Bachelor Thesis

Crisis Management in the midst of the Migrant Crisis
A Case Study of New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne

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Declaration of Academic Integrity

Hereby, I declare that I have composed the presented paper independently on my own and without any other resources than the ones indicated. All thoughts taken directly or indirectly from other sources are properly denoted as such.

This paper has neither been previously submitted to another authority nor has it been published yet.

Enschede, 30 June 2016

[Signature]
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## Abbreviation List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany (<em>Alternative für Deutschland</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (<em>Christlich Demokratische Union</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (<em>Christlich Soziale Union</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry of NRW (<em>Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Causal Process Tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal MOI</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior (<em>Bundesinnenministerium</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal IM</td>
<td>Federal Minister of the Interior (<em>Bundesinnenminister</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Federal Police Force (<em>Bundespolizei</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoGeSa</td>
<td>A right-wing extremist group of hooligans fighting against Islam/Salafism (<em>Hooligans gegen Salafisten</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Police President Cologne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Ministry</td>
<td>North-Rhine Westphalian Ministry of the Interior (<em>Landesinnenministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Minister</td>
<td>North-Rhine Westphalian Minister of the Interior (<em>Landesinnenminister Nordrhein-Westfalen</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZPD</td>
<td>State Office for Central Police Services (<em>Landesamt für Zentrale Polizeiliche Dienste</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAO</td>
<td>Standard Structural Organisation (<em>Allgemeine Aufbauorganisation</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAO</td>
<td>Special Structural Organisation (<em>Besondere Aufbauorganisation</em>)</td>
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Abstract
This thesis explores the relationship between the improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management of the police in the case of New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, Germany. It especially focuses on the influence of the contextual factor politicization and the role of distrust in the interplay with an adequate crisis management. The dataset combines official documents, parliamentary hearings with journalist interviews and an extensive media search. The findings suggest that preparatory mistakes, internal miscommunication and the context of the migrant crisis hindered a timely recognition and signalling of the crisis. The inaccuracy of crisis communication resulted in scapegoating of the Police President Cologne and in a loss of public trust. Blame games continued on higher political levels, but effects could not be taken into consideration here. The study suggests further research especially on the role of distrust in higher institutional level and the effects of the organizational culture.

1. Introduction
“I am Syrian; you must treat me kindly! Mrs. Merkel has invited me.” This quote is derived from an internal police report describing reactions during the chaotic New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne. And it already shows the main challenge for any crisis manager: How to cope with a crisis which is a perfect topic for political instrumentalization? The case of Cologne is a wonderful example of how a crisis should not be managed. Thus, it provides an excellent testing ground to explore further the mechanisms which created the adverse effects on crisis management. Current research of crisis management focuses on adequate crisis responses (see Coombs, 2007) or on the dynamics of politicization in a crisis (see Broekema, 2015). Some case studies extensively discuss the interplay of politicization and improvisation from protocols within geopolitical, sensitive contexts (see Torenvlied, 2015). Little research is done on the dynamics of trust in crisis management (see Aykens, 2005). However, no study has yet combined these aspects in an in-depth case study. Still, a connection between politicization, distrust and improvisation seems necessary to achieve comprehensive insight into the underlying processes of crisis management.

A. Boin (2005) gives a thorough overview of strategic leadership tasks in crisis management in his book “The politics of crisis management”. He shows how public confidence is recovered and learning from crisis enabled. What is missing is an extensive analysis of the effects of external pressures on the decision-making process. This study aims at filling this gap. Hence, it
provides a theoretical framework which sheds light on the implications of a politicized and distrustful environment on the adequacy of crisis management.

Coombs (2010) wrote an elementary book in crisis communication research, the ‘Handbook of Crisis Communication’. He sets specific parameters for crisis communication and states that the key activity for a proper crisis response is to be quick, accurate and consistent. Coombs (2010) argues that managing a crisis requires the organization to be the central source of information to get control over the outcome. These findings are also displayed in the Guidelines for Crisis Communication by the German Ministry of the Interior (Federal MOI), thus one could expect that central aspects such as honesty and openness are standards followed by every crisis communicator. However, there are conditions that make it more difficult to be clear and transparent in information supply, for example, the level of politicization and the existence of informal norms. In this case, improvisation is required to adequately handle the situation.

The event of New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, Germany is a perfect case to study the dynamics of politicization, distrust and protocols which shape the adequacy of crisis management. Official data from the police states that over 450 women were sexually assaulted during New Year’s Eve. Over a thousand reports of pickpocketing were filed. Still, the police was unable to recognize and signal the crisis in the wake of the critical events, the night of New Year’s Eve 2015. It took days after the public was comprehensively informed. Allegations that the police covered up information fuelled distrust against the crisis management and resulted in a blame game against the police. A determining factor in the debate was the background of the offenders. Although the police had no suspects until the 7th of January, they knew that the majority of the identified people on the station forecourt originated from North-African or Arabian countries, with some still in the status of an asylum seeker. Even before the police confirmed reports of the news in this regard, it became the most emphasised issue in Germany. Sexual violence against women was seen by some as the direct consequences of the migrant policies of the government, as an Islamic problem. Thus, a cautious and late crisis response of the police created cover-up allegations against the police and resulted in the dismissal of the PP.

To throw light on the causes of the event and the unsatisfying crisis management, the Federal Parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia established an official Commission of Inquiry (COI). Their task is to investigate the event and to finally conclude about responsibilities of the crisis management organization. This study uses data collected by the COI in hearings with important actors. Additional interviews with journalists are conducted to find out which
mechanisms drove the crisis management and eventually affected its adequacy. Thus, the results will present regularities of improvisational decisions in a politicized and distrustful environment for crisis decision makers and managers. The study aims not at holding individuals or groups accountable for their decisions, but rather to enable learning for future crisis management.

1.1 Research Question

The research question (RQ) below represents the main interest of this study.

**RQ1: To what extent and how did improvisation from protocols affect the adequacy of crisis management of the local police authority concerning the massive criminal offences in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015?**

The question aims at explaining the adequacy of crisis management by analysing the underlying effects and processes of improvisation from protocol before, during and after the event took place. This relation occurs in a specific environment characterized by high politicization and distrust of the public in the government and media. The study assesses on one hand a potential moderating effect of politicization (a) on the relation between improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management. Distrust (b) on the other hand might explain the relationship between the adequacy of crisis management and politicization in more detail. Thus, the following research question complements the study.

**RQ2: How did (a) politicization, and (b) distrust in government/media affect the relation between improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management?**

The study takes into account data available until the 29th of June 2016. A causal reconstruction of critical decisions made during New Year’s Eve in Cologne and of the crisis response will reveal regularities encountered during this specific crisis case. Thus, it is explanatory research in conjunction with exploratory features.

2. Theoretical Framework

This study considers crisis, crisis management, and crisis communication as inextricably intertwined. Following Coombs (2010), the terms can be seen as a progression from crisis to crisis management to crisis communication. An organizational crisis is defined as “a specific, unexpected and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threatens or perceived to threaten an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). Crises are always socially constructed, and whether or not a crisis is
perceived as such heavily depends on how it is framed. The perception of the organization’s stakeholders is significant in whether an event develops into a crisis or not. (Coombs, 2010)

Crisis management can be generally defined as “a set of factors designed to combat crises and to lessen the actual damages inflicted [which seek] to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage” (Coombs, 2014, p. 20). In detail, the Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice conceptualizes an adequate crisis management in six aspects. For this study, four are considered relevant: (1) preparation, (2) recognition and signalling, (3) provision of information and (4) crisis communication (Toetsingskader Rijkscrisisstructuur, 2012). The missing two aspects (5) analysis, judgement, and preparation of decision as well as (6) decision making and steering are neglected. Drawing useful lessons would require a much deeper knowledge about crisis decision making within the police organization. Hence, it necessitates official access to data and would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

Finally, crisis communication is the “collection, processing and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Although crucial in all three phases, the focus here is on the crisis response after the crisis. Strategically, the crisis response stage is divided into three kinds of information, (1) instructing information, how to cope physically with the crisis, (2) adjusting information, how to cope psychologically with the crisis, and (3) reputation repair, attempts to ameliorate the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization (ibid. p.29). Failure to give instructing information gives the impression that the organization does not care about their stakeholders. Hence it intensifies the damage and may create new crisis situations. Adjusting information such as expressing sympathy and explaining which actions are taken to let the crisis never occur again is of great importance for sustaining a certain level of trust and reputation. Reputation repair means strategic choices made to rebuild the credibility of the stakeholders in the organization.
Figure 1 below displays the expected relationships derived from expectations in the literature. Hypotheses 1 to 4 are presented including the expected positive or negative relationship.

![Figure 1 Theoretical Framework](image)

The first hypothesis (H1) concerns the improvisation from protocols. The definition of ‘protocol’ used here does not only refer to extensive standardized action guidelines as they are often conceived and analysed in the literature (see Coombs 2010) but takes a broader approach including organizational norms as well. To give an example of organizational norms, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior established a comprehensive Guideline for Crisis Communication aiming at companies and public agencies. It lists the most important rules for a successful crisis management. Thus, it may also illustrate organizational norms within the police organization. Improvisation from well-accepted norms describes any decision which deviates from the norms. The norms are idealistic in nature and can never be followed a hundred-percent. Finding a balance between external pressures and following the norms is a crucial task of the crisis manager. The greater the clash between external expectations and principles of the norms, the bigger the risk to inadequately manage the crisis. The literature consequently shows that deviances worsen the crisis management and damage the organization’s reputation (see Coombs 2010). These organizational norms may also act as mechanisms shaping the adequacy of crisis management (see A. Boin, 2005). Hence, the following hypothesis is built.

\[ H1: \text{The more improvisation from protocol, the lower the adequacy of crisis management.} \]

Hypothesis 2 (H2) gives insight into the process of politicization within the crisis management. An event or issue is politicized when it “becomes subject to heightened political attention” in parliamentary questioning, hearing, debates and inquiries (Dekker & Hansén, 2004).
Politicization also includes disagreement within the political sphere, containing both, political institutions and informal political arenas such as mass media. Disagreement refers to the framing of (1) the course of events, (2) the underlying causes and effects, (3) questions of responsibility and accountability, and (4) what lessons should be drawn (Broekema, 2015). If a crisis seems to threaten crucial values of the state, then a framing contest on ‘how could it happen?’ and ‘who is to be sanctioned?’ begins. Brändström and Kuipers (2003) developed a decision tree along which decisions the different actors face are displayed. It distinguishes on the agency dimension between framing the situation as an incident (referring to problems on the technical and operational level) or as a symptom of underlying policy failures. Hence, their theory is used to reveal the underlying motivations of the actors in the accountability process.

Studies have shown that politicization not only hinders organizations from adequately managing a crisis (Arjen Boin & Hart, 2000) but can also contribute to an effective learning and managing process (Dekker & Hansén, 2004). The focus of this thesis remains on the crisis response. Thus effects on learning processes are not analyzed. Consequently, the following relationship is expected:

**H2-**: The more politicized the event, the lower the adequacy of crisis management.

Hypothesis 3 (H3-) describes two different types of trust. Type A refers to a general distrust of the public in the government and media. It can be seen as a particular social context (Aykens, 2005). On one hand, it is expected that negative action by the police as executive part of the government has a huge impact on the overall trust in the government and vice versa.¹ If support for the government is already declining in opinion polls, it is more likely that more criticism will arise in times of a crisis. On the other hand the mass media may heavily depend on the government. Hence, it adopts their voice in framing a crisis. It is a claim oftentimes used by populist movements, but also reflected by scholars (A. Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2008) When many media organizations share a similar opinion coinciding with the government, trust in the government can be boosted. Conversely, an overall distrust in the government might as well hurt the media’s reputation. In Germany, the recently very successful party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) which evolved from protest movements against the government and media, became a strong voice in public opinion. Thus, when a significantly huge party regards government and media as completely unreliable, it may also influence the publics’ perception

¹ Recent research found that the government cannot be just seen as a composition of all government agencies, but that the impact of the individual agencies on public perception of the government differ. (see Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003) Still, for Germany there is no evidence that the police is not seen as public service.
of the adequacy of crisis management of a public agency. Type B refers to the specific distrust as an outcome of the crisis. Both Types are prone to influence each other and often go hand in hand. Thus, they are summed up together in the following relationship.

**H3**: The more the public distrusts the government and media, the lower the adequacy of crisis management.

Hypothesis 4 takes a closer look at the effects of politicization. Blame games are considered the central mechanism which shape the relation between improvisation from protocol and the adequacy of crisis management. As in hypothesis 2, the theoretical implications are based on Brändström and Kuipers (2003). If an event can be narrowed down to failures of single actors, scapegoating becomes a useful way of preventing damage and preserve reputation. But if the roots of the problem are framed as more complex, such simple solutions might lose their effectiveness. When analysing a crisis temporally, the dominant framing might shift during the process. Improvisation from protocol refers to internal police decisions. Thus, when blame in the politicization process shifts to policy failures or higher levels of authority, operational mistakes might be less salient. The following hypothesis describes this effect.

**H4**: The process of politicization affects the relation of improvisation from protocols on the adequacy of crisis management.

Hypotheses 1 to 4 assume a one-way relationship. Whether the direction of the shown causalities is indeed unilateral should be questioned. Inadequate choices of the crisis management may be used in politics to blame others which further politicizes the crisis. Besides, the dynamics of distrust are prone to become self-reinforcing - “distrust breeds low credibility, which breeds fault-finding interpretations of the past and current behaviour, which in turn reinforces distrust” (A. Boin, 2005, p. 78). A. Boin (2005) calls it the “credibility trap”, which appears when the decision makers “deny unwelcome, yet widely covered aspects of crisis reality”. If distrust characterizes the relationship between public, government and media, then official announcements are less likely to be believed. Thus distrust not only influences the adequacy of crisis management directly but may intensify the politicization as well. Hence, the following feedback dynamics are expected:

*Feedback circle: The adequacy of crisis management increases the politicization and the distrust. Moreover, the higher the distrust, the stronger the politicization.*
3. Methodology

This chapter explains the methodological grounds of the thesis. It is important to understand how the study was conducted to enable the reader to assess the studies’ scientific value. First, the design is explained. Second, the procedure of data collection is presented in detail. Finally, validity and reliability issues are discussed.

3.1 Research Design

This study is designed as a single case study. Its methodology is based on Causal Process Tracing (CPT) which is the most suitable approach to draw inferences on dynamic processes in a single-case study (see Blatter & Haverland, 2012). CPT requires a special way of looking at a case which is guided by ‘configurational thinking’. It assumes that the interplay of many and complex causes result in the specific outcome rather than a single specific cause. Similar outcomes can be produced by different causes (equifinality) which in consequence means that effects of causal factors differ in other contexts and combinations (causal heterogeneity). The aim of a CPT-case study is to identify the mechanisms that connect the causal conditions to the outcome. Tracing the process, first of all, requires insight knowledge of the event of interest. Thus, a comprehensive storyline which structures the event in critical stages is constructed. Based on the information received in the storyline, observations are made which allow the inductive construction of strong causal claims. These claims are backed up by further evidence found in Confessions of central actors. Confessions reveal motivations behind specific decisions and actions and allow a deeper understanding of the mechanism at work. Finally, supported claims enable the explanation of regularities of certain mechanisms which work only under specific institutional, spatial or historical contexts. Thus, it substantially differs from classic research designs such as longitudinal or cross-case studies.

3.2 Data collection

The main sources are official documents of the police and the Interior Minister plus official statements published online. Furthermore, newspaper articles and other media content reveal much information, especially about leaked reports and official statements given to the media. Moreover, due to personal attendance, some interviews conducted by the official Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (CoI) with the main decision makers of New Year’s Eve are included. An additional interview with a police press speaker gives insight into the general workings of the police’s press office in Cologne, although specific case-related questions have not been asked due to legal obligations of the job. Interviews with investigative journalists who have comprehensive knowledge and insight about the case were conducted. These shed light on the
relationship of media, public and police. An overview of interview questions asked to the journalists and how they were approached can be found in Appendix A.

The level of distrust of the public in government and media is measured by using data from the “DeutschlandTREND”, a weekly survey from Infratest Dimap on behalf of the national news agency ARD about the public opinion. The level of satisfaction with the government and the level of satisfaction with top politicians are taken as a mean to display the general level of (dis)trust of the society.

3.3 Validity and reliability

An often discussed issue in case study research are problems of validity and reliability. This thesis addresses these problems by following methodological standards as summarized by Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki (2008) to ensure the quality of the results. The internal validity is covered due to a theoretical framework solely derived from literature and theory triangulation. The expectations of the hypotheses are discussed from different theoretical lenses, and the analysis considers more than one interpretation approach. The construct validity is ensured by applying data triangulation. Besides, Appendix A presents an explanation of how access to data has been achieved. Regarding the external validity, this study is not directly connected to a broader frame of additional case studies. Still, as the thesis was written in a bachelor circle of 8 students who used a similar thus comparable theoretical framework, findings can be generalized to a certain extent. Besides, Cologne is a perfect case to study the workings of politicization processes and the role of distrust, which makes it relevant for science. Last, a case study protocol was written to show how the entire case study was conducted to enable others to get a reliable picture of the procedure.

4. Case Description

This case description summarizes the most important details about the event and the development of the crisis. Before the case is presented in detail, the migrant crisis as the context is described and an overview of the topic is given. The actual crisis then is divided into 5 Stages. Stage 1 describes the preparation misjudgments. Stage 2 gives an overview of the Police Operation on New Year’s Eve. Stage 3 presents the mixed crisis response of the police and the development of the media coverage. Stage 4 introduces the first attempts of damage control and the start of the blame games. Stage 5 finally illustrates political consequences. An in-depth description including comprehensive timelines can be found in Appendix B.
4.1 Context – The migrant crisis

The events during New Year’s Eve need to be observed in the very sensitive context of the migrant crisis. According to the ARD DeutschlandTREND, 73% of the public regards the topic of refugees, asylum, immigration, and integration the most important political issue for 2016\(^2\). The migrant crisis gave rise to right-wing parties in Germany. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) as a right-wing populist party was founded in 2013 and is already part of the European Parliament and had a turnout of 24% in Sachsen-Anhalt in the federal state elections in early 2016. They create serious pressure on the political system. The government ruled with an open-door policy for refugees, which led to over a million people coming to Germany, mostly unregistered in the beginning. Not only the AfD but also the Christian Social Union (CSU) as coalition partner fought for a change in strategy of the government.

The public opinion, in general, supported the government’s open-door policy. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as the chancellor’s party is trusted the most to be able to cope with the refugee situation.\(^3\) Still, populist movements such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) showed that there was much uncertainty in the society which was not sufficiently addressed by politicians who are least trusted in the political system.

4.2 Overview of New Year’s Eve

In the night of New Year’s Eve 2015, a large number of sexual crimes, theft and robbery were committed on the central train station forecourt and in the central train station in Cologne. The victims were almost solely women. The situation was described by police forces of the local and federal police and from other eye witnesses as temporarily chaotic and uncontrollable. On the station forecourt, a crowd of over 1000 people was situated. The majority was described as male and between 15 and 35 years old. From their outer appearance, it seemed that they originate from the North-African and Arabian area. Most of them were severely under the influence of alcohol and were described by the police officers as aggressive and completely uninhibited. Fireworks were purposely fired into groups of people and police forces. Within this crowd of people, smaller groups of different sizes evolved. These groups massively


sexually harassed women and pickpocket them. In sum, over 1200 offences were reported, out of which around 600 have a sexual background. 40% of all reported cases happened between midnight and 1 a.m.4

4.3 Stage 1: Preparation misjudgements

The police authorities misjudged the danger of possible critical situations for New Year’s Eve. The supervisory authority for the NRW police, the NRW State Office for Central Police Services (LZPD) approved only one Hundertschaft5 with two platoons á 38 police, although a full Hundertschaft was requested by the Local Police Authority Cologne6. This reduced the opportunities for the police to have surveillance and early detection teams on-duty. When the riot police started their duty, it turned out that the situation already went out of control and that options for actions were limited. Support forces were not suitable to call because of lack of time. Besides, on a meeting on 9th December 2015, responsibilities were discussed among the federal police (FP), the cities Ordnungsamt7 and the police on the basis of former experiences. Due to the lack of an official organizer, an overall security plan was not established. The focus of the distributed responsibilities for certain areas did not reflect the available knowledge and experiences from former years. The police report of New Year’s Eve 2014 stated that the station forecourt was a hotspot for people and that pyrotechnics were used extensively and dangerously, but the station forecourt was not even mentioned as a specific area. Besides, the pickpocketing scene grew immensely in the months before New Year’s Eve. The leading police officer of the commission for pickpocketing stated in a news interview with the WDR Aktuelle Stunde that there have also been new developments of a combination of pickpocketing and sexual assaults.8 Moreover, the organizational structure was kept as a Standard Structural Organisation (Allgemeine Aufbauorganisation – AAO) and not a Special Structural Organisation (Besondere Aufbauorganisation – BAO) which is comprised of a complete leading team including a press speaker to react quickly to upcoming situations and requests by the media. Last, the operation lacked the necessary infrastructure to deal with a bigger number

5 A Hundertschaft is the name of a riot police team consisting of three platoons á 38 police and two leaders.
6 From now on, ‘Police’ refers to the local police authority Cologne, which includes the riot police on-duty on New Year’ Eve
7 The Ordnungsamt is a public order office of the municipality responsible for public safety and order. The Ordnungsamt is not allowed to arrest people.
of offenders. Two prisoner cells of the federal police in the central train station and three prisoner transport cars were available. Police of the LZPD stated this as being an on-going problem in Cologne which has also led to problems in former events.

4.4 Stage 2: New Year’s Eve

Most offences happened on the station forecourt which was under the responsibility of the riot police. The riot police entered the station forecourt at 10:45 p.m. when several thousand people were already situated there, many in a completely uninhibited and aggressive mood. Due to the immense and dangerous use of fireworks and the lack of responsiveness to the presence of the police, the decision was made to evict the station forecourt. At 11:35 p.m., the eviction started. During this time, the federal police was responsible for closing the doors of the central train station. At 00.5 a.m., the federal police had to open the doors to release increasing pressure of people inside. Federal police described an aggressive atmosphere. At 0:15 a.m., the eviction was finished. Later, the situation on the station forecourt worsened again. Around 2:30 a.m. it finally calmed down. Table 1 below gives an overview of the most relevant stages of the operation.

![Table 1 Timetable of the operation on New Year’s Eve](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>What happened?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:45 p.m.</td>
<td>Riot police arrive at the station forecourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:35</td>
<td>Start of the eviction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:56</td>
<td>Train service stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:15 a.m.</td>
<td>Eviction finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:30</td>
<td>Access to station forecourt allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>Train service restarts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30</td>
<td>Situation calms down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.1 Operational mistakes

Due to the preparatory mistakes, the leaders of the operation on New Year’s Eve were faced with problems to deal with the situation. First, due to the unanimous start of the operation at 10 p.m., the riot police depended on information of detection teams which was not available. The only information available came from the police leader who on the way to the police office recognized a potentially dangerous situation on the station forecourt. This was not sufficient to take additional measures besides sending police there to get a closer look. Hence, when the riot police arrived at the train station, the situation was already on a stage where the available
amount of police did not leave many options to the leaders. As the riot police leader and other police officers stated, there was no possibility at this point to get the necessary support in time which would have been needed to break up the crowd. The late detection of the crisis led to a lack of opportunities to call for help. Second, missing communication channels, especially between the Ordnungsamt and the federal police, inhibited a proper decision. The adjacent Hohenzollernbrücke (Passenger Bridge – see Map in Appendix B) was a hot spot for many people to watch the fireworks at midnight. The amount of people on the bridge created much pressure which forced some to escape on the train rails. In consequence, the train service had to be stopped for about an hour short after midnight. It was not possible anymore to leave the city by train which further aggravated the situation inside the train station. Decisions were taken which for a separated area made sense but created unforeseen problems in other areas where another actor was responsible.9

4.5 Stage 3: Mixed Responses

On 1st of January at 8:57 a.m., the police gave out a press statement regarding the event of New Year’s Eve. It states that overall the celebrations were peaceful with minor situations which were handled adequately.10 However, throughout the day, the police received 30 reports of women who have been sexually assaulted during the night. Consequently, an investigation team was built to clarify the unexpected development. The day after, the 2nd of January, the associated press statement was publicized.11 The next day, the first suspects had been identified which was also communicated via a press statement.12 Although the police was aware that New Year’s Eve could not have been that peaceful overall, the first, positive press statement on the 1st of January remained online without correction.

### Table 2 Timetable of Mixed Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>What happened?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st January</td>
<td>Press Statement “Peaceful New Year’s Eve”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment investigation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd January</td>
<td>Press Statement about establishment of investigation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd January</td>
<td>Press Statement of first investigation results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st – 3rd January</td>
<td>Increasing number of local newspaper reports of sexual offences during New Year’s Eve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the meantime, local newspapers in Cologne took up the story and received eye-witness reports of women and police officers who described the situation on the station forecourt. The picture drawn in the newspapers differed significantly from the peaceful celebrations as stated by the police’s press statement. However, the national media attention was low.\(^\text{13}\) Still, the newspaper reports showed the police that the dimension of the sexual offenses and thefts might diverge tremendously from their knowledge and presentation of the event. Thus, a press conference was set for the 4\(^{th}\) of January.

### 4.6 Stage 4: Damage Control and Blame Games

On the press conference on 4\(^{th}\) January, the Police President in Cologne (PP) stated that 60 offences regarding theft and sexual assaults have been reported to the police, including several massive sexual offences and one rape. No information about suspects was given, as the investigations were still ongoing and no have brought about no profound results yet. A large group of men with a North-African and Arabian appearance were suspected to be involved, which the police as well as eye witnesses stated. Regarding the upcoming Carnival celebrations, greater safety precautions are presented.\(^\text{14}\) After this press conference, the national and international news took up the story and reported about Cologne. Soon, allegations that the police held back information evolved, especially regarding the background of the suspects. Although the PP condemned the offences, he was very cautious regarding the possible ethnic background of the suspects. The responsible police director for public affairs later stated in the Committee of Inquiry hearing that it would not have been a lie to tell that the investigations

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strongly lead in a direction to the North-African and Arabian men and that the PP was advised to do so.

Table 3 Timetable of Damage Control and Blame Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>What happened?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th January</td>
<td>Press conference of PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blame Games start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th January</td>
<td>Press conference PP, Mayor, FP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#einearmlaenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th January</td>
<td>First Identification of suspects</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

On the 5th of January, the PP, the federal police representative for Cologne and the mayor of Cologne had a first crisis meeting. The results were published in the following press conference of the PP and the mayor. Focus of this press conference was damage control, by naming the measures taken to prevent such assaults in the future, especially regarding coming major events (e.g. Carnival). Besides, as no additional information about perpetrators were known, the mayor and the PP both insisted not to suspect refugees just based on their presence on the station forecourt. The mayor gave the tip to women to “keep a distance of more than an arm’s length” to foreigners. It soon developed into a shit-storm on the Internet under the #einearmlaenge, because it somehow put the responsibility for the assaults on women and trivialised the events.

Quickly, the blame games started. The Federal MOI heavily criticized the police for the operation and that they are the ones to blame. Moreover, the National Minister of Justice called the event a “rupture in civilization”. In contrast, the Interior Ministry defended the work of the police against the attacks. The leader of the police union as the political speaker for police issues, blamed the latest political decisions about cuts in staffing and technological equipment which led to operational problems. Especially sensitive was the issue of a possible migrant background of the offenders. Due to the lack of information and knowledge about the event, allegations spread out that the police, as well as the media, were trying to cover up facts to create a desirable, political outcome for the government without inferences about the migrant crisis. The sexual assaults on ‘German’ women were instrumentalized to support political opinions about the migrant crisis. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) but also members of the Christian Social Union (CSU) fuelled, even more, mistrust against the Establishment and accused it to rather defend the foreign refugees than women. In social media, calls for vigilante

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justice came up to defend the German women against the evil attacks of the refugees. The first statement about the identification of four suspects did not calm the situation down because the criminal charges were based on theft, not on sexual assault. Thus, the background of the sexual offenders was still not communicated by the police.

4.7 Stage 5: Political consequences

The pressure on the Interior Ministry to shed light on the event became that heavy that it was decided to send the PP into early retirement on 8th January. The attempts of damage control did not work, as the negative attention towards the police and the responsible people still went on after the press conferences on the 4th and 5th of January. Cover-up allegations were not successfully denied. Moreover, the mayor complained about not having been comprehensively informed about the background of the offenders, which the police had. On the 9th of January, PEGIDA, a right-wing populist movement, called for a demonstration in Cologne to defend the German women. A counterdemonstration of feminists for stopping violence against women also gathered in Cologne to send a message against the instrumentalization of the topic for political purposes. Due to a high amount of violent behaviour in the PEGIDA demonstration and an aggressive atmosphere, the police had to break up the demonstrations after half an hour.

The NRW and the National Committee of Internal Affairs, as well as the NRW parliament, hold special meetings to discuss the event and consequences of New Year’s Eve in Cologne. Focus of the debate was to discuss the possibilities of a faster processing of deportation of criminal refugees and the tightening of the law against sexual violence. In March 2016, the Sexual Criminal Law was tightened.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Time</strong></th>
<th><strong>What happened?</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Dismissal of PP&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Correction of press statement from 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Violent demonstrations of right-wing extremists, demonstrations of feminists</td>
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<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Special Meeting of NRW Committee of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Bundestag special meeting, National Committee of Internal Affairs meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>NRW special parliamentary meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January</td>
<td>Establishment NRW Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for New Year’s Eve in Cologne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; February</td>
<td>Tightened rules for criminal foreigners regarding their deportation&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; March</td>
<td>Tightening of Sexual Criminal Law is approved</td>
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The dismissal of the PP resulted in a shift of public focus to higher political stages. Now, especially the role of the Interior Ministry and the Ministerial President NRW in the cover-up affair was discussed. The opposition in the NRW parliament called for an official Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January to investigate the story behind the cover-up allegations<sup>22</sup>. The investigations will end latest in March 2017. Table 5 gives an overview of the above-presented stages and connects it with the underlying processes as laid out in the theoretical framework.

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<sup>20</sup> The PP as a civil servant cannot be fired due to political circumstances. Thus, whenever this thesis talks about the dismissal, it refers to the dismissal from his position, not the termination of his job as a police.

<sup>21</sup> The implementation is still pending on approval of the Bundesrat, the legislative organ of the Federal States. (29.06.2016)

### Table 5 Overview of the Stages & Depiction of Crisis Management and Underlying Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Stage 1 Preparation</th>
<th>Stage 2 New Year’s Eve</th>
<th>Stage 3 Mixed Responses</th>
<th>Stage 4 Damage Control and blame games</th>
<th>Stage 5 Political Consequences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>01.01. 02.01 03.01</td>
<td>04.01 05.01</td>
<td>08.01 27.01 25.02 16.03</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Important event</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Crisis Management</strong></td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Recognition and signaling</td>
<td>Setup IT</td>
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<td><strong>Provision of information</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Crisis communication</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>PS peaceful night</td>
<td>PS setup IT</td>
<td>Press conference PP</td>
<td>PC Mayor, PP</td>
<td>PC Interior Minister</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Numerous public appearances by PP</td>
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<td><strong>Politization</strong></td>
<td>Previous crisis</td>
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23 The approval of the second legislative organ, the Bundesrat, is still pending. (29.06.2016)
5. Analysis

Improvisation from protocols has an expectedly strong explanatory power regarding the adequacy of crisis management. The better organizational norms are followed, the more adequate the crisis management will become (Coombs, 2010). The adequacy must not necessarily be bound to accepted mistakes during the crisis management, but can to a large extent be connected to external factors which will then be the most influential factor. Hence, the exploration of this assumption first requires a closer look at the relationship between the improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management with regard to underlying mechanisms. Based on this, mechanisms of politicization and distrust can be implemented in the analysis. Figure 2 is situated at the end of the analysis part. It presents an overview of the causalities which are elaborated in the discussion of the hypotheses. The reader may use it to better understand the workings of the mechanisms.

5.1 Hypothesis 1: Improvisation from protocols negatively affects the adequacy of crisis management.

The core of this thesis are the four aspects of crisis management, (1) preparation, (2) crisis recognition and signalling, (3) provision of information and (4) crisis communication. The protocols applied for these elements are well-accepted norms which stem from two sources. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior published an official ‘Guideline for Crisis Communication’ in which they state explicit norms feasible for (1) preparation and (4) crisis communication. The Guidelines for Crisis Communication of the Dutch Government are used for (2) recognition and signalling and (3) provision of information. Obviously, these norms were not established for the German context. Nonetheless, they provide a useful anchor point for the analysis. Preparation (1) comprises the existence of a crisis structure and crisis infrastructure as well as learning from previous experiences. Recognition and signalling include an accurate and consistent information flow to all relevant actors and the speed of management reaction. An adequate provision of information (3) requires the completeness of information, full accessibility of data and the control over data. Crisis communication (4) entails an active information policy, quick information flow, consequent action-taking and the coherence between crisis communication and the public demand for information.

5.1.1 Preparation

The German Federal Ministry of the Interior established Checklists for the preparation of an adequate crisis management. They can be summarized in 3 characteristics, (a) the existence of
a crisis structure, (b) the existence of proper infrastructure to cope with the crisis and to ensure crisis communication channels, and (c) learning from previous experiences. Strong evidence for the claims of the crisis preparedness of the police would require in-depth knowledge about the learning from previous crises. But no internal information has been published so far. Thus, the following evidence is based on information gained from the interview with a press speaker of the police, the hearings of leading police officers in Cologne and newspaper articles.

The police has a sufficient crisis structure at hand to cope with unexpected situations. The local police Cologne is one of the biggest local police authorities in Germany and one of the few in NRW with internal crisis structures. A Special Structural Organization, which includes a specific crisis leadership team and determined crisis communication channels, can always be implemented if considered necessary. Besides, it has the possibility to set up a Stabslage24 with a crisis team consisting of the involved police directorates. Communication paths with cooperating authorities are already established in the day-to-day business. For specific crises such as rampages, precise crisis communication plans are available. In addition, a press office with 12 employees and a 24/7 presence is on-duty all the time.

The police has a sufficient infrastructure at hand to react quickly to a changing environment. Due to the size of the organization with over 5000 employees, the police can if necessary always shift people to achieve priority goals. Concerning Special Forces, the police can reach out to the higher authorities to quickly get additional material or staff. It is limited by availability due to other operations, but the more intense the crisis is, the higher the chance of receiving what is requested. Problematic is the approval of staff and technical equipment for “normal” operations. During New Year’s Eve, the call for support forces was not a feasible option because of lack of time. Besides, requested technical equipment such as spotlights and fences for the station forecourt was not approved for the federal police. It is weird insofar as that the station forecourt was later declared to be under the responsibility of the police Cologne. Thus, equipment could have also been used from the police Cologne after disapproval for the federal police. The infrastructure of the police depends on the cooperation with other authorities; they cannot deal with a crisis on their own. Dependencies on outside organizations, no matter how good the cooperation is, always hinders the options and slows down the reaction time of the management. The existence of sufficient infrastructure can thus not be completely confirmed.

24 A Stabslage depicts a special organizational stage which is set up for big events or unexpected situations.
Learning from previous comparable situations have negatively contributed to the preparation of crisis management. In the two years previous to New Year’s Eve, the violent HoGeSa\textsuperscript{25} demonstration and the Special Forces Incident\textsuperscript{26} have shown that the crisis management and the PP as crisis manager might not be prepared to cope successfully with unexpected situations. During the HoGeSa demonstration, the degree of violence of the demonstrators came by surprise to the police, who was as a result unprepared and lacked control over the situation. The Special Forces Incident was dealt with by the PP unsuccessfully. He broke up the Special Forces Team although no charge have been found in the investigation, thus trust in his leadership qualities was damaged. A supporting factor might have been the experience with investigating the growing pickpocketing scene in Cologne through a cooperative commission with the federal police. Besides, a database registering offenders from North-African countries (NAFRI) may have given insight into criminal structures of the suspected offenders of New Year’s Eve.

In general, it can be said that the Police Cologne follows the norms regarding the preparation of crisis management. The existence of comprehensive crisis structures and the availability of infrastructure build a good basis for an adequate crisis management. But learning from previous crises lowered the trust capabilities of the police as a whole and of the PP specifically. The question remains why they managed New Year’s Eve so badly? A clue can be found in the cooperation issue for the crisis infrastructure. In the case description, preparatory misjudgements of New Year’s Eve are presented. They show that cooperation with the federal police, the city, and higher police authorities was insufficient to have a good overview of what is to be expected and what staff and material should be approved. To conclude, the pure existence of a more or less advanced crisis management system is not proven to be a necessary nor sufficient cause of a well-managed crisis.

5.1.2 Crisis recognition and signalling

According to the Guidelines for Crisis Management by the Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice, crisis recognition, and signalling depends on (a) the information flow to all relevant actors and (b) the speed of management reaction. The police itself and the mayor are considered the only relevant actors here because they had close contact before the crisis was publicly

\textsuperscript{25} HoGeSa is a right-wing hooligan group fighting against Salafism in the Islam.

\textsuperscript{26} In 2015, a Special Forces Team was dissolved by the PP because of allegations of mistreatment of new team members. Later, investigations brought about no evidence for any mistreatment. The reputation of the PP especially internally was damaged.
acknowledged. The role of the Interior Minister and superior authorities are neglected because not enough information is available to make statements about their behaviour and knowledge level. The question to answer is why the press statement of the 1\textsuperscript{st} January presented a positive image of the night despite the different portrayal of the police at the scene? Boin (2005) discusses two applicable reasons why organizations often fail to create the necessary information for an effective crisis recognition: Mechanism 1 says that many organizations are not designed to look for trouble. Simon (1976) names it the “problemistic search”.\textsuperscript{27} Mechanism 2 states that the “variable disjunction of information and the politics of information” is responsible. The applicability of the mechanisms is explored in conjunction with the definition of the Dutch Ministry.

5.1.2.1 The information flow

The internal information flow was insufficient. The first written down internal information about the situation was a WE message\textsuperscript{28} sent during the night after the eviction. The wording did not point to a much bigger dimension of the event, as the eviction was completed without any incidents, no one was injured, no suspects were arrested, one report was filed to the police and the media interest was low. Besides, not all information from operation leaders was collected. One of the two platoon leaders did not write a report, although he was on-duty on the station forecourt and had knowledge about sexual arrests and of the atmosphere within the crowd. The malfunctioning of communication channels resulted in incomplete overall reports of the night. A comprehensive and accurate overview was not available. A combination of Mechanism 1 and 2 can shed light on the problems. First, it seems that all responsible persons for the operation on New Year’s Eve did not feel responsible to take further action after their duty was over. All police officers in the CoI hearings stated that the ‘aftermath’ of an operation is a distinct matter inside the organization and that they are not involved. Hence, if the organisational system does not require them to locate problems, then they remain with the routine tasks. Second, the sheer size of the police complicated the data collection. It requires a concerted effort. But due to the plain fact that it was New Year’s Eve and the days thereafter public holidays, these efforts were further impeded.


\textsuperscript{28} WE messages (WE = Wichtiges Ereignis) are Important Events, which are a summary of important events happened within a local police authority. Some are also send to the LZPD and the MOI depending on their significance.
The sufficiency of the information flow to the mayor is questionable. On the day of the PP’s dismissal, the mayor published a statement claiming that the information flow was lacking important details which became known to her via the media. In consequence, the relationship was described as shaken confidence in the police leadership. The PP denied this statement. On 2nd of January, the PP informed the Mayor extensively about the situation, similarly during a telephone call before the press conference on the 5th of January. Besides, during the press conference, he described the group to which the suspects are necessarily related. He only stated what was known, the fact that no suspect could have been identified yet. According to the PP the mayor had all information available. Mechanism 2 might explain the mayor’s statement regarding the political characteristics. Data interpretation becomes “the subject of a political process” (A. Boin, 2005). Thus, it depends on one’s own interest how to weigh the evidence. The mayor’s statement is likely to be an instrument of preventing damage to the own organization.

5.1.2.2 Reaction Speed

The speed of the management reaction was slow, internal as well as external. The first internal recognition of the event was on the early afternoon of the 1st January. An investigation team was established. But the crisis management decided not to correct the morning’s press statement until further details are known. In consequence, the public was first informed a day later in a small press statement. The PP repeatedly stated in the hearing of the COI that he was aware of the sensitivity of the event. Thus, he recognized it already as an upcoming crisis. However, the setup of an investigation team as such did not reflect this awareness. Neither did he try to actively achieve a better overview of the situation by requesting comprehensive reports of the responsible police leaders nor did he actively communicated to the public. The response was reactive, waiting for the normal process of investigation and information collection to create results. Mechanism 2 may again shed light on this behaviour. The available information lacked certainty of the scope and severity of the event for the PP to act immediately. The PP stated that although he was aware of a critical situation on 1st of January, the full dimension became clear only on the 3rd of January. The disjunction of information about the background of the offenders was reason to wait for a clearer picture.

29 http://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/presse/mitteilungen/15783/index.html
In conclusion, two mechanisms may have driven the police to recognize the crisis in a late stage and signal it even later. First, ‘many organizations are not designed to look for trouble’. No one seemed to be responsible to detect any problems and to take appropriate action. Second, the ‘variable disjunction of information and the politics of the organization’ explain the halting information flow and the hesitant decision making of the PP.

5.1.3 Provision of Information
The guidelines of the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs point out three norms for an adequate provision of information: (1) the completeness of data, (2) the accessibility of data, and the (3) control over data.

*The data was not complete to get a full overview of the situation.* Three problems are found which resulted in the insufficient police report to the Interior Ministry on 8th January. First, not all reports from important actors were requested. Second, early statements of victims during the night were only insufficiently recorded due to long waiting periods in the police offices. Thus, the dimension of the event as presented in the statistics was skewed. The missing field reports of important actors in the operational plan makes it hard to attain an early comprehensive overview. Third, the preparatory misjudgements come into play here as well, because they hindered the collection of data during the night.

*The data was not immediately accessible and lacked in quality.* The PP stated in the press conferences two main reasons why information about the situation on New Year’s Eve was so rare: the darkness and the insanity of the environment through the extensive use of fireworks. It complicated the observation for the police and hindered anyone to detect offenders or possible suspects. Moreover, many of the victims did not immediately report the crimes to the police. Most victims reported after the 4th of January when the event was extensively present in the media. Two explanations should be considered here. First, the low amount of police to file the reports during New Year’s Eve. Second, the craziness of the scene which many just wanted to escape from without immediately filing a report to the police. More importantly, the report rate for sexual offences in Germany is very low, only every 7th woman who has

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experienced sexual violence has filed a report to the police. Going to the police involves reflecting the experienced situation and can be very burdensome to the victim. Thus, many need time to think about the consequences before they go to the police which limits the possibilities for investigators. Furthermore, in this case, many of the victims were not living in the city but in nearby towns. Thus, direct contact between the victims and the responsible investigation team in Cologne was more difficult.

The police lacked full control over the data. The most important evidence is the leaked report of a federal police officer to the media and some other unofficial statements by police given to the media. Besides, a great part of the used data for the investigations of the police came from the victims or eye-witnesses themselves, which means that the police logically cannot have control over their statements.

The deviation described above had a negative influence on the adequacy of provision of information. Although external factors such as the darkness of the forecourt and the increasing number of reports over a long time hindered and slowed down the accessibility of data, internal mistakes contributed to a lack of completeness and control over the information.

5.1.4 Crisis Communication

The Guidelines for Crisis Communications of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior point out four norms to be followed: (1) active information policy, (2) words follow consequent actions, and (3) the communication needs to meet the public demand for information. Additionally, Coombs (2010) distinguishes strategic crisis communication in instructing information, how to cope physically with the crisis, adjusting information, how to cope psychologically with the crisis, and reputation repair, attempts to ameliorate the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization. Instructing information are the first priority in crisis management. Coombs (2007) regards it the ethical responsibility to address the physical and psychological concerns of the victims first before starting to care about reputational assets. Furthermore, the Interior Ministry has established a directive for the protection of national

minorities against discrimination. It states that information about the involvement of national minorities should only be mentioned if a predominant information interest or investigation interest exists.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{The reactive crisis response resulted in “fuelling thunder”}. Scholars of crisis communication always stress the fact that crises require a ‘quick’ response (see Coombs, 2010, p.28). A proactive disclosure of information is likely to result in a “stealing thunder” mechanism which lessens negative implications on the organization (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). To turn this around, a ‘slow’ crisis response may result in “fuelling thunder”. The evidence suggests in three ways that indeed a slow crisis response intensified the impacts of the crisis. First, the three press statements published during the first days after New Year’s Eve did not represent an active or offensive crisis communication. The strategy appeared to prolong the outbreak of a crisis which was obvious to come. Second, local newspapers draw a more intense story of the event by telling stories of victims and eye-witnesses who described the event as chaotic and insane. Thus, the decision on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of January to hold a press conference the next day was a reaction of growing external pressure by the media. Third, the late crisis response created cover-up allegations. They became a central aspect of the public debate. It shows that the inadequacy of the crisis management is at least partly self-created by “fuelling thunder”. The change to an open and quick information policy after the press conference on the 4\textsuperscript{th} was too late to diminish damage to the organization.

\textbf{The communicated reaction measures to the crisis were rigorously followed by consequent actions.} The focus of the press conference on the 5\textsuperscript{th} of January was already the preparation for the upcoming Carnival and presence measures around the central train station the following weeks. News reports confirm that the presence measures were immense and worked after they were implemented. There was a huge drop in pickpocketing and drug selling around the central train station. Besides, no further situations regarding sexual offences occurred during Carnival. The security concept did not only involve more police but included new concepts such as ‘central safe places’ for women where they receive immediate support and security.

\textsuperscript{34} Leitlinien für die Polizei des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten vor Diskriminierungen (2008) \textit{Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales Nordrhein-Westfalen}. Retrieved from https://recht.nrw.de/lini/owa/br_bes_text?anw_nr=1&gld_nr=2&ugl_nr=2051&bes_id=12564&val=12564&ver =7&sg=&aufgehoben=N&menu=1
The communication did not meet the public demand of information. Online videos and newspaper reports suggested that refugees were involved in the offences, which made the situation politically critical. In the press conferences, it was repeatedly stated that the group out of which the offences were committed appeared to consist of North-African and Arabian men. However, it was emphasised as well that there is no known connection to refugees. Later it came out that most of the over hundred identified men during the evening identified themselves indeed as refugees. Thus, trust in the open communication of the police was damaged. Besides, a leaked police field report and eye-witness statements showed that the situation especially before and during the eviction was not really under control but rather chaotic and dangerous. Still, the PP transcended the responsibility for the event and emphasised that the police is not to blame. The clash of framings resulted in a loss of trust.

The ‘tendency to emphasize adjusting information over instructing information’ created an impression of lacking empathy. Coombs (2010) stresses that crisis managers oftentimes neglect the importance of giving instructing information because it is seen as self-evident. This mechanism can be observed in Cologne in two aspects. First (1), the crisis response strategy of the Cologne crisis management team focused on adjusting information and reputation repair. Much emphasis was on the transcendence of responsibility. The PP emphasized the promotion of frames, depicting the event as unforeseeable and uncontrollable. The most preferred description of New Year’s Eve was the ‘new’ phenomena, which was not foreseen and couldn’t have been prevented. The stories told by eyewitnesses and victims differ from that view because they present an overstrained police which was unable to protect them due to missing presence and equipment. The police tried to rebuild trust and weaken the impression of No-Go areas by showing greater presence and presenting an enhanced security plan for the upcoming mega event Carnival. Second (2), the only instructing information which stuck in the media ended up in a shit-storm #einearmlaenge on the mayor. She referred to advice for physical behaviour in an uncertain situation in an unfortunate way. In a newspaper interview in June 2016, she stated to regret creating a bad image through this well-meant advice. The small coverage of instructing information by the police made it easier for others to instrumentalize the topic for their matters. Right-wing movements and politicians used the situation for compassionate statements in favour of protecting women against sexual violence and harassment, although it does not fit their actual political opinion.\(^{35}\) In sum, the “tendency to

\(^{35}\)https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/koeln-pegida-103.html
emphasize adjusting information over instructing information”- mechanism is likely to create an inadequate crisis communication.

The guidelines of the Interior Ministry to protect national minorities against discrimination had no likely influence in the decision of the PP. The PP stated in the hearing that the guideline did not play a role in his decision. Of course, protecting refugees in general against unjustified indiscrimination was the basis of his decision. However, the PP was guided by personal values as a PP and not driven by following these guidelines. But when looking at the police organization as a whole, a change can be observed. A team of journalists found out that naming the background of offenders has significantly increased after the event. In the last quarter of 2015, press statements included the background 5 times. But in January 2016, it was already mentioned in 13 press statements. It is likely that Cologne sensitized the press offices. Naming the background might just be a way to prevent criticism and damage to the organization. Another possible explanation is an increased number of situations where the background might have actually played a role, because Cologne acted as a trigger for more ethnic-background-related crime. Which of these reasons applies cannot be observed.

The late change to an active information policy in combination with a crisis response which differed from the public perception and knowledge of the event had a negative effect on the adequacy of crisis management. The mechanism of the ‘tendency to emphasize adjusting information over instructing information’ might have complicated an adequate crisis communication and contributed to the negative image of the police.

5.1.5 Conclusion of Hypothesis 1
In sum, deviations from well-accepted norms appear to hinder an adequate crisis management in Cologne. The evidence suggests that three mechanisms have been at work. The first two mechanisms are the ‘problemistic search’ mechanism and the ‘variable disjunction of information and the politics of organization’ mechanism which shaped the recognition of the crisis. In combination with the insufficient preparation of the operation, they constitute the basis for the late recognition and signaling of the situation and the lack of detailed information. These mechanisms might also explain the halting information flow which resulted in an incomprehensive knowledge base necessary for an adequate crisis communication. The PP’s decision not to mention the ethnic background information about the offenders was influenced by this uncertainty of knowledge. The crisis communication strategy eventually created the

public perception that information is held back. The third mechanism describes the ‘tendency to emphasize adjusting information over instructing information’. Although the police expressed empathy to the victims, it was not emphasized enough to create a caring image. The question remains which factors hindered the application of well-accepted norms. This will be addressed in the following parts.

5.2 **Hypothesis 2**: The more politicized the event, the lower the adequacy of crisis management.

Before we analyse the mechanisms of politicization, we have to determine the level of political attention and disagreement. Earlier, we have defined politicization as (1) the degree of political attention and (2) the degree of political disagreement within political institutions and informal political arenas such as mass media. It refers to the framing of (a) the course of events, (b), the underlying causes and effects, (c) questions of responsibility and accountability, and (d) what lessons should be drawn (Broekema, 2015)

5.2.1 **Political Attention**

*The political attention was high from the 4th of January onwards.* After the 4th of January, Cologne received increasing political attention from local, federal state, national and international level as well as much attention in media and social media. Besides statements from all political parties in the *Bundestag* (Federal Parliament), the issue was also on the agenda of the NRW Committee of Internal Affairs, the National Committee of Internal Affairs, the NRW parliament, and the national parliament. The setup of the Committee of Inquiry by the NRW parliament shows how politically important the crisis is. On the international level, many politicians commented on Cologne, mainly concerning the migrant crisis.

Media attention is shown by a simple media frequency analysis for news coverage. The analysis of the most popular news program “Tagesschau” in Germany of the public TV agency ARD shows that between the 4th and the 27th of January, the crisis was discussed 15 of 24 times with a daily coverage until the 11th of January. The great attention of the event in social media is evident by looking at three examples. First, New Year’s Eve in Cologne was a trending topic on Twitter, which can be seen e.g. in the news media coverage of the use of #einearmlaenge.

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37 See Table 8 in Appendix A
It came up after the press conference on the 5th of January regarding behavioural tips of the mayor for women to keep an arm’s length distance to unknown people. Second, the international extent of the event is evident. Donald Trump, a potential presidential candidate of the Republicans in the United States, tweeted about Cologne on the 6th of January. Third, the attention the event received in social media was of great intensity. A social-media expert of the NRW State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA) stated that after the event in Cologne, a ‘hate-hype’ was observable online resulting in an increasing number of criminal investigations.

5.2.2 Political Disagreement

_The political disagreement was rather low regarding police issues but high on national/policy level._ To show the degree of political disagreement, a simple content analysis of the most relevant actors is conducted concerning the four aspects of political disagreement listed above. The most relevant actors are the PP of the Police Cologne, the Police Union NRW, the Interior Minister, the Federal IM, the CDU as an opposition party in NRW and the AfD as representative of the right-wing voices. Table 6 shows that questions of responsibility and accountability reveal the most disagreement among the actors. The NRW CDU and the Federal IM see the responsibility especially with the Police Cologne, whereas the Interior Minister accounts the Federal Police for the mistakes of the event as well. The Police Union and the PP, on the other hand, defend the working of the police. The PP does not make statements about the responsibility other than denying that the police is not the one to blame. The Police Union criticizes the political police authorities who failed to sufficiently staff and equip the police.

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38 Trump, D. (2016, January 6). Re: Germany is going through massive attacks to its people by the migrants allowed to enter the country. New Years Eve was a disaster. THINK! [Twitter Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/684742583520722944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor/Framing process</th>
<th>Course of events</th>
<th>Underlying causes and effects</th>
<th>Responsibility and accountability</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police President</td>
<td>“unforeseeable phenomenon”, police showed sufficient presence, appropriate decisions during operation</td>
<td>Not the police</td>
<td>Immediate measures, strengthened presence during large events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Cologne Police Union</td>
<td>Understaffing of the Police Lack of appropriate staffing, problem was known, deportation rules not rigorously executed</td>
<td>Police oversight, Politics</td>
<td>More staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Minister</td>
<td>Preparatory mistakes, operational mistakes by police</td>
<td>Police Cologne and Federal Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRW CDU</td>
<td>enhanced surveillance and technological progress in policing by NRW government</td>
<td>Police Cologne and NRW government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal IM</td>
<td>Operational mistakes, “Police cannot work like that”</td>
<td>Police Cologne</td>
<td>Tough answer of the rule of law, change of law for deportation, sexual assault law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Cultural differences between Islamic people and Germany</td>
<td>Merkel, Migrant Politics</td>
<td>Change of leadership, change of migrant policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Much political attention in conjunction with a heated framing contest over the responsibility resulted in a strong politicization of the crisis. The crisis response entails the provision of information and the crisis communication. The effects of the politicization processes on these aspects is analysed below.

5.2.3 Effects of Politicization

The politicization contributed to an adequate provision of information regarding the completeness and accessibility of information. The great media attention beginning on the 4th of January obviously reached many people, and consequently more victims and eye witnesses as well. Many of those did not live in Cologne. Thus the coverage in the local newspaper was not reaching them. Hence, a rising number of victims filed reports to the police and a more comprehensive overview of the situation was possible. The huge attention did contribute as a psychological factor for the victims. In part 5.1.3 Provision of information, we have shortly elaborated on the psychological consequences of sexual assaults on women. A general applicable mechanism can be derived, namely that ‘politicization lowers hesitancy to report sexual violence’. Statistics about sexual violence in Germany and other countries support this mechanism, although it cannot be found in scientific studies of crisis management.\(^{40}\)

Blame Games within the politicization process lowered the morale of the police, which led to a lack of data control. In the theory, blame games were introduced with regard to the agency dimension. A political crisis can either be framed as an ‘incident’ or as a ‘symptom of policy failure’ (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). Table 6 shows that blame was concentrated on the police and their operational and preparatory mistakes. The lower-level actors were in focus, which the evidence of the dismissal of the PP clearly shows. The PP stated in the CoI hearing that he sees himself a scapegoat of politics. But even though the PP had to take the consequences, the blame was also put on the police Cologne as a whole. The police and the police union blamed strategic political choices of the Interior Ministry. But they were not able to withstand the dominant framing of the Federal Interior Minister and the Interior Minister. As a consequence, the lack of political support and the scapegoating was likely to lower the morale within the police, as an insider report by the described\(^{41}\). According to former newspaper articles, the morale was already damaged due to the unjustified dismissal of a Special Forces team the previous year. It can explain the lack of control over the data shown


through the leaked police reports and unofficial statements. Thus, the Blame Games as a mechanism shaped the politicization process and complicated an adequate crisis management.

The involvement of “refugees” complicated an adequate crisis communication. The PP stated that immediately after knowing that refugees might be involved in the offences, he was aware of the explosive political nature of the situation. Thus, he actively tried to stick only to known facts about the suspects and refraining from every connection to refugees. The personal decision to be cautious created a clash between the public demand for information and his information policy. In contrast, the press speaker stated that the politicization did not have a direct effect on the daily working of the police department. Despite the fact that the workload for the press office increased immensely due to international media requests, the job was no different than before. The lower the position in the hierarchy of the organization, the less affected one is from political occurrences. But politicization may have had a positive effect on the consequent actions following the promises made in the press conferences. Due to the high political attention, rather technical problems such as spotlight equipment, staffing and enhanced video surveillance via bodycams were implemented and approved immediately. Concerning the crisis communication strategy, one can conclude that the connection of the crisis with refugees had a negative effect on crisis communication. In minor aspects, it may have contributed to a more consequent action taking.

Overall, a negative effect of politicization on the adequacy of crisis management can be supported. Blame games acted as a mechanism which lowered the adequate provision of information. Regarding strategy, the decisions were actively influenced by the political sensitivity of the topic. The execution of the strategy itself was not affected, as the police is not itself a political organization. In contrast, a mechanism of ‘politicization lowers hesitancy to report sexual offences’ is observed. This might have positively affected the collection of data and could be a reason why the countermeasures were implemented quickly and comprehensively.

5.3 Hypothesis 3: The more the public distrusts the government and media, the lower the adequacy of crisis management. Feedback loop: The lower the adequacy of crisis management, the more the public distrusts the government and media.

Distrust as used in this thesis is a mechanism which may explain interaction effects between politicization and the adequacy of crisis management. It is important to distinguish different
types of (dis)trust: Type A (a) refers to a general distrust of the public in government and media which already existed before the crisis is explored. It describes the relationships of movements such as PEGIDA and parties such as the AFD with the government and media. Type B (b) refers to distrust after the crisis evolved in form of cover-up allegations. It goes beyond PEGIDA and AfD and takes the uncertainty created by the crisis into account. The first type is only analysed in the first claim, the following claims use the second trust type.

A general distrust (a) of the public in government and media negatively affected the crisis management. There is no evidence to be found for this claim. The interviewed press speaker and all journalists stated that there was no additional pressure and influence. Although all of them received negative reactions from the public accusing them of cover-up communication and lying, the feedback was expected and did not affect further decisions. Besides, about the police, a general distrust cannot be observed at all. Results from the ARD DeutschlandTREND after New Year’s Eve show a comparably high level of trust with only a minor decline throughout the week.42

The inadequate crisis communication created and increased distrust (b) of the public in government and media. Uncertainty and the image of No-Go areas in public space evolved. This is reflected in the survey of the ARD DeutschlandTREND report which shows that almost 2/5 of the women want to avoid bigger crowds of people due to the event in Cologne. Moreover, 82% of the overall population support an extension of video surveillance on public spaces. The task of the police is to keep the citizens safe, hence a feeling of insecurity is by logic connected to distrust in the organization.

The more the distrust (b) increased, the more politicized the issue became. The high level of distrust is reflected by the intensity of cover-up allegations not only by right-wing populists but also by public-law broadcaster.43 It intensified the pressure on politics to react in some way to rebuild trust. The PP himself stated that he asked for a clear stand of the Ministry about the event so that the organization can stay viable. From the 7th of January onwards, the PP felt that

The more politicized the issue became, the more distrust (b) increased. Political disagreement creates an inconsistent crisis communication, especially when the responsibilities are not clearly outlined. The more actors make statements about the event, and the more speculation is within these statements, the less clear the picture of the event becomes. The complexity of crises in public organizations is that the organization only exist in a broader framework with superordinate authorities and co-existing organizations. Thus, speaking with one voice to be consistent in the information flow is almost impossible. Following Coombs (2010), the credibility of the organization is damaged by inaccurate and inconsistent information. For the police, it resulted in the dismissal of the PP. For the superordinate authorities such as the Interior Ministry and the Ministerial President of NRW, it resulted in damaged reputation which might influence the next elections and their political career in general.

The actual hypothesis that a general distrust (a) had a negative influence on the adequacy of crisis management cannot be supported. Evidence instead shows that the public trusts the police. But an increased feeling of insecurity and uncertainty within the public is evident. Still, the general trust in the police shows that the public is not blaming the police itself for the event. A positive relationship between distrust and politicization is backed up by news reports and confessions of the Police President. A decrease in credibility due to the inconsistent crisis communication seems plausible.

5.4 Hypothesis 4: The process of politicization affects the relation of improvisation from protocols on the adequacy of crisis management.

Although Hypothesis 1 claims a negative relationship between the improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management, the mechanisms of politicization may shape or alter this relationship. Brändström and Kuipers (2003) refer to it as the problem of ‘concentration or dispersion of blame’. If the complexity of an event can be narrowed down to an ‘actor failure’, then scapegoating an agency head might prevent damage from the own organization or position. But if the roots of the problem are framed as more complex, such simple solutions might lose their effectiveness. In Cologne, the dismissal of the PP can be seen as scapegoating by the Interior Minister. But after the dismissal, the event was not ultimately depoliticized. It might have just shifted the blame games to higher levels of political
responsibility. Thus, Stage 4 and 5 as depicted in the case description are separately analysed to reveal the mechanism of ‘concentration or dispersion of blame’.

**The blame was concentrated on the PP in Stage 4 Damage Control and Blame Games.** Two aspects undermine this claim. First, the PP thought of himself a scapegoat of the Ministry and felt that the media very much focussed on his person on the 6\textsuperscript{th} – 8\textsuperscript{th} January. Second, as Table 6 shows, most superior actors in the blame game made the police responsible for the event. Especially the Interior Ministry made the PP responsible for the inadequate crisis communication. In the CoI hearings and in official statements in the media, employees of the Interior Ministry stated that they strongly advised the PP to emphasize the involvement of refugees, which the PP refused.

**The blame shifted to the Interior Minister and the Ministerial President in Stage 5 Political Consequences.** Due to the dismissal of the PP, the mistakes found in the crisis management of the police were somewhat taken responsibility for. Thus, the blame game shifted from the police to higher levels of responsibility. The blame was dispersed between policy failures and the role of the Interior Minister and the NRW Ministerial President.\textsuperscript{44} The NRW Ministerial President did not play a dominant role in the crisis framing. She did not hold up the image of a Kömmerin (someone who cares a lot about the citizen) as which she was perceived in other crises. The Interior Minister was criticized due to cover-up allegations as well as internal antipathy by the police. The majority of the police officers did not feel supported from the Interior Minister and thus did not feel represented. Although both lost reputation, they did not face direct consequences. But the CoI represents a political instrument for the opposition to clarify their role in the event. Thus, in the long-term, political consequences are likely to happen.

*In conclusion, the concentration of the blame game on the PP in Stage 4 appears to be the cause of his dismissal. The shift of the blame game to higher political authorities in Stage 5 dispersed the blame between policy failure and political actors. Thus, the internal mistakes within the police only played a subordinate role.*

Figure 2 Causal Chain Diagram

Context – The Migrant Crisis

Learning from previous crises

Adequate Preparation

Operational mistakes

Adequate recognition and signaling

Adequate provision of information

Mistrust

Level of Morale

Blame Games

Lowers hesitancy to report sexual violence

Adequate Crisis communication

(1) Change of national laws
(2) Faster and easier deportation of criminal migrants (pending)
(3) Shift in public trust in coping with migrant crisis

Cover-up Accusation

Local consequences

(1) Dismissal of Police President
(2) Resignation of head of press office

Offenders are migrants

Trust Crisis

Dismissal of Police President

National consequences
6. Conclusion

This thesis attempted to identify the factors that shape the relation between improvisation from protocols and the adequacy of crisis management for the case of New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne. The case has shown that protocols cannot be seen as standardized action plans which present a detailed step-wise procedure. Such strict guidelines did not exist in this case, which could as well have an effect on the crisis management. The findings of the analysis suggest that the less well-accepted norms were reflected in the decision making, the worse the crisis was perceived by external actors. Still, the importance of the norms for the adequacy differed. The police had the potential for adequate preparation, but the actual preparation of the event revealed crucial misjudgements. These deficiencies hindered the recognition of the crisis and data collection for the investigation. In consequence, the basis of information on which the police had to communicate to the public was incomplete. The internal miscommunication complicated the information collection; the available data did not reveal the whole picture. The police was not able to become the predominant actor in the framing contest even though an active communication strategy was followed. It was rather the media and politicians who covered the public need for information.

The politicization created unsolved problems of crisis communication, which increased the feeling of uncertainty and created images of No-Go areas with no protection by the police. It ended up in a trust crisis with cover-up accusations by many politicians and the media which further intensified the politicization process. The actual assumption was that a general distrust in the society against the government and media developed in recent years which affected both the crisis communication as well as the politicization. However, both journalists and the press speaker denied such an effect. Thus, no evidence can be found. Still, it might have contributed to a higher level of distrust on a low scale.

The established theoretical framework enables to draw some general conclusions about crisis management. To be considered, this crisis is unique in the sense that it occurred in a sensitive setting of the migrant crisis which was already a political hot topic. Besides, previous crisis situations already shaped the public perception about the adequacy of the police’s crisis management. The political consequences might have been different in other contexts. Still, the analytical and systematic tracing of the crisis management process in Cologne resulted in the following five findings:
(1) Deviation from well-accepted norms had an important influence on the adequacy of crisis management. It supports the usefulness of official Guidelines for Crisis Management, such as the one from the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

(2) A. Boin (2005) lists three mechanisms as inhibiting factors of sense making. The findings of this study show that two of them, the ‘problemistic search’ and the ‘variable disjunction of information and the politics of information’ are indeed shaping the adequacy of crisis recognition and signalling.

(3) Evidence was found for Coombs (2010) assumption that the ‘tendency to emphasize adjusting information over instructing information’ creates the impression of missing empathy for the victims. The police’s strategy stressed adjusting information and reputation repair. In consequence, they appeared as trivializing the events.

(4) Using Brändström and Kuipers (2003) decision tree for blame games, the outcome of framing shifts could be explained. Hence, the scheme of blame games as a mechanism of politicization can be supported.

(5) Influences of a general distrust of the public in the government and media cannot be found. Instead, distrust is likely to explain interplay-effects between politicization and crisis communication.

The quality of the results of a single-case study depends mostly on the access and availability of data. During the research, two main problems were encountered which limit the scope of this thesis. First, it seems to be quite impossible to get access to data of public organizations in Germany. Three requests about the use of crisis communication plans were sent out to police press offices in NRW and turned down by the Interior Ministry, who is responsible for such decisions. Also, the COI which holds public hearings during their investigations denied access to the meeting protocols although I was able to attend the meetings in person. It required a lot of time and effort so that only a few important meetings could have been attended. Information about the other meetings had to be derived from secondary sources in the media which did not cover all the relevant aspects. Besides, the investigations of the COI will last until December 2016 which means that not all information was used in this study. A side-consequence was that it is not allowed for involved people who were heard or are to be heard by the COI to give interviews to externals before the COI achieved results.

Second, the event in Cologne occurred very recently in relation to the finish of this thesis. Long-term developments regarding the public distrust on the Police Cologne and on the police in general cannot be taken into account. The report of the Commission of Inquiry may also
result in additional political consequences for the Police Cologne, higher level actors or policy changes. Yet, given the validity of the study, the findings contribute to crisis management research as a first exploration of the mechanisms underlying the crisis management of the police in the case of New Year’s Eve in Cologne. It shows in how far official guidelines influenced the crisis management. The role of distrust as a link between effects of crisis communication on the politicization process was presented and revealed the function of a mediator.

Further research is needed in several areas. First, the role of trust and distrust in a crisis requires further exploration. This study concluded that the distrust had a minor effect on the crisis management and was more involved with politicization. However, the influence might be stronger when looking at a higher institutional level such as the federal ministry or ministerial president. Thus, as stated, the long-term consequences of this crisis should be studied to broaden the scope of learning from crisis and political and policy consequences. Second, the study showed that crisis protocols were missing in this case, although the police was in generally prepared for and experienced in crisis management. If learning from previous crises did not result in a general guideline for crisis management or crisis communication, the organizational culture could have played a huge role and would thus explain decisions much better than improvisation from protocol can. Organizational culture takes the influence of previous crisis situations of the organization into account as well. Media reports gave hints that internally the PP lacked empathy within his staff due to misjudgements in the Special Forces team incident. Thus, more insight in internal processes could bring about valuable knowledge.

The use of a single-case study design seemed to be the proper choice to achieve insight in the mechanisms of the crisis management in Cologne. Although the generalizability of the results is limited due to distinct circumstances, it may help scholars to understand the dynamics of crisis management in the migrant crisis. The political sensitivity of the topic contributed immensely to the politicization and thus influenced all above mentioned processes. A multiple case study might bring about more extensive explanations of the theoretical relationships. But this thesis, within the limits of the scope, does present very clearly how crisis management is inhibited through organizational misconstruction and a wrong choice of a crisis response strategy.
7. References


8. Appendices

Appendix A Information sources

For this thesis, five information sources were used. They are listed in this Appendix.

1. Official Documents

2. Interviews with Journalists
   a. Journalist A works for the Süddeutsche Zeitung and was responsible for the news coverage of New Year’s Eve in Cologne until March 2016.
   b. Journalist B works as an independent journalist with much insight knowledge in the Police Cologne and in local Cologne affairs. For New Year’s Eve, the journalist worked for foremost for the Westdeutscher Rundfunk.

Both interviews were conducted via telephone. A semi-structured interview was chosen as the best approach to receive the needed information. Figure 3 shows the structure of the interviews. They were conducted in German. Thus, the questions are here presented in German as well. Figure 4 shows an example of how journalists were approached.
Figure 3 Journalist Interview Guideline

Leitfragen für Interview

1. Zur Person
Beruf, Erfahrung, Zusammenhang mit Krisenmanagement der Silvesternacht Köln

2. Silvesternacht – die ersten Tage
Wann und wie wurde Ihnen das Thema bekannt?
Weiche Gründe gibt es dafür, dass das Thema nicht früher in überregionalen Zeitungen/Medien aufgegriffen wurde?

3. Die erste Pressekonferenz am 04.01
Was war Ihnen zu der Zeit bekannt?
Wichtigkeit der Meldungen von Lokalzeitungen (Express, KSTA, Kölnische Rundschau)? – Wichtigkeit der Pressekonferenz für eigene Informationen
Wie läuft die Zusammenarbeit der Polizei mit den Medien? Hat sich diese nach der Pressekonferenz verändert?
Arbeitet die Polizei ihres Wissens nach über einen Krisenkommunikationsplan in besonderen Situationen?
Wenn ja, Wer stellt den Plan auf? Wann tritt er in Kraft? Was steht drin? Inwieweit ist Presse und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit Improviert?

4. Krisenmanagement
Wer leitet in einem solchen Fall das Krisenmanagement? Gab es klare Strukturen, Aufgabenverteilungen?

5. Vortäuschungsvorwürfe und Misstrauen
Wann hat die Polizei eindeutig gesagt, dass die Täter einen Migrationshintergrund haben/ausländische Wurzeln haben?
Wie wurden die Informationen der Polizei in der Redaktion verarbeitet? Wie groß ist die Hürde für Journalisten, Migrationshintergründe zu nennen? (Stichwort Presserst)
Hat sich die Kommunikation mit der Polizei nach der ersten PK verändert? Inwieweit wurden Informationen von der Polizei offen weitergegeben, was kam an Informationen von Zeugen?
Weiche Reaktionen der Bevölkerung gab es auf die Berichterstattung in den ersten Tagen?
Weiche internationalen Reaktionen gab es auf die Berichterstattung?

6. Politisierung
Inwieweit hat die starke Politisierung das Krisenmanagement beeinflusst? (direkt, indirekt)
Wie groß ist die Rolle von nationalen Politikern (die Maaßen, Merkel etc.) und Landespolitikern (Süder, Kraft) dabei?

7. Kommunikation nach Albers
Welchen Einfluss auf das KM hatte der Rücktritt von FP Albers am 08.01?
3. **Interview with Police Press Speaker**
   a. A press speaker gave an interview about the workings of the press office in Cologne. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, no specific issues regarding New Year’s Eve were discussed.
   b. Three police press offices were approached to receive insight in crisis communication plans of the police. All of them forwarded the request to the responsible Ministry of the Interior NRW which denied the request due to the sensitivity of the topic.

4. **Personal Attendance of Commission of Inquiry Hearings**

   An official request was send to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to get access to official documents and protocols of the public hearings the CoI conducted with crucial actors of the crisis management. But the request was denied with reference to ongoing investigations. Thus, I had to personally attend the public hearings. The following hearings were attended:

   May 23, 2016

   1. Thorsten Meyer, Leader of the Hundertschaft of the riot police
   2. Oliver Pilberg, Platoon leader of riot police
   3. Karl-Josef Ommer, group leader of riot police
   4. Klaus Rüschen Schmidt, Police Director Besondere Aufgaben Police Cologne
May 24, 2016

5. Bastian Marta, Leading civil servant in LZPD State Office for Central Police Services
6. Dr. Manuel Kamp, Vice President Police Cologne
7. Patrick Aust, civil servant LZPD
8. Thorsten Schröder, civil servant LZPD

June 2, 2016

9. Michael Temme, Police Director Gefahrenabwehr Police Cologne
10. Karlo Kreitz, Vice Head of Press Office Police Cologne
11. Uwe Reischke, Police Director of Leitungsstab Police Cologne

June 13, 2016

12. Wolfgang Wurm, Head of Office of Federal Police Station Sankt Augustin
14. Wolfgang Albers, Police President of the Police Cologne during New Year’s Eve
15. Mark Diehm, Leading Police Officer Police Cologne

Figure 4 and 5 below show how the CoI was approached to request access to data.
Förmlicher Antrag zur Protokollinsicht der öffentlichen Sitzungen des Parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses zur Silvesternacht 2015

Sehr geehrte Mitglieder des Untersuchungsausschusses,


Sämtliche zur Verfügung stehenden Daten werden vertraulich behandelt und in keinem Fall an die Öffentlichkeit gegeben. Die Bachelorarbeit wird aber nach Fertigstellung von der Uni veröffentlicht und somit frei verfügbar sein. Um eine größtmögliche Vertraulichkeit zu gewährleisten werden keine Informationen veröffentlicht, die Rückschlüsse auf individuelle Personen ermöglichen.

Ich hoffe, dass obige Erläuterungen mein glaubhaftes Interesse verdeutlichen und klargestellt, dass eine Beeinträchtigung der Wahrheitsfindung durch den UA nicht zu befürchten ist.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

[Signature]

Enschede, 02. Mai 2016
UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

To: Untersuchungsausschuss Silvestermacht 2015 des Landtags Nordrhein Westfalen
    Platz des Landtags 1
    40221 Düsseldorf

INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND GOVERNANCE STUDIES

FROM
Prof. dr. R. Torenvlied

DATE
02 May 2016

T: [Redacted]
E: r.torenvlied@utwente.nl

SUBJECT
Unterstützung des förmlichen Antrags des Studenten Thomas Hermanns zur Protokolleinsicht der öffentlichen Sitzungen des Parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses zur Silvestermacht 2015

Sehr geehrte Mitglieder des Untersuchungsausschusses,


Ich hoffe, dass ich das glaubhafte Interesse des Studenten bestärken konnte und dem Antrag stattgegeben wird.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Prof. dr. René Torenvlied

Professor of Public Management
Program Director

University of Twente (UT) is registered at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce under no. 55130512900000.
5. Media Analysis

Table 9 lists the online sources used in this thesis.

Table 7 List of Media

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<td>EXPRESS</td>
<td>01.01.2016</td>
<td>Oliver Meyer</td>
<td>Silvesternacht Hauptbahnhof: Junge Frauen sexuell belästigt</td>
<td><a href="http://www.express.de/koeln/silvesternacht-hauptbahnhof--junge-frauen-sexuell-belaestigt-23251504">http://www.express.de/koeln/silvesternacht-hauptbahnhof--junge-frauen-sexuell-belaestigt-23251504</a></td>
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<td>Presseportal.de Polizei Köln</td>
<td>02.01.2016</td>
<td>Polizei Köln</td>
<td>Übergriffe am Bahnhofsvorplatz - Ermittlungsgruppe gegründet</td>
<td><a href="http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3125530">http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3125530</a></td>
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Polizei Köln, Bundespolizei

03.01.2016

POL-K: 160103-1-K
Fünf Verdächtige nach Übergriffen am Bahnhof festgenommen
http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3215749

WDR Aktuelle Stunde

04.01.2016

VIDEO: Silvesternacht am Kölner Hauptbahnhof: Viele Opfer melden sexuelle Übergriffe
http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln/uebergriffe-bahnhof-100.html

Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten

04.01.2016

Gespenstisch: 1.000 Männer belästigen in Köln Frauen, ignorieren Polizei

Wrong report of 1000 men harassing women

Dailymail

04.01.2016

German police hunt for group of up to 1,000 men ‘of Arab and North African origin’ who sexually assaulted numerous women and threw fireworks into crowds at Cologne train station on New Year’s Eve

Focus

04.01.2016

Gruppe von 1000 Männern war Ausgangspunkt - In Köln kam es zu einer Vergewaltigung
http://www.focus.de/regional/koeln/silvester-koeln-uebergriffe-verantwortlich_id_5188685.html

WDR

04.01.2016

Sexuelle Übergriffe sollten von Diebstählen ablenken
http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln/uebergriffe-bahnhof-100.html

WDR

04.01.2016

Viele Opfer melden sexuelle Übergriffe
http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln/uebergriffe-silvester-hauptbahnhof-100.html

EXPRESS

04.01.2016

Oliver Meyer, Chris Merting, Polizist: So brutal war das am Kölner Hbf an Silvester
http://www.express.de/koeln/sexuelle-uebergriffe-polizist--so-brutal-war-das-chaos-am-koelner-hbf-an-silvester-23252866
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<td>“Wir haben bisher keinen Tatverdächtigen”</td>
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<td>05.01.2016</td>
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<td>Übergriffe an Silvester: De Maizièr wirft Kölner Polizei Versagen vor</td>
<td><a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/koeln-innenminister-thomas-de-maiziere-kritisiert-koelner-polizei-a-1070651.html">http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/koeln-innenminister-thomas-de-maiziere-kritisiert-koelner-polizei-a-1070651.html</a></td>
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Frank Specht
05.01.2016
zustaenden-zum-kriegsende/12790994-5.html

Burkhard Ewert
05.01.2016

Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung

Kriminalbeamte zu Kölner Übergriffen: «Kein neues Phänomen»
05.01.2016
dpa
Bitte bei den Fakten bleiben

Cicero.de
05.01.2016
Petra Sorge
http://www.cicero.de/salon/koeln-und-die-sache-mit-den-uebergriffen/60324

The Washington Post
05.01.2016
Niraj Chokshi
Sexual assaults blamed on ‘Arab’ men in Germany may inflame refugee debate

The New York Times
05.01.2016
Melissa Eddy
Reports of Attacks on Women in Germany Heighten Tension Over Migrants
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/world/europe/coordinated-assaults-on-women-in-cologne-were-unprecedented-germany-says.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=MostViewed&version=Full&src=mv&WT.nav=MostViewed

Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland)
05.01.2016
Gerd Kolbe
Missbrauchte Silvesterfeiern: Sexuelle Übergriffe erschüttern Deutschland
http://www.nzz.ch/international/sexuelleuebergriffe-erschuettern-deutschland-1.18672467

BBC News Europe
05.01.2016
n.a.
Germany shocked by Cologne New Year gang assaults on women

Youtube-phoenix
05.01.2016
n.a.
Übergriffe in Köln: Henriette Reker gibt Pressekonferenz am 05.01.2016
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRzfSx-I-3o

KSTA
05.01.2016
n.a.
Rechtsextreme verabreden sich im Internet
http://www.ksta.de/koeln/sote-rechtsextreme-verabreden-sich-im-internet-23481046

Twitter
06.01.2016
Donald Trump
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/684742583520722944
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<td>06.01.2016</td>
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<td>Reuters</td>
<td>06.01.2016</td>
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<td>Erste Tatverdächtigen nach sexuellen Angriffen in Köln</td>
<td><a href="http://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-ln-bergriffe-idDEKBN0UK1T020160106">http://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-ln-bergriffe-idDEKBN0UK1T020160106</a></td>
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<td>06.01.2 016</td>
<td>Kristiana Ludwig</td>
<td>Köln, Stadt der Räuber</td>
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<td>Der Standard (Austria)</td>
<td>06.01.2 016</td>
<td>Kate Connolly</td>
<td>Cologne attacks: mayor lambasted for telling women to keep men at arm's length</td>
<td><a href="http://derstandard.at/2000028560878/Koeln-Oberbuergermeisterin-Reker-erntet-mit-Armlaenge-Tipp-Kritik?ref=rec">http://derstandard.at/2000028560878/Koeln-Oberbuergermeisterin-Reker-erntet-mit-Armlaenge-Tipp-Kritik?ref=rec</a></td>
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<td>Koelner Stadtanzeiger Online</td>
<td>07.01.2 016</td>
<td>Tim Steinauer, Detlef Schmalenberg</td>
<td>Sexuelle Übergriffe am Kölner Hauptbahnhof</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ksta.de/koeln-polizei-silvester-uebergriffe-silvesteruebergriffe-sote-koeln-23458442-seite2">http://www.ksta.de/koeln-polizei-silvester-uebergriffe-silvesteruebergriffe-sote-koeln-23458442-seite2</a></td>
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<td>Welt am Sonntag</td>
<td>07.01.2 016</td>
<td>Wolfgang Büscher, Martin Lutz, Till-Reimer Stoldt</td>
<td>&quot;Die meisten waren frisch eingereiste Asylbewerber&quot;</td>
<td><a href="http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150735341/Die-meisten-waren-frisch-eingereiste-Asylbewerber.html">http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150735341/Die-meisten-waren-frisch-eingereiste-Asylbewerber.html</a></td>
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<td>07.01.2 016</td>
<td>Jan Bielicki</td>
<td>Warum die Medien so spät über Koeln berichten</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/uebergriffe-an-silvester-warum-die-medien-so-spaet-ueber-koeln-berichteten-1.2808386">http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/uebergriffe-an-silvester-warum-die-medien-so-spaet-ueber-koeln-berichteten-1.2808386</a></td>
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<td>SZ</td>
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<td>Nico Fried</td>
<td>Ein Wort zu viel</td>
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<td>B.Dörries, J.Osel</td>
<td>Kölner Ereignisse zeigen bei Kanzlerin Wirkung</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sexuelle-uebergriffe-an-silvester-koelnereignisse-zeigen-bei-kanzlerin-wirkung-1.2808523">http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sexuelle-uebergriffe-an-silvester-koelnereignisse-zeigen-bei-kanzlerin-wirkung-1.2808523</a></td>
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| FAZ.net | 08.01.2 016 | Reiner Burg | Deshalb muss Kölns | http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/deshalb-muss-koelns-polizei-chef-
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<td>Pressemitteilung</td>
<td>Kölner Polizei muss Vertrauen und Handlungsfähigkeit zurückgewinnen.</td>
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<td>WDR Aktuelle Stunde</td>
<td>Jochen Hilgers</td>
<td>WDR extra: Kölns Polizeipräsident in den Ruhestand versetzt.</td>
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<td>Jonas Wixforth</td>
<td>Chronologie der Vertuschungsvorwürfe.</td>
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<td>Henriette Reker</td>
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<td>09.01.2</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Kölns Präsident muss gehen.</td>
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<td>09.01.2</td>
<td>Tagesschau.de</td>
<td>Demian von Osten</td>
<td>Kaum gestartet - schon aufgelöst.</td>
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<td>Kristiana Ludwig, Max Hägler</td>
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<td>Mohamed Amjahid, Christian Fuchs, Vanessa Guinan-Bank, Anne Kunze, Stephan Leber, Sebastian Mondial, Daniel Müller, Yassin Musharbash, Martin Nejezchleba, Samuel Rieth</td>
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Analysis of ARD Tagesschau and Tagesthemen

Table 8 below shows the results of the media analysis for the political attention-claim. A "Yes" was noted when Cologne was explicitly mentioned in the topic list or when a topic description indicated a connection to Cologne. This was verified by checking the report if clear references to Cologne are made.

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Appendix B Extended Case Description

In the following, the event of New Year’s Eve and the crisis management afterwards are presented in detail. The crisis is divided in five stages. Stage 1 introduces the context and preparatory measures. Stage 2 depicts the actual event of New Year’s Eve in Cologne, describing the preparation for and decisions made during the event. It starts with preparatory measures taken in the beginning of December 2015 and ends at 6 o’clock on 1st January 2016. Stage 3 describes the mixed response of the numerous stakeholders with a special focus on the actions taken within the police organisation and public opinion. It starts in the morning of 1st January 2016 and ends on 4th January before the first press conference by the police president and Cologne’s mayor is held. Stage 4 depicts first attempts of Damage Control and the beginning of blame games. This presents the actual beginning of the organizational crisis. The police begins to take counteraction to face the challenges that evolved. It starts with the press conference on the 4th of January and ends before the press conference held on the 8th of January. Stage 5 shows how political consequences. The crisis entered high politics with decisions made on national level and federal state level instead of municipal level. It starts with the press conference held on 8th of January and ends with the setup of the Committee of Inquiry at the end of January.

Stage 1: Preparation and Context

Since 2013, Germany is ruled by a grand coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Angela Merkel as Chancellor since 2005, brought Germany over the financial crisis of 2008 and made important choices during the still on-going migrant crisis. “Migrant crisis” is here used as an overarching term covering the immense increase of refugees and immigrants coming to Europe since 2011. By many, it is seen as the most important political challenge since the financial crisis45. Migration to Europe does not only constitute a political challenge, it includes the most dangerous and fatal migration route in the world, the Mediterranean Sea. In August 2015, Angela Merkel declared in the famous phrase “Wir schaffen das46” to open the borders and let refugees enter Germany without border controls and prior registration. Europe’s migration laws, known as the Dublin III procedural rules, were already proven inapplicable, which made Germany the most attractive state for migrants. The public mostly supported the morale

46 https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html
decision of the Chancellor, although others regarded it the biggest mistake in her career. (Source)

As in other European countries, right wing parties are on the rise in Germany as well. Formerly known for their critique on the financial politics of the government, the 2013 founded party “Alternative für Deutschland – AfD” quickly took up societal issues and made the migrant crisis and the immigration of people with Islamic background their flagship topic. Scholars classify the AfD as populist, very conservative, but economic liberal with tendencies to right and national extremist. They started as a protest party to the established system. In three federal state elections in May 2016, the AfD was at least the third strongest force, in Sachsen-Anhalt even the second strongest with 24.3%. The anti-political and anti-establishment party with successful elections heavily threatens the government. They aggregate and fuel distrust against the government “up there”, which can also be seen in right wing movements such as ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident’ (PEGIDA). Pegida distrusts the establishment and the media, or the so called lying press - “Lügenpresse”. With several thousand supporters and immense media attention, they constitute a notable voice in public opinion. This context explains the sensitivity of topics related to refugees and the migrant crisis. The contradiction between the pro-Merkel and the Contra-Merkel camps created an environment in which small issues can easily be politicized due to their relatedness with this topic.

**Preparation**

**Operational planning**

There was no overall security concept for NYE. A major reason was that there was no official organiser for NYE. Thus, the responsibilities were not clear and only decided through personal conversations and not written on paper. It may explain communicaton problems between the RAC, the FP and the PP Koeln. There has been plans of evicting the Hohenzollernbruecke, which connects Deutz with the inner city and the train station. But the instruction needed to come from the police on NYE, who had no information about the situation on the bridge.

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49 http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/landespolitik/silvester-untersuchungsausschuss-koeln-102.html
**Management structure**

The Part of the preparation of crisis management is the setup of a clear hierarchical order, to divide responsibilities in case of emergencies or special events. Here, the leading police officer was not supported by a leading group to help creating a comprehensive picture of the event. According to news reports was there no communication plan for NYE. (QUELLE) Furthermore, the rank of the police officer was, according to the police report, not sufficient to meet the requirements of leading such an operation. The official report of the NRW Ministry of the Interior states that an officer with a higher rank would have had more experience to recognize and handle the situation. 50 Leading police officers have a different view, because the event was handled by the officers with the most experience with this event, as they have also successfully been responsible for the New Year’s Eve operations the previous years. There is doubt if a higher rank would have actually contributed to recognizing the crisis earlier. (Source Hearing CoI 2.06. Police director GE) Besides, the leader of the group of hundreds, was leading the operation in Cologne for the first time.

**Staffing**

**Police Headquarter Cologne**

Out of experiences from the year before, the police management in Cologne requested more police forces in comparison to the previous years from the State Office for central Police Services (LZPD), a full group of hundreds (á 114) instead of only one platoon (á 38). Instead of the requested full group of hundreds with 114 police forces, only two platoons with in total 76 riot police were approved. Statements from the police direction Cologne do not bring about specific reasons for the disapproval by the LZPD. But according to the Leader of the Group of Hundreds, without any special situation the amount of police would have been sufficient. The beginning of duty was for both platoons set to 10 p.m. The disapproved third platoon was meant to start at 8 p.m. to gain more flexibility, which was then no longer possible. Experiences from previous years suggested a more intense need of police at a later stage of the evening. Here, the critical situation started before the riot police started their duty, which made it, according to the RPL, difficult to secure the situation. The police report regards it critical as well, because of the lack of flexibility. (page number?) Furthermore, there were 12 operative police officers for criminal investigations in the field. Due to the high amount of criminal situations, the police report regards the number of operative police officers critically.

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50 MIK Report 10.01
In the planning, civil police forces of two teams á 3 police with a two-men coordination group were supposed to do undercover investigation and determination of operational focus for improving the situation. Due to illness, only one team was used without the coordination group.

In the police stations, the positions for recording reports were filled with 2 police officers, after 3 a.m. on 1st January, two additional officers joined as support. These officers were not capable of coping with the amount of reports. The understaffing of the police station thus led to longer waiting periods (up to an hour?), during which some of the people left the police stations before their matter was registered.

**Federal police force (FP)**

There were 67 federal police active during NYE in the train station. In the previous year, only 45 have been on duty. Usually, a support unit of a nearby federal police station is on-call duty for special occasions. But due to operations at the southern border to control the migration crisis, all available police were already on duty on NYE.  

**Ordnungsamt**

In support of their normal staff, the Ordnungsamt used the services of an external security company. Investigations of a local cologne newspaper revealed that the training of the people who were hired for this specific job was insufficient to meet the standard requirements of the Ordnungsamt. Only a short period before NYE, the company started looking for part-time staff for this job and did not do sufficient background checks or training. 

**Police cells and prisoner transportation**

In total, 3 prisoner cells where available in the train station. For prisoner transportation, 3 transport cars were on duty. It turned out that due to the high amount of offences, these were not sufficient. The platoon leader states that they led a suspect leave because of the long waiting period. Although he calmed down and there was less reason to keep him, it was likely that he would commit the same crime again. For taking the reports and processing the prisoners in a timely manner, a customized central holding place (Brauchtums-GESA) was setup. Instead of

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51 Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 18/7590, Kleine Anfrage zum Einsatz der Bundespolizei in der Silvesternacht 2015/2016 in Koeln
54 Hearing 2nd platoon leader
a full central holding place for prisoners, in which all criminal charges and eye witness statements are reported, a customized CHP is used in particular for crime prevention of suspects. 55

Stakeholders on New Year’s Eve

Figure 7 Map showing responsibilities


Police Headquarter Cologne (HQ Cologne)

The Police Headquarter Cologne is the local police authority in the area Cologne and Leverkusen. The police operation on New Year’s Eve was coordinated by the HQ Cologne. Normally, during an event such as New Year’s Eve with an expectancy of many people, alcoholic excesses and the use of pyrotechnic, the HQ does not use standard police officers to ensure the security of the people. Instead, forces of the riot police which act under sub-ordnance of the Ministry of the Interior NRW are used. The riot police is organized in groups

55 Hearing Group of Hundred Leader
of hundred, each consisting of three platoons á 38 riot police. The platoons are themselves divided into three groups á 12 riot police, which build sub-groups of 6 riot police.

The operational plan for the riot police envisaged protection measures (Raumschutzmaßnahmen) and criminal prosecution in the area of the old town, the Rhine bridges and the outer city rings where the usual “party zone” is. Part of the old town is the area around the cathedral and the station forecourt, which lies in focus of the event.

Federal police force

The federal police force is the police agency subordinated under the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Among other tasks, it is responsible for border control and acts as railway police. Thus, the Federal Police Force was responsible for the area within the central train station in Cologne.

North Rhine-Westphalian State Office for Central Police Services (LZPD)

The SOCPS is the overarching State Office which among other tasks, is responsible for the coordination of the riot police and the communication between the local police authorities. The coordination of the riot police refers especially to the preparation of operations. The local police authorities request riot police from the SOCPS which then decides which areas require how many police. The communication is ensured through a 24/7 national control center, in which all WE-messages from all police authorities in NRW are received and processed. The most relevant and important WE-messages are concluded into a Daily Situational Summary of the State (Taegliches Landeslagebild).

Ordnungsamt Regulatory Agency Cologne

The Regulatory Agency Cologne is a municipal body. Besides administrative police work, its main competence is the prosecution of administrative offences. On NYE they were responsible for securing the Hohenzollernbrücke, which connects the Old Town with the part of Cologne at the other Rhine waterfront (Deutz). It is the main train traffic point for the central train station. Next to the train lines are popular public walking ways which are highly trafficked during special events such as NYE.
Stage 2: New Year’s Eve

Overview

In the night of New Year’s Eve 2015, an abnormal number of sexual crimes, theft and robbery were committed on the central train station forecourt and in the central train station in Cologne. The victims were almost solely women. The situation was described by police forces of the local and federal police and from other eye witnesses as temporarily chaotic. At times, over 1000 people gathered at and around the station forecourt. The majority was male and between 15 and 35 years old. From their outer appearance, it seemed that they stem from the North-African and Arabian area. Most of them were severely under the influence of alcohol and were described by the police officers as aggressive and completely uninhibited. Fireworks were purposely fired into groups of people and police forces. Within the crowd of people, sub-groups of different size were formed. These groups massively sexually harassed women and robbed them.

Figure 8 Total Delicts and Number of Victims

Course of operation of riot police

The security of the station forecourt, where most of the sexual harassments took place, was under responsibility of the riot police. Between 23:35 and 0:15 the riot police evicted the station forecourt. In this area and between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. did the most thefts and sexual assaults happen (Die Welt). Thus, a special emphasis is to shed light on the course of the riot police operation and their decision making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of total delicts (victims) known</th>
<th>Number of sexual offences known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.01.2016</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.01.2016</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.06.2016 Last stand</td>
<td>183 suspects, out of which 55 Marroccans, 53 Algerian, 22 Iraqi, 14 Syrian, 14 German 73 are asylum seekers, 36 illegal, 11 residency permits, rest unclear</td>
<td>497 (648)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>What happened?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the Eviction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Before the Eviction

At the beginning of their duty, the riot police leader had a meeting with the police leader. On the way to the police station at 9 p.m. he observed a situation on the station forecourt. According to his perception, 400 to 500 “refugees” were on the station forecourt, already under massive influence of alcohol or other drugs and using pyrotechnic in an inappropriate way. It should be further observed by the riot police. The riot police leader arrived at 22:45 as one of the first police the station forecourt. He describes the situation as a shock, because it is hard to find the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00 p.m.</td>
<td>The police leader detects on his way to the operational police meeting a group between 400 and 500 men on the station forecourt. uninhibited, and under the influence of alcohol, men on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Beginning of duty for riot police Briefing, knowledge about situation on forecourt through police leader’s own knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15</td>
<td>Riot police groups spread out to duty areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45</td>
<td>Riot police leader enters station forecourt, sees several thousand people on the forecourt, inhibited and under immense influence of alcohol “Schlag getroffen” Use of Pyrotechnic to shoot at people, men do not react to warnings by the police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### The Eviction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:15</td>
<td>Decision to evict the station forecourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:35</td>
<td>Beginning of eviction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:56</td>
<td>Stop of train service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.01.2016</td>
<td>Partly opening of train station doors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:05 a.m.</td>
<td>Eviction finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:15</td>
<td>Access to station forecourt possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### After the eviction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Platoon leader: Uncountable number of sexual assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:45</td>
<td>Information of bigger number of theft through reports of victims in a nearby police station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>Re-gathering from groups NAFRI on station forecourt, increasing number of theft and sexual assaults, many single events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>Restart train service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30</td>
<td>Situation calms down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
appropriate words. Around the cathedral and the station forecourt were a lot of people, in the majority young men between 17 and 35 years old with an Arabic and North-African appearance. The police report estimates the number of people of over 1000, the riot police leader’s estimate is at 1500 whereas the federal police talked about 3000-4000 people. Besides the immense sound level, legal and illegal pyrotechnic was fired upon and into other groups of people. The once being fired at did not take this as an offense, but celebrated every explosion and shot back instead. The riot police leader personally addressed one of the young men to make him clear how dangerous his behaviour is, but he did neither receive understanding nor compliance. The federal police officer within the station declared a similar situation, which made it clear that something had to be done to ensure the safety of the people, especially under consideration that at midnight, the situation might further escalate. Two options to react to the situation were possible. The first was to actively engage with every dangerous act happening on the forecourt. It includes crashing the larger groups of people, to arrest offenders when necessary and to impede the use of fireworks. The RPL named two main reasons why this option was not taken. First, it would have meant that the police only acts to already finished actions instead of preventing a further escalation of the situation. Second, such actions would have required more rigid and aggressive behaviour of the police in order to make their actions have impact. It could have backfired in terms of more aggressive people and probable fights. Thus, option 1 was not considered expedient.

The second option was to evict the station forecourt. This was problematic because many people were situated on the stairs leading from the station forecourt to the cathedral plate. An eviction from the upper to the lower level has the danger of people falling down etc. Still, the eviction seemed a more reasonable approach than the first. It put the police in an Acting-role rather than Reacting, it would probably contain the dangerous use of pyrotechnic and break up the large group of people. Thus, the RPL in coordination with the police leader and the federal police decided at 11.15 p.m. to evict the station forecourt. In order to stop more people to enter the station forecourt, the Federal Police was supposed to block the doors of the central station. The riot police gathered also the police who were still operating in other areas at the forecourt and setup a car with a loudspeaker system to make it usable during the eviction.

The Eviction

At 11.35 p.m., the eviction started. The crowd was send, if necessary with use of light force such as pushing, off the stairs and then into the Domprobstketzerstrasse (see Figure 7). The first 56 According to the riot police leader in the hearing at the CoI
part off the stairs went unproblematic, until the crowd suddenly stopped. Some people were just not willing to further move on. Moreover, the masses did not walk into the proposed street, but went instead straight into a dead end. Pushing the crowd out of this dead end to the intended street took more effort and time. Shortly after midnight, at which point the eviction was still going on, was the federal police forced to re-open the train station doors due to increasing pressure by the people inside. Hence, the station forecourt filled up again, although to a smaller degree and with a less aggressive crowd. Video recordings of the doors of the station also show that, contrary to the plan, one door was still open during the eviction through which people were able to enter the forecourt. This increased the difficulty of a successful eviction. Overall, the RPL stated that the eviction proceeded, under the perception during and afterwards, quite well. His perception was that the danger was over. Although it went slower after the crowd went into the dead end, there were no massive protests or active violence against the police. At 00.15 a.m., the eviction was finished, and at 00.30 a.m. the forecourt was given free again for the public.

After the eviction

Shortly after the eviction at 0.33 a.m., one platoon leader reported that he had knowledge of an “uncountable” number of sexual assaults. In detail, he knew of one case involving five young women who he had to pull out of a group of men and take care of them. His assessment of the number of sexual assaults was derived from this case and the information he got at 0:45 a.m. from the police station that an increasing number of theft and sexual assaults are reported. Through this combination and due to former experiences of the police, the situation was explained as theft with sexual assaults as distraction. Thus, all police was sensitized to focus on these delicts. Furthermore, passers-by were informed to take care of their belongings.

At 1.00 a.m., the situation again intensified itself. Again, larger groups of young men with North-African and Arabic appearance gathered on the station forecourt. Many single offences were committed, with an increased number of theft, pickpocketing and sexual assaults. Still, some police forces were shifted to the outer areas of Cologne, because the situation there required attention as well. At 02:30 a.m. the situation calmed down again. Until the end of the operation, no important situations occurred anymore.

Consequences of the Eviction

Due to the eviction, the situation in the train station and on the Hohenzollernbruecke worsened. Many people arrived at the train station at this time or wanted to be on the Hohenzollernbruecke. Thus, the pressure within the crowd increased, and people fled on the train lines to escape the
masses. In consequence did the Federal Police stop the train traffic for an hour (TIME). Many offences occurred during this time on the Bridge and in the Station.

Support
The police leaders unanimously stated that support would have been good, but that it was not feasible. The SOCPS asked, when informed about the planned eviction, if support was necessary. The RPL denied the offer. The police report points out four options of support forces. First, the on-call duty group of hundreds of the riot police. Second, immediate support forces of local police stations (Sofortverstaerkungskraefte). Third, police forces of regional on-call duty reserves. Fourth, support would have been possible be pro-longing the duty of another group of hundred, which was on duty during a demonstration nearby. The first option was disregarded due to the amount of time it would have taken the group of hundred to arrive in Cologne. The time when they would have been usable was estimated to be around 2-3 hours. Hence, as immediate action needed to be taken, the support would not have been of help. The second option was disregarded because patrol police differ from riot police. They don’t have the proper equipment and not the same standard of special training for such an operation. Unexperienced and not trained police has the danger of overload the capabilities of these people. For the third option, no reason is known. Regarding the fourth option, the mentioned group of hundred were already out of duty at 8:00 p.m., which made it impossible for the RPL to extend their duty. Still, the MIK report assesses the decision not to call for support as a grave mistake.

Communication
The information flow between the different police and regulatory officers was insufficient. The accumulation of information was not giving a complete and comprehensive picture of the situation, thus decisions were made on a flawed overview. When the federal police had to stop train services due to people walking on the rails, the Hohenzollernbrücke should have been evicted as well. But the RAC was not informed about the situation in the train station or on the station forecourt. Besides, the police should have given them the instruction for eviction. This was discussed in the preparation meeting on the 9th of December. The communication channels between police, federal police and RAC were insufficient, because only direct

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57 Police directors, RPL, platoon leader, SOCPS police unanimously estimated longer than 2, closer to 3 hours. But the MIK and the Minister of the Interior NRW stated 1 ½ hours.

58 http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/landespolitik/silvester-untersuchungsausschuss-koeln-102.html
communication between the police and the RAC was possible. When the federal police tried to contact the RAC to inform them about the situation, it was just not possible.59

Stage 3: Mixed Responses

The initial response was mostly focussed on the internal communication and the setup of an investigation team. To the public, only a press statement on 2nd January was given which informed them about some troubles which the initial statement on 1st January did not reveal. Instead, local newspapers reported that the situation might have been much worse than suggested by the police. Nationwide news did not pick up the story yet, the interest was on terrorism warnings in Munich and other stories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Internal Communication</th>
<th>Press Statements</th>
<th>Local Newspapers</th>
<th>National Newspapers</th>
<th>Social networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.01</td>
<td>Three WE messages “Rape, theft by group of foreign men”</td>
<td>“Peaceful and Joyful Celebration”</td>
<td>Report about sexual assaults</td>
<td></td>
<td>Few reports in Facebook group Nett-Werk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.01</td>
<td>“Formation of an investigation group for NYE”</td>
<td>‘30-40 women reported to the police’, ‘men with North African appearance’</td>
<td>Dpa ticker – press statement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.01</td>
<td>WE message “Arrest of five suspects”</td>
<td>“Arrest of five men, suspects of NYE offences”</td>
<td>‘more than 100 suspects and over 35 female victims’</td>
<td>Dpa ticker – press statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investigation Team

During the morning of the 01.01.16, it became clear to the police due to a rising amount of reports about sexual assaults and thefts that New Year’s Eve was not as peaceful as it seemed. Thus, an investigation team for the event was set up to explore the actual dimension of what happened and to find and prosecute offenders.

Press and Public Affairs

On the morning of the 1st of January at 8.57 a.m., the police gave out a press statement talking about a mostly peaceful celebration with no huge difference to the events in previous years.

59 http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/landespolitik/untersuchungsausschuss-silvester-koeln-100.html
The station forecourt had to been cleared to prevent mass panic, but the situation was handled adequately because the police was situated at neuralgic areas with proper presence. At the 2nd of January, the police gave out another press statement about the formation of an investigation team to inspect several sexual assault and theft cases occurred during NYE, which was set up the day before. The statement explains that around 30 cases were reported, in which the offenders were described by eye witnesses as having a North-African appearance. Moreover, the focus of their crimes was on stealing, not foremost on sexual assaulting. The police asks other possible victims to also report to the police, and asks for hints. On the 3rd of January, another press statement reports the arrest of five men who assaulted women at this very day and were suspected to be involved in the New Year’s Eve offences. Inofficial statements of police officers also exist. An investigator told a local newspaper on the 2nd of January that the suspects are well-known to the police and that refugees have nothing to do with it.

Internal Communication

The internal communication of the local police with the NRW state office for central police services and the ministry of the Interior NRW works through WE-Messages. WE is the abbreviation for Wichtiges Ereignis – Important event. Who receives the message depends on the importance of the event. On 1st of January, three messages related to NYE were send, two of which were also forwarded to the Minister of the Interior NRW. Another message was send on the 3rd of January, dealing with the arrest of five crime suspects by the federal police.

The first WE message dealt with the eviction of the station forecourt. The second WE message is about rape, insult on sexual basis, thefts and robberies committed by a larger group of foreigners. In this message, a larger amount of sexual assaults and theft as well as the foreign background of the perpetrators is clearly communicated. The third WE message of the 01.01.16 is an extension of the second message. Nonetheless was there no hint to the dimension of the situation in the WE messages.

Press and Public

In general, the interest of the press on this matter was low. The focus of the news was on terror warnings in Munich in the early evening of NYE. Only local newspapers received and published information about sexually assaulted women. The Kölnische Rundschau, the Koelner

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60 Insert Press statement 01.01.16
61 Insert Press Statement
62 Insert press Statement
63 http://www.ksta.de/koeln/-sexuelle-belaestigungen-sote-in-der-silvesternacht--23364658
64 See Vorlage 16/3642 MIK, p.3 Bericht 18.01
Stadtanzeiger and the Express reported in the evening of the 1st January that several women were sexually assaulted and robbed by a bigger group of men during New Year’s Eve. The cases were confirmed by the police, but not undermined with additional details. The police press statement of the 2nd January was included on a very low priority level by the news agency dpa in their ticker, which is widely received by daily newspaper in Germany. Thus, the first articles appeared in national newspaper, but with no strong public reaction. The press statement of the 3rd of January was again published via a short message in the dpa ticker in national newspapers.

Stage 4: Damage Control and Blame Games

On the afternoon of the 4th of January, the police president Cologne and the Mayor of Cologne held a press conference admitting that on NYE, a situation occurred where a lot of women were sexually harassed and robbed around the central train station under the eyes of the police. It was not before this point that national newspaper took up the story and wrote first reports about it. It soon became the most debated issue in Germany. The police president called the event “criminal offences of a completely new dimension” (Source). Although the criminal offence were men ‘dance’ around their victim to distract and then rob them was already well known to the police, the extent and the group processes are new.

On the 5th of January, after a crisis meeting of the mayor, the federal police and the police, another press conference was held. Besides a list of measures taken to re-gain public trust in the police, such as enforced presence of the police around the train station and plans for the upcoming festivity “Karneval”, the background of the perpetrators was an important issue. Although the police described the crowd as mostly 18 to 35 year old men with North-African or Arabian appearance, the Mayor distinctively stated that there were no hints whether the offenders are refugees. Moreover, the Mayor stated on request how women can protect themselves in these situations. “There’s always the possibility of keeping a certain distance of more than an arm’s length – that is to make sure yourself you don’t look to be too close to people who are not known to you and whom you don’t have a trusting relationship”. Soon, a shitstorm under the hashtag #einearmlaenge started in social media.

66 http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln-uebergriffe-hauptbahnhof-100.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Media and Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04.01.2016</td>
<td>Press Conference: About NYE</td>
<td>National Newspapers begin to report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.01.2016</td>
<td>Crisis meeting Local Police, Federal Police, Municipality</td>
<td>National and international news begin to report, Shitstorm in social media starts, #einearmlaenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.01.2016</td>
<td>Press Conference: Measures to take</td>
<td>National politics react and give statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.01.2016</td>
<td>Three suspects are identified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.01.2016</td>
<td>Police President interim retirement⁶⁹</td>
<td>First press statement of 01.01. is rectified⁷⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First press statement of 01.01. is rectified⁷⁰</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reactions on federal state level**

On 5th of January, the ministerial president NRW gave a statement to the local newspapers in Cologne in which she condemned the assaults and explained that the police and justice departments will rigorously investigate. According to her, she had no knowledge about the event before the 4th of January (source). Still, her public appearance was reserved, hence her image as a caring leader was damaged.⁷²

The Minister of the Interior NRW, who is politically responsible for the performance of the police, defended the police against attacks from national politics. He regards flaws in the operation during NYE not only as mistakes from the local police, but from the federal police as well, which is under the responsibility of the national Ministry of the Interior. ⁷³ The leader of the police union defended the police actions as well. He states that under the circumstances, with the amount of police available, there have been no other options than the ones taken by

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⁶⁸ [http://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-k-ln-bergriffe-idDEKBN0UK1T020160106](http://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-k-ln-bergriffe-idDEKBN0UK1T020160106)
⁷⁰ [http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3214905](http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3214905)
⁷² [http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln-silvesternacht-handerttage-100.html](http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/koeln-silvesternacht-handerttage-100.html)
The chairman of the NRW Christ Democratic Union blames the police for not protecting women against the sexual assaults. He also sees a connection to former events where the police was not ready to cope with the situation and lost control for a short time, namely the HoGeSa demonstrations in 2015. He criticizes the federal state government (Social Democrats and Greens) for their general dislike of public surveillance and massive police presence on public spaces.

Reactions on national level

The reaction of national politics began on the 5th of January. All top politicians gave statements about the situation in Cologne. Merkel herself called the Mayor in Cologne to let her be informed about the situation (Source), and later stated that she expects a “hard reaction of the constitutional state”76. This includes not only a strict investigation of the event, but also a re-assessment of the deportation procedures in Germany, which may need to be tightened.77 The National Minister of the Interior criticized the police in Cologne heavily. In an interview in the national news (Tagesthemen), he called for quick clarification, also with regard to the ethnic background of the offenders.78 Important for both of them was not to build a general suspicion against refugees.

Connecting to their usual reaction to media releases (“Lügenpresse”), the AfD accused the media of holding back information and purposefully not informing the public about what happened and who is responsible. The national chairwoman of the AfD stated that through such events the state of law is at the end. She sees Cologne as the logical consequence of the Asylum- and Migration policies. The chairman of the fraction of the AfD in Thuringia regards NYE in Cologne as a pre-taste of the coming cultural and civilatory decay.79 Furthermore, members of the Cristian Social Union criticized the media as well. The General Secretary of the CSU said that social cohesion should not be endangered by cautious news reports. People, who are worried about the societal development criticize that the published opinion does not reflect the
reality. The Federal Minister of Justice calls the event in Cologne a “rupture in civilization - Zivilisationsbruch”. He received lots of critique because it is a word used for the singularity of the systematic murder of the Jews in the WW II.

Reactions from the press

Shortly after the press conference on the 4th of January, national newspapers took up the story and first reported about NYE. Not all media already recognized the extent of the event. The ZDF as the second major public television agency in Germany did not include Cologne in their 20:00 news. The next day, the chief editor apologized, calling it a misjudgement. The press themselves accused the police of holding back information. Heavily debated was whether the background of the perpetrators or, at this point still suspects, should be mentioned in the news reports. Many newspapers only reluctantly mentioned the North-African and Arabian appearance of the crowd in front of the central train station. Although the police president in Cologne made statements on the background of the suspects on the press conference on the 4th of January, it was not seen by all news as an important and reliable fact to mention. The press codex of the German Press Council states that the affiliation of a suspect or offender to religious, ethnic or other minorities should only be mentioned, if it is necessary for the reported event. As this requires careful balancing, there were different outcomes.

Reactions from the public

A major issue in the public opinion was the allegation that the police as well as the media tried to hold back information about the background of the offenders. Allegations came up that the media and the police tried to cover up the story in the days following NYE, although the event was already discussed in social media. For that, no proves are to be found. Before the press conference, only very few pages mentioned the topic. Additional background information was not available in the social networks, the comments were based on the reports of the local newspaper. The NRW State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA) had built a task force against internet criminality at the end of 2015. They observe the social networks and investigate...
criminal offences if possible. A leading LKA officer reported that since New Year’s Eve, a “Hype” of inflammatory postings was observable which already led to a double-digit number of criminal offences. 87

International reactions

In Europe and the United States, many major news agencies reported about Cologne. In Great Britain, in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria the reports mainly focused on the critique on the police, the #einearmlaenge and gave a rather detailed description of what was known about the event.88 The US media was more focused on discussing the reasons and consequences for the migrant crisis debate and how the German public and politics would react to it. 89 Not only the news, also politicians referred to Cologne as a result of the open-border policy in Germany. Quicker than the debate in Germany, the Americans made the link between Cologne and the migrant crisis. 90

Stage 5: Political Consequences

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87 http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/hetze-internet-lka-100.html
91 Reker: http://www.stadt-koeln.de/politik-und-verwaltung/presse/mitteilungen/15783/index.html
92 https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/koeln-pegida-103.html