Instrumentalising Identity

How the EU is using the narrative of European Identity in its discourse to securitise migration in order to combat terrorism

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A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Bachelor of Science

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July 6, 2017
Abstract

In this Bachelor thesis, a critical discourse analysis is conducted to answer the research question "Did the increase of terror attacks along with the refugee crisis in the EU since 2015 lead to a discursive interlinking of counter-terrorism and migration policy and can these developments in the discourse be regarded as a securitisation process?" The research is carried out by analysing various policy documents of EU Institutions authored in recent years, in the areas of counter-terrorism and migration and asylum policy. The aim is to detect if the EU is discursively constructing an existential terrorist threat that is legitimising security practices which are possibly restricting immigration and conflict with the shared values that constitute the European identity, including freedom, the respect of fundamental rights and the principle of openness.
Introduction

The European Union has seen better times. The past three years have especially been challenging the concept of the EU due to multiple serious crises at a time. The refugee crisis, resulting from aggravating wars and violent conflicts in the Middle East, is severely testing the migration framework of the European Union. Not only in an economical, but also in an ideological way, as the divide between welcoming culture and anti-immigration voices is becoming more evident. Migration is overall perceived as the biggest problem on European level by EU citizens (European Commission, 2016). The positions of the member states towards a common asylum strategy are, however, strongly diverging and the action steps which are expected to be taken by the EU from the different member states are mostly incommensurable in political reality. The perception of migration as the major problem for the European Union nowadays results to a great extent from the public fear that the refugee crisis has triggered the increase in terrorism which the European Union is experiencing. Since the uprising of Da’esh, the terror threat reached new and previously unimaginable expansions. European Metropolitan areas increasingly became the focus of terrorists, the frequency of attacks increased dramatically: while in 2014, there was only a single terror attack committed by Da’esh on EU territory, the number rose to four in 2015 and to 8 in 2016. Especially the cruel incidents in Brussels, Paris, Nice and Berlin with in total more than 250 people killed shook the European Union to its core. The fact that such worrying phenomena have been hitting the EU simultaneously and in addition, the circumstance that the investigation of some attacks showed that a few terrorists exploited the European asylum system, are feeding populism, nationalism and racism in public as well as in politics. Right-wing politicians of some member states, such as Marie Le-Pen in France, Viktor Orban in Hungary or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands (Zalan, 2015), have increasingly been using the public discourse of fearing terrorism to promote their populist anti-immigration policies. The growing call for the closure of the European external borders was already realised by some member states on a national level (Stevens, 2015). The EU institutions find themselves in a challenging position: they are expected to balance the European strategy to provide for internal security between the prevention of potential terrorists entering the EU territory and likewise guaranteeing protection and asylum to people fleeing from war and terror.
For this balancing act, the way in which the European Union is constructing the issues of terrorism and migration in its security discourse is especially relevant. The language used on the EU level to frame the counter-terrorism and migration agendas, serves as an important indicator to identify the political focus of the EU and how it evolved in response to increasing terrorism. Discourse can serve as powerful tool, especially in security policies. The theory of securitisation, which is itself a discursive process, was developed by the Copenhagen School and determines that securitisation is constituted by an actor claiming “that a referent object is existentially threatened”, demanding “the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that the threat” and furthermore convincing “an audience that rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified” (Van Munster, 2012). This process has already been object to analysis by various scholars in the context of the connection between terrorism and migration in the EU. The assumption that terrorism might lead to a securitisation of migration policy is not a new one. However, the research on the link of migration and counter-terrorism policies still lacks an analysis of the very recent developments in the EU, as most of the discourse analyses were conducted in the aftermath of 9/11. This thesis seeks to answer the following research question:

Did the increase of terror attacks along with the refugee crisis in the EU since 2015 lead to a discursive interlinking of counter-terrorism and migration policy and can these developments in the discourse be regarded as a securitisation process?

The research question is answered through the conduction of a discourse analysis. Object of this analysis are official documents, including statements, recommendations and legally binding texts draft by the different EU institutions in response to various terror attacks which were committed in EU Member States and confessed to by Da’esh. The focus of analysis lies on discovering patterns of change in this discourse, particularly securitisation tendencies not only in the political agenda of the European Union to combat terrorism but also in migration policy. Of importance for the evaluation of discursive developments in terms of securitisation is the narrative of the European identity which is prevalent throughout the discourse and contributes to the constitution of the dialectic between the threat and the threatened. This European identity is based on shared values and principles, including freedom and the respect of fundamental rights but also the principle of openness and free movement. Examining how the EU is constituting and utilising its identity throughout the discourse and if this is conflicting with the security measures affecting migration is thus imperative to evaluate the ways in which the EU discourse
responded to the growing terror threat of recent years.
The following chapter is elaborating on existing theoretical approaches that are relevant for the conduction of the analysis in this thesis as well as for the evaluation of its findings. Subsequently, the relevant research methods are introduced taking into account the way of collecting and analysing the relevant data. Furthermore, the analysis is conducted in two parts: the first part is examining the discourse in terms of linkages of migration and counter-terrorism policies, while the second part is analysing how the EU is utilising the identity narrative in order to consolidate its position as a security actor. Eventually, the concluding chapter is discussing if the discursive developments can be regarded as a securitisation process and what the implications are for the political reality of the contemporary European Union.

Theory

Discourses can usually be understood in two interlinked ways: on the one hand, what texts or speech acts express linguistically and on the other hand, how discourse can be interpreted, taking into account the context in which it occurs. The following chapter is aimed at elaborating on existing research and theories in the area of critical discourse analysis, especially in terms of migration and counter-terrorism policy. This section predominantly goes into conducted analyses of the European security discourse and the linking of migration and counter-terrorism. However, also other theoretical insights which serve as a basis of analysis for this thesis, are discussed. The focus lies on the concept of securitisation, the respective findings and theoretical approaches social science has developed. The analysis and interpretation of discourses can serve as an efficient instrument to discover and reveal concealed ideologies and intentions of speakers and authors through the examination of language and formulations. Discourse analysis is a broad field. It is understood differently in every area of social science and for every type of discourse. For the analysis of political discourse, one method is especially popular to obtain a bigger picture of intentions, ideologies and power structures behind political speech acts and texts. The Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA) was developed and applied by Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.3) to serve the distinct purpose, not only to establish a link between language and intention, but rather to explore underlying power relations (Wodak, 2001, p.2). The theory of CDA is assuming that
especially in discourses highly focussed on conflict, such as gender, media and political discourse, “structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak, 2001, p.2) are prevalent and need to be investigated to show up and counter social inequalities (Wodak, 2001, p.2). The CDA approach offers a mechanism to identify the power position of actors and parties to the discourse and to analyse, how power is utilised to execute dominance and apply pressure from above. Wodak claims that “dominant structures stabilize conventions and naturalize them, that is, the effects of power and ideology in the production of meaning are obscured” (2001, p.3) and thus points out that power relations and ideologies hinder the neutral and value-free perception of the meaning of discourse. The critical analysis of political discourses is aimed at producing awareness of the way in which ideology is “establishing and maintaining unequal power relations” (Wodak, 2001, p.10) to eventually produce “enlightenment and emancipation” (Wodak, 2001, p.10) in order to reduce deeply-rooted social inequalities.

Keeping in mind the theory and objectives of CDA, it seems to serve as an appropriate approach to analyse the security discourse of the EU, in order to examine discursive developments and potential securitisation tendencies in migration and counter-terrorism policy. The EU discourse appears to be an elite discourse, constructed by powerful political actors to frame crisis and conflict situations in ways, that could contribute to legitimise and stabilise concrete policy actions. Analysing political discourse is essential to understand certain political and social development and additionally, how language is able to shape political decisions and the public perception of crises. Discourse operates in different ways and researching on it can serve various purposes. Richard Jackson enumerates those purposes in his work on the “war on terror” discourse of the United States: “The analysis of public political discourse [...] reveals how some forms of knowledge are privileged over others, how identity is constructed and maintained, how power is legitimised, how political and institutional practices are normalized” (2005, p.174). Furthermore, he states that “discourses act as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction, and transformation of relations of domination in society.” (2005, p.174) This idea takes up the theoretical approach of the Critical Discourse Analysis. The identification and critical evaluation of structures of dominance is not only important for the “war on terror” discourse, but also for the EU’s counter-terrorism policy in order to assess if and how the discourse is instrumentalised to construct identity and if this has effects on migration policies.
The area of security is in particular impacted by power relations when it comes to the implementation of protection and control measures legitimised by the existence of a certain threat or crisis situation. Securitisation is a term with different conceptualisations in existing theory. There is a general understanding of what a process of securitisation includes, which is mostly oriented along the traditional securitisation approach developed by the Copenhagen School. However, there exists no common set of fixed steps of actions that are applied in order to securitise a certain political area. Rut Bermejo, who analysed the linkage between immigration and security in the EU, states that in order to frame a specific issue in security terms, an existential threat needs to be presented discursively (Bermejo, 2009, 2p.07). She further identifies the pre-conditions for the classification of a security threat: the threat as well as the threatened object needs to be clearly defined, additionally the causal relation, “the chain linking the causes […] and consequences”(2009, p.207), between threat and threatened has to be made obvious. Thus, securitisation usually results from the discursive construction of the dialectic relation between the threat and the threatened object in need of protection. Bermejo furthermore claims that securitising certain matters can have important implications, which political elites are using for their purposes: the framing of an issue in security terms offers the possibility “to introduce exceptional measures which would otherwise encounter greater resistance” (2009, p.208). This raises the question if the European Union as a political elite and social power, is using its counter-terrorism discourse to introduce and legitimise concrete political measures in order to respond to the (constructed) threat, which under different conditions would have been perceived as illegitimate.

In his analysis of the EU counter-terrorism discourse, Christopher Baker-Beall especially emphasises the way, in which the European Union is projecting its identity internally and externally through its counter-terrorism policy and specifically how this EU identity is discursively create in opposition to a terrorist “other” (Baker-Beall, 2014, p.217). The identity in this context is itself constructed: “reproduced through and productive of numerous EU policies” (2014, p.217). Baker-Beall points out that, through this dialectic, the threat and those who need to be protected are clearly distinguished. The EU uses the construction of a shared identity to enhance the perception that this identity needs to be protected from the terrorist threat, which is itself incompatible with the European Values (2014). The possibility to introduce exceptional measures (2009, p.208) that is identified by Rut Bermejo as one intention of securitisation, was also mentioned by Baker-Beall as a consequence of the discursive construction of the EU’s fight against terrorism: “what is most ‘effective’ about it, is the way in which the threat of the terrorist
'other' has been invoked by EU institutions, politicians and policy-makers, on a consistent basis, in order to legitimise or to justify the expansion of EU internal security policies and the 'Europeanisation of crime control policies' (p.231,232). The counter-terrorism approach of the EU is constructed in a specific way, creating a "we versus them" perception, to legitimise policy actions which, without the existence of the terrorist threat endangering the European identity, would probably not have received the necessary degree of approval. The findings of Baker-Beall go hand in hand with one theory that has a long tradition in identity studies. The Social Identity Theory, developed by Henri Tajfel in 1974, assumes that belonging to a group provides individuals with a certain sense of social identity. People tend to increase their self-image by discriminating other social groups with different identities (Tajfel, 1974). This exactly creates that "we versus them" perception, which Baker-Beall identified in his research on the counter-terrorism discourse of the European Union.

In his work on the linkage between the European Union’s “fight against terrorism” discourse and securitisation of migration policy, however, Christopher Baker-Beall expands his theory of legitimation through discourse. In order to examine the discursive construction of a migrant “other” threatening the European society, he argues that the EU discourse constructed the threat of terrorism as interlinked to the threat of the “migrant other”, a social group that potentially jeopardises the European society and its common values. This linkage is subsequently leading to the securitisation of migration policy (2009, p.199).

However, Baker-Beall is distinguishing the concept of securitisation that occurs in the area of migration policy from the securitisation theory which he developed in the context of general EU security policy. He argues that in the area of migration “it is a more banal form of securitisation in that its impact is less the creation of special measures in exceptional circumstances [...] and more the introduction of mundane policies and practices, [...] that in this case result in "normalising the statistical majority and a normalising the migrants" (2009; 199). In contrast to the traditional securitisation concept, it is therefore not the creation of a status of exceptionalism to push for extraordinary policy actions but rather “a normalisation of the policies and practices, the technologies of security that construct the ‘migrant other’ as a threat.” (2009, p.199).

Examining the connection of the EU counter-terrorism approach and the securitisation process of migration and asylum policy, Baker-Beall furthermore pointed out the conflict between the “openness” of the European society and the threat of terrorism conflated with the problem of migration (2009, p.198). While the openness of the EU is rooted in the establishment of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, as it was pursued by the Tampere Conclusion in 1999,
it is discursively constructed as a threat to the European society being “an environment which the terrorist(s) abuses to pursue their own objectives” (2009, p.198). A central finding of his analysis is again closely linked to the concept of European identity, which he defines as “a shared commitment to a number of values including freedom, respect for human rights, democratic institution the rule of law, as well as peace, prosperity and tolerance” (2009, p.198). He emphasises that “terrorism is constructed as a threat to these values and as such a threat to European society” (2009, p.198). This clearly indicates that the EU counter-terrorism is powerful in constructing “insiders” and “outsiders” and creating a sharp distinction between those who are promoting the European values and therefore enjoying their merits, and those who are endangering the European identity and thus should be excluded.

The deep connection between the securitisation discourse and the identity narrative has already been object of analysis of various social scientists. Based on traditional social theories, including the “Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel Huntington, which assumes that the prior source for conflict in the modern world will be of cultural nature (Huntington, 1993) as well as the above mentioned Social Identity Theory, many scholars already have detected that the identity discourse plays a role of importance for immigration policies, especially in terms of security. David Campbell stated as early as 1998: “Inescapable as it is, identity - whether personal or collective - is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference” (p.352). Furthermore, he claims that this is also reversely the case: “difference is constituted in relation to identity” (p.352). This statement highlights the discursive nature of both phenomena and their inability to exist objectively, due to the fact that they rather are social constructs. How this discursive construction of identity is connected to securitisation is discussed by Alessandra Buonfino in the context of the securitisation of immigration in Europe. She states the following “This security/insecurity dilemma is at the heart of the immigration debate in Europe today. In a world where boundaries and categories are necessary in order to establish and reaffirm identity, immigration - as the flow of foreigners, the Other - has increasingly become a phenomenon that needs to be controlled” (2006, p.47). This reflects what Baker-Beall has likewise identified in his work: foreigners are constituted as “the other” who pose an unpredictable security risk, if they maintain uncontrolled, due to the assumption that the openness of the European society could be exploited by potential terrorist individuals.

Elspeth Guild emphasises as well that the principle of openness of the EU is increasingly presented as a threat. He identifies that asylum and migration constantly have to cope with
conflicting principles, this is on the one hand the spreading of human rights and economic liberalisation resulting in an increasing level of openness and on the other hand the exclusion of the foreign, implying the closure of borders, in order to maintain national security (2003, p.395). Guild points out that the threats, which foreigners are represented as, are of distinct nature: they are especially regarded as a danger to social welfare systems and national culture and identity but since the increasing number of terror attacks committed by foreigners and especially as a reaction to 9/11, foreign individuals are regarded as possible criminals and a threat to national security (2003, p.396). However, as Guild furthermore mentions, the principles of human rights and national security are not only conflicting in a normative but also in a legal way. The EU itself has, through its commitment in the realisation of human rights standards, limited the possibilities of closing borders and deny foreigners access to EU territory. The Geneva Convention as well as the European Convention and Human Rights both “create obstacles for the exclusion and expulsion of foreigners from the territory of signatory states” (2003, p.396). These obstacles were initially set up to guarantee asylum for people with unsafe states of origin and protect them from persecution and violence. Especially the events of September 11th in 2001 in the US produced a “tension between open borders in fundamental human rights law for others [...] and the pressure for closure of borders for national security reasons” (Guild, 2003, p.379). These tensions seem to increase significantly now that Europe has to face a severe refugee crisis on the one hand and a previously unexperienced frequency of terror attacks on the other.

This conflict of principles is posing the question how, in face of the crises it is confronted with, the European Union will be able to guarantee for the compliance with human rights and likewise for security for its citizens. Guild concludes that “among the most important challenges which the post 11 September climate presents, is how to adhere effectively and consistently with the Community’s new laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of racial and religious origin” (2003, p.398). He hereby stresses the fact that even if the temptation is high for the institutions to implement laws and practices concerning migration in a way that “handicap individuals on the basis of their state of nationality in the name of national security” (2003, p.398), this would be discriminating and therefore not legal neither in union nor in national law.

The existing literature on the EU counter-terrorism discourse as well as on the securitisation of migration is extensive. Various scholars clearly identify a link between the terror attacks of the 21st century and their impact on the European security discourse especially in terms of migration. The findings of the diverse analyses of this phenomenon are however differing between scientists. Rut Bermejo concludes from her analysis of post 9/11 developments in the
EU that the changing and expanding of existent migration and asylum law after the cruel and shocking events of September 11, 2001 cannot be regarded as a securitisation process of this policy field and that the EU discourse on immigration “has surprisingly remained untouched by the antiterrorist agenda” (2009, p.220).

The closer discourse analysis by Christopher Baker-Beall, which may be one of the most comprehensive ones currently in existence, results in the finding that the increasing number of terror attacks is promoting a securitisation process. This process is impacting the migration and asylum policy of the EU, though being a “more banal” form of securitisation with the consequence of normalizing technologies of security (2009, p.199).

The analyses of both scholars, however, have in common that they clearly identified the dominance of the identity narrative in the EU security discourse in the areas of counter-terrorism and migration policy. The construction of a social identity to shape a very distinctive dialectic between the European society and its values in opposition to terrorists or even migrants, who are increasingly perceived as a security risk. If this narrative is still prevalent in the security discourse of the EU nowadays or if and how it has evolved throughout the past few years is part of the following analysis.

It has to be taken into account that existing literature in this field is indeed copious, however, most of this research was conducted to examine the international impacts of the events of 9/11. Recent developments, such as the rise of the Da’esh, the increasing number of Islamist motivated terror attacks on EU territory since 2013 and their effects on the EU security discourse and subsequent implications for migration and counter-terrorism policy are a field yet to be studied.

### Methods

Critically analysing a specific discourse requires more than the sole reading and interpreting of language and meaning without any underlying strategy. Rather it is imperative to structure the analysis process and plan it thoroughly to avoid arbitrary- and misinterpretations. This structuring implies the methodic collection of data, keeping in mind the construction of the dataset in the most adequate way to receive an extensive picture of the discourse. Hereby it is necessary to take into account the publication dates, authors and contexts of the documents. Prior to conducting the analysis of the relevant documents constituting the EU security, it is important to specify the respective procedural steps that are taken in order to answer the
research question. This specification is discussed in the following chapter. Furthermore, this section is presenting why and how the case of the security discourse of the European Union was selected, by outlining the scientific and also the political relevance of this topic. Additionally, it is explained how the data, in this case the policy documents of the European Union, were selected and what the intention was behind that choice. In summary, the following section introduces the research methods used to adequately and successfully execute the discourse analysis in order to obtain relevant as well as highly diagnostic findings.

Case Selection

The European Union finds itself in a state of global insecurity. International conflicts which seriously impact the EU and its member states, even if their epicentre is far away from its border, are directly and indirectly contesting the European values on which the European Union is based. Among the greatest challenges the EU has been facing in recent years is the significant increase of islamist motivated terror attacks as a result of the rise of Da’esh. These attacks are occurring parallely to the severest refugee crisis since World War II, generated by ongoing wars and violent conflicts in the Middle East. These two phenomenons are increasingly perceived as interlinked issues and heavy immigration is frequently taken as a cause for the uprising of terrorism in media and public discourse, mainly because EU citizens fear that potential terrorists enter European territory hidden between thousands of people in desperate need for asylum and protection (Cordesman, p.2016). The EU institutions are more than ever forced to guarantee security within their borders, not only to protect their citizens but also to preserve the trust in the values and principles on which the EU is founded, security being one of the most important among them. The European political elite needs to find efficient ways to deal with these concerning issues in order to provide not only for security but also protect what the European Union stands for: freedom, fundamental rights and the rule of law. However, this poses a major challenge for the EU institutions because it appears to be a fine line to promote one of these values without violating another and often extraordinary measures implemented under the course of a securitisation process are likely to conflict with individual freedoms and human rights (Romaniuk & Webb 2015, p.222). The choice to examine the securitisation agenda of the European Union, results from the great relevance to reveal and raise awareness on how two actually distinct policy areas become increasingly interlinked discursively in terms of
security and how this process could possibly conflict with the Union’s identity and discursive self-representation, especially in terms of freedom, openness and fundamental rights. The research on securitisation tendencies is necessary to discover how the EU’s political elite is able to construct threats in one policy area, that could possibly legitimise controversial security measures in another. The pressuring problems of terrorism and uncontrolled migration are able to heavily influence how the EU is representing its identity in face of threat, which of the founding values are eventually the ones presented as prioritised in the security discourse and which are to some extent sacrificed, in order to assure internal security. The analysis that is conducted here is adding to the extensive existing research on the developments of the EU security discourse in the areas of counter-terrorism and migration through the examination of very recent discursive trends triggered by the new and previously unknown frequency of terror attacks on EU territory, while previous analyses mainly focussed on post 9/11 developments.

Data collection

The documents which are object to this analysis are exclusively official and public policy documents authored by various EU institutions. The time frame of this analysis is set from the year 2014 to now, due to the fact that the phenomena of terrorism and mass migration have only been hitting the European Union in their full extent for a few years as a result of the rise of Da’esh and the aggravating of civil wars, especially in the Middle East. The research question is aimed at examining the developments of the EU discourse in response to the terror attacks committed by Da’esh. Object of analysis are therefore only documents which were published after the first terror attack to which Da’esh confessed, was committed on EU territory (Belgium) in 2014. Included in the analysis are different types of EU documents, ranking from joint statements in response to terror attacks to legal documents with a binding character in counter-terrorism or migration policy. From both areas, documents with a specific focus on security were chosen especially from areas of policy action, such as border control and collection of private data, that are assumably interlinked. From these, certain parallel developments are expected to be discovered.
Data Analysis

The Discourse-Historical Approach that is adopted to structure the analysis is not providing for a fixed conceptual framework, but rather lays out that social theories cannot be operationalised generally but needs to be customised individually for specific social problems (Wodak, 2001, p.64). This implies for the specific topic chosen here that the applied securitisation theory needs to be operationalised and adapted to the issues of migration and terrorism. In the theory chapter, the conceptualisation of the securitisation process was based on the Copenhagen School. This theory of securitisation and the aspects, which it presents as pre-conditions for the process serve as key references when it comes to the evaluation of developments in the security discourse of the EU. Throughout the analysis, the focus is going to be on identifying whether the European Union is discursively constructing a) a referent object (that is threatened), b) an existential threat and c) extraordinary measures as legitimate and necessary tools to eliminate that existential threat and protect the referent object. The development of a concrete coding scheme is abandoned due to the fact that a discursive securitisation process cannot easily be detected by single keywords. More important is to identify significant formulations in their context and to pay attention to predominant narratives which are frequently used throughout the discourse. The first part of the analysis is focussed on identifying discursive links between the policy areas of migration and counter-terrorism by examining how the security discourse treats both phenomena and furthermore how the implementation of new security measures is presented. Special focus is thereby put on the discursive constitution of overarching policy tools, namely such tools that are initially aimed at countering terrorism, but have significant effects on migration policies. The second part of the analysis is aimed at examining whether and how the European Union is using the security discourse to represent itself and its policies in a certain way as well as if underlying intentions can be detected. It is not possible to pre-define key words and indicators for certain strategies of self-representation of the EU, attention will rather be paid to recurring narratives characterising and significantly shaping the discourse.

It is imperative that the European Union, even in facing challenging times of increasing terrorism and mass immigration, maintains its value balance and its trustworthiness while guaranteeing security to its citizens. Likewise it needs to avoid the discursive creation of a sentiment of fear, a strong dialectic between “insiders” and “outsiders” or the renormalization of migrants as
potential criminals. The discourse analysis which is conducted in this thesis critically evaluates to what extent the European security discourse is constituted in alignment with freedom, human rights and equality or if the increase in terror has rather triggered a security agenda which is conflicting with the values on which the European Union is founded.

The scientific and social relevance of this thesis can accurately be summarised with these words:

“The struggle against extremism cannot be “won” in the sense that the threat will end quickly or decisively. Attacking terrorists is a grim necessity, but real victory means attacking its causes – something that requires time and a serious commitment to reform by the states involved. It means providing hope and building trust through effective governance, political structures that actually that serve the people, economic reform, and a civil society that focuses on building for the future rather than trying to retreat into a mythical and repressive past.”

(Cordesman, A.H. 2016)

Analysis Chapter

The analysis of the EU security discourse in the following section is aimed at answering the research questions in order to evaluate the discursive developments on the EU level in the light of the aggravating terrorist threat. Countering terrorism became one of the top priorities of the European security agenda: the EU institutions are under increasing pressure to develop effective strategies in order to prevent further attacks and diminish the public sentiment of insecurity as a result of the inability to predict further violent assaults. The worrying increase of terrorism occurring also during the severest refugee crisis since World War II, is challenging the security framework of the European Union and it is not unlikely, that the EU as a powerful and competent international political actor is adopting measures which under different circumstances would not have gained the necessary public support. Analysing the discursive developments which occurred in migration and counter-terrorism policies in response to the evolving terrorist threat is crucial to detect, if the growing public perception of an interrelation of migration and terrorism is reflected also in the security discourse. Furthermore it is important to identify, if the European Union is discursively constructing securitisation processes of migration and counter-terrorism policies by constituting both phenomena as immediate security risks in order to justify controversial counter-measures.
This section is divided in two parts: the first part is analysing the discourse immanent specifics by comparing the security discourse in the area of counter-terrorism and migration policy. This is detected by direct discursive links as well as indirect references and overarching policy measures set up in the discourse, that are connecting both political fields, such as increasing border control and the surveillance of movement. Special attention is be paid to possible divergence between the discursive language and the effects of the discourse on the political reality which is further assessed in the conclusion at the end of this thesis. The second part of this chapter is aimed at analysing critically how the European Union uses the security discourse to constitute itself in the face of increasing terrorism and the refugee crisis in recent years. The analysis, based on the Critical Discourse Analysis approach seeks to identify, if and how the EU is possibly instrumentalising the discourse in order to consolidate its position as a security actor. Object of this analysis is the strong discursive focus on the narrative of the European identity, constituted of common democratic values, such as freedom, security, justice and especially human rights. The findings of both parts will allow to evaluate in the conclusion, if the rising terror occurring parallel to the refugee crisis in the European Union triggered a discursive shift towards the interlinking of terrorism and migration. Eventually it is assessed, if these developments can be regarded as securitisation process, with the European Union as a political elite actor using the discourse as a tool to justify and legitimise extraordinary policy action through the instrumentalization of certain narratives.

1. Linking counter-terrorism and migration: how the security discourse of the EU is responding to an increasing terrorist threat

Terrorism is nowadays posing one of the main threats to the internal security of the European Union. Initially, migration has not been a policy field at heart of the security concerns of the EU, however, through the rising perception of migration as a contributor to terrorism in the light of the contemporary refugee crisis occurring along the rising number of terror attacks, both policy fields became increasingly interlinked. Thomas Nail describes the situation after the Paris attacks as follows: “Every refugee and migrant has now explicitly become a potential terrorist – and vice versa. The two figures have been transformed into the other’s virtual double. The migrant is a potential terrorist hiding among the crowd of migrants, and the terrorist is a potential migrant ready to move into Europe at any moment” (2016; 185). What can be observed is that
political measures implemented by the EU to combat terrorism are to a significant extent affecting migration policies. In the EU security discourse, both phenomena appear inseparable through the constitution of measures of migration control as imperative to combat terrorism and prevent further attacks by thoroughly monitoring the flow of third country nationals entering the EU territory as well as surveilling the movements of people inside the Schengen area. The EU security discourse appears to be blurring the lines between the fields of counter-terrorism and migration policies by establishing and justifying measures that are aimed at both fighting terrorism and irregular migration in order to protect the internal security of the EU, its citizens, values and identity. This discursive interlinking of two distinct policy areas is visible in various EU documents which were drafted since 2015 in direct or indirect response to the various terror attacks committed on EU territory during that period.

The European Commission named in its Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism as prior security threat the increasing phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, defined as persons, who travel outside of the European territory and possibly return to either commit an attack or engage in the radicalisation of further individuals (European Parliament and Council, 2015, p.2). Even though Europol emphasised that only a small amount of individuals traveling abroad for the purpose to affiliate with terrorist groups might return and commit attacks on EU soil, this phenomenon is constituted as a serious risk requiring the effective improvement of monitoring terrorist related travel (European Parliament and Council, 2015, p.2). The issue of foreign terrorist fighters is similarly addressed in the Council Conclusion on the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat which demands to engage in

“Enhancing the fight against foreign fighters, in particular through enhanced external border controls”
(European Council, 2016, p.10).

Foreign terrorist fighters might not directly be connected with migration but the measures adopted to monitor the travel routes of suspected individuals which may be related to terrorist objectives, may influence the accessibility of third country nationals entering the EU territory. External border controls are constituted throughout the discourse as virtually universal measure to counter terrorism, organized crime and migration simultaneously. The Conclusion of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism,
which was published in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, determined as main objectives the finalisation of the Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record Data (PNR) as well as the implementation of

“systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement” (Council of the European Union, 2015, p.1).

Furthermore, it suggests systematic security checks and registration of migrants, including taking fingerprints and the checking of international and national databases. It additionally demands the revision of the Schengen Border Code to implement systematic controls of EU citizens at the external Schengen borders. What is striking here, is that the directive is demanding systematic checks not only of third country nationals entering the European Union but also of EU citizens who actually enjoy the right to move freely throughout the Union without being controlled at borders. This objective can certainly be regarded as controversial. However, the discourse does not elaborate on possible collisions of the principle of free movement and the directive. These two main objectives for combating terrorism that clearly affect migration policy were already formulated by the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government in Brussels in February 2015, which took place in response to the terror attacks at Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 in Paris. The guide work agreed upon in that meeting states that the security of European citizens is a key priority and necessity, which should be guaranteed by disrupting terrorist related travel through the adoption of the PNR directive, the modernisation of external border control and the implementation of:

“systematic and coordinated checks on individuals enjoying the right of free movement against databases relevant to the fight against terrorism”(European Council, 2015, p.1).

The contradiction between "systematic and coordinated checks" and “enjoying the right of free movement” is also at this point of the discourse left aside without any further explanation, which giving the impression that such a regulation is unproblematic and by all means necessary and proportionate. The European Agenda on Security was reworded by the European Commission in April 2015. The pillars of action which were identified as necessary to be strengthened also included various instruments crucial for migration policy. The agenda states that the security at the external borders needs to be strengthened through the more comprehensive use of the Schengen Information System together with databases of Interpol. It further requires high
standards of border management and the finalisation of the PNR system to destroy terrorist networks (European Commission, 2015). The Security Agenda is also directly referring to the *European Agenda on Migration* which is addressing security related migration issues in even greater detail, including discourse overarching aspects such as social cohesion and border management (European Commission, 2015). With the mutual reference in one policy field to another, the European security discourse is laying out that even though the phenomenon of terrorism is not directly mentioned in the context of migration and the problems are actually presented distinctively, both areas contain a security dimension which needs to be encountered with common measures of action. Illegal migration is itself not defined as one of the core priority for European security in the agenda. Among them are however, foreign terrorist fighters and organized cross border crime, which both involve a migration dimension that the EU addresses with the strengthening of existing or implementation of new border control or information sharing instruments such as PNR, ETIAS or the SIS (European Commission, 2015). *The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System* (ETIAS) is introduced by identifying the migration and refugee crisis as well as terror attacks as:

“severely testing the EU migration and security frameworks”(European Parliament and Council, 2016, p.2)

and is hereby directly linking both phenomenon as serious threats to the security of citizens, which can be addressed parallel to the implementation of ETIAS. The ETIAS directive is important for the discourse as it is naming third country nationals, including refugees and migrants as a potential security risk in relation to terrorism and thereby constitutes the connection between the two issues which was mostly avoided in other parts of the discourse. In the description of the context of the proposal, the Commission stated that there is an urgent need:

“to assess and manage the potential irregular migration and security risks represented by third country nationals visiting the EU”(European Parliament and Council, 2016, p.2)

without specifying the respective risk they represent, therefore constituting the irregular migrant as an unpredictable threat to internal security which needs to be combatted and made reviewable through the collection of personal data and travel information. This construction of
knowledge gathering as the universal tool to guarantee security and rule out any risks is a narrative which is prevalent throughout the whole discourse. This narrative appears questionable because it plays down the importance of the respect for privacy opposite to collecting as much information as possible to provide for security. The proposal furthermore points out that it is necessary to keep the EU action in balance between the guaranteeing of mobility and enhancement of security (European Parliament and Council, 2016, p.2). This implies that the idea of an open Europe, including the free movement within the Schengen Area for EU citizens and the visa-free entry of third nationals from partnership countries, shall not be significantly limited by measures adapted to counter terrorism and irregular migration. Nevertheless, the introduced policy measures including border control and information collection and sharing are constituted as immediately necessary to ensure the security of EU citizens. As the PNR directive was finally passed in April 2016, its objectives were predominantly the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorism and serious crime (European Parliament and Council, 2016, paragraph 2), however it determines, that the PNR is collected and processed in combination with the Advanced Passenger Information data (API) which serves the purpose of combatting illegal immigration (paragraph 4). Thus, the use of both kinds of data collected is both preventing terrorism and serious crime as well as illegal migration. This represents another example where the discourse itself is avoiding to interlink migration and terrorism. However, a closer look reveals that the action steps taken in order to ensure internal security are indeed connecting migration and counter-terrorism policies.

The list of examples illustrating the overarching dimension of the security discourse in the areas of migration policy and counter-terrorism could certainly be extended even further by taking into account more EU policy documents published in response to the various terror attacks since 2015. But it already becomes clear at this point that the discourses are closely interlinked and similarly construct terrorism as well as irregular immigration as simultaneous threats that can be countered effectively with common policy measures. However, irregular immigration is not constituted as a core security issue threatening the European values and society throughout the discourse. The policy measures and security instruments introduced in the discourse are rather predominantly aimed at fighting terrorism through securitising migration policies. The discourse is clearly emphasising control, data collection and information sharing in the area of migration and movement of people as the ultimate tool to prevent terrorism on EU territory. Knowledge in form of personal data and travel information is presented as a vital instrument against terrorism and serious crime in opposition to the unpredictable risk that missing
information about individuals moving in and out of the EU poses. Again, the strong discursive focus on the gathering and sharing of all possible information and data is obvious at this point: not only of third country nationals who are, however, presented as especially risk-bearing if not checked before traveling into EU-territory (in the ETIAS directive), but also of people enjoying free movement, including EU citizens. In the discourse, this is represented as necessary and in order, in reality it is, however, highly contestable in regard to the principle of free movement in the Schengen area. In the new European Agenda on Migration, external border control is also among the four main pillars on which the agenda is build, though it is not constituted as a tool against terrorism, but rather as a measure to make border control more efficient and fight irregular migration. Nonetheless, the document is introducing the “smart borders” initiative, which is aimed at

“strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals” (European Commission, 2015, p.11).

This initiative is similarly mentioned in the European Agenda on Security as an instrument to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of border management immediately necessary to prevent cross-border crime and terrorism (European Commission, 2015, p.6).

In general, the analysis of the security discourse of the EU reveals that terrorism and migration are just rarely linked directly to each other in the language of the discourse. Rather, it avoids to constitute both phenomena as interrelated. Terrorism is overall not presented as a result of uncontrolled or irregular migration. The measures and tools introduced to prevent irregular migration are rather discursively justified by the intention to save lives and restrict other forms of organised crime such as human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. However, the concrete policy measures introduced in counter-terrorism as well as in migration policy are remarkably similar and thus blur the line between the two fields of action in the European Union. The implementation of measures of data collection, such as the Passenger Name Record or other instruments enhancing border controls, including systematic checks and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System which should ultimately lead to the prevention of potential terrorists traveling inside the EU, are significantly playing into the field of migration policy and have direct effects on the movement of people in and out of the Union. At heart of the European principles lies the openness of the Union, which was described in the Tampere Programme in 1999 as the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” was established. It
determined that freedom, including the free movement throughout the Union, should be extended to the access to security and justice for the citizens of the Union. Moreover, the programme stated:

“It would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. These common policies must be based on principles which are both clear to our own citizens and also offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to the European Union” (European Council, 1999, paragraph 3).

Since then, the EU has presented itself as an open society, whose freedom and common values are not limited to the people living inside its territory but also to individuals from third countries who seek protection and safety in the EU. This openness is, however, increasingly perceived as a threat to internal security. The European Commission stated on its website that

“[t]he EU's increasingly open area of free movement could be abused by terrorists to pursue their objectives” (2017).

This implies that the risk posed by the uncontrolled movement of potential terrorist perpetrators which is made possible through the principle of openness, needs to be averted by the effective implementation of the European Security Strategy.

Nevertheless, it is the core values of the European Union constituting the European identity that prohibit the direct discursive linking of the phenomena terrorism and migration, both of them being highly controversial and delicate. The refugee crisis of recent years is exploited by certain media channels, right-wing parties and various public fora as root cause for the alarming increase in terror attacks of European soil. The EU institutions, however, try to balance those populist tendencies and anti-EU sentiment, which roots in the disappointment about the Union’s inability to effectively implement a common migration policy and cope with the vast flows of refugees. Discursively, this implies that even though the policy actions implemented in order to combat terrorism are in reality heavily bleeding into the area of migration control, the security discourse is not presenting the migrant explicitly as responsible for the terrorist threat. Nevertheless, irregular migration and uncontrolled travel into the Union’s territory is portrayed as a general risk to internal security that needs to be made predictable through the eradication of
loopholes in the European information system on the movement of people inside its territory and across external borders.

Overall it can be concluded, that even in challenging times which the EU is facing nowadays due to an alarming frequency of terror attacks and the most severe refugee crisis since World War II, the European Union is cherishing its values of freedom and openness. These values once have been established as foundations of the system sui generis uniting the nations of Europe. While the political reality during the last two years indeed tended to increasingly interlink the two policy fields of counter-terrorism and migration, through the enhanced focus on border controls and surveillance, the security discourse itself refrains from presenting “the migrant” as “the terrorist”. Thus, it avoids to trigger public resentment towards refugees and other people seeking access to the EU and rather promotes the idea of an open society guaranteeing its freedoms not only to EU citizens but to all people, regardless of their origin. The counter-terrorism and the migration agenda of the European Union overall do not directly present both phenomena as causally related. However, the connection is framed more subtly.

The directive establishing ETIAS formulates:

“Both from a migration and from a security point of view, there is a clear necessity to conduct prior checks in order to identify any risks” (European Parliament and Council, 2016, p.3).

Preventing irregular migration and ensuring security are furthermore listed likewise as top priorities for the Schengen Area in the document. The EU Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs demand in their Joint Statement on the terrorist attacks in Brussels to:

“increase [...] the systematic feeding, consistent use and interoperability of European and international databases in the fields of security, travel and migration” (Council of the EU and EU representatives, 2016, paragraph 5)

while the Council Conclusion responding to the Paris attacks in November 2015 stipulates the establishment of a systematic registration of third country nationals illegally entering the Schengen area within the context of the current migration crisis (European Council, 2015). These examples of the discourse elucidate that migration, in particular irregular migration, is indeed to some extent portrayed as a threat to security, though its specific risks are not specified any further and beyond, a direct discursive link to terrorism is missing. This lack of specification can be regarded as a discursive tool to intentionally leave scope to what kind of risks migration could pose to the internal security. This is either done to prevent criticism about
controversial policy measure that treat migrants as potential terrorists or because mentioning both phenomena as interrelated could be regarded as discriminating towards migrants. To sum up, it is obvious that the EU discourse on security is eager to be cautious in its phrasing of migration as a threat to security, even though the measures implemented to fight terrorism directly impact the European migration policy. The prevention of presenting migration and terrorism as causally related comes along with the EU’s foundation on fundamental rights and openness towards people in need. If the European Union would seize the public sentiment of identifying “the migrant” as a scapegoat in the terrorism issue, it would turn against the European values and foundations on which it is based. The analysis of the discourse nevertheless reveals that the EU institutions are indeed regarding migration as a security threat with potential terrorist dimensions. The most effective and necessary measures are especially those that affect migrants and other third country nationals travelling to the European Union through enhanced checking and controlling.

While analysing the EU security discourse in order to detect certain tendencies and developments which possibly could have occurred in the course of the evolving terrorist threat the Union is facing in recent years, it is imperative to pay attention to certain important narratives that the Union is using throughout the discourse to consolidate its position as an international security actor. These narratives could be used to legitimise the EU’s security competences and justify the implemented or proposed counter-terrorism measures which increasingly affect migration policies and fundamental rights or principles of the European Union, such as privacy or the principle of free movement. How the European Union is constituting its fundamental rights based identity throughout the security discourse and if and how this is conflicting with the political reality, should be the object of analysis in the following parts.

2. Promoting or limiting fundamental rights? How the EU is discursively constructing its identity in order to consolidate the counter-terrorism agenda

To adequately evaluate critically how the EU security discourse developed in recent years in the light of frequent terror attacks and ongoing immigration, it is imperative to identify possible structures of dominance in the discourse as well as underlying ideologies of the political elite. In
regard to the Discourse Historical Approach, it is necessary to not only analyse the discourse immanent characteristical developments, but also to level some sort of socio-diagnostic criticism on how the political elite, in this case the European Union, is utilising the instrument of discourse to constitute its position towards the European society on the one hand and the international community on the other. One of the main narratives which the European Union is using throughout its security discourse is the dialectical construction of the European identity based on common European values. This narrative constitutes the European identity as in need for protection against the threat of terrorism, including the unpredictable terrorist risk that third country nationals could pose. Besides this dialectic, the Union’s security discourse is however heavily focussed on protecting the European values only by means which are not themselves conflicting with those norms. In which way this narrative is functioning in the discourse will be analysed throughout the following part: on the one hand by having a closer look at how the EU is constituting its identity via discourse and on the other hand, how the security discourse is balancing policy measures with the fundamental rights narrative. If this is in accordance with the political reality, or if the EU is rather using its security discourse to legitimise exceptional measures which are actually contradictory to the founding values and principles of the Union will be assessed in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

Striking about most of the documents included in this analysis is that the constitution of terrorism as an attack on the European values and thus on the European identity established by these common values, is consequently used as a narrative to introduce the context of the respective proposals or directives or otherwise in statements commenting the concrete terror attacks. The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism defines these universal values the Union is based upon as:

“human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law” (European Commission, 2015, p.2).

In the following, it states that terrorism constitutes:

“one of the most serious violations of the universal values […] on which the European Union is founded” (European Commission, 2015, p.2).
Similar phrasing is used in the *The Conclusion of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism*. It describes the occurrence as an attack on the European values (Council of the EU, 2015, p.1). Also, the EU Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs used this narrative in their statement on the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, emphasising that it was an assault on the open and democratic European society while likewise pointing out that the European values will nevertheless be upheld in the fight against terrorism (Council of the EU & EU representatives, 2016, p.1). This an important discursive aspect, as it constrains the narrative of the “fight against terrorism” with the requirement of respecting fundamental rights. This is representing the fight against terrorism as just and legitimate - not lawless and arbitrary. The formulations used in the Joint Statement in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris are even more emotionally charged:

“The European Union is deeply shocked and in mourning after the terrorist attacks in Paris. It is an attack against us all. We will face this threat together with all necessary means and ruthless determination. France is a great and strong nation. Its values of liberty, equality and fraternity inspired and inspire the European Union. [...] This shameful act of terrorism will only achieve the opposite of its purpose, which was to divide, frighten, and sow hatred. Good is stronger than evil. [...] We will do what is necessary to defeat extremism, terrorism and hatred” (EU Council, EU representatives, 2015, p.1).

This statement clearly shows the discrepancy between the diplomatic and relatively neutral language of legal EU documents and the emotional positioning of the European leaders in response to an attack with hundreds of killed innocent people. It is especially remarkable for the overall security discourse that has developed in reaction to the increasing number of terror attacks because it reflects quite explicitly what can be observed throughout the whole discourse: the EU is constructing an opposition of “good” and “evil”. The European citizens and their values are hereby taking the side of the “good”, the terrorists and their ideals are forming the “evil” counterpart. While other documents are usually focussed on expressing that the fight against terrorism should not be contradictory to exactly those European democratic values the EU seeks to protect, this statement leaves open, if “what is necessary” is limited by any norms.

All these quotations taken from the security discourse of the European Union are discursively constituting a clash between the phenomenon of terrorism and the value based European identity. This dialectic is representing terrorism not only as a physical threat endangering the lives and health of humans but additionally as destructive to the normative framework which provides the “raison d'être” of the European Union. The direct opposition of the
“good”, the universal values shared among the European society, versus the “evil” terrorism with all its different facets, serves as discursive tool to clearly underline who and what has to be protected and what to be defeated. Through this narrative, the security discourse of the European Union is introducing the tools implemented in order to provide for internal security. It is presenting them not only as necessary to prevent further attacks but also to guarantee that the European Union and its very concept continues to exist as its citizens and the outside world know it, not letting terrorism and its root causes undermine the foundation of freedom, equality and human rights. However, this discursive dialectic between the European and the terrorist values can rather not be judged as a linguistic tool to justify exceptional security instruments. The narrative is indeed carving out a clash between “good” and “evil” values, nevertheless, the discourse puts a strong focus on fighting terrorism with all possible means, under the prerequisite that the implemented measures respect the values of the European Union. The discourse is constantly emphasising, with few exceptions such as the rather emotional Joint Statement in reaction to the Paris attacks that the terrorist threat can only be countered with respect to fundamental rights and no measures implemented should go against what the European Union stands for. For example, this can be found in the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, which declares that:

“security and respect for fundamental rights are not conflicting aims, but consistent and complementary policy objectives” (European Commission, 2015, p.13)

and demands in the following that all security measures implemented to respond to the terrorist threat need to be carried out in full respect of fundamental rights obligations (European Commission, 2015, p.13). However, it is clear that the measures established in order to provide for internal security, especially those that affect migration policy in terms of surveillance and border control, usually limit personal freedoms and fundamental rights to some extent. The PNR directive is one of these measures as it requires the collection of personal data. Nevertheless, it states that:

“the application of this directive should ensure full respect for fundamental rights, for the right to privacy and for the principle of proportionality”, and furthermore “the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others in the fight against terrorist offences” (European Parliament, Council of the EU, 2016, paragraph 22).
Even if the discourse is constantly emphasising the urgent necessity of respecting fundamental rights, it remains unclear if and how this is realized in the policies itself. The PNR directives also contains controversial provisions like the checking of passengers against predetermined criteria (European Parliament & Council of the EU, 2016, article 6, paragraph 3, point b). However, the discourse is focussing highly on ruling out all possible criticism on limiting freedoms or fundamental rights by consequently stressing that fundamental rights need to be respected. In this case, demanding that the pre-determined criteria shall be established in a non-discriminatory way (European Parliament & Council of the EU, 2016, article 6, paragraph 4). Similar risk assessment tools are also envisaged in the Conclusion of the Council of the European Union and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. The development of these tools and the basis on which this should take place is not defined any further, however it is made clear that it should be in complete accordance with the Rule of Law and of the Charter of Fundamental rights (Council of the EU, 2015, p.2). This discursive concentration on the respecting of fundamental rights is as well to be found in the European Agenda on Security which requires that individuals, their freedom and their security need to be “protected in full compliance with the Union’s values, including the rule of law and fundamental rights” (European Commission, 2015, p.2).

Similar formulations can be detected in the proposal for the Regulation establishing ETIAS. The ETIAS regulation also provides for the screening of the collected data against specific risk indicators to identify irregular migration, security or public health risk and furthermore defines that these indicators shall be proportionate, specific and non-discriminatory. Thus, it clarifies that fundamental rights will be regarded throughout the process of travel authorisation (European Commission, 2016, p.10).

In summary, the main narrative of European identity is constituted by two elements: firstly, the constitution of the dialectic between the “good” values of the European Union that need to be protected against the “evil” values of terrorism and secondly, the strong discursive emphasis on respecting fundamental rights while providing for internal security. It can be concluded that the interplay of these two elements exposes how the European Union is constituting the protection of the European society and its shared identity as prior security objective.
The identity narrative frequently observed in the security discourse is a crucial element for the evaluation of discursive changes. The construction of clashing identities is a deliberate step of the EU institutions in order to shape the public perception of the Union as a security actor that has the legitimate competence to protect the European society and its values by all means and prevent the spread of “evil”. This utilisation of identity as the object of protection goes in line with the Social Identity Theory developed by Henri Tajfel, which is proposing that through the belonging to a group, a social identity is created and constantly opposed to other social identities (Tajfel, 1974). The respective groups try to raise their self-image by enhancing the own identity through discriminating or prejudicing other social groups. The result of this opposition is the division of the world into “we” versus “them” while the “in-group” will always feel superior to the “out-group” (Tajfel, 1974). A further theory that can be applied to the discursive process of projecting the European identity and values as seriously threatened by terrorism, predominantly islamist motivated, is the “Clash of Civilizations” theory by Samuel Huntington, which assumes “that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (Huntington, 1993). These two theories in combination comprehensively explain how the European Union is instrumentalising the narrative of the European identity. It can cautiously be concluded that through the security discourse, the Union is utilising identity and social belonging as a tool to form its basis of action and legitimise its competences in order to provide for the victory of the “good” European values over the “evil” terrorists, religious extremists, radicals and fanatics.

However, it is also apparent throughout the discourse that even in face of an evolving terrorist threat, this objective shall only be pursued by means which are to no extent limiting the values the EU is eager to secure. With its security discourse, the European Union is constructing itself as an international human rights actor, valuing internal security just as high as the promotion of freedom, justice and fundamental rights. Nevertheless, this discursive self-representation should be critically assessed in terms of its transformation into political reality, especially when it comes to controversial security techniques: one example being the implementation of common risk indicators, which in theory must not be based on discriminatory aspects, in practice however are kept secret and are therefore not subject to public scrutiny (Privot 2016).

Overall, even though the EU is consequently constructing its security discourse around the focus on fundamental rights, measures implemented to enhance surveillance and also the collection of data on the movement of people inside the Union and across its borders, are
undoubtedly to some extent “undermining Europe’s founding principles and policies related to the free movement of persons and privacy” (Bigo et al, 2015, p.12). Their efficiency and effectiveness should be thoroughly assessed while taking into account that these are the only valid factors that are able to legitimise such policy actions.

Conclusion

The analysis of the security discourse has shown that the increase in terror attacks in Europe during the past years has led to a growing connection of counter-terrorism and migration policies, which is not as visible in the discourse than it is in the political reality. Furthermore, it can be concluded from the analysis that the European Union is instrumentalising the security discourse to construct an identity clash of a sort between the values on which it is founded and the ideologies of terrorism. These ideologies are presented as seriously jeopardising not only the internal security but the very existence of the European Union as it is known. In fact, it is the case that the alarming frequency of terror attacks which the EU is facing nowadays did not leave the security discourse in the areas of counter-terrorism and migration untouched. The question is, however, how these discursive developments can be classified: does the European Union use the security discourse to counter - or is it rather constructing a threat? Can the changes in the discourse be regarded as a securitisation process?

The evaluation of the discursive developments identified in the former chapter will be object of this conclusion section. By recalling the concept of securitisation and existing assessments of the EU security discourse, the analysis results will be eventually classified into existing theories. Furthermore the divergence between discourse and political reality is evaluated.

Rut Bermejo and Christopher Baker-Beall who both analysed the security discourse in terms of counter-terrorism and migration of the European Union after 9/11, came to differing findings. While Bermejo stated that “in terms of discourse, the developments analysed above, show that the discourse on immigration control in the European Union has surprisingly remained untouched by the antiterrorist agenda. European Union’s policies before and after September 11, 2001 have been particularly careful in separating immigration and terrorism” (2009, p.220), Baker-Beall came to a somewhat different conclusion. He indeed identified the developments in the discourse as a securitisation process, however he determined the type of securitisation as deviant from the traditional concept of securitisation and stated, that “it is a more banal form of
securitisation in that its impact is less the creation of special measures in exceptional circumstances (that threaten the survival of a society) and more the introduction of mundane policies and practices, technologies of security” (2009, p.199).

According to the traditional definition developed by the Copenhagen School, securitisation describes a discursive process which is constituted by an actor claiming “that a referent object is existentially threatened”, demanding “the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that the threat” and furthermore convincing “an audience that rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified” (Van Munster, 2012). It becomes clear throughout the security discourse of the European Union that the EU as a powerful political actor is indeed claiming that the European identity and values are existentially threatened by terrorism, extremism and radicalisation. However, and this can be agreed on with Baker-Beall as well as Bermejo, the European Union is keeping distance from introducing extraordinary measures in its fight against terrorism. The developments in the light of the growing terrorist threat can rather be regarded as a normalisation and trivialisation of security technologies affecting migration in terms like border control and data collection. Furthermore, the European Union is not using the discourse to convince “an audience”, in this case its citizens, that the breaking of rules is necessary and in order to combat terrorism. Quite the opposite is the case: the EU is constantly emphasising that all measures, implemented in order to fight terrorism, are fully respecting fundamental rights and the European values and principles. With the words of Baker-Beall, this process can be regarded as “banal securitisation” which is eventually not discursively legitimising extraordinary policy measures in a state of exception but rather justifying the implementation of security measures that clearly affect third country nationals trying to get access to the European Union - may it be for travel or migration purposes.

The evolving terrorist threat has indeed blurred the line between the areas of counter-terrorism and migration policies. The tendencies to restrict the movement of people into the Union as well as monitoring the travel of all individuals, regardless of their citizenship, in order to prevent further terror attacks became especially prevalent throughout the last two years with the implementation of border control and surveillance measures such as PNR and ETIAS. However, as Rut Bermejo identified already in 2009: in its discourse, the European Union is carefully distinguishing the two phenomena of counter-terrorism and migration. This can be, to some extent, regarded as surprising taking into account the growing public perception that the vast influx of migrants as a result of the refugee crisis might have enabled terrorists to gain access to the European Union, hidden between people seeking asylum and protection from war and
violence inside the EU. However, constituting a direct connection between migration and terrorism would be contrary to the EU’s values such as openness, freedom and non-discrimination: it would possibly result in increased mistrust and animosity towards migrants and the public’s persistence on restricting migration and the closure of borders. The analysis showed that it cannot be denied that the EU is considering uncontrolled migration as a possible cause for terrorism. The links between the two phenomena in the discourse, however, are more subtle: foreign terrorist fighters are represented as reasons to enhance border controls and the implementation of smart borders is aimed at the same time at reducing irregular migration and the entering of EU territory by terrorist individuals. The ETIAS directive to enhance border controls is constituting the influx of unmonitored third country nationals as an unpredictable security risk and the PNR directive also provides for better coordinated transfer of API data which is actually collected in order to combat illegal immigration.

The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his speech at the G20 summit in response to the terror attacks in Paris: “We should not mix the different categories of people coming to Europe.” and “those who organised these attacks and those that perpetrated them are exactly those that the refugees are fleeing and not the opposite” (Eleftheriou-Smith, 2015). But even if this position is upheld on the discourse level, the political reality speaks a different language. The policy measures affecting migration are indeed concerning potential terrorists and, to a far greater extent, those who cannot at all be related to any threat. With the focus on fundamental rights and the discursive construction of “good” European values that need to be secured by any means possible in accordance with that values, the EU tries to justify certain security measures as necessary to maintain and secure the Europe as we know it - not only in regard to internal security but also to normative stability and the preservation of shared values, such as freedom, security, justice, human rights, democratic rule of law. This self-representation as an international security actor highly committed to fundamental rights and democratic values is however questionable if the implications of the policy measures that were established in order to combat the growing terrorist threat are assessed. Security measures which are clearly restricting the accessibility of the EU for third country nationals as well as the principle of free movement for EU citizens are indeed controversial and can possibly be classified as contrary to the values of which the European Union is constituting its identity throughout the discourse. Didier Bigo in cooperation with other social scientists evaluates the security related political developments after the Paris attacks as debatable and conflicting with the European values. They stated that the introduced security
policies “should be firmly anchored in its rule of law, fundamental rights and criminal justice traditions” and furthermore that they “should not undermine Europe’s founding principles and policies related to the free movement of persons and privacy. That trust is an essential component in European cooperation and will not be gained through proposals focused on re-establishing national border controls and overstretching current EU legal frameworks to expand surveillance of each other’s citizens and residents” (Bigo et al, 2015, p.12).

These findings can also be applied to the analysis conducted in this thesis: even if the European Union is presenting itself constantly as fully respecting the fundamental rights and values on which it is based, the security measures implemented in response to the recent terror attacks are significantly blurring the distinction between counter-terrorism and migration policies. They are challenging the EU’s authenticity because they indeed undermine some of the principles, which the EU claims in its discourse as threatened by terrorism and extremism. Among them are the right to move freely throughout the Schengen Area for EU-citizens; the right to privacy, which might be challenged by the mass-gathering of personal data; and the principle of openness towards people in need that could possibly be limited by stricter border controls and systems like ETIAS. Additionally, the right to non-discrimination can also be mentioned, that is likely to conflict with the implementation of common risk indicators which are kept secret, not open to public scrutiny and might very well be based on discriminatory aspects as it is already the case with racial profiling.

Based on the findings of the conducted discourse analysis, it can be concluded that there is indeed a form of securitisation in place, even though it might be, as Baker-Beall determined already several years ago, a less radical form of securitisation where the EU is not seeking to introduce extraordinary measures in exceptional circumstances. Rather, it instrumentalises the discourse to convince its citizens and the public that it is necessary to combat terrorism with migration restricting policies because unmonitored third country nationals as well as unsupervised travel routes of EU citizens might pose a risk to the European values and society as a whole. The discursive utilisation of European identity is a characteristic of the security discourse which was identified by Baker-Beall even before the European Union was confronted with such an increase in terror attacks. His findings in 2009 were remarkably similar to what the conducted analysis has shown today: “terrorism is constructed as a threat to these values and as such a threat to European society” (2009, p.98). The creation of an inside and an outside group based on the concept of an European identity to distinct who is in need of protection, and who is to be combatted and should be excluded from the European society and its merits, was
already identified by Alessandra Buonfino in 2006. Thus, it has been prevalent in the security discourse even before Da’esh and its terrorist fighters became an immediate threat for the internal security of the European Union. The conflict of the principle of openness and the exclusion of foreigners in order to provide security was even identified as far back as 2003 by Elspeth Guild in the migration policies of the EU.

To sum up, the analogy of the analysis’ findings conducted here with earlier results of scholars such as Baker-Beall, Bermejo, Buonfino and Guild shows that the significant increase of terror attacks on European soil did not lead to a paradigm shift in the EU security discourse towards the implementation of exceptional, rule-breaking security tools. Rather, it is the case that certainly a tendency towards securitising migration in order to prevent terrorists from entering EU territory is existing in the EU security discourse. Even if the overall discourse of the European Union in the area of counter-terrorism is focussed on criminal justice and fundamental rights, the increased blending of migration and anti-terrorism policy in political reality on the one hand and the careful separation of both areas throughout the discourse on the other, could possibly result in a lack of authenticity and provide a target for criticism. In an era of growing populism and nationalism resulting from a growing fear of the “other” and a prevalent public discourse of clashing identities, the European Union needs to balance these undemocratic and discriminatory tendencies and strengthen also in reality what is promoted throughout the whole discourse: the values and principles on which it is founded. As Claudia Postelnicescu concludes in her recent analysis of the European identity in face of the refugee crisis: “for the future of the European Union and the persistence of its stable, normative framework, which constitute its identity “the major challenge [...] is to find the proper balance between all these conflicting needs: security, freedom and unity” (2016, n.p.). That the EU has seen better times does no necessarily mean that it is condemned to clear the way for nationalist right-wing politicians and their call to close the EU borders. Rather, it should be more motivated than ever to promote the values for which it stands, towards its own citizens as well as to those fleeing from war and terror, who count on a future in security and freedom in the European Union.
References


Cordesman, A. H. (2016). Terrorism: The Thing We Have to Fear the Most is Fear Itself. Center for Strategic & International Studies.


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