The future of EU – Russia relations case study about the EU as defence actor

Jasmin Schmitz
B.Sc. Thesis
S1730940

1st Supervisor:
Dr. S. Donnelly

2nd Supervisor:
Dr. P.-J. Klok

University of Twente
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
Abstract
This research project aims at empirically testing which options are open to the EU to react to the perceived Russian threat through the use of the realist theory. The neoclassical realist paradigm will set this study’s theoretical framework because it evolves around concepts born in this paradigm - ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’. It is thereby presumed that the EU will either balance Russia’s rise in power by enhancing its defence towards a more unified defence policy, or that the EU will bandwagon by relieving to tension between itself and Russia.

The research project is conducted in the context of the dissolution of the USSR and the development of EU-Russia relation thereafter. It will be observed in how far Russia is a possible ally or an opponent to the EU. This study is in set in a time-series design, as it will be explored at different points in time, from 1991 until 2017, how the perception of Russia as a threat to the EU changed.

In order to gain sufficient insight into the behaviour of states when they are faced with threat, realist literature regarding similar circumstances will be viewed, as the literature about the EU ‘s bandwagoning and balancing behaviour is not yet very conclusive, several case studies about South East Asian nations reacting to the Chinese rise to power will be carefully considered. To further appropriately investigate the EU’s stand point, official documents and newspaper articles will be included as material for the analysis.

This study is thereby trying to make educated predictions about the European future, aiming at outlining a clear pathway for its behaviour.

Keywords: Russia, EU, Defence policy, Security, Balancing, Bandwagoning, Neorealism, NATO, Aggression, The Baltics
1. Introduction
This research project examines to what extent the flux in EU-Russia relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 2017 triggered the EU to pursue balancing or bandwagoning behaviour.
The relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation has always been an unsteady one; while Russia partnered with France and the UK in the first World War as the Triple Entente, it also become associate with Hitler’s national socialistic regime in dividing East Europe among them (Kirby, 2014). Eventually, the Soviet Russia was a helping force in bringing down in the national socialistic regime in Germany. Yet in the post-war era, the Soviet Union quickly became an ideological opponent to the West – mainly the United States. While the allies tried to rebuild Europe through implementing capitalism, the Soviet Union ruled East Europe through communism (Cox & Stokes, 2012). As physical and ideological walls were build, the gap between West and East grew, influencing all spheres of statehood and social life. “[…] [W]ith the stark of menace of nuclear war ever present” (Gorbachev, 2009) the constant arms race meant ongoing tension between the USSR and the West and thereby, the isolation of the Warsaw pact countries from the West (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). The system was changed through the collapse of the Soviet Union, introducing new pathways to the former Soviet nations. Gorbachev himself hoped for an institutional framework integrating both Western nations and Russia. The former Soviet president and reform-pusher planed for Russia to be integrated into what he called the ‘Common European Home’ (Markham, 1989). Yet, the build-up of a security platform happened, against the hopes of Gorbachev and others, after the example of western structures (Newton, 2013). Integrating the former USSR countries into western governance structures proved to be challenging for several reasons: Russia’s view of its own position in the region, the kind of relationship between Russia and the former USSR states, and Russia’s relationship with the West. The security dilemma born out of this predicament therefore indicates that either Russia perceives the West’s impact in its sphere of influence – the former Warsaw pact- as a threat or the former Warsaw pact states fear that they will come under the control of Russia again without outside protection. Although, all former Warsaw-pact nation aimed for independence and sovereignty, some struggled more than others, finding themselves between the West and Russia. After the Soviet Union collapsed Eastern European states sought to connect to Western Europe very early to get access to the Western institutions. “History and circumstances made the Balts, of all nations in the USSR, the most likely to climb on the global bandwagon” (Clemens: 1991: 3). The Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia- are seen as pioneers in developing stronger ties to the West. They, immediately after reclaiming their independence, styled their democracies after the example of the Nordic countries. The Baltics generally tried to move as close as possible to the Nordic states concerning political matters to get access to NATO and the EU. Through the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden- involvement through official development assistance (ODA), the development of a Nordic-Baltic sphere was possible (Bergman, 2006). As a consequence deriving from these strong regional ties, eventually it furthered the Baltic accession process to both NATO and the EU (Kirby, 2014). As expected, also other Eastern European states sought to balance out Russia’s control through NATO. The issue of Russia’s perception has continued being an issue as Europe and Russia both view the other as the problem; therefore, both parties see the need for change in the other (Liik, 2017). The West does
not see Russia as a global power or a European power. Russia, perceives itself as a European superpower and therefore demands to be recognized as key player in the region (Larson, 2014). Russia tried to prevail its influence in the former Soviet territory through the Commonwealth of Independent States; yet, the alliance has a troubled history as several member states exited the alliance. The Baltic states never became member states, thereby not reassuring Russian control over their premises (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014).

However, it seemed like the relationship between the EU and Russia would slowly recover from the power dynamics of the Cold War through the Russian Foreign Policy under Putin’s presidency. ‘’Within the framework of the new realism Putin sought to craft a policy that asserted Russia’s national interests while integrating it into the world community’’(Sakwa, 2008:242). Finally, Russia’s behaviour towards the EU became more assertive as the Kremlin saw the ongoing integration of East European countries into NATO as a threat to its authority (Sakwa, 2008). The security dilemma born after the Cold War would thereby intensify as Russia’s national interests became the focus of its foreign policy (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Thereafter, when Russian troops occupied Crimea in the verge of Euromaidan, a diplomatic crisis was born (Gromyko, 2015; Larson, 2014). The Crimea crisis ultimately made Western European countries decide to distance themselves from Russia. The EU answered the annexation of Crimea with economic sanctions against Russia. Since these became active, they have been the reason for heated debates within the Union. Russia on the other hand is condemning the sanctions as harsh and is demanding them to be lifted (Jones & Whitworth, 2014).

The aggression shown towards Ukraine’s sovereignty is especially worrisome for the Baltic States as the three countries have little to protect themselves from outside aggression due to limited resources. A major partner to guaranty their safety has been the US through NATO (Maheshwari, 2017; Oreskes, 2016). Russia perceives NATO troops stationed in the Baltic countries as a threat to itself which further put a strain on the situation. Therefore, the foreign policy endorsed by President Trump, which puts the US’ national interests above others, is posing a controversial threat to the Baltic states as well as for global stability. The Commitment to its European partners are therefore at risk (Lima, 2017).

There has been a census within the EU seeking a more independent defence as a way to build up protection against possible Russian aggression. The United Kingdom has in the past been one of the stronger opponents of a unified defence policy (Barigazzi, 2016). The British exit of the EU does allow scholars to question whether a European Defence Union (EDU) is more likely to become reality now.

Therefore, it is the aim of this project to determine how the EU will evolve its relationship with Russia based on its past behaviour. This study will explore how the EU reacted to Russia from 1991 until 2017. The goal is to identify European behaviour when faced with external pressure to name a common theme by asking: To what extent did the degree of the Russian threat towards the EU influence the EU to pursue bandwagoning or balancing behaviour?
By comparing different points in time that brought by major change in the relationship, the EU’s behaviour is observed over time, giving the study a more conclusive idea of the EU’s behaviour towards Russia over time. By studying the EU reacted to Russian behaviour, it is hoped to identify developments which allow the author to classify the EU’s character as a defence actor. The project itself is set in an empirical framework as the research question is answered through observations based in the current literature and existing policy documents concerning defence and security. The research question itself is furthermore explanatory as it aims at disclosing the EU’s reaction to the change in its relations with Russia. The objective of the question is to explore the effect the studied developments had on the EU’s defence census. The research question is further aiming at establishing predictions about future behaviour of the EU as a defence actor.

To further refine the answer to the research question, sub questions are added to ensure clarity:

In how far did the perception of the Russian threat develop since 1991?

Which motives of the EU drove its behaviour after every changing structural setting?

In how far can the EU completely pursue bandwagoning or balancing behaviour in the future?

This study is furthermore based upon the neoclassical realist paradigm or more explicit balance of power and bandwagoning. Both these concepts have not been used intensively to explain power dynamics in Europe after the Cold War, literature about both concepts is thereby not very comprehensive. However, the literature about Asian countries balancing power and bandwagoning on another powerful nation is very resourceful. In this project, research about Asian countries balancing or bandwagoning Chinese power is used as a basis for further predictions about the EU’s behaviour. It is though being considered that the studied Asian countries differ from the EU which is the focus in this research. It is moreover an ambition to add research to the literature about European bandwagoning or balancing behaviour.

This study is significant to the scientific community in so far as it introduces more evidence about the EU’s balancing and bandwagoning behaviour. The information is highly relevant as patterns of behaviour which are being analysed here, help to make predictions about the EU’s future. It becomes thereby clearer how another country – in the case of this research, the US or Russia – reacts to certain actions. It can thereby be argued when the EU tends to build up military capacities within the Union or strengthen alliances. If those reactions can truthfully be predicted, measures to prevent damage of all kinds can be undertaken in time. It can thereby be reassured that conflict or even war can be prevented from even starting.

2. Theory

This study aims at explaining and analysing the EU’s reaction to the flux in its relations with the Russian Federation. The behaviour expected from the EU is interpreted through the concepts ‘bandwagoning’
and ‘balancing. Both of these were born in the realist paradigm. The decision to analyse the issue at hand in a realist perspective was made as the paradigm offers a conclusive view into international relations – “‘no tradition has conceptualized and theorized alliances in a richer manner than realist’” (Jørgensen, 2010: 91). It will further be elaborated why the realist paradigm is the most appropriate theoretical framework for this research project.

2.1 The theory of balancing and bandwagoning
Starting the theoretical background of this research project, the main concepts of analysis will be explained. Balancing and bandwagoning will be used to define the EU behaviour towards Russia in the set timeframe. It will further be concluded which reactions are to be expected from the EU according to the neorealist paradigm. This research is based on the prediction that the EU is in the future either going to pursue bandwagoning or balancing behaviour towards the Russian Federation.

Before elaborating on the theory of both concepts, it will be clarified what is seen as the concepts origins. As both bandwagoning and balancing describe the behaviour of sovereign nation states, it is relevant to determine which circumstances lead to states pursuing either behaviour.

Kenneth Waltz (1979) is arguing that balancing or bandwagoning behaviour is happening automatically as states are continuously seeking to gain an advantage in comparison to other states. They do so to secure their own territory in a generally unsecure system (Jørgensen, 2010). This would mean that individual nation states would either form an union to balance another economically strong state or build a union with an economically strong state. However, Stephen Walt (2000) reasons that state’s balancing or bandwagoning behaviour is triggered by one nation’s power posing a threat to the other states. Thereafter, nations only alter their behaviour after incidents made them perceive another nation as a threat. This study will predominantly be based on Walt’s balance of power theory as the framework as this research project evolves around EU reacting to Russia in the aftermath of the Cold War, when Russia was perceived as the main threat. Moreover, the threat based balancing or bandwagoning can be found in the literature about relations among Asian countries. Scholars researching the reaction of South East Asian nations to the Chinese rise to power, argue that China’s power was the reason behind an increase in bandwagoning or balancing behaviour (Bloomfield, 2016; Singh, Teo, & Ho, 2017; Zhao & Qi, 2016). Also, European scholars state that the Chechnya war (among others), as a demonstration of power, triggered a change in Europe-Russia relations (Haukkala, 2010). It is presumed that the EU did not consequently pursue only bandwagoning or balancing but that certain Russian actions triggered the EU’s behaviour to shift.

Moreover, the concepts will each be defined and their significance to the EU will be explained in order to underline which behaviour is expected to be observed within the study and what that means for presumptions about the future. Firstly ‘balancing’ will be explained, afterwards, an explanation of states bandwagoning behaviour will follow.
Walt and Waltz, even though they propose different origins for bandwagoning and balancing, agree on the definition of both concepts. Balancing is thus ‘‘defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat’’ (Walt, 2000:111). The act of balancing thereby is meant to prevent that a state achieves a hegemonic position and becomes too powerful. Other nations will henceforth put their survival at risk to ally with a in comparison weaker nations. Walt argues that when allying with the weaker party, the influence the allying state receives will be greater. Posen (2006) furthermore added in his research that balancing is an option only open to states which already have obtained some power through natural resources, military capacities or diplomatic relations. States without these would risk their survival by being part of an alliance against the hegemonic power. Scholars have found out that Japan’s behaviour was accordingly when China rose to power. It proceeded to improve its relations with Indonesia and the Mekong region to prevent these nations from bonding with China, which would then make China the hegemon in the region (Singh et al., 2017). South East Asian countries such as the Philippines chose to cooperate with Japan, the weaker state in comparison to China, as a way to limit Chinese influence within their premises; ‘‘the Philippines consider Japan a counterweight to China’’ (Zhao & Qi, 2016:496). For the EU, this means that it uses the already existing alliance – the EU – to foster a stronger defence cooperation to balance the aggression shown by Russia. However, as not all member states (MS) are equally rich in resources, the risk undertaken to develop a mostly independent EDU would vary among nations. The Baltic states would take a higher risk than other nations by putting their resources into the EDU and thereby reducing the resources available for their national defence. Henceforth, they would have the resourceful nations such as France or Germany aggregated to take the lead. The EU would have to develop a framework that allows stronger nations to take the lead while ensuring other weaker states of its commitment to their protection.

Hypothesis 1: The EU will establish an independent European Defence Union which operates in cooperation with NATO.

Additionally, the concept of ‘bandwagoning’ will be sorely elaborated on and the connection to the EU’s position towards Russia will be made.

Bandwagoning on the other hand is defined as ‘‘alignment with the force of danger’’ (Walt, 2000:111). Walt thereby claims that states will seek to ally with the stronger nation which poses the threat. Walt is moreover stating that ‘‘the more powerful the state and more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with it’’ (ibid.: 112). Bandwagoning is further explained to be a measure for states to avoid an attack on them and is thereby a security mechanism. Bandwagoning is used to be a part of the winning team (Walt, 2000) . It is also an option mainly used by weaker countries that cannot afford to build up capabilities (Posen, 2006).

In the South-East Asian literature, this kind of behaviour can be observed as South-East Asian nations do not have they capabilities to balance China and are not united enough within ASEAN (Singh et al.,
According to Zhao and Qi (2016), Cambodia bandwagoned China by refusing to discuss maritime issues with the Philippines and Vietnam, in return it received significant funding from China.

For Europe, this means that the states would ally with Russia to be protected from its possible aggression. Thereby, the states would not have to build up their unified military capacities to gain security. However, the case of China and Cambodia shows that the nations which seek to bandwagon must meet certain demands from the stronger nations to be able to benefit from the relationship, as the South-East Asian literature proved, the states that others seek to bandwagon with will pose demands for their protection. Thereby, the EU would have to comply with Russian demands to make allying possible.

Hypothesis 2: It is expected that the EU will bandwagon by allying with Russia, to prevent a possible attack on countries like the Baltics through excepting Russian conditions.

Concluding, this research project is expected to produce predictions about the future of EU-Russia relations. Henceforth, two options will be examined. Firstly, the EU could balance Russian aggression shown by developing a more unified defence instrument. Secondly, the EU could better its relationship with Russia through complying with what has been demanded from the EU in the past, meaning the EU would have to disarm.

2.2 Appropriateness of the neorealist paradigm
This section will go on explaining for which reasons the neorealist paradigm was chosen as the most appropriate theoretical background for the research project at hand.

Firstly, theories, used to explain European integration, such as Neo-functionalism, Intergovernmentalism and Institutionalism would be feasible to analyse a possible accession of Russia to the EU. As such a scenario is becoming increasingly unrealistic and the objective of this study is not so much EU enlargement – even though the accession of the Baltic States is being considered- as it is European relations with the Russian Federation.

Secondly, Liberalism poses an appropriate choice when analysing the EU’s bilateral or multilateral partnerships. This paradigm examines cooperation as a key element in international relations (Drezner, 2011). In this research project presumed that the EU, for most parts, perceives Russia as a threat. It is hereby argued that the perception of its threat to the EU varies at different points in time. Therefore, the dialogue between both actors has not been aimed at cooperation but was shaped by mistrust and sanctions – especially during the aftermath of the Crimea crisis. The liberalist paradigm does therefore not sufficiently explain the presumed conditions in relation between the EU and Russia.

Thirdly, social constructivism offers explanations for the EU’s behaviour towards Russia as this paradigm’s focus are “material factors such as economic wealth and military power” (Drezner, 2011:65). The key argument for social constructivist is that actions are influenced by identity and pressure (Wendt, 1994). This assumption does not prove to be viable here as the background of this
research is the difference between Europe and Russia. The two actors do not necessarily value the same norms equally. The perception of Crimea’s annexation proves this as the European side viewed it as an infringement of Ukrainian sovereignty while the Russian counterpart celebrated the re-unification with the Crimean Peninsula (European Council, 2014b, Putin, 2014). Furthermore, domestic policies, relevant for identity building according to Wendt, will not be regarded in this research project as the main focus of analysis will be the EU’s foreign policy.

When examining the realist paradigm, its key assumption is that states exist in an anarchic system which is not regulated by any order. This perception of the international system is in line with the context of this research as it acknowledges that the EU and Russia both rely on their own actions for security. Drezner (2011) and Jørgensen (2010) argue that nations trust in “self-help” in order to ensure their survival. Therefore, the most powerful nation is the one “with the greatest ability to use force” (Drezner, 2011: 37). Hard power capabilities and strategy henceforth play a very central role in the continuity of states. Jørgensen points out that states are hence always depending on gaining more capabilities in comparison to other states to secure their own position. He further refers to Kenneth Waltz to elaborate the neorealist current; the focus therefore is on a few ‘prime players’, the international system is analysed based on those. Thereby, ‘real actor characteristics’ are being left out of the paradigm. Thus, domestic policies are not being regarded. The focus rather lies in theorizing the behaviour of states when they are faced with “changing structural setting” (Jørgensen, 2010:84). It is henceforth concluded that the neorealist paradigm is the most suitable realm to present this research in because it adequately reflects the relationship between the EU and Russia and because it allows to solely focus on the two actors considered. It is therefore analysed how the prime player – the EU- is affected by these.

3. Methodology

In the following, this study’s research design, conceptualization and data collection will be elaborated in the detail. Firstly, the choice of research design will be explained. Secondly, it will explained how the concepts will be translated into ‘real’ issues. Thirdly, the type of data regarded will be explained.

3.1 The Research Design

This research project is firstly an explanatory case study as it is primarily dealing with the EU’s defence capabilities (George & Bennet, 2005). It thus does not have the aspiration to be applicable to other situations.

In order to answer the research question appropriately different approaches were considered. Ultimately, the decision was made to conduct the research within a time-series design.

A cross-sectional design was also regarded. However, it was concluded that a solution to the research question could not be found without the context of development within EU-Russia relations. Hence, it is necessary to study processes in the past to make predictions about the future. The intervention of Russia through different levels of aggression will be observed within different periods of time. The
research will start considering actions taken after 1991, as the Russian Federation officially emerged from the Soviet Union in the end of 1991. The periods regarded in this research project will therefore be 1991 until 1995, 1995 until 2000, 2000 until 2005, 2005 until 2010 and 2010 until 2017. The last period is slightly larger in comparison to other four periods as recent events will be included in this last period of analysis.

Within the period of analysis specific events will be regarded to determine the level of Russian aggression. These are approached as interventions by Russia to the status-quo of the EU’s defence policy. However, the entire historical and political context of each event will not be regarded, the events will be analysed as set points in time. This research predominantly examines the effect each of the had on the EU’s balancing and bandwagoning behaviour towards Russia.

Yet, the time-series approach is not free from validity threats. These threats need to be carefully considered to make the overall study’s conclusion as accurate as possible.

Measurement validity is a threat to the time-series approach as the interventions possible do not explain the studied outcome as it is ultimately the result of a combination of several interventions. This threat is partly affecting the study. For once, the most significant events in EU – Russia relations were chosen but it not certainly be said that the EU’s bandwagoning or balancing behaviour is solely a result of the EU’s relations with Russia. Nonetheless, the eliminate measurement validity in this project, it was made sure that the EU’s reaction actively refers to the Russian intervention. Yet, due to the limitation of this study intervening variables could not be considered (see Chapter 6).

Internal validity is moreover posing a threat to this research as further developments such as Brexit or the fight on global terrorism could not be included due to the set framework of this study. This project’s aim is also to motivate further research to completely understand the incentives that influence the EU’s behaviour.

Furthermore, the variables will be elaborated. The unit of measurement, which will be used to examine the variables introduced in the following, will be the EU. The MS will be regarded as part of the European decision-making process

The dependent variable in this research project is the EU’s behaviour towards Russia (y).

The behaviour towards is measured through the actions to EU undertook towards Russia. As the European decision making becomes thereby highly relevant, the Ms will be considered within the European decision-making process. Even though, the main unit of analysis is the EU, the MS cannot be completely disregarded as they have sufficient influence on the decision making through the European Council and the Council of the European Union. Yet, as real actor characteristics are excluded, domestic affairs of the MS are not considered (Jørgensen, 2010). This study will solely regard the position of the
government. MS are hereby defined as the UK, France, Germany and the Baltics. The decision to limit this study to the previously named six nations will be explained in the following.

The UK’s position within EU will be included, as the UK is the strongest military force within the Union. Even though, the procedure of the UK’s exist of the EU was formally started in 2017 (European Council, 2017), the UK as is of now an important actor within the Union and was so, especially in the past because it is and was one the strongest defence actors in the Union (Rettman, 2016). Germany and France are furthermore included as they are the second and third strongest military powers within the EU (Lehne, 2012). Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are furthermore included as the three Baltic states are due to their geographical position, in comparison to other weak military European nations, especially vulnerable to possible Russian aggression (Lamoreaux & Galbreath, 2008). Their positions are therefore particularly significant to this research project.

The dependent variable has two extreme manifestations: bandwagoning and balancing. ‘’It is usually conceded that most states, most of the time, cannot easily be characterised as ‘pure’ balancers or bandwagoners’’ (Walt, 1987: 28 - 22 in Bloomfiled, 2016: 262). Henceforth, the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable will be measured on a bandwagoning – balancing spectre in this study. Through the independent variables, the dependent variable’s position is shifted on the spectre between balancing and bandwagoning. Figure 1 portrays the spectre between bandwagoning and balancing, while Table 1 explains the general meaning and specific meaning of the different manifestations. The different manifestation of bandwagoning and balancing move from the most extreme bandwagoning behaviour on the far right (Submission) to the most extreme balancing behaviour on the far left (complete independence).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANIFESTATION</th>
<th>GENERAL MEANING</th>
<th>MEANING FOR THE EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBMISSION</td>
<td>A State in conflict with Russia will accept Russia’s position or demands towards a certain issue entirely</td>
<td>The EU will accept all of Russia’s demands (lifting the sanctions, recognizing Crimea etc.) in order to guarantee the protection of all EU states from Russian aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>A state will openly support Russia in its interests and engage in a formal arrangement with Russia</td>
<td>The EU would arrange a cooperation agreement with and support the Russian agenda openly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMAL ALLIANCE</td>
<td>While the state would not engage in an official arrangement with Russia, it would still engage with Russia politically and generate the same interests</td>
<td>The EU would keep Russia at a certain distance but still considered it a partner in certain issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUTRAL ZONE</td>
<td>A state is seeking cooperation with Russia while also maintaining other cooperation to avoid making a defined decision about the relationship to Russia.</td>
<td>The EU would maintain cooperation with Russia while maintaining strong relations to NATO through its MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT AMBITIONS</td>
<td>The state would foster loose cooperation with other states to accumulate capabilities against Russia</td>
<td>The EU would engage in a vague cooperation with NATO through its MS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### UNIFIED DEFENCE

A state would engage in a structural defence plan with other states that are also feeling threatened by Russia while trying to achieve a build of its own defence.

The EU would significantly deepen its defence cooperation on European level while still cooperate with NATO.

### COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE

The state further builds up its defence and military powers to be protected from Russian aggression and achieves independence from other nations defence vice as well.

The EU would engage heavily in the build-up of its defence, become able to defend its own borders and thereby become independent from NATO.

---

**The independent variable is the Russian threat (x).**

The independent variable for this research project was selected according to intense literature review which suggests that the intensity of the perception of the Russian threat to the EU, influenced the EU’s behaviour towards Russia (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014; Haukkala, 2010). The Russian threat itself will be determined through the degree of its aggression, meaning how extreme Russian foreign policy is towards the EU. Thereby, it will be concluded in how far Russia posed as possible threat to the EU. However, it is the aim of this study to determine the direction of the EU’s actions.

#### 3.2 Conceptualization

In the following it will be elaborated which kind of data will be collected and how it will be measured. In chapter 3.3 it will in the further be examined how the data will be collected and which documents are relevant for this research project.

When wanting to measure the EU’s degree of bandwagoning and balancing one needs to consider how these concepts can be translated into real issues. Bandwagoning will in this study be understood as the approaching of Russian demands, as according to Walt (2000) bandwagoning means to ally with the threatening force. Thereby actions that are in line with Russia’s agenda are being analysed as bandwagoning. This means that EU policies which would allow Russia to integrate its power in Europe are in Russia interest. Balancing will be understood as the development towards a more independent European defence policy, as according to Walt (2000) balancing means allying against the threatening force. Unifying its defence policy would significantly weaken Russia’s influence on Europe as the EU would then have means to counter possible aggression.
The main issue at hand is the EU’s defence development, meaning that the EU’s defence will either not develop which would be in Russia’s interest or its defence would develop towards unification. Thereby five indicators of the EU’s defence behaviour were identified- coordinated defence, cooperative actions, prohibitive actions, systemic actions. These indicators shall describe the character of the EU as a defence actor in both the time after the dissolution of Soviet Union and after Crimea Crisis. Thereby it will be possible to differentiate in how far the EU has -or has not - made progress and in which areas. A comparison will determine the degree bandwagoning or balancing the EU has been practising in the past. The comparison of past behaviour will then allow scholars to make prediction about the EU’s future behaviour. In the further, it will be explained how it will be measured in how far the EU’s behaviour indicates bandwagoning or balancing behaviour in table 2. Yet, before that the indicators and their relevance will be shortly elaborated.

‘Coordinated defence’ measures the EU’s willingness to coordinate its defence policy (operations and funding) on Union bases or if the defence policy is coordinated through the MS.

‘Cooperative actions’ measures the EU’s willingness to cooperate with partners to develop its defence.

‘Prohibitive actions’ measures the EU’s willingness to move in on aggression shown towards the Union or towards its neighbourhood.

‘Systemic actions’ measures the EU’s ability to adapt its institutions to changing structural settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification/index</th>
<th>Coordinated defence</th>
<th>Cooperative actions</th>
<th>Prohibitive actions</th>
<th>Systemic actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submission</td>
<td>The EU does not coordinate its defence, solely the MS do</td>
<td>The EU MS engage in defence cooperation solely with Russia</td>
<td>The EU does not sanction Russia even though its actions harm international/ EU provisions</td>
<td>Cooperative instruments are highly integrated into the EU decision making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>The EU is making suggestions towards the MS coordination of defence</td>
<td>The EU is strongly engaged with Russia but EU and Russia are separate defence entities</td>
<td>The EU does not sanction Russia yet the EU warns Russia about future actions</td>
<td>The EU is commitment to cooperation agreements with Russia, which mainly serve Russian interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Alliance</td>
<td>The EU is setting standards for the</td>
<td>The EU is discussing security</td>
<td>The EU expresses its deep concern</td>
<td>The agreement between the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to measure the results, each classification will be given a value from –3 for ‘Submission’ to 3 for ‘Complete Independent’ as shown in figure 2. ‘Neutrality’ does thereby hold the value 0, which does not indicate that the EU is not taking any action but that the actions undertaken does not imply bandwagoning or balancing. Furthermore, no meaning is implied through a negative or a positive value. Each indicator will thereby be paired with a classification. The overall sum of all indicators that were fulfilled in one period of analysis will be combined and then divided through the number of indicators.
within this period. The result will then be used as an indicator for the overall behaviour of the EU during this period. The sum may not be an even number, therefore if the first number behind the comma is below five the sum will be adjusted downward, the sum will be adjusted upward if the number is higher than five. If the sum has a five behind the comma, the sum is exactly between two classifications and will therefore be regarded as such. It has to be noted that one reaction can only carry one classification after carefully studying the existing literature and policy documents. Before elaborating on the measurement of the indicators, it will be explained in how far the indicator is in connection with the EU’s bandwagoning or balancing behaviour. As each indicator will be paired with the appropriate classification as a result of the analysis, the classification as well as the context of the policy will make it possible to determine the policies place on the bandwagoning-balancing spectre according to Table 1. The procedure will be that the higher the indicator scored towards bandwagoning or balancing the stronger is the tendency towards full bandwagoning (submission) or balancing (complete independence). Moreover, as each classification will be given a value, it is possible for the EU’s behaviour to reach a maximum of -3, indicating overall strong bandwagoning behaviour and maximum of 3, indicating overall strong balancing behaviour within each period of analysis. Figure 2 illustrated how the values of classifications are added to the bandwagoning-balancing spectre.

*Figure 2: Bandwagoning-Balancing Spectre with values*

When attempting to analyse the EU’s defence behaviour in relation with its relationship with Russia it is relevant to find specific policies which can serve as indicators for the EU character as a defence actor in the set context. As the previous part explained the depended variable is measured on the bandwagoning-balancing spectre. It will now further be determined how the independent variable will be measured. As it is the goal of this research project to conclude in how far the degree of the Russian threat influences the EU’s behaviour, it is relevant to establish the perception of threat. The Russian threat will be determined through the degree of aggression of its behaviour; aggression thereby, represents in this study the Russian willingness to either use force or diplomacy in foreign policy affairs.
which has a significant influence on the EU’s perception of Russia as a threat. Therefore, aggression means the intensity of escalation shown by Russia towards the EU. It will henceforth be argued that the higher the escalation of Russia’s foreign policy behaviour is, the higher is the EU’s perception of Russia as a threat. It is thereafter the main goal of this research project to determine how the EU will then react the different levels of threat. The EU’s possible reactions which will be study in this project are detailed in table 1. The degree of aggression is indicated for once by the Russian military capabilities, which will be measured through military spending and Russian strategic actions which will be determined through the nature of demands Russia is verbalising towards Europe. Russia’s foreign policy behaviour is classified in table 4; the classifications follow an upward trend, which means that ‘‘de-escalation’’ signifies the least/ no degree of aggression while ‘‘highly escalatory’’ is thereby the highest degree of aggression Russia can pursue in its relationship with the EU. Each strategic action, which will be analysed in this study, will thereby in connection with the military spending at the time be given a classification of escalation as described in table 3. Furthermore, each classification will be given a score from 0 – 4, making ‘‘de-escalation’’ the lowest scoring classification and ‘‘high escalatory’’ the highest scoring classification according to table 5. Through the values to the classification, it will later on be possible to assemble to results of Russian behaviour on a scale.

**Table 3: Classification Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>General Meaning</th>
<th>Strategic action</th>
<th>Meaning for Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De-escalation</td>
<td>A state is trying to avoid tension between itself and another state by presenting itself as peace-seeking. The state will thereby avoid posing as military power and seek cooperation with the other nation.</td>
<td>Russia tries to cooperate with the EU in foreign policy matters both are affected by (the European Neighbourhood Policy).</td>
<td>Russia decreases its military spending to higher percentage than the EU MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tension</td>
<td>A state is having difficulty to find a common ground to discuss some issues with another state. However, the discussion is ongoing and the relationship between the actors outside the concerned issues</td>
<td>Russia and the EU struggle to find common ground during debates. Yet, officials are still negotiating compromises. Russia is not using military power to influence to debate</td>
<td>Russia is neither significantly increasing or decreasing its military expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>EU MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>A state is using the promise to use to compel another into choosing its side in a conflict. However, communication remains open, the conflict may also affect other areas of the relationship</td>
<td>Russia is using its military capacities to coerce the EU into agreeing with its conditions. Even though, the relationship worsens, leading actors are still in communication</td>
<td>Russia’s military spending is increasing and is coming close to the EU MS’s expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostility</td>
<td>A state is using its military force openly to pursue its interests with little regard to the other countries reaction as the state sees its action as justified. Communication remains partly open</td>
<td>Russia is using force to pursue its demands (internal sovereignty, territorial integrity of other states in its neighbourhood), negotiation and compromises are unlikely or unfruitful. However, Russia sees its actions as justified</td>
<td>Russia military spending is increasing and even with the spending of the EU MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly escalatory</td>
<td>A state is using all of its military force to pursue total gains for itself, the relationship to other states that have been unsupportive becomes secondary. Communication to others is limited</td>
<td>Russia is using force to meet its demands within its neighbourhood. The relationship to the EU becomes secondary while the relations to individual MS become more relevant to Russia</td>
<td>Russian military spending is rising periodically, the amount is exceeding the EU MS expenditure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each classification of Russian behaviour will be paired with a value; given ‘de-escalatory’ the lowest value of 0 to 4 for hostility being the highest value. Each of the two indicators will after analysing it given a classification and thereby a value. The overall sum of both indicators during a period will be divided by the number of indicators, therefore by two. The result will then be used as an indicator for the period of analysis. Shall the result not be even, the sum will be adjusted downward if the number behind the comma is below five and adjusted upwards if the number behind the comma is higher than five. Therefore, the dependent and independent variable’s results will be considered in even numbers.
Table 4: Values of the classifications for the independent variable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of classification</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>De-escalatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Highly escalatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concluding, the degree of bandwagoning or balancing done by the EU is determined through its reaction to the actions undertaken by Russia. Henceforth, the level of the aggression Russia is showing to the EU is relevant to the level of the EU’s behaviour. It can be presumed that there is a causal relationship between the intensity of the Russian foreign policy behaviour and the intensity of the EU’s behaviour towards Russia. The analysis of both the Russian behaviour and the EU’s reaction to it will help to make a prediction on the EU’s future behaviour.

3.3 Operationalization

In order to measure the introduced concepts, the above-mentioned indicators will be used to clarify in which direction both Russia and the EU are moving. The indicators are neutral, which means that, by definition, they do not measure a specific direction of actions. Thereby, the indicators of the EU’s behaviour towards Russia can show both bandwagoning or balancing behaviour, each one can move into either direction; only the analysis can reveal the exact direction of the EU’s reactions. The same goes for the Russian actions directed towards the EU or its neighbourhood. It is hereby noteworthy that even though, the eastern neighbourhood of the EU is not legally part of the EU, yet, aggression shown within its neighbourhood will be regarded as a source for instability and a loss of control to the EU. Thus, Russia’s actions within the European eastern neighbourhood will be considered as actions concerning the EU.

Moreover, the indicators measuring the EU’s reaction - coordinated defence, cooperative actions, prohibitive actions, systemic action– will serve as a specification of what the EU can answer with. These indicators describe areas which are both relevant to determine bandwagoning or balancing behaviour the analysis shall thereby clarify in how far the EU using these to react. Which behaviour indicates which classification is further outlined in table 1. The reaction itself will be measured according to table 2. The decision was made to predominantly focus on the European Council and the Council of the European Union decisions as reactions as the Council is navigating MS perceptions ("The decision-making process in the Council," 2017). However, other EU institutions input will also be considered.
Furthermore, Russia’s aggression will be measured through its degree of aggression which is composed out of the military spending and strategic actions. Military spending will be measured as the total government expenditure in million USD according to the prices and exchange rates in 2015, expect for the expenditure in 2016 which is measured according to the prices and exchange rates in 2016. Figure 2 is thereby illustrating the development of Russian defence expenditure, while figure 3 shows Russian defence expenditure in comparison with the defence expenditure of the EU’s biggest military powers – the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Lehne, 2012); all data about the defence expenditure was retrieved from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The strategic actions will be measured according to table 5. The discussion to use the overall defence expenditure as measurement instead of the defence expenditure as a percentage of the GDP was made because for this study it is relevant to consider which capabilities Russia has. Therefore, the overall expenditure allows to make conclusions about the actual sum which was intended to be spend on defence while the expenditure as a percentage of the GDP does not illustrate the total sum that was available for spending; thereby, the percentage of a weaker nation could be equally to the percentage of the GDP of stronger nation, yet the sum available for spending on defence would significantly differ. Yet, it has been taken into account that the shift in Russian defence spending might not at all times be the product of an actual increase or decrease of the defence budget but be the product of shift in-between budgets (capabilities that were listed in the defence budget once may be listed in another budget – training for soldiers may be accounted for in the defence budget or the education budget) or it may be due to money not spent within the previous budget (Galeotti, 2017).

Russia’s strategic will be measured according to table 5, which means that the strategic actions are given the same classification as the degree of aggression shown by Russia. Yet, the ultimate degree of aggression is composed out of the classification of the strategic action and the defence spending within a certain period in time. Henceforth, the strategic action does not solely speak for the degree of Russian aggression.

Figure 3: Development of Russian expenditure
4. Analysing EU-Russia relations since 1991

Following chapter 3, it has been explained how the shift in EU-Russia relations will be measured; this chapter will subsequently analyse in how far the relationship changed within the four periods of analysis. The analysis will hence clarify for which reasons the change occurred within the capacity of this thesis, it shall thereby be elucidated that this research project does not have the capacity to analyse all possible reasons for changes in EU-Russia relations. The most relevant causes for change have been retrieved through an intense literature review. The same accounts for the EU’s reaction towards Russian behaviour.

Moreover, each subchapter of the analysis will concern itself with one of the periods of analysis; this chapter is therefore divided into five subchapters. Each subchapter will be structured identically, after introducing the core conflict of the period the level of Russian aggression will be analysed, subsequently the EU’s reaction towards Russian behaviour will be analysed and then allocated with a manifestation of bandwagoning or balancing. In the end, it will be summarized how the Russian threat towards the EU has developed and in how far the EU as a defence actor has developed within the given timeframe. The conclusion in chapter 6 will furthermore clarify which meaning the results of the analysis hold and which predictions can be made on the grounds of these results.

4.1 1991 – 1995: The beginning of friendship?

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia’s foreign policy under then-president Boris Yeltsin became open to the West and was focused on cooperation. Arms control was an important step towards Russia becoming part of the new world order. However, the proceeding NATO enlargement troubled the developing relationship as Russia viewed the Eastern European countries, the former Warsaw Pact
nations to be under its protection (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). In the furthering, the EU’s reaction to Russia supporting arms control and later on critiquing NATO’s enlargement will be analysed after having analysed the specific level of Russian aggression.

The Russian expenditure significantly decreased within the period from its starting point in 1992. The defence budget in 1995 was 45.6% smaller than in 1992. The Russian defence spending is, furthermore, lower in comparison to the three main defence powers in the EU as illustrated in figure 5. The UK’s, France’s and Germany’s defence spending did also decrease in the period from 1992 until 1995; however, their defence budgets decreased to a smaller amount than Russia’s. The German defence expenditure decreased around 17.5%, France lowered its defence budget 5.5% while the UK lowered its budget around 12.9%. Nonetheless, it must be considered that the Russian Federation only in January 1992 gained independence. Hence, it unsurprising that the newly sovereign country prioritized domestic policies before defence when considering that Russia was in need was foreign aid to build up its economy (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Russia’s military spending can be classified as de-escalating (0) as it is substantially lower than Germany, France’s and the UK’s military spending and because there is a vast decrease in spending within the period. The aggression level of the military spending is therefore 0.

Figure 4: Defence expenditure from 1992 until 1995

The decreasing trend of the defence spending is in line with Russia’s foreign policy in this period as Russia tried to cooperate with the West, including to EU to integrate itself into the new world order while not yet being entirely clear which place Russia shall take in the new multipolar system (Lo, 2002). The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) was one important step towards lowering the perception of the Russian threat. The treaty which signed in 1993 implied that both the US and Russia would diminish their strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds until 2003 (Schmemann, 1993). This treaty was a significant move to create distance to the structures of the Cold War, making it possible that Russia
would be viewed as less a threat. However, the treaty itself was, due to opposing powers within Russian government was only ratified in 2000 (Kimball, 2003). Russia formed bilateral agreements with its former Warsaw-Pact nations during 1993 and the following years. Besides establishing trade relations to Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria (among others), Russia agreed to pay billions USD in Soviet debt to these nations and withdraw Russian troops from their territories (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Even though, the states in question were not yet EU MS, it is relevant to note that Russia withdrew military power from the EU’s east neighbourhood, posed little threat to the Union itself. “Russia to be accepted in what President Gorbachev called ‘our common European home,’ (Markham, 1989). The relationship between former Warsaw- Pact nations and Russia would become critical, as Yeltsin’s speech during the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (CSCE) Budapest summit in 1994 outlined. The Russian president harshly criticised the planned NATO expansion (Sciolino, 1994). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created during the Cold War to protect Europe from possible Soviet aggression, its objectives were to “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014: 239). Undoubtedly, these objectives were not useful after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, therefore Russia hoped to implement an alternative which would secure security within Europe, yet any proposals made by Russia were rejected (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Yeltsin argued that thereby Cold War structures were kept alive, ultimately describing it as ‘Cold Peace’ (Kempster & Murphy, 1994). A NATO expansion was perceived as threatening by Russia, as it would possible produce a scenario in which Russia would become isolated among European nations while being surrounded by NATO equipped armies. Russia is actively sought cooperation with European states and sought integration. The critique on a possible NATO expansion may seem contradictory to this; however, it needs to be considered that was at this point trying to shape the picture of security in Europe. Russia was also not using military capacities as a means of influencing the discussion about the NATO expansion. Russia’s strategic actions in the period from 1991 until 1995 can be classified as de-escalatory (0) because Russia is presuming integration and cooperation even though the West is not agreeing with its standpoint. The strategic actions thereby have an aggression level of 0.

The analysis of Russian behaviour between 1991 until 1995 has revealed that Russia’s aggression level is increasingly low. Both strategic actions undertaken by Russia and its military spending indicate de-escalatory behaviour, meaning that Russia tried to avoid confrontation for the sake of cooperation. The topic of NATO’s planned expansion did, even though it was openly opposed by Moscow, not erupt in escalation during this period. Therefore, it was concluded that the Russian level of aggression was de-escalatory (0) between 1991 and 1995. The overall aggression within the period is thereby 0.

Moreover, having analysed the Russian level of aggression, in the following the EU’s level of bandwagoning or balancing behaviour will be analysed through its reaction to the Russian behaviour described above. While the signing of START 2 would promise disarmament of Russia, ultimately making it a less powerful military power, Russia would still remain the second most resourceful state
concerning defence capabilities behind the US (Schmemann, 1993). As mentioned above, Russia sought bilateral relations to former Warsaw-Pact-states, the Baltic states as former Soviet states however remained critical towards Russia (Clemens, 1991). Russia’s relations to Western European states were less tense. Especially Russo-German relations flourished under Helmut Kohl and his successor Gerhard Schröder; Germany viewed Russia as a highly relevant ally in Eastern Europe. Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Even though, Russia primarily was interested in forming bilateral relations in the beginning the 1990s, talks with the EU started in 1992. However, the negotiations were not held in a setting of equality as the EU gave Russia the same tariff preferences usually given to developing countries. While a draft version was signed in before the Budapest summit of 1994, Yeltsin’s evoked ambiguous reaction from European states. (ibid.). The conflict about NATO’s possible enlargement was perceived differently across European nations. Yeltsin’s speech made Eastern European nations perceived it as critical, as they feared that Russia what might have an influence over them becoming NATO members, arguing with American words that an outstanding nation should not have a veto-right (Kempster & Murphy, 1994). Western European nations reacted calmer to the speech. Yet, France’s President Mitterand, voiced that Cold War structures should not be strengthened, thereby arguing against the NATO enlargement (Marshall, 1994). However, German chancellor Helmut Kohl argued earlier that with accession plans to the EU for former Warsaw-Pact-states (and possibly also former Soviet states) developing, different degrees of security within the Union would not be feasible. Thereby, being a member of NATO before becoming a member of the EU would be optimal to ensure that all MS are have the same protection (Bertram, 1994). Henceforth, the European states, which at this point were also EU MS did not promise Russia any concrete action while being committed to the European agenda.

In order to classify the EU’s behaviour during the period of 1991 to 1995 as bandwagoning or balancing it is relevant to consider which policies were at issue regarding Russia. The indicator ‘coordinated defence’ does not show any development which can be ascribed to Russia’s level of aggression. When considering ‘cooperative actions’ on the other hand, it can be argued that the EU MS are during this period engaged with NATO. As it was the main source of security during the Cold War and also after it for them, henceforth, the MS did not immediately change their position towards the necessity of NATO. However, the Russian position towards the planned NATO enlargement were considered by EU MS. Such cooperative action indicates ‘joint ambitions’(1), giving it a balancing score of 1. As Russia, is during this period of analysis focused on integration and cooperation, no international or European standards are hurt which would make prohibitive actions redundant. The EU is furthermore undertaken strategic actions towards Russia as the first EU – Russia talks start in 1992. The negotiations very fruitful instantly as the first draft was signed only in 1994, and the implementation by the Duma took only in 1996 (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). The agreement will be analysed more detailed in Chapter 4.2: in this chapter, it will be taken into consideration however that there is dialogue between the EU and Russia. However, as the negotiations were set under the preferences the EU also granted developing countries, the talks were not started in an environment of equality. Thereby, making the EU the stronger negotiating
partner which indicates ‘joint ambitions’ (1), giving it a balancing score of 1. The EU’s behaviour towards Russia between 1991 – 1995 can therefore be identified as balancing under the classification ‘joint ambitions’ (1); the overall balancing score is thereby 1.

4.2 1995 – 2000: Protest and cooperation
Between 1995 and 2000, Russia struggled to convince Western leaders of an alternative for European security in order to avoid NATO being the strongest defence actor in Europe. As Russia sees NATO as a Cold War construct, created to protect European countries from possible invasions of the USSR., it highly condones the expansion of NATO closer to Russian borders. Meanwhile, Russia is finalising its treaty with the EU. These events will be further analysed to determine the level of aggression within Russia’s actions and the degree of the EU’s bandwagoning or balancing will be determined according to the EU’s reaction to Russia’s actions.

During the period of 1995 – 2000 the Russian defence budget continued to decrease until 1998 by 38.6%, where the expenditure was on its all-time low as shown in figure 6. The vast decrease of Russian military spending happened simultaneously with the Russian economic crisis in 1998 (Haukkala, 2010). After 1998, the Russian military budget grew slightly by 33.3% until 2000. The Defence expenditure did, however, not outpace its starting point in this period in 1995. Therefore, the overall expenditure decreased by 8% during this period in time. The EU MS’s defence expenditure did not shift significantly as Germany’s budget decreased by 4.8%, France’s budget decreased by 4.9% and the UK’s defence expenditure decreased by only 0.7%. Even though, the trend of disarmament which started after the end of the Cold War continues, the pace of it has slowed down and perhaps in the case of Russia it has even ended in 1999 as it is the first time since the dissolution of the USSR that Russian defence expenditure increased. Even though, Russia’s budget did overall still decrease it is relevant to note that the expenditure increased between 1998 and 2000. The overall expenditure of Germany, France and the UK combined was still 55.7% higher than the Russian expenditure in 2000. Russia’s military spending is thereby not threatening to the EU. The second analysis of defence expenditure thereby concludes that the Russian defence expenditure between 1995 and 2000 indicates de-escalation (0), meaning that the aggression score was 0.
Moreover, Russian strategic actions within this period will be analysed to determine the overall level of the Russian threat between 1995 and 2000. The most relevant actions undertaken by Russia to be discussed in the following are its signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relation, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation and the signing of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the EU. The agreement with NATO will be observed as to how the solution was negotiated within the context of Russia contesting he NATO enlargement. The agreement between the EU and Russia will be analysed within the context of its making and towards its content. As the EU – Russia agreement can be regarded as an action undertaken by both actors, it will be analysed from both parties’ sides.

When examining Russian foreign policy behaviour within the period of 1995 to 2000 it is relevant to note that ‘[b]y 1995 the tide had clearly turned in Moscow, with the enthusiastically ‘romantic’ leaning towards the West having been replaced, with a more assertive Russia’’ (Haukkala, 2010: 94). Thereby Russia’s actions in the following are more based on the Russian agenda instead of the West’s. The signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relation, Cooperation, and Security (FAMRCS) between NATO and the Russian Federation is on so far relevant as the it was NATO’s attempt at appeasing the relationship with Russia after it became final that final that NATO would officially invite former Warsaw-Pact-nations to become MS (‘Founding Act On Mutual Relations Cooperation And Security Between NATO And The Russia Federation, 1997’). Russia had foremost made its dissatisfaction of this decision heard as it feared the integrity of its borders. However, the FAMRCS was a compromise for Russia as it had wanted the treaty to be legally binding, the final agreement however was not (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Nonetheless, the FAMRCS finalised the creation of the NATO Russia Permanent Joint
Council, which established Russia as a consulting partner to NATO concerning European security (‘Founding Act On Mutual Relations Cooperation And Security Between NATO And The Russia Federation, 1997). Yet, ‘’the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 was merely “damage limitation”: As Russia had no means to stop NATO enlargement, it might as well take whatever the Allies were willing to offer, even at the risk of appearing to acquiesce in the enlargement process’’ (Rühle, 2015). The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became full members of NATO in 1999.

The process of formulising an agreement between the EU and Russia started, as noted above, in 1992 and was signed by the EU in 1995 and ratified by the Duma, the Russian parliament, in 1996. Yet, the development of the agreement was shortly disturbed due the war in Chechnya which erupted in the end of 1994. The semi-sovereign province of Russia was aiming at independence in governing itself which Russia answered with military intervention (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). Russia dealt with the uprising of separatist movements with invading Chechnya, a move that earned it criticism from the EU (European Parliament, 1995). Nevertheless, Russia justified the invasion by arguing that it was necessary to keep internal peace (Evangelista, 2004). Eventually, the war in Chechnya would end with the province gaining independence while still remaining a part of Russia. When negotiations resumed, the agreement with the EU meant that Russia would move forward towards integration as it opened Russia a pathway to the world economy. However, as Russia was at this point not classified as a ‘’market economy’’, it was not an agreement between equals (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). As noted before, the EU orientated the negotiations on agreements it had created with developing countries, underlining that the EU was the economically stronger partner. On the other hand, the agreement would offer Russia advantages like significantly tariffing European products while ‘’allowing the EU to retain antidumping restrictions on fifteen products’’ (ibid: 253).

Russian strategic actions can be classified as de-escalatory (0) as Russia excepted the agreements offered even though not all details were to its liking. Furthermore, Russia did refrain from using military interventions outside its own territory. Yet, it must be noted that the intervention in Chechnya shows a tendency towards ‘tension’(1); the aggression score is thereby 0,5.

Concluding, between 1991 and 1995, as Russian military spending remained low and the strategic actions showed no sign of severe aggression towards the Russia, the overall Russian aggression level can be classified as ‘de-escalatory’(0), meaning that the overall aggression level is 0.

In the following the EU’s reaction towards Russian behaviour within this period of analysis will be further analysed before a conclusion about the EU’s bandwagoning or balancing behaviour can be made.

While the ongoing of NATO expansion process is generally beneficial to the accession process of Eastern European states to the EU because of the coherent security level, the treaty between NATO and Russia is supporting the role of Russian becoming a strategic partner to Europe. The agreement between the EU and Russia on the other hand had ‘’the gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of
cooperation in Europe’’ (‘‘Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part’’, 28 November 1997, hereafter PCA, Article 1), as an objective. Even though the treaty speaks about a partnership between the two actors, it is apparent that its aspiration was to further Russian development to ultimately adopt more Western of governing. The goal is therefore for Russia to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (PCA, Article 5) as Western economic institutions. However, besides fostering Russian economic development and Union gain (ibid., Article 56) also political dialogue was targeted by the agreement through establishing a Cooperation Council (ibid., Article 90). The Cooperation established through the agreement was meant to meet once a year in order to debate possible issues and developments as well as amendments to the treaty. The agreement is embracing different fields of cooperation between the actors, it henceforth gives way for the conclusion that the EU as well as Russia intended to deepen their partnership and to make it permanent. It can, due to the focus on Russian development, be argued that the intention was to eventually have a partnership between equals. The Russian invasion of Chechnya however prolonged the European signature to the agreement as the European Parliament (EP) denounced the intervention as a human rights violation (European Parliament, 1995). The EP formulated a recommendation to the Council in which it is referring to the Helsinki Charter as well as the 1949 Geneva Convention to justify its disapproval of the invasion which the EP argued led to ‘‘horrifying and widespread human rights violations in Chechnya’’ (1995: 90). The EP thereby raised a serious concern about the progress of reforms within Russia while demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops. The goal of the EP’s recommendation was for the Council to voice protest towards Russia because of its actions. Even though delegations from Spain, France and Germany were send to Moscow to discuss the issue, the agreement was signed by the EU later that year, 1995 even though the war only ended in 1996 (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014; Evangelista, 2004). However, the war in Chechnya moved the Union to formulate its first strategy on Russia which was adopted in 1996 (Haukkala, 2010). The strategies goals were to further foster Russian development according to ‘‘western liberal values (democracy, human rights, individual liberties, and rule of law) as well as further progress towards economic reform in order to ‘ensure Russia’s economic liberalisation and establishment of market economy’’ (European Commission, 1995:9 in Haukkala, 2010: 94) which once more underlined the inequality of the relationship. The EU was mainly offering Russia support to adapt to its values, it was henceforth not a partnership of mutual acceptance.

Having outlined the EU’s reaction to the Russian behaviour in the period from 1995 to 2000, it is possible to determine its classification. Firstly, ‘coordinated defence’ did not develop due to Russia’s actions within this period of analysis. However, ‘cooperative actions’ was just in previous period effected by Russian actions. It could again be observed that the EU regards Russia’s interests, not wanting NATO to enlarge, yet just as in the previous period the EU MS decide for the EU’s sake that cooperation with NATO is more important. The difference to the previous period is that in this one, the
enlargement became reality which was beneficial for the enlargement process of the EU. This behaviour indicates ‘joint ambitions’ (1), giving it a balancing score of 1. Moreover, even though the EP questioned Russia’s actions in Chechnya and delegations went to Moscow to further investigate, no prohibitive measures were enacted upon Russia which indicates ‘support’ (-2); meaning that the bandwagoning score is -2. However, as the conflict at hand was an internal one, the indicated bandwagoning behaviour cannot be considered as strong for the Russian agenda but merely for Russian territorial integrity. Furthermore, the PCA can be regarded as a ‘systemic action’. The agreement as such serves both parties interests in this moment as both parties gain certain advantages from it, which indicates ‘neutrality’ (0), meaning that both the bandwagoning and balancing score is 0. With ‘cooperative action’ and ‘systemic actions’ indicating classification close to one another regarding their level, it seems like ‘prohibitive actions’ is not fitting into the picture. However, due to nature of the conflict ‘support’ cannot be seen as a strong indicator of bandwagoning. The behaviour is therefore in line with the other indicators as it outlines that the EU is moving slightly closer to Russia, framing its behaviour as in the ‘neutral zone’ (0), meaning that both the level of bandwagoning and balancing is 0.

4.3 2000 – 2005: War and Peace

The period from 2000 until 2005 is signified through the accession of the Baltic states to NATO and the EU within the same year, 2004. The Baltic states thereby become the only former Soviet states to enter either of these; so far only former Warsaw-Pact-states, who were not formally integrated into the USSR, had been able to take steps towards NATO. Russia did not welcome these plans as it means that NATO would proceed even closer to its borders and Kaliningrad would be surrounded by EU and NATO. Though, before these actions were taken, the second Chechnya war started in 1999 and due to harsher intervention of Russia, relations with EU were tensed. Henceforth, Russia’s military spending and strategic actions such as the war in Chechnya will be considered in order to identify Russian level of aggression within the period of 2000 to 2005. Afterwards the EU’s reaction to Russia’s actions will be analysed to determine its level of bandwagoning or balancing behaviour.

In the following the Russian development in military spending between 2000 and 2005 will be analysed. The tendency to increase its defence expenditure can also be observed in the third period of analysis. Russian defence spending is continuing to increase as the sum grew around 49% between 2000 and 2005 as illustrated in figure 7. Which outlines a significant difference in trends concerning the defence spending of all actors involved. Germany’s expenditure continued to decrease, as the defence spending was lowered 7.2% between 2000 and 2005. France’s and the UK’s behaviour during this period on the other hand outlines an increase in their defence expenditure as France’s spending rose by 5,5% while the UK’s spending rose by 21,1%. Besides, the significant growth of defence expenditure among the UK, France and Russia, it is relevant to note that due its rapid growth Russia’s spending is now coming close to Germany’s expenditure. The Russian defence budget was in 2005 25% lower than the German
defence expenditure, which is a small difference in comparison to 101% in 2000 and 94% in 1995. Henceforth, the Russian defence expenditure between 2000 and 2005 is indicating pressure (2), the aggression score is thereby 2.

Figure 6: Defence expenditure from 2000 until 2005

In order to determine the overall level of aggression shown by Russia, its strategic action will further be analysed. The origin of the second Chechnya war was that Chechen fighters lead by rebel leaders invaded nearby Dagestan in order to create the Islamic State of Dagestan within the region, according to Russia (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). However, ‘‘[t]he events preceding and following the raid are shrouded in mystery ‘’(Haukkala, 2010: 111). Nonetheless, Russia reacted to the turmoil by launching airstrikes against Chechnya before Russian troops proceeded to overtake the region and trampling any resistance within the region. Then President-elect Vladimir Putin justified the war in Chechnya as Russia’s fight against extremisms which was necessary to protect Russians in Chechnya (BBC, 2000). The war was thereby framed as the fight against a terrorist take-over in its own territory which was mandatory to protect the Chechen people (Haukkala, 2010). The conflict in Chechnya resulted among other in several violations of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the government assured investigation and later on admitted that Article 2 (the right to life) had been violated during the conflict (“Military strike on Chechen village in 2000 was in breach of the Convention, as acknowledged by the Russian Government,” 2013; BBC, 2000). As a result, the conflict got an increasingly international character because through the attention of international human right groups, Russia was determined to treat the conflict as an internal issue. Moscow was persistent in continuing trade negotiations with the EU as previously planned on the EU – Russia Summit in Helsinki in October 1999 (Haukkala, 2010). The conflict sought to escalate and produce lasting consequences when Russian troops took the Chechen capital Grozny and gave the remaining inhabitants an ultimatum to leave the city. The second Chechnya war was eventually settled in June 2000 by establishing that Chechnya was
once again part of Russia, and the new Chechen leaders pledged their loyalty to the Kremlin (Mansur, 2014).

Moreover in 2002, the Baltic States announce their application for both NATO and the EU. Both applications would be accepted by 2004, making the Baltic States the first – and so far, only- former Soviet states to join both institutions. Russia furthermore hoped that through the EU the protection of Russian minorities within the Baltics would be stricter implemented as minority rights had been subject to the partnership agreement of 1997 (PAC, Preamble, Best, 2013). Russia therefore, wished for the EU to address the statelessness of ethnic Russians living in Estonia and Latvia who were not legal citizens of either state (Best, 2013). Russia was further determined to negotiate visa-free travel for Russians living in Kaliningrad to not isolate the Russian republic from its neighbouring countries. Russia hence argued that through necessary visas a possible prosperity gap between Kaliningrad and its surroundings would be created (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014).

The Russian behaviour as outlined above will in the furthering be classified. The strategic actions undertaken by Russia during the period from 2000 until 2005 indicate tension as Russia and the EU were unable to find a common ground during the second Chechnya war. Yet though the conflict was of military nature, Russia’s military force was not directed against the EU or other countries but acted within Russian territory, thus implying that the conflict between the EU and Russia did not indicate pressure. Pressure would have been indicated by Russia using its military force to actively influence debates with the EU. The negotiations following the accession of the Baltic states were furthermore only partly successful as the minority rights for ethnics Russian were established in Estonia and Latvia but the visa-free transit of Russians into Lithuania was not granted which further indicates Tension (1).

However, it can thus not go unnoticed that the Russian military expenditure during this period indicated ‘pressure’. Therefore, it can be concluded that Russian behaviour in the period from 2000 until 2005 indicates ‘tension (1,5) ’ with a tendency towards ‘pressure’. The score of 1,5 underlines that the Russian behaviour is exactly between ‘tension’ and ‘pressure’.

In the following the EU’s reaction to the second Chechnya war, the Russian demands regarding the accession of the Baltics will be analysed in order to determine the EU’s degree of bandwagoning or balancing behaviour.

Firstly, the EU answered the Russian intervention in Chechnya with support for Russian territorial integrity. The Russian ‘counter-terrorism’ campaign however soon earned Russia criticism from the EU as the approach was generally perceived as too brutal, which was underlined by the ECHR declaration that human rights had been violated (Haukkala, 2010). As Russia proceeded to treat the conflict as an internal one, the EU’s interest in Russia’s action grew and with its suspicion of Russia. Especially when Russia refused to engage in political negotiation with local leaders, instead of proceeding the conflict through fighting (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014). On the EU – Russia summit in Helsinki, 1999 the conflict was highly discussed though no common ground was found on how Russia should continue to intervene.
The Russian ultimatum mentioned above ultimately triggered the EU to embrace a more affirmative tone towards Russia. In its ‘Declaration on Chechnya’ the European Council proposed possible sanction which would implemented if Russia would not re-evaluate its behaviour (European Council, 1999). Article 7 of the declaration further identifies these sanctions as the revision of the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia, the suspension of certain provisions of the PCA, the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tacis) for 2000 should only include first concern areas and human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety. However, the declaration also ended on sentimental note, urging Russia to not ‘move’ away from the EU as isolation is not the Union’s goal but rather partnership. Later on, in January 2000, the General Affairs Council decided on sanctions against Russia. Yet, the sanctions implemented were not identical with the sanction proposed in the Helsinki declaration, it has been argued by scholars that the sanctions did not have a significant effect on Russia and were titled ‘pseudo-sanctions’ (Donaldson & Nogee, 2014; Haukkala, 2010). The sanctions were ended in June 2000 ‘‘with the Union opting for a double strategy entailing a development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia while continuing to criticize’’ (Haukkala, 2010: 129).

The tone in the beforehand published statement summarizing the EU-Russia summit in May 2003 (“Joint Statement,” 2002) underlines that the EU sanction in this case might have been an instrument to appease the public opinion; in the document, the actors talk about their willingness to prolong their cooperation through the PCA and the EU acknowledges Russia’s efforts done towards creating market relations in its economy.

Secondly, the EU and Russia negotiated Russia’s demands concerning the accession of the Baltic states until 2004. The EU did not comply with Russia in all points. The EU recognized the issue of stateless people living within the Baltics, and stated its commitment to the protection of minorities in the Joint Statement on EU Enlargement an EU-Russia Relations, signed in Brussels 27.April 2004 (“Joint Statement in EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations,” 2004). However, visa-free travel for individuals from Kaliningrad to Lithuania would not be possible. The statement introduced the compromise of ‘‘a quasi visa regime using ‘facilitated travel documents’ for passengers transit by land and rail’’(Karabeshkin & Spechler, 2007). However, this compromise meant more of a loss for Russia than for the EU.

Concluding, the analysis of the EU’s behaviour towards from 2000 until 20005 has brought to light that EU’s behaviour changed significantly. This analysis has conducted that the EU’s tone has become harsher towards Russia however, it is questionable in how far that has effected the relationship. The EU sanctioned Russia for the first time in 2000. Yet, the effect of the sanctions on Russia were very limited; furthermore, the sanctions were imposed, were not as conclusive as the amount of sanctions the EU threatened Russia with for the sake of cooperation and development. Henceforth, ‘prohibitive actions’ indicate that the EU’s behaviour is in the ‘neutrality zone’ (0), thereby not scoring towards bandwagoning or balancing. It is thereby unsurprising that the EU deepened its relationship with Russia.
through closer economic cooperation in the years following the lifting of the sanctions. The ‘systemic actions’ thereby indicate that the EU is leaning towards balancing. The compromise over Russia’s demands following the Baltic accession application, were only partly met. The compromise rather serves the EU’s interests. The ‘systemic actions’ therefore imply ‘joint ambitions’ (1), the balancing score is thereby 1. Yet, it cannot be ignored that the second Chechnya war can be seen as a significant point in the relationship of the EU and Russia, as it was when the EU started to vary of Russia’s commitment to both democracy and human rights. The ‘cooperative actions’ remain unchanged in comparison to the previous period. The EU is valuing in commitment to NATO while regarding but not always respecting Russian interests as the NATO membership of the Baltic states underlines. The level of balancing remains ‘joint ambitions’ (1), the balancing remains 1 as well. As the ‘coordinated defence’ did not change as a reaction to Russian behaviour, the overall behaviour of the EU in period of 2000 until 2005 can be classified as ‘joint ambitions’ (1), the balancing score is thereby 1.

4.4 2005 – 2010: The case of Georgia
During the period of 2005 until 2010, the main conflict in EU-Russia relations was the Russian-Georgian war. It will therefore be elaborated how Russia justified its intervention and in how far the EU reacted to the intervention.

The increased level of aggression indicated by Russian behaviour in the previous period of analysis is resulting in subsequently increasing defence expenditure from all actors. Each state considered in this analysis in increasing its defence expenditure, Russian spending is increasing by 41,7 %, the UK’s spending grew by 8,2%, France’s expenditure increased by 1,7 % and German defence expenditure increased by 5,5 % as illustrated in figure 8. Even though, all actors increased their defence expenditure, Russia’s growth between 2005 and 2010 is the biggest. The overall sum of expenditure is also higher than the overall sum of expenditure of Germany. The difference between the combined spending of the three strongest defence actors within the EU and the Russian defence expenditure was 17% in 2010. As the difference is thereby significantly smaller in comparison to the difference in the previous period of analysis and the Russian defence expenditure is very close to the combined sum of the here considered EU MS, the Russian defence expenditure between 2005 and 2010 is indicating hostility (3), which means that the aggression score is 3.
After having analysed the Russian military spending between 2005 and 2010, it is relevant to analyse the most significant Russian strategic actions in this period of analysis in order to determine the overall level of Russian aggression within this timeframe. Therefore, the strategic actions most relevant for the relationship between the EU and Russia were identified as the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008. In this case the Russian actions will be outlined before the EU’s reaction will be analysed.

The relationship between Georgia and Russia has been troubled since the Georgian independence from the Russian Empire. The conflict in 2008 however was concerned with the two Georgian regions that had announced their independence from Georgia in 1992 – South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even though the independence was not recognized by Tbilisi (or any other government) the regions governed themselves. As there had been violent conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia in the past due to the independence claim, a ceasefire was adopted and Russia intervened as a mediator (Nichol, 2009). Nonetheless in August 2008, both South Ossetia and Georgia claimed the other had disrespected the ceasefire; Georgia therefore send troops into South Ossetia which Russia answered with airstrikes (ibid.). Days later Russia then proceeded to send troops into Georgia while warships arrived in Abkhazia, before Russia agreed to a peace agreement which was sponsored by French president Nicolas Sarkozy (Mahony, 2008). Even though, the agreement included provisions making both Georgia and Russia withdrawal their troops (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2008). Tensions remained high as Russia recognized both the regions, it shared borders with, as independent which Georgia understood as another act of aggression; a Russian, government-close news outlet described the situations as follows:
For the first time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some of the former autonomous Soviet regions of post-Soviet countries won recognition as independent states. Russia changed its status from that of mediator and peacekeeper to a promoter of self-determination in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia, for its part, hardened its resolve to become part of the North Atlantic and European communities” (Markedonov, 2016).

Russia understood its actions as liberating, as protecting the two regions from Georgian dominance while nobody else did. Georgia and also the EU refer the South Ossetia and Abkhazia as occupied by Russia ("Abkhazia profile ", 2015).

After having analysed Russian strategic actions within the period of 2005 to 2010, it can be concluded that Russian strategic actions can be classified as ‘‘pressure’’ (2), the aggression can thereby be defined as 2. Russian behaviour within this period of analysis cannot yet be classified as ‘‘hostility’’ as the communication between the EU and Russia is still open, however Russia is using its growing military power to pursue its interests against the EU’s will. For the classification, it makes a significant difference though that Russia is arguing that its intervention was necessary to protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia but Russia is not voicing territorial demands. It accepted both Georgian regions as independent entities, for its actions to be classified as ‘‘hostility’’ the territorial demands would need to significantly stronger. Due to the analysis of the strategic actions and the military spending, Russian behaviour is indicated to be between ‘‘tension’’ and ‘‘hostility’’ (2,5). The level of aggression within this period is thereby 2,5, which means that it is exactly between ‘‘pressure’’ and ‘‘hostility’’.

The EU answered Russian intervention in Georgia with criticism and concern over EU-Russia relations as the new PCA with Russia was to be negotiated in September 2008. The conflict itself was, through a peace-agreement under direction of French president Sarkozy, brought to an end. The EU in its Council Conclusion outlines the six point plan which Russia and Georgia had agreed to implement. The agreement is thereby, mandating the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian troops and the establishment of stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The agreement is furthermore underlining the respect for territorial integrity (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2008). Unsurprisingly, the EU condemned the Russian formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as it would work against the implementation of the peace plan but also because the recognition is not compatible with Georgian territorial integrity (Spiegel, 2008). The EU did refrain from sanctioning Russia over its involvement though; through the increasing Energy cooperation, the EU would have suffered from sanctioning just as much as Russia (Goldirova, 2008). The Baltic States and Poland have, however urged the EU to adopt a harsher tone towards Russia. In a joint statement, they proposed that the actions should influence the negotiations concerning the new PCA with Russia and they are questioning Russian commitment to democracy and thereby the benefit of the relationship for the EU (“Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia,” 2008). As no sanctions were imposed, the Baltics were partly disappointed in their demands. The EU made the decision to
postpone the negotiations of the new PCA, which were supposed to start in September 2008, for an unlimited period of time. However, in November it was announced that EU-Russia talks would be opened again (Schlamp, 2008). The Baltic States highly opposed this development and argued that negotiations should start again when the peace-plan was entirely implemented. Lithuania argued that Russia did not yet withdraw all its troops (Castle, 2008) – reports about Russian troops be withdrawn from Georgia did still surface in 2010 (Pop, 2010). The EU nevertheless held the summit with Russia, as the opposing MS could not accumulate enough power within the Union (Vogel 2008). The Commission notes that the EU was concerned about the Russian actions and sees human rights as a general issue in the relationship, yet the EU was also interested in pursuing further dialogue ("Review of EU-Russia Relations," 5 November 2008). The main goal of the EU after the Georgia-Russia conflict was to remain cautious while not isolating Russia. The leaders of Germany and France argued in a joint statement in the French newspaper Le Monde in 2009 that the EU shall build stronger cooperation with NATO; they also note that Russia shall thus not be isolated but that its action in Georgia ‘‘created a’’ trust problem” ‘‘(Vucheva, 2009).

The relationship between the EU and Russia shifted significantly during the period of 2005 and 2010, as the EU grew further suspicions of Russia but isolating it was not seeing as a viable option due to economic interests in Russia. Also, the EU did not desire to re-establish Cold War alike relations; yet the reliability of Russia as a partner has come into question which explains Germany’s and France’s interest in bettering relation with NATO as a more reliable option. Especially, the NATO relationship becomes increasingly relevant as it indicates the EU’s balancing ambitions. ‘Cooperative actions’ thereby imply that the EU is pursing ‘unified defence’ (2) as the EU moving closer to NATO while not regarding Russian interests as these are not compatible with European standards (as the respect for Georgian integrity). The balancing score is therefore 2. The EU sought dialogue with Russia but the character of the dialogue has changed. The EU is now more focused on not losing Russia as a partner and trying on influencing Russia towards integration and reform. Due to changed economic conditions, the EU can however no longer hold the upper hand in negotiations. The EU is in this period becoming aware that Russia needn’t necessarily comply with European compromises. The ‘strategic actions’ thereby indicate ‘neutrality’ (0), meaning no significant bandwagoning or balancing score can be observed. Furthermore, the ‘prohibitive actions’ indicate ‘neutrality’ (0) as the EU as taking measures against Russia by postponing the summit., the bandwagoning and balancing score is thereby 0. However, the measurement does not seem to be consequently executed as the summit is hold before Russia implements the agreed-on peace treaty. Moreover, there has been no movement in ‘coordinated defence’ as a response to Russia’s actions. Concluding, most indicators imply that the EU’s behaviour leaned towards neutrality within the period of 2005 until 2010, however ‘cooperative actions’ indicate ‘unified defence’ (2), the overall behaviour classification is thereby ‘neutrality’ with a tendency towards ‘joint ambition’ (1), the overall balancing score is thereby 1.
4.5 2010 – 2017: The way towards ‘Cold Peace’?

The main source of conflict in the period of 2010 until 2017 was the Crimea crisis. It will be explained how the crisis was created and how the EU reacted to the Russian involvement.

After having exceeded the defence expenditure of Germany in the previous period of analysis, the Russian defence expenditure grows higher than the French defence expenditure in 2012 by 4,1 % and exceed the British defence expenditure in the following year by 18,9 % as illustrated in figure 9. Russia thereby continues its trend in persistently increasing its defence spending. In the period from 2010 to 2016 Russia increased its defence expenditure by 35,9 %, while the UK decreased its spending by 24,9 %, France increased its spending by 2 % and Germany decreased its defence expenditure by 0,8 % as illustrated in figure 9. By 2016 the difference between the Russian defence expenditure is 30,1 % higher than the overall combined sum of defence expenditure of the EU MS. As Russia is by 2013, the most spending defence actor within Europe, its behaviour can be classified as highly escalatory (4), the aggression score is therefore the highest it could be, with a score of 4.

*Figure 8: Defence expenditure from 2010 until 2016*

In the following Russian strategic actions will be elaborated in order to determine the overall level of Russian aggression. The main strategic action in this period of analysis will be the Crimea crisis in 2014. Afterwards, the EU’s reaction to Russia’s behaviour will be analysed.

Russia and Ukraine have a moved history, of one ruling over the other. It was only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that Ukraine became independent, However, its politics remained highly connected even after Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ (Yushchenko, 2013). Especially after the EU’s accession round of 2004, Ukraine became the EU’s most important partner in the eastern Europe. While Ukraine was seeking EU membership, Russia was still having a significant influence on Ukrainian politics.
through exports of natural gas from Russia to or through Ukraine (Bates, 2014). While the Orange revolution brought a pro-EU leadership into power, the election of 2010 results gave power back to the pro-Russia opposition, who effectively ended negotiations with the EU ("Ukraine suspends preparations for EU trade agreement," 2013). Ukrainians answered such government actions with protests, ultimately leading to the happenings of the Euromaidan in 2014, protesters overtake government institutions, while pro-Russian movements rallied against such actions in the East of Ukraine. Ukraine therefore became internally separated (for more a more analysis coherent of Ukrainian internal politics (Dyczok, 2015; Katchanovski, 2015b). Russia argued that the government take-over was a “fascist coup” (Katchanovki, 2015a: 85) which endangered ethnic Russians and thereby justified Russian support for the separatist. However, Russia denies any military involvement in Crimea as Putin argued that Russia never made use of the parliament’s permission to use armed forces in Ukraine (Putin, 2014). After the separatist overtake government institutions in Crimea and Sevastopol, a referendum about Crimea’s accession to Russia was held (Katchanovski, 2015a). Russia’s involvement in the crisis sparked when Crimea was formally accepted as a part of Russia, making the citizens of the area Russian and leading to a re-organisation of governing institutions ("Agreement on the accession to the Russian Federation signed," 18 March 2014). In his speech regarding the accession President Putin underlines the legality of the referendum, the right of the Crimean people to express their opinion but also that Russia was “robbed” (Putin, 2014) of Crimea after the dissolution of the USSR. Ukraine and Russia had formally been one state and within this state Crimea was given to Ukraine. He goes on explaining that Russia let this happen, as it was directly after the end of the Soviet Union not strong enough to “[protect] its interests” (ibid.). Putin goes to define Russian territorial demands, referring to Crimea as “historical Russia” and thereby concludes that what became known as an annexation, is, from a Russian point of view, a reunification. Putin argues in his address harshly against Western nations, that they are denying Crimea independence under the argumentation of national sovereignty even though the independence of Kosovo was viewed as legal and just. He furthermore notes that “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs” (ibid.). The emphasis when regarding this quotation shall be on the “independent”, in combination with the praise that is given to China and India in the same speech, can be understood as a clear message to the West, including the EU, that Russia is not in need of their approval. However, the speech also underlines that the EU would through sanctions be the party to damage the relationship. Putin, by pointing out the similarity between Kosovo’s and Crimea’s case, portrays the EU as a hypocrite for sanctioning Russia. Henceforth, it becomes clear that Russia does not acknowledge the EU’s narrative. Russia furthermore sees itself as the protector and saviour (ibid.). Even though, Russia agreed together with the US, the EU and Ukraine to the joint statement on Ukraine ushered in Geneva in April 2014 (“Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17: The full text,” 2014), the measures of de-escalation which were expected by the EU (and the US) were not met in their totality. The Geneva statement just as the Minsk Protocol have in common
that, even without formally talking about Crimea, the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine is a vital part ("Minsk Monitor", 2016)

Russian behaviour can increasingly be defined as aggressive and assertive. The actions in Ukraine furthermore prove that Russia is increasingly using its military power to pursue its interests. The fact that Russia did not comply with the agreements made to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine (the Geneva statement and the Minsk agreement) underlines that the perceptions of the accession (annexation) are not compatible. Russia is furthermore not making compromises to its own perception and is using its military power to guaranty that no compromises will be necessary to protect its territorial demands. Russia’s strategic actions can be classified as ‘’hostility’’(3) as Russia not increasingly putting its own demands and interests first and is using military power. The aggression score is therefore 3. Russian behaviour can thereby be classified as between hostility and highly escalatory (3,5), the aggression is also supporting that the Russian level of aggression is exactly between hostility and aggression.

The clash in perception could be observed all through the crisis, among the first reactions from the EU was the Council conclusion on Ukraine on the 3rd March 2014, in which the EU strongly condemns Russia’s actions within Ukraine and is urging Russian to withdraw any force (Foreign Affairs Council, 2014). The EU MS who participate in G8, furthermore suspended their participation in the upcoming summit in Sochi; other restrictive measures like the suspension of visa talks as well as the on the new PCA followed (Article 3) (European Council, 2014a). The EU furthermore expressed its support towards the new Ukrainian government while urging the Ukrainian and Russian government to engage in dialogue. Henceforth, the EU is in the beginning of March 2014 pressing for a peaceful solution and hopes to move Russia into the direction of negotiations with Ukraine through the threat of more sanctions. Unsurprisingly, the EU condemned the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and does not recognize them as part of Russia (Article 29) and therefore extends the sanctions in place but does not add further sanctions. The European Council argues in its conclusion from the 21st March that more sanctions were not added to not close the possibility of dialogue and de-escalation (European Council, 2014b) Yet, as the statements of Geneva statement have not been implemented the European Council’s sanctioned Russia and Crimea with ‘economic sanctions’ in July 2014. These ‘economic sanctions’ would deny Russia access to EU capital markets, European based companies and banks would through the sanctions no longer be allowed to trade or in any way engage with their Russian counterparts. The sanctions further included an arms embargo regarding import and export ("Adoption of agreed restrictive measures in view of Russia's role in Eastern Ukraine ", 2014). The tone towards Russia is becoming increasingly critical and distant, while earlier conclusions were still furthering the dialogue. The EU is less willing to make any compromise, its making clear to Russia that cooperation is only possible under its conditions it has set. With the Minsk agreements, the EU connected the lifting of the sanctions to specific conditions (European Council, 2015). However, the implementation of the Minsk agreements has as of June 2017 not been successful ("Minsk Monitor,” 2016). The annexation of Crimea had besides
the sanctions imposed on Russia and frozen EU-Russia relationship, a significant influence on the security within Europe. The Baltic states were due their geographical and historical connection to Russia especially effected by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the concern about the Baltics security grew. The three states had during the time of the Soviet Union been integrated into the USSR, possibly making them “historically Russian” (Putin, 2014) in Russian eyes; the argument of Russian interest in the Baltics becomes stronger through that fact that Ethnic Russians still make up significant percentage of the population. The protection of Ethnic Russians had been used as an argumentation for intervention during the war with Georgia in 2008 and was also a reason for the support of separatists in Crimea (Best, 2013). Due to limited military resources, the three Baltic states are unable to protect themselves and therefore especially vulnerable to possible Russian attacks (Hyndle-Hussein, 2015). As the conflict with Russia did since 2014 not resolve, Russia continued to pose a security threat to the Baltics. NATO had so far acted as their main source of protection through, as NATO troops, among them troops from EU MS such as Germany, France and the UK, were deployed in the Baltic states (Rettman, 2017b). Henceforth, the cooperation between EU MS and NATO grew significantly after the Russian annexation, making it even clearer that NATO is now the main security and defence actor within Europe. However, as the President of the US, the main donor to NATO, did first not pledge his full commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the article concerned with collective defence "Collective defence - Article 5", 2017), before then announcing support for the concept of collective defence (Pence, 2017; "Trump erkennt Artikel 5 nun doch an," 2017). Thereby NATO and the US became a less reliable for the EU. Especially, the focus of the Estonian presidency on unified security underlines that there is a development towards a more independent European Defence Union that could possibly become more than an idea. Also, other MS such as Germany have voiced their support for a more European defence. Chancellor Angela Merkel has in a recent speech expressed that should not rely on others for its cooperation (Rettman, 2017a). First notions were seen towards such development could be observed when the EP proposed a vague plan on how to achieve closer defence cooperation within the EU in October 2016 (Europea Parliament, 2016). The EP’s proposal calls for a permanent headquarter concerned with European defence, a unified defence budget, the creation of a permanent Council of defence ministers and the development of a White Book process among others. Even though the proposal has been entirely implemented, the Council Conclusion on the progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence shows significant development in the areas of defence budget as well as the reformation of existing structures. The Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) had been implemented earlier, but had not been used by MS to organize coherent defence cooperation therefore reformation of the instrument shall make it more attractive to MS (“Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence,” 2017). Most recently, the European Commission has moreover started to debate a possible security and defence union with the goal of “enhac[ing] Europe’s own abilities in defence by 2025” (A Europe that defends:

Summarizing, the EU showed intensive signs of a change in its behaviour after the Crimea crisis. Firstly, the EU adopted measures regarding 'coordinated defence' that can be traced back to the Russian intervention in Ukraine as the annexation is named as a specific reason for the development. It is also significant that Estonia is now through its Council presidency pushing the defence agenda further, as it is highly effected by the Russian threat. Through the measures described above, ‘coordinated defence indicates ‘unified defence’ (2), giving the action a balancing score of 2. The classification describes a state in which the EU is trying to achieve a more European defence, which fits the observed development. ‘Cooperative actions’ furthermore indicate ‘unified defence’ (2) as well, as the EU is strengthening its cooperation with NATO. However, the EU is not equally capable in comparison to NATO, ‘complete independence’ is therefore not indicated. The balancing score is therefore 2. Moreover, ‘prohibitive actions’ indicate ‘unified defence’ (2) as the sanctions imposed on Russia are bound to the implementation of the Minsk II agreement and thereby not necessarily permanent from the EU’s perspective, the ‘prohibitive actions’ therefore get a balancing score of 2. The sanctions have furthermore effected the relationship between the EU and Russia in so far that dialogue is only very rarely possible and formal cooperation is impossible. ‘Systemic actions’ can due to the sanctions be classified as ‘complete independence’ (3). The EU is not negotiating with Russia and is therefore regarding other nations as partners. The balancing score for ‘systemic actions’ is therefore 3.

Having regarded all indicators, it can be concluded that the EU is in the period of 2010 until 2017 pursuing balancing behaviour with the classification ‘unified defence’ (2), the overall balancing score is therefore 2.

5. Conclusion
This research’s objective was to study the effect Russian aggression had on the EU behaviour towards Russia. The analysis has revealed that in the period of 1991 until 1995 the Russian aggression level was at the lowest level of ‘de-escalatory’; the EU answered that behaviour with ‘joint ambitions’, low balancing behaviour. During the period of 1995 until 2000 Russia continued to engage in ‘de-escalatory’ behaviour to with the EU reacted with ‘neutrality’. In the period from 2005 until 2010, Russia pursued ‘tension’ towards which the EU reacted with ‘neutrality’. In the following period 2005 until 2010 the Russian level of aggression grew to be ‘pressure’, which the EU answered with balancing behaviour to the degree of ‘joint actions. When the Russian aggression grew to be ‘hostile’ in 2010 to 2017, the EU answered with balancing behaviour of ‘unified defence’.
As visualised in figure 9, the behaviour moved, in the overall studied period from 1991 from to 2017, towards balancing behaviour. The analysis has henceforth exposed that the Hypothesis 2 false is, as the EU did not pursue bandwagoning behaviour within the studied timeframe. Hypothesis 1 however is true but only to a certain as the EU did not yet establish a European Defence Union but significant steps towards such an establishment were taken. As hypothesis 1 was found to be true, it is the answer to the research question that the EU pursued balancing behaviour which makes it more likely that the EU will pursue balancing behaviour in the future. The Hypothesis can still be viewed as true, as significant steps towards balancing have been observed. Moreover, to answer the first sub-question, the Russian aggression level did substantially increase within the studied timeframe, making it possible to consider in how far the Russian aggression level will behave in the future. The steadily increasing military spending indicates that the Russian level of aggression will go on to rise or at least not decrease. A decrease in Russian aggression is unlikely for the reason that makes it unlikely that the EU will reduce its balancing behaviour: Crimea. The most recent conflict was also the most damaging for the relationship. Ultimately, one party must give in on the perception of Crimea. While the EU perceives it as an annexation, Russia sees it as a reunification with Crimea. These perceptions are not compatible in any way. Yet, for dialogue and negotiations about partnership to ever start again, there would need to be one common understanding of Crimea’s status. This is highly relevant as the conflict brought to light conflicting understandings of sovereignty. Russia, perceiving it has its sovereignty to help Crimea, while the EU perceives it as Ukraine’s sovereignty. Without the same understanding no trust can be established. As of now, neither party shows signs in changing its perception of Crimea’s status. This argumentation serves as an answer for the second sub-question, as it underlines that the EU was motivated act through a feeling of commitment to international norms, while economic interest also play
a significant role. Henceforth, it is likely that the EU will further develop defence capabilities to establish security from the Russian threat. To answers the third sub-question, it seems unlikely that the EU would pursue the most extreme bandwagoning behaviour as the EU is valuing its and other nations integrity too much to let another nation intervene which makes ‘submission’ impossible. The EU has furthermore been very persistent in pursuing its agenda, the analysis has shown that the EU most in advantage in comparison to Russia concerning negotiations. The would moreover not change its behaviour completely, the analysis revealed that mostly follows one trend of behaviour and only slowly developed towards a certain direction. The EU did develop towards balancing during the analysed timeframe, the might therefore, be a possibility that the EU would pursue extreme balancing behaviour in the far future.

6. Limitations

While this research was conducted, it was tried to cover as much information about the development of the EU-Russia relationship as possible. However, not all information could be viewed as feasible for the conduction of this research project as it would have infringed its validity. The Russian reaction to establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could not be included as it would have meant that that the dependent variable would have come before the independent variable. Also, the relationship between the Ukraine and both actors was considered, however, it could not be included. The relationship with Ukraine did influence the conflict, yet Ukrainian internal developments are highly relevant for understanding its relationship with Russia and the EU. Furthermore, the decision was made to only include Russian actions that resulted in a direct reaction from the EU, the conflict around the Ukraine did not qualify for that. Therefore, the focus was put on the Crimea crisis.

It must be further noted, that while the neorealist paradigm is most appropriate one for this study, it does not allow the acknowledgment of internal developments. In order to shed light on certain developments, like to Russian development towards to political right, national politics would have to be considered. The same goes for the EU, during the studied timeframe significant changed were made to the EU’s framework; however, in order to include such changes, it would have been necessary to study internal politics among MS and within MS.

Furthermore, it was noted in Chapter X, this study was unable to include intervening variables due to the framework in which it was conducted. Even though, NATO was included as an institution in which EU MS act, the influence of the US could not be studied. Therefore, a suggestion for further research is to investigate in how the US through NATO influenced the EU – Russia relationship.
Henceforth, it would be a suggestion for future study projects to also include the internal developments of the actors included to explain the international developments. A more concrete for future research would furthermore be to re-do this study in ten years or even more from now. If this issue would be researched again in the future, new conclusions about the effect of the Crimea crisis can be made. It would be likely that due to new developments, the EU’s behaviour could be assets more carefully. Furthermore, this research ends on the note that the EU will develop further defence capabilities; in the , it will thus be possible to study if hypothesis 1 did become possible
Bibliography

Books and articles


*Military strike on Chechen village in 2000 was in breach of the Convention, as acknowledged by the Russian Government press release by the European Court of Human Rights, 03 October 2013*


**EU documents**

*Adoption of agreed restrictive measures in view of Russia's role in Eastern Ukraine* Press release by the General Secretariat of the Council, 31 July 2017


European Council (1999) *European Council in Helsinki 10 – 11 December, Presidency Conclusion, Annex II Declaration on Chechnya*


European Council (2017) *European Council in Brussels, 22 May, Annex to Council decision (EU, Euratom) 2017/... authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangement for its withdrawal from the European Union – Directives for the negotiations of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union.*


**Russian documents**


**Joint documents**
Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part' (28 November 1997). Official Journal, L327/3.


Other documents


Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia, 09 August 2008

Appendix I

Overview over the tables used in this thesis.

Table 1: Explanation of the manifestations of the bandwagoning-balancing spectre......................... 12
Table 2: Indicators for the classifications ......................................................................................... 14
Table 3: Classification Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour ................................................................. 17
Table 4: Values of the classifications for the independent variable: .................................................. 19
Table 5: Summary of the analysis regarding the dependent variable .............................................. 51
Table 6: Summary of the analysis regarding the independent variable ............................................ 52

Overview over the figures used in this thesis.

Figure 1: Bandwagoning and Balancing Spectre ............................................................................. 11
Figure 2: Bandwagoning- Balancing Spectre with values ................................................................. 16
Figure 3: Development of Russian expenditure ................................................................................. 20
Appendix II
Overview of European and Russian defence expenditure in total numbers (shown million USD) according to the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$41,938,00</td>
<td>$56,716,00</td>
<td>$56,686,00</td>
<td>$53,864,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$36,661,00</td>
<td>$54,125,00</td>
<td>$56,058,00</td>
<td>$48,423,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$34,657,00</td>
<td>$52,636,00</td>
<td>$56,346,00</td>
<td>$45,159,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$22,803,00</td>
<td>$49,369,00</td>
<td>$53,557,00</td>
<td>$44,416,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$21,533,00</td>
<td>$49,074,00</td>
<td>$52,272,00</td>
<td>$43,549,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$23,540,00</td>
<td>$47,528,00</td>
<td>$52,451,00</td>
<td>$41,966,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III

Table 5: Summary of the analysis regarding the dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military spending</th>
<th>Strategic actions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991 – 1995</td>
<td>De-escalatory (0)</td>
<td>De-escalatory (0)</td>
<td>De-escalatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinated defence</td>
<td>Cooperative actions</td>
<td>Prohibitive actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1991 – 1995</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Joint ambitions (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995 – 2000</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Joint ambitions (1)</td>
<td>Support (-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000 – 2005</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Joint ambitions (1)</td>
<td>Neutrality (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005 – 2010</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unified defence (2)</td>
<td>Neutrality (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010 – 2017</strong></td>
<td>Unified defence (2)</td>
<td>Unified defence (2)</td>
<td>Unified defence (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995 – 2000</strong></td>
<td>De – escalatory (0)</td>
<td>De – escalatory (0,5)</td>
<td>(0 + 0,5)/2 = 0,25 De-escalatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000 – 2005</strong></td>
<td>Pressure (2)</td>
<td>Tension (1)</td>
<td>(2+1)/2 = 1.5 Tension – Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005 – 2010</strong></td>
<td>Hostility (3)</td>
<td>Pressure (2)</td>
<td>(3+2)/2 = 2.5 Pressure – Hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010 – 2017</strong></td>
<td>Highly escalatory (4)</td>
<td>Hostility (3)</td>
<td>(4+3)/2 = 3.5 Hostility – Highly escalatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Summary of the analysis regarding the independent variable*

*Figure 10: Summary of the results of the dependent and independent variable*
Figure 11: Development of the independent and dependent variable

Figure 11 illustrates the development of Russian aggression and the EU’s development towards balancing — as the analysis did not reveal any significant development towards bandwagoning, the negative bandwagoning scores are not included. The periods of analysis are illustrated by the number of horizontal pivot. Whereas 1 signifies 1991 until 1995, 2 signifies 1995 until 2000, 3 signifies 2000 until 2005, 4 signifies 2005 until 2010 and 5 signifies 2010 until 2017.