Pathos and Technology
a Matter of Rhetoric

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Pathos and Technology - a Matter of Rhetoric

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August 2017

Master Thesis
Philosophy of Science, Technology, and Society
Track: Technology and the Human Being
University of Twente
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Introduction
Despite millennia of convincing critiques and rigorous reforms, the field of rhetoric is still very much alive and relevant. Philosophy has always had an ambiguous relation with the discipline, but in the past century—where the Truth (with a capital T, a universal, objective Truth) made room for (rhetorically) contextualized truths. The enlightened subject became at best a (rhetorically) constituted subject, and Nietzsche declared God dead in favour of “a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms” (Nietzsche, 1964). Rhetoric found its way in the 20th century to become a proper element of philosophical reflection (cf. IJsseling, 1975). Besides these developments in philosophy since Nietzsche and Heidegger, current developments in politics all over Europe and America demand us look at the discipline of rhetoric once again. Rather than appealing to content, rational discourse and reason, politicians seem to gain their power through proper sophistry; appeals to the nationalist feelings in the gut of the people, the fear for change and losing a way of life, repeated emphasis on the achievements and character of the politician or president him- or herself, and getting away with blatant lies. Despite Plato’s warnings in his *Georgias* and *Sophists*, the demagogue is rising to power.

And it was indeed Plato who famously criticized the use of rhetoric to the end of looking more convincing to the untrained masses than the expert. Rather, he argued, we need to shine a light on the Truths that are already there, and an audience need not to be moved to anything. To the masses a rhetorician might be convincing, but only to those that do not know much about the matter at stake, contrary to the expert himself. It is indeed the handbooks of rhetoric by which the appeal of contemporary politicians can be analysed, which is a mayor clue into the origin of the bad name the discipline gained through the years. Rhetoric, was Plato’s conclusion, is not good for anyone, we should cast it aside and not burn our fingers on it as philosophers. Instead, we should restrict our appeals to those with priority, those of reason.

In a course that Heidegger taught in the summer semester of 1924 titled ‘*Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie*’, where the ‘Rhetoric’ gains central attention, he argues strongly against this strict dismissal of the discipline. While indeed, authentic discourse takes place on the basis of proper reflection, our everyday being-with-one-another is for the first time systematically treated in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Heidegger argues that humans are not in the first place rational beings. Rational discourse, or *logos*, does not come prior to appeals to *pathos* and *ethos* being merely stylistic after-
thought. The concept of *pathos* forms instead the ground and soil out of which speaking emerges. Reflective speaking is grounded in a more original everyday experience and speaking with one another. The rationality that Plato holds so dear, was not given to the Greeks on a platter. As Heidegger writes: “The Greeks were completely absorbed in the outward. At the time of Plato and Aristotle, being-there was so burdened with babble that it required the total efforts of them both to be serious about the possibility of science.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 75) Instead of disregarding the domain of rhetoric, Heidegger makes it the ground on which reflective thinking builds. If we are to understand what it means to be human we need not to disregard rhetoric, but understand it as the “interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself” (ibid.).

While Heidegger, like Plato and Aristotle before him, favours the appeal to rational discourse, he does not disregard rhetoric. Instead he shows how such ‘inauthentic’ speaking is appealing and human beings tend to ‘fall’ into such discourse over and over again. Our everyday being with one another is for the most part rhetorical. And as we can see in contemporary politics, the appeal to think rationally and be weary of the tempting words of the demagogue never seems to lose its value. But rather than a rhetoric that describes an ingenious speaker capable of wrapping an audience around his little finger—as would be closer to Cicero and Roman rhetoric—Heidegger finds in this rhetoric an understanding of how human beings are *moved* in their everydayness, speaking with one another.

The ability to move human beings is not restricted to the domain of the clever speaker; we can recognise a in technologies a similar effect on the decisions humans take and the actions they undertake. We see how technologies gather groups working with them or against them in activism, and for almost four decades philosophers have been talking about the bridges in Long Island, New York, designed by Robert Moses. Technologies invite people to speak about them, or to tailor their actions towards them. But also on a more everyday basis we see how the material presence of technologies shape how our lives take shape. Such influences of technology have certainly been topic of many historical, sociological, aesthetical, and cultural studies of design and new media. In philosophy of technology numerous ways of studying how technologies play a role in society and individual lives have been developed. Their rhetorical impact is then often conceived on a symbolic level on how technologies carry meanings or certain views on the good live in them. But can we also understand the mediating role of the concrete and material presence of technologies in our everyday lives matters to us as a form of being-moved in terms of rhetoric?

*Being-moved* is not a trivial matter for Heidegger and in his semester course he ingeniously waves together different concepts of Aristotelian philosophy. While often far-fetched, how he understands Rhetoric in concordance with other works from Aristotle’s corpus makes that he can weave together different dimensions of Aristotle’s philosophy, and show the basic function of the rhetoric.
First and foremost, he does not see pathos as an afterthought, but rather as the ground out of which speaking emerges. Rather than an ‘emotion’ he insists on a translation of pathos as *being-moved*, grounded, as Heidegger convincingly shows, in Aristotle’s concept of *kinesis*. Human being is a being in movement. This being in the world is characterised by ambiguity, change, and an openness to the fact that it could be otherwise. Rhetoric is not discussed as the art of persuasion (though it is still one of its tasks, of course), but as a hermeneutic of being-with-one-another in speaking-with-one-another. The kind of speaking in rhetoric founds a community (*koinōnia*), inviting people to engage with others.

We should read Aristotle’s treatment of the passions as that which contours the possibilities of moving about in a shared world, and not so much as a recipe to sway an audience. Pathos is a being-moved, a being-taken, not of some individual mental state, but of the full bodily being-in-the-world of human being. The rhetor is trained in forming a critical moment (*kairos*) that demands a judgment or action, folding past experiences and future possibilities into a provisional present. Rather than swaying an audience by bringing them in a certain mood, the listener is brought out of composure in order to resolve oneself about a matter once again. Indeed, human beings *find themselves* in a certain composure, a disposition in a world that is already there. The words that we use, the language that we speak, is initially and for the most part used as ‘One’ uses it. This universal abstract other is an important element of the rhetorical discipline according to Heidegger, and rather than only a negative thing, it is an important dimension of understanding being-in-the-world. How we find ourselves is determined in various ways; by others, but also our cultural heritage, shared language, and the tools with which we go about the projects of everyday life. What Heidegger shows beautifully is that in all of these dimensions pathos, human being-moved, plays a pivotal role in their understanding and relates these matters to one another. Instead of a stylistic afterthought, for Heidegger pathos becomes the ground on which we can understand our everyday being with one another.

But since this thesis is not so much about speaking with one another and focuses instead on the mediating role technologies have in our daily lives, why this focus on Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric? Technologies do not speak as humans do, and we do not typically associate them with the emotional dimension of being-in-the-world. But, as is the contemporary understanding in philosophy of technology, *we are* moved by technologies to certain behaviour, ideas, judgments and ways of relating to one another; our being-in-the-world is technologically mediated (Ihde, 1990; Verbeek, 2005). Even though technologies do not speak in a human sense, they do address and move us and we are moved by them.

Indeed, applying the framework of rhetoric to what technologies can do seems to be out of place. How does a technology make use of enthymemes and metaphors, how does it build suspense and rhythm, and how does it portray itself as the most trustworthy person to accept a stance from? Certainly the more traditional regard of rhetoric as a handbook for the ingenious speaker in control of an audience...
does not easily apply to technologies, though this has certainly been tried (cf. Buchanan, 1985; Ehses, 1984). But the central concern of this thesis is the question whether Heidegger’s original reversal of the rhetorical doctrine can be applied to our understanding of the ways in which we are moved by technologies. For Heidegger, rhetoric tells us how the words of others can move us, what role our historically sedimented language plays in that, the ways in which we find ourselves in the world and comport ourselves, and how this being-moving is more than just an emotional state of the mind. Rhetoric tells us how we are rooted in a specific time and place and the ways in which we can move about in a shared world. Our shared language mediates how we see the world and are affected by it, and so does technology. Are these ways of being affected similar enough, and can Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s rhetoric say something about the way we are moved by technologies? This problem leads me to ask the following research question:

How can Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric add the concept of pathos—being-moving, rhetorically conceived—to the understanding of technological mediation in our everyday encounters with technologies

1 Outline

Postphenomenology studies the phenomenon of technological mediation in the relations humans have with their world. This field of research is influenced by the work of Martin Heidegger. While his later work is criticized for being transcendentalist, reducing technology to its conditions of possibility, his earlier analysis of how tools can be present for us in terms of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit became a basis for postphenomenological thinking on technological mediation. But before Heidegger’s Being and Time, in which we find this analysis, we can find an earlier Heidegger who was still developing his ideas in close discussion with great thinkers in the history of philosophy. As I will argue in the first chapter, this Heidegger, who was dealing with Aristotle’s Rhetoric in his summer semester course of 1924, might open up a third way in which we can think about technology.

Rhetoric is not an obvious place to look for concepts to discuss our interactions with technologies, but I argue that Heidegger’s interpretation of it could help benefit our understanding of technological mediation. In the second chapter I will discuss Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and how he makes some interpretative steps that could allow room for an application of the concepts to technological mediation. Heidegger argues that our modernist convictions, such as a strict distinction between the subject and the object and the sciences that study them, should not be read back in Aristotle’s work, and that only then we can understand what Aristotle probably meant. In doing so he paves the way for a renewed understanding of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and especially the role of pathos in it. Heidegger draws both speaking and being-moving out of the sphere of individual psychology, and places it into a perspective on how we are moved as human beings in our everyday being with one another.
Heidegger interprets pathos as a being-moved (Bewegtsein, from Bewegung), rather than its more conventional translation as ‘emotion’. Though that latter translation is not wrong, Heidegger makes clear that its contemporary connotations might make us blind for what the concept has to offer. Pathos does not just stand for how we are moved to certain thoughts or behaviours, or brought into a certain mood, but the concept carries in itself a specific way of understanding being human. Human being is a being in movement, and being-moved, or being-affected is an intrinsically human trait. (Contrary to the more Platonic or stoic idea that we are essentially rational, and emotions might blind us in this sense.) A being-affected presupposes something that can be affected; a possibility of being-affected, which Heidegger finds in a certain disposition or Befindlichkeit. Both of these meanings are carried in the concept of pathos; it is both the possibility of being moved and being-moved in the sense of being-affected. Heidegger makes pathos the ground for logos; we are already engaged in the world in a pre-lingual manner upon which we then can reflect. Specific to the rhetoric is that this being moved happens in a world that we have and share with others, and that our possibilities of moving about in such a shared world are contoured by pathos.

In the third chapter I discuss how this understanding of rhetoric, and especially the concept of pathos, can be related to, and improve our understanding of technological mediation. Things cannot speak in a sense as discussed in the rhetoric, and also in Heidegger’s work they do not acquire that ability. World disclosure through technology is a different category. But I argue that the technologically mediated human world relation at the centre of the postphenomenological framework might still benefit from the concepts developed in that different context. When technology mediates our relation with the world, we can say that we are moved by technologies. Also in this case we can recognise that the human being that is moved carries a history of experiences with him in a certain comportment which makes that some things resonate differently from others. What I aim to understand here is that the concrete moment of being-affected is not so much invoked by a technology as ‘speaker’, but that the ‘expressive power’ of technologies can be understood as mediating how such a moment comes to be. Some technologies being more eloquent in that sense than others.

This thesis might raise more questions than it answers. The purpose of it is to be an essay, in the sense of evaluating the possibility of an idea. I believe this attempt to bring rhetoric into the domain of technology is more fruitful than those of for example Richard Buchanan and B.J. Fogg, who focus too much on communication through technologies, the designer inscribing his intentions in an object. Introducing Heidegger’s rhetorical concepts such as pathos to the framework of technological mediation can help us understand better how we are moved by technologies. But moving forward to a full-fletched rhetoric many questions still need an answer. How can we for example understand the enthymeme, the topoi, and the troping of a figure of speech in relation to technology? And could technologies move us by means beyond a one-dimensional articulation, building up a tension orambiance as an eloquent rhetor is trained to do?
Chapter 1

Heidegger and Rhetoric in Postphenomenology
1 Introduction

The work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger is often roughly divided into two parts: that what he wrote before his *Kehre* (turn), and that what he wrote after. This ‘turn’ in his thinking can be characterised by how he approached the question of being. In his earlier works, Heidegger understands ‘being’ through an analysis of human being, while later on Heidegger located the meaning of being in being itself. Verbeek shows in What Things Do (2005) what consequences this shift had for Heidegger’s view on technology. In Being and Time, the tool is a thing that mediates our access to the world, while in his later work, such as “The Question Concerning Technology” (Heidegger, 1954) Heidegger’s thinking became ‘transcendental’. Technology itself became a mode of being, a way in which the world is disclosed. In that, Heidegger reduces technology to its conditions of possibility, Verbeek argues, and then criticizes these conditions as if they were technology itself. Verbeek criticises this latter Heidegger convincingly, but argues that Heidegger’s analysis of the tool in Being and Time forms a good starting point for a renewed philosophy of technology. Besides these two views of Heidegger dealing with technology, I argue in this thesis, there is a third Heidegger that deals with Rhetoric where we can find clues into how technological mediation works.

In this chapter I will first elaborate on how Heidegger forms a basis for postphenomenology. That starts with Heidegger’s more nuanced view on how concrete technologies help shape our lives. Such an approach can be found in Heidegger’s earlier Being and Time. There, Heidegger discusses how things can be present to us. On the one hand they can be objectively present (present-at-hand, or *Vorhanden*), but they can also be present while withdrawing from our attention (ready-to-hand, or *Zuhanden*). This is an important starting point for the postphenomenological perspective. That things can mediate our relation with the world. We do not focus on a hammer itself when it is in use. Rather we use that hammer and focus our attention on the nail that we would like to hammer into a piece of wood. When the hammer functions properly, it is present to us by allowing us to do something (namely hammering) while it withdraws from our attention. When something is wrong, the hammer breaks down, the hammer itself becomes the object of our attention and we relate to the world in a different way. These two ways in which
technology can be present to us, and especially the idea that it thus mediates the way we relate to the world becomes a cornerstone for the postphenomenological perspective, as I will discuss in this chapter.

Heidegger discusses the tool in Being and Time in the broader context of analysing what being-in-the-world is. This being is partially determined by our technologically mediated relations to the world, which draws up a ‘world’ existing in meaningful relations. The hammer refers to a context of use; something that needs to be hammered, in a workshop, in order to produce or repair something. But besides the ‘world’ that is constituted in such a way, Heidegger describes more ways in which being-in-the-world is there. Heidegger understands the ‘self’ as a way of relating to what he calls the ‘they-self’, a way of being that we are initially and for the most part, namely how ‘one’ is. The Cartesian self, interacting in an extended world of objects, is only an abstraction of our original everyday experience. Only in distancing from how ‘one’ thinks or goes about doing something, being-in-the-world actively has to develop an ‘authentic’ relation to it, which constantly falls back into that they-self, into how ‘one’ does it.

So the world and the self are not pre-given Cartesian truths, but rather secondary concepts that result from a certain manner of being-in-the-world. The world is only understood in as far as there is a relation to it, and the self is only understood against the horizon of the inauthentic universal ‘other’. A third element is that the type of relation of being-in that world is characterised as attuned understanding and discourse. Reflective speaking, like scientific discourse, is grounded in everyday idle chatter. Heidegger recognises the seductive power of such idle chatter and appeals to the struggle of relating to it by active reflection. Though scientific speaking might be a goal to strive for, Heidegger makes clear that it is not the primary way of being in the world, but rather something that is a struggle to maintain.

Though these other aspects of being-in-the-world might not directly seem relevant for an understanding of the role technology plays in our lives, for Heidegger our being-in-the-world is not only determined in terms of technologically mediated constitution of a world. Being-in-the-world goes about discoursing and understanding, being attuned and being affected. Our shared language in which we disclose the world develops in that process, and the way we are disposed to it, and what we are concerned with as well. These are interesting themes that make up a broader perspective of what it means to be in the world rather than only through technology; we also discourse with others, care about things, and we find ourselves attuned to the world in a certain disposition.

According to Heidegger, “Aristotle's Rhetoric must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another.” (1996, p. 130) If we want to properly understand how our ‘attunement’ (Stimmung) plays a role in our understanding of the world, and how others are necessarily part of that world disclosure, we can look at that Rhetoric. And indeed, in 1924, Heidegger taught a sum-
mer semester course on Aristotle, in which his Rhetoric got a central role in understanding our everyday being-with-one-another. What Heidegger makes clear in that course is that human beings are always subject to change, and that being in movement by moving people and being-moved (being affected) are intrinsically part of being human.

We find here a Heidegger that sees a world populated with others that we share the same world with and we communicate with, in contrast to the Heidegger of Being and Time that sees the Other more as a horizon against which we can understand our authentic self. It is also more clearly articulated how our material bodily presence matters in how we interact with one another. Our being-affected is something not only of the mind or of the body, but rather are we moved in our being-human. In the next chapter I will discuss Heidegger’s rhetoric and his conception of what means to be human in terms of this being-moved. In this chapter I will first further elaborate how Heidegger forms a basis for postphenomenology. I will then discuss whether we can already find such a rhetorical dimension, in the sense of moving and being-moved, in that framework. In the end, I will conclude that there is still room to look further into developing this third line of thinking in Heidegger that could help understand technological mediation better.

2 Heidegger in What Things Do

In “What Things Do” Verbeek develops a postphenomenological perspective on philosophy of technology. Such an approach to discussion of technology’s influence on our thinking and acting should start from the things themselves1. He finds such an approach in the work of the American philosopher Don Ihde, who builds a framework of technological intentionality and human-technology relations on Heidegger’s early analysis of the tool. Based on this human-technology relation, Verbeek identifies a hermeneutical dimension and one of praxis in our technologically mediated relation to the world. In order to fully explore these dimensions he discusses praxis along the lines of Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory and Albert Borgmann’s concepts of engagement, involvement and focal things and practices, and hermeneutics following Don Ihde’s human-world relations. The book is concluded with a chapter on a material aesthetics. In that a collaboration with the collective Eternally Yours is employed in order to explore how users can get attached to products themselves, rather than their functionality of what they signify.

Verbeek begins his plea for a postphenomenology by first extensively discussing and criticizing two approaches in classical philosophy of technology: those of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. He discusses

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1 This “zu den Sachen selbst” is the credo of the father of phenomenology: Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology would be able to get behind reality as it appears, and get to how things really are. The sentence remains influential, but its meaning takes a turn in postphenomenology: it is about concrete technologies themselves and not about Technology’s ‘conditions of possibility’. 
Jaspers as an existential thinker on philosophy and criticizes his view that Technology necessarily makes people into cogs into a machine and indices mass existence. Martin Heidegger is discussed as a hermeneutical dimension of classical thinking on technology. Both philosophers are convincingly criticized for transcendentalism in their thinking. That is, technology is first reduced to its conditions of possibility, which are then discussed as if they were technology itself. Heidegger conceptualizes technology as a mode of being, and then finds the character of Technology to be that of a *Gestell* (a standing-reserve), where the world is regarded as raw materials that can always be demanded at our disposal. Verbeek argues that such a conclusion necessarily follows from this type of analysis, but that in that analysis the mistake is made of not discussing what concrete technologies do in the relation between humans and their world.

Verbeek discusses Heidegger’s writings in chronological order and shows how his thinking on technology gradually changes. In Heidegger’s early work, in *Being and Time*, he discusses how concrete tools can be ready-at-hand (*vorhanden*) or present-at-hand (*zuhanden*). When in use, we do not focus on the hammer, but are rather focussed on the nail what we intent to hit with it. The hammer is then ready-at-hand. Being characterised as ‘withdrawing from conscious experience’, this readiness-to-hand forms a basic way in which things are present for humans in the relation with their world. It requires a thing to function properly for example, and the user of the tool to be acquainted with it. The hammer thus shapes our relation with the world while withdrawing from our attention. If this relation breaks down, for example by malfunctioning of the tool, our attention immediately shifts from the nail to the hammer itself. The tool becomes objectively present and subject to conscious experience; the object of interaction. The hammer is then present-at-hand, rather than something *through which* we engage with the world. This dynamic forms a basic way to analyse human-world relations in postphenomenology.

Later on, Heidegger moves towards a different conception of technology. In “Question Concerning Technology” Heidegger regards technology not as concrete tools, but as a mode of being. He understands this as a mode of *revealing*, bringing-forth, from the Greek word of *alatheia*. In making a chalice, the craftsman has to take into account what the material allows and what function the object has, allowing the chalice to appear. But what characterises modern technology is its calculative thinking. We think of what we want and we take what we need from nature. Nature is then no longer something that provides, but something that we can take from what we want. We see ourselves as the most important cause of something bringing something forth, and it is this way of seeing the world that characterises what technology is in Heidegger’s later works.
In Verbeek’s criticism on this later he argues that Heidegger moved away from the Husserl’s original credo of phenomenology: “to the things themselves”. For a better analysis of technology we should take that credo up again, and look at what concrete things do in the relation between humans and their world. Paradoxically, Verbeek writes, a starting point for such a perspective can be found in Heidegger’s philosophy itself. Namely in his earlier analysis of useful things (Zeug, tools, implements) in Being and Time. There, Heidegger “did not describe the world itself, but rather inquired into the structures of the ways in which humans are engaged with the world in their actions and experiences.” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 108) It is exactly these human-world relations that Verbeek is interested in, and tools plays a significant role in that: “a useful thing [...] discloses a world by shaping human praxis and thus the relation between human beings and their world.” (idem, p. 91) From this starting point Verbeek continues to develop his postphenomenological perspective.

“The crucial question now,” he writes, “concerns the various ways in which things, on the basis of their readiness-to-hand, play a role in the human-world relation. For such things shape this relation from their withdrawn or ingrown position.” (idem, p. 114) And one important way the role of technology can be understood in shaping this relation is through the concept of ‘technological intentionality’. It builds on, but extents Ihde’s conceptualization of the way in which things have “a certain directionality, an inclination or trajectory that shapes the ways in which they are used.” (ibid.) It refers to the phenomenon that, for example, a text written by a pen, typewriter, or word processor will show a difference in writing style because of the properties of the different tools. “These writing technologies are therefore not neutral means, but rather play an active role in the relation between author and text.” (idem, p. 115) Another beautiful example Verbeek mentions is how tools can also mediate a certain work practice. As he writes, the mayor of the Romanian city of Cluj Napoca observed that workers in the public gardens spend too much time leaning on their rakes rather than using them for work, and intended to intervene by shortening those. “By shortening their shafts, the mayor thought, he could discourage laziness and encourage harder work.” (ibid.) Verbeek uses this example to show how technology can organize, or mediate, a work practice en passant, even besides the ‘proper’ function of a tool.

Verbeek extents Ihde’s conceptualization of technological intentionality here. Besides the ‘intentions of the technology itself’, we can also find the ‘intentionality of artefacts’ that “consists of the fact that they mediate the intentional relation between humans and world in which each is constituted” (idem, p. 116, my emphasis) This idea that humans and technologies cannot be something in themselves, but can only be something in relation to each other, that they are being constituted as something in use, is an important idea in (post)phenomenology. The rake is a rake-for-gardening or a rake-for-leaning, which is constituted only in the relation with the employee. This idea builds strongly on the Heidegger of Being and Time.
So we see different ways in which Heidegger is important for postphenomenology, and this adaptation of his readiness-to-hand (and presence-at-hand) forms this basis for the most part. This analysis of the tool is especially relevant in the dimension of experience that Don Ihde calls microperception; the bodily dimension of sensory perception. This is further worked out in terms of four technologically mediated human-world relations. When it comes to macroperception, which is the framework within which sensory perception becomes meaningful, Heidegger is taken to be less relevant. In the everyday interaction with technology, it does not show itself as a standing reserve, and instead the analysis goes in a different direction that shows how technology is capable of transforming perceptions. In postphenomenology Heidegger is thus mainly used in order to discuss how concrete technologies mediate experience in a bodily, sensory manner, while the context in which that is understood has a less obvious Heideggerian influence.

When it comes to how Heidegger is relevant on the level of microperception, according to Ihde there are three significant characteristics in Heidegger’s line of thinking to be considered. “First, Heidegger shows that each tool, each piece of equipment is related to a context. […] Second, it is clear from Heidegger’s analysis that equipment has an ‘instrumental intentionality’; a tool is ‘something in order to,’ and in that ‘in order to’ there is always a reference of the tool to a use context, to whatever can be done with it. […] And the third element that Ihde finds of special significance is that the tool or piece of equipment, in use, becomes the means rather than the object of our experience.” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 124) Verbeek adopts Ihde’s last element critically by emphasizing that Heidegger spoke of a tool’s role in praxis, rather than in experience: “Heidegger investigates what [equipment] practically makes possible, withdrawing in the process. He refers to the hammer not as a means to experience the nail but rather to drive it in the wall” (ibid.) That our experience can also be mediated through technology, Verbeek points out, is found in the work of the French, Heidegger-inspired, philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his work, we find examples of how human beings can relate to the world ‘through objects’, such as the blind man that ‘perceives’ the world through his walking cane. Heidegger’s analysis of how artefacts are present to human beings, and Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the relations to the world that can arise on the basis of that presence, can be taken together, according to Verbeek, as “a structure of perception that can be described in terms of mediation” (ibid.).

So, in sum, Heidegger forms a basis for postphenomenology in four different ways. First, and most importantly, Heidegger’s discussion of equipment shapes how we can understand the way tools are present to us. This presence is understood in terms of readiness-to-hand—a way in which the tool is present to human beings, shaping praxis, while withdrawing from experience—and in a lesser degree presence-at-hand—where the artefact is objectively present. Postphenomenology studies the different relations to the world that arise on the basis of this type of presence of artefacts. For example, with the help of the work
of Merleau-Ponty, we can see how our experience of the world is mediated and with Ihde’s human-world relations on the level of microperception we can study how the world is present to us through artefacts, which also has Heidegger’s analysis at its basis. Secondly, technologies are not to be understood in themselves, but always in their intentional character; a tool as something in order to. In fact, humans beings can also not be understood purely in themselves. Instead, subjects and objects are co-constituted in their technologically mediated relation. Third, Equipment always refers to a context. A hammer is not only used in order to drive a nail into a wall, it also refers to a context in which this hammering takes place; a workshop, a construction area, or cracking nuts. A tool discloses a world by shaping human praxis, drawing up a world in which the use of this tool makes sense. Finally, we see Heidegger popping up as an important inspiration to the most important thinkers that draw up the postphenomenological vocabulary in ‘What Things Do’: Don Ihde, Albert Bormann, Merleau-Ponty, and clearly Peter-Paul Verbeek himself.

3 Heidegger and Rhetoric?

We have discussed an early Heidegger dealing with technology in terms of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, and a later Heidegger that regards it a calculative and efficient mode of revealing. But there is a third line of thinking in Heidegger that might be of relevance for understanding technological mediation. Before Heidegger’s famous hermeneutics of Being and Time came about, he was still developing his thoughts in relation to the philosophies of the ancient Greeks, moving from his theological background towards philosophy. In the summer semester of 1924, he taught a course on “Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie” (Basic Principles of Aristotelian Philosophy) in which discussed Aristotle’s concepts in their ‘conceptuality’. Instead of only translating them, Heidegger wants to find the ground (Boden) out of which these concepts arose. He does not what to understand Aristotle in the scholastic abstractions of today, but wants to understand the intuitive understanding of these concepts Aristotle and his students had from their use in everyday life. He goes against more traditional interpretations of Aristotle, for example arguing that we should not read back into Aristotle the contemporary strict distinction between the natural and social sciences. Also, Heidegger makes clear that the Rhetoric is not some loose end that does not really fit the rest of Aristotle’s corpus, but that taking the ways in which it relates to other works of Aristotle seriously demands us to understand his philosophy in new and interesting ways. Ways that might provide us with a third line of thinking in Heidegger that could help us understand technological mediation better (even though technology is not the topic of rhetoric).

In this course Heidegger gives Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” a central role, and indeed it was titled “Aristoteles: Rhetorik II” in Karl Löwitz’ transcript (Gross, 2005, p. 2). The Rhetoric is not considered as a handbook for persuasive speaking, but as elaborating what it means to be with one another in a shared world in speaking with one another. In this being with one another, moving others and being moved are intrinsical-
ly human affairs. Human being is a being in movement, always and continuously subject to change. In order to maintain the world as we have it there together with others, we have to be invested in it, engage with it. And in this engagement Heidegger reserves a prominent role for the concept of pathos. Often translated as emotion, Heidegger instead translates it as being-moved (Bewegtsein, Sein-in-Bewegung). Going against the use of pathos as a stylistic afterthought in building up an argument, Heidegger sees it as the ground out of which speaking emerges. The concept of pathos refers to a certain disposition that contains the possibility of being moved, as well as being-taken itself.

This disposition is determined variously, and is a way of being ‘attuned’ (Gestimmt), of how we ‘find ourselves’ in the world (Befindlichkeit). Rather than it being the mood that we are in, Heidegger emphasises how it also contains within itself the structures that make such a mood or being affected possible in the first place. This can be found, among others, in the shared language with which we articulate things in the terms of our time. Being affected on the other hand, is something that demands others. Heidegger makes it clear how being affected is an intrinsically social affair, and how it constitutes political community. When we feel threatened, we are moved to deliberate with others about what action to pursue.

Though a more elaborate discussion of this line of thinking in Heidegger is the topic of the next chapter, we can already see how Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric covers a being-with-one-another in which moving each other (Bewegen) and being moved (Bewegtsein) are central topics. It presupposes a certain conception of what it means to be human: having a disposition and be subject to change, a shared community, and a way in which things come together in a certain moment in which one is moved. Human beings are thus not only understood in terms of their understanding of the world and their behaviour in it, taking shape in relation to technology, but also in terms of their (shared) history through which they are composed and attuned in a certain manner, and how our possibilities for moving about are contoured by a shared world. After I discuss Heidegger’s rhetoric in more detail in the next chapter, I will relate it back to the framework of technological mediation and see how it can help us inform postphenomenology. But first we will see whether and how we can already find elements of such a rhetorical approach in What Things Do.

3.1 Rhetoric and involving an audience: material aesthetics
What we can already take from this brief and preliminary introduction into Heidegger’s rhetoric is his emphasis on understanding how we are moved, in which we can also recognise how an audience gets involved in an argument. While in a different context, Verbeek does address such an involvement in the last chapter of What Things Do. In that chapter he develops what he calls a ‘material aesthetics,’ which addresses how the materiality of a product can invite attachment with that product. How much people are
attached to a product turns out to be an important factor for its lifespan. People do not easily get rid of their photographs, for example. But rather than such things that get devotion, mainly from their symbolic value, the focus was here on everyday things that were not securely put away but are instead used in daily life. The goal was, in collaboration with ‘Eternally Yours’, to lengthen the lifespan of a product through its materiality, making the product more sustainable. An admirable goal, but how does that relate to rhetoric?

In the way Verbeek discusses how people can be involved with a product, we can recognise some elements from rhetoric. He moves away from the symbolic level, where typically rhetoric is used for its added value. In design the focus is often on the functionality of the product, or the cultural meanings that it carries along. A product can promote a certain lifestyle for example, which can very well be studied through rhetorical analysis. But Verbeek argues that these domains are a poor ground for sustainability. When a product is valued for its functionality it can easily be replace with a newer version fulfilling that same function. In keeping up a certain lifestyle, such a newer phone might be an added value, even when the older one still functions. In really making products more sustainable, it is important that people somehow get attached to them through their inherent materiality. Verbeek sets out three ways in which products can invite such engagement: “First, transparency can invite involvement when products become present-at-hand, that is, when they break or need to be revised. Second, products can also invite involvement from their readiness-to-hand.” (2005, p. 231) And a third way is can be found in the aging process of a product. The question is whether such involvement indeed contains rhetorical elements.

The first problem Verbeek points at is that as soon as products break down, we often cannot be involved with them other than them being mere objects. The lack of transparency of their functioning makes that we do not know how to fix them or relate to them in another way. We are then tempted to just dispose of them. In more technical terms, the problem is that it is often not possible, due to lack of this transparency, for a product to become ready-to-hand again after becoming present-at-hand, after breaking down. In order for such a return to be possible, products thus have to become transparent. Their functioning should be understandable and accessible, through which they allow for functional clarity. This makes attachment possible in two ways: “First it allows people to maintain a relation with products even when they break down. Second, and more important, it makes it possible for people to become involved with products as material entities” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 227) This does not seem like an obviously rhetorical problem. The furthest we might stretch it in order to relate rhetoric to this kind of involvement is that the audience is necessarily part of this transparency. How the user is composed in his or her knowledge about the technology that is dealt with matters in what way it is transparent; a well-educated audience can follow the ‘logic’ of a product further than a layman, and can thus maintain a relation in more ways than someone
lacking that knowledge. This transparency is thus not something in itself, but can only be understood in relation to the audience.

Second, products can invite engagement from their readiness-to-hand. Verbeek refers to this type of products as ‘engaging products’, and these can be related to rhetoric in a more obvious way. These are distinguished from transparent products in the sense that “not only the fact *that* it functions is important, but also *how* it functions.” (idem, p. 230). Engaging products involve humans in their functioning, and through this a bond is forged between the user and the material thing itself rather than the commodity it provides. While they are in use, and thus ready-at-hand, these engaging products remain explicitly present in this relation. A clear example of how this works is the use of a musical instrument, a piano, that only fulfils its function by the grace of being played. Only when the piano is played, and the pianist adds his or her efforts the technology, its functionality comes to completion. While being played, the piano does not withdraw from the attention, even though a certain presence-at-hand is necessary for a proper treatment of the instrument, but rather becomes present in its proper functioning. This way of involving the user in the functioning of the instrument echoes the way a rhetorical argument, the enthymeme, involves the audience in completing the argument. A dialectical syllogism spells out how a conclusion follows from two premises: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore Socrates is mortal. In the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, one of the premises is left out in order to engage the audience: ‘All men are mortal, and therefore Socrates too!!’ (implying that he is indeed human), or ‘all men are mortal, and Socrates is also human’ (..and will therefore die at some point). The argument only works because of the extra effort the listener puts in there, and will therefore take it to heart. How engaging products involve the user in their functioning can thus be read as a rhetorical engaging.

Finally, Verbeek briefly discusses how the aging process of a product can also add to a longer lifespan of a product. When we sit on a leather couch for example, the oil and acids on our skin will stain the leather. When we continue to sit on the same spot every time, the wear of the leather starts to show use traces on the places the couch is most used. This process can be used to develop materials that emphasise this process. Again, it is a bit of a stretch to relate this to the framework of rhetoric. But while our understanding of Heidegger’s reading of it is yet too preliminary, I will hint forward a little. For Heidegger habituation is important; our past experiences do not merely fade away, but make us who we are in a certain comportment, a comportment that is important for how we can be moved. We need a better understanding of Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric in order to fully make a claim on this. But we might say here that through such habituation the couch changes from a couch into your couch.
3.2 Borgmann’s engagement with devices

To engage an audience essentially a rhetorical trait. It is one of the ways in which it can be set apart from reasoning purely syllogistically, which aims at establishing an argument aimed at truth rather than involving an audience in it. Verbeek’s ‘engaging products’ seem indeed to suit such a rhetorical understanding of engagement. In “What Things Do” however, the concept of engagement as a dimension of technological mediation is instead worked out along the lines of Albert Borgmann’s understanding of it, and his agenda is a different one. Bormann is strongly inspired by the later Heidegger and his gloomy view of technology. Borgmann follows him in the sense that with modern technologies (devices) commodities become available in a consumptive manner. Similar to how nature becomes a Gestell (standing-reserve) for Heidegger. Without much effort we can just turn up the heater and ‘consume’ the commodity of heat. This is contrasted with a more ‘engaged’ interaction with older technologies, like cutting wood and keeping a fire burning for the same purpose. Verbeek summarises Borgmann’s difference as follows: “A thing cannot be separated from its context or its world nor can it be divorced from our involvement with it: dealing with a thing requires us to engage with it and its environment. A device, on the other hand, puts out of play its context and does not require engagement; it does the work for us and without our involvement.” (2005, p. 117) This pattern of how we interact with technologies is something inherent to our time and that we regard technology in such a consumptive manner is what Borgmann calls the ‘device paradigm’.

The way technology relates to the social order is neither substantivist (or technological deterministic), neither instrumentalist, nor pluralist, Borgmann argues. We are not determined only by technology, and neither is it only a neutral means that has no influence on what we think or do. Borgmann also does not believe that there can be no definite view of technology, but that only a pluralism of views co-exist besides one another. Instead, Borgmann promotes a paradigmatic view on technology. How we regard technological pattern is such a paradigm, namely the device paradigm. Regarding it as such, Borgmann grounds our understanding of technology in a historical situation. That we regard technology as such, is inherent for the liberal democracies that dominate western cultures. In such societies technology typically acquires this power to deliver commodities, which also promotes a certain view of the good life. It is not set in stone, however, and paradigms have the possibility to shift. Though lacking a revolutionary character, Borgmann proposes a reform by bringing this device paradigm to our attention and promoting engagement with focal things and practices.

As we will see in the next chapter Heidegger emphasises that essential to being moved is a certain way of being disposed towards a matter, being attuned in some way. Though Heidegger’s conception of attune-
ment cannot simply be equated with Borgmann’s socio-historical situation, there is certainly a similarity in how both thinkers presume something of a directedness to the world that informs how we deal with technology. For Heidegger, this attunement pre-structures how we can be moved by speech, what resonates with us if you will. For Bormann the technological pattern is precisely what keeps us from being engaged with technology in our device paradigm.

Verbeek adopts Borgmann’s ideas critically. While Borgmann wants to lay bare how Technology has a power to dictate some idea of the good life, Verbeek argues that engagement should rather be seen as a dimension of technological mediation. “If people give up focal practices, they do not do this because they use technological devices, but because they are entirely submerged in the consumptive attitude that the use of devices invites.” (2005, p. 188) It is one of the ways in which we can discuss how humans deal with technologies. Sometimes this takes the form of ‘consumption’, and in another case the form of ‘engagement’. For Borgmann this engagement has the meaning of ‘taking effort’ or ‘giving meaning’, Verbeek points out. But something does not always have to take effort in order to become engaged, Verbeek rightly points out. We do not necessarily have to be engaged with the technology that makes something possible. Although it can be great to make a fire and cut wood for it, we can also appreciate the commodity itself that is brought forward by a device, such as warmth. Verbeek distinguishes three forms of involvement: with the artefact itself, its environment, and the product the artefact makes available. While the first one is often diminished with technology, the others not necessarily.

Verbeek’s adaptation of Borgmann’s engagement indeed provides a much more nuanced view on how technologies mediate our relation with our world, as a dimension of mediation in terms of engagement. Indeed, Borgmann, just like Heidegger, might have been wrong in attempting to reveal some kind of ‘essence’ of technology. But what Bormann did, and Verbeek did not adopt, is giving a description of the cultural embeddedness of technologies. Whether it is the logic of liberal democracy that Borgmann focuses on can be up for debate. But part of a rhetorical approach to understanding technological mediation does presume some kind of disposition or attunement to the world that makes being moved by technologies possible. In the next chapter I will elaborate more on how Heidegger regards such a disposition, but we can already see that how we are moved by technologies cannot be understood outside of such a context—as Borgmann rightly noted.

3.3 Merleau-Ponty’s original engagement with the world

According to French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty our access to the world always presupposes some kind of involvement with it. “In order for a subject to render a judgment about reality, according to Merleau-Ponty, it must already be alongside and engaged with reality—which involves much more than
judging, since it is the field in which judgments can take place. Human beings are continually engaged
with their world, and this engagement precedes any judgment they may have of it.” (Verbeek, 2005, p.
110) Such a form of presupposed engagement seems to be close to Heidegger’s idea that we always find
ourselves in a world shared with others that is already there. This forms an important ground for how we
can be moved in Heidegger’s rhetoric. Merleau-Ponty is important for the development of postphenomen-
ology, but this form of engagement is not further thematised.

Instead, Verbeek argues for two points. First, that Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the relation between humans
and their world is a fruitful idea and should be the point of departure for a phenomenology of technology.
But, second, that Merleau-Ponty was wrong in claiming, like Husserl, that phenomenology can indeed go
back ‘to the things themselves’. Thus, Verbeek finds in Merleau-Ponty’s work a fruitful basis for thinking
about mediation. Phenomenology arose as an answer to the tension between the idealism and realism in
19th century philosophy. Instead of understanding truth as something that only happens in the brain, or
something that mirrors the outside world, it is something that can be found in the interrelation between
the two. In the discipline of phenomenology there have been phenomenologists studying a ‘hermeneuti-
cal’ dimension (like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and others that studied an ‘existential’ dimension
(like Kierkegaard). What binds these philosophers argues Verbeek (2005, p. 108), is that they study the
relations between humans and their world, and his new phenomenological perspective takes this as a start-
ing point. In studying these relations, however, we are not able to reach out to some authentic reality, as
Merleau-Ponty seems to claim.

This does however not prevent us from reflecting on how this plays a role in technological mediation.
“The fact that technological artifacts can be conceived as constructions, always exist in a context, and are
interpreted by human beings in terms of their specific frameworks of reference do not erase the fact that
systematic reflection can be undertaken of the role that these contextual and interpreted constructions play
concretely in the experience and behavior of human beings.” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 113) But besides such
contextualisation, what I believe Merleau-Ponty was pointing at has a lot to do with Heidegger’s ‘onto-
logical structures’ that prefigure how the world is disclosed in our relations to it. Indeed, also Merleau-
Ponty does not have unmediated access to ‘reality itself’, but might the dimension of a ‘more originary’
(rather than original, authentic) ground been dismissed too hastily?

Merleau-Ponty (or Heidegger, as we will see later) does not seem to be after a noumenal Reality, but ra-
ther a ‘more originary’ (experiential) ground out of which that what we speak about springs forth. Ac-
cording to Heidegger speaking and reflection close off access to a pre-lingual experience in which we find
ourselves in the world. In a similar manner, Merleau-Ponty renders phenomenology as an alternative for
'scientific speaking’. Phenomenology, then, should have the potential to reach to a more authentic, original experience. For example, Merleau-Ponty discusses human consciousness in the introduction to his “Phenomenology of Perception” as a unified consciousness that he calls ‘the One’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1996) (a remarkable choice, taking the context of Heidegger’s philosophy into account). Only on the basis of this shared consciousness we can understand our individual conscious perception of the world. While such an abstract idea might be difficult to maintain, Heidegger develops in relation to Aristotle’s rhetoric a much more concrete form of such a shared world disclosure in which our speaking with one another is grounded.

Indeed, also Merleau-Ponty does not have unmediated access to ‘reality itself’, but might the dimension of a ‘more originary’ (rather than original, authentic) ground been dismissed too hastily? Such a dimension of studying human-world relations might be a valuable addition to the postphenomenological framework. Not as a dimension that is ‘more true’ (authentic), but as a dimension that shows how technological mediation is grounded in something more originary, a ground out of which we can understand the ways we are moved in our relations with the world.

4 Rhetoric and Technology

With all these promises about Heidegger’s rhetoric, we are eager to get to a more in-depth understanding of it. What does Heidegger do in 1924 that makes his reading of rhetoric potentially so interesting for understanding technological mediation? But before turning to a more elaborate discussion of Heidegger’s approach to rhetoric, it is worth considering why other approaches that relate rhetoric to technology are not a good enough basis to proceed from. Relating rhetoric to the domain of technology is not a new enterprise. There have been several attempts with more or less success. Rhetoric is often employed to understand things on a symbolic level, what meaning a product carries. Especially in the domain of semiotics and visual rhetoric the domain of language is stretched up to more general ‘sign systems’ to cover different forms of symbolic communication (cf. Groupe-mu, 1992). When rhetoric is concerned in the domain of technology we often find analyses of paintings, advertisement, informative illustrations (such as manuals) or interfaces (cf. Ehses, 1984; Hill & Helmers, 2012; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996). But Postphenomenology is precisely an attempt to answer to such approaches by showing how a technology mediates also in its material presence (Verbeek & Kockelkoren, 1998). In that spirit a rhetoric related to technology should then also focus more on a technology or design itself. I will discuss three perspectives that could be regarded as such: Richard Buchanan’s “Declaration by Design” (Buchanan, 1985), B.J. Fogg’s “Persuasive Technology” (Fogg, 2002), and Ian Bogost’s concept of ‘procedural rhetoric’ in “Persuasive Games” (Bogost, 2007).
4.1 Design as Rhetorical Practice

Probably the first to discuss design and the design process explicitly in terms of rhetoric is Richard Buchanan with his article “Declaration by design: Rhetoric, argument and demonstration in design practice” (Buchanan, 1985). He expresses an intuition that is remarkably similar to the starting point of this thesis, namely that products have a certain effect on human beings that can be recognised as something rhetorical. Buchanan takes rhetoric to be “an art of shaping society, changing the course of individuals and communities, and setting patterns for new action” (idem, p. 6) and recognizes the “remarkable power of man-made objects to accomplish something very similar” (ibid.). The common conception of rhetoric is too much limited to the realm to language to include this impact of technologies, “but […] the vast output of man-made objects in the present represents another, unrecognized mode of communication, a rhetoric of things” (idem, p. 18). In his essay, Buchanan provides a rich discussion of how design is indeed intrinsically rhetorical, what the implications and the use of approaching design in terms of rhetoric are, and how different elements of the rhetorical framework apply to product design.

Buchanan argues against a ‘technologist’ view of product design that regards it as an applied science, and draws it straight into the domain of rhetoric: “if technology is in some fundamental sense concerned with the probable rather than the necessary—with the contingencies (sic) of practical use and action, rather than the certainties of scientific principle—then it becomes rhetorical in a startling fashion” (idem, p. 6) He provides a nuanced perspective on rhetoric, and contrasts it from the more ‘grammatical’ semiotics that flourished at the time and Marxist-like perspectives on dialectical power relations. A rhetorical perspective of design could instead be an approach to embrace the persuasiveness of objects, and to regard how design “involves the vivid expression of competing ideas about social life” (idem, p. 7). Buchanan thus aims at a theory of rhetoric in design that first of all regards technology as a rhetorical problem that could secondly provide a ground for better public criticism and evaluations of design to make sense of the ‘puzzling diversity of design communications’.

Buchanan provides a nuanced approach to the problem, recognising how the materiality of a product matters and how an argument comes to live in use or when use of the product is considered (idem, pp. 7-8). However, he has a strong emphasis on the communication of designer to the user through the medium of technology, while I wish to understand not the designer’s expressive power but that of that technology itself. Even though Buchanan’s intentions and argumentation is nuanced, rich and elaborate, how he applies the elements of rhetoric to design does not seem to do justice to the potential of his proposed inclusive rhetoric. Buchanan keeps up a strong analogy with verbal communication, and Aristotle’s classic threefold of ethos, pathos and logos:
“One is the idea of the designer as a speaker who fashions a world, however small or large, and invites others to share in it. Another is the idea of an audience of users who may be persuaded to adopt new ways and means to achieve objectives in their lives. Still another is the idea of practical life as subject of design communication [...]. Most important, however, is the idea of argument, which connects all of the elements of design and becomes an active engagement between designer and user or potential user.” (Buchanan, 1985, p. 8)

In how Buchanan explains these elements of rhetoric, he has a strong focus on the intentions and purposes of the designer. He identifies logos as ‘technological reasoning’, and puts that at the core of persuasive design (Heidegger, as we will see in the next chapter, puts pathos at the centre instead). This technological reasoning is something on the behalf of the designer: “in essence, the problem of technological reasoning in design is the way the designer manipulates materials and processes to solve practical problems of human activity” (idem, p. 9). On ethos, the character of the speaker, Buchanan writes: “products have character because in some way they reflect their makers [...]. In essence, the problem is the way designers represent themselves in products, not as they are, but as they wish to appear” (idem, p. 14). When it comes to pathos, emotion, Buchanan argues that it is what gives design the status of a fine art. Pathos is the true province of design.

Pathos is about bringing an audience in a certain frame of mind for Buchanan, “so that when they use a product they are persuaded that it is emotionally desirable and valuable in their lives” (idem, p. 16). The designer has at his disposal for persuading the audience in this sense both the physical interaction as the contemplation about use. Buchanan argues that for example movement in the form of a gesture, or directing visual attention, is a way in which an emotional appeal can be made. It is also what makes it powerful: “it collapses the distance between the object and the minds of the users, leading them to identify with the expressive movement and allow it to carry them where it will.” (idem, p. 18) Buchanan approaches the emotional appeal with the caution that is characteristic of it. There are those designers that use it in a superficial and coercive way—the sophist designer if you will, that only market a product and have no eye for whether it functions or not. There are those that adapt a product to “existing tastes of audiences and to popular beliefs about what is artful or beautiful” (ibid.). But the strongest use of pathos is by designers that are “concerned with discovering new aspects of the utility of emotional expression in practical life. Their products attract and hold audiences in surprisingly different ways, and in this lies the importance of emotion as a mode of persuasion.” (Buchanan, 1985, p. 18, my emphasis). A designer can, by appealing to pathos in this way, according to Buchanan, help “an audience to entertain new possibilities for practical living and to remain open to the technological reasoning and character of a product.” (ibid.)
Buchanan distinguishes three types of movement. A calm emotion that “serves and enhances use, but it also defines the object as an independent, autonomous whole.” An emotion that “intensifies the environment, perhaps capturing the social occasion of dining, even as the objects perform their simple functions. Instead of appearing self-sufficient, they seem to seek connections and relationships with other objects or people around them, because the emotional excitement is directed outward.” And lastly, one that “involves a quiet and delicate play that reaches subtly into the mind of the user and sets loose the imagination.” (idem, pp. 16-17) Buchanan thus recognizes how technologies refer to something more than only their immediate functionality; how two teacups can move us to drink tea in different ways cannot only be understood as such. However, how we should understand this movement, and how it is at work is worked out only superficially by Buchanan.

4.2 Persuasive Technologies
A second and more contemporary approach to relating some form of rhetoric to technology is the field of persuasive technology. Though not strictly rhetorical, it is concerned with the persuasive powers of technologies. Persuasion taken from psychological accounts, of which the predecessor is rhetoric. Already being married to mediation theory in a way, persuasive technology might be the closest we already got to investigating rhetoric within the realm of technological mediation specifically. Verbeek argues that the domain of persuasive technologies is a specific manifestation of technological mediation (Verbeek, 2006, 2011). It is characterised as a certain form of ‘force’, ranging from seduction via persuasion to coercion. An influential approach to persuasive technologies is developed by B.J. Fogg in Stanford. And again, the basic intuition is similar to that of Buchanan and of this thesis. As renowned psychologist Philip Zimbardo writes in the foreword to the book: “[Fogg] engaged in original research exploring the parallels between the persuasive influence of computers and human agents.” (Fogg, 2002, p. ix) But although persuasive technology already has a place in postphenomenology, its limited scope does not do justice to a full rhetorical approach to technological mediation.

Fogg is concerned with ‘computers as persuasive technologies’ (Captology) which he defines as: “[the focus] on the design, research, and analysis of interactive computing products created for the purpose of changing people’s attitudes or behaviors” (idem, p. 5) In framing his research, Fogg is clear about its scope. First, he defines persuasion as “an attempt to change attitudes or behaviours or both.” (idem, p. 15) The focus is thus on intent, and not on the (unintended) outcome. It is not so much about whether the user is indeed persuaded, but on the intentions of the designer. This thus means that he “does not include […] unintended outcomes; it focuses on the attitude and behaviour changes intended by the designers of interactive technology products.” (Fogg, 2002, p. 17) Secondly, Fogg limits the research to interactions with technologies, leaving human interactions through technologies out of it: “captology […] focuses on hu-
man-computer interaction (HCI), not on computer-mediated communication (CMC).” (idem, p. 16). Thus, the designer inscribes his planned persuasive outcome into a technology, with which then a user interacts. In that sense the approach of persuasive technology resembles that of Buchanan.

The definition of persuasion that Fogg, as well as the field of psychology more generally, uses is rather narrow. There is no one and clear definition, as Fogg also recognises, but the one he chooses has a strong focus on influence; the intent of someone (the designer) to influence someone else. This is also reflected in him paraphrasing Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric: “In classical Greece, Aristotle was the leading thinker on the topic of rhetoric—the art of determining how to persuade in any given situation.” (idem, p. 24) A closer and more modest translation would be: “the art of seeing what is persuasive in any given case.” As we will see in the next chapter Heidegger would see Fogg’s translation as a fundamental misinterpretation of what rhetoric is about. A broader interpretation of persuasion as rhetoric, and especially Heidegger’s reading of it should provide a broader basis for discussing technology’s ‘persuasive’ character.

Nevertheless Fogg presents a wide variety of ways in which technologies can be persuasive. Characteristic for computers is that they have the ability to interact, be persistent, simulate, and can in some cases even be regarded something of a social actor. The tools that the designer has at his disposal to communicate a message are a wide variety of ways in which computers can influence behaviour and attitudes. In these tools the appeal to rhetorical pathos seems to be remarkably absent. He covers how we are moved to certain behaviour in his ‘behaviour model’ (Fogg, 2016). For behavioural change to happen there need to be three ingredients that converge at the same moment: motivation, ability, and trigger. The core motivators are emotions like pleasure and pain, hope and fear, social acceptance and rejection. A technology can be persuasive in providing a certain trigger at the right moment. Fogg’s approach is useful at a practical level, providing insight in ways computers can be used for influencing behaviour. But for a philosophical reflection of how that matters for how we shape our existence in being with one another or how our perception of the world is affected by it receives little attention.

4.3 The digital rhetoric of procedurality

An approach where technology and rhetoric meet each other in which the emphasis on the designer is less strong is Ian Bogost’s ‘procedural rhetoric’ which he elaborates in “Persuasive Games” (Bogost, 2007). In a lengthy introduction, Bogost places his approach to digital rhetoric in the tradition of rhetoric from ancient oratory to visual rhetoric. A digital rhetoric, he argues, “must address the role of procedurality, the unique representational property of the computer.” (idem, p. 28) And procedural rhetoric is “the practice of using processes persuasively, just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using oratory persuasively and
visual rhetoric is the practice of using images persuasively,” (ibid.). Though there is a form of persuasion at work, this has the character of steering behaviour in a lesser extent, while an understanding of the mechanisms that are at work even more so.

What Ian Bogost gets at is that procedures, which we can paraphrase as ‘sets of rules or instructions’, have a rhetorical impact with its own characteristics. The specific goal of persuasion is not set in advance, but rather the context is set in which a user will shape his or her course of action. Bogost’s persuasive games do not necessarily work towards a specific goal, contrary to serious games or B.J. Fogg’s persuasive technologies, but do have the purpose of making the player consider a certain topic and understand the mechanisms that are at play. An example of that is Brenda Romero’s game called ‘Train,’ part of her art project ‘The Mechanic is the Message’ (Takahashi, 2011). The game simulates mechanics that were at play during the holocaust. With no specific goal presented, the miniature boxcars and tokens invite to move as many of these tokens to the other end of the track. Soon, after turning over the destination card, the players discover that the train is heading to a concentration camp. The rule that determines the end of the game writes: “The game is over when it is over”. Some people stop playing, some even before it, and some try to subvert the system and get as many tokens to freedom as possible, for example by derailing trains. That goal is not set by the game designer. She only set the context in which the player has to resolve oneself and make up his or her mind about what course of action to take.

In order to understand the persuasion of Romero’s game works, Bogost would argue, we need an understanding of the rhetoric of procedurality. Not only such a game, but basically all algorithmic programming of the computer is expressed in procedures. It can thus be read both in computational and noncomputational structures. (Bogost, 2007, p. 4). What matters is that these procedures construct and interpret “a symbolic system that governs human thought and action.” (idem, p. 5, my emphasis) Most interesting for a rhetoric are those procedures that present on comment on processes that are inherent to human experience. Romero’s games provide such a context in the form of the holocaust, or covering the ‘middle passage,’ how slaves were shipped to the Americas. Those who play it get a sense of what mechanics were at play and have to figure out a way to relate to that.

Bogost makes elegantly clear that understanding persuasive, or rather rhetorical power, does not have to be understood through the intentions of the designer. Instead of a focus on a pre-set goal that is communicated, we can focus on how the mechanisms of a specific context can have power to make users reconsider their convictions and behaviour. But again, we see a strong focus on the type of arguments that can be

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2 Romero tells an anecdote of a Rabbi that played the game and as soon as he understood where the game was leading stated that he did not want to play. Her reply was: “you just did.”
deployed. Though Bogost is right (and Buchanan makes a similar point) that we should make clear how arguments can be expressed a specific medium, there is less attention for other intrinsically rhetorical aspects such as the appeal to pathos. Heidegger would not speak of mechanisms. But as we will see in the next chapter, important aspects of how he understands rhetoric is how we already find ourselves in the world, how we are disposed to a matter, and what possibilities there are for moving about in a shared world. How we are moved is indeed to a large part dependent on how we care to listen to what is going on in a speech, or a computer game if you will.

4.4 Towards a rhetoric of technology beyond persuasion

The three approaches to relating rhetoric to technology discussed here each add something to the discussion in their own way. They are practically oriented and can provide tools for the designer, as is their main purpose. In their practical orientation however, they adopt a standard view of rhetoric and persuasion that Heidegger argues against. As the purpose of their research does not demand it, a profound understanding of rhetoric and the mechanisms at work are not put up for discussion, which leaves a rather flattened out version of what rhetoric is. Rhetoric is regarded as an approach that provides a speaker, or a designer in this case, with tools for eloquent expression in a symbolic system of some sort with the purpose of influencing a rather passive audience. It is a form of communication with the focus on the speaker’s intended goal of persuasion (although less so in Bogost’s approach) that is communicated through the medium of technology. This *logos*, or argumentation, takes the shape either of ‘technological reasoning,’ human-computer interaction, or procedurality. If emotions are discussed at all, they are predominantly regarded as something of individual psychology, the state of mind of mind of a user that functions as a motivator or renders something as useful for a situation. There seems to be room for investigating further in rhetorical terms what things themselves do in mediating human existence and hermeneutics, or a philosophical underpinning of the mechanisms at work here.

Mediation theory, while recognizing that a product is of course designed with certain intentions, focuses on studying the role technologies play in the relation between people and their world. The consistent focus on communication from designer to the user we find here makes it difficult to problematize this. In mediation theory the intentions of the designer move to the background, and the broader range of mediations are taken into account. Instead of a focus on the designer and user, with technology as an instrumental object, mediation theory starts from the perspective that both the object as subject are constituted in their relation with one another. Only in the interaction with an object it truly becomes what it is at that moment. Marrying rhetoric with the perspective of technological mediation would then have the potential to reach to a more profound understanding of the mechanics at work, but would be served with a rhetoric that goes beyond communication between subjects.
In Heidegger’s approach we will see that while rhetoric might be indeed about persuasion, this should be understood as a manifestation of how we are with one another in our everyday lives. Aristotle’s rhetoric deals with this being-with-one-another in our everyday concerns, and how that constitutes community. While something like peer pressure is indeed brought up by B.J. Fogg, and Bogost insist that in order to speak of rhetoric the matter at hand should be a public matter, a more profound understanding of this communitarian dimension is only superficially touched upon. Human beings are not only concerned with their own goals, but also with their shared world that they are invested in and convince others to participate in. We want others to care about a matter, and make them think about it or take up action. When paralleling spoken rhetoric with technological mediations, how human beings are moved in a shared world should be a starting point rather than an afterthought.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the ‘Heideggerian roots’ of phenomenology. While Heidegger’s later work is convincingly criticized for being transcendentalist, his analysis of the tool in Being and Time forms a solid basis for postphenomenology. Especially Heidegger’s concept of readiness-to-hand, the way technologies can be present by withdrawing from our attention in use, and presence-at-hand, the way we encounter things that are broken as objectively present, form a solid basis. These things are never things in themselves, but always things-for-us. We do not encounter a hammer as a meaningless wooden stick with a piece of metal, but as a hammer, for hammering. Also Heidegger’s ‘worldliness of the world’, the manner in which our world is drawn up in relation to technologies, how a hammer can reveal a situation as one that needs hammering, and the place where it is as a carpentry, finds its place in the postphenomenological perspective. Finally, Heidegger finds its way to postphenomenology in the form of being a mayor inspiration for the contemporary philosophers that draw up the discipline.

Besides the ‘early’ and ‘later’ Heidegger on technology, there is a third line of thinking in Heidegger on rhetoric that, as I argue, might contribute to understanding technological mediation. In Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s rhetoric a central theme is how we are moved, and how such a being-moving presupposes a certain possibility to be moved in the first place, a certain disposition. The way we are involved with the world is an important theme in (post)phenomenology. I have discussed how our preliminary understanding of Heidegger’s rhetoric already receives attention in What Things Do. First, as ways of ‘attachment’ to things. In order to prologue the life-span of products, products can invite us to engage with them. Second, in terms of Borgmann’s engagements with technology. How we deal with technology should be understood in the broader context of how we are with one another, for example in libertarian democracies. Finally, at the basis of the discussion of the phenomenological method, in Merleau-Ponty’s engagement
with the world that precedes any judgment of it. In such an engagement we find the world already there, before reflection.

Postphenomenology is all about how we are moved to certain thoughts or behaviour through technological mediation. And, as we have seen, different aspects of rhetoric such as engaging an audience and a context or disposition that structures how we are moved receive attention in the perspective. Verbeek describes nicely how a piano engages a human in its use. However, how human beings are moved is not thematised as such. Though different themes are discussed in developing the perspective, often the aspects relating to it do not become part of the postphenomenological vocabulary. Heidegger’s rhetorical approach might provide postphenomenology with the tools to problematize this in a more structured manner.

In discussing three other approaches that parallel rhetoric with the influence technology can have on how we think or act it became clear why there is room for a new approach. Being taken up with a more classical understanding of rhetoric, these approaches necessarily focus strongly on the intent of the designer but fail to understand the mediating character of technologies themselves. They provide a good practical understanding of how a designer can influence thoughts and behaviour through the medium of various technologies. But how technologies have an ability to engage an audience, its expressive power if you will, is less understood. How human beings are moved beyond persuasion and individual psychology is not so much part of these practical approaches to rhetoric and technology.

Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective might be able to cover some of the gaps that we find in postphenomenology and approaches to design and rhetoric. It can make visible what it takes for human beings to be in movement and be affected by technologies. It could shed a light not only on what things do, but also on how we should understand their expressive power. Central in that is an account of pathos, the ways in which human beings are moved. Not only in how we understand the world, but certainly also in how we are called upon taking action and resolving ourselves; realizing our existence in the world. The question then becomes: how do we think such being-moving into mediation theory? And for that, we first need a good grasp of Heidegger’s account of rhetoric, with a special focus on rhetorical pathos.
Chapter 2

Heidegger’s Rhetoric of Being-moved
1 Introduction

Understanding technological mediation might benefit from a rhetorical perspective as we have seen in the previous chapter, and that perspective could come from Heidegger’s early course on the “Basic Concepts Of Aristotelean Philosophy”. In that course, which was titled “Aristoteles: Rhetorik II” in a transcript of Karl Löwitz, Heidegger discusses Aristotle’s philosophy with central attention to the role and function of his rhetoric. He wants to get behind the conceptions we already have of it, and find out how the concepts that Aristotle uses are grounded in practical everyday being. Or in Heidegger’s terms: he wants to understand these concepts in their conceptuality. In the course Heidegger provides a reading of rhetoric that has been influential for that field, but also draws rhetoric straight into the domain of philosophy. Rhetoric is not to be understood as merely an account of persuasive speaking, which is a mistaking of rhetoric that already persists since the Greeks:

“The tradition lost any understanding of rhetoric long ago, since it had become simply a school discipline even in the time of Hellinism and in the early Middle Ages. The original sense of rhetoric had long disappeared. Insofar as one forgot to inquire into the concrete function of Aristotelian logic, one gave up the basic possibility of interpreting this so that it would thereby become clear that rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there is explicitly fulfilled. Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 75)

In this chapter I will elaborate different aspects of this interpretation of rhetoric, with the intent to find the tools necessary to relate it to the postphenomenological study of technological mediation.3

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3 Heidegger’s semester course, referred to as GA18, SS1924, or GBAP, is taken up as nr. 18 in the Gesamtausgabe. But already before it came out, Theodore Kisiel raised high expectations in his “Genesis of being and time”. It is praised throughout literature as an extraordinary course. Heidegger reclaims “Aristotle’s Rhetoric for philosophy” in a way unparalleled in any philosophical studies, “to have gotten it back from the extreme periphery of Aristotle’s works to which the tradition of philosophy, including Aristotle himself, had relegated it.” (Smith, 1995, p. 316)
In order for Heidegger’s rhetoric to be a useful candidate, we have seen in the previous chapter that it should at least meet two demands: it should be possible in some way to relate it to mediation theory, and this marrying of rhetoric and technology would benefit from a proper philosophical retrieval of rhetoric instead of discussing it only as a study of persuasion. However beneficial this rhetorical perspective is to understanding technological mediation is a question for the next chapter, in this chapter we will see that Heidegger indeed made some interesting interpretive steps that suit these conditions. Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric does not so much discuss ingenious orators moulding words, as the Roman rhetoricians would have it, but rather describes how human being is a being in movement invested in a concrete practical situation that needs taking care of.

A central theme in Heidegger’s course is his reversal of the priority of pathos and logos. Heidegger finds the emphasis on rationality and the cognitive, making feelings and emotions merely ancillary to it, to be an abstraction of our experience in everyday being in the world. According to Heidegger, reflective thinking to which the larger part of the history of philosophy appeals might be a goal to strive for, but does not describe what it means to be human most of the time. We cannot understand what it means to be human in our everyday being with one another without an understanding of pathos, or how human beings are moved. Before any reflection, we already find ourselves in a world is already disclosed in a preliminary way, always in one mood or another. Pathos, Heidegger shows in his course, is not some afterthought, but a basic determination of what it means to be human.

Heidegger draws pathos out of the domain of individual psychology by understanding it as a being-moved. The pathē are not some state of mind, but rather describe how we are being moved in our human being. We do not say, as Aristotle says, that the soul is moved, but rather that the human being is moved. This presumes an understanding of the human being as a being-in-movement. I will start with elaborating how Heidegger gets to this insight by taking the parallels between Aristotle discussing the polis and physis seriously. Understanding the being-in-movement of nature has implications for how we should understand any account of moving people, and with that how we should understand the pathē.

Heidegger certainly adopted it for his own philosophy. He was working on a book on Aristotle, which instead ripened into the first drafts of Being and Time. (Kisiel, 1995, p. 292) Even though Heidegger might have stretched what he calls a more original understanding of Aristotle’s concepts, his interpretation broke ground with traditional interpretations in an innovative way (Oele, 2012). In this thesis I often build on the Daniel Gross’s introduction to his edited volume on “Heidegger and Rhetoric” (Gross & Kemmann, 2005). In that introduction Gross focusses on the central role that pathos plays in Heidegger’s course, relating various aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy together. Gross argues that Heidegger’s innovative understanding of the concept of pathos is key to understanding the relevance of Heidegger’s summer semester course of 1924.
Heidegger find in the rhetoric a description of everyday being with other people, and this being is characterised with a certain ambiguity and openness to the fact that things could be otherwise. For the larger part, human being is not a rational being, but rather this every day being going about the projects of everyday life which is the domain of rhetorical speaking. Contrary to the derogatory accounts of pathos, Heidegger makes clear that being subject to affects instead defines us as human beings. I will continue discussing how in the ambiguity of everyday life it matters how we stands towards a matter, and how this disposition is partially informed by our shared beliefs through which we make sense of the world.

Central to Heidegger’s interpretation of rhetoric is his conceptualisation of pathos and how it relates to other concepts in Aristotle’s philosophy. His understanding of pathos thus presumes some being in movement that is subject to change. But in order for such a being to be moved, Heidegger makes clear, there should already be something that can be moved in the first place. One of the meanings of pathos that Heidegger finds is indeed pathos as some possibility to change, the possibility be moved. Heidegger finds this in a certain disposition in which we find ourselves in the world. This disposition is variously determined, and structures the ways in which being-in-the-world can be moved.

But pathos is also that change itself, a being moved in the sense of a being affected, being-brought-out-of composure. I will outline how in the rhetoric this being-moving has a relational and social character. Not the primal fear of a snake is topic of concern, but rather the concrete threat of others that are out to harm us. Heidegger shows how pathos ties human being in its unique way to its embodiment. In the moment human beings are moved past experiences and future possibilities fold into a provisional present that demands action or judgment. It becomes clear how in this moment, kairos, being-in-the-world is concretely there in its specific temporal and spatial situation. Heidegger then renders rhetoric not as ingenious speaking, but rather as a careful listening to such a situation.

Finally, we will see how Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective influenced Being and Time, which is where mediation theory and this reading of rhetoric meet. Heidegger’s discussion of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung—notoriously difficult to translate, but maybe best understood as attunement—is clearly influenced by his earlier discussion of Aristotle’s rhetorical pathos. But more than that, we will also discuss briefly how Heidegger’s early course on rhetoric has implications for how he discusses everyday tools.
2 Human Being as Being in Movement

“pathos provides the very ground for judgment (krisis), first moving the listener to be realized in some form.” (Gross, 2005, p. 9)

Throughout his course, Heidegger insists that pathos should not be translated with ‘emotion’ in the sense of an individual psychology but rather as a being-moved. The importance of this seemingly minor point lies in how Heidegger draws attention to the fundamentally different view on the human being Aristotle and the Greeks had. Our contemporary sciences are structured roughly along the lines of the division between the subject or the mind and the objective world, which gives us respectively the social and natural sciences. Differences in how we can approach these subjects have made quite a strict separation between them; the social sciences study the changeable realm of human mind and behaviour, while the natural sciences research the more robust character of our natural world. The emotions, then, are studied as a state of mind, influencing our thoughts and actions in our mind. But Heidegger argues that the Greeks did not have such a view of the human being. The strict distinction between how Aristotle studied the polis and how he studied physis was not Aristotle’s own. Pathos, the concept for what we call emotion or mood, is not only something of our inner man, but is part of the fundamental categories with which Aristotle understood nature. Understood this way, pathos is not only a state of our minds, but is something that can only understood in the Greek sense when human being is understood as being-in-movement.

Heidegger thought the distinction between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft to be exaggerated, and certainly when it is read back into Aristotle. Though certain analogies between the study of the polis and of physis were recognised already before Heidegger, they were regarded coincidental. But “shattering centuries of interpretation of Aristotle while staying stubbornly in character, Heidegger takes such analogies seriously” (Gross, 2005, p. 13). In his course, Heidegger treats the Aristotelian corpus holistically, seamlessly crossing over between for example the Physics and the Rhetoric. Through this approach, Heidegger is able to place Aristotle’s Rhetoric at the heart of Aristotle’s philosophy. The concept of pathos, which is a characteristic element of rhetoric, is not only found in the Rhetoric. It is one of Aristotle’s basic categories through which he understands all natural things (physis): “The pathos of a stone allows it to become part of a wall, the pathos of a plant to grow, the pathos of an animal to perceive imminent danger and to shriek warnings to others.” (ibid.) We share with all things natural that we are beings in movement, though only human being is moved to language. “What we share with things of all sorts is body-in-movement, a movement characterized by pathos.” (ibid.).

Heidegger realised that this understanding of nature in motion, has “radical consequences for any discussion of moving people” (Gross, 2005, p. 26)—of course one of the tasks of rhetoric. The pathē should be
considered in a human context. Rather than a condition of the soul or psyche, or a marginal addition to rational discourse, “according to Heidegger, Aristotle’s discussion of the pathē treats ‘the disposition of the living in his world, how he stands to something, how he lets something affect him.’ The affects indeed play ‘a fundamental role in the determination of Being-in-the-world, of Being with and to others.’” (idem, p. 27) They are not purely abstract nor only physical-material alterations. And neither are they only the ‘feelings’ of ‘emotional people’, that did not manage to get these emotions under control, as would be along the lines of the negative judgment of the passions throughout history. What we find in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle are pathē that “indicate possible ways of being-moved that tie humans in a unique way to their embodiment.” (idem, p. 26) Aristotle does not discuss the pathē in terms of physiological considerations, but rather as ways in which they determine the possibilities for moving about in a shared world. While the ‘material’ (hule) of pathos might be found in the material body, Aristotle discusses the pathē in their eidos, their in how they appear. And “the eidos of the pathē is a disposition towards other humans, a Being-in-the-world.” (Heidegger, translation in Gross, 2005, p. 26) When discussing the social phenomena of the polis Socrates puts physics in the background, but Aristotle saw this as a fundamental mistake. Heidegger argues that also being in the polis has its foundation in Aristotle’s basic categories of being in physics. Understanding being in movement lies in understanding “the complex relation between pathēsis and poiētikos, whose interanimation defines motion (kinēsis) for Aristotle.” (Gross, 2005, p. 20)

Heidegger makes clear how this holistic approach to Aristotle’s philosophy looks by means of an example. He asks a scientific materialist, a humanist, and a true Aristotelean ‘physicist’ (Gross’s classification) the question: “How does a ‘house’ look?” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 138). The materialist would describe the house in terms of its materiality (stone, brick, wood) or its mathematical extension (surface area, weight), which would not give us a full account of what a house is. The humanist perspective however also does not provide us with a full perspective, only being able to describe it in its purpose (its eidos, appearance) for example as shelter from harmful elements (rain, wind, heat). Finally, the Aristotelean physicist, according to Heidegger, describes the house as follows: “A house appears in wood, stone and brick, so as to produce the necessary protection and shelter; it is a ‘being-built’ carried out in light of a shelter being there.” (Heidegger, translation in Gross, 2005, p. 25) The material is thus construed in terms of the human world, and the human world in terms of its materiality. “Material is realised as it takes shape (pathētikos) and the realization takes place in becoming concrete (poiētikos).” (ibid.) And as we have seen before, it is the relation between these two that make up the movement that defines ‘nature’. Heidegger shows that for the Greeks movement in not only understood in its narrow understanding as locomotion (moving in space) but that it had had a broader meaning. The consequence for rhetoric is that it describes our being in
movement with others, and for pathos that it should be understood as an intrinsic part of that; pathos is not merely afterthought.

What Heidegger elaborates is an understanding of “the spatial materiality of Being-with that lies at the intersection of physis and polis, and [a] rediscovery of a profound pathos at the heart of the rhetorical tradition.” (Gross, 2005, p. 24). The pathē should be understood as a disposition to the world and to others, and as part of a way in which we are with one another. As it is often understood, an eloquent speaker has pathos at his disposal to influence a listener, to make a speech more appealing by stylistic afterthought. But as Heidegger understands it, “pathos provides the very ground for judgment (krisis), first moving the listener to be realized in some form.” (idem, p. 9) Speaking only comes to its end when what is spoken is truly heard. Not only in the sense of hearing a voice, but in the sense that what is said is taken at heart. An audience is not so much manipulated with pathos, but realised as a listener in the first place.

3 The Humanness of Heidegger’s Rhetoric

“Without affect our disembodied minds would have no heart, and no legs to stand on. We would have no grounds for concern, no time and place for judging, no motivation to discourse at all” (Gross, 2005, p. 4)

Rhetoric actually deals with what it means to be human in a shared world and is more than a philosophy of language, Heidegger argues. Everyday human being is characterised by movement, change, ambiguity and fluidity, and only out of that, reflective thinking or dialectics can emerge. Heidegger discusses this ambiguity in terms of doxa, in conjunction with pathos. Doxa circumscribes the realm of rhetorical speaking and with that everyday being with one another. The openness to change that characterises doxa is the realm of rhetoric, and it is pathos that provides doxa with the dynamism that it potentially has. In Heidegger’s rhetoric we do not just find a theory of persuasion, but a perspective on the humanness of being human.

Aristotle’s view opposes Plato’s here. In Plato’s “Gorgias”, we find one of Plato’s famous critiques on Rhetoric. In discussion with established rhetoricians of the time, among which Gorgias himself, Plato lets Socrates argue that there is no use for Rhetoric at all. Rhetoric is always a perversion of power, something for people of the likes of demagogues, and should therefore never be employed. All speaking should be directed at the truth, at uncovering the things as the really are, and the ‘art’ of rhetoric is not concerned with such speaking. The argument roughly goes as follows: rhetoric is the art of moving people. But truth is already there, to be dis-covered, and therefore one never has to be moved anywhere. In his later treatise the “Phaedrus”, the topic of Heidegger’s course of the winter semester of 1924 (Heidegger, 1997), Plato presents a more nuanced view on rhetoric, understanding it as a form of self-expression and everyday
communication. But also there, dialectics, that speaking which is directed at the truth, is what one should be concerned with and which grounds rhetoric. Plato has been influential with this position even until today. But in 1924 Heidegger casts Plato as the villain that helped forgetting the original function of rhetoric that Heidegger finds in Aristotle. Though Plato prepared Aristotle’s work, according to Heidegger we need to turn to Aristotle for an ontological understanding of rhetoric.

In his 1924 course Heidegger takes a proper stance against a purely rational worldview, and pathos plays a fundamental role in his grounding his rhetorical ontology. Human being is always in motion, a movement characterised by pathos. This has a close connection to how Heidegger understands the concept of doxa. Typically this is translates as ‘belief’ or ‘opinion’ and carries a rather negative connotation as it is contrasted with the truth. Following the analogy of Plato’s cave, doxa are merely the changeable shadows, or projections of some more profound unalterable ideal, or truth. This priority of rational knowledge over everyday beliefs has been part and parcel of the history of western philosophy. While Heidegger does not argue against truth as a goal to strive for, he does draw doxa out of its negative constraints by making it an intrinsic part of being human. Doxa is the realm in which rhetorical being, that is everyday human being, necessarily takes place. The zoon logon echon, Heidegger states in his provocative ways, is not a ‘rational’ animal, but rather a being that reads the newspaper, that understands what is going on in its shared community (Heidegger, 2009, p. 89). The ideal of a purely rational human being is heavily misguided: being human means being uncertain, unfinished, and subject to desire. Such an orientation is characterised by doxa: “We must make do in a world of the merely probable and thus we are always susceptible to affect and change.” (Gross, 2005, p. 32)

Heidegger finds in Aristotle an account or how our reality (Wirklichkeit) is not something static that is always there, but something that is always changing. We have to keep investing in it for it to be as it already was, it is something to be maintained. It is in a way Aristotle’s solution to the Greek problem that something cannot both be something and always changing; everything is always changing, but it is something because it can develop a habit of being as it already was. However, Heidegger sees in this solution not only a view on how nature works, but also about how we are as human beings, found in Aristotle’s ethics. Also we are constantly subject to change, but still we are someone. Which is possible because we are composed in a certain manner; we develop habits (hexis) that characterise us as someone even though we are constantly changing. This is because we can change into something else, like when we change our minds, but it can also be a change into something that we already were before. A carpenter does not change into something else when building a house, but becomes even more the carpenter that he already was. By being invested in our reality we maintain our world as well as our own composure.
This changeable character is what defines our everyday human realm, which is not defined by the unchangeable world of ideas. Based on this idea, Heidegger reverses the priority of pathos and logos. Reflective speaking is grounded in everyday human being with one another, which is the domain of unreflective stances, subject to affect. In a brief apology for Plato, Heidegger presents his emphasis on rationality as a response to the babble and chatter the Greek polis was deeply immersed in. From there we can understand how the Greeks “worked their way out towards a concreteness, from out of discussion and idle chatter” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 176). It takes the effort of both Plato and Aristotle to make this point. Heidegger takes the struggle of the Greeks to work their way out of discussion and idle chatter seriously. “Only thus can we understand that it is false when one holds Greece in general to be a fantastical place, as if things just fell into the lap of these distinguished men.” (ibid.) By understanding the relation between pathos and logos in this way, Heidegger argues, can we understand the Greeks emphasis on logos. From this perspective we can put the pathē (plural of pathos) in the right place.

Human being is neither animal- nor Godlike, but a being in between which is characterised by doxa. The common contemporary understanding of doxa as a ‘belief’, some opinion, does not do justice to the full significance of the term according to Heidegger. Rather, doxa is a “being-positioned’ relative to the thing (“ein Gestellsein zu der Sache”). Doxa is characterized by a particular kind of protolinguistic disposition or nonreflective perspective (Ansicht)” (Gross, 2005, p. 31). It is a position to which we necessarily and confidently say “yes”; a Ja-sagen. It consists in the received opinions that we share and make up the world in which we find ourselves, that we share with others. But even though we have to confidently say ‘yes’, essential to doxa is that it could also be otherwise. In our contemporary society for example, we generally share the view that gravity is a force that keeps us on the surface of the earth. In our everyday being with one another, we do not question this perspective, and use it with confidence. But the possibility of it being otherwise is kept open; scientists keep reflecting on what it might actually be (a curvature of a space-time continuum?). The point here is that doxa are not merely opinions (‘I believe it is wrong’), but can really make up the stronger dispositions through which we make sense of the world first and foremost, even though they could be otherwise.

Heidegger notes that such received opinion is seductive, with which he already prepares for his discussion of ‘fallen discourse’ in Being and Time. There too, Heidegger shows how we initially and for the most part are a ‘They-self’, and authenticity resorts in the active relation to it. But we continuously ‘fall back’ (Verfallen) into this perspective of received opinion. But for Heidegger this is not some undesired situation, but rather a basic mode of being human. “What makes doxa a distinctly human revelation of being is its provisional status, its ‘openness’ (Offenheit), its ‘yes’ that could be otherwise. […] and it is pathos that provides doxa with dynamism.” (Gross, 2005, p. 31) Convicting that we have such a disposition to the
world denies what it means to be human. We can appeal to reflecting on the beliefs that we share and are institutionalised, but that we have certain convictions (that are temporal, in the end) in which the world becomes intelligible for the time being is an unavoidable trait of our humanness.

The world is already disclosed in doxa before any reflection. “In doxa we are already ‘there’ in the world with others in some essential, but ultimately provisional way. Out of doxa we can articulate the common concerns of a community, and upon doxa we can build a proof (pisteis)” (idem, p. 32). It is precisely because we live in a less than ideal world, where there is friction with what is there, that we have the possibility of being-moved, to get angry over something, and only then we articulate our concerns: “It is pathos and pathos alone that draws logos out of doxa” (idem, p. 31). As Heidegger makes clear is that in a purely rational world logos would be the last thing on one’s mind. “Without human emotion what we would be left with is apathy and unexamined belief. And without the dynamism that only pathos can provide, doxa would remain frozen and inarticulate.” (idem, p. 31)

By discussing pathos in conjunction with doxa, Heidegger outlines an account of the humanness of being human in its being disposed to the world in a confident way while leaving open the possibility to change. And that change is made concrete; “moving and persuading people is […] an essential human activity.” (idem, p. 33) Gross makes more clear how this humanness can be understood based on §18 of the course: “pathos, its general meanings and its role in human being-there” (Heidegger, 2009, pp. 129-139). Pathos is a being taken of humans in their proper embodied being in the world. Gross sets out three types of non-human being: an animal, a dogmatist, and a God. Like animals, humans are embodied, bound to their special environment in which they go about taking care of things. Humans however have the capacity to “making manifest the beneficial and the harmful, and thereby the proper and improper too” (idem, p. 33). So even though we share a part of our being in the world with animals, our capacity to think distinguishes us from them. The dogmatist is capable of having beliefs, but these beliefs are set in stone and thus the dogmatist does not have the capacity to change. Neither is the possibility to change left open for a ‘God’ in the sense of a perfectly rational, omniscient being. This makes basically makes them non-human beings.

Contrary to Plato or the Roman rhetoricians, Heidegger does not see such perfectly rational being as an ideal but argues instead that in such a state being itself would be frozen. Indeed, there would be no need for eloquence or appeals to pathos in a speech, but as Gross explains: “if humans would be omniscient, speech in any form would be unnecessary—we would have nothing to discuss, nothing to describe, nothing to debate. It is precisely our limits that make us human (not God or simple animal) and motivate us to eloquence.” (Gross, 2005, pp. 32-33) Speaking takes place in a human situation that is shared with others,
where it can be heard. That concrete situation is, by its imperfect nature of being human, not perfectly rational and subject to affect. Thus, one of the major points that Heidegger makes is that it is indeed pathos that forms the ground for logos. “The doxa is thus ground, source, and motive for speaking-with-one-another.” (Heidegger, translation by Gross, 2005, p. 31). Gross summarises it concisely: “Without affect our disembodied minds would have no heart, and no legs to stand on. We would have no grounds for concern, no time and place for judging, no motivation to discourse at all” (Gross, 2005, p. 4).

Rhetoric thus not only provides us a ‘toolbox’ for persuasive speaking, but rather provides an understanding of how we necessarily deal with the uncertainties of everyday life. In a world that is always subject to change human beings compose themselves, and are invested in a reality to have it there with one another in some form. These provisional dispositions in which the world becomes intelligible are characteristic of the way human beings are in the world. It is precisely its imperfect character that makes that there is reason to speak with one another, that we are affected and that we are thus moved to such speaking in the first place.

4 The twofold concept of pathos

In the discussion above we have seen how Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s rhetoric a view on what it means to be human. Being human is a being in movement, always moving and being moved, having the capacity to believe and be disposed to something and at the same time being open to the possibility that it might be otherwise. Central in that story, the concept that provides dynamism to it all, is pathos, being-moved. The concept of pathos has several meanings in Aristotle’s philosophy, and one of Heidegger’s accomplishments is that he formulates these in a way that binds these different meanings to one another (Oele, 2012). Heidegger reads in Aristotle’s rhetorical pathos not only as a being affected4 (what we experience ontically as an emotion, or mood) and the magnitude of that, but also as the possibility of being moved in the first place. In 1924, Heidegger characterises pathos as a movement in the form of change, as well as the possibility of that change, and the discussion of human being in movement provides the background necessary for Heidegger to be able to do this. Heidegger also makes clear that when rhetoric is concerned this being-moved is discussed in a social contexts; being-moved necessitates community.

How we are moved are thus to be considered in a twofold way: “Πάθη are modes of being-taken with respect to being-in-the-world; through the πάθη, the possibilities of orienting oneself in the world are

4 Heidegger even argues that ‘affect’ would not be a right term. This term refers to something ‘spiritual’, like a soul, that is moved, while Heidegger insists pathos is always a full bodily being-taken of beings as living things as such. “Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 133)
determined essentially. Being-out-of-composure is *in itself related to being composed*, ἕξις. We are taken in an average and everyday way; we move ourselves within parameters in relation to which there is a being-composed.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 162) In this chapter I will first turn to how pathos presumes a composure, a disposition, that makes being-moved possible, and then proceed to discussing pathos as a being-moved. We will see how “the πάθη are characterized in this way, as a mode of being of living things whose basic structure is being-in-the-world, dealing with the world, dealing with others.” (ibid.) Being-moved, Heidegger makes clear, should not be discussed as individual psychology but rather as a mode of being-in-the-world.

### 4.1 Pathos and Disposition

Pathos as a disposition that provides the possibility for change is a ‘finding oneself in the world’, a *Be-findlichkeit*. We find ourselves in a world that is already there, a world shared with others. This finding oneself is determined in various ways. The concept of pathos itself does not directly translate to disposition. It is rather when Heidegger discusses it in conjunction with *hexis* (habit) and *diathesis* (“a kind of position”) that the importance of such a disposition is made clear for being-moved. The way we are composed structures how we are moved, what resonates with us if you will, and how we direct that being-moved. We have also seen how being-in-the-world always has a certain orientation towards the world in terms of doxa. How we stand towards a matter also pre-structures how we receive what we encounter in the world (e.g. in spoken language). Heidegger uses the word *Befindlichkeit*, which is a common way in German to express what would in the English equivalent be ‘mood’, or ‘how you are doing’. But in Heidegger’s stylistic appropriation of the word he makes eloquently clear that more than a mood, it is ‘how one finds oneself there’; Not only determined as some ‘feeling’, but precisely how one is disposed to a certain situation.

Summarised by Heidegger in 1924 he writes: “Insofar as the pathe are not merely an annex of physical processes, but are rather the ground out of which speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows back into, the pathe, for their part, are the basic possibilities (sic) in which being-there itself is primarily oriented towards itself, finds itself.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 176) So, the pathē are not only a mood, but rather that disposition in the background in which we are composed, which makes speaking possible, and continually reinvents itself. Such a disposition, and the speaking that comes with it, necessitates a social/political community. (‘Political,’ here in the sense of *koinōnia*: sharing in the same world that we have there with one another, being concerned with being-with-one-another.) Language here is thus not understood as bits of sound that we connect together (as in phonetics), or as an arbitrary system of signs corresponding to objects in the world (pace French semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure). Language should
instead be understood discursively: “that is to say rooted in shared moods, human institutions, and the nonchronological history these institutions compose.” (Gross, 2005, p. 3).

How we find ourselves in the world, our disposition, is thus not just a matter of our individual psychology, but is initially and for the most part to be understood in relation to community; how ‘one’ is in the world, what ‘one’ stands towards something, or how ‘one’ does something. How we are moved and articulate this being-moved necessitates community as well. Speaking-with-one-another and being-with-one-another are meaninglessness without one another, or in Heidegger’s terms: they are equiprimordial. “Speaking is not primarily and initially a process that other human beings may join in on later, so that only then would it become a speaking with others. Rather, speaking is, in itself and as such, self-expressing, speaking-with-one-another where others are themselves speaking; and therefore speaking is, according to its being, the fundament of [koinōnia].” (Heidegger, 2009, pp. 35-36) In order to understand how we are moved, and what determines how we are disposed to a matter it is thus not enough to only look at our individual mood, but we need to understand how that takes shape in our shared world reflected among others in a shared language, shared history, cultural heritage, social relations, and our institutions.

Something like shame does not make sense without something like a social status, losing face. Neither does envy make sense in a world without others to envy. While we constitute our own shared language (etc.) in speaking, at the same time we are subjected to it; we are both mover and moved Heidegger would say. “We constitute and are subject to those institutions in which our acts make sense. Outside of a world with religious laws and objects, an act of sacrilege, for instance, is unthinkable.” (Gross, 2005, pp. 10-11) But also the pathē themselves are discussed in a social context (as argued in section 2 of this chapter). We do not find Aristotle treating the primal fear we experience in encountering a poisonous snake or a lion, but rather passions that presume a shared context: anger and calmness, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamefulness, kindness and unkindness, pity, indignation, envy, emulation. Heidegger elaborates on the pathos of fear, and “not surprisingly the passionately contoured world that Heidegger draws out of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is indeed teeming with wily and threatening people just waiting to do something unpleasant” (idem, p. 36) We are fearful about the threat of a man seeking retribution, I might fear someone who has power over me, or I fear being at the mercy at someone who knows I committed a crime and can betray me (in fact Aristotle describes nine kinds of fearsome people). And when we are fearful, we start deliberating with others on what we can do; as long as there is a prospect of being saved. “What Heidegger emphasizes in the tradition like none before is the fact that without others, pathos would remain unarticulated (as it does in nonhuman life) and rational discourse would never get off the ground” (Gross, 2005, p. 4). The pathē thus ground a speaking community in which these affections are articulated and they contour the possibilities of moving about in such a shared world.
How human beings find themselves in the world comes from within being-in-the-world, and is as such not only a matter of what state of mind someone is in. How one finds oneself in the world is determined also by how one is comported towards a shared world. That shared world is there in a shared language, sharing the same world with others, in which the possibilities for moving about are also contoured in relation to these others. Finally, how one also finds oneself in an environing world of things and technologies, that disclose a world in which matters need to be taken care of and shape possibilities for going about such projects of everyday life. How we find oneself in the world takes that world into account and shows how we are invested in it.

4.2 Pathos as Being-moved

Human being is thus a being in movement that is always subject to change in a certain comportment that structures the possibilities for being moved. But pathos is of course also that change itself; pathos is also a being-taken, a being-brought-out-of-composure. In the moment that this happens to us, the different determinations of pathos start working together. Pathos plays a role in how we embody our past experiences and shape ourselves in relation to our shared world in a composition being disposed to that world in a certain manner. Theodore Kisiel refers to it as a “historical happening” (Kisiel, 1995, p. 299). But pathos also contours in its unique way how we envision future possibilities in a shared world. We are not moved by pure fantasy, but rather by beliefs on concrete possibilities of what might happen to me in the near future. When we are touched, affected, when we are moved, these past experiences and future possibilities fold into a provisional present that demands action (kairos).

A bringing out of composure presupposes a certain composure, which we have already discussed and is treated in Aristotle’s ethics as developing habits (hexis), preferably virtuous ones (arête). This is always a being composed in a certain disposition. Heidegger notes that pathos is characterised as something disruptive; something can be a ‘blow’ to us (Heidegger, 2009, p. 147). It is disruptive because Dasein’s ‘old being’ ceases to exist and changes into a ‘new being’ (Heidegger in Gross, 2005, p. 35). But while in describing pathos as something disruptive Heidegger seems to line up with the idea that pathos confuses clear-headed rationality, such being subject to change is what defines us as human. Our experience is contoured by pathos; without it “nothing would be appealing or repelling, frightening or attractive; indeed nothing and nobody could elicit either our love or our hate.” (Gross, 2005, p. 37). But we do not necessarily have to passively suffer such disruptive affect. Rhetoric appeals to an active response. When a matter becomes immediate one has to judge the matter and recompose oneself. And “it is the rhetorician who is trained in the art of making pathos immediate (kairos), thus inspiring us to judge and act [krisis]” (ibid.). Pathos can thus inform a critical moment which forms the concrete motivation for deliberation.
Such a moment in rhetoric, kairos, shows how pathos is concretely tied to its concrete spatial and temporal situation. We have already seen how past experience becomes a certain comportment, a disposition in which we find ourselves in the world. In the moment we are moved these past experiences become relevant in the sense they become part of a provisional present, and in that present not only our past, but also our passionately contoured future possibilities fold together. What these possibilities entail becomes clear in how Aristotle discussed the pathē in the rhetoric.

Heidegger follows Aristotle in discussing fear as the most influential pathos. That what we can be afraid of is not yet there, but announces itself as something threatening. This what announces itself must have three characteristics: 1) “it must ‘show itself’” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 169); it should not be there yet but is rather characterized as a possibility. 2) that which comes towards me must have the character of “powerfulness” (idem, p. 170). Something I can handle cannot really be a threat. And 3) “threat becomes danger when it draws nearer to me as such” (ibid.). Heidegger also emphasizes that there should be a possibility of not happening what is about to happen; there should be a hope for a being saved. “It must matter to me. It cannot be something of indifference”, (idem, p. 174) otherwise it would pass us by.

Though these possibilities of something happening to me lay in the future, and are in a sense a belief, they have to be concrete possibilities: “Being afraid must be characterized as an οἴεσθαι [forebode]. The one who is brought into fear must once ‘believe’ that the definite thing that threatens, threatens him, and further, that what is threatening proceeds from this definite human being, and that he threatens him now.” (idem, pp. 173-174). Not any threat or possibility I can imagine qualifies. “I can equally imagine the threatening qualities of Atilla the Hun” Gross puts it (Gross, 2005, p. 37), but there should be a “concrete relationship to this person—past and present—[that] positions me unfavorably with respect to his or her capacity to harm me in the near future.” (ibid.)

Heidegger highlights nine different types of people that can be frightening (φοβεροί) that he finds in Aristotle’s rhetoric. These people are greedy, out for revenge, or for power. “He to whom I am compromised is frightening” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 172) But also the powerful are frightening to those who are inferior to them, and at the same time “those who are weaker than we are, and are out to ruin”. The injured, and those who have injured are frightening to one another. Competitors in the same cause, since they are capable of anything to gain advantage. Those that are able to harm those that are more powerful than we are, which makes us even more vulnerable. Lastly, the “ironic” and the “slick ones”, since “one does not know whether everything is all right with them, or whether they only act as though it is. [...] so it is never clear that, in fact, no danger is present.” (Aristotle Rhet. B5,1382b19 translated by Heidegger, 2009, p. 173) The other is thus not, as is the case in Being and Time, only some horizon against which we can
understand our selves, but concrete others to which we relate and with whom we are-with-one-another. We are not just moved, we are taken in our everyday being with one another.

5 Rhetoric in Being and Time

In Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time postphenomenology and Heidegger’s rhetoric meet. In the first chapter I discussed how Heidegger’s analysis of how the tool is present in our relation to the world forms a basis for the postphenomenological perspective. But Heidegger also articulates that being-in-the-world is in the world in an attuned understanding that is determined by discourse. Being-in-the-world is also for a large part a being with others (Mitsein), which also forms a horizon against which a ‘self’ can be understood. In these parts of discussing Dasein Heidegger builds on his earlier rhetorical insights, more implicitly when discourse is at stake, but explicitly when it comes to attunement. Theodore Kisiel argues in “The Genesis of Being and Time,” (1995) that Heidegger’s course on Aristotle marks an important step in Heidegger’s thinking. And indeed, Heidegger’s course on rhetoric often reads familiar to Being and Time. So, In Heidegger’s discussion of being-in-the-world in Being and Time, Rhetoric and mediation theory seem to meet, though they never actually connected.

Heidegger discusses Dasein as being-in-the-world and in three basic parts: 1) the worldliness of the world, 2) being-with and being a self, and 3) being-in as such. He then characterises the mode of being of this being as ‘care’. Though they are different aspects of being-in-the-world, they cannot be seen separate from one another: there is no world without our understanding of it, there is no self without others, and there is no understanding of the world if that world would not already matter to us in the first place. But also is worldliness of the world an intrinsic part of being-with, as a shared world disclosed with others. And all of this happens in a form of attuned understanding, or being-in. When Heidegger discusses attunement he refers explicitly to Aristotle’s Rhetoric as the source for his insights. Pathos in its various characterisations shows up in some form as Stimmung and Befindlichkeit. Heidegger left Aristotle’s practical philosophy behind however. The triad of ethics, politics and rhetoric makes place a the more abstract hermeneutical perspective. This allows Heidegger to make more general claims, but this is at the cost of a political community from which speaking can spring forth, and in which the pathē are to be understood.

Heidegger thus begins with an analysis of how a world is present to us in the form of a meaningful understanding of it through the practical use of tools; the worldliness of the world. In the first chapter of the thesis, we have seen how especially this aspect of being-in-the-world, having a world, forms a basis for mediation theory. Here Heidegger also specifically refers to technologies, or tools.

Heidegger follows this up by asking “Who is it that Dasein is in everydayness?” (1996, p. 111), a section in which rhetoric seems to play a role. According to Heidegger, our being a self is grounded in our every-
day being-with-one-another (Mitsein). “Initially, Dasein is the they and for the most part remains so” (idem, p. 125). We are how ‘one’ is, what ‘one’ expects of us, we do what ‘one’ would do in this particular situation. Or Heidegger: “We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.” (idem, p. 123) In the rhetoric we also do not find specific case, but Aristotle rather discusses what typically speak for a matter. One typically gets angry when wronged, or one typically becomes fearful in face of a threat. But as Gross points out (Gross, 2005, p. 40), and as has also been Arendt’s main critique on Heidegger, the other is only portrayed as a horizon against which the self can be understood. The other only exists as cultural and historical conventions that covers up what is authentically our own. In Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric however, we find others there as a political community in which we articulate our concerns.

Finally, Dasein is primarily in the world in attuned understanding. The there is disclosed in understanding, and this “understanding is always attuned” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 138). This attunement has everything to do with Heiegger’s early rhetoric: “We see the two equiprimordially constitutive ways to be the there in attunement [Befindlichkeit] and understanding [Verstehen]. […] Attunement and understanding are equiprimordially determined by discourse.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 130). As in his earlier work, where he discusses in greater detail the relation between dialectics and rhetoric, Heidegger makes clear that there is no purely rational understanding. How we understand the world, its disclosure, always happens in some attunement. Our everyday speaking with one another is characterised as Gerede, Idle talk. We repeat general knowledge without thoroughly reflecting on our premises. Heidegger insists that this does not hold a negative value judgment, but that it is rather a determination of how Dasein is initially and for the most part. In the context of the rhetorical perspective outlined above we can see how that is similar to his rhetorical perspective on the openness and necessary ambiguity of everyday life. Reflective understanding is grounded in this everyday speaking, also in Being and Time, and such understanding is always in some mood or another.

It is clear that Heidegger’s rhetorical insights have influenced his discussion of being-in-the-world of Being and Time. But as Christopher Smith shows in “The Hermeneutics of Original Argument,” (Smith, 1998) we can find Heidegger’s interest in rhetoric also in his interest in the everyday practical life. What should have become clear by now is that Heidegger does not take scientific or reflective speaking to be the basic mode of speaking, but rather everyday speaking in going about things; the realm of rhetorical speaking. Scientific speaking is rather an abstraction of that. Similarly, Smith finds Heidegger arguing that Descartes’ res extensa and “some sort of detached ‘subject’” are abstractions that arise out of a more original existence in the world with the tools “for getting on with the projects of our life” (1998, p. 15).
Heidegger does not only discuss the “implements” (tools) “with which human being-there is involved […] in their handiness and usefulness but also precisely in their ‘not being’ what we had in mind for them to be, in their ‘deficient modes’ of withholding themselves from us, namely in they recalcitrance in being useless for the task we had in mind, or in their never being where we think they are when we want them, or even in being in the way” (ibid.). Heidegger’s earlier reversal of the priority of reflective speaking and everyday rhetoric lays at the basis for his hermeneutical approach in Being and Time (idem, p. 16); in order to be able to formulate more universal hermeneutical claims on the being of human being there, we should understand that being first in its everydayness.

But Heidegger did not only see the separation of pathos and logos, or the rational and cognitive from what supposedly is merely ancillary feeling and emotion, as an abstraction from a more original experience. As discussed before, Heidegger thought this separation to be an illusion. “Thus, when Heidegger comes to elaborate our being-there in the world within which we carry out our projects, and when he comes to elaborate our knowledge and understanding of that world, he must go behind the usual accounts of the ‘subjects’ of cognition just as he had gone behind the usual accounts of its ‘objects’.” (idem, p. 17) In other words, in our original experience, the world is not encountered only as a knowing, but that knowing is always already in a certain mood. As Smith formulates it, the ‘objects’ of our world help setting the tone: “For the uncovering of our original being-there in the world makes clear that all our understanding of things takes place within the setting of a certain tonality or mood that these things have about them, a voicing or Stimmung, as Heidegger calls it, and which, unbeknownst to us, has somehow ‘always already’ come over us and them and given a particular tenor to our awareness of things.” (ibid.)

With this in mind, it is clear how the following passage in Being and Time reflects much of what has been discussed on rhetoric in this chapter:

“[T]he world already disclosed lets innerworldly things be encountered. This prior disclosedness of the world which belongs to being-in is also constituted by attunement. Letting something be encountered is primarily circumspective, not just a sensation or staring out at something. Letting things be encountered in a circumspect heedful way has—we can see this now more precisely in terms of attunement—the character of being affected or moved. But being affected by the unserviceable, resistant, and threatening character of things at hand is ontologically possible only because being-in as such is existentially determined beforehand in such a way that what it encounters in the world can matter to it in this way. This mattering to it is grounded in attunement, and as attunement it has disclosed the world, for example, as something by which it can be threatened. Only something which is the attunement of fearing, or fearlessness, can discover things at hand in the surrounding world as be-
Heidegger describes here the encounters with things in the world in terms of being moved, and this being moved is grounded in a possibility to be moved characterised as attunement, a prior disclosedness of the world. Being moved by things is primarily circumspective, like the listener that carefully listens to a situation in his rendering of the rhetoric. How we are attuned structures how the world that we are invested in matters to us.

6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s rhetoric that could potentially inform a better understanding of technological mediation with an account of how human being is moved. Heidegger makes this rhetoric philosophically relevant by drawing it out of the realm of persuasive speaking and finding in it a description of what it means to be human in a shared world. Being human, Heidegger argues, means making do with the merely probably and the ambiguous, and finding our way in taking care of the projects of everyday life. Human being is a being in movement, which is not primarily rational. Logos should instead be understood as an informed and engaged speaking. This speaking grows out of some attunement in which we find ourselves in the world, and what is spoken grows back into that.

In that way, pathos becomes central in Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric.

The aim is to relate the rhetoric laid out in this chapter to the study of technological mediation. We have seen that there are some ways in which this rhetoric can directly be related to the way Heidegger discusses our dealings with everyday ‘objects’, or rather implements. The recalcitrant character of these tools in not doing what we expect of them parallels Heidegger’s insight that everyday speaking also often is not the rational reflective conversation we might want it to be. But more than that, how we deal with these things is informed by some attunement that they bring with themselves, and how we deal with them has the character of a being affected by them. Things become useful things when we do not merely stare out at them, but in a mode of heedful circumspection. An ‘audience’ is not just there when spoken to, but what is encountered has first to move a listener to be realised in some form. A listener should not only ‘hear’ what is said, but what is spoken about should be taken at heart.

What we have also seen is that Heidegger has a specific understanding of what it takes for human beings to be moved. Heidegger attempts to get behind what he sees as abstractions of original experience such as the notions of Descartes’ ‘object’ and ‘subject’, and argues that this more original being-in-the-world is rather characterised by movement. In this chapter I discussed what his understanding of human being as being-in-movement looks like, and especially how it informs how we should understand the concept of
pathos. A being that is always in motion can still be something ‘what it already was’ through habituation, being in a certain comportment or disposition. Being-in-the-world has a certain stance towards the world in which it makes sense, but this stance or directedness is also characterised by a certain openness in the sense that it could also be otherwise. Against this background, two ways in which Heidegger characterises pathos become intelligible: pathos is both the possibility of change and that change itself.

Heidegger discusses this meaning of pathos as ‘possibility of change’ as the ground and soil (Boden) out of which speaking springs forth and in what it grows back into. He finds this ground in the form of a certain Befindlichkeit, how one ‘finds oneself in the world’, or how one is doing. This ‘attunement’ is variously determined, and is composed in various ways past experience is embodied. Attunement is not only a matter of an individual stance, but is also determined by our shared world. It encompasses our shared language and the no-chronological history that if carries in itself, and our shared institutions. Without a church, an act of sacrilege would be meaningless, for example. How we find ourselves in the world being attuned and disposed towards something is determined strongly in the sense of a shared and social context.

Finally, pathos is also understood as a being affected, or being moved. Heidegger characterises it as a being-brought-out-of-composure, which indeed presupposes some kind of composure. Here too we have seen how Heidegger emphasizes the social context and relational aspect of Aristotle’s treatment of the pathē in the rhetoric. We are not afraid of something fantastical that only exists in our imagination, but for a concrete threat that we belief is nearing; the concrete belief that someone is out to hurt me for example. This being affected is characterised by a moment, kairos, in which these future possibilities and our past experiences fold together into a provisional present that demands a response. And indeed, as Heidegger also emphasises, Aristotle wants a response from the audience. In the rhetoric the audience is moved to retake a position, to recompose oneself, to judge and to act.

We have now a better understanding of Heidegger’s rhetorical sensibilities. In the first chapter I have argued that mediation theory might improve with a better understanding of these sensibilities and an account of how human beings are moved. Such an account should be able to go beyond an understanding of rhetoric as ‘mere persuasion’, and show its philosophical relevance. It should also be possible to merry it with the perspective of technological mediation. It seems that Heidegger’s rhetoric indeed meets these criteria, and in the next chapter I apply what we have learned here to the framework of technological mediation.
Chapter 3

Being Moved by Technologies
1 Introduction: Pathos and technologically mediated relations

In Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric we find an elaboration of human being as an everyday being with one another which is characterised by ambiguity, change, and an original experience that is more messy than the abstractions with which that being-in-the-world is understood. Human beings are not in the first place rational, and do not speak in reflective, apophantic statements (declarations, assertions), but rather speak in an everyday manner that is thoroughly attuned. Similarly, Heidegger sees that our dealings with tools in going about the projects of everyday life, these often do not do what we would want them to do. Things subvert these intentions by breaking down, not being where we want them to be, or even by being in our way. In order to understand the role of technology for our being human, we need to understand it also in how it is present in an everyday manner and not just through what it is supposed to do—just like understanding human being entails an understanding of everyday human being and not merely the ‘desired’ rationalist abstraction of it. Heidegger’s reversal of the priority of pathos and logos thus also has an influence on how he understands our everyday dealings with technologies.

Human beings are constantly moving and being-moved in this everyday being-in-the-world, and in this dynamic their human being gets direction, we are moved somewhere. In how we are moved, it matters how we find ourselves in that world, our Befindlichkeit, and what our attunements are, our Stimmung. As we have seen how we find ourselves is variously determined: in a shared language and the non-chronological history it embodies, how ‘one’ understands or does something, social institutions, cultural heritage, and how we ourselves are composed and how we are disposed towards something. But as I will argue in this chapter, our technologies also help determine how we find ourselves in the world. We have a different directedness to the world with a phone in our hand, than without it. Taking the train in the Netherlands, for example, involves some flexibility to get to your destination because of small delays, platform changes, and adjustments based on time of travel. In their smartphone application, these disruptions can easily be tracked dynamically and alternative routes are suggested. The static timetables on the platforms on the train stations are a lot more cumbersome to get around with. Having such an app and some experi-
ence makes that I take the announcement of a disruption differently, more relaxed, than when my battery has run out. I ‘find myself in the world’ differently when I have my phone with me.

Besides how technology matters for how we find ourselves in the world, we are also affected by technologies, and we get engaged with them. Heidegger’s rhetoric can also be understood as dimensions of that relation. Rhetorical pathos colours how the world is disclosed; we always encounter the world in a certain attunement that thus necessarily provides it with a certain experience. In how that relation takes shape, I will argue in this chapter, technology also plays a role. As we have seen in Heidegger’s reading of rhetorical pathos, the rhetor has the power to fold past experience and future possibilities into a provisional present, kairos, that demands a response in the form of a judgment or action. In this chapter I will see how we can understand the ‘expressive power’ of technologies as its ability to mediate how such folding takes place in our relation with technology. Here we should be able to see how our attunements and the social embeddedness of a concrete situation matter for how we are moved by technologies.

In this chapter I will further elaborate how Heidegger’s rhetoric and rhetorical pathos can be related to the framework of technological mediation. First, I discuss two ways in which we can understand this: in understanding how a technologically mediated relation emerges, and as a dimension of that relation itself. Secondly, I discuss how Heidegger’s rhetoric relates to the two ‘poles’ of the relation: what does it presuppose on the side of the human being, and how can it help understanding technology’s expressive power?

2 Technology and Attunement: ground for a mediated relation

As we have seen in the previous chapter, one of Heidegger’s basic insight is he finds in the rhetorical use of pathos as 
\textit{pistis} (proof, appeal) a reversal of the priority of pathos and logos. Instead of pathos being a stylistic afterthought—a common place for pathos in rhetorical frameworks—it becomes the ground out of which articulation springs forth. This means that a moment of resolving oneself, taking a new position, speaking about a matter or taking action follows on a relation being formed in a way. First the listener has to be moved in order to be realised in some form in order for a relation to take shape; otherwise true communication does not take place, and we cannot truly speak of an act of speaking\textsuperscript{5}. This point is relevant from at least two perspectives: that of the listener, and that of the speaker. According to Heidegger, rhetorical speaking involves a concernful listening to the situation, seeing what speaks for a matter. The rhetor speaks, but only speaks insofar as he can hear and respond to a particular shared situation. This

\textsuperscript{5} In a way this is an answer on the question whether a tree actually fell if nobody heard it: whether that is the case or not, at least it is not a relevant phenomenon that becomes part of our shared world disclosed in language.
concern is important for a speaker to be able to move an audience to be realised. Speaking finds its completion in being heard, and with that Heidegger means a taking something matter at heart, not just perceiving a voice. This takes the form of a being affected, being moved in such a way that what is spoken is taken at heart. Also here, a heedful circumspection is presupposed on behalf of the listener; being disposed to the world and a matter in a specific way, being concerned with everyday projects, and letting oneself be moved. Thus both speaker and listener ‘find’ themselves in a shared situation that needs taken care of in which a relation between them can emerge. The emerging of such a relation depends not only on the intentionality of the speaker, but even more so on how the listener is moved, is to be realised.

If we translate this to postphenomenology, which discusses technologically mediated human-world relations, we can ask ourselves how these relations emerge. Following Heidegger’s philosophy this presupposes a concerned and heedful dealing with the world that being-in-the-world is invested in. What we see more clearly now is that such a dealing with the world is characterised by a being-moved⁶. While postphenomenology uses Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit in order to illustrate how technologies can be present in their use or when they break down, the involvement with that technology in a context of use is presumed more or less implicitly. In Heidegger’s discussion of pathos, or attunement in Being and Time, he problematizes how such an involvement can be there in the first place. It presumes a shared world that we are already invested in, in which something needs to be done, and that we are disposed to in a various ways. We could then understand the mediated relation as a form of logos, and the ground out of which it springs forth, and the affect that actualises that relation, as a pathos. With the concepts discussed in the previous chapter, we should then be able to problematize such a coming-to-be of that technologically mediated human-world relationship in terms of a certain being-disposed and a moment in which something happens that such a relation emerges; characterized by pathos.

These shared situations are the situations we find ourselves in in our everyday existence, going about the projects of everyday life in which things can appear useful to us or are obtrusive in one way or another. We are attuned to that situation which makes that some things resonate differently with us than others, an attunement in which we find ourselves. This attunement can be seen as how we ‘feel’ about something, how we stand towards it. But what makes Heidegger’s analysis so interesting is that this disposition takes form in various ways for which we have to get behind what appears at the surface. How we are attuned towards something is often determined in the character of the ‘they’, which means that we stand towards something in a way that ‘one’ stands to something, or that we critically related to how ‘one’ stands to it.

⁶ In Being and Time Heidegger gives a third characteristic of attunement in which letting things be encountered has the character of being affected, or being moved §29
Though in Heidegger’s rhetorical analysis attunement is thoroughly social and relational, how we are attuned is also influenced by the technologies that surround us. I discussed a brief example of my everyday experience traveling by train with or without my smartphone equipped with an application, but in the work of Petran Kockelkoren we can see different ways in which this attunement is technologically mediated.

The project of Kockelkoren is different from the one in this thesis, but in his analysis we can find interesting parallels that might help us understand attunement in a better way. Together with Verbeek he argued against the symbolism in design and for their concrete material relevance in technological mediation (Verbeek & Kockelkoren, 1998). Kockelkoren is especially interested in aesthetics, or how our senses have to get adjusted to new technologies (2003). He argues with Plessner that we are always ex-centric, with which he means that there is no essential way in which our senses work. Rather, how we experience something through the senses is ‘centred’ in a cultural and historical manner and can be decentralised. After a process of technological mediation our sense re-centre in a new centre in which the technology that caused the disruption, but can never go to some ‘original’ state. Kockelkoren describes this process as some collective cultural phenomenon. When the train made its entrance for example, we see an increase of emerging of specific symptoms of train sickness that only showed up at that time and in that context (2003, p. 14). Kockelkoren refers to this as a cultural pathology and finds it in multiple examples. Our rhetorical perspective is concerned with pathos, and not with the senses. We are interested in how that pathos as attunement is co-determined with technology rather than with in a collective disruption in which people are caught off guard. But Kockelkoren’s perspective shows interesting similarities and can help us understand the role of technology in our attunements better.

Kockelkoren takes up the task of showing that the concept of the autonomous self is something cultural and temporal, grounded in technological developments, and wants to understand its implications for the autonomy of the artist and its art. He wants to see how mediatory technologies can form material conditions out of which such a concept can arise\textsuperscript{7}, and for that it is not enough that we use these technologies as metaphors, as topics of conversation (idem, p. 38). When we talk about the human brain as a ‘network’ that has a ‘capacity’ to ‘process data’, we use a metaphor in order to make something understandable. With the help of Panofsky however, Kockelkoren shows how such technologies can establish new sensory regimes. We do not only talk about ourselves as autonomous subjects, we incorporated this perspective as an onlooker on life in how we are disposed to the world. This is however a temporary configuration,

\textsuperscript{7} He refers to the process of technoèsis of Roy Ascott, philosopher of new media. It is “The capacity of technology to open up reality and to give shape to culture” (Kockelkoren, 2003, pp. 31-34)
and not some essence of the human being, as Descartes would have it. Panofsky shows beautifully how Descartes’ ideas emerge with the development of ‘central perspective’ and the *camera obscura*, which facilitates such a spectator view on the world.

In Kockelkoren’s story it becomes clear how a certain embodied disposedness to the world is grounded in an active appropriation of new technologies. I see a strong parallel with Heidegger’s *Befindlichkeit*: we find ourselves in the world that was already there, not only in a shared language that conveys some form of history, but also with technologies and our collective appropriation of them. Kockelkoren sees this as a cultural historical interpretation of corporeality: “The body is not some universal substratum on which cultures graft their different linguistic attributions of meaning, from above as it were, but the senses are sensitive to historical fluctuations. They are constantly in motion because they are the points of anchorage of cultural re-education.” (2003) Kockelkoren’s regard of the body and the senses shows a remarkable resemblance with Heidegger’s conception of Aristotle’s human being in motion, though Heidegger focuses on the pathē, and not so much on corporeality. But pathos can be understood in a similar historical sensitivity. How we are moved is something that is constantly in motion, situated in a cultural, historical, and technological context.

Technologies thus have a role in how our dispositions take shape, and how these are constantly subject to change. And that change comes in the form of some tipping-of-balance, being-caught-off-guard, or as Heidegger would call it: being-brought-out-of-composure. This being-moved, decentring, makes it possible for technological mediation to emerge. Mediation that grows out of a disposition and grows back into it, just as is the case with Heidegger’s attunement:

> “Mediation takes place as soon as an artefact, like the helicopter⁸, articulates our sensory relations with the world around us. In the first instance the current sensory disposition is tipped off balance. That event is enveloped in new images and metaphors until a new balance is attained, one that incorporates the technology which caused the disruption in the first place.” (Kockelkoren, 2003, p. 14)

Technologies thus not only help attuning us to the world, they can also help articulating how we relate to that world. When out of composure, also for Kockelkoren, we need to re-compose ourselves, find a new stance towards a matter. Kockelkoren argues that such a re-centring happens not only in one case, but in a

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⁸ In the introduction to his booklet Kockelkoren elaborates an anecdote of himself flying in a helicopter when he was young. This gave him a new perspective on the city of Roermond where he grew up, gaining a dose of life experience as well. He uses this helicopter trip as an analogy to discuss the process of de- and re-centring throughout the booklet.
series of mediations where we find our new position in the world. Heidegger argues that the reality of a being-in-movement is something that needs habituation, constant work, in order to be there the way it is there. Kockelkoren seems to make a similar point when he argues that it took multiple engagements with mediatory technologies for human beings to re-centre in a position where it embodied the onlooker view of the central perspective. Kockelkoren draws attention to how we find such “centring machines for bodies that have been thrown off balance.” (2003, p. 83) on fairgrounds, in theatres, and in art exhibitions. People could get used to the new perspective in cameras obscura that were found on fairgrounds. But also in anatomy theatres, where people could observe the dissection of a deceased person, which served as an exercise ground for embodying the spectators position. Besides that there was also a rise of panorama buildings, buildings made for the sole purpose of exhibiting paintings of a specific view on the world, of which Panorama Mesdag in the Hague is still maintained. In this building one can look at a painted view on the beach of Scheveningen that could also be observed a few kilometres away in real live. But there one would be immersed in it, while Panorama Mesdag also formed a place for re-centring. Even drawing in central perspective, finally, is something that took excessive disciplining of the body in order for people to adopt it. As Kockelkoren makes clear, it takes a lot of effort and playful exercise, but after re-centring we find ourselves in a certain historical experiential situation within which we encounter the world. Kockelkoren focusses on a collective re-centring, but Heidegger makes a similar point about the individual when he appeals to the fact that when brought-out-of-composure one has to recompose oneself in its new attunement, and figuring out how to judge and act in this new situation. That individual recomposing can however be understood in a broader social context that we are invested in, and with the help of Kockelkoren it becomes more clear how technology can play a role in that recomposing. In establishing a mediated relation it is important to see how this attunement matters in how one is moved. In a certain attunement some things resonate while others remain mute.

3 Rhetorical dimensions of technological mediation

Next to understanding how technologically mediated relations spring forth out of some attunement, being important for how such a relation is established, in Heidegger’s rhetoric we can recognise dimensions of that mediated relation itself. In this case we should understand logos and pathos as dimensions of that mediated relation; as some kind of argument, and how that relation is attuned.

First, technology takes the place of a ‘speaker’ in this relation, which begs the question what its ‘expressive power’ consists in. In the approaches of Buchanan, Bogost, and Fogg we have seen a strong focus on the argument for understanding technology’s persuasive character. If we take Heidegger’s approach to rhetoric seriously, such an argument is of course important, but how it is rooted in some kind of pathos, and speaks to that, makes that an argument actually has the ability to reach to the heart of its audience.
According to Heidegger, the rhetor has power over being-with-one-another (Mitsein). Those that are most eloquent and persuasive have influence over how one speaks about something, how something is revealed, how one is disposed to a matter, and what one finds matters in need of taking care. How he can do that, what the rhetor is trained in, is making a situation concrete by folding together experiences from the past and concrete future scenarios into a provisional present and appealing to the audience to take a stance on that matter. Technology does not speak, and it certainly does not have the ability to ingeniously mould words into a persuasive argument. But we might understand its expressive power as its ability to mediate how such a moment becomes concrete.

Secondly, on the other ‘pole’ of the relation we can ask what is moved when the human being is concerned. When Heidegger concerns pathos, he neither sees it as something that happens in some consciousness nor something that only happens in the body. Pathos is instead a “being-taken of human being-there in its full bodily being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 132). Heidegger refers to Aristotle in his observation that “I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave.” (idem, p. 133) What is moved is thus not only how that being understands, or how it acts, but how that being is in the world. That being-there consists among others in how our past experiences are composed into a provisional disposition. We are moved in our being ‘there’, as a human being, and pathos can thus colour how we stand in a technologically mediated human-world relation.

3.1 The expressive power of technology

From the outset of this thesis there is the issue of possibly making a category mistake in applying a rhetorical framework on the issue of technological mediation; technology cannot speak, after all. Also in Heidegger’s framework, technology certainly is something else than (human) nature, and his reading of rhetoric is restricted to the realm of human beings. He does draw rhetoric out of a purely cognitive frame and discusses it as an ontology of everyday human being; a being with others. But nevertheless, in rhetoric we discuss human beings, their dispositions, and their being with one another in speaking. In such a perspective technologies are merely topic of discussion, not some eloquent speaker. The question is, however, whether there is not a way to understand the ‘expressive power’ of technology as the ability to reach out, mediating how a careful listener finds himself in a concrete situation that demands action, articulated by technology.

Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective presumes the human being moving about in a technologically mediated world to comporting past experiences in some disposition and having future possibilities outlined by a shared existence. Technology can play a role in how these experiences and possibilities fold together in a temporal moment in which something needs to be done. But again, keeping the possible criticism in mind
that technologies do not speak as humans do, how are we to understand this rhetorical power of technologies? How are we to understand its power of expression? The problem of things not having agency, freedom, or intentionality is not a new problem in philosophy of technology. In postphenomenology this issue is tackled with the idea of mediation. Indeed, things do not have agency in themselves as humans do, but we need to acknowledge their role in mediating how our thoughts and behaviour takes shape (cf. Verbeek, 2005), how they mediate what we call freedom (cf. Verbeek, 2011), and that we can understand their mediating role as a form of intentionality (cf. Verbeek, 2005, 2011). Similarly, the rhetorical power of technology is not a ‘speaking’, but rather can be understood as the ability to mediate how a critical moment, where past experiences and future possibilities fold together, becomes concrete.

When human beings are moved, they can either become something else, as is the case when we change our minds, or become more what we already were, as a carpenter becomes more and more a carpenter when he makes a cabinet or a table. But pathos is also characterised as a severe blow, as something confusing and disruptive. The moment in which a situation is articulated by a technology can as such be understood as a being-brought-out-of-composure; our interaction with technologies might bring us out of balance. The technology itself in its materiality, but also in its historical significance in a certain temporal and spatial situatedness, might mediate such confusion. Kockelkoren writes that “People are often caught off balance by the introduction of new technologies. They adopt a decentered position: the technology in question appears as ‘present-at-hand’.” (2003, p. 18) From which one proceeds to re-centre and embody that technology by which it becomes ready-to-hand. In taking this new stance both individual and shared experience of the past inform what possibilities there are for taking such a stance. Similarly, the projected future of how one can move about in a shared world contours these possibilities. When brought out of composure we find ourselves in a new attunement. The new stance that is taken is thus still a position that is informed by pathos, understood in its historicity and social context.

It would be helpful to make concrete what it would look like for a technology to mediate such a situation by means of an example. Let’s first consider spoken rhetoric. In order to create such an opportune moment, what a rhetor needs to do first is to tune in to how his audience finds itself in the world. In a political example, we can imagine a group of people that feel wronged because they had to chip in when times were bad, and do not profit now that times are better—whatever times that may be, it is easy to imagine how these people are attuned to news coming from their government. A rhetor can then easily portray some other group of people appear to have it better, a group that should deserve it less according to this audience. Sketching the immediacy of a future in which the balance tips and such an advantage is difficult to be reversed makes a threat concrete and the audience likely to follow whatever action the rhetor then proposes. But technology does not have the nuance of spoken words to picture such a complex state of
affairs. Even contrary to this, in online environments people turn out to be less likely to experience such a threat.

Hubert Dreyfus, a prominent interpreter of Heidegger, argued that bodily presence, and the awareness of bodily vulnerability that comes with it, leads to a preparedness for danger and surprise that we could characterise as a certain disposition (Dreyfus, 2008). This harm can both be physical, or in social situations this can be harm in the face of others—like Heidegger’s rhetorical pathos. One of the consequences that Dreyfus focusses on is that online learning is more difficult, for example because of the apparent lack of consequences for one’s actions. In a situation of unmediated access to others the immediate consequences of one’s actions and decisions are much more experienced as a threat, informing what decision or action one takes. Though indeed the intervention of technology in how we relate to a situation can detach us in a certain sense from that situation, what is mediated is precisely the experience of such a concrete situation made immediate. Online environments might not be the place to look for eloquent technology.

We can however also find situations where the opposite is the case. In “Moralising Technology,” (Verbeek, 2011) Verbeek uses the example of the obstetric ultrasound to illustrate how technologies can mediate morality. This ultrasound constitutes the unborn in a very specific way. How the unborn is presented on a screen outside of the body, at the size of a baby, shapes how it is perceptually present, and how it is interpreted. How the people watching relate to the unborn through the ultrasound is characterised as a hermeneutic relation in Ihde’s terms; how the onlookers interpret the unborn child is mediated by technology. Because of the specific ways the technology presents the unborn child, independent of the mother and at a relatable size, it gets a new ontological status as an individual person that is at the same time a patient, rendered with its medical parameters. The technology mediates in this way how ‘expecting a child’ changes into ‘choosing’ a child, how parents relate to the unborn child (fathers are much more involved), and how the mother is regarded more as an environment for the unborn child than forming a unity with it. But “the most important mediating role of ultrasound imaging […] is that it constitutes expectant parents as decision makers regarding the life of their unborn child.” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 26) Verbeek emphasizes that these parents are put in an ethical decision making process that they did not explicitly choose. But what we can also see is how a situation that without the ultrasound was only a matter of speculation now becomes a concrete situation where the possibilities of possible actions are tied to what the ultrasound makes visible, and a certain attunement to a new reality.

Heidegger makes clear that we can only speak of communication when something is indeed heard. Not only as a receiving of the sound that was produced, but hear in the sense of a being-moving. The central form of rhetorical argumentation is the enthymeme, the rhetorical syllogism, and Heidegger finds an ety-
mological argument in that it is a ‘taking something at heart’ (*en* *thumos* (heart)) (Kisiel in Gross & Kemmann, 2005, p. 137). The rhetorical syllogism is thus a form of reasoning in which the audience is actively involved. By leaving out one of the premises or the conclusion that would complete a syllogism, the enthymeme demands its listener to be actively involved by thinking along, completing the argumentation, or drawing the conclusion. The hearer Heidegger constructs is thus an active listener. With that he shifts the focus from the ingenious speaker that is supposedly in power of what will happen, to the importance of the heedful listening of an audience making communication happening. What the speaker *can* do, however, is attempting to move that listener to be realized in some form. The words do matter, but they are meaningless when left unheard. Parallel to this, technologies can make people take something at heart.

Technologies can open up new forms of experience, that a heedful listener, invested in his or her shared world can be attuned to. Recomposing oneself to these newly opened up possibilities changes our disposition, and we become attuned in a new way to our surrounding world. As becomes clear in our reading of Heidegger this new position is never an endpoint, but always a point from which we continue. The being-taken is taken up in this new attunement and from out of it we can foresee new future possibilities.

### 3.2 Being-taken by technology

On the pole of human being in the relation, Heidegger’s discussion of the *pathē* provides a perspective on how mediation engages and how that relation is attuned. As we have seen, Heidegger’s rhetorical pathos is not confined to the realm of consciousness, or of individual psychology. Rather, it is an attunement, a determination of being-in-the-world itself. In Verbeek’s example of the obstetric ultrasound he argues that there mediation takes places in a hermeneutical relation. How the unborn child is rendered as a separate entity, outside of the mother’s body, and at a specific size, makes that the parents, in their mediated perception of their unborn child, relate to it in different ways. The technology also renders the unborn as a patient, putting the parents in a position where they potentially have to make moral decisions on the life of the unborn child. In this analysis Verbeek also discusses how the technology mediates how the parents relate to the unborn (2011, p. 26). They feel closer and more attached to the unborn. The father feels more involved, while the mother’s unique relation to the child is challenged in a way. Instead of forming a unity with the child, the mother is regarded more as an environment, a potentially dangerous environment when the unborn is considered a weak subject. The technology “inevitably and radically changes the experience of being pregnant and the interpretations of unborn life,” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 27) both in its positive and negative guises. But what we can see better now through our rhetorical lens is how the nuances of Verbeek’s hermeneutical relation cannot only be understood as mediating experience and interpreta-
tion, but how this also grows back into how one is attuned to their being-in-the-world contoured by pregnancy.

The most important mediation, Verbeek argues, is that the parents potentially have to make an ethical choice regarding the life of the unborn child. A decision that only is made possible by the grace of having the technology there. “What appears to be an innocent look into the womb may end up being the first step into a decision-making process that the expectant couple did not explicitly choose.” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 26) The technology does not favour a specific outcome, Verbeek argues, as it can both encourage abortion by preventing suffering, or discourage it in its ability to enhance the emotional bonds between parents and unborn. But what Verbeek shows, and what we can understand better with Heidegger’s rhetoric, is that the technology does mediate how one is attuned to the matter in this decision. In Heidegger’s reversal of the priority of pathos and logos he makes clear how pathos becomes a ground for judgment (*krisis*), rather than only the negative perspective of it clouding that judgment. How these parents find themselves attuned to the matter, mediated by technology, mediates what that decision making process is going to look like.

To be sure, Heidegger does not see pathos as something that only occurs in the mind, but rather what is moved is also the situation one finds oneself in. Pathos is not as something either in consciousness or in the body, Heidegger argues. Rather, we should regard it as a determination of human being. In line with Aristotle Heidegger states that: “I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave.” (Heidegger, 2009) We should not understand the bodily manifestations as symptoms of a state of mind, but as intrinsic part of being-moved. But while we cannot understand the pathē without their bodily manifestations, neither can we understand them without the social context in which they become intelligible. When we are moved in terms of pathos, that has both to do with the social context of being-with-one-another, as well as our physical presence in that shared world; we are moved in our full bodily being-in-the-world. “The πάθη are not ‘psychic experiences,’ are not ‘in consciousness,’ but are a being-taken of human beings in their full being-in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that the whole, the full occurrence context, which is found in this happening, in being-taken, belongs to the πάθη.” (Heidegger, 2009, p. 133)

We have also seen that being-taken presumes a careful listener, a being-in-the-world in a heedful circumspection, and this involves a human being that is invested in his being-in-the-world. How one encounters things is also informed by one’s attunement, and as we can see, that attunement is mediated in relation to technology. So, how one is attuned in a relation grows back into some being-in-the-world in which other things are encountered.
4 Postphenomenology revisited

The setup of this thesis is not only to see how Heidegger’s reading of rhetoric can be applied to technological mediation, but also to see where it might add something. In the first chapter we have seen that themes that could be coined rhetorical were touched upon, but not treated systematically.

In Verbeek’s discussion of engaging products for example, the concepts of readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand inform his analysis, but do not seem sufficient to really understand the technology’s engagement. We can see now better how this engagement takes shape in a broader context of being-in-the-world, and how composure matters in how a thing appears. Verbeek appeals to the idea that products need to be transparent in order to be able to engage people also when they become present-at-hand. How one finds oneself in that relation however matters a great deal in how this transparency is experienced. As a simple example it matters if one is attuned to it with a certain habituation in dealing with the malfunction of products.

With Borgmann we touched upon a certain historical situation of technology and how we deal with technology: the technological pattern or device paradigm. Though his concept of engagement has been adopted as a dimension of technological mediation, his analysis of the historical character of technology is put aside too quickly. With the early Heidegger, we can understand Verbeek’s criticism that Borgmann does not reveal some essence of technology. However, in its place Heidegger would argue that the historical situation, and more factors, determine how one is attuned to something, and that this matters for how one is or gets engaged with something. One of the ways in which we find ourselves in the world and are attuned to technologies might for example be determined by the influence of Borgmann’s liberal democracies, but it could also be the dominance of consumerism, or some other force that induces a certain direct-edness to the world.

Finally, though he has been greatly influential in the development of the postphenomenological framework, even Merleau-Ponty was not able to reach to the noumenal world-in-itself and his unified consciousness—the ‘One’—is cast aside. If Merleau-Ponty, however, like Heidegger in his summer semester course, wanted to reach behind the abstractions through which we understand the world to reach to a more originary experience that informs how we are in the world, some form of that consciousness might stay upright. Though I believe Heidegger would not agree with the idea of a shared consciousness, he does emphasize the role of the ‘one’ in how we find ourselves in the world. How we are attuned to something is variously determined, and one of the factors is certainly our shared disclosure of the world that we find ourselves in. Though in a different guise, with the intention of being more concrete, Heidegger’s attunement might provide the more originary experience Merleau-Ponty pointed at.
Besides a possible answer to some lapses in postphenomenology, I have discussed how Heidegger’s rhetoric could compete with other approaches marrying rhetoric and technology. One significant reason to take Heidegger’s approach to rhetoric is its meeting point with the roots of postphenomenology in Being and Time. However, we have seen more ways in which it can be contrasted with the approaches of Richard Buchanan, B.J. Fogg and Ian Bogost.

The intent of the approaches is fairly similar to that of this thesis: the effect that we have on others, rhetorically understood, is an effect we can also recognise in technologies. What the nature is of that influence differs however. For Fogg this is ‘influence’, for Buchanan a ‘suggestion, a vision (on the good life)’, and for Bogost an ‘appeal to understanding’. In Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective however, this effect is much more understood as an influence on how we are in the world. How our constant being in movement gets a direction in our everyday interactions with others, while being invested in a shared world. The domain that is covered is broader, and drawn more into the domain of philosophy. Though that might provide a better understanding of mediation, its practical application is also more difficult to envision.

These authors share an interest in what kind of arguments their media of choice allow, and the means for a designer for inscribing their message in a technology. We see a rather strong dependence on a communication analogy, with a strong emphasis on the intent of the designer. Bogost is interested in the various ways the ‘reader’ can understand the ‘text’, making the intent of the designer less prominent. He does however focus on the kind of argumentation that is possible in digital rhetoric; procedurality. Heidegger interpretation of Aristotle’s rhetoric stands in a stark contrast to the rhetoric of the Romans or even to scholastic interpretations of Aristotle’s version. Heidegger even turns speaking in a form of hearing. Not the genius of the designer, but the careful circumspection of the user shapes the possibility to be moved by technology. Heidegger’s perspective provides in that sense an alternative in sharp contrast to these other approaches.

Not in all cases is that contrast so strong. Buchanan provides an interesting perspective on the role of pathos in his rhetoric of technology. Pathos can provide a movement in which a user can follow along, for example as a gesture. The terminology certainly resonates with that of Heidegger. This movement of technology can be self-contained, reaching out, or stirring imagination. Technologies can do something more than only providing functionality. We need Heidegger, however, to get a more profound understanding of being in movement, and being taken by technologies. Also in Bogost’s procedural rhetoric we find an interesting relation to Heidegger. We can see how someone can be brought out of composure, having to resolve oneself, and how this happens within a set of procedures, or rules. The strict direction is
not given, but the possibilities are outlined by what the rulebook allows. Bogost deals with abstractions in the form of models contoured by procedures. Similarly for Heidegger, how we can move about in our shared world is contoured by the dependencies on passions, language, and the world that we find ourselves in.

The rhetorical perspective with a focus on rhetorical pathos proposed in this thesis forms a red threat through these different approaches. The twofold understanding of pathos, bringing together attunement and being-moved, can be related to various aspects of what is discussed here. It can bring these aspect that often seem unrelated together in a coherent perspective. Also, Heidegger’s rhetoric could draw perspectives that might have been too hastily dismissed back into the domain of postphenomenology.

5 Conclusion

Heidegger’s perspective on rhetoric can be related to the postphenomenological framework. We relate to the world through technologies in going about the projects of everyday life. In our being-in-the-world, we are in the that world together with technologies and others that we share that world with. In that being in the world, being already invested in it, technological mediations emerge in which we are moved in how we are in that world. As I have discussed in this chapter, Heidegger’s rhetoric can provide a framework for understanding how such mediations emerge. Before any mediation can happen, technologies have to address us, move us to become an audience in the first place. How we find ourselves in the world attunes us to that world and provides a condition for such a being moved by technology. We are disposed to that world and ‘listen’ to the situations around us, being-in-the-world is circumspective. Technologies can mediate how we are in that world, and before technology can ‘do’ anything they first has to move human beings to take them at heart. In other words, Heidegger reverses the role of pathos and logos, and shows that before any reflective thinking can be understood, it already has to matter to an audience for them to be rendered heedful listeners. In this way, Heidegger’s rhetoric can thus help us understand technological mediations as a logos, which presumes a certain possibility to be moved, an attunement (pathos) or disposition, on the side of the human being.

Besides this, I have also discussed how Heidegger’s rhetoric can be understood as dimensions of that relation itself. On the one hand the rhetorical perspective presumes on the side of technology some form of expressive power, and on the side of the human an involvement in the world and a certain history of experience composed in a certain attunement. This expressive power of technology is understood as its ability to move us—before any script or program can start rolling, before things can do something, before it can seduce is—to get involved with it. It proposed that it can do so by mediating how a moment is established that appeals to the user to resolve oneself; a concrete moment where past and future fold togeth-
er in a provisional present. Besides this role for rhetoric for technology, on the side of the human a certain attunement is presupposed. Human beings carry in themselves their own history and that of the ‘there’ (community, time and place, and things) that they find themselves in. On the one hand this attunement matters for how one get engaged with technologies in the first place, but it also attunes how that relation resonates. The pathos of Heidegger’s rhetoric is a being-taken with respect to being in the world. Technologies do not only mediate how we look at things, or intervene through their physical presence in our behaviour, but they mediate how we are in the world, how we find ourselves there.

Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective can illuminate and address some lapses in the postphenomenological perspective. It can address issues that have been touched upon but left out, or make more clear how rhetorical elements that are present in postphenomenology work. I have argued that especially the concept of rhetorical pathos can have the capacity to bring together different lines of thinking that otherwise seem unrelated. The focus on being-in-the-world as being-in-movement and the constant moving and being-moved that comes with it, can provide a different lens to look at the world one is invested in in which technological mediations take place.
Discussion
Things move us. We get attached to our phones, get amazed when technology makes us see the world in a different way, and gather together happily with a game. But how can our being-moved by technology understood in rhetorical terms? That was the goal set out for this thesis. How technologies influence what we think and do can be discussed in terms of technological mediation. Technologies do not only influence us cognitively on some symbolic level, or are instruments for us in their functionality. Also when they do not do what we expected of them, being there in our concrete everyday reality where we go about the projects of our life, they have an impact on how we realise our existence and how we understand that world. Technologies are not only there when we need them, when they function properly, or when they are useful. In many cases they do not line up with what we intended, and express their influence on how we see the world or how we act in it. We can say they mediate how these perceptions and actions take shape in relation to them. But can we also say we are moved by them, as we are also moved by the words of an eloquent speaker?

I have argued that in order to answer this question we need to get behind interpretations of rhetoric that take it to be ‘mere persuasion’, and a strict communication metaphor in which we focus on the intentions of a designer ‘inscribed’ in a product for an audience to read. Instead, I have argued, we need an account of how human beings are moved, and what it takes to be moved in the first place. Such a perspective on rhetoric is laid out by Heidegger in 1924, which seems to be a suitable candidate. That is because Heidegger’s thinking on technology in Being and Time also forms a solid basis for postphenomenological thinking on technological mediation. The question is thus asked: How can Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric add the concept of pathos—being-moved, rhetorically conceived—to the understanding of technological mediation in our everyday encounters with technologies?

First off, Heidegger’s course on Aristotle’s rhetoric provides an interesting and original reading of that rhetoric and received increasing attention over the past years, mainly in the field of rhetoric. One of the main arguments of Heidegger in the course is his reversal of the priority of pathos and logos, meaning that Heidegger sees pathos not as ancillary to rational discourse, but rather as the ground out of which this
speaking springs forth and grows back into. Before any reflection, the worlds is already disclosed in some provisional, everyday manner. This idea roughly lines up with the interest of contemporary research in emotions such as that of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio who shows that our decisions are to a large extent determined by our emotions (Damasio, 1994). These studies seem to support Heidegger’s claims, and Heidegger could even help providing an interpretive framework (Ratcliffe, 2002). Even the notoriously functional Donald Norman has taken up the importance of emotion for design (Norman, 2004). But it also tunes in on the interest in the subconscious mind (cf. Mlodinow, 2012), or how our surroundings set the stage within which our actions take shape (Rickert, 2013). Rickert’s approach is particularly interesting in the context of this thesis. He attempts to widen the rhetorical domain to include technologies as well, and uses Heidegger’s concept of attunement in order to make this possible, with a special interest in his course on rhetoric. Heidegger’s lectures on rhetoric was already innovative at the time, but have thus regained a new and exciting interest.

I have elaborated Heidegger’s rhetorical approach elaborately in the second chapter of this thesis. Heidegger does not just discuss rhetoric. One of the strengths of his analysis is that he discusses Aristotle’s Rhetoric amidst other important works of his corpus, instead of treating it as a separate work. Crossing over between Aristotle’s Physics and Rhetoric, Heidegger grounds the rhetoric in a new way that has interesting consequences for how we should understand Aristotle’s rhetorical account of moving people. Addressing the complicated status of pathos in the history of rhetoric and philosophy, Heidegger makes it a basic concept for understanding our everyday being with one another. It does not only have consequences for how we should understand affect (as a being-moved of a being-in-movement), but also draws attention to the conditions of the possibility of such being moved. Human being is a being-in-movement, a being that is composed in a certain manner and has a certain disposition to a shared world. Being-moved is not only something of individual psychology, it says something about how human beings find themselves in the world.

This rhetorical perspective, with an emphasis on pathos as an account of being moved, can be related to the postphenomenological framework of technological mediation in various ways. Apart from the philosophical context in which pathos is understood, the rhetorical framework can add to the scheme of technological mediation 1) a twofold understanding of pathos as a) the possibility of being moved and b) its concrete bringing out of composure (moving a listener to be realised in some form), and 2) expressive power understood as the ability to fold into a provisional present: a) past experience (e.g. Befindlichkeit and Stimmung) and b) future possibilities (in a shared world), shaping a situation that demands some form of judgment or action. Heidegger’s rhetoric might first help understand how a technologically mediated relation comes to be. Secondly it could be understood as a dimension of that relation itself.
In the relation a careful listening to the situation on the side of the human being, or a heedful circumspection, is elementary for an engaged relation to be formed. Getting engaged does not spring forth out of a ‘staring out’ at things, but getting involved with them presumes a certain openness to be moved by them, be open to the possibility that they can be useful to us. This letting one be affected presupposes a certain attunement that structures how things resonate with us. This attunement is variously determined, and carries in it both a shared disclosure of the world, as the things we encounter in that world. On the ‘pole’ of technology, we can try to understand its ‘expressive power’, its eloquence. I have discussed this as its ability to mediate how one is affected by its role in how a situation takes shape that demands some judgment or action by folding past experiences and future possibilities in a provisional present.

Having established ways in which Heidegger’s rhetoric can be related to technological mediation, it is a good time to take stock of what we have established and what not. I have argued that mediation theory does not have a coherent account of how human beings are moved and that Heidegger’s discussion of rhetorical pathos could be a possible way to bring this into the field. Though there are ways in which attachment and engagement, and other aspects of a rhetorical account are touched upon, they have not become part of the basic vocabulary of the postphenomenological framework. How being-in-the-world is co-determined by our social institutions or cultural heritage, for example, and how that informs how we are attuned to a matter, is a significant lapse that could be addressed better in postphenomenology.

Heidegger’s understanding of such attunement seems a promising candidate and it even lines up with studies in neuroscience. Also Heidegger’s broader conception of being moved not only as a mental state but rather as structuring turns of the direction we live towards seems a fruitful basis to study further. Not only do things present the world in a certain way, or intervene in what we are doing, they help structuring what we choose to get involved with and how we stand towards our shared world and the things in it.

I argued that Heidegger’s rendering of rhetoric does provide a more solid basis, with more philosophical relevance, than when we are to understand technologies only in their ‘persuasive’ character. Rhetoric has the power not only to study ‘influence’ or ‘power’. That easily raises the objections that for example Plato expressed in the Gorgias. Taking rhetoric to be the power to influence others and get them to do or think what you want indeed, at the very best, raises the question of responsibility on the behalf of the speaker, or designer. But Heidegger shows how rhetoric can also be understood as a hermeneutic of our everyday being with one another. That being is messy, ambiguous, and full of movement, and precisely in such a context we find ourselves caring about matters that make us angry, afraid, or happy. The world is contoured in such attunements, and that is how it appears to us.
What has proven to be difficult however is the practical application of Heidegger’s rich and often abstract work. What exactly is attunement, how can we practically analyse it, and apply it to an evaluation of a technological mediation? Heidegger wants to reach beyond received conceptions to a more original experience of the world, uncovering the ontological structures that make our everyday experiences possible. Therefore it might be difficult to connect it to concrete analyses of technological mediations. But it does point us in a certain direction. Heidegger’s rhetoric demands us for example to look into how we are attuned and find ourselves in the world as a dimension of technological mediation. And how our involvements with technology involve past experience and future possibilities, and how technology plays a role in how these come together. And that we can do.

There is a lot more to be said on the topic. The thesis might raise more questions than it answers. But that is indeed its intent: it is an essay in the sense that it explores the possibility of marrying Heidegger’s rhetoric with mediation theory, leaving open its full implementation. That implementation needs further research. A more narrow focus would definitely improve the understanding of the different ideas that are introduced in this thesis. I connected pathos directly with a certain disposition for example, while in Heidegger’s text this disposition is rather understood in relation to hexis and diathesis, which are discussed in relation to pathos. Understanding the being moved of pathos thus also necessitates an understanding of hexis. But such a narrower focus would also stand in the way of the goal of this project: looking whether this rhetorical Heidegger could inform mediation theory. It was necessary to sometimes take big leaps through the meticulous work of Heidegger. But I think it is made plausible that there is room for more rhetoric in mediation theory. In really implementing this in the framework of mediation theory however, we might need a better understanding of what is going on.

Heidegger’s summer semester course is a beautiful, and complex work in which he gives rhetoric a fascinating place in Aristotle’s philosophy. As I have argued in this thesis, this reading of rhetoric can provide a third line of thinking in Heidegger with which we can understand our involvements with technologies. Technologies are not only present in their readiness-to-hand, or presence-at-hand, but they are an intrinsic part of how we find ourselves in the world, and moreover, how we are attuned in that being-in-the-world. The frameworks that postphenomenology provides allow us to understand the mediating character of technologies. The often nuanced perspective on what things can helps in articulating how we want these technologies to play a role in our lives. That vocabulary can however be enriched with Heidegger’s rhetorical perspective, a perspective on how we are constantly in motion, moving and being-moved; a line of thinking in Heidegger that seems to have been overlooked.
References


