenize the causes. In this case, it is zoomed into powerful underlying causes. This involves that the analysis extends back in time. When this happens, the focus moves up in the hierarchy (Bovens et al., 1998).

Accordingly, top policy-makers will either stress the immediate causes of a crisis, sacrifice a scapegoat and limit the scope of investigation (Brändström et al., 2003), or when they might themselves end up as scapegoat broaden the scope and argue for network failure. This diffuses blame across the many hands and offers the possibility for avoiding sanctions (Bovens et al., 1998; Brändström et al., 2003). Change oriented players will stress the symptomatic dimension. Figure 2 two shows the construction of blame by in framing contests.
Crisis Exploitation. Crisis exploitation is defined as “the purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 83). Crisis exploitation takes place on two different levels:

1. The political level, where the government’s and opposition’s frames collide. This political crisis exploitation game is about reputation and political offices. The different options and possible outcomes are shown in Table 1.
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

Table 1: Political Crisis Exploitation Game (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Critics</th>
<th>Absolve blame</th>
<th>Focus blame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept responsibility</td>
<td>I. Blame minimization: Elite escape likely</td>
<td>II. Blame acceptance: Elite damage likely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny responsibility</td>
<td>III. Blame avoidance: Elite escape likely</td>
<td>IV. Blame showdown: Elite damage, escape, rejuvenation all possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The policy level, where proponents of the status quo collide with advocates for change. During the policy crisis exploitation game, status quo and change-oriented actors negotiate policy changes. The beginning of policy exploitation bases on the assessment which delegitimization and destabilization had for the policies in force. Status quo actors have to decide whether some kind of accommodating gestures are necessary, while change-oriented actors have to decide whether the crisis created the opportunity to alter policies.

Table 2: Political Crisis Exploitation Game (A. Boin et al., 2009, p. 84)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status-quo players</th>
<th>Change advocates</th>
<th>Press for policy paradigm shift</th>
<th>Press for incremental reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resist policy change</td>
<td>I: policy stalemate or politically imposed paradigm shift</td>
<td>II: policy stalemate or politically imposed incremental adjustment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contain policy change</td>
<td>III: major and swift rhetorical/symbolic change; more incremental substantive change</td>
<td>IV: negotiated incremental adjustment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Centralization. The expectation that top policy makers call the shots in times of crisis is an acknowledged phenomenon (Boin, 2005; Peters, 2011). In the wake of crisis, centralization of decision-making is thus a logical reflex. Centralization is conceptualized as the upscaling of competences towards the center of power.

However, the effects of centralization during crises, are widely contested and not consistent. Peters (2011) argues that decision-making migrates upwards for good reasons. High political pressures and the public’s perception that crisis management lies within the domain of the top-policy maker exacerbate the tendency for centralization. However, the potential harms of centralization stem from the condition that actors on the ground have the most precise information. Additionally it blocks the flow of information and makes collaboration more difficult (Peters, 2011). Especially in highly technical crisis relying on experts, who possess most profound knowledge is advisable (Boin, 2005; Weick, 1988).

For the implementation of new policies during crises, centralization can increase resistance of field actors. This resistance stems from a widened central-field gap, which may paralyze reforms and implementation of policy objectives (Boin et al., 1996). Boin et al. (1996) explain that the threat resulting from the central-field gap consists of two factors: (1) The capability of administrators, to resist centrally formulated policies, by using their autonomy to jeopardize or sabotage them. (2) The willingness of implementing agencies to resist centrally imposed objectives.

Actors become less willing to implement objectives when the appreciative gap is diminished. This gap refers to the mutual understand of the values, perceptions, and definitions of the other party, which eventually leads to frustration on both ends.

Boin (1996) identified two conditions which help to control the central field gap: (1) limiting field discretion by “establishing a unitary administrative system; a clearly formulated and uniform set of norms and rules; unambiguous objectives; availability of necessary information and no time pressure” (Boin et al., 1996, p. 151). (2) Addressing the willingness of implementing actors to conform to central objectives. Furthermore, Boin and Otten (1996) suggest to iron out differences in opinion in order to ensure compliance. This will result in a shared philosophy, but also creates a very time consuming procedure

One might expect that in crisis everyone automatically cooperates. This is not the case, as Crisis decisions might have severe long term effects. Normal patterns of behavior thus don’t simply disappear. Furthermore, different definitions and perceptions of the crisis on various levels of the administration might lead to a widened central-field and appreciative gap (Boin et al., 1996).
Hypotheses

From the presented theory, the following causal diagram can be derived. The causal diagram shows the hypotheses marked in different colors.

This following causal pathway is marked red. High politicization jeopardizes the components of an adequate crisis management. Much disagreement will lead to intense framing contests, blame games and crisis exploitation. With many different frames, the ability for timely crisis-recognition and thus crisis construction is in jeopardy.

Also, crisis exploitation logically comes at the cost of an adequate crisis management. Advocates for change try to alter the policies that the crisis management bases on, or the authority of the crisis manager itself. This leads to inconsistent and unstable crisis management.

Framing contests among crisis managers will result in inconsistent crisis management. Because of disagreement on the issue itself, information will be evaluated in diverse ways, resulting in an insufficient provision of important information amongst decision makers. Due to the different positions within the administration, fast decision-making becomes more difficult and inconsistent communication along the hierarchy leads to ambiguous commands on the ground. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis.

**H1a: The higher the degree of politicization the stronger the negative effect on the adequacy of crisis management.**

This following causal pathway is marked in black. This hypothesis shows the possibility of a potential feedback loop, created by process dynamics, as described by Blatter et al. (2012). In this relationship, inadequate crisis management triggers the politicization process. Politicization and the processes described in H1a might even have their root cause in an inadequate crisis management itself. When the public and the political arena bears witness to an inadequate crisis management, decreased output legitimacy creates space for the emergence of different crisis frames. Furthermore, critical actors will, allocate blame amongst crisis managers and eventually exploit the crisis, aiming for a policy or leadership change. Thus we formulate the following hypothesis.

**H1b: Inadequate crisis management politicized the crisis.**

This causal pathway is marked in blue. In a highly politicized crises, many actors contest the course of action and argue that core values are at stake (Brändström et al., 2003). Furthermore, it is likely that the public expects decision-making to be centralized when the issue is considered to belong into the domain of the top policy-makers (Peters, 2011). Actors with different frames and an interest in crisis exploitation will try to alter support for office
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

holders and policies (Boin et al., 2009). The chance of losing a blame game or a crisis exploitation game because of a subordinate’s mistakes increases the intention to stay in control, which is a causal factor adding to the decision of centralizing decision-making.

Centralization excludes actors from decision making and thus allocates blame in the wake of politicization. It suggests that the crisis is not the result of a systemic problem like policy failure, but that actor failure is the root cause. Furthermore centralization minimizes the influence of other policy makers, who might try to alter crisis policies. Thus, it limits discretion on policy-making dimension.

H2: Politicization increases the chances of a centralized decision making.

The next causal pathway is marked in green. Scholars, whose findings suggest centralization as a potential liability, argue that times of crisis do not create inter/intra-organizational solidarity. When competences are centralized the central-field and the appreciative gap will widen (Boin et al., 1996). Furthermore, the flow of information will be blocked (Peters, 2011). These factors have negative effects on the analysis, judgement and preparation of decision-making, as well as decision-making and steering. Ultimately, centralization will affect the adequacy of crisis management negatively.

However, in a highly politicized crisis, centralization of decision making positively affects the adequacy of crisis management. Politicized crises are marked by little consensus amongst stakeholders concerning the possible solutions to a crisis. By centralization, unity of command is ensured and critical actors can be excluded from decision making. This has a positive effect on the appreciative gap and decreases the willingness of actors to alter policies as they a clear and unambiguous approach (Boin et al., 1996).

By centralizing decision making the critical actors’ influence is eliminated or at least minimized. The central-field gap is diminished, as the capability of policy-makers to alter policies is reduced. Ultimately some of the consequences of crisis exploitation games are eliminated, too. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H3a: Under the condition of politicization, centralization of decision making has a positive effect on the adequacy of crisis management.

This pathway is marked in purple. The head of any hierarchy is ultimately accountable for the crisis management. In the case of inadequate crisis management a framing contest will start in order to construct blame. Driven by the maximization of utility, the head of the hierarchy
will ultimately try to increase control over the situation. This results in a centralization which resulted from inadequate crisis management.

\[ H3b: \text{Inadequate crisis management leads to a centralization of decision making.} \]

**Methodology**

The chosen research design bases on realist assumptions, where social reality is stratified. In order to fully understand how certain events and processes are connected, this research looks behind the variables. It identifies what drives the relationship between politicization, centralization and crisis management is driven by. The methods used are based on configurational ontology and a critical realist epistemology (Blatter et al., 2012). Configurational thinking bases on the following assumptions: (1) all social outcomes result from a combination of different causal factors, (2) different pathways lead to similar results, (3) the effect of the same causal factors can differ in different contexts (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 80).

This study’s aim is the identification of causal mechanisms. In essence, causal mechanisms are plausible hypotheses that explain a certain outcome (Hedström et al., 2010). These “refer to those causal configurations that link generic social mechanisms in a multi-level model of causation” (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 95). The study’s unit of analysis is the refugee crisis in Germany.

**Terminology & Causal Mechanisms**

Following the advice of Blatter and Haverland (2012), the next section provides clear definitions for the terminology used and its functions in CPT.

In CPT, outcomes are the result of different types of causal conditions. A *necessary condition* is evident, when “Y is not possible without X, but X does not always lead to Y” (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 92). A *sufficient condition* is evident, when “X always leads to Y, but Y is also possible without X” (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 92). Thus, a cause needs to be sufficient and necessary for a strong causal claim. Identified conditions are combined into causal configurations. One can think of causal configurations in an *additive* and *interactive* way. For the former, a configuration of causal factors is thought of as a sum of factors, which each has a certain causal power. Added together, they produce a causal effect. Theoretically, one causal factor can substitute another, given that it has enough causal power. In contrast, the interaction effect of causal configurations, assumes that the causal power of a configuration, depends on
the existence of other causal factors. Each factor in a configuration is necessary for the causal effect. Each factor is non-substitutional (Blatter et al., 2012).

The basis for causal inference

“For causal inference, the analyst attempts to reveal the various steps that lead to an outcome; he reflects on the that causal factors played in each sequence within the identified causal pathway and focusses on those situations when a plurality of causal factors come together and shape further pathways in decisive ways” (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 106). In order to reveal these steps, a comprehensive timeline, which is constructed from the collected data, is used. The timeline displays the course of events over time and the development of important causal factors. Furthermore, this timeline shall help to identify critical moments which further shaped the process. The timeline helps to identify turning points and phases of transformation.

The information concerning causal conditions and factors are not transferred into scores. The observation is used to determine the “temporal order between causal conditions and effects/outcomes (Blatter et al., 2012, p. 107).

Causal inference. The methods for causal inference base on Mahoney (2012). Mahoney describes two tests for causal inference in process tracing. (1) Hoop tests are used to identify necessary conditions, which need to be present for a hypothesis to be valid. “The hoop test specifically asks about the presence of data concerning one or more mechanisms linking X and Y” (Mahoney, 2012, p. 10). It might be difficult to link X to Y directly. Thus a mechanism (M) that has already been identified as necessary for Y needs to be observed. Eventually, it is assessed whether X is necessary for M and thus necessary for Y. The hypothesis fails the hoop test when no mechanism can be identified, or when no connection between X and M could be established (2) Smoking gun tests refer to the validity of the hypothesis itself. In smoking gun tests ask for the presence of mechanisms linking X and Y. When a cause is hypothesized as necessary for an outcome, a mechanism is identified and it is assessed concerning its connection to X.

In both cases, mechanisms are intermediate processes, connecting the cause to the outcome. Using mechanisms in order to connect cause and effect has the advantage that causes and mechanisms might have a stronger spatial and temporal connection. Hoop and smoking gun tests will be combined in order to make causal claims as strong as possible.

Confessions. These aim at showing the motives and represent traces of causal mechanisms. They can complement the macro-structural features of a causal process or the
smoking-gun observation. Confessions can help to infer empirical information on structural factors and connect the empirical information with the actions of stakeholders and behavioral theory. Last, statements from actors involved can be confessions too. However, confessions need to be critically reflected. They need to be reflected in the context, they were made in. Political statements often serve a strategic purpose and are likely to be biased (Blatter et al., 2012).

Validity

In order to ensure a sufficiently high degree of internal validity, arguments (1) include theory triangulation. Outcomes are explained presenting multiple possible twists and turns, supplemented with a visual diagram and (2) every stage of the model will be verified with an estimate of relative uncertainty (Gerring, 2006). Internal validity shall furthermore be ensured by the explicit formulation of a research framework and the use of clearly formulated methods for pattern matching. By the identification of potential biases in the conclusion, descriptive validity shall be secured (Gibbert et al., 2008).

Construct validity is ensured by data triangulation. The data collection largely bases on archival data and is supplemented by interview data. Participatory and direct observation were not possible, given the limited access and scope of a bachelor thesis (Gibbert et al., 2008).

Process tracing has significant weaknesses in terms of external validity. However, classical generalization is not the study’s aim. The aim is to get in depth knowledge of one specific case. External validity is maximized by a clear provision of the case study context.

The use of a comprehensible methodology ensures reliability and the provision of all publicly available data sources (Gibbert et al., 2008). Readers can assess validity, by reading Hemmelmann et al. (2016), who identified tendencies in the news coverage during the Refugee Crisis and assess whether such biases can be found in my thesis. The interviews are anonymized and strictly confidential. As transcripts would allow to draw inferences about the interviewees, no publicly available transcripts are provided. Reliability as formulated by Maxwell (1992) questions descriptive validity, “different observers or methods [could] produce descriptively different data or accounts of the same events or situations” (p. 288). Reliability of the present study was enhanced by the use of standardized tests for causal inference, where hypothesis need to fulfill clearly formulated criteria.

Case Selection

The refugee crisis complies with the sampling criteria for CPT, formulated by Blatter & Haverland (2011). (1) The refugee crisis represents a case of very high social and scientific
relevance. Most important in this context, is that previous literature did not explicitly focus on wicked, politicized crises. Thus, exploring mechanisms that underlie politicization centralization and crisis management is thus a valuable contribution to crisis management literature. Furthermore, an in depth analysis of the crisis will furthermore produce relevant knowledge with societal relevance. It also aims at providing an unbiased and non-judgemental analysis of a very value-laden issue. (2) Relevant information is available, because of its high societal relevance. The crisis is very well covered by the media and important stakeholders give regular statements.

Data Collection

The collected data is the result of an extensive media analysis, using the newspaper database Lexis Nexis. The media analysis was complemented by stakeholder interviews. In these semi-structured interviews evaluations on processes related to the crisis management were addressed. This stage of data collection was characterized by an extremely low response rate. Out of 50 contacted institutions, three agreed to give a written statement and two were interviewed. A detailed description of the data collection process is provided in Appendix B.

Operationalization

The processes and mechanisms underlying the adequacy of crisis management, politicization and centralization will be measured by the use of exclusively qualitative data.

The Adequacy of Crisis Management. The Adequacy of Crisis Management was narrowed down to the successful execution three core components, which will be measured as followed: (1) Adequate preparation is measured by evidence which shows how preventive measures were taken in order to prepare for unexpected contingencies. (2) Adequate crisis-recognition is measured by observations that suggest that the information needed for a timely crisis-recognition were processed properly and not hindered by any processes. (3) Adequate Crisis Decision-making making is measured by observing decisions that led to the termination of the threats.

Politicization & underlying mechanisms. Politicization was conceptualized as political disagreement concerning an issue. The degree of politicization depends on the extent to which the data sources suggest the existence of political disagreement. Framing contests are operationalized in observations which show how actors or groups of actors are in a competition about the most popular frame. The operationalization of Blame games is closely connected to the operationalization of framing contests. Blame games are measured by observations that show how blame is constructed by the framing of events. The last underlying mechanisms
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

Political and Policy Crisis exploitation are measured by evidence that shows how actors tries to alter support for policies or political actors.

Centralization. Centralization is measured by observations that show on upscaling of competences, officially and unofficially.

Case Presentation
How did the refugee crisis materialize within the Federal Republic of Germany? How did it evolve until spring 2016? How did stakeholders act during the crisis? What activities of crisis management could be witnessed? These questions will be answered in the following description.

Contextual information
The following section presents the most important stakeholders in the crisis management. Their function is presented, followed by a description of central characteristics.
The Chancellor Angela Merkel, is the top crisis manager. She is the head of the Christlich Demokratische Union [Christian Democratc Union] (CDU), which forms a political union with the Bavarian regional party Christlich Soziale Union [Christian Social Union] (CSU)

CSU. She is known for incremental politics. In most of her time in office, she had to engage in crisis management. She is often criticized for her pragmatism and for not having a political vision.4 Merkel is the daughter of a pastor5 and has frequently justified her decisions with hero Christian values.6 The Minister of the Interior (MI) Thomas de Mazière, was the top crisis manager for all interior issues, until October 2015. His policies are similar to the chancellor’s. He is known for his loyalty and trust in bureaucracy. During the crisis he was criticized for late action and lacking flexible solutions for the crisis.7 The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland [Social Democratic Party Germany] (SPD) is the junior partner in a big coalition with the CDU. The approval rates of the SPD have been decreasing for years. During the crisis, approval rates have reached a ten-year-low.8 The CSU is in a political Union with the CDU and is thus part of the government. Before the emergence of the AFD, the CSU was the most conservative party. Ministerpraesident [governor] of Bavaria, Horst Seehofer, is the head of the

---

party. During the crisis he received much attention because of his critique on Merkel’s asylum politics.

Important stakeholders in the refugee crisis all societal forces, who opposed or support Merkel’s asylum policies. The anti-asylum forces were channeled in newly emerged movements, such as the AFD and Pegida. Pegida and AFD are considered crisis-winners, as their positions during the crisis appealed to the citizen (Hemmelmann et al., 2016). The AFD was founded as an anti-euro Party, but shifted to the right end of the party spectrum. During 2015 it has evolved to an anti-asylum party. In the course of the crisis, approval rates rose to over 10%. The party was in severe trouble, after founding members left, because of the right-wing populist tendencies. It lived a revival with the increasing number of refugees arriving in Germany. Pegida is a street-level movement founded in October 2014. From its onset it positioned itself against migration and the political establishment.

The BaMF is the pivotal point for a successful management of the influx of refugees. It processes applications for asylum and estimates the influx of refugees. The agency has been subject to significant restructuring, since 1993. While the applications for asylum were decreasing until 2006, to 300 103, from 2012 to 2015, there has been an increase by the factor 6. An advisory opinion stated that compared to other European states, the German Asylum system is the most complicated and resource consuming. According to experts, this is nothing new, but has been known for years. Until September 2015, Dr. Manfred Schmidt was the agency’s president. He was replaced by Hans Juergen Weise. In handling the influx of refugees, the Bundeslaender und Kommunen [Federal States and Communes] (BLCM) have to fulfill a great share of the tasks. While the BaMF processes applications for asylum, the BLCM need to provide the rest. They pay for the reception centers and refugee hostels, as well as, cash and non-cash benefits.

The citizens of Germany played an important role in the refugee crisis. Without the voluntary support, government institutions would not have been able to supply basic goods to

---

POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

the refugees. The government publicly stated that volunteers will be needed during the entire process.\textsuperscript{14} Table 3 summarizes actors, their function and important characteristics.

Table 3: Central Stakeholder in the Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angela Merkel (CDU)</td>
<td>German Chancellor</td>
<td>Incremental politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incremental politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Maizière (CDU)</td>
<td>Federal Minister of the Interior</td>
<td>Top crisis manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horst Seehofer (CSU)</td>
<td>Governor of Bavaria</td>
<td>Critique on Merkel’s asylum politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>Grand coalition with CDU</td>
<td>Faces decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low approval rates &gt;20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative for Germany (AFD)</td>
<td>Opposes Government, Express “popular will”</td>
<td>Alleged right-wing populist, Anti-asylum,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>Opposes Government, Express “popular will”</td>
<td>Street-level movement of AFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BaMF</td>
<td>Pivotal point for asylum policy</td>
<td>Overloaded since 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process applications for asylum</td>
<td>Subject to organizational changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate expected refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLCM</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} Pivotal point,</td>
<td>Overloaded since 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide shelter for refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash and non-cash benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-asylum citizen</td>
<td>Volunteer work</td>
<td>idealistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-asylum citizen</td>
<td>Oppose government</td>
<td>Fear superalienation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage 1

First Signals. A first crisis signal from the BaMF came at the beginning of 2014, when the president of the BaMF, Manfred Schmidt, signaled that there are significant staff shortages. He reported that the number of application, already now, exceeded the agency’s capacities. In order to deal with this deficiency, Schmidt requested for 900 extra jobs for his agency. Figure 4 depicts the increase in applications for asylum since 2011. The number of people who came into the country is significantly higher, as there were significant backlogs for filing applications, too. According to the BMI 1.1 Million people came to Germany in 2015. This means that less than half of them were able to apply for asylum.15

Figure 4: Number of applications for asylum from 2011 – 201516

In 2014, first crisis signals also came from the Communes. Already in 2014 capacities in providing shelter for incoming refugees were almost exhausted. A masterplan for improving the public infrastructure was demanded, as well as financial aids for the federal states. Furthermore, they argued that the long duration of the applications process for asylum in the


BaMF created significant financial burdens because shelter, cash and non-cash benefits need to be provided during the entire process. The federal government did not approve financial aids.\(^\text{17}\)

The signals that the BaMF is prone for crisis persisted. In August 2014, BaMF President Schmidt once more demanded the Federal MOI to approve 1440 jobs, needed for 2015.\(^\text{18}\) In December, the BaMF was, for the first time, not capable anymore to accept applications for asylum.\(^\text{19}\) Respondent A from the BaMF stated that already during 2014 Schmidt prepared plans for restructuring, in order to react to the increasing influx.\(^\text{20}\)

With the conclusion of the coalition agreement of the new coalition government between SPD and CDU, the government approved 350 extra jobs in the BaMF. To help the federal states and the Communes, a reduction of the average duration of applications for asylum to 3 months was decided.\(^\text{21}\)

In October 2014, the anti-immigration movement Pegida was founded. Pegida warns that a big influx of refugees will Islamize Germany and poses a great threat to German identity.\(^\text{22}\) The success of Pegida shows increased political disagreement and the construction of a sense of severity by anti-status quo actors.

**Stage 2**

**1st half of 2015 - louder signals.** On the 23rd of April 2015 the personnel council of the BaMF intervened. It announced that for 2015, the expected 300 000 refugees posed an unsolvable challenge for the BaMF. The federal states accused the BaMF of wrong estimates. Their approximations showed that 590 000 will come.\(^\text{23}\) During this period, most of the migrants came from the West Balkans.\(^\text{24}\) In order to deal with mostly unpromising applications from the Balkans, a faster procedure for Balkan countries is concluded, which eliminates the pull factor of financial aids during the longs process.\(^\text{25}\)


\(^{20}\) Respondent A


\(^{25}\) Ibid.
On the 7th of May 2015, only two months after the first estimate, the BaMF announced that 450,000 refugees are expected for 2015.\(^26\) In May, de Mazière approved that the BaMF will get 2000 extra employees, 750 until 2016.\(^27\)

Bad tidings in the BaMF did not come to an end. In July, the backlog of pending applicants waiting for a decision since 2013 had mounted to 140,000.\(^28\) President Schmidt warned that the Asylum system will collapse until September. He predicted that someone will have to carry the can.\(^29\)

The AFD gained popularity and engaged in blame games and crisis exploitation. Party officials emphasized the systemic dimension, arguing the situation in the BaMF is a result of Merkel’s asylum politics.\(^30\)

Stage 3

**August 2015: The crisis breaks out.** The BaMF released a final estimate on the 18th of August. 800,000 refugees were expected for 2015.\(^31\) On the 19th of August 2015, an action committee for the coordination of refugees and asylum was established. The committee had the task to develop feasible solutions for the problems in registration, distribution, supply and processing of applications for asylum.\(^32\) The Committee is labeled *Koordinierungsstab* [Coordination Committee] instead of *Krisenstab* [Crisis Committee].

On the 28th of August 2015, de Maizière presented plans to establish *Entscheidungszentren* [Decision Centers], where all information are collected and complete applications will be decided upon.\(^33\) Already then, commentators argued that he did not acknowledge shortcomings soon enough. Critics wrote that what he eventually did was not enough either.\(^34\)

On the 31st of August, Austria and Hungary began to channel the influx of refugees to Germany. Merkel decided not to take into account the considerations of the Federal MOI, which

---


\(^{29}\) http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-


formulated that according to Dublin-III, the refugees could be sent back.\textsuperscript{35} This development contributed to the unbearable situation in the BaMF. To reduce its workload, the BaMF tweeted, on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of August that Dublin-III is no longer applied on Syrians. The measure backfired and of refugees felt encouraged to seek asylum in Germany.\textsuperscript{36} De Maizière tried to reduce the damage and makers stressed that Dublin-III is still in force and that only Syrian refugees will not be sent back.\textsuperscript{37}

On the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of September, Hungary stopped transportation to central Europe. Thousands of refugees stranded in Hungary. The refugees started walking along highways and rails. Merkel decided, together with the Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and Austrian Chancellor Faymann, to use busses and trains to transport the refugees to Austria and Germany. Merkel later argued that she wanted to avoid pictures of knocked over refugees and policemen protecting the border with violence, in a country as rich as Germany.\textsuperscript{38}

On the 7\textsuperscript{th} of September a masterplan for the refugee crisis was presented. This masterplan contained: (1) the necessity for a European solution; (2) the execution of Dublin III (the decision to allow refugees coming from Hungary to enter Germany was an exception, due to humanitarian reasons); (3) the establishment of hotspots and the importance of sharing the burden; (4) the elimination of wrong incentives; (5) supporting voluntary work; (6) increasing expenditure by three billion, and giving another three billion to the federal states; (7) 3000 extra jobs for the federal police.\textsuperscript{39}

On the 13\textsuperscript{th} of September, de Maizière announced border controls, in order to regain control. Furthermore he appealed to the European states to stick to Dublin-III.\textsuperscript{40} During a crisis summit on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of September Prime ministers of the federal states complained that Merkel and de Mazière did not recognize how severe the situation in the communes was. Many criticized BaMF president Schmidt for stagnation of reform.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, no significant

improvements within the BaMF could be seen. The backlog of untreated application had more than doubled in comparison to 2014.\textsuperscript{42} Up to this point, 2000 extra jobs were granted. However, not even the 750 jobs for 2015 were occupied, due to long training periods and low response rate\textsuperscript{43}. Until 2017, 7000 people should work at the BaMF\textsuperscript{44}.

Volunteers became essential in handling the influx. In this phase of the crisis, the state depended on the volunteers’ help. If it was not for the thousands of volunteers, the state would not have been able to deal with the arriving people. Some newspapers wrote that the situation might have gotten out of control, resulting in a complete collapse.\textsuperscript{45} While politicians expressed their sympathy and respect for the willingness to help, the dependency on volunteers was argued to be a sign of helplessness.\textsuperscript{46}

17th of September 2015 - Sacrificing a Scapegoat. On the 17th of September 2015, BaMF President Manfred Schmidt resigned. The resignation came very unfortunate as the agency was subject to great organizational changes, turbulences and criticism.\textsuperscript{47} It is argued that even though, he informed his superiors on time about developments, his approaches were too bureaucratic and not flexible enough.\textsuperscript{48} Newspapers report that Schmidt was replaced by order from the GC.\textsuperscript{49}

Schmidt’s resignation set extensive framing contests and blame games in motion. The issue severity was constructed about, was the responsibility for the overloaded municipalities and BaMF. Two camps could be observed: (a) the anti-de Maizière camp, which argued that Schmidt was sacrificed by Merkel and de Maizière to protect de Maizière. As part of this camp, the parliamentary opposition held de Maizière accountable for the mismanagement in the BaMF and argued that the government did not take appropriate measures on time.\textsuperscript{50} The federal states’
criticized that they cannot take integrative measures, as long as the applications for asylum take this long. They also criticized the planning of refugee hostels. Planned locations owned by the state were already in use. They accused de Mazière of having no plan by whom they should be run. At the same time the federal government blames the federal states for reducing the number of refugee hostels in 2014 and for not executing deportations – thus wasting capacities. The media largely supported the anti – de Maizière camp. The media wrote that he lacked leadership qualities in turbulent times. They described him as reluctant to seek help and as a bureaucrat, rather than a leader. In contrast to (a) there was (b), the pro-de Maizière camp, mainly consisting of the government. The government stated that Schmidt resigned because of personal reasons, which emphasizes that he was not sacrificed to protect de Maizière. Protecting himself from blame, de Mazière stressed that nobody could have foreseen the increasing influx of refugees between August and September.

In an interview, Professor Hajo Funke predicted severe consequences for de Maizière. He stated that someone will have to leave, in order to increase the capability of acting, if nothing changes.

On the 19th of September, the GC orders that, Hans-Jürgen Weise should become new head of the BaMF. Weise is widely perceived as Merkel’s man when reforms are needed. Weise reformed the Bundesagentur für Arbeit [Federal agency for labor]. Respondent A confirms that Weise was appointed because of his successful reform in the Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit [Federal agency for labor] and his excellent connections to external consultancy firms. On the same day, some actors framed this measure as a disempowerment of de Maizière. Critics of de Mazière argued that this disempowers him, as Weise was in close contact with Merkel and the Bundesarbeitsministerium [Federal agency for labor].

**October 2015 - Time for reform.** Under Weise, the insufficient exchange of relevant data between government agencies was identified as problematic. New information and

---

56 Respondent A
communication technology and legal bases were needed. Soon after taking office Weise hired the advisory firm McKinsey. Their task was to improve the efficiency of the processes. BaMF personal criticized the multi-million euro contract, because of the obviousness of McKinsey’s conclusions. Even though McKinsey’s analysis was perceived as constructive and feasible, the rapid change within the organization put much pressure on its employees. Some employees saw it as an enemy takeover by the Federal Agency for Labor, some compared it with the taking over by a privatization agency. In an interview Weise described that the increase in personnel was insufficient and not effective, because the IT system was not designed for more employees and applications. Weise supported Merkel in her framing contest, by presenting the refugee crisis to be a great chance for Germany the crisis in the BAMF of technical nature and can be solved by reforming the administration. He also acknowledged that the political fight about the refugee crisis has poses significant challenges to the work of the BaMF. There were quick hiring practices. During this process it was criticized that potential employees are only interviewed on the phone and do not even have to come in for an interview. Proponents said that Weise did well, since average duration for applications decreased, while the total number of applications in process increased.

7th of October 2015 - Centralization of Crisis Coordination. During this crisis episode, the focus of blame remained on de Maizière. On the 7th of October 2015, the GC announced that the competence for crisis coordination will be upscaled from the Federal MOI, to the GC. All organizational decisions were now under closer supervision by Merkel. Operational competences remained with de Maizière. Merkel framed the decision as act aiming at an increase of efficiency and an unburdening of de Maizière. However, commentators interpreted it as a result of lacking communication and transparency on the parts of Maizière. The media felt reinforced in their framing and portrayed the act as a sign of mistrust in de Maizière. The

62 Ibid.

28
measure found many proponents in the political and social arena, as de Maizière was the opposition’s focus of blame. Respondent B confirmed this interpretation. Critics of de Maizière argued that de Maizière would have given in, to pressure from the CSU and other opposing forces. Merkel saw the threat that de Maizière might close the borders and tighten asylum policies unilaterally.

Despite the change in leadership, the BaMF and de Maizière remained in the focus of blame. Martin Schulz, President of the EU Parliament, accused de Maizière for not reacting on complains against the BaMF on time. Ministerpräsident [governor] of Bavaria Horst Seehofer and AFD politician Meuthen blamed Merkel for not equipping the agency properly. Analysts argue that Merkel was most vulnerable during this period. They elaborate that during this time the Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble and Horst Seehofer influenced Merkel to take concrete measures in order to limit migration.

The internal conflicts did not pass unnoticed. Prof. Hajo Funke warned how intra governmental conflict paralyzes the government’s crisis management. Ministerpräsident [governor] of Baden-Württemberg, Winfried Kretschmann, stressed that oppositional and governmental actors needed to join forces, as this challenge requires unity.

21st of October 2015 – Insufficient coordination within crisis actors. Despite his disempowerment, de Maizière’s crisis management remained subject to controversy. On the 21st of October, the reintroduction of Dublin III for Syrians was declared by the Federal MOI, without informing the crisis coordinator in the GC, nor the BaMF. Respondent B stated crisis

68 Respondent B
communication within the government has not improved since the crisis is coordinated in the GC.76

**November 2015: Crisis Termination - Regaining control.** The time from November onwards was characterized by policy crisis measures. These included a parliamentary decision on the 5th of November, which increased expenditure of four Billion to finance measures related to the increased influx of refugees. For 2015, the federal states received two Billion. On the 6th of November 2015 a law took effect, which declared Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia, as safe countries of origin. Applications could be processed within a week and refugees from these countries thus be deported sooner.77 For these cases, the government announced to create registration centers, where refugees with low chances for asylum should live until they can be deported. In order to make refugees comply, financial aid is only to be paid after registration in such a center. The entire asylum procedure will be performed in these centers.78

On the 9th of December, the Federal MOI presented further measures: (1) a standardized refugee ID, which every refugee should get on arrival shall be issued to everyone from February 2016: (2) Every ID has a number, leading to a centralized database, where all information is collected centrally and can be accessed by all agencies involved.79

The AFD profited from the crisis. On the 28th of November the AFD had approval rates of 10.5%.80 AFD vice-president Alexander Gauland publicly stated that the crisis is a gift for his party.81

Since New-year’s eve, the Balkan route shut down. Refugees could no longer migrate to Germany, using the route through the Balkan82.

---

76 Respondent B
Since 2016. At the end of 2016, the BaMF had 3500 employees, Weise planned to employ 6300 until mid-2016.\textsuperscript{83} On the 5th of February, there are 670000 to 770000 open cases, only 370000 untreated cases and 300 000 to 400 000 people who have not applied for asylum yet\textsuperscript{84}.

On the 25th of February 2016 the government concluded the Asylpaket II. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were labeled as safe countries of origin. Family reunion for refugees with limited asylum was suspended for two years. Asylum-seekers from safe countries of origin are generally eligible for this procedure. The procedure can be reduced to one week. Furthermore, the right for family reunion was suspended. Financial aids were reduced. Barriers for deportation were minimized. Persons working in refugee hostels, need to present a criminal record certificate.\textsuperscript{85}

On the 27th of February 2016, the staff council sued Weise because of unlawful recruitment practices, where the agency hired, without including the staff council and, according to the accusers, did not sufficiently check their profile. Weise spoke of a severe conflict within the agency, but also emphasized the common objective\textsuperscript{86}

The media reported that the government has now reached its crisis management mode. A popular newspaper argues that the good coordination within the German government is also results from a unity of command and obedience.\textsuperscript{87}

In March 2016 the EU and Turkey concluded a treaty, which commits Turkey to control its borders and not let refugees cross the sea, while the EU commits itself to provide ways for regular migration from Turkey\textsuperscript{88}. This treaty has significant implications for the national crisis management since refugees can no longer come to Germany that easy.

Since the Balkan route was closed down fewer refugees arrive in Germany, the number of applications for Asylum was still on the rise, since many refugees had not filed applications

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} (5. February 2016). Bundesamt fuer Migration muss eine Millionen Asylantraege bearbeiten. Welt Online. Retrieved from: \url{http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151871966/Bundesamt-fuer-Migration-muss-eine-Million-Asylantraege-bearbeiten.html}
\item \textsuperscript{85} (17. March 2016) Kuerzere Verfahren, weniger Familiennachzug. Die Bundesregierung. Retrieved from: \url{https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/02/2016-02-03-asylpaket2.html}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Fischer, Joschka &Papandreou, Geroge (23 May 2016). Der Tuerkei-Deal ist besser als sein Ruf. Retrieved from: \url{http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-05/fluechtlinge-europa-tuerkei-usa}
\end{itemize}
yet. The number of old cases still rises and Weise admitted that hiring of new staff goes slower than expected. However, newly arrived refugees can file an application much faster now. The number of refugees that have not filed application is below 300,000.

On the 11th of April, it is reported that over half of the reception centers are empty.

On April 25th there were still 2000 vacant jobs. To deal with these many old cases, Weise hired KPMG, PwC, and Deloitte to work on the applications as well. The BaMF planned to spend up to 12 million on contracts with consultancies.

At the beginning of May 2016, many newspapers reported that the refugee crisis now was under control since significantly more applications were processed by significantly more personnel in the BaMF. However, the termination of the refugee crisis might only be temporary as it is unclear if the EU-Turkey treaty will last. Secondly, refugees who do not get asylum will have to be deported. Accordingly, there might be 500,000 persons, who have to be deported soon.

The Refugee Crisis in the media

The media is of importance for the study, as political disagreement is also expressed in the media. For strategic games, the media is a key arena. In April, after thousands of refugees drowned in the Mediterranean. The media constructs a sense of severity and largely focussed blame on the EU refugee policies (Hemmelmann et al., 2016).

The refugee crisis was the top media issue from August to October – online and offline. This period shows a growing gap between social and traditional media. The traditional media went through empathic outries, triggered by tragic events, as the 71 suffocated refugees in a...
smuggler truck, or the dead three year old, who was washed up at the Turkish shore (Hemmelmann et al., 2016).

In social media anti-asylum actors gained popularity. Hemmelmann et al. (2016) show how AFD, CSU and Pegida were able to mobilize followers on their social media accounts during this period. The clear anti-asylum position is expressed, as no pro-asylum posts from AFD and CSU between September and October were published. Using these posts, they significantly gained likes and followers. This development was not observable for any other political actor or proponent of Merkel’s policies.

**Development of Politicization**

This section shows how politicization and underlying mechanisms evolved in the course of the crisis. 2014 marked the beginning of a new dimension politicization concerning refugees, asylum, and Muslim migration. The following three conflicts demonstrate this increase: (a) the foundation of Pegida shows politicization within the population. (b) The policy crisis exploitation games, where the BaMF demands more manpower from the BMI and (c) the Communes demand better performance by the BaMF. The latter two show increased politicization on the institutional dimension.

In the first half of 2015, asylum policies and its consequences received increased attention. It became subject to framing contests and unsuccessful crisis exploitation. Driven by dramatic events in the Mediterranean Sea, the mainstream media framed asylum as a matter of life and death. Pegida and AFD framed the issue as a matter of national survival.

With the crisis break out in August 2015, politicization reached the top policy level. De Mazière is blamed for late and insufficient action. Specifically, Merkel’s decisions to let refugees in the country regardless of the Dublin II regulations is criticized from anti-status quo actors in society and politics. Open criticism and traces of crisis exploitation from within her political Union and the government are evident, too. During the second half of 2015, politicization is at its climax. Possible outcomes of blame games and crisis exploitation games are centralizations of decision making, scapegoating Schmidt and policy and political changes.

**Crumbling support & radicalization.** Merkel’s decisions at the beginning of September became subject to extreme controversy. Merkel stressed this act as the responsibility Germany and Europe have, because of their colonial past and foreign policy. The parliamentary


opposition parties widely supported Merkel’s decision to open the borders. Criticism arose on different levels. (a) On an overarching policy level, the AFD accused the government of giving strong incentives for refugees to come to Germany. The general policy of social aid for refugees is contested. (b) On the level of concrete crisis-management, criticism was more frequent. The non-application of Dublin-III was highly criticized. The AFD added it to the list of wrong incentives. However, Merkel’s decisions were not only contested by the far-right oppositional party. The federal states criticized the decisions, as they have to carry a great share of the burden, but were excluded from decision making. Criticism did not end there. Ministerpraesident [governor] Horst Seehofer, whose party is part of the federal government, joined the critics. He emphasized every politician’s duty, to point to the limited intake capacities for refugees. Just as the AFD, he criticizes Merkel’s decision of transporting refugees from Hungary to Germany, as a mistake with severe long-term consequences. Even her top crisis manager, de Maizières, sided with the critics, saying Merkel’s decisions caused a loss of control.

Commentators argue that the future success of the AFD, also depends on the ability of Germany to deal with the refugee crisis. The AFD itself announced an autumn campaign against Asylchaos. In speeches, AFD officials frame the refugee crisis as an attempt of national suicide. AFD politician Alexander Gauland describes the influx as Voelkerwanderung [mass migration] and expresses his sympathy for eastern European states, who are afraid of super alienation. Party Officials promoted their anti-immigration frame, by portraying Merkel as a human trafficker, because of her decisions at the beginning of September.

---

100 Respondent C.
Analysis

As suggested by Collier (2011) the analysis of the hypotheses will be divided into sub-hypotheses. Following Mahoney (2012), hoop and smoking gun tests will be applied to identify necessary conditions and connect causal mechanisms. To limit the scope of the analysis, only relevant results are presented.

Predicted effects of policy crisis exploitation games are especially evident with measures limiting the scope of the right for asylum, such as the Asylpaket II, which arguably represents a major turn in comparison to decisions made in the 2nd half of 2015.

H1a: Politicization had a negative effect on the adequacy of crisis management

The adequacy of crisis management was split up into three components. Thus, politicization will be assessed for each component.

Crisis Preparation. There is no evidence concerning any measures of crisis preparation. Decisions, such as the approval of 350 and later 750 extra jobs for the BaMF, or the reduction of the processing time of applications for asylum, do not comply with criteria for crisis preparation. They are reactions to claims coming from the BaMF, or the Communes and do not prepare for unforeseen contingencies. A logical follow-up the question is, whether politicization might have hindered crisis preparation. However, there are no clues which offer possible explanations.

Crisis-Recognition. This section presents evidence that shows how politicization had an adverse effect on crisis recognition is presented.

Barriers to Crisis Recognition. Boin (2005) identified barriers to crisis recognition as necessary condition for inadequate crisis recognition. If we can observe Accordingly, the validity of the hypothesis depends on an observation suggesting a barrier of crisis recognition and the causal connection to mechanisms of politicization. The evidence suggests such a barrier. All necessary information were available, but they were not processed and reacted on adequately. The BaMF and the Communes agreed on the impending crisis, as they frequently sent crisis signals since 2014. The most resourceful claim maker, de Maizière, and his government did not agree to this claim until summer 2015.

Short term considerations kept long term threats of the agenda. Why was available information not processed adequately? Information was not processed because de Maizière minimized the severity. For adequate Crisis-recognition, de Maizière would have needed to acknowledge the severity and agree with the Communes’ and BaMF’s framing. He would have had to reframe from denial to crisis as a threat. In consequence, he would have had to spend
extra money and justify the additional spending. This shows a mechanism where short-term utility keeps a longer term threat off the agenda (Boin, 2005). If maximizing severity of the situation had maximized his or the government's utility function, the measures would not have been so limited. If he had maximized the significance and equipped the BaMF as per their demands, the crisis within the BaMF and also in the Communes would not have been so severe. The backlog of application would not have grown as much and also the Communes would have been able to deport declined applicants for asylum faster. We can infer that minimizing severity was a necessary and sufficient factor, creating a barrier of crisis recognition. This minimizing of significance is an act of framing and part of the Crisis Framing Contest. This ultimately allows connecting a mechanism of politicization as a condition constituting barrier of crisis recognition. The contextual factor that it is de Maizières responsibility to equip the BaMF and at the same time can heavily influence the construction of crisis crucial.

**Rival Hypothesis.** It can be argued that the government did acknowledge the severity of the situation, as there were plans to reform the BaMF and some demands were approved. However, if the measures the government took until summer 2015 are weighted and held against the crisis signals, it can be concluded that the severity was not acknowledged, but minimized.

**Table 4:** Signals of severity vs. Governmental measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signals of severity</th>
<th>Governmental measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BaMf demands 1440 extra employees</td>
<td>• 750 BaMf jobs for 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Estimates for the expected influx are rising significantly</td>
<td>• Reduction of processing time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communes demand faster processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary.** First, we analyzed why there must have been a barrier to crisis recognition. Second, we established that de Maizières framing was the reason why no adequate measures were taken. Third, we argued that the minimization of significance has its cause in the maximization of short-term utility. Fourth we identified a necessary contextual condition: the Maizières framing constituted to the barrier because he is responsible for equipping the agency
and has the most influence. These conditions created a negative impact on the adequacy of crisis management. The mechanisms have its weaknesses, as there is the possibility that de Maizière asked for an increased budget to finance new jobs in the BaMF. There is the chance that he was not the most influential player in the framing contest, but someone more influential dominated it and produced the result. The following diagram shows how the mechanism works:

Figure 5: Framing contests and Crisis Recognition

![Diagram showing the process of framing contests and crisis recognition]

Crisis Decision-making. This section presents evidence that shows how Politicization had an effect on crisis decision-making (2nd half of 2015 to 2016). The centralization of decision-making was a key decision in crisis management and is formulated in hypothesis H2.

H2: Politicization caused centralization of decision-making

The crisis had two major incidents of centralization, which happened on two different dimensions. The first act of centralization happened on (a) the agency dimension. After Schmidt had resigned and Weise was appointed as new head of the BaMF, by an order from the GC. This is an act of centralization because Weise is in closer contact to Merkel than Schmidt was and implements a centrally imposed reform. The second act of centralization happened on the (b) governmental dimension. The decision to upscale the competence for coordination from the Federal MOI to the GC is an act of centralization, as the GC is the federal agency serving the
chancellor. As both dimensions function after different working logics, they are assessed separately.

a) The Agency Dimension

**Intention to stay in control.** Peters (2011) proposed that the intention to stay in control is a necessary condition for the centralization of decision-making, in crises with strong political implications. The test of that hypothesis in the present case, is somewhat trivial, as the head of the executive, of course, wants to stay in control. However, the appointment of Weise, by an order from the GC is an unusual move, as it usually is the Federal MI’s competence. Thus, this action shows Merkel’s increased desire to stay in control. Weise has close ties to Merkel and is Merkel’s person for complicated organizational reforms. If there was no desire to stay in control a search for the new head of the BaMF would have been de Maizière’s competence.

**Politicization.** It was hypothesized that politicization is a sufficient condition for the desire to stay in control. There are two connections between the desire to stay in control and a mechanism underlying politicization. The maximization of utility drives both aspects. (a) De Maizière is Merkel’s minister. Continuing blame on de Maizière thus reflects badly on her. By centrally appointing Weise, she enhances her control over the situation. She thus tried to ensure that her subordinates do no further. In case the problem should persist, and the newly appointed head of BaMF would not be able to reform the agency, investigators might zoom into underlying causes (Brändström et al., 2003). The timeline provides evidence for this claim. Once the reform within BaMF turned out to be more time-consuming, the focus of blame shifted away from the agency to the government.109 (b) The appointment of Weise and the implied importance of that decision constructs blame on the agency dimension, as this act frames the crisis as actor failure.

**Summary.** We now can construct the causal diagram, which shows how the above-described mechanisms work together. While we can be certain that the desire to stay in control played an important role, it is less certain that the diffusion of blame was critical for Merkel. Criticism on de Maizière does not automatically imply criticism on de Merkel. Accordingly, this stage of the mechanisms has weaknesses. The effect of this centralization on the adequacy of crisis management is assessed in H3.

**Figure 6: Centralization on the agency dimension**

---

109 The question whether Schmidt was sacrificed as a scapegoat or not is only of minor importance. No matter the motivation behind the resignation, the government tried to construct blame on the agency dimension. From the onset of this decision, there was vast disagreement on this framing. The evidence shows that all other actors did not adopt this frame, but blamed de Maizière for the crisis in the BaMF.
b) Governmental Dimension

**Intention to stay in control.** There is evidence that shows how the desire to stay in control goes beyond the desire for control during normal times. The competence for crisis coordination in internal matters usually lies within the competences of the Federal MOI. The evidence shows that crisis coordination was centralized to the GC. Thus, Merkel had the desire for increased control. This observation leaves open the reason for the increased desire.

**The threat of crisis exploitation.** It is hypothesized that the threat of crisis exploitation by de Maizière sufficiently drove the decision to centralize crisis coordination. De Maizière blamed Merkel for the chaotic situation and sided with the critics of the government. Boin et al. (2009) show disagreement is the basis for framing contests. This disagreement is furthermore necessary for crisis exploitation. Thus, disagreement with de Maizière contained the possibility of a crisis exploitation game. The possibility of crisis exploitation threatened Merkel due to two reasons. (a) Both attach high salience to crisis management in the refugee crisis and (b) de Maizière has much influence. She decreased his influence by centralizing crisis coordination. The evidence bolsters these claims. Disagreement with de Maizière has a strong temporal and spatial connection with both incidents of centralization. The claim is furthermore bolstered by respondents C and B, as well as Commentators, who argued that Merkel feared that more restrictive policies might be formulated with de Maizière coordinating crisis management.
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

The government stated that crisis coordination is centralized because resources can be used more efficiently when the crisis is coordinated in the GC. Accordingly, the causal claim needs to take this causal factor into account, too. There is not enough evidence to elaborate on the necessity or sufficiency of the condition. The threat of crisis exploitation and the contextual condition of a more efficient use of resources thus form a causal configuration.

**Summary.** We constructed a causal pathway by: (1) identifying the necessary condition for centralization and (2) showing a causal connection to crisis exploitation. (3) The identification of a contextual condition. This mechanism has high certainty, due to strong evidence and a high explicability by theory. We cannot evaluate the relative explanatory strength of the factors coming from politicization, in relation to the more efficient use of resources. The effect of this centralization on the adequacy of crisis management is analyzed in H3.

**Figure 7: Centralization on the governmental dimension**
Crisis Decision-making. The following section assesses the claim that politicization influenced crisis policies. There are three prime examples: (a) The Balkan states as safe countries of origin on the 6th of September. (b) The Asylpaket II and (c) the EU-Turkey treaty. Interviewees A, B, and C stated that these would have been unthinkable before the crisis and showed an 180-degree turn in Merkel’s policy. What changed her mind?

Policy crisis exploitation. The three measures are hypothesized as results of policy crisis exploitation. The evidence shows how political disagreement concerning Merkel’s asylum politics increased since 2014. From the onset the critics’ ultimate aim was to alter support for politicians and policies. However, during 2014, until the beginning of the 2nd half of 2015, no powerful stakeholder parted with the critics. Thus Merkel’s policies remained uncontested.

With the sudden increase in influx and growing criticism on Merkel’s asylum policy, powerful actors, such as the CSU and critics within the CDU joined the group of change-oriented actors. High approval rates of the AFD show political pressure and the opportunity for vote-catching with restrictive policies. Interviewee B argued that the group of new critics adopted more radical frames to win voters from the far right. From the CSU and critics from CDUs’ behavior, we can deduct a change in influence as it shows how the new critics assumed that the crisis had brought enough delegitimization and destabilization for crisis exploitation.

From the 2nd half of 2015 old and new change-oriented actors (CSU, CDU Critics) demanded that the number of refugees seeking asylum in Germany shall be decreased. The new change-oriented actors represent powerful change advocates, their demands express a policy paradigm shift. The evidence shows that status quo actors (Merkel), never openly announced a policy paradigm change, but crisis decisions from October onwards show a changed objective to the influx of refugees.

Policies from October onwards show a policy paradigm change, from the Welkommmenenskultur [welcoming culture] to isolation. Policies as the Asylpaket II and the EU-Turkey treaty show a controlled major policy change. Within less than six months, Merkel’s policy evolved from deploying trains and help refugees come to Germany, to striking a deal with Turkey to limit the influx of refugees. It is a matter of interpretation whether the events present a negotiated adjustment, or a policy paradigm shift. Either way, the model allows inference on Merkel’s motivation. The policy crisis exploitation model suggests that actors who try to contain policy changes, try to avoid a politically imposed shift. Merkel avoided a potential politically imposed shift by, for instance, rebellion against her leadership in the CDU.
The motivation behind this is the maximization of utility. Given the political realities a policy change was inevitable and containing it the only chance to shape it. If Merkel had resisted policy changes, the national political arena would have blamed her for not managing the crisis. Also, her popularity within the European partners would have further suffered, as national decisions affect the entire Schengen area. The law determining new safe countries of origin and the Asylpaket II directly unburden overstrained agencies and thus signals determent action.

This possible explanation is somewhat limited for the EU-Turkey treaty. The second half of 2015 was characterized by negotiations about a quota distributing refugees over Europe. Until the EU-Turkey treaty was concluded an alternative European solution was not in sight. Finding a European approach was a defined goal in the government’s master plan from September 2015. The EU-Turkey treaty is a pan-European approach and is thus not necessarily only the result of national crisis exploitation.

**Summary.** From this analysis, a five component causal pathway can be constructed. (1) A policy crisis exploitation game without influential change-oriented actors resulting in a policy stalemate. (2) Due to contextual changes, influential actors part with the change-oriented actors. (3) This leads to a policy crisis exploitation game with influential actors. (4) The status quo actors decide to contain the policy changes to maximize utility, leading to (5) policy paradigm shift or a negotiated adjustment, depending on the change-oriented actors. The disagreement was thus a necessary leading to crisis exploitation, but the presence of influential actors in the crisis exploitation game a necessary and sufficient condition. The question whether these policies and thus crisis exploitation had a positive effect on the adequacy of crisis management is subjective. This depends on the normative standpoint of the evaluating person. The discussion further elaborates on this issue. The following model shows how these factors work together.
H1b: Crisis management politicized the crisis

The hypothesis is self-evident. The mechanism driving the relationship between the adequacy of crisis management and mechanisms of politicization is that of maximizing utility from a situation. Actors with different values and beliefs will use the crisis management to maximize their utility functions by politicization.

This hypothesis shows the selectivity of politicization, described by Brändström et al. (2003). The crisis in the BaMF was not subject to politicization until it was commonly accepted that the situation is unbearable. Since 2014 the BaMF constantly showed that it was not functional, but relevant actors only politicized it once the issue of asylum had become more salient during the second half of 2015.
A broader mechanisms where crisis management is politicized can be observed in context with the “suspension” of Dublin III for Syrians, the insufficient preparation, Schmidt’s resignation and conflict from within the government. Other actions of as the inadequate reactions to the crisis in the BaMF were only politicized once the crisis had been constructed.

Figure 9: Crisis management politicises

H3: Under the condition of politicization, centralization of decision-making had a positive effect on the adequacy of crisis management

In H2, two incidents of centralization were identified. Both incidents happened on two different levels. The first instance concerned a) The agency dimension, while the second dimension concerned the b) governmental dimensions. Both cases will be analyzed regarding their implications for the adequacy of crisis management and the moderating role mechanisms underlying politicization played for its relationship. Recall that the theoretical argument from the theory: when mechanisms of politicization are at work, the central-field and appreciative gap do no widen as much, because centralization helps to control mechanisms of politicization.

a) The Agency Dimension

Centralization. Centralization is hypothesized as an asset for the reform in the BaMF because it put an end to ambiguity and was planned to end the construction of blame on the BaMF. Boin et al. (1996) argued that centralization has a negative effect in implementing agencies because it widens the central-field and appreciative gap. The negative effects are compensated when the willingness and the ability to alter reforms is limited. For the validity of the hypothesis, evidence that shows how centralization was an asset because it stopped the negative influences of politicization on the BaMF needs to be found.

The evidence shows that this first act of centralization had the negative impacts as predicted by (Boin et al., 1996). There was a severe conflicts in the BaMF. The staff perceived his reform as an enemy takeover and the personnel council sued Weise because of his hiring practices. This evidence shows two underlying mechanisms: (a) during this act of centralization no adequate balance could be struck between discretion and control, which widened central
field gap. (b) The failure to mutually come to a common problem perception, which widened the appreciative gap.

Both mechanisms created resistance. The observation that the personnel council sued Weise to stop his hiring practices, threatens is reforms and ultimately negatively affects the adequacy of crisis management. No evidence suggests that centralization ended ambiguity or that in a politicized setting a widening of the central field gap or the appreciative gap does not occur.

The evidence does suggest that the centralization had a positive effect on the adequacy after all. As every further action depends on the application for asylum, quick improvement in the BaMF and determinant action were essential for successful management of the refugee crisis. If the reform had been implemented, following an extensive deliberate procedure to iron out differences between center and field, as suggested by Boin et al. (1996), the performance would not have improved as quickly. Critics and change-oriented actors would have had yet another topic to politicize.

**Summary.** Politicization fails to diminish the central file or the appreciative gap. However, the pressure created by politicization presents these evident liabilities of centralization in another light. The gains from quick and determinant improvement seem to compensate the negative effects a bumpy implementation with lawsuits and resistance has on the adequacy of crisis management. The mechanism is visualized in the following causal diagram:

**Figure 10: Centralization and adequacy of crisis management**
b) Governmental Dimension

Boin et al. (1996) study the adverse effects of centralization on the agency level and concerning its effect on the implementation of new policies. The hypothesis and its criteria need adjustments for the governmental dimension. Merkel’s cabinet primarily has to formulate policies and oversee implementation. Thus, within the cabinet, there cannot be a gap between policy makers and implementers. The condition of the central-field gap is excluded. However, 1) we can look for the development of the appreciative gap and 2) whether centralization was an asset because of the politicized setting. The hypothesis is valid when the evidence shows an observation of the latter.

For the effect on the adequacy of crisis management, one must distinguish between (a) the increased adequacy gained by excluding de Maizières and (b) the gained utility from crisis coordination from the GC. The observations show that centralization of the coordination competence widened the appreciative gap. The “reintroduction” of Dublin-III shows that the perception of adequate communication within crisis managers diverges. Centralization limited de Maizières influence. Thus, it was an asset for Merkel’s idea of crisis management, as it limited de Maizières capacities to alter policies. The “reintroduction” Dublin-III, which was not communicated to other actors, shows that the centralization did not fully eliminate his capabilities to cause confusion amongst the crisis managers.

While the evidence shows that de Maizières threatens Merkel’s idea of adequate crisis management, there is not enough evidence to evaluate on (b). For aspect (a) it can be said that because of politicization this step contributed to the adequacy. Excluding de Maizières without him threatening crisis management is not rational. Because of lacking data no statement on aspect (b) is possible. It is even possible that (b) alone has enough causal power to cause the result. Configurational thinking assumes that results are the effects of many causes. It is thus most likely that the cause is a combination of (a) and (b).

Summary. We identified two potential factors but cannot make a convincing causal claim on how they work together. In the diagram both have an impact on the adequacy of crisis management. As we can neither evaluate the effect of (b) nor (a) on the adequacy of crisis management. The mechanisms are extremely uncertain. No statement on the effect of this 2nd incident of centralization on the adequacy of crisis management can be made.

Figure 11: Centralization on the government dimension
The following table shows the effects of each tested hypothesis on the adequacy of crisis management.

**Table 5: Effects on the adequacy of crisis management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/Decision/Dimension</th>
<th>Impact on Adequacy of Crisis Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1: Politicization → the adequacy of crisis management</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Recognition</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Centralization – Agency Dimension</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization- Governmental dimension</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis-Decision making</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3: Centralization → Adequacy (condition of politicization)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency dimension</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental dimension</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

The analysis shows that mechanisms underlying politicization are ubiquitous. It is shown how they are major forces, which drive crisis management from its onset. As we can see in *Table 5*, the analysis shows that no universal statement about the effect of politicization on adequacy can be made. Four important conclusions can be drawn from this study.

(1) The test of H1 shows how a framing contest was a major factor constituting to the barrier of crisis recognition. This crisis framing contest was a potential threat to crisis
recognition because three conditions came together: (a) the actor who should recognize a crisis in the making was (b) the most powerful actor in the framing contest and (c) had an incentive to minimize severity. This finding shows how the political system of Germany offers incentives for behaviors that come at the cost of adequate crisis management. A politician cannot be successful when he or she repeatedly attracts attention by repeatedly asking for more funds in times were balanced expenditure is a main objective. It confirms Boin (2005) finding that short-term threats keep long term threats of the agenda, driven by utility maximization.

(2) The analysis of H1 and H3 produced two interesting results: (a) it shows how the decision for a centralization of competences is necessarily connected to the desire to stay in control. It further shows how this desire is heavily influenced by blame games and potential crisis exploitation. (b) Centralization could not be identified as a liability. While it did have the negative effects scholars put forward (Boin et al., 1996), the advantages prevailed for the given case. For the situation of a necessary reform in the BaMF, centralization could be called a necessary evil (Peters, 2011).

(3) The mechanism of policy crisis exploitation is of importance for two reasons: (a) it had a great impact on crisis management policies. The refugee crisis is an excellent case to observe, how policy crisis exploitation potentially changes crisis policies. The case shows the process, how status quo actors become advocates for change due to contextual changes. (b) The question on implications for the adequacy of crisis management shows the conceptual limitations of the concept of adequacy. How can we ultimately evaluate crisis management when there is no agreement on values? Depending on one’s moral position crisis exploitation could be considered as a correctional mechanism and could be good for a healthy polity (Boin et al., 2009). For the given case the Crisis exploitation game resulted in policies that minimized the influx of refugees and thus contributed to the elimination of crisis hot spots within Germany. However, this interpretation leaves the moral dimension of relocating crisis hot spots from Germany to Turkey aside.

(4) The findings suggest that politicization and its underlying mechanisms as analytical concepts are too broad for wicked problems. Disagreement concerning values and knowledge is the starting point for wicked problem, just as it is for politicization and the underlying mechanisms. In fact, disagreement on values and uncertainty of knowledge is what mechanisms of politicization are all about. Accordingly, it is extremely likely to observe these mechanisms in a wicked problem.
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

The study can furthermore confirm that the ongoing debate on centralization is there for a reason, as also the effect of centralization on the adequacy of crisis management was twofold. As politicization was identified as an ubiquitous phenomenon in wicked problems, centralization was closely connected to mechanisms of politicization, too. However, politicization did not turn centralization into a universal remedy.

The study makes two contributions to the societal debate on the refugee crisis. (1) It shows that the drastically increased influx in 2015 is not the root cause of what we call refugee crisis. The crisis within the Communes and the BaMF proceeded the drastically risen influx of refugees in 2015. The identification of mechanisms constituting a barrier of crisis recognition shows that the refugee crisis would not have been that severe, if crisis recognition would have been adequate. (2) The findings are also a reminder that the measures which “solved” the crisis in Germany simply relocated crisis hot spots

Limitations

Due to limitations imposed by the case, the analysis had to be broken down in scope and analytical depth. The case also limited centralization as a concept. The first instance shows the implementation of a centrally formulated reform under central supervision, while the second instance only indicates the centralization of crisis coordination. In the analysis, data was limited to the information provided by change-oriented and critical actors, from the parliamentary opposition, activist groups and the Communes. Hence, claims concerning the motivation of crisis managers from within the government might have been biased. Access to the higher level administrators of the BaMF or the BMI would have enriched this research, by the provision of valuable confessions concerning the motivation behind decisions of crisis management. The low response rate of key stakeholders severely limits what Maxwell (1992) describes as interpretative validity. However, these limitations came handy, as it would not have been possible to give account to the entire process within the scope of a bachelor thesis.

Future research

The present study shows the impact of mechanisms underlying politicization on the adequacy of crisis management and vice versa. It is clear that contextual factors of the Refugee Crisis limit external validity, but the identified mechanisms can be a starting point for future research. The study shows several areas for further research: The identified mechanisms should be tested for statistical significance in quantitative studies with a sufficient number of cases.

For adequate crisis recognition, future research should explore how structures within political systems hinder adequate crisis recognition and how these obstacles can be removed.
The findings showed the importance of crisis exploitation. The findings also show, how mechanisms underlying politicization are natural phenomena in wicked crisis. Accordingly, further research should study whether the importance of crisis exploitation has the necessary criterion of wickedness and how the effect of crisis exploitation develops in protracted crises. Most effective crisis exploitation came from within the governing coalition. In order to avoid crisis exploitation, a deeper understanding of the mechanisms turning status quo actors into advocates for change is needed. The study gave a first glance at the implementation of reform within the BaMF. It fails to give account to the in depth-processes underlying resistance. Scholars with good access can give elaborate on the question why crisis did not create a shared understanding of problem perception and what drove the perception gap between policy makers and implementers.
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

References


Appendix A

This appendix concerns the contact approach with stakeholders. It consists of four elements: (1) remarks on the approach for making contact (2) the contacted institutions (3) draft email & letter of reference (4) Interview guideline. For the interviews the following institutions were contacted:

(1) Comments on the approach

At the beginning of this study, the crisis focus lay on the organizational crisis in the BaMF and the way it was managed. The request for an interview was much more specific than in the email shown below. Rejection regularly came with feedback, stating that the approach for making contact was impeccable. However, it was predicted that only a few have the information needed. Stakeholders who have the necessary information stated that the preparation for the interview is very time-consuming and many requests come in each day from more important actors than Bachelor students. As the internal workings of the BaMF are not covered in the media and only very few reliable sources are available, the scope was widened.

With a widened scope an broader interview questions the number of positive answers increased. Eventually, two interviews were conducted and two answers by letter were received. Two days before the deadline, three further possibilities opened, but could not further be pursued due to time constraints.

- Respondent A - Unofficial answers by an employee of the BaMF
- Respondent B - Interview with a speaker of the parliamentary oppositional party DIE LINKE
- Respondent C - Interview with the president of a major German refugee council
- Respondent D - Answer by letter from the president of a major German refugee council

(2) Contacted Institutions

Parties & Ministries & Agencies

- Federal MOI
  - At first agreed to answer question, but renounced the offer once the questions were received.
- BaMF
  - Rejected because of workload.
  - Inofficial statement was given after approaching employees personally.
- GC
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

- No response.
  - ChefGC
    - No response.
  - Bundesbeauftragte fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge [Federal Commissioner for Migration]
    - No response.
  - Fraktion CDU/CSU [Fraction CDU/CSU]
    - No response.
  - Fraktion SPD [Fraction SPD]
    - No response.
  - Fraktion DIE LINKE [Fraction DIE LINKE]
    - Interview
  - Franktion Buendniss 90 die Gruene [Fraction Buendniss 90 DIE GRUENE]
    - No response.
  - AFD
    - No response.
  - CSU Landtagsbuero
    - Rejected because of workload.
  - 16 BLCM
    - Mixed responses. Two interviews were cancelled on short notice.

Non-Governmental Organizations & Institutes

- Institut fuer Migrationsforschung und interkulturelle Studien
  - Rejected because of workload.
- UNHCR
  - Makes no statements about partner organizations.
- Sachverstaendigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen fuer Integration und Migration [Expert Council of German Foundations for migration and integration]
  - Rejected because of workload.
- ProASyl
  - Rejected because of workload.
- Fluechtlingsraete [Refugee Councils]
  - Positive responses.
- Bertelsmann
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

- No response.
- Mercator
  - No response.

Recordings or summaries can be provided on demand and with the consent of the respective interviewee.

(3) Contact email & letter of reference

The following draft email was used. The content slightly varied, due to the different stakeholders:

„Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,


1. Welche Signale hat es bezüglich einer drohenden Überforderung der Kommunen und Länder seit 2014 gegeben?
   a. Wurde auf diese Signale seitens der Bundesregierung angemessen reagiert?

2. Hätten die beteiligten Akteure besser auf die ansteigenden Flüchtlingszahlen vorbereitet sein können? Wenn ja, wie?

3. Welche Rolle spielt der Kampf um Deutungshoheit (framing) bei diesen Entscheidungen?

Ich bin auf der Suche nach Interviewpartnern, die mir im Rahmen eines Telefon/Skypeinterviews ihre Einschätzung mitteilen. Daher würde ich mich sehr freuen, wenn Sie meine Anfrage an einen fachkundigen Kollegen weiterleiten und somit zum Gelingen meiner Arbeit beitragen. Das Gespräch wird selbstverständlich anonymisiert und streng vertraulich behandelt.

Im Anhang finden Sie eine Referenz meines Supervisors. Des Weiteren kann ich Ihnen den kompletten Interviewleitfaden gerne vorab zukommen lassen. Telefonisch bin ich unter +4915788611151 jederzeit zu erreichen.

Vielen Dank.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Moritz Fromageot“

The following Letter of Reference was attached:
(4) The interview guideline consisted of the following questions:

(1) 1. Was verstehen Sie unter dem Begriff „Flüchtlingskrise“?
(2) 1.1. Wer sind für Sie die zentralen Akteure?
(3) 1.1.1. Politisch, Administrativ Gesellschaftlich.
(4) 1.2. Wann hat sie begonnen?
(5) 1.2.1. Wann ist es für Sie krisenhaft geworden?
(6) 1.3. Ist sie inzwischen vorbei? Wenn nein, wie lange dauert sie noch an?
(7) 2. Was sind Ihrer Meinung nach Schlüsselerignisse im Krisenmanagement der Bundesregierung?
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

(8) 2.1. Welchen Einfluss hat fehlender politischer Konsens und gegenseitige Schuldzuweisungen seitens politischer Akteure?

(9) 3. Wie hat sich die Belastung der Kommunen in den letzten Jahren entwickelt?

(10) 3.1. War eine Überbelastung der Kommunen vorauszusehen? Wenn ja, woran?

(11) 3.1.1. Warum wurden die Anzeichen von der Politik nicht wahrgenommen?

(12) 3.2. An welchem Punkt wurde die Überforderung erkannt?

(13) 3.2.1. Was sind Ihrer Meinung nach die wichtigsten Maßnahmen die die Kommunen entlasten?

(14) 4. Mit welchen Behörden arbeiten Sie zusammen?

(15) 4.1. Wie hat sich diese Zusammenarbeit seit 2015 verändert?

(16) 4.2. Von welchen Problemen mit den Behörden berichten Ihre Klienten?

(17) 4.2.1. Wie haben sich diese seit 2015 verändert?

(18) 4.3. Begleiten Sie die Antragsstellung im BaMF?

(19) 4.3.1. Wie hat sich dies seit 2015 entwickelt?

(20) 5. Wie beurteilen Sie den Umgang der deutschen Politik und speziell der Bundesregierung, mit den stark angestiegenen Flüchtlingszahlen seit 2014?

(21) 5.1. Haben sich die Beratungsanfragen seit 2015 verändert? Wenn ja, wie?

(22) 5.1.1. Wie hat sich Ihre Beratungstätigkeit seit 2015 verändert?

(23) 6. Inwiefern beeinflusst das hohe Maß an Politisierung der Flüchtlingsdebatte die Arbeit der agierenden Akteure?

(24) 7. Vor welchem Hintergrund wurden Maßnahmen, wie das Asylpaket III verabschiedet?

(25) 7.1. Spielt das Erstarken der AFD hierbei eine Rolle? Wenn ja, welche?

(26) 8. Hat Ihrer Meinung nach da Krisenmanagement verändert, seitdem die Kompetenz zur Koordinierung im Bundeskanzleramt liegt?

Appendix B
This appendix contains (a) the data sources: (b) a table on the course of events and the development of mechanisms underlying politicization.

(a) The storyline is based on the information from an extensive and systematic news analysis. The following online sources were analyzed. They are listed in the order as they appear in during the study:

Hildebrand, Tina & Ulrich, Bernd (20. September 2015). Angela Merkel- Im Auge des Orkans. DIE ZEIT. Retrieved from:
http://www.zeit.de/2015/38/angela-merkel-fluechtlinge-krisenkanzlerin/seite-4

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/gauck-und-merkel-der-pfarrer-und-die-pfarrerstochter-11679371.html

http://www.taz.de/!5251194/

(06. Februar 2016). Der ohnmächtige de Mazière. Wirtschaftswoche. Retrieved from:

(29. April 2016). Berliner SPD sackt auf Zehnjarestief ab. SPIEGEL ONLINE. Retrieved from:
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfragen-berliner-spd-sackt-auf-zehn-jahres-tief-a-1089912.html

(9. November 2015). Kann die AFD den Aufschwung in NRW bis 2017 halten. DIE WELT. Retrieved from:

(10. Mai 2016). Endlich verständlich: Fakten zur Flüchtlingskrise. SPIEGEL ONLINE. Retrieved from:
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-und-einwanderer-die-wichtigsten-fakten-a-1030320.html

(10. Mai 2016). Endlich verständlich: Fakten zur Flüchtlingskrise. SPIEGEL ONLINE. Retrieved from:
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-und-einwanderer-die-wichtigsten-fakten-a-1030320.html

POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY


(27. November. 2015). Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge forderte schon 2014 mehr Personal. SPIEGEL ONLINE. Retrieved from:

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-141495080.htm

www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/origins-of-german-anti-muslim-group-pegida-a-1012522.html

Hildebrand & Ulrich, (20. September 2015). Im Auge des Orkans. DIE ZEIT. Retrieved from:
http://www.zeit.de/2015/38/angela-merkel-fluechtling-krisenkanzlerin/seite-4

https://www.greenpeace-magazin.de/tickerarchiv/arbeitnehmerverband-des-fluechtlings-bundesamtes-schlaegt-alarm

www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis

https://www.alternativefuer.de/2015/08/27/meuthen-de-maiziere-lockt-asylbewerber-regelrecht/


(20. December 2015). Ein “unfähiger Haufen”?. FOCUS ONLINE. Retrieved from:
POLITICIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND ADEQUACY

http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/politik-und-gesellschaft-ein-unfaehiger-haufen_id_5146398.html

http://www.bamf.de/DE/Service/Top/Presse/Interviews/20160604-SpiegelBAMFPortr%C3%A4t/portr%C3%A4t-bamf-spiegel-node.html


www.lexisnexis.com/uk/news


6. October 2015. Kanzleramt übernimmt: Merkel macht Flüchtlingshilfe zur Chefsache. SPIEGEL ONLINE. Retrieved from:
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-macht-fluechtlingshilfe-zur-chefsache-a-1056478.html

Monath, Hans (07.10.2015). Angela Merkel macht Flüchtlingspolitik zur Chefsache. Der Tagessouegel. Retrieved from:
http://www.tagessspiegel.de/politik/fluuchtlinge-angela-merkel-macht-fluechtlingspolitik-zur- chefsache/12416088.html
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-martin-schulz-wirft-thomas-de-maiziere-versagen-vor-a-1066400.html

(7. December 2015) Seehofer gibt Regierung Schuld and BaMF-Problemen. Welt Online. Retrieved from:
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article149691571/Seehofer-gibt-Regierung-Schuld-an-BAMF-Problemen.html

https://www.alternativefuer.de/2015/12/08/meuthen-schulz-sollte-vor-der-eigenen-haustuer-kehren/

http://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/gesellschaft/id_76106636/fluechtlingskrise-ist-angela-merkel-bereits-entmachtet-.html

(1. Februar 2016). “Ich bete jeden Tag für Angela Merkel”. DER TAGESSPIEGEL. Retrieved from:


http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/asylpolitik-koalition-einigt-sich-auf-registrierzentren-1.2724922

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingsausweis-thomas-de-maiziere-stellt-dokument-vor-a-1066823.html


http://www.derwesten.de/politik/afd-vize-gauland-sieht-fluechtlingskrise-als-ein-geschenk-id11374880.html


http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151871966/Bundesamt-fuer-Migration-muss-eine-Million-Asylantraege-bearbeiten.html
Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from:

Retrieved from: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/02/2016-02-03-asylpaket2.html


(18. April 2016). Deutschland registrierte im Maerz nur noch 20 000 Fluechtlinge. RP Online. Retrieved from:
http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/deutschland-registriert-im-maerz-2016-nur-noch-20000-fluechtlinge-aid-1.5888615

http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/migration-fluechtlingszahlen-sinken-weiter_id_5513325.html

http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/article154704929/Asylbehoerde-steckt-weiter-in-Personalnot.html


http://www.cicero.de/berliner-republik/asylverwaltung-bundesamt-kauft-sich-unternehmensberater-ein/60685

https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/BaMF-asylantraege-101.html

http://www.rp-online.de/politik/truegerische-ruhe-aid-1.5966618

http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/4894267/Was-bleibt-von-der-Generation-Hauptbahnhof-

www.lexisnexis.com/uk/news


(b) The following table shows course of events in the refugee crisis and the development of the mechanisms underlying politicization over time. In each row an information box elaborates on the possible effects of politicization.

**Table 6: Course of events, development & politicization hotspots**
**Refugee Crisis** | **Politization**
--- | ---
**2014 Preparation** | First signs of increased politicization:
- BaMF - Significant staff shortage
  - 1440 jobs needed for 2015
- The Communes
  - capacities are almost full
  - long processing of applications for asylum are problematic
- de Maizière
  - 350 jobs for BaMF
  - reduction of duration to 3 months
- Pegida vs. government
  - refugees threaten German identity
  → alter support for status quo politics and policy
- Communities vs. BaMF
  - BaMF performs too slow, wastes Communities’ capacities
  → blame Bamf
- BaMF vs. Government
  - bad performance is because of staff shortage
  → blame government + alter staff policy

**1st half 2015**
- BaMF
  - personell council complains, hopelessly overloaded
  - 140 000 applicants waiting since 2013
  - corrects estimates from 300 000, to 450 000, to 800 000
- de Maizière
  - 750 jobs for 2015/ 2000 in total
- Pegida, AFD vs. Government
  - overloaded Agency is the result of the government’s asylum policy
  → alter government politics and Policy
- BaMF vs. Government
  - personell council complains, hopelessly overloaded
  → alter staff policy
- Media, civil society vs. status quo
  - tragedies in the Mediterranean must end
  → alter support for EU asylum policy

**2nd half 2015**
- de Maizière
  - establishment of Koordinierungsstab (19th of August)
  - Entscheidungszentren (28th of August)
- Refugee ID and centralized database (9th of December)
- BaMF
  - no more Dublin III for Syrians (25th of August)
- Schmidt Resigns (17th of September)
- Merkel
- Weise comes (18th of September)
- Media and Civil society
  - connect drowning refugees to core values
- Climax of politicization – More actors
  - Anti-status quo actors from within the government coalition join the change oriented actors
    - AFD, Critics CDU/CSU vs. Merkel
    - government sets wrong incentives: non-application of Dublin III, financial aid
    - blaming BaMF is a shame, politicians are responsible
    - Merkel’s decision will have severe long term consequences
    → alter support for politics and policy
- Communities, Media, AFD, Civil society vs. De Maizière
  - criticize leadership
    - insufficient preparation of refugee hostels
    - responsibility for BaMF chaos
    → alter political and policy support for the Minister
  - Powerful stakeholders engage
    - Critics from CDU/CSU join change oriented actors and attack Merkel
  - anti de Maizière fraction includes pro and anti status quo forces
  → Change oriented players are strong, political and policy changes become more

**2016**
- Closure of the Balam route
- Merkel
  - Asylpaket II (27th of February)
  - EU-Turkey treaty (March)
Appendix C

Declaration of Originality

I certify that this is my own work and has not previously been submitted for any assessed qualification. I certify that the use of material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged in the text.

Moritz Carl Fromageot