Identity of the European Union
A comparative study of Postcolonial Theories and Normative Power Europe

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Abstract:

The concepts of identity and culture have long expanded beyond the idea of personal and cultural identity to fields like institutional identities and business culture. Identity has a great impact on the EU. It fulfills various complex functions. It is a base of legitimation, directly connecting the role in society and self understanding. Institutions act according to their self-image - their identity. The self-image shows how it interprets the past and its future path, as it develops in the direction its members believe it is meant to be. Two prominent theories in the field of EU identity are examined in this work. Manners Normative Power Europe and the postcolonial theories offer different perspectives on the identity the EU prescribes to itself, its development and role as the foundation of actions. This bachelor thesis studies the identity given by the self-image of the European Union as it is presented in the discourse over the free trade agreement between the EU, Peru and Columbia and its relating documents, based on these two schools of thought. It points out how the EU defines itself, formulates and uses identity politics within its actions. Furthermore, it reflect over the explanatory value and relevance of these theories for the discourse over EU identity. The research model is a qualitative Theory testing case study.

Keywords: Postcolonial Theory, Normative Power Europe, EU, Latin America, Discourse Analysis, Trade, Identity politics, Values, Free trade Agreements, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador
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1. Introduction

Analysing EU identity requires a deeper understanding of its relation to European identity. The EU is only one of three constructs which can be described as Europe, the other are the Council of Europe and the cultural or territorial Europe as a ‘collective of states’ (Guild 2004, 3). Diversity is at the core of the ‘collective’ European Identity making deriving a single identity challenging (Diez 2004, 319), Chakrabarty goes as far as proposing that the concept of a collective Europe and the West are entirely constructed (2002, 306). Walker establishes that the EU is often mistakenly equated with the construct of Europe. Europe describes a place (with ambiguous borders) whereas the EU is an institution so rather a ‘something’ than a ‘somewhere’ (see Walker 2000, 17). One has to further distinguish the ‘civic identity’ of being European (cultural, historical) which describes the identification of the people, this identification tends to lay less with the EU but more with the vague ‘collective’ concept of Europe (Risse 2003, 8-10). Europe and the EU are distinctively different concepts it is important to separate them from each other. However the EU seeks to occupy the space of Europe and give it solid definition, hence the concepts started to overlap (Risse 2003, 9). The ‘civic identity’ of Europeans is of less relevance for this work, since the institutional identity of the EU and how the EU defines itself in comparison to others are in focus of this work.

Two approaches that aim to explain how the EU generates identity and study its role in the international community will be compared in regards to their relevance for this discourse. These works do not represent the whole discourse over EU identity however they have been leading the field in developing European identity and especially in its relation to third parties. On one hand “Normative Power Europe” approach, one of its main contenders is Ian Manners who wrote the article coining this name. Normative Power Europe describes the EU as an exporter of good norms and humanitarian values, by establishing relationships in different fields of politics and economics with non-member countries (Manners 2000, 55; Freres 2000, 64). On the other hand the postcolonial perspective is presented with its spokesmen like Stuart Hall or Edward Said, stating that the EU identity maintains the basic historical mindset of imperial times (Ramoe 2011, 2). The EU hereby constructs its self-image and its legitimation by distancing itself from others (Said 2009, 236-237), making the EU an economic and ethic tool to interfere, exercise influence and power, like in imperial times (Said 2009, 236-7). Both theories are highly debated and this work seeks to add to this field by comparing both on a single object.

Looking into the free-trade agreement (FTA) with Peru and Colombia (in newer sources also Ecuador) as the EU’s ‘other’ gives ideal conditions to test these theories. They have a strong European history of colonialism, the relations where for several hundred years dominated by imperialistic ideas. There was a considerable (mostly one sided) export of culture, but only little immigration from Europe (Quijano 2000, 237). Both counties are large enough to be able to be considered a worthwhile partner. An economic treaty lends itself less as platform for deliberate identity politics and image branding focuses on economic and financial considerations. Therefore the embedment of political ethics on its own has informative value. The discourse regarding the FTA emerged 7-8 years ago, consequently opinions are already built and structures and lines of argumentations can be assumed as solidified. A temporal comparison over the development of the discourse can be established. The critical decision of signing the documents is fully discussed (as far as a discourse is ever completed), which makes a discourse analysis more feasible. Using the FTA and measurable tools in the comparison of ideologies helps identifying central hypothesis in current EU politics. Therefore this work can establish
a base for comparison with other economical treaties. It should further help to create a model expandable to other fields of politics.

There has been research into similar fields by both schools of thought. Eurocentrism by Conrad and Randeria (2002) picks up the postcolonial ideas and applies them to modern India, he puts special emphasis on the way Europe constructs its past, establishing Europe as a key player and centre of the world. The work of Bhabha (2006) describes the “myths of cultural diversity” as a postcolonial idea of utopian separated cultures which live alongside with each other (Bhabha 2006, 1155). Both approaches interpret postcolonial theories in the postmodern context. Further there have been analyses of EU economics by both schools of thought. A study by Zein-Elabdin (2009) has researched a postcolonial perspective of the culture in economics criticising the global generalisation of Smith’s economic theory (Zein-Elabdin 2009, 1153). In contrast to Özer (2012) describing the ‘civilian power’ of the EU by analysing its trade policy. These two perspectives on European Economics and trade show that within the ongoing (ethical) economic discourse both theories are represented. Most of the previous works take one broad field of politics and analyse it using one of these theories (e.g. Steinbichler 2009, Freres 2000, Chakrabarty 2002), which is mostly useful to gain more insight in the political field. There have also been various works challenging the opposite perspective and mitigating works trying to connect both approaches (e.g.: Aggestam 2000, Diez 2004; 2005). But taking just one small discourse and looking at it from two angles might bring new perspectives to the theories themselves on how they interact and which of the argumentation given is actually stronger reflected, making this work equally a policy and theory study. By incorporating quantified data this work aims to gain new insights into the mechanisms of argumentation, comparing not only the models to each other but testing its core arguments for applicability.

There are discourses influencing this agreement, but the focus is on examining the presentation of the EU and its self-image, by choosing two influential theories and analysing which of these constructs and assumptions are more present. This indirectly includes the Hypothesis that both theories have one but no equal influence leading to the following set of research question and working hypothesis:

**RQ:** To what extent is the identity of the EU in the discourse over the free-trade agreement between the EU, Peru and Colombia based on a postcolonial or normative power Europe’ ideology?

**H I.** The ideas of one or both theories can be found in the discourse around the FTA

**H II.** One of both theories has a stronger influence on the concept of European Identity as its functions in this discourse

The following five chapters will help answer these question. In the next chapter the theoretical framework is presented, followed by a chapter about the methodology of this thesis. In the fourth chapter the gained understanding will be applied to the sources. The fifth and last chapter will be the conclusion and give a critical reflection of this work as well as a placement of this works results in the scientific field.
2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the necessary theoretical base to fill the research questions with measurable indicators. But further it prepares the analysis by presenting the background the research is applied to. Before analysing how both theories describe EU identity is build it is necessary to take one step back and look at the construction of identity and culture in general as well as the specific EU framework as a multi-level institution, with the goal to prepare the analysis and highlight areas of special analytical value. The next two sections are dedicated to the main theories, working out key assumptions to transform them into measurements, enabling the evaluation of ideological dominance in the discourse. The normative Power Europe (NPE) will be the first introduced the postcolonial approach will be presented thereafter concluding this chapter with a chart presenting analytical key points.

2.1 Identity and the EU

Identity according to Hall is always constructed by an inside in comparison to the outside which results in a feeling of continuity (Hall 1994, 67). A fixed and one arbitrary point is built (Hall 1994, 79), by making the fixed point through identification the core of identity the arbitrary point against which the identity is constructed becomes the ‘other’ (Hall 1994, 73). The production of individual identity by identification means always the construction of a collective in this case a collective of institutions and employees which build a collective cultural identity. The EU, is generated by the other, the Identity is always an likeness reflected from the point of the other (Hall 1994, 73). The collective or individual identity can only be constructed and kept stable by blinding out the conflicts and contradiction creating the ‘silence’ within identity (Hall 1994, 74; Hall 2005, 444). To test the accuracy of the theories it has to be identified what includes the we and the other, and which conflicts are silenced. Hall's conception of culture will be one of the main theories for this work, “It defines ‘culture’ as both the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they ‘handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and as the lived traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in which they are embodied” (Hall 1980, 63). For EU the treaties and documents (acquis communautaire and acquis politique) are part of institutional culture Making the FTA both an expression and constructive part of EU identity.

Constructing EU identity is a mechanism of power over opinion which constantly develops. Cultures can deepen in society or lose influence, but never vanish (Hall 1980, 60). A definition of what is normal and evident holds power, a study of what is normal to the EU and which theory encapsulates it more accurately. Culture is not universal, freed of a historical or lingual context (Hall 1994,70). Consequently, cultural analyses is relative to its level of abstraction and time of the observation, which brings the necessity to develop a clear time frame and context for answering the research question. Different from a territorial state, binding and centralizing cultural identity to a territory (Diez 2004, 322) creating a measurable inside and an outside (Diez 2004, 325), the EU's changing members and borders cause a need for alternative mechanisms to solidify cultural identity. Definition of the EU identity has been a deliberate act of declaring its uniqueness and superiority to other actors (Bretherton and Vogler 2005, 52). EU representatives are included in the conscious act of 'purposeful construction' of European identity (Bretherton and Vogler 2005, 39). There have been many changes and reshapes of the EU. "The enlargement of the European Union has also been a story of continuing changes of territorial identity and borders" (Guild 2004, 3). But not only the borders interfere with
stable identity construction, there are inner conflicts as well. The EU walks a thin line between statehood and international organization. Different EU organs functions and responsibilities challenge a consistent identity. The Council of Ministers and Committee of Permanent Representatives have for example a double commitment to the EU and its member states (Risse 2003, 19). This possible sub-identities make a multilayered analysis necessary to gain a full understanding of conflicting narrative necessary.

Delving further into the background of EU identity, the constant has been an emphasis on shared norms as well as shared political and legal properties (Shaw and Wiener 2000, 3). The European identity has been defined early on in the “Declaration on European Identity” (DEI) from 1973. A value based European community and unified international representation is a defined goal (DEI I.1 and I.5). The believe that European unity benefits the international community is described as one driver for international engagement (DEI II.9). Many of the core values of the EU can be found in the draft of constitutional treaty. “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (TCE, Title, Article 1). Given that EU’s social norms are being transferred into legal status (as happened with human rights), and that social norms have the ability to cross borders even without legal implementation (Shaw and Wiener 2000, 5,10), the EU is set up with the ability to be a normative power.

2. II Normative Power Europe

The NPE approaches developed from the wish to evaluate the international role of the EU as a non military actor (Manners 2002, 235-236). The construct is historically related to the end of the cold war and builds on the upcoming constructivism and idealism of the era (Aggestam 2008, 2). The loss of a foreign opponent after the collapse of the UDSSR left a void in the discursive identity construct. The NPE European identity is founded in a direct rejection of the imperialistic, nationalistic and violent past of Europe, describing a new common goal (Freres 2000, 64). Early works like François Duchêne’s (1972) described a ‘civilian power Europe’ approach as a concept of civilizing and non military positive influence on the international community, the terms ‘structural’ or ‘narrative’ power are used with similar intend (Özer 2012, 68). With the European Security Strategy (2003) and further military collaboration the ‘civil power’ became a concept of controversy (Bretherton and Vogler 2005, 51 referring to: Zielonka: 1998, 299; Biscop and Coolsaet 2003, 31). Manners (2002, 238) distanced his concept from the ‘civil power’ and used the term ‘normative power’ to emphasize the ideological impact of the EU rather than the militarisation debate. Later, Diez (2005, 620) integrates the idea that the EU decides which is more dominant, its military power or normative power. Manners’ model with some additional sources gives the theoretical framework used to represent normative approaches in the analysis.

Central to this theory is the definition of the EU by norms. Manners categorizes “peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, and rule of law” as ‘core’ norms and “social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance” as ‘minor’ norms (Manners 2002, 242-243). These norms stem from the draft of the constructional treaty (TCE: Title, Article 1-3). Theses norms give the EU the standing of an independent actor exceeding the sum of European nations (Manners 2002, 244). Accordingly, the discourse should be represented by the following principals: “living by example” (Manners 2008, 56), “Being reasonable” (Manners 2008, 58), “Doing least harm” (Manners 2008, 58), and “other empowering” (Manners 2008, 58). The norms which are assumed as universally inherent properties are applied to international relations, leading the state-centric international system to more multilateralism (Aggestam 2008, 1; Manners 2008, 45). They are a constructive element for its identity.
against the ‘outside’ which do not have these norms (Diez 2005, 614; Manners 2002, 239). Different from historical European empires which had also been promoting their norms and political institutions, identification is achieved by ‘othering’ against the Unions past (‘temporal othering’) instead of the international community (Bretherton and Vogler 2005, 51; Manners 2002, 240). The norms and therefore the power is seen as a peace building power (Manners 2008, 51). The absence of direct material gain in distributing its norms is provided as an evidence that the EU is not exercising imperialism though norms (Manners 2002, 253). Consequently the incorporation, frequency and quality of theses norms has analytical value.

The EU is not only supposed to act with superior standards but spread its norms in the international community (Manners 2002, 252). Manners argues even that the existences of the EU itself has the power to change norms (Manners 2002, 252). The power lays within the influence to change the behaviour of the counterpart (Diez 2005, p.616) and determine what is normal and appropriate (Diez 2005, 615). In the tradition of Whitehead (1996) and Kinnvall (1995), Manners (2002, 253) believes that the normative power is founded in the ability to transfer norms, set norms and determine their political interpretation. This discursive power is always in its context the power to construct opinion and truth. The argument that the EU is “predisposed” to ethical actions is used by Manners (2002, 242) as an argument for the legitimacy of norm export. Diez (2005, 632) however sees less the norms it self than the way this power is used as a qualifier for normative power. They should be constructed in such a way that they cause more just and peaceful relation. (Diez 2005, 633). The EU should spread their norms careful and with concepts of partnership (Manners 2000, 55; Freres 2000, 64). The EU's efforts to spread norms and act as an example will be discussed in this work.

According to NPE the EU executes their normative power in the following five ways. ‘Norm diffusion in international relations’ is described as the unintentional emitting of norms, “Informational diffusion” is the strategic inclusion of norms through international relations and enlargement. “Transference” is defined as diffusion of norms caused by economic relations and “Overt diffusion”, which results from the physical presence of the EU or Member states in other countries. Lastly the “cultural filter”, is the power to define what is normal or good through cultural, economical and geopolitical influence without direct ties to the receiver (Manners 2002, 245). Additionally, Manners states that the stand as a moral institution with universal norms will only be as successful as the involved parties legitimize and willingly share the norms (Manners 2008, 46,56). Diez however argues that the strategic use of norms and the normative power can not be distinguished and that the NPE discourse should be the focused on the “narrative of the normative power”, seeing the current NPE narrative as a distortion from the actual EU identity (Diez 2005, 626). In consequence the analysis has to distinguish between normative narrative and executed power in the search for mechanisms of norm transference.

NPE is a very controversial approach especially postcolonialists doubt the overcoming of imperialism but see it reproduced in NPE. Postcolonialism strongly opposes the idea of the EU as a normative power and question the intentions and power structures behind EU actions. Aggestam criticizes the installation of certain ethics as a common good without regard for the cultural context (Aggestam 2008, 3) and addresses the marginalized mixed motivations lying within the export of values (Aggestam 2008, 4). Generalising over norms and seeing another party as the recipient could lead to new cultural imperialism (Aggestam 2008, 7). Further the dynamics within and the motivation of the member-states remains unquestioned within NPE (Freres 2000, 81; Aggestam 2008, 4). According to this criticism some new normative approaches tend to use the term “responsible power” to emphasise the cultural bias and and focus on intentions toward the other (Aggestam 2008, 9-11). Diez contribution to NPE incorporates some of this criticism. The member-states are according to Diez (2005, 620) mixed in intentions but one in the will to implement norms in the international community.
Furthermore, some postcolonial assumptions, like not assuming general universality of EU norms and promoting a reflexive transfer of norms are incorporated. Dietz states that differentiation between altruism and interest is not necessary as long as the norms are beneficial (Diez 2005, 626), following the NPE narrative instead the postcolonial one. But leading to a less deterministic look on the normative power of the EU.

2.III Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism describes the imperialistic empires as the founding point of the current international relations, and colonialism as crucial for the construction of European identity (Quijano 2000, 234). Postcolonial studies became popular in the 70’s and 80’s of the twentieth century. Its motivation is described by Ramoe in the following way: “Postcolonial theory responds, in the main, to the particularly rampant colonial expansion undertaken in the nineteenth century” (2011, 2). Founded in “[...] examining European literature as part of a larger colonial discourse, an instrument of cultural hegemony” (Zein-Elabdin 2009, p.1158). Edward Said is often considered one of the founding fathers. Postcolonial theories try to uncover the intransparent power which is hidden by the common assumption that science is neutral (Said 2009, 19,23). In postcolonial studies modern science is not only seen as an ideological instrument but a product of a discursive context. It is inseparable from mechanisms of power (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 34), constructed with claim of worldwide validity but without the knowledge and experiences of most of the world (Chakrabarty 2002, 284). Conrad and Randeria (2002, 24) and Chakrabarty (2002, 305) describe how, with these mechanisms, a tool was created to apply local measurements on an international scale. Leading to the need of this research to compare mechanisms of power and assumptions of bias free knowledge of both theories.

Most of the spokesmen of these theories agree that European values and measurements are unjustifiably extrapolated and taken as universally valid (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 24; Chakrabarty 2002, 305). Conrad and Randeria describe this as ‘Euro-Centrism’: the idea that Europe serves as a model for civilisation development and can be used as a criterion of evaluation (2002, 12). History becomes a variation of the tale of European history (Chakrabarty 2002, 283). It is defined as the expansion of Europe, unique and independent from the European “other” (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 12-13). History becomes a mechanism for the consolidation of hegemony where people on the outside have no history (Chakrabarty 2002, 283). Zein-Elabdin (2009 p.1156) expands the concept to modern economics. Similar as the enlightenment did for culture politics, Smith's economic theory gave western economics a position of unchangeable truth and argumentation for westernisation of the world. A discourse led by postcolonial ideas would subsequently be indicated by ‘Euro-centrism’, little regards for historical and cultural context and generalization of western knowledge methods.

The ‘other’ or ‘outside’ in this discourse further should be constructed, according to Said (2009, 235), fixed in the “latent” stereotypes of imperialistic times. Certain patterns of behaviour of the “other” are filtered and then systematized as they get a “common value of interpretation” (Said 2009, 235). These are which are declared neutral facts. Said argues that the common picture of the orient was that it is in need of salvation and deliverance, it is inferior and needs to be ruled. Similarly, Conrad and Randeria (2002, 12) see historical differences interpreted as deficits and expressed in a “language of shortcomings”. It becomes represented in terms of problem and a solution (Said 2009, 236-7). Said divides stereotypes into two categories, the “manifest orientalism”, which describes attitudes and outspoken opinions, and “latent orientalism” which contains the unconscious long lasting prejudice (Said 2009, 236). This authorizes colonial domination and can further serve as an authorization for the EU to exercise power. Hall describes the other as frozen “into some timeless zone of the primitive, unchanging past” (Hall 2005, 449). Unchanging stereotypes rationalise the continued perpetuation of
old power constellations, the identity of the ‘we’ therefore can maintain stable. Similarities in the stereotypes towards Latin America would confirm postcolonial argumentation. The subject-object dialectic is important when looking at the discourse at hand, indicated by the inclusion of Peru’s and Colombia’s perspective. According to Said the fact that the Orientalist does not experience the Orient or include it in the discussion causes pressure to construct an imaginary Orient (Said 2009, 236-7). Politics is the attempt to reach hegemony, not with the disappearance of differences but by their emphasis (Hall 1994, 84). This also leads to Bhabha’s thesis that contact between cultures does not necessarily result in the depletion of stereotypes but the emphasis of cultural differences (Bhabha 2006, 155).

Postcolonial theories developed in different directions and are applied to various fields. Diez introduces 2004 (320) a bridge between both theories, with the thesis that “geographical othering” has shifted to “temporal othering”. He does not argue for an extinction of “geographical othering” or colonial heritage but its diminishing importance, (Diez 2004, 326-27), as a evolutionary development of European identity. It shows that a substantial comparison of both theories is necessary and ambiguous interpretation might be possible. Both theories rely on similar mechanisms for construction of identity but define different EU strategies to build its self-image. They define different historical contexts as decisive and deduce their assumptions accordingly. An understanding of the European history and identity building is inevitable for applying both theories. Therefore, the indicators (table 1 below) have to be weighted for different EU entities. This process of decoding the discourse uses the indicators to construct an open coding system applicable to the analytical text body.

Table 1: Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPE</th>
<th>Postcolonial</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incorporation of EU key norms (Manners 2002, 42-3)</td>
<td>• Geopolitical driven policy agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Altruism driven foreign politics (Ozer 2012, 89;</td>
<td>• Geographical othering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manners 2002, 240)</td>
<td>• Language of shortcomings (Conrad and Randeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• act upon superior standards and principles. (Manners 2002, 252;</td>
<td>2002, 12; Diez 2005, 628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008, 56-8)</td>
<td>• Assumption of superiority model function of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ‘Informational diffusion’ and ‘Transference’ of Norms (Manners</td>
<td>European history and principles (Conrad and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• respectful, equal and fair treatment (Manners 2002, 252)</td>
<td>• Generalisation and simplification of the ‘other’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Voluntariness of the 3rd parties in taking over new norms</td>
<td>(Said 2009, 235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Manners 2000, 55; Freres 2000, 64)</td>
<td>• Stereotyping as primitive and backwards (Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005, 449)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Methodology

After introducing the objectives and essential theoretical groundwork for the analyses, the next chapter establishes the methodological approach. The goal is to present sources and describe the sampling process and rationale, to achieve transparency of the research process. The first part of this chapter contains the sampling rationale and selected sources. The second part explains the analytical strategy, with special focus on the function and execution of discourse analyses, using discourse analysis to incorporate the indicators into the identified sources. There is a variety of analytical methodology, this work mainly utilizes the discourse analytical method according to Keller (2008). A phased open coding structure with semi-qualified results which lend itself to the comparative aspect of this work.

3.1 Method of Data Collection

Since the focus is on the EU internal discourse over the conscious and unconscious efforts to define and give itself identity, the analyses will be restricted to mostly internal sources, though external validation and its relevance will be examined later in this work. The discourse over this agreement took shape in its recent form in January 2009 when the negotiations over a free trade agreement started. In June 2012 when FTA was signed, the discourse was active and especially in the first half of 2012 most documents were released. After the agreement was applied in 2012-2013 the discourse faded. With the addition to the regulations of Banana Trade in January 2013 and the inclusion of Ecuador in November 2016, there was briefly more discussion of the FTA. As can be seen in the graphic below, most documents come from the time the agreement was signed, as it was the most relevant phase in source production, this leads to an uneven representation of time periods but a more accurate representation of the discourse as a whole.

The analysis includes three types of sources. First the treaty with its relevant Annexes, second, the speeches of EU politicians concerning this treaty, and lastly, released documents and press statements by the EU or its organs. There are many documents which partly contain statements or segments related to the negotiations, for example in annual reports or general speeches concerning Latin America. But since the mix with other strategies and intentions specific for these discourses
might distort or change argumentations, those documents are excluded from the pool of sources. But even without these sources, it has to be considered that discourses can hardly be factually separated, they overlap and are impossible to tell apart. Further criteria for choosing the sources was a degree of diversity. They are laid out for different audiences and from different positions within the European Union, since the motivations differ between actors within the EU. The Commission is the negotiating party and leading actor in the discourse which is reflected in its quantitative representation. Including different sub-identities within, the EU enables to test the consistency of talking points throughout different audiences as it might point to hidden intentions. As there are repetitive statements and recycled paragraphs given by the EU, documents with mostly identical contend were omitted. Another factor is the consideration of relevance within the discourse, how often the sources are referenced to or linked by actors of the discourse as well as their dominance in search engines, as a stronger exposure within the discourse leads to the strengthening of position. With these selection of sources the discourse can be analysed regarding the changes of images and definitions along time as well as by different institutions and addressed to various audiences.

With twenty documents which fulfil these criteria, the analytical body should be sufficient to represent the discourse as well as still be feasible for a detailed literature analyses. For the open coding system, six speeches are used as analytical primary sources, as their argumentative language is especially fitting. Three speeches are by Karel De Gucht, the European Commissioner for Trade, one before the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (INTA) Brussels, (16 March 2010), this is one of the few early speeches with focus on the reason and motivation why the FTA is made. Additionally one speech for the European Parliament in Strasbourg, (22 May 2012) and one to the European business community in Lima, Peru (16 November 2012). Of José Manuel Durão Barroso (12 June 2012) and Herman Van Rompuy one speech is used (12 June 2012) after meeting the President of Peru and a further speech of Van Rompuy one year later after meeting with the Peruvian and Columbian President. These speeches are chosen for the open precoding since they are directed to various institutions and audiences. Choosing primary sources largely around the most active time of the debate, helps to establishing a coding system for the remaining texts, and to find repetitions and changes in argumentation.

3.II Method of Discourses Analyses

The interpretation of discourses and understanding of them is often related to Foucault in the 50s (Keller 2008, 103,105). According to Keller a discourse describes structural organized statements, opinions, constructions and claims made over a phenomenon (Keller 2008, 236). They are the rules and expression of the social environment (Keller 2008, 236; Bettinger 2007, 77). By accepting certain discourses as true, concepts of right and wrong are introduced, what can reasonably be said becomes the socially constructed truth (Landwehr 2001, 85; Bettinger 2007, 77). The holding of the constructed truth gives power to actors and powerful actors narratives are more likely to be considered true (Keller 200, 237; Bettinger 2007, 81). The EU’s ability to shape what others perceive as its identity correlates with its power in the international community. In this way, discourses reflect the power structure of one point in time. Giving the EU the ability to constitute what is seen as a problem, that needs to be disputed or solved (Keller 2008, 236). Within the tradition of “systemic-functional linguistics, American descriptive linguistics, ethnomethodology, and critical theory” (Johnstone 2006, 595) discourse analysis is used to point out the “dynamic relationships between discursive events” (Wodak 2006, 597). Based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s findings, Keller (2008, 104) states that language is a coded system. This code has to be known and decoded to understand the meaning of the words spoken. The system ‘language’ structures our experiences and gives tools
of interpretation (Bettinger 2007, 78), explaining the need for linguistic interpretation to find the truth the EU presents over its own identity. In this context Berger and Luckmann (2008, p. 40) speak of a “social construction of reality”.

Analysing language can establish assumption about the bigger context of society and culture as patterns of interpretations and concepts of knowledge vary in relativity to context. Every discourse relies on definitions ideas and is constructed from other discourses. The discourse over the free trade agreement is influenced by the discourse over the EU's self image, which has been possible influenced by the principals of NPE or postcolonialism. By examining the discourse over EU foreign relations, one can observe which part of the identity discourse is influential enough to be reflected in other discourses. Considering the overlapping nature of discourses, this analysis can not incorporate every intervening discourse which makes a background analyses inevitable and the first step of the analyses (1). The beginning of the linguistic analysis is defining the key vocabulary (2) (“Deutungsmuster”) which is used throughout groups of discourses (Keller 2008, 240,3). They are definitions preconditioned for the discourse equipped with complex buildings of thoughts. These concepts of thinking are not fixed and solid they are in process and change with time (Bettinger 2007, 77). Equipped with this basic knowledge and the theories initial categories as a third step a code is generated using the primary sources (3). The “Phänomenstruktur” (Keller 2008, 248) is analysed by assessing the arguments used and their implied meaning, pointing out what is presented as fact, the ascription and labelling of qualities and how argumentation and rhetoric is used to dramatize or evaluate (Keller 2008, p. 248). The previous operationalisation (Indicators: Table 1) forms initial categories which are first applied to primary sources to be revised and form the coding. Following Keller (2008, 243-4) a more or less formal “classification” of these patterns and grounded theory based open coding is used. The developed codes can no longer be directly deduced from the theories and incorporate dominant talking points that have to be analysed in their discursive position.1 By additionally using quotes and direct text relation, narratives can be pointed out.

1. Coding and numerical findings can be found in Table 3
The code is validated upon and used on the whole volume of documents. The findings are evaluated based on the theories and a narrative structure is built (4) as to how the EU constructs identity within this discourse. The open coding is not completed with the primary sources, different narratives within the secondary documents are taken into consideration in the further analyses. This is dimensional analysis (“Dimensionale Erschließung”), the numeric generation of codes and code families based on grounded theory (Keller 2008, p. 249). It is used, to prove, question or elaborate the initial findings from the primary sources. To analyse the temporal development, and enhance the validity by enlarging sample quantity. The narrative structure can be mapped by knowing the role of the actors, the conflicts in the stories, and the means of argumentation (Keller 2008, p. 251/252) concluded in setting the findings in relation to the theories. In the last step the theories themselves become subject of analysis by reversing the process and evaluating the theories based on the discourse. This meta analytical step is a reflection of before described conflicts and relations between both theories, evaluated based on the findings. In consequence the research question can be answered conclusively. The research steps are described in linear order but executed more flexibly. Encompassing the complex process of linguistic and discursive analyses in one model means a calculated reduction and prioritization of sources, codes and findings. The chosen sources and methods should minimize risks to the quality of the findings.

4. Analysis of the Discourse

This chapter presents the findings of the research. Using the assumption of the theories with the goal to describe the EU identity presented to reflect aspects in conflict within the theories. The results of this process are structured in the following way. The discursive context will be the objective of the first part of the next chapter. As the discourse relies on a variety of definitions and vocabulary with specific implications, the second segment will single out those of interest for the analyses. The third part presents the data collected. The narrative of the discourse is deducted by interpreting data and providing relation to the theoretical context, which is the objective of the later section. The fifth section will conclude the analysis by comparing the results to the assumption of the theories.

4.1 Context Analysis

The historic context postcolonialism refers to starts when Peru and Colombia where part of Incan territory, Tawantinsuyu. Latin America itself is a construct by European Powers (Mignolo 2005, 2). The imperialistic expansion is an integral part in construction of European identity as well (Quijano 2000, 234), “In this way, race became the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in the new society’s structure of power” (Quijano 2000, 235). This was a new construct of a Eurocentric world who gave legitimization and formal neutrality to European superiority (Wade 1997, 9; Quijano 2000, 234-5). The colonies were used to produce the resources and products by unpaid labour, whereas the Europeans controlled trade and means of production (Quijano 2000, 237). Colonies where not only the recipients of European achievements but also the “laboratories” of the modern Europe (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 26), by missionary activity domestic Christian values where strengthen (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 32), cultural export being the consequence. The Latin American colonies where, at the beginning of the 19th century considerably early in gaining independence.

Starting in the late 1950s the current relationship to Latin America according to NPE was build on partnership as a common goal in EU’s development assistance program (Freres 2000, 64). “Latin
America was one of the areas where the E.U.’s socio-economic approach initially took shape in the mid-1980s, and many policy makers still perceive it as the most emblematic case of Europe’s “socialization” approach” (Youngs 2002, 115). Gurgel describes that in the 1990s ‘partnership’ was used to its extreme as a idealized description (Grugel 2004, 607, 608). Fereres however interprets these aids as an instrument used by the EU to gain trade and investment opportunities and questions the claimed ‘European difference’ (Freres 2000, 64). The European goal in Latin America at this time can be described as an intervention against US dominance to establish global presence (Freres 2000, 64; Youngs 2002, 129). The focus was on democratisation, institution building and pacification combined with marked interests (Youngs 2002, 116). Best practice with the EU as the example became part of political exchange. “Europe as a solitary supporter and partner was and is still widely doubted prioritized a defensive commercial self interest” (Youngs 2002, 127). Within this ambiguity of intentions the FTA was formed, there is no consensus in its evaluation giving both theories a bases for their arguments.

Beyond the historical context the trade context the former practices of agreements and international commitments shape the discourse over the FTA. Trade is one of the most established and powerful branches of EU politics (Özer 2012, 64). The organ almost exclusively in charge of implementing these is the European Commission. It has a history of agreeing on consensus even if majority is the formal requirement (Özer 2012, 77). There is a general preference for persuasive measures since sanctions are difficult to approve in the Council (Özer 2012, 88). The EU has a long tradition of binding ethics to trade policy, since the 1990’s the ‘essential element’ is the ethical foundation of each bilateral trade agreements (Özer 2012, 88; Metreveli 2012, 5). The Laeken Deklaration shows further commitment, as the EU bounds itself to being “power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework” and commits to change that would benefit developed and developing countries alike (Laeken Declaration 2001, I). Consequently trade discourses have a long tradition of value driven narratives. However, authors like Metreveli (2012, 4) point out that results have been mixed. Further, the marked liberalisation and trade regime building have been criticised as economical westernisation (Zein-Elabdin 2009, 1158). Before this agreement negotiations with CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones) failed and the EU had to take a more regional approach, the loss of marked chairs and a stronger focus on the market for raw materials (Raw Materials Initiative 2008) were also urging factors to propose bilateral trade. The intention was first to include Ecuador (which then joined in 2016) and Bolivia which opted out of the agreement. A similar pattern as described for the discourse activity can be seen for medial attention and outside publications, with attention between 2010 and 2011, the major reporting in 2012 and a short re-visit in 2016. But the coverage was small coverage compared to agreements like TPP. Though the media did not partake much in the ethical discourse, NGOs gave different perspectives and reflections on the EU as a normative actor. The EU as of now has released two annual evaluation papers on the agreement and will maintain the discourse.
4.II Discursive Terms and Definitions

The EU has a very specific definition of ethics or values founded in the aforementioned ‘essential element’. Especially firm is the definition of the term ‘human rights’. It refers within this discourse to the Human Rights Charter of the UN, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Whereas the term rule of Law is more open to interpretation, the EU describes its cornerstones as an ‘independent and impartial judiciary’, ‘legal accountability of the government’, ‘anti-corruption’, and ‘transparent and fair laws’ (European commission 2016c). Good governance, which is one of the ‘essential elements’, is never mentioned directly within the sources but referred to in its principals. Which the Commission describes 2013 in the paper “Governance and development”:

“A wide range of instruments is available for promoting governance whilst at the same time combating poverty and promoting sustainable development, e.g. humanitarian aid, support for building up transport, health and education institutions, support for administrative reform, combating corruption, maintaining peace and security, promoting respect of human rights and participation by civil society, trade promotion, support to enable the country to take ownership of reform programmes and budget support.”

As can been seen in this examples the definitions of the values overlap. To make the values quantifiable separation is needed. Therefore good governance in this analyses includes: support of civil society, participation (except democratic votes this is included in democracy), transparency, mentions of reasonable, efficient policy, and anti corruption efforts. There is further a duality within the definition of ‘anti discrimination’. Equal treatment of products and companies will be evaluated as a trade policy separated from the value. Social solidarity is divided in its meaning into international solidarity mostly connected to foreign aid and inner solidarity, overlapping with anti discrimination and good governance. Sustainable development is frequently mentioned in connection to environmental protection with little reference to development. Within this discourse sustainable development is often a synonymously used for environmental protection.

The second term crucial for the analysis is ‘othering’. As given interpretation from the theories it is the process of identity building by segregation and ‘direct othering’ is one of those forms. The postcolonial theories describe foreign nations and cultures as the ‘other’, there are different approaches as to what the other is the NPE. Since both theories describe forms of ‘othering’ the count of words (we, they etc.) becomes an insufficient measuring tool. Therefore there has to be a distinction between ‘disconnective (postcolonial) othering’ and ‘connective othering’ (the ‘we’ includes Peru and Columbia or an ‘other’ outside the trade union is established). In consequence ‘connective othering’ speaks against a postcolonial perspective suggests a sense of community. The way othering is used has to be analysed additionally to its quantity. The established vocabulary helps to define indicators and analytical categories and is necessary to decrypt the meaning behind EU messaging.

2. Full list of terms Table 4 in the Annex
4.III Data

The values assigned as one category is the most frequent talking point of the EU. Especially principals, the EU Parliament identified as the most concerning: labour rights, good governance and environmental protection (Parliament 2012, Committee on international trade 2012), are dominant as can be seen in the Graphic 3 below^3. Looking at the Agreement these priorities are carried over, besides the first Article describing the “common values” there are 7 further articles strongly dedicated towards environmental issues (Art. 85.a, 232, 267, 270, 271, 275, 286). The same can be seen for labour rights and good governance, within this especially anti-drug and corruption efforts are emphasised. Labour rights are not included in the list given by Manners, however they could be attributed to good governance. But since they are mostly addressed independently they became their own category. Other value related statements often include giving leniency like demanding “reasonable efforts” (FTA Art. 202) and only actions to the “extend of possibility” (FTA art. 255 §2).

‘Othering’ is a prominent concept in both theories. The other can be found frequently in the documents, one can see that ‘disconnective othering’ is common (111/40). Forms of “we” are far more frequent (81.5%; Graphic 5) showing a gravitation towards positive language but not inclusive statements. The amount of exclusive statements towards the partners is not negligible. Graphic 6 shows that despite the mostly inclusive language far fewer statements actually including Peru and Colombia (and Ecuador) into the EU’s ‘we’ are made^4. There are rare (2%) occasions where the other is outside the agreement (mostly referring to Peru’s and Colombia’s neighbours) but there is no temporal othering. The Parliamentary documents avoid any form of ‘direct othering’ while describing the problems it sees within the partners and the Diplomatic Delegation has a balance of connective and ‘disconnective othering’^5. There are rare (2%) occasions where the other is outside the agreement (mostly referring to Peru’s and Colombia’s neighbours) but there is no temporal othering. The Parliamentary documents avoid any form of ‘direct othering’ while describing the problems it sees within the partners and the Diplomatic Delegation has a balance of connective and ‘disconnective

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3. Graphic 3: sustainable development and environmental protection accumulated - for separate distribution see Graphic 4
4. Legend of the graph is explained in the Annex
5. Graphic legend is explained in the Annex

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othering’.\textsuperscript{6} This shows that ‘othering’ not semantically necessary and thus carries informational value. The commission uses the highest frequency of ‘disconnective othering’.

In graphic 7 the frequency of coded concepts is displayed. Cooperation and partnership with Peru and Columbia is, mentioned 96 times within the documents. Especially the trade agreement stands out as with 48 mentions it contributes to half of the cases.\textsuperscript{7} The Agreement itself with over 400 pages has the largest text body but is sparse in validating or opinionated statements. But even without the agreement is this the strongest line of argumentation. But it is a relatively weak validation of their qualities. The EU goes further in classifying them as ‘valuable’ and ‘constructive’ partners (7 times) and point out common values on 17 occasion. The common values are always directly related to the ‘essential elements’ but when talking about the value of the partnership economical reasons are referred to. It is a common strategy to use positive valuation and backtrack or devalue it with criticism, often linked with dissatisfaction over the current status. The Colombian government is described as “extremely open” towards human rights issues (De Gucht 2010), complementing its willingness to adapt the EU agenda while implicitly criticizing the current state. The ‘working on improvement’ argument can be found 30 times presenting the third strongest concept. Compliments for Peru’s current economic growth and ability to overcome economic crises as referred to in De Gucht 2012b are immediately devalued, complementing its ability to overcome crises while doubting its ability to face future crisis within the same paragraph. Further devaluation can be found in the terms developed and developing, encompassing the negative connotation of ‘backwardness’. The term is very common in international relations and politics. The parliament describes that Peru and Colombia are “still solving old problems” therefore further giving socioeconomic circumstances a temporal order (Committee on International Trade 2012, Parliament 2012).

Not only the values identified by the EU as lacking become dominant in the discourse but the conversation is further shifted to ‘their’ problems. Describing Peru and Columbia as problematic is a very common EU narrative (for example: De Gucht 2010/2012a; Van Rompuy 2012/2013; Parliament 2012). A related argument is awareness about the “problematic situation”: “Although all of this progress is impressive, the situation is not yet as it should be. Indeed, the Vice Presidents of both countries admitted as much […]” (De Gucht 2012a). The partners are devalued solidifying the EU standards by ‘admittance’. Labelling Columbia’s efforts as “still is far from satisfactory” (Committee 2012), the EU is literally judging Peru and Colombia, establishing the EU values as the base of judgment and morally higher. A judgmental stance becomes apparent and is repeated throughout the whole text body. Instances of clear judgment (4), are combined with strongly dismissive statements (3 times).

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
    \textbf{Codes/Concepts} & \textbf{Frequency} \\
\hline
    Economical Benefits for EU & 15 \\
    Policy support for Peru and Colombia & 10 \\
    Shared values & 7 \\
    Close Relationship/Cooperation/Partnership & 12 \\
    Judgemental statements & 20 \\
    Support for Peru and Colombia & 8 \\
    Considering partners’ opinion/interests & 5 \\
    Mutual benefits & 3 \\
    Equal parts and responsibilities & 2 \\
    They need EU & 4 \\
    Demands for EU & 6 \\
    Demands for Peru and Colombia & 8 \\
    Considering partners’ weaker position & 4 \\
    EU needs & 2 \\
    Peru and Colombian needs & 3 \\
    Benefit/Opportunities for Peru and Colombia & 1 \\
    EU influencing/enforcing change & 1 \\
    Brothacic foreign standards & 1 \\
    High EU standards & 2 \\
    Actions/Abilities of Peru & 1 \\
    Working on Improvement & 7 \\
    Peru and Colombia valued partner & 3 \\
    Strongly dismissive statements & 10 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Graph 7: Codes/Concepts}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{6} For ‘othering’ by documents see Table 5
\textsuperscript{7} Codes sorted by outlet see Table 3
There is a strong discrepancy in the way the country’s abilities and actions are described. The dominant talking point when reflecting EU behaviour is by its abilities and performance (23 times). Whereas Peru and Columbia are often described with a language of demands describing how they have to take actions (17 times). The speech of De Gucht (2012a) reflects how the EU is presented as the “maker”:

- We have actions promoting the reintegration into society of child soldiers and street children in Colombia.
- We are working to support the right to join and form trade unions - also in Colombia, and
- We have projects to support the implementation of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples in both Colombia and Peru. In total, we have already spent some 50 million euro in this area

Peru and Columbia in contrast are presented as the receiver of the EU’s charitable actions. De Gucht further argues that the contracting partners choose priorities within EU agenda, implying legitimacy of the intervention and for its role as a supporter. The partners are further described as the ones in need (7 times) affirmed by the fact that the EU needs are hardly mentioned (1 time). The need for support is extended to oversight: “But we all know that cooperation is not sufficient. It needs to be matched by appropriate international commitments” (De Gucht 2012a). Upon closer inspection, the aforementioned common values in solving problems are directed at solving Peru’s and Colombia’s problems. The EU creates a sense of concern for the people of Peru and Colombia and expresses on various occasions a wish to help (e.g. Committee on international trade 2012, Delegation 2010). The one time the EU’s problems are referenced (concerning the financial crises), emphasis is on the ability to solve its problems. Making an argument of solving the partner’s problems together while the EU can solve their own. With the overarching argument of a problematic situation and the EU’s ability to help, it is argued that the EU is needed, which is reflected in various statements (6 times). This alleged need is met with different strategies: economic aid (23 times) and policy support (27 times). But despite assuming cooperation, there is also a strong notion of pressure. In documents addressed between EU organs, pushing values against resistance and using the agreement as a tool for commitment is discussed (Committee on international Trade 2012; Parliament 2012; De Gucht 2012a/b). De Gucht shows that this is deliberate EU agenda:

“There is no obligation to prove that the problematic measures have an effect on trade. That means that we will be in a position to open arbitration procedures in a much wider scope of cases. This is far more consistent with the objectives and the rationale behind our trade and sustainable development chapters” (De Gucht 2012a).

With the trade agreement the EU achieves the legal ability to fight violations of its ethics as a breach of contract. This ethical intervention strategies are connected to acting in the partner’s best interest even if it means patronizing. The EU extends its aims beyond the borders of Peru and Columbia, stating that it hopes to improve the conditions for people in the whole region (De Gucht 2010), making regional integration literally an ‘EU project’ (Delegation 2012 and De Gucht 2012). Describing the EU as beneficial for everyone (De Gucht 2012b).

The EU further promotes a specific economic policy, a (social) free market as the driver for development. The EU describes the common goal of “combating protectionism” (De Gucht 2012b; Commission 2012). Competitiveness is assumed to promote innovation and therefore wealth (Commission 2012) and open economies to cause better government (De Gucht 2010). The EU describes its own model as successful and therefore it implies that economic westernisation will lead to improvement. Superiority of the EU system is expressed as foreign standards are labeled “burdensome”, “bothersome”, and “unnecessary” (Commission 2012; 2011a, De Gucht 2012b). The Commission and its representatives describe: “[...] the EU is highly competitive but disadvantaged by burdensome foreign standards or technical regulations” (Commission 2012). EU standards are
described as beneficial, complying with them would improve the quality of products (De Gucht 2012b) and improve the safety of citizen (Delegation 2010). Generally the focus on European ideas and procedures shows the EU’s belief in its ‘better’ economical system and expected adaptation. By giving transitional advantages development potential is optimised, in consideration of their weaker economy a “grazing” period is used (De Gucht 2012b) and “asymmetric trade deals tailored towards developmental needs” are formed (Commission 2016). Consequently the EU’s argumentation for its trade practices is heavily reliant on the superiority of European economical theory.

Further, the descriptions of benefits are categorised for this analyses. There are 27 occasions when it is stated that all parties would benefit mutually. Locking into the labelling of the individual benefits, for Peru and Colombia they can be classified as support in policies (for example: Barroso 2012 and Committee on International Trade 2012) as well as economical and financial gains, whereas the gains for the EU are purely described as economic (33 times), second strongest talking point. Noteworthy is a comparison to the US’ trade agreement showing financial and competitive interest: “I can also assure you that this compares favourably to the benefits obtained by the USA in their trade agreement” (De Gucht 2010). The benefits for Peru and Columbia are described as higher (Commission 2012/De Gucht 2012). Further mentioned: “The EU will help Peru, politically and financially, to tackle the growing challenge of production of illicit drugs and narco-trafficking, which directly affect also Europe” (Van Rompuy 2012). Stating that the EU can solve the problems created by Peru and Columbia for its own marked. Through an isolated statement it is a reinforcement of the partners as instigators of problems and The EU as solution bringer. The EU claims selflessness in its social help, willing to lead the way for a better future for everyone, as can be found in Article 225 §2 of the Trade agreement.

The EU institutions have shown to prioritise different concepts. The parliament emphasises the demands it has more strongly, whereas the diplomatic outlets put emphasis on shared values, mutual benefits and state consideration towards the partners more frequently. The Council frequently referred to cooperation and has generally similar emphasis as the Diplomatic Delegations. Both are the organs with strong diplomatic emphasis and the four documents were either addressed towards or reflections of diplomatic meetings. And as with the ‘direct othering’, the Commission uses the most negative language, frequently making condescending and judgmental statements, making the most cases of EU superiority. This has to especially be minded as it is drafting the agreement. Independent from the EU outlet, humanitarian values are an essential part of the discourse. The distribution of the values is equal within the sources as emphasis is put on the same ones.
4.III.2 Temporal Evaluation

Values and cultural identity tend to change slowly. Nevertheless, shifts can be seen throughout the discourse. Graphic 8\(^8\) below shows that ‘connective othering’ was the strongest within the signing periods, which is further reflected in many appeals to unity. On the other hand, ‘disconnective othering’ is on a constant decline. This might not be necessarily connected to growing identification with the partners but the nature of the documents. Documents after 2012 contain less speeches, which within the sources tend to show the most othering. The same could be the reason for the decline in ‘connective othering’ seen in the Graphic (8) below. Graphic 9 shows that the opposite is the case with the predominant values they tend to get less mentioned in the discourses main period. But considering the average of values in the three periods, it becomes clear that the focus shifts to other values.\(^9\) The strongest discrepancy is within the labour rights discussion, which shrinks from 2,3 mentions per doc. to 1,4 but rises to 4,8 per doc. after 2012. A similar trend can be seen with environmental protection. However considering the data of environmental protection and sustainable development combined (Graphic 9.2), a rhetoric shift becomes apparent from environmental protection to sustainable development and reversed in 2012. It stays equally relevant in every phase of the agreement. Temporal comparison of the arguments is not feasible, because of the uneven amount of documents and different nature of sources. The EU strongly states both partnership and superiority tends to focus on priorities and problems it has identified for its partners. Generally, they are described as partners but also as inferior. European norms are presented as universal, strengthened by the narrative that the partners agree with them. The EU is seen as the example in accomplishing the values and takes on a charitable quest to bring them to its partners. This act is seen as a responsibility to answer their need for help and take their weaker position into consideration even in economic decisions. Becoming more like Europe is a process of development and improvement. A similar argument is made for the economic theory and system. It is argued that submission to EU rules means economical and political benefits. Approximation to the European markets and integrating brings benefits and almost guarantee stability and development. Benefits for the EU but also an overall promotion of a better strategy for the region and worldwide economy. The EU describes an effort to shape the world in its image, but it is for its own good, using different strategies of norm diffusion.

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8. Because of the different number of sources within the three time intervals the numbers are based on a per document average. Numbers to be found in Table 6
9. 17 per doc. before 2012; 15 during 2012; and 17 per doc again for post 2012
4.IV Narrative Structure

The presentation of values builds a crucial part of the EU narrative. The priorities deviate from Manner description (2012, 242-243). A domination of EU driven agenda is shown by the shifting of the discourse towards the partners “problematic” values. Though the EU argues that the priorities are developed together (Van Rompuy 2013), the extensive promotion of environmental consciousness is hinting toward an EU led dialogue. As pointed out before, the EU implies the universality of its values by making them the cornerstone of development and base of judgment. Contrasting them with the work that has to be done by the partners and highlighting their insufficiency. That the Diplomatic Delegation describes them as one core to the partnership showcases that the values are assumed to be desired by the partnering countries. The unbalanced discourse leads to a FTA focused strongly on ‘their problems’. There is a strategic norm inclusion in the relation. The specific norms in focus and the way they are utilized suggest a postcolonial, condescending narrative.

In the discourse forms of ‘othering’ indicate how the EU assesses their partners. Generally there is a preference of inclusive and positive language suggesting an inclusive mindset as described by NPE (Manners 2000, 55). Emphasis is put on common values, partnership and other arguments to express the similarity of the partners. Cultural difference or ‘exoticisation’ are not expressed (Said 2009, 236-237). The differences are ignored and replaced by a developmental narrative, which presents the partners as pre-developed and ultimately a “lesser self”. It reflects Eurocentrism, the contracting countries are defined as an early stage of European development (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 12-13). According to Diez representing the ‘other’ as ‘different’ is the measure of least harm, as it does not legitimise a position of power and intervention (Diez 2005 628-9). In contrast, the EU fills the discourse and agreement, what it has identified as the shortcomings of the ‘other’. The ‘subject-object’ dialectic (Said 2009, 239) is maintained within negotiations where the ‘other’ is physically present. Peru and Columbia are presented as the receiver of the EU’s charitable actions showcasing a power discrepancy. Another form of this narrative is by describing leniency in not exploiting their weakness (FTA Art. 202,255 §2). Suggestions to solve ‘their problems’ together while the EU can solve its own extend the narrative of the helplessness and neediness. The EU uses massively forms of ‘othering’ which are harmful, i.e. the presentation as inferior and in violation of universal principles (Diez 2005, 628). Similarly to Saids ‘latent orientalism’ (2009, 236), the attitudes towards the ‘other’ stagnated, only the way it is addressed changed into an inclusive language.

After establishing that the EU sees Peru and Colombia as in need of its norms, the process of norm transference becomes relevant. One of the main arguments of NPE is that they are gently and voluntarily transferred (Manners 2008, 46,56). The treaty contains measure for the enforcement of values, but in result of joint negotiation and applied voluntarily. The trade power imbalance might introduce a unaccounted indirect power mechanism contradicting Manners assumptions. As all civil power theories agree, the EU defines itself as role model for ethical behaviour and good norms and tries to bring change through its policy and economical aid (Manners 2008, 56-58). The EU founded committees for policy aid are very similar to the “empowering others” concept by Manners (2008, 58), describing a long term goal to help the partners transitioning into a stronger stable government and economy. In some ways condescending the consideration towards the partners economical situation and abilities is used as a helping tool in transitioning (Manners 2008, 58). The transfer of norms is undisputed in both theories. The EU transfers its norms more similarly to NPEs model but uses some forms of pressure. It extends its role model function by enforcing the transfer of the economic system and regulations beyond the concept of universal ethics.

But only transferring norms does not necessarily constitute a ‘normative power’. Diez’s defines what stets colonial aspirations apart from normative diffusion, the quality of the norm and the reflexivity
towards ‘othering’ (Diez 2004, 320). Within the discourse there is a strong focus on European ideas and a lack of reflexivity. The EU assumes higher moral standards, not taking the differences in ethics or challenging ideas into consideration. European history becomes the standard and gives Europe a mission to civilize (Diez 2005, 629). The EU is given not only a pretext to intervene in other countries affairs but “In this, the European experience itself is brought into being as a specific one; an experience that leads from despair to having seen the light and is therefore pleasurable for EU Members.” (Diez 2005, 629). The EU in this narrative gets to see itself as the saviour and can convince itself to have stepped back from its past while repeating it to a certain degree. Going out of their way to ensure a responsible treatment in an effort to redeem themselves from an imperial past. But in the process it repeats patterns of Eurocentrism, as the other has to be depreciated to justify intervention. It can be concluded that the EU tries to implement ‘good norms’ in its trade policy as stated by NPE, but what is perceived as helpful is very selective and solely based on the European experience. It sees its responsibility in creating a level playing field, without questioning the game it has laid out.

But the motivation is not only altruistic. Within the postcolonial argumentation the sharing of norms is driven by a benefit motive. NPE only excludes direct gains through the inclusion of norms (Manners 2002, 253), and more stable trade partners are not seen as direct gain. The EU does gain from the agreement, as it hopes for increased trade and political relevance. This does not conflict with NPE, but fits the postcolonial narrative. The same can be said for the aid programs. “Much assistance, in the past and still today, has been of dubious value, a result of the predominance in some donor countries of commercial or political interests that have little or nothing to do with development” (Freres 2000, 67). The Colombian and Peruvian goods referenced are mostly raw materials and food, matching the European “Raw Materials Initiative” (2008), which is benefit driven. The EU describes export benefits by westernising industrial standards, showing a direct financial gain in transference is in conflict with NPE. In addition that no policy gains are referenced for the EU shows that a one-sided learning experience is assumed, implying that the EU can not learn from Peru’s and Colombia’s example in any aspect. Though the benefits described in the discourse do not contradict NPE’s assumptions, they affirm the benefit motive and assumption of superiority postcolonialism suggests. That NPE does not control for indirect economic benefits does not mean that they can not Be part of EU strategy. Since orchestrating the system of international economics is geopolitical and economically relevant.

In extension to the benefit motives of the EU, the intend is relevant. It sets apart colonial power with a moral facade from the power aiming at good norms. Within the discourse the EU states concern for Peru and Columbia. The EU invests resources into helping their partners in enforcement and to mitigate the weaker position. This supports Özer’s analyse: “The EU does not seem to follow first and foremost geopolitical interests. Instead, it binds itself to international norms and promotes values it believes in affairs, but also due to its civilising impacts” (2012, 89). But according to Zein-Elabdin the aggressive spreading of technical standards and a strong focus on economic benefits lays out an economic motivation. The generalisation of European economic theory is clearly coherent with Zein-Elabdin’s argumentation (2009:1156). One could evaluate foreign aid as a measure of political pressure but the trade power of the EU would most likely be enough to attract force partners to submit to the principals of the European market. Therefore the discourses strong fixation on norms is not sufficiently explained only by geopolitical interests. Nevertheless, the control the EU seeks in trade and labour is eerily similar to the one it had in late colonialism (Quijano 2000, 237). The mixed intentions can be elaborated further. The EU does not only represent itself as an institution but also its member states. Specific member state interests are not Discussed within the discourse but there are
mentions of protecting and prioritizing inner EU trade. The possible conflict of interest between development help and representing the member states are not addressed. Identities conflicting with the EU narrative are are “silenced” (Hall 1994, 74; 2005, 444). Postcolonial advocates see this as failure to see the EU’s lesser altruistic motivations (Aggestam 2008, 8) ignored in NPE. In this discourse inner conflicts and geopolitical interest are muddled with the idea of altruism. It is further unclear how much the reputational effect drives the seemingly good intentions. But the assumption of good intentions can not be extended to economic regime building.

Many of the concepts do not stand in conflict with NPE, however strongly fall in line with postcolonialism. The focus of the discourse on their problems, a language of shortcomings (Conrad and Randeria 2002, 12) or the need of salvation (Said 2009, 236-7) can be directly related to postcolonialism. But generally both motives are found in the discourse. It can not be definitively determined whether postcolonial or NPE theories describe the EU identity mechanisms more accurately. The analysis has shown that assumptions of EU actions lack exclusiveness, and can often be interpreted in favour of either theory. It can be concluded that both motives are present. Meta-theoretical reflection is needed to distinguish both theories as they describe similar processes but evaluate them differently. As a provisional result, the majority of argumentations reflect either completely or partly postcolonial indicators.

4.V Meta Theoretical Reflection

The interpretative tools provided by the theories are products of their own assumptions and can therefore be examined on this foundation. Through at first glance both theories look like opposing standpoints, they actually claim a different relation. NPE sees postcolonialism as accurate for the past but no longer valid, whereas postcolonialists claim that the conclusions drawn in NPE are inaccurate deductions of the same findings. Before evaluating which is the more influential theory, the crossovers have to be considered. Though both theories see the influence the EU exercises differently, with closer inspection it becomes evident that the constructed image of the EU is similar. The EU distances itself by “othering” (temporal or geographical) and claims a superior position. In NPE approaches the EU takes a superior position in the discourse over norms, while postcolonial theories describe a falsely claim of more general superiority. Both relate back to the debate over universality of EU norms, as it is the source of legitimation in NPE and also one of its biggest criticisms. This leaves the question, can the claim to be morally superior be evaluated distinctively from imperialistic patterns? The universality of norms is a meta-ethical discourse. Works such as Hutchings (1999) exclusively prescribe themselves to the question of international ethics in politics. Kant is seen as one of the founders of universal ethics, but what exactly these universal values contain is controversial. Postcolonialists are in the tradition of theories over the dependency of ethics on socio-economics and culture, like Marx, Engels, or Nietzsche (Conrad 2002, 12). It can not be factually determined whether ethics are universal. Both theories base their assumptions on polar opposite philosophies, which leads to a different interpretation of the same observations. But the EU value code is very specific and there lies a problem within its existence above cultural differences. Dominant values in this discourse concerning labour rights and sustainable development but especially the EU’s interpretation of those are influenced by western ethics. Aggestam even claims that the UDHR and ECHR are created by western institutions and dominated by western nations, and impose westernisation regardless of the quality of the norms (Aggestam 2008, 3). Problematic is further that the European system of economics is generalised and to a certain degree moralised. Universal ethics and assumption of

10. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948) and the European Convention on Human Rights (entered into force on 21 September 1970 by the EU)
moral superiority are part of NPE, but the extension to economic mechanisms is an unjustifiable measure. It proves the postcolonial argument, to claim unrightful hierarchy. The strong Eurocentrism within this discourse shows that the EU believes in the western model as the only successful development. It describes the EU as an actor predisposed for ethical behaviour (Manners 2004, 242), showing that NPE builds on the idea of EU exceptionalism. The generalisation of EU norms as base of structural legitimation, leading to unquestionable power structures.

The role of ‘othering’ in identity building is significant in both theories. The narration clearly favours a postcolonial interpretation of the discourse since the forms of ‘othering’ are strongly dismissive, with little reflexivity. But since it is part of identity construction, how far can ‘othering’ be avoided. Additionally, ‘temporal othering’ is a newer hypothesis, and has therefore not been studied much. ‘Othering’ based on values may be necessary for finding identity within changing borders and members. The observation, “Speeches on EU enlargement frequently convey this message: ‘fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe’” (Aggestam 2008, 7), might, though expressed as criticism, be a mechanism to come to term with a problem. The EU is trying to construct an identity beyond geographical borders or cultural components, in need of a stable source of identity, with universal claim to be inclusive for potential enlargement. The lack of ‘temporal othering’ does not mean that the EU's current identity has not been constructed as a rejection of imperialism (Bretherton and Vogler 2005, 51), or psychological speaking a ‘negative-identity’ (Tiedemann 2007, 82). This form of identity building is often a mechanism to cope with shame but does not necessarily mean a change in action. It can reflect a repression. Much speaks for the EU rejecting its past but repeating it at the same time. The development within a violent climate (Europe’s past and international politics) leads to a repetition of the strategies learned to be successful partly in an effort to fill them with good intentions. And both theories do not offer viable alternatives to ‘othering’ for identification without repeating imperialistic patterns.

Additionally there are general problems in the theories' descriptions of norm transference. Both treat the identity of the EU as a collective cultural identity. But within cultural identity theories it is a given assumption that models, which are perceived as successful, are copied and extrapolated within one culture (Trompenaars 1998, 20,21,157). Therefore the EU trying to transfer its norms according to its own example might be a natural process. Further, normative diffusion is described as an effort to spread norms, even intentionally against residents. This is a flawed idea. Universal norms would preserve across culture. ‘Overt’ and ‘cultural’ diffusion would transfer these norms without intent, as they are universally desired Manners (2002, 244-46). Lastly both are not conclusive in their idea of norm transference. The postcolonial idea that norm transfer is always imperialistic or a consequence of perceived superiority is partly questionable, considering cultural study theories. Furthermore, NPE’s arguments for universal values are undermined by the need to spread them.

It is necessary to examine how outside actors in the discourse reflect on norm implementation. What is most commonly criticised is not the universalisation of norms or aggressive transference, but not being persistent enough. Especially NGOs from Europe and Latin America encourage the EU to take stricter action and rely more on sanctions (EurActiv 2012, ETCU 2012, One Europe 2013, Abad and Lopez 2012, Enlazando Alternativas i.a. 2009). Within the westernisation of science, NGOs are likely westernised as well. But nevertheless NGOs are traditionally seen as moral compasses within the discourses. And the EU is encouraged push its values onto others, if it wants to establish itself as a moral actor. Though only Human rights, which are not widely seen as a tool of cultural imperialism. The economical transfer argument is much harder to be made. This is reflected by the other parties within the discourse, the transfer of the European economical system and values is often seen as intrusive and potentially harmful (Olivet and Novo 2011, Enlazando Alternativas i.a. 2009). Economic
outlets are generally more positive about the agreement (EurActiv, 2012). This comes to show that the EU is mostly encouraged in its value approach. Establishing trade agreements based on ethics becomes a reputational factor, which puts the EU in a dilemma, since it has to take a stance. The public judgment is an inevitably, which leads to an incorporation of humanitarian norms. Independent of imperialistic or altruistic motives, the norms perceived as subjectively beneficial will be transferred, but the degree of reflexivity in norms and transfer is crucial and that has shown to be minimal. The evaluation shows that NPE assumes unrealistic standards, expecting the EU to overlook inner power dynamics, conflicts of interest and disregarding cultural biases. NPE describes an ideal motivation from an European perspective. Postcolonial theories however vilify the motivation of EU, as a wish to dominate at the cost of others, disregarding its motivation to retribute for its past and historical disadvantages. The arguments of postcolonial theories are reflected within the discourse, but the coherency of postcolonial theories is questionable as well. As they trace generalisation, norm transfer, and “self centrism” back to European imperialism past of Europe, seldom controlling them in other contexts. There is little regard given to the viability of alternative construction of identities, leaving unclear if those mechanisms are inherently postcolonial. Colonialism has shaped our world beyond the directly involved parties and the mechanisms exceed their European iteration therefore testing the theory outside of a colonial context, is difficult. Despite describing generalisation of European values and trade politics accurately, they fall short, as they give little viable alternatives for constructing identity in a less harmful way. As expected the discourse is binarily influenced to varying degrees. Within sub-discourses it can be proven that postcolonial patterns dominate over ones presented by NPE. But EU identity has proven to be more complex than both theories suggest. The economic ethics proved to be strongly postcolonial. Though postcolonialism describes the same processes as NPE, the research has shown that the discourse extends the motivations given by postcolonial theories and NPE aspects have influenced the construction of EU identity. Despite being the dominant theory in this discourse, the overarching argumentation of NPE can not be proven, as the causation by European imperialism is not sufficiently documented, and alternative explanation are in some aspects likely. Furthermore, the premise of postcolonial theories can not be entirely validated, as the EU has shown that its values can not be reduced to a mere dominance strategy. There is a strong western bias in Manners theory, in the lack of reflexivity towards the validity of western norms and therefore the legitimation of norm transfer, showing a repetition of imperialistic measures. But within the construction of identity intentions matter especially within the value policy, there is a continuity within the discourse, suggesting at least mixed intentions by the EU.
5. Conclusion

As established before, the weak representation of NPE might not be entirely caused by imperialistic mechanisms or actions of the EU but a flawed NPE theory by Manners. The causality established leads to the affirmation of almost any EU action, achieved by omitting challenging mechanisms. This leads to a strongly biased theory with a lack of reflexivity and a distorted picture of the EU. The Western bias can further be understood when comparing the authors of both theories. NPE is mostly constructed by Western and specifically European scientists, whereas the authors of postcolonial theories come from a wider range of backgrounds. The Western bias among cultural science might cause the reinforcement of stereotypes and validating NPE ideas upon the bias they were created with. It leads to an additional overestimated validity of NPE. This causes a weak explanatory value for Manners’ NPE as a whole but some verifiable assumptions over the embedding of core values and EU motivations. Diez effort to introduce mixed intentions and the necessity of othering into Manners theory has proven to be a valuable base to describe the EU. His work is focused on differentiating ideologies, mechanisms and their consequences. Further, the introduction of utilitarianism to the usage of norms, as a judgment by results, shifts the focus to the partners instead of EU ideology. Diez’ mitigating work (2004, 2005) tries to give benchmarks for responsible power usage, causing least harm without denial of self interest and acknowledgement of mixed intentions. As shown, it can be widely used to analyse the normativity of EU discourse, but his assumptions about EU behaviour suggest a stronger dissociation from imperialistic patterns than this discourse has depicted.

The theories of Conrad/Randerias and Chakrabarty show the greatest congruity with this research. The developmental tale and connected stereotypes are almost entirely reflected (Conrad and Randerias 2002, 12-3), beyond the aforementioned possibility of imperialistic independent mechanisms. Further, the principles Said describes regarding the West’s description of the Orient could mostly be found when describing Latin America as well. Besides the “exoticisation” (Said 2009, 236-237), the stereotypes match flawlessly despite addressing another culture. The classification of stereotypes can be seen in the continuation of “latent stereotypes” within the changed “manifest” tone emphasizing partnership (Said 2009, 236). Other principles of identity construction introduced by postcolonialists, such as the ‘silence within identity’ (Hall 1994, 74; 2005, 444), are representative of this discourse. Bhabha’s description of multiculturalism however finds little reflection, as the narrative of intrinsic differences is overshadowed by the idea of an evolutionary difference (2006, 1155). It is crucial to consider that the theories of Said and Bhabha are not describing the EU and therefore should not be held to the same standards as Manners when it comes to explanatory value.

The postcolonial theories achieve more accuracy applied to the EU context. But this is partly achieved by omission of key component of the discourse. Where Manner tries to distort EU actions and motivations to fit his theory, postcolonial theories touch little on the aspects not submittable to their theoretical framework. This becomes especially clear with the works of Zein-Elabdin (2009) and Özer (2012), both describe EU trade and both simplify its motivation in different directions. Özer’s argumentation is reflected in regards to some aspects of normative behaviour within this discourse, however is aimed to explain all trade relationships. Zein-Elabdin on the other hand is very accurate in the postcolonial analyses of economical trade regime transfer but touches little on deviating motivations of norm transfer. Both are not giving a complete model of the mixed intentions, in assuming superiority, caused by a variety of historical developments and the surrounding international community. This work should be seen as a small contribution to this discourse that tries to test and at times prove the theories, hoping to help in developing this field of studies further.
Every research can only be as valid as its methodology. One can never analyse the entirety of one discourse. Making a clean cut and blending out overlapping discourses always means to distort it in some way, necessary but not beneficial for the validity of the result. The representable selection of sources while maintaining a controllable number for the discourse is critical. Evaluation of the relevance of documents is used to minimize this risk. To retrieve the consequential loss of information context study is used. The numeric results with a data pool of 20 documents unevenly subdivided into three intervals of uneven length, makes valid conclusions over temporal development unreliable. Small sample sizes are an overarching problem within quantitative research, which mainly effects external validity. Defining the documents into three epochs intensifies the problem, as the data gets thinner for every interval. This leads to an external and internal validity problem weakening the abilities to make valid conclusions and generalisations. For this reason the temporal analysis was given little focus. Further research over a longer time with more documents would be needed to establish the changes of identification and identity caused by the agreement.

A further source of limitation in this work is subjectivity. By using open coding, categories can be found and interpreted. The analysis wraps around the sources and equips one with exactly the tools to find hidden implications. This method comes with an interpretational error margin and the risk of overinterpretation. The subjectivity in measurements increases and can lead to a biased research. This work tries to mitigate the risks, by controlling the results and, with the theories and additional literature. In the attempt to achieve a critical balance between validating the findings by the theories and not letting them dictate the findings. Despite the attempt to take this bias into consideration, one has to acknowledge that no one researching culture and identity is ever free of their own cultural preconceptions. Reproducing ‘Eurocentrism’ is a concern given the influential standing of European science. The presented view on the discourse specifically concentrates on how the EU presents its own identity and therefore blending out how others construct their identity. This leads to the question of causality of imperialistic patterns in modern identity construction, which was raised several times. Since experimental exposure is not realizable in cultural and historical developments, establishing causality becomes almost impossible. But researching postcolonial theories in cross culture comparison can help to identify how much of the arguments are founded in the colonial past. This might be an insightful approach for further research, would however exceed the limits of this work.

Generally, there is much potential in researching EU identity, as it is a complex topic with relevance in international policy and many fields of appliances. This work is only a small part of a much larger field of constantly redefined identity. Therefore, it is critical to keep studying and evaluate these and other works for its methods, findings, and how they hold up over time. As cultures and identities develop cultural studies have to develop along them and remain critical of past findings and methods, as they might lose their validity (Hall 1980 p.69). Within its limitations, this work hopes to show how the EU constructs identity. Looking into other discourses and other actors might generate entirely different conclusions. One might see different balances between the relevance of the theories, aspirations for power, or humanitarian affords.
II. Literature


Aggestam, Lisbeth (2008). Ethical power Europe?. International Affairs 84: 1, Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1-11


Biscop, Sven and Coolsaet, Rik (2003). Core group, directoire, enhanced cooperation? Finding the key to an effective foreign and defence policy for Europe. Studia Diplomatica 55. 3, Brussel: Egmont


European Parliament (2012). MEPs want human rights pledge before backing trade with Peru and Colombia
### III. Annex

#### III.1 Tables

**Table 1:** Indicators; own illustration p. 7  
**Table 2:** EU Sample Sources; own illustration

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Table 3: Patterns and Concepts phenomenons numeric chart sorted by Outlet; own illustration

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Table 4: Terms of Othering; own illustration

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Table 5: Othering by Document; own illustration

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Average Othering per Document by time intervals; own illustration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Interval</th>
<th>Disconnective</th>
<th>Connective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2012</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 212</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.2 Graphics

**Graph 1:** Timeline of Sources; own illustration p. 8
**Graph 2:** Research Steps; own illustration p. 10
**Graph 3:** Values; own illustration p. 14
**Graph 4:** Values, separate calculation of sustainable development and environmental protection; own illustration:

- Environmental Protection
- Labour Rights
- Good Governance
- Sustainable Development
- Anti Discrimination
- Social Solidarity
- Rule of Law
- Human Rights
- Democracy
- Liberty
- Peace

**Graph 5:** Othering by Terms; own illustration p. 14
**Graph 6:** Connective and Disconnective forms of Othering; own illustration p. 14
- Connective 'we': Positive statements (forms of "we") including Peru and Colombia
- Connective 'they': Negative statements (forms of "they") targeted towards agreement outsiders
- Disconnective 'we': Positive statements (forms of "we") excluding Peru and Colombia
- Disconnective 'they': Negative statements (forms of "they") targeted towards Peru and Colombia

**Graph 7:** Codes/Concepts; own illustration p. 15
**Graph 8:** Connective and Disconnective Othering by Time Interval; own illustration p. 18
**Graph 9:** Main Values by time interval; own illustration p. 18
**Graph 9.2:** Main Values by time interval, separate calculation of sustainable development and environmental protection; own illustration: