Poland and the EU: From Poster Child of European Integration to Enfant Terrible?

by

Nabila Lalee
s0194921

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, program European Studies, University of Twente

2019

Supervisors:
Dr. Martin Rosema, Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social sciences
Dr. Veronica Junjan, Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social sciences

Date: 21.03.2019
# Table of Content

1. Introduction .......................... 5  
1.1. Problem Background ............... 5  
1.2. Research Question .................. 6  
1.3. Relevance of the Polish case for research and society ......... 7  
2. Theory ................................ 8  
2.1. The evolvement of Euroscepticism ...... 8  
2.2. Dimensions of Euroscepticism ......... 9  
2.3. Causes of Euroscepticism .......... 10  
2.4. Euroscepticism at the elite- and the mass-level .......... 13  
2.5. Euroscepticism in the new member states ............. 14  
2.6. Youth Euroscepticism .............. 15  
2.7. Theoretical framework ............. 16  
3. Methodology .......................... 17  
3.1. Research Design and Strategy ...... 17  
3.2. Operationalization ................. 18  
4. Analysis ................................ 22  
4.1. Background on the relationship between Poland and the EU ...... 22  
4.1.1. Changes associated with EU membership .......... 22  
4.1.2. Actors shaping the relationship between Poland and the EU .... 24  
4.1.3. Poland’s relationship to other countries .............. 25  
4.1.4. Summary of the background on the relationship between Poland and the EU 26  
4.2. Poland’s relationship towards the EU throughout the years .... 26  
4.2.2. Crisis (2007-2012) ............... 28  
4.2.3. Euroscepticism entering Polish parliament (2015) ...... 29  
4.2.4. Poland after the Election (2015-2018) .......... 30  
4.2.5. Summary of the Poland-EU relationship throughout the years .... 32  
5. Results ................................ 33  
5.1. Euroscepticism in the general population ............. 33  
5.2. Euroscepticism in the youth population .......... 40  
6. Conclusion ............................ 40  
6.1. Discussion of Results ............... 41  
6.2. Limitations and incentives for future research ......... 42
List of Figures

Figure 1.: Patterns of Euroscepticism

Figure 2.1.: Relation between the independent variable “year” and the dependent variable Integration Euroscepticism

Figure 2.2.: Relation between the independent variable “year” and the dependent variable Affective Euroscepticism

Figure 3.1.: Difference between the Institutional Dimension and the Affective Dimension in 2005

Figure 3.2.: Difference between the Institutional Dimension and the Affective Dimension in 2010

Figure 3.3.: Difference between the Institutional Dimension and the Affective Dimension in 2015

Figure 3.4.: Difference between the Institutional Dimension and the Affective Dimension in 2018

Figure 4.: Difference between the Youth and the General Population (Year 2018)

List of Abbreviations

ANOVA       One-way analysis of variance
CEEC        Central and Eastern European Countries
CSDP        Common Security and Defense Policy
df          Degrees of freedom
EaP         Eastern Partnership initiative
EB          Eurobaromenter
EU          European Union
LPR         Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish family)
MW  Młodzież Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth)
N  Number of observations
NOP  Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland)
ONR  Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (National-Radical Camp)
PiS  Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
p  probability
PO  Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
\( \chi^2 \)  Chi-square
Abstract

Poland joined the European Union in 2004, the year of the Union’s great enlargement. Ever since, Poland’s attitude towards the EU is shaped by new opportunities but also new challenges associated with EU membership. International media claims the change of Polish government in 2015 to mark a throwback for the relationship between Poland and Brussels. The latest developments in Poland are discussed in the context of a broader emerging Euroscepticism across Europe. The aim of this study is to examine how the nature and level of Polish Euroscepticism changed over time and in how far demographic characteristics as age influence attitudes towards the EU. Based on the reflection of existing theories on EU-attitudes, three dimensions of Euroscepticism are identified. Attitudes of the wider Polish population are investigated through statistical measures, based on empirical data of the Eurobarometer surveys between the years 2004 and 2018. Additionally, the analysis of this study examines Polish Euroscepticism and its development over time by reflection of media and scientific literature. The analysis indicates a shift towards eurosceptic ideas on the political level since 2015, based on concrete actions taken by the Polish government. However, statistical measures could not reveal a rise of eurosceptic attitudes in the wider Polish population. Furthermore, a significant difference in attitudes for the youth population in comparison to the general population could not be found.

*Keywords: Euroscepticism, Poland, PiS, Nationalism, Eurobarometer, Youth*
1. Introduction

1.1. Problem Background

When in October 2015, the Polish people elected their government, the outcome has divided the country and raised concern beyond Polish borders (Kellermann, 2017). The election of the national-conservative and eurosceptic party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), Polish for Law and Justice, led to a change in the country’s political and cultural landscape – such as the censorship of media or the separation of powers. As a reaction to these changes the opposition organized big demonstrations against the new government and concerns were raised regarding Polish democracy. Furthermore, the election reflected the rise of eurosceptic ideas in Polish society. The great winner of the EU among Europe’s post-communist countries has seemingly turned its back from the idea of unity among European countries and heads towards a nationalist, isolated future.

The rise and actions of the PiS have resulted in harsh criticism coming from western media and institutions, which have described the PiS’ limitation of civil liberties, the control of media and the weakening of the highest court’s political independence as undemocratic. The PiS on its side condemns European values, such as secularism and multiculturalism as not matching with Polish interests. The main issue touched upon in the eurocritical debate by the PiS is the fear of losing national sovereignty. While the PiS has not stated any interest to leave the EU, the party’s head Kaczyński expressed interests to diminish the influence of the institution over its member states by proposing that “the EU should re-examine consensual decision-making processes and broaden the spectrum of issues on which unanimity was needed” (Pawlak, 2016, para. 14). Another striking feature of the country’s shift towards EU-scepticism is the huge number of young Poles leaning towards this idea (Zdrazalek, 2016). According to the documentary Polen geht rückwärts by Zdrazalek (2016), 60 percent of young adults in the country voted for a eurosceptic or even openly xenophobic party. This is especially surprising since the Polish youth grew up with the EU and are believed to be most influenced by it (Fomina, 2017). Furthermore, if young people in Poland are indeed significantly more eurosceptic than their older countrymen, this a worrying generation change for the EU. However, while Euroscepticism is claimed to be on the rise in Poland, other figures indicate that the EU still receives general support among the population. According to Pawlak (2016) a survey in February 2016 revealed that 81 percent of the Poles want to remain in the European Union.

The developments in Poland are often discussed in the context of a broader emerging Euroscepticism throughout whole Europe. Euroscepticism is publicly debated as a reaction to European integration. Euroscepticism is believed to pose a threat to pose a threat towards further European integration (De Vries, 2018), at the same time it is argued that Euroscepticism became a relevant issue after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and the deepening of the integration process following this treaty Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug, Kuhn, 2013; Hooghe &
The Brexit referendum in 2016 is an example of a concrete outcome of this debate, which highlights the importance of this topic. The election of the PiS in Poland seems another example of a rising Euroscepticism that reflects in domestic politics of the member states. According to De Vries (2018), parties holding a eurosceptic stand gained support in regional and national elections in the last years. However, the relationship between Euroscepticism on the political level and the public mass level remains unclear, also in the case of Poland. The changing political landscape in many member states indicates that European integration cannot be pushed without public support and shows that Euroscepticism signifies a serious threat for the European Union. Trying to identify causes of Euroscepticism, scholars also discuss differences between member states of the west and the new member states. The historical legacy of Central and Eastern Europe and the way it influences European integration in these countries are important topics in the discussion of Euroscepticism in the new member states.

1.2. Research Question

The strong support for eurosceptic parties like the PiS on the one hand and the appreciation of membership on the other hand raises many questions concerning Polish attitudes towards the EU and the exact nature of Polish Euroscepticism. Speaking about the emerging of Euroscepticism in Poland raises the question, what Euroscepticism as a concept contains and how it can be measured. Uncertainties also remain regarding the role of the Polish youth in the perceived shift to the right of the country. This results in following research question: How has Euroscepticism in Poland developed since the great enlargement? The sub-questions I want to examine in order to get a better understanding of the development of Polish Euroscepticism are the following:

1. What are the characteristics of Polish Euroscepticism?
2. How have attitudes towards the EU developed in Poland since 2004?
3. To what extent are there events during this period that show drastic changes in attitudes towards the EU?
4. In how far do attitudes of the youth differ in comparison to the attitudes of the general Polish population?

Before addressing the question of Polish Euroscepticism and its development throughout years, the term Euroscepticism will be explained in the theoretical part of this chapter. Different theories on the meaning of this concept will be compared, next to theories about determining factors and how researchers evaluate the term in the context of differences between new and old member states. The reflection of scientific research on the concept of Euroscepticism will form the basis for the theoretical model constructed in this research in order to examine EU-attitudes in Poland. A reflection on the Polish case in the context of Euroscepticism will be given in the analysis part of this study.
1.3. Relevance of the Polish case for research and society

The developments in Poland show many parallels to Hungary, with both current governments often referred to “illiberal democracies” (Erlanger & Santora, 2018, para. 5). In the years before accession, Poland showed one of the highest levels of public support among the prospective member states (Fomina, 2017). However, as Fomina (2017) points out, public opinion was not shaped by an extended debate about potential cost and benefits that come with EU membership. Rather, EU accession was embraced for symbolic meanings, somewhat connected to historical terms such as the end of the east-west division and a return to Europe. It is noteworthy, that the possibility of accession was faced with mixed associations from the very beginning (Góra & Mach, 2010). On the one hand, the EU was linked to concepts such as enlightenment, human rights, individualism and liberalism. On the other hand, other voices in Poland claimed that membership only makes sense as long it is based on a Catholic or at least christian identity (Góra & Mach, 2010). The latter attitude goes in line with the self-perception of Poland being both the defender of a christian Europe and to be a country “ever suffering for the good of Western European nation” (Fomina 2017, p. 145; Góra & Mach, 2010).

Despite this dilemma described above, for many years, Poland stood out as a success story in the transition from a communist country to a democratic and economically aspiring member state. Poland remained largely unaffected from the Eurozone crisis, still the crisis shaped Polish attitudes towards adopting the common currency. The adoption of the common currency was increasingly linked with the fear to lose sovereignty over its own money (Fomina, 2017). Today, the Polish case stands out as a threat to democracy and the legal order of the EU (Buras & Knaus, 2018). This is also because no other EU-member ever undermined the neutrality of courts (Buras & Knaus, 2018). As stated by Buras and Knaus (2018, p. 2): “The Polish case is a test whether it is possible to create a Soviet-style justice system in an EU member state; a system where the control of courts, prosecutors and judges lies with the executive and a single party.” In the clash between old and new member states, Poland is believed to play a key role due to its size, military power and geostrategical importance (Erlanger & Santora, 2018). If the relationship between Poland and the EU continues to be troublesome, it raises the question in how far this influences the relationship between Brussels and member states further to the east. Examining the influence of the Polish case on other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) goes beyond the limitations of this study. Anyhow, it can be concluded that Poland can be studied as an important factor in the discussion of Euroscepticism, both as a part of the CEEC and a country of its own. The developments in Poland and Hungary, bring up the question, in how far historical and cultural differences between member states can be overcome for a successful cooperation. The growing gap between the old member states and the new member states of Eastern and Central Europe challenge the cohesion and survival of the European Union,
since the dispute revolves around central issues such as identity, history, values, religion and interpretations of democracy and solidarity.

2. Theory

2.1. The evolvement of Euroscepticism

Prior to addressing the scientific discussion about the meaning of the concept Euroscepticism, it is important to understand the term in its historical context and to highlight its relevance in the actual debate of challenges faced by the EU. The term *Euroscepticism* for the first time appeared in 1985 in the British newspaper *The Times*, in an article describing sceptic opposition towards the European Union and its policies in that time (Ultan & Ornek, 2015). As described by Ultan and Ornek (2015) the *Bruges Speech* held by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in September 1988 is one of the first examples regarding this aspect of Euroscepticism. In her speech, Thatcher stated her opposition to the supranational sovereignty of the European Union, fearing the limitation of power of the national government (Thatcher, 1988). Elaborating on the literature on Euroscepticism, there seems to be a rise of eurosceptic attitudes in the years following the treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992 (Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug, Kuhn, 2013; Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). To this day, the treaty of Maastricht is considered a milestone for European integration, expanding cooperation to many areas such as the foreign and monetary policy, thereby relocating competencies from the national to the supranational level (European Central Bank, 2017). However, this also evoked people’s concerns regarding the consequences of further integration for national identity, social policies and living standards (Hakhverdian et al., 2013). While opposition to the EU system focused on market integration in the decades before, it had extented to aspects of national community (Hooghe & Marks, 2007).

Despite existing opposition to the EU system, Euroscepticism has been treated as a marginal phenomena in the 1990s. The topic entered the main stage of European debate in the course of 2000s and became a major issue around the time of the Eurozone crisis (Vasilopoulou, 2013). According to Hartleb (2012), the situation in Greece and other EU countries affected by the financial crisis and re-introduced passport controls seen in Denmark indicate a threat to two major achievements of the European Union: the single currency and the Schengen agreement. Moreover, Hartleb (2012) states that dissatisfaction with the EU can be observed among various social classes in member states and spreads among people via street protests. The rise of anti-EU sentiments is also observed by Torreblanca and Leonard (2013, p. 1) stating that: „Euroscepticism has [...] spread across the continent like a virus“. In the European Parliament elections in 2014, many eurosceptic parties gained voters, not only in crisis-stricken countries such as Greece but also in countries that were not impacted by the Eurozone crisis in the same
way (Vasilopoulou, 2017). This led to the highest share of votes for eurosceptic parties in the history of the European Union (De Vries, 2018).

The year 2016 was marked with another throwback for Brussels, when Britain voted for leaving the EU, in a nation-wide referendum that became famous as the Brexit. Although the British public in comparison always showed a stronger tendency towards Euroscepticism, the strong support for eurosceptic parties in the 2014 elections raises the question whether the Brexit might be an indication for “a larger process of a revolt against Brussels” (De Vries, 2018, p. 4). The rise of eurosceptic parties highlighted the importance of public opinion for the ongoing process of European integration. Unlike the past, where integration could be pushed by political elites with little to no regard for public opinion, the future of the European Union seems now challenged by the lack of public support (Hooghe & Marks, 2007).

2.2. Dimensions of Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is roughly understood as the loss of support to the European Union and the supranational government in Brussels. Discussing public opinions on the EU has led scholars to create different dimensions of Euroscepticism. These dimensions serve to capture the various ways Euroscepticism can express itself given the complex nature of EU integration. Kopecky and Mudde (2002, pp. 299-300) refer to two definitions of Paul Taggart which are often found in contemporary literature dealing with Euroscepticism. According to Taggart's initial definition, Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). Taggart refined this definition later by including the categories of soft and hard Euroscepticism: Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU; soft Euroscepticism, in contrast, “involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 6). However, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) still see deficits in the later version. Accordingly, soft Euroscepticism is defined so broadly that every disagreement with any policy decision could fall into the category of soft Euroscepticism. As a result to this, Euroscepticism can be assigned to parties that are outright against the EU but also parties that are in their core still supporting the idea of the EU, possibly leading to both an under- and overestimation of the phenomena. In order to avoid this problem, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) offer a new definition of the term Euroscepticism, by introducing the terms diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support relates to support for the general idea of European integration, while specific support relates to support of how European integration is implemented.

In addition, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) introduce two dimensions for studying the degree of support or scepticism regarding EU integration. The first dimension distinguishes Europhobes...
from Europhiles. Europhiles in their essence believe in the idea of European integration, regardless of how European integration is put into practice. Europhobes on the other hand do not support the idea of European integration which underlies the EU. Europhobes may still be in favour of cooperation between European states but they do not embrace the idea underlying European integration. Thus, Europhobes reject the EU in its core essence. The second dimension introduced by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) is the one that separates EU-optimists from EU-pessimists. EU-optimists believe in the EU because they are either satisfied with its status quo or they believe in the direction it is running. EU-pessimists in contrast do not support the EU as it currently is or are not satisfied with how it develops. EU-pessimists can be in favour of EU-membership but also in this case believe the EU at its current status to be a bad implementation of its original ideas.

Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) describe instrumental and political Euroscepticism as two underlying dimensions both connected to one superordinate concept of Euroscepticism. The instrumental dimension refers to perceived benefits of EU-membership, while the political dimension is used to evaluate people’s attitudes towards national versus supranational governance. Easton (1975) adds another aspect to Euroscepticism, describing a more emotional-based relation to the EU. This aspect is called diffuse support, relating to a general evaluation of what the EU represents. In contrast to that stands the notion of specific support, relating to how the EU acts, hence to concrete policy outcomes. The more emotional relationship towards the EU grasped by the concept of diffuse support is also mentioned by Boomgaarden et al. (2010), reviewing the work of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and thereby mentioning the concepts of utilitarian and affective Euroscepticism. While the first concerns the functioning of the EU, the latter one relates to emotional responses, identity-related factors and perceived threat to the nation.

2.3. Causes of Euroscepticism

Complexity also shows in the discussion of different causes for Euroscepticism. Hartleb (2012) and Sitter (2002) for example name nationalism an important driving factor behind eurosceptic attitudes, based on the fear of losing democracy and/or national sovereignty. Sitter (2002) discusses both soft and hard Euroscepticism as a political tool to protest against the agenda of mainstream parties. Euroscepticism as a political tool can be used at a tactical and a strategic level (Sitter, 2002). On the tactical level, opposition parties integrate criticism about the way mainstream parties approach EU politics to their general method of protest against the establishment. On the strategic level, several parties have found that many main issues they touch range on a European level rather than simply on a national level, such as issues about economic regulation, anti-NATO positions or opposition to immigration.
Lubbers (2008) offers three approaches in order to explain which factors shape people’s evaluations of the European project: the threatened identity approach, the utilitarian approach and the political approach. The threatened identity approach to Euroscepticism contains feelings of national identity and the perceived threat to national culture. Accordingly, Euroscepticism is linked to “preservation of national integrity or fear of foreign influences” (Lubbers, 2008, p. 62) as well as to strong tendencies towards anti-immigration attitudes. The threatened identity approach as a cause of Euroscepticism is somewhat related to the concepts of diffuse support (Easton, 1975) and affective Euroscepticism (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970), since both concepts offer an approach towards Euroscepticism based on emotions. The utilitarian approach is linked to perceived costs and benefits of EU membership, especially in economic terms. The utilitarian approach as a cause is comparable to the instrumental dimension of Euroscepticism (Easton, 1975) or to the dimension of specific support (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970), all describing an attitude towards the EU that is influenced by perceived benefits of membership. The political approach draws a connection between education and EU evaluation. Education mainly contains the degree to which people are informed about the EU as a system and what the EU in general is about. This approach claims that there is a positive correlation between degree of information about the EU and EU support.

Similar approaches towards possible causes of Euroscepticism were made by Hooghe and Marks (2007), who examine economic interests and identity as causes for the rejection of European integration. According to Hooghe and Marks (2007), the economic and identity dimension need to be contemplated in the political context, since Euroscepticism emerges when political actors link the process of European integration to feelings of cultural threat or economic disadvantage (Hooghe & Marks, 2007). In addition, Hooghe and Marks (2007) note the importance of the institutional factor, emphasizing the positive correlation between distrust in national institutions and distrust in European institutions. Accordingly, institutional distrust serves as a driving force for Euroscepticism and eurosceptic vote as a tool to protest against the political establishment, for those feeling dissatisfied or left behind by their national government (Hobolt, 2015). In this context, Euroscepticism can serve as a tool for populist parties, when it is used to project discontent about domestic politics (Neumayer, 2008). De Vries (2018) mentions two mechanisms that determine the negative correlation between economic strength and EU support: people’s expectations of government and responsibility attribution for policy. According to this theory, people residing in a member state that is characterized by strong economic and political conditions also hold higher expectations of government. These high expectations can lead to the perception that politics at EU level lacks democracy.

Discussing factors that shape people’s attitudes towards the EU, De Vries (2018) introduces the benchmark theory of EU public opinion. Accordingly, public opinions on the EU are shaped by a comparison of the benefits of EU membership and the benefits of an alternative state, namely abandoning EU membership. Based on this theory, De Vries (2018) differentiates between four
types of support: Loyal support, Exit scepticism, Regime scepticism and Policy scepticism. Exit sceptics believe policies and regime at the alternative state (outside the EU) to be preferable to membership. Loyal support forms the opposite, meaning that policy and regime at the status quo (membership) are preferred over the alternative state. Regime sceptics prefer rules and procedures of the alternative state but are supportive of EU-policies. On the contrary, Policy sceptics support the regime at EU level, but are sceptic regarding policies at EU-level. According to this model, Exit scepticism is mainly influenced by economic performance and quality of government. When economic conditions are good, people are more likely to believe that their country can do well even without EU membership. On the other hand, bad economic conditions is linked to less optimistic beliefs about the alternative state (outside the EU) and EU membership (status quo) is seen as more beneficial for the country’s economic well being. Respectively, people from member states with a good economic condition are more likely to be Exit sceptics than people from member states with bad economic conditions (De Vries, 2018). Policy scepticism is also more likely to blossoms under good economic conditions. Even though people under this conditions might be approval of rules and procedures at EU level, the economic benefits the EU provides, such as policies and public goods might be less convincing or even seen as weaker than benefits provided from the national level. On the other hand, the EU is more likely to be linked to better opportunities when economic conditions are low, thus Loyal support is more likely to be found when economic conditions are poor.

Reflecting on the sections about the dimensions and causes of Euroscepticism, it can be concluded that despite a multitude of theories revolving around Euroscepticism and its potential causes, many scholars define a similar pattern of factors underlying EU-support and EU-rejection. The first pattern often described is the differentiation about pragmtical and emotional arguments. Pragmatical arguments are described as being directed towards the functioning of the EU. Concerning this, it can be found that many scholars differentiate between institutional functioning, related to evaluation of a supranational governance and instrumental functioning, linked to the evaluation of costs and benefits associated with EU membership. Hence, institutional and instrumental arguments form the first two dimensions repeatedly described by scholars. Emotional arguments form the third dimension that can be distinguished as often described in theory, often also referred to as the affective dimension.
2.4. Euroscepticism at the elite- and the mass-level

Discussing the factors that encourage eurosceptic attitudes leads to the question about the linkage between the mass public and political elites in the context of European integration. Some scholars argue, that political elites pick up eurosceptic attitudes from their electorate and integrate it into their political agenda, while other scholars argue that the attitudes of the mass public are shaped by the information received by the parties. Steenbergen, Edward & De Vries (2007) state that Euroscepticism is possibly a product of reverse causation saying that political elites and mass public influence each other. That means, attitudes towards the EU can be shaped both bottom-up, thus from the mass to the elites and top-down from the elites to the masses and furthermore, both directions can be mutually reinforcing. In the bottom-up approach, information moves from the mass public to the elites, with the mass public feeding the parties with information about their attitudes. In the top-down approach, information flows from the political elites to the mass public, with parties informing the electorate about political matters.
Furthermore Steenbergen et al. (2007) conclude that different factors contribute to this reciprocal reinforcement, including electoral contest, party (system) attributes, and attributes of supporters. Illuminating mass- and elite-based Euroscepticism in the new member states, Toomey (2007) states, that in Poland and the Czech Republic, Euroscepticism is higher at the elite level than on the mass level.

2.5. Euroscepticism in the new member states

The term Euroscepticism also gained relevance in the scientific debate about differences between the old member states and the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. A closer look at this debate is relevant for this study in order to help building a theoretical model on the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. According to Hartleb (2012), the Eurozone crisis paved the way for Euroscepticism especially in the old member states, so to speak in Southern and Western Europe. Countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal faced high financial distress as a consequence of the crisis and were granted financial assistance by stronger Eurozone countries. This created discontent among people in both the financially affected countries and in those countries paying for bailout funds. However, political elites in the subsidising countries did not succeed to justify this concept of solidarity to their populations, which put the idea of a common union into jeopardy (Hartleb, 2012). However, the Eurozone crisis shed a new light on the accession into the Eurozone of the new member states (Ciancara, 2014). The new member states held high expectations towards EU membership concerning economic development, however, they faced disappointments, especially when they were hit by the Eurozone crisis (Agh, 2015). Poland forms an exception among the new member states, with only minor impact for the country’s economy, even after 2008 (Sandor & Reiner, 2008; Staehr, 2010). According to Agh (2015), another factor that adds to dissatisfactions with the EU among the new member states is the perceived dependency on the old member states that EU accession has created, “with its development closely integrated with production structures in Western Europe” (Agh, 2015, p. 31).

According to Hartleb (2012), in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, Euroscepticism has different roots than in Western Europe, due to historical differences. Prior to EU accession, the CEEC underwent significant changes in economic, political and social terms (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001; Sandor & Reiner, 2010). Compared to the older member states, democratization and pluralism are relatively young concepts in the new member states, since they did not experience a growing pluralism of economic, social, cultural and ethnic interests during the time of socialist regimes (Ayata, 2014). To this day, this pluralism is only present to a limited extent and differences among the Western European countries and CEEC exist within the domains of culture, politics, economics and their interconnection (Guibernau, 2004). However, pluralism was crucial for the establishment of western democracy (Ayata, 2014). Also regarding the party systems, there are differences between the old member states and the CEEC (Ayata,
Especially in the first years, the party systems of CEEC were characterized by diffuse interests and positions on the political spectrum (Agh, 2015). Parties and politicians that diminish these feelings of diffusion and the fear of future are most likely to be accepted by the people, even if their political agenda comes in the form of nationalism (Ayata, 2014). Central and Eastern European member states strongly focus on nationalism in the eurosceptic debate (Toomey, 2007). In the Czech Republic and Poland, EU-criticism goes often hand in hand with anti-German sentiments, claiming that EU-integration is too strongly promoted by Germany and therefore too closely linked to German interests (Hartleb, 2012; Toomey, 2007). Winstone (2018) argues, that the new and the old members have different viewpoints on multi-culturalism due to their past. Accordingly, in Eastern Europe, returning to ethnic diversity awakes association with a time of troubled interwar period and the Soviet-era.

Reflecting on the transformation from socialist regimes to democratic member states, it gets clear that the member states of Central and Eastern Europe still experience struggles in establishing a stable political landscape and a pluralistic society. This unstable transformation process, combined with the socialist past and the challenges the EU has faced in the last years, renders the CEEC more prone to anti-democratic impulses, questioning current laws and institutions. The historical legacy of the new member states seems not yet overcome and must be considered as an important factor shaping the relationship between new member states and the EU and its (old) member states. The pattern of the three dimensions, described as the institutional, the instrumental and the affective dimensions earlier in this study, also seems valid after a closer examination of Euroscepticism in the new member states. The institutional dimension plays a role due to the fear of losing national sovereignty might influence how people evaluate the question of further supranational governance. The instrumental dimension plays a role in the big expectations people in the new member states held towards accession regarding economic development in their country. The affective dimension is linked to the sometimes troubled relation the new member states hold towards some old member states.

### 2.6. Youth Euroscepticism

Young, well-educated people are most likely to hold positive opinions towards the European Union and to be optimistic about the benefits it offers (De Vries, 2018; Guerra, 2017). In the Brexit elections, young people were least likely to vote for leaving the EU (Fox, 2013; Banaji & Mejias, 2018). However, dissatisfaction with the EU can be also seen among young people, especially in the context of the Eurozone crisis. This became prevalent with emerging mass protests of young southern Europeans in 2011 and 2012, caused by the economic situation in these countries (Campos Lima & Artiles, 2013). Discontent also reflected in the party support of young southern Europeans. Like older generations, young people in Spain, Greece and Italy showed increasing support for anti-establishment parties (Dokos, Poli, Rosselli, i Lecha, & Tocci, 2013; Malkoutzis, 2009). Inherent to these parties were eurocritical attitudes, especially
regarding how the European Union handled the economic crisis (Dokos et. al., 2013; Malkoutzis, 2009). Despite these developments that can be seen in countries mostly affected by the Eurozone crisis, studies focusing on the role of the European youth in the European Parliament elections do not indicate a general increase of eurosceptic attitudes among young Europeans (Ellinger, 2015).

According to Guerra (2017), economic problems fuel youth Euroscepticism not only in Southern but also in Eastern and Central Europe. Young and well-educated, but unemployed people feel frustrated because their country didn’t develop as quickly as it was hoped by EU membership (Guerra, 2017). In a time of transformation, that created new opportunities but also new challenges, ethnic, regional and local attachment becomes a stabilizing factor for many young people in the new member states (Walker & Stephenson, 2013). Discussing youth Euroscepticism in Poland, scholars point out that EU benefits could be taken for granted by young people since they have not experienced any other state than EU-membership. Fomina (2017) argues that young Poles have missed the period before EU accession, when debates emphasized the benefits that come with the EU. Instead, they grew up in a time of increasing politicization of EU issues, with various aspects being publicly debated in a critical manner.

2.7. Theoretical framework

Based on the theory, we make several assumptions about the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. The first assumption relates to the different types of Euroscepticism discussed in this chapter. To put it more specific, we expect that Polish Euroscepticism can be described from an institutional, an instrumental, and an affective perspective, hence reflecting the same pattern of dimensions identified earlier in this chapter. We can expect from the theory, that the causes of Polish Euroscepticism underly this very same pattern. The second assumption is based on the discussion of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. We believe to find concerns about national sovereignty to be an important source for eurosceptic ideas in Poland. Most importantly, we believe that Poland joined the European Union with high expectations regarding its economic development and that these unfulfilled expectations led to a rise of Euroscepticism on the instrumental dimension. On the affective dimension, we expect to find distrust to surrounding (member) states and rejection of foreign cultural values among the causes of Euroscepticism. These assumptions are the basis for exploring the first two sub-questions, addressing the characteristics of Polish Euroscepticism and its changes throughout time. This means that this study will take a look in how far Polish Euroscepticism changed throughout time on the three different dimensions derived from the theoretical part.
3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design and Strategy

The purpose of this study is to examine Euroscepticism of the Polish population throughout time. A quantitative research design was chosen for this study to investigate Euroscepticism from the time of accession to the most actual data available, hence 2018. In the methodology part, I introduce statistical means to examine Polish Euroscepticism and its development over time. The analysis of this study takes a closer look at Polish Euroscepticism and its development over time by reflection of media and scientific literature. The analysis describes Polish Euroscepticism on both the elite- and the mass-level. The main aim of the analysis is to examine, whether Polish attitudes and its changes over time can be described and explained by the patterns of the three dimensions identified in the theory. The extent of these changes will be investigated by statistical measures described in the methodology part.

The recent developments in Poland have evoked a lot of criticism and international attention. Yet, it remains unclear, what conclusions on EU attitudes of the Polish population we can draw from actions driven by the Polish parliament. Recent coverage on the fraught relationship between Poland and Brussels lacks a focus on the wide population. This research might serve as a starting point for further research on the development of Euroscepticism not only in Poland but other CEEC as well, with a special focus on the mass-elite link in shaping EU attitudes. Exploring the causes and the link between mass and elite goes beyond the extent of this study. However, studying the nature and possible changes of EU attitudes and the influence of demographic characteristics (in this case age) might be a suitable starting point to address the issue of Euroscepticism in the new member states.

The dependent variable in this work is Euroscepticism, and the independent variables are year and age group. The examination of the dependent variable is based on the Standard Eurobarometer (EB) surveys, publicly available on the website of the European Commission (European Union, 2004-2018). The dataset for this study is based on following Eurobarometer surveys: EB63 (May 2005), EB64 (October 2005), EB65 (March 2006), EB71 (June 2009), EB72 (October 2009), EB73 (May 2010), EB74 (November 2010), EB77 (May 2012), EB84 (November 2015) and EB89 (March 2018). The EB is undertaken for the European Commission and measures attitudes towards different aspects of the EU, using either a three point or five point Likert scale or by assessing agreements and/or disagreements with certain statements about the EU. The Eurobarometer is a study conducted twice a year in both member states and candidate countries. The number of people interviewed for each survey is approximately 1,000 per country and the method of assessment are face-to-face interviews (European Union, 2004-2018). The Eurobarometer does not address the issue of Euroscepticism specifically, however it includes a set of questions that can be used for the purpose of measuring Euroscepticism.
(Bârgăoanu, Radu & Negrea-Busuioc, 2014). For this study, the answers from the Eurobarometer will be rescaled from partly two response options and partly a five-point and three-point Likert scale into three-response options for all questions in the case of assessing changes throughout time. A rescaling into a uniform range was chosen to make the data more comparable. Exploring Euroscepticism of the Polish youth, this study also recodes all answers into one uniform scale, however this time, into a two-point scale. The three-point scales will include following answer options: Eurosceptic, Eurosupport or Neutral. The two-point scale will include the options Eurosupport and Eurosceptic. The choice to rely on an existing dataset was made due to the economic advantages of this approach. An existing dataset allows the investigation of a larger sample size, which is especially significant due to the limited resources of time in this study. Relying on an existing dataset enables to compare attitudes throughout a range of several years, which is one of the main aims of this study.

A quantitative research design was chosen for this study because it is most suitable for the purpose of this research. Since this research examines changes in attitudes towards time, it relies on a survey conducted regularly, such as the Eurobarometer. The evaluation of the Eurobarometer requires a quantitative approach. Quantitative analysis allows to include a large n-study (in the case of Eurobarometer, n=1000), which makes the outcome more representative for the whole population. A quantitative approach was used in other studies to investigate Euroscepticism, such as the studies by Boomgarden et al. (2010) and Bârgăoanu et al. (2014).

3.2. Operationalization

Measuring Euroscepticism. In the theory section of this study, Euroscepticism was defined as a multidimensional phenomenon. The multi-dimensional character of Euroscepticism is addressed in the first sub-research question of this study, examining the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. Several studies examining Euroscepticism lean on different types of Euroscepticism, such as the study by Boomgarden et al. (2010). These studies measure the different types of Euroscepticism individually. In order to measure changes of Polish Euroscepticism over time, two types of measurement will be executed in this study. At first, changes in the individual dimension will be measured over time. Secondly, measurements will compare the differences between the dimensions for each year chosen.

The questions of the dataset will be assigned to each of the types of Euroscepticism measured in this study. The assignment of this questions relies on the theoretical part of this study. A factor-analysis in order to confirm the right choice of items for each dimensions of Euroscepticism is not possible, because the dataset is only available in aggregated form. The identification of different types is therefore based on the theoretical part of this study. In the theory section of this study, I distinguished a pattern of three dimensions repeatedly described by scholars. These three dimensions are the institutional, the instrumental and the affective dimension of Euroscepticism.
1) Institutional Euroscepticism
The aim of the institutional dimension of Euroscepticism is to grasp people’s perceptions towards the EU as a political system. According to Lubbers and Scheepers (2005), Euroscepticism is formed by people’s attitudes towards the EU government in comparison to the national government. The institutional dimension is also comparable to the notion of specific support for the EU (Easton, 1975). The institutional dimension is considered relevant for this study because of the different democratization Poland as a new member state underwent compared to the old member states. The dissatisfaction with the dependency of the new member states on the old member states described by Agh (2015) also renders the institutional dimension a relevant part to measure. In order to assess, how people on the mass-level evaluate the supranational governance of the EU, I will assign following question about European integration to this dimension. *For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?* This question will assess support for European integration in the following areas: currency, defence, foreign policy and further enlargement. In the original dataset of the Eurobarometer, the answer options to these questions are either *for, against* or *don’t know*. For the statistical analysis of this study, answers from the For-category will be coded as Eurosupport, answers from the Against-category will be coded as Eurosceptic and the don’t know-category will be coded Neutral. Two additional questions will assess people’s satisfaction with the political system of the EU: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied the way democracy works in the EU?* and *My voice counts in the EU*. The first question, regarding satisfaction with democracy has a five-answer option in the dataset of the Eurobarometer. The answers will be recoded into a three-scale category: *not at all* and *not very* will be recoded as Eurosceptic, *fairly* and *very* will be recoded into Eurosupport and *don’t know* will be coded as Neutral.

2) Instrumental Euroscepticism
The aim of the instrumental dimension of Euroscepticism is to assess people’s evaluations about costs and benefits that come with EU membership. As described earlier in this study, the instrumental dimension of Euroscepticism was described by Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) and by Easton (1975). Like the institutional dimension, the instrumental of Euroscepticism is linked to the notion of specific support of the EU (Easton, 1975). The instrumental dimension is also important due to the huge economic changes Poland underwent since accession and because of the high expectations held by the new member states as described in the theory above. The dataset of the Eurobarometer includes certain questions that directly address the issue of perceived benefits of EU membership, e.g. *My country benefits from EU membership*. This question is used in the study of Nelsen, Guth and Fraser (2001). The question *My country could better face the future outside the EU* also fits the instrumental dimension of Euroscepticism. However, none of these questions appear continuously, but only for a limited set of year that does
not cover the time range measured in this study. Therefore, the instrumental dimension cannot be included in this study due to the limitations given by the Eurobarometer.

3) Affective Euroscepticism
The affective dimension of Euroscepticism was added in order to examine EU-attitudes that are shaped by emotional responses to the EU rather than on evaluations based on the functioning of the EU. According to Easton’s concept of diffuse support for the European Union (Easton, 1975) and the description of emotional relationship towards the EU by Boomgarden et al. (2010), I will assign questions about identity-related factors and perceived threat to the nation. This dimension was chosen as relevant for this study due to the focus on national identity in the Eurosceptic debates in the new member states. Following questions will be assigned to the affective dimension: (1) *How attached do you feel to the EU?* The original answer options to this question are *not at all, not very, fairly, very* or *don’t know*. The answers will be recoded into a three-scale category: *not at all* and *not very* will be recoded as Eurosceptic, *fairly* and *very* will be recoded into Eurosupport and *don’t know* will be coded as Neutral. (2) *In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?* The original answer options to this question are *fairly positive, very positive, fairly negative, very negative, neutral* and *don’t know*. The answers will be recoded into a three-scale category: *fairly positive* and *very positive* will be recoded as Eurosupport, *fairly negative* or *very negative* will be recoded as Eurosceptic, *neutral* and *don’t know* will be recoded as Neutral. (3) *Do you see yourself as National only vs. National and European vs. European only* and (4) *Trust in the EU.* The original answer options to this question are *tend to trust, tend not to trust* and *don’t know*. *Tend to trust* will be recoded into Eurosupport, *tend not to trust* will be recoded into Eurosceptic and *don’t know* will be recoded into Neutral. The answers will be divided on a three point rating scale: Support, Scepticism and Neutral, with *Only Polish* being recoded as Eurosceptic, *Polish and European* and *European and Polish* and *European Only* will be recoded as Eurosupport and *don’t know* and *none* will be recoded as Neutral.

Summed up, the examination of the dependent variable is based on the two types of Euroscepticism mentioned above. It is the intention of this study to examine, if changes in institutional and affective Euroscepticism can be detected over time. Furthermore, this study will analyse the relationship between these two types of Euroscepticism for each year examined. By this, the study aims to investigate whether one type of Euroscepticism is significantly stronger represented in one or several years. The identification of two different dimensions of Euroscepticism forms the first step of the methodology of this study. Through this, the examination of the dependent variable was specified. The next step is to identify the years to be measured in this study and thereby clarifying the first independent variable time.

**Measuring changes throughout time.** In order to examine changes of EU-attitudes throughout time, I will compare data from different years. I will evaluate data from the years 2005, 2006,
2009, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018. I will use the data to compare attitudes across different time spans. The first time span includes the years 2005 and 2006 (EB63, EB64, EB65). The second time span includes the years 2009 to 2012 (EB71, EB72, EB73, EB74, EB77). The third time span includes questions from the year 2015 (EB84). The fourth time span includes questions from the year 2018 (EB89). The reason for including several years in the first two time spans is the limitations given by the Eurobarometer. The questions included in the survey differ from year to year to a certain extent. In order to use the same set of questions for each time span, several years were included in one time span for this study. In the results, the time spans will be presented as only one year measured. The first time span will be presented as year 2005 in the results, because most of the questions were taken from this year, and the second time span will be presented as 2010. A chi-square test of association will be conducted in this survey, in order to examine changes in the general Polish population over time. First, the study will address the question of changes on the individual dimensions over the years. Secondly, the different dimensions of Euroscepticism will be compared in each time span chosen. In this case, the dependent variable is Attitude and the independent variable is Dimension.

A chi-square test allows to examine an aggregated dataset, which is the case in this study. Another way to examine two variables simultaneously is a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Babbie, 2010). However, ANOVA-analysis is not possible to perform with an aggregated dataset. The years analysed in this study were chosen according to changes described as challenging or relevant in literature. The first time span marks the first years of accession, the second time span conducts attitudes during the year of the Eurozone crisis, the third time span was chosen according to the year of Polish elections and the fourth time span includes most actual data. It is not the intention of this study to examine a causal relationship between EU-related changes and EU-attitudes but merely to indicate an association between a significant EU-related changes and changes in attitudes.

The second independent variable of this study is age. Specifying the second independent variable forms the next part of this study.

**Measuring attitudes of the youth.** A chi-square test of association was chosen in order to compare the attitudes of Polish youth with the attitudes of the general population in Poland. ANOVA cannot be performed for this purpose, since the data set is aggregated. The Eurobarometer presents the outcome of the survey both for the general population and different age groups, starting with age 15 to 24. For this reason, the age group of 15 to 24 is chosen for representing attitudes of the Polish youth. However, the attitudes of different age groups are presented in the Eurobarometer survey starting only at later years and not for each question included in the survey. Therefore, differences between the youth and the general population cannot be examined over time but only for the latest period assessed in this study (2018). The survey used for this study is EB89 (March 2018). Due to the limited choice of questions,
Euroscepticism will not be measured on different dimensions, rather the questions will examine general Euroscepticism. Following questions will be assigned to measure Euroscepticism on one dimension: (1) *Our country could better face the future outside the EU* (yes/no answer). Yes will be recoded into Eurosceptic and those, who have not answered yes will be counted as Eurosupport (2) *My voice counts in the EU* (agree/disagree). Agree will be recoded as Eurosupport while disagree will be recoded as Eurosceptic, (3) *More decisions should be taken at EU level* (agree/disagree/don’t know). Agree will be recoded as Eurosceptic and don’t know will be counted as missing value, (4) *Trust in the EU* (trust/no trust/don’t know). Trust will be recoded as Eurosupport, no trust will be recoded as Eurosceptic and don’t know will be counted as missing value, (5) *Direction in which things are going* (right direction/wrong direction). Right direction will be counted as Eurosupport and wrong direction will be counted as Eurosceptic, (6) *In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?* (positive/neutral/negative). Positive will be recoded as Eurosupport, negative will be recoded as Eurosceptic and neutral will be counted as missing value. The items will be measured on two scales, Eurosupport and Euroscepticism. The choice to include a two-scale dimensions rather than a three-scale dimension was made because not all questions used in this answer include an answer option that can be re-scaled as Neutral in the original data set. Therefore, the statistical analysis addressing Polish youth differs from the statistical analysis addressing changes over time.

4. **Analysis**

4.1. **Background on the relationship between Poland and the EU**

In order to answer the first sub-question, relating to the nature of Polish Euroscepticism, it is important to understand which factors shape the relationship between Poland and Brussels. Examining these factors shall provide a deeper understanding of how the Polish people shape their understanding of their place in the EU. Furthermore, it shall provide us with a better knowledge of those aspects of the Union, the Polish people consider as beneficial and an opportunity for their country and those aspects of the EU, that challenge the relationship between Poland and Brussels. Linking these factors to the three dimensions of Euroscepticism derived from the theory part shall indicate possible causes of Polish Euroscepticism and thereby also giving a deeper understanding of its nature.

4.1.1. **Changes associated with EU membership**

The impact EU-membership had on Poland is widely recognized by scholars, politicians and the media. “Of the 10 mostly post-communist countries that joined the European Union exactly a
decade ago today, none has benefited more from membership than Poland” (Adekoya, 2014, para. 1), while Kolodziejczyk (2016) states that Poland transformed from a post-communist and backward country to the European leader in economic growth. The influence EU membership exerted on Poland and its society comes in various forms. Between 2007 to 2013, Poland received EUR 67 billion of cohesion funds from the EU budget (European Union, 1995-2018), making Poland the largest recipient of cohesion funds among all member states (Jackson, Mach & Miller-Gonzalez, 2011). This money was for big parts spent in benefit of the country’s infrastructure (European Union, 1995-2018), including highways, youth sports facilities, modern sewerage systems, kindergartens and pre-schools (Adekoya, 2014) and modern means of public transport (Arak et al., 2014). Also the country’s economy blossomed after accession. Polish GDP increased by almost 50 percent after becoming an EU member (Kolodziejczyk, 2016), while Polish income increased by 20 percent from 2003 to 2013 on average (Arak et al., 2014). In the first three years of EU-membership, over 15,000 projects aimed at business support were implemented (European Union, 1995-2018). The boost in economy, however, is to the biggest part acclaimed to the growth of the export sector, hence the country’s economy greatly benefitted from the free movement of goods linked to accession. Although even before accession, trade between Poland and the European Community was alleviated by the Association Agreement, only as an EU member state, Poland was able to export food and agricultural products. Until 2013, Polish exports to the EU were around three times higher compared to pre-accession, which put Poland in the eighth place among the leading exporters in intra-EU trade (Kolodziejczyk, 2016; Arak et al., 2014). No other country in the EU has experienced such a boost of trade (Arak et al., 2014).

In the years that followed accession, Poland also underwent big changes on the social dimension. Young Poles today have the ability to travel and study abroad without facing restrictions older generations had faced due to the Iron Curtain. While in the 1990s, only few Poles had contact to the world outside their country, young Poles today have interacted with people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds (Adekoya, 2014). Polish people also benefit from open borders in economic terms, seeking employment in other EU member states. In fact, open borders are regarded as one of the main advantages EU accession has brought by the Poles and the elimination of border control was among the leading responses of what Poles associate the EU with in 2007, seven years after joining the Schengen area (Kolodziejczyk, 2016; Fomina, 2017). EU accession also executed great effects on the educational landscape in Poland. Between the years 2004 to 2012, the number of Polish universities that participate in the Erasmus exchange program has almost doubled, rising from 187 to 324 at the end of 2012. Following the Lisbon Strategy and the Europa 2020 strategy, Poland also managed to increase the rate of people following higher education from 10 percent in 2002 to 25 percent in 2012, scoring only slightly below the EU average of 29 percent (Kolodziejczyk, 2016). EU accession also led to a development of Poland’s agriculture, including the economic strengthening of farms and the increased competitiveness of the agri-food sector (Sobczyk, 2014).
Unemployment and low wages are still a common problem in the country, with an unemployment rate of 14 percent representing the major reason for many Poles to leave the country (Adekoya, 2014). Despite growth, Polish wages remain below EU average. Growth among the regions has not been equal and income inequality has grown (Arak et. Al, 2014). Among those seeking employment outside Poland are many highly educated people. “Poland’s economic situation is still not satisfactory enough to encourage people to remain in the country” (Kolodziejczyk 2016, p. 23). Other scholars point out that Poland advanced when it comes to its old economic branches but failed to develop in the field of innovation and human investment based new economy (Agh, 2016).

4.1.2. Actors shaping the relationship between Poland and the EU

Examining Polish attitudes towards the EU and the country’s integration into its system requires a deeper look into the role of the Polish Church in shaping the political life of the country. This is significant due the value faith holds in creating and maintaining a Polish identity. In Poland, the Catholic Church and national identity are to this day deeply intertwined (Guerra, 2017; Chojnicka, 2015). Over 90 percent of the Polish population identify themselves as Catholic (Chojnicka, 2015; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). The Polish politician, sometimes also referred to as the father of Polish nationalism, Roman Dmowski argued in his famous book of 1927 The Church, the Nation, and the State: “Catholicism is not an addition to Polishness, colouring it in some way, but is a part of its essence [...] Any attempt to separate Catholicism from Polishness, to separate the nation from religion and from the Church, threatens to destroy the nation’s very essence.” (Pankowski & Kormak, 2013, p. 158) The strong significance of Catholic belief in the country is rooted in its history and the role faith played for national survival and independence. Throughout centuries, Poland was surrounded by strong neighbours and repeatedly experienced conquest and partition. For the population, Catholicism was a constant in an ever-changing state and at the same time, it was a mean to distinguish oneself from neighbouring states that were often perceived as aggressors (Froese & Pfaff, 2001). In the 18th century, the country was divided into three parts by Russia, Austria and Prussia. However, the Polish nation persisted through common religious symbols. One famous example of a religious symbol that became an icon of Polish identity is the image Black Madonna of Częstochowa (Polish: Czarna Madonna).

Also throughout the years of the Soviet regime, the Catholic Church had a major influence in protecting national sovereignty (Guerra, 2017). Unlike other Eastern European states under Soviet or Communist rule, Poland maintained its high levels of religious activities (Froese & Pfaff, 2001). The Catholic Church even became a haven for political opposition in Poland which became most prominent in the case of the Solidarity movement (Polish: Solidarność) (Froese & Pfaff, 2001; Guerra, 2017). According to Guerra (2017, p. 56) “Catholicism in Poland has historically played the double role of maintaining social cohesion and representing the symbol
against the enemy”. In the years that followed the new Polish constitution in the 1990s and EU-membership, the influence of religiosity was diminished on an institutional level also by a decrease of believers, although faith continued to play an important role in people’s everyday lives. The EU was perceived as a representative of secularism, pluralism and consumerism which raised concerns among representatives of the Polish Church regarding the consequences of EU-integration (Guerra, 2017).

Although holding no formal power, the Polish Church maintained to execute political influence through making political recommendation during elections. According to Guerra (2017), the electoral success of parties such as the nationalist conservative party League of Polish family (Polish: Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) in 2004 and the PiS in 2015 can be dated back to the support of church-representatives. Religious values are sometimes used to back up political decisions, such as the proposed total ban on abortion in 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Catholicism itself never represented a determining cause for negative attitudes towards the EU in Polish society, however the Church’s rhetoric on the EU could influence public discourse during the integration process and by that be a source for opposition (Guerra, 2017). While the current Polish government is positive towards the role of the Church, civic protests that followed a proposed total ban on abortion in 2016 seem to reflect a society that is divided between supporters of a more liberal Poland and those supporting a social conservative Poland (Guerra, 2017). Toomey (2007) points out that the church's influence on party positions and on mass-level positions may differ in the country, probably also due to the declining influence of the Polish Church in the every-day lives of Polish people.

4.1.3. Poland’s relationship to other countries

Poland is the biggest and most populous of all new member states. However, in terms of population, it is still only half of the size of neighbouring Germany, while its GDP is less than 25 percent of the GDP of Germany or France (Kaczynski, 2008). Kaczynski (2008) puts Poland’s geopolitical dilemma in European affairs as following: “Is Poland a big or a small state? If it is big, then it is the smallest and poorest of them. If it is small, then it is by far the largest of them.” Poland’s undefined role on the Union’s political stage shapes the country’s relation to international partners in- and outside the Union (Kaczynski, 2008, p. 16; Klatt, 2011). This can be especially seen in Poland’s ambitions to shape EU policy towards its eastern neighbours (Klatt, 2011). The main aim of the European Union’s policy towards the east is to support democratization of the Union’s direct neighbours to the east, with Poland taking an active role in these policies. According to Klatt (2011), Poland aspires to establish its role as a significant member of the European Union through taking a key role the Union’s policy towards its eastern borders. For a long time, Poland’s relationship towards eastern neighbours has been influenced by the country’s perception as being the keeper of western values and traditions (Klatt, 2011; Fomina, 2017; Góra & Mach 2010). To this day, Poland still aims to act as the bridge between
east and west, supporting political transformation in the countries to its east (Marcinkowska, 2016). According to Haliżak (2016) Poland’s position between the east and the west rendered the country to be dominated by Russia and Germany in the past. Joining the structure of the European Union and the NATO put Poland in the position to overcome the dominance of its powerful neighbours, however Poland is still in the process of finding its place between Russia and Germany (Haliżak, 2016; Kaczynski, 2008).

4.1.4. Summary of the background on the relationship between Poland and the EU

The analysis shows, that economic factors are significant for the relationship between Poland and the EU. Poland entered the European Union with high expectations regarding its economic development. Despite being handled a success story, the country did not manage to fully catch up with the old member states in this matter. According to Agh (2015) who names unfulfilled expectations regarding economic developments an important aspect for the relationship between the EU and the new member states, this is a potential cause for Euroscepticism in Poland. In consideration of the first sub-research question it can be assumed that economic factors are important for shaping the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. However, the instrumental dimension is not included in the statistical examination of this study, hence this remains an assumption. Due to its position and relevant role in the past, the Catholic Church continues to execute political power even after accession, mainly by making political recommendations and stating concerns regarding further EU integration. In the latter case, the Catholic Church acts as a preserver of national values and identity and through this is, according to the threatened identity approach by Lubbers (2008), an important driving factor for Euroscepticism. Linking this to the first sub-question, the influence of the Catholic Church indicates a relevance for the integration and the affective dimension. Poland’s ambition towards the east indicates, that Poland aims to overcome the dominance of other countries that was experienced in the past. This can be attributed to Poland’s history as a country constantly conquered by powerful neighbours. A troubled relationship with neighbouring states is a characteristic shared by other new member states as well. However, Poland’s self-perception as a bridge between western and eastern countries distinguishes the country from other states of Central and Eastern Europe. It can be assumed, that common European policies gives Poland new possibilities to act internationally, indicating a relevance for the integration dimension.

4.2. Poland’s relationship towards the EU throughout the years

The second section of the Analysis investigates Poland’s relationship throughout the years, form the first years of accession to the year 2018. Thereby, this section relates to the second and the third sub-question of this study. In order to find out, whether there a significant events that came parallel to changes in attitude, several time spans are examined individually. These time spans
are congruent with those examined statistically, in order to make a comparison between the statistical findings and the analysis part possible.

4.2.1. Accession (2005 and 2006)

The first years of accession were mainly characterized by economic changes, that were strongest in this time, compared to later years (Reichardt, 2011). Another major change that came directly with accession was Poland’s new strength in the international scene due to the country’s new position as a EU-member (Willa, 2014). According to Willa (2014), EU-membership made Poland a more trustworthy partner to negotiate with, also due to the high political, legal and economic standards required for accession. Since 2004, Poland continued to emphasize the importance of one common voice for the EU in international negotiations (Willa, 2014). Poland’s new role in the international scene is also described by Potocki (2014), stating that Poland emerged into a significant actor in establishing new relations of the European Union to the east of Europe. However, in the first years of EU-membership, Poland did not attempt to actively shape the agenda of EU’s neighbourhood policy but remained rather uninfluential regarding these policies’ directions (Kolodziejczyk, 2016; Potocki, 2014).

Support for EU-membership rose steadily among Poles in the first years after accession (Jackson et al., 2011; Balcerowicz, 2007). In May 2004, 71 percent of the population was in favour of membership, while opponents made up for 20 percent of the population. By August 2006, the number of supporters has risen to 86 percent, while the number of opponents dropped down to 10 percent (Balcerowicz, 2007). Support for the European Union grew parallely with the believe that Poland benefits from membership (Jackson et al., 2011; Balcerowicz; 2007). Cichocki (2011) however mentions that positive attitudes did not lead to readiness for action in the country. In the European Parliament election of 2004, Poland had a voter turnout of only 21 percent. In 2009, the turnout only increased slightly to 24 percent, still representing one of the worst results among all member states (Cichocki, 2011).

Poland’s attitudes towards adopting the Euro have been supportive, even before accession. In 2002, 60 percent of the population considered the Euro to be of advantage and to represent a safe harbour to the country. This attitude persisted during the first years of accession (Winstone, 2018). In 2007 to 2008, the government announced that Poland would enter the Eurozone by 2012 (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013). These plans were promoted under the slogan “Euro for the Euro” (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013). In 2009, the Polish government announced its aims to prepone adoption of the Euro to end of 2011.

After the election in 2005, the PiS became the strongest party in the Polish government, but unlike the election in 2015, it did not own enough seats to form a one-party cabinet. Instead, the new government under Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) also included extreme-right-wing-nationalist
and populist-radical parties (Kaczynski, 2008). According to Kaczynski (2008), new conflicts emerged between Warsaw and Western European countries under Jarosław Kaczyński as new prime minister of Poland.

4.2.2. Crisis (2007-2012)

In 2007, Poland held new elections, after a government term of only two years. This time, the PiS went into opposition, while the liberal-conservative PO (Platforma Obywatelska) won the election. While the EU was hit hardly by the economic crisis, Poland is among the very few member states that did not go into recession (Reichard, 2011). However, the crisis slowed down Poland’s fast economic growth, especially because Poland’s export numbers made the country more dependent on neighbouring countries (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013; Reichard, 2011). The crisis was clearly felt in the country’s employment sector. Since Poland’s budget deficit increased to over seven percent of GDP from 2009 to 2010, the county experienced cuts in public employment and welfare (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013, Reichard, 2011). In 2011, after being re-elected, the government under Donald Tusk announced plans to raise the retirement age, which was also presented as a reform due to budgetary limits connected with the crisis. These announcements resulted into opposition and protests (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013). According to Meardi and Trappmann (2013, p. 203), those reforms “mark the end of market euphoria in Poland”. Even though Poland was spared from the most devastating effects of the crisis, restructuring the market in order to make it internationally more compatible was received with more scepticism than in the years before.

The most notable change in attitudes in the years of crisis is probably Polish viewpoints on adopting the Euro. According to Winstone (2018), when the crisis continued to hit Europe, adopting the Euro in Poland was increasingly associated with the loss of national identity. At the same time, attachment to the national currency Zloty increased (Winstone, 2018). In October 2011, Poland’s national bank stated that the Euro crisis scattered beliefs in beneficial effects of the Euro for Poland (Meardi & Trappmann, 2013). To this day, Poland has not adopted the Euro.

According to Pankowski and Kormak (2013) right-winged street activities that followed a strong anti-EU tenor are on the rise since 2007. During the so-called Independence March that was organized in Warsaw by the All-Polish Youth (Polish: Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW) and National-Radical Camp (Polish: Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR) in 2011, Polish nationalists and nationalists from other European countries gathered for a demonstration chanting slogans such as “Tomorrow belongs to us – the nationalists” and “Down with Brussels”. A parallel demonstration called the March of Patriots was organized by the National Rebirth of Poland (Polish: Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP) in the city of Wroclaw. An invitation to participate in that march had been posted on the website of Dawid Jackiewicz, an MP from the Law and Justice party (PiS) just a few days before (Pankowski & Kormak, 2013). The Independence
March and a parallel march both taking place a year later again displayed a very nationalist rhetoric. At the end of the parallel march, participants burned the EU flag (Pankowski & Kormak, 2013). MP Prof. Krystyna Pawłowicz (PiS) was part of the demonstration’s committee for the Independence March.

Since 2008, Poland shapes EU policy towards the east more actively. Together with Sweden, Poland proposed the idea of an Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP) (Adamczyk, 2010; Kolodziejczyk, 2016). The project was adopted in 2009 and mainly aims to bring eastern neighbours closer to the EU by integrating chosen countries into EU programmes and policies. Poland hoped to support economic and political changes in countries of the eastern neighbourhood. By this, Poland attempted to facilitate the access to the labour market for workers from neighbouring eastern countries (Adamczyk, 2010; Marcinkowska, 2016). In 2013, Poland proposed the idea of energy security of Europe, aiming to strengthen the EU’s role at the world’s energy market by developing an integrated all-European market. The attempt was also to rely on energy resources more diverse than gas supplies from Russia. The idea of energy diversification was already mentioned under the government of Kaczyński (Agnieszka, 2008). It can be said, that the PO with Donald Tusk as prime minister continued Kaczyński’s eastern policy in the sense that Poland remained an important actor of the EU to deal with its eastern neighbours (Agnieszka, 2008). As illustrated by the attempt to rely less on Russia in terms of energy sources, it can be assumed that also the PO-government aspired to diminish Russia’s dominance in the eastern countries of the European neighbourhood and thereby strengthening the role of Poland in this region. However, Donald Tusk was more in favour of European integration and relations to Germany were less hostile than under Kaczyński (Agnieszka, 2008).

4.2.3. Euroscepticism entering Polish parliament (2015)

In October 2015, Poland held parliamentary elections. As briefly mentioned in the section above, the governing term of the PO of 2011 to 2015 was accompanied by some reforms that raised discontent among large parts of the population. The retirement reform and other social reforms were criticized by opposition parties from both sides and also became a dominant subject in the election campaign of 2015 (Marcinkiewic & Stegmaier, 2016). The biggest damage for the ruling government’s image however was caused by the so-called waiters’ tapes scandal shortly after the European Parliament Election in June 2014. Private conversations among cabinet members that were illegally recorded and published in press revealed “controversial private opinions, vulgar language and the arrogance of the bugged politicians” (Marcinkiewic & Stegmaier, 2016, p. 1). The dissatisfaction that people held with the current government was demonstrated in the elections outcome. PiS’s president Duda won the first election round with 35 percent of the voters while 34 percent of the votes went to Komorowski from the PO. Kukiz, a political movement from the far-right, gained third place with 20 percent. In the second round, Duda
managed to gain 52 percent of votes, foreshadowing the success the PiS was to experience in the October 2015 election.

During the parliamentary election campaign, the PiS focused on promoting its social agenda, among other pension, families and education. These plans received broad support among the population (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). The PiS intended to not discourage moderate voters and hence mainly focused on social values during the election campaign (Marcinkiewic & Stegmaier, 2016). The party gained from substantial support from young voters (Śliwiński, 2016). The campaign overlapped with the refugee crisis that was at its peak in September 2015. The PiS took the opportunity and positioned itself clearly against Muslim immigration. A few days before the election, former prime minister Jarosław Kaczynski (PiS) hold an aggressive speech on migrants, asserting that migrants already brought parasites and diseases to Europe. In addition, he stated that Poland would be forced to take in more than 100.000 muslim refugees unless the country undertakes a change of government. At that time, the EU indeed considered to relocate a few thousand asylum seekers to Poland, which considering the extent of the crisis at that time was a rather marginal number. However, the EU considerations seemingly triggered enough fears among parts of the Polish population, given the electoral success the PiS experienced later this year (Burak & Knaus, 2018). With gaining 38 percent votes, the party gained an absolute majority of seats as the first party since the fall of Communism (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016).

4.2.4. Poland after the Election (2015-2018)

Immediately after the election, the new Polish prime minister Beata Szydło announced her intention to remove the European flag from the standing podium used for press conferences (Kalantzis, 2018). In 2017, the Polish government announced its plan to dismiss 27 of 72 judges of the country’s highest court (Becker & Dudek, 2018). The dismissal was made possible by a newly introduced law that decreased the age of retirement for judges from age 70 to 65. The actions of the Polish government mainly raised fears that the dismissed judges at highest court might be replaced by people holding stronger pro-regime attitudes (Becker & Dudek, 2018). As a result, the European Commission implemented legal proceedings under Article 7 of the EU treaty that could, in theoretical terms, ultimately lead to Poland losing its voting rights in EU bodies (Becker, Müller & Schult, 2018). However, Hungary stated that it would not vote against Poland, thereby blocking possible sanctions in this direction that can only be executed through unanimity. (Wohin treibt Polen?, 2018). The drastic changes intended in the Polish courts also led to resistance among judges affected by the dismissal. The resistance was backed by demonstrations in the country, counting a total number of thousands of participants. The changes concerning Polish media are also notable, because Poland was considered a success story in developing an independent and pluralistic media in the 1990s (O’Maley, 2016; Babovnika, 2018). However, in January 2016, the new government passed a new law that transferred the
power to appoint the heads of public TV from an independent committee to the government ("Polish media laws", 2016). Moreover, the public media was renamed into national media (Babovnika, 2018). The country, as stated by international media, “has gone from being the poster child of European integration to enfant terrible“ (Why is Poland’s government worrying the EU?, 2016, para. 1).

The Independence March that took place in the year 2017 was widely reported in the international media, also because it attracted far-right leaders from elsewhere in Europe, and was described as damaging Poland’s international reputation (“Poland’s Independence Day”, 2017). The number of participants was estimated 60,000 by the police and accordingly march developed to become the major Independence Day event in Poland, overshadowing other (public) events in recent years (“Poland’s Independence Day”, 2017).

The PiS has repeatedly presented itself as a preserver of Polish culture and values. The party stated its intentions to “defend Polish national identity, tradition, culture [...] against the emerging tendencies to introduce, in a supranational manner, some risky cultural experiments which are not accepted by the majority of society” (Fomina, 2017, p. 146). Among those values considered to be too liberal and forced upon from the outside is the promoted equality for the LGBT community or the legalization of abortion (Adekoya, 2014). Those dismissed as a threat to Polish culture are the EU and “liberals, vegetarians, bicycle riders and beneficiaries of globalization [...] people who want to introduce gay marriage and who would bring scores of Muslim refugees into the country if they had their way” (Hoppe & Puhl, 2016, p. 1). The current Polish government also criticizes the EU for not being transparent and democratic (Puhl, 2017) and demands more sovereignty for nation states (Puhl, 2018). The demand for sovereignty is often coupled with an anti-German rhetoric, depicting Germany as an aggressor that damages Poland by interfering in the country’s domestic politics (Babovnikova, 2018).

Increased expression of eurosceptic attitudes of the Polish parliament and the growing isolation goes hand in hand with the awakening of the old Polish trauma of being surrounded by enemies (Wohin treibt Polen?, 2018). One major event that illustrates this matter is the famous plane crash of 2010, killing the country’s president and other members of the Polish parliament. Many Poles believe that the accident was in truth a Russian conspiracy. This believe is also expressed by Jarosław Kaczynski, whose twin brother was among the killed passengers on board (Wohin treibt Polen?; Szumen, 2017). Kaczynski openly blamed the government at that time for taking no actions to uncover the Russian involvement in the plane crash. The EU is depicted among some Poles as too weak and too disunited to be relied on in terms of solidarity (Hoppe & Puhl, 2016). The strong emphasize on Poland’s victimhood also reflects on how Poland interprets its past. In January 2018 Polish government made it illegal to claim Polish people responsible of any crimes committed during World War II (Babovnikova, 2018; Zubrzycki, 2018).
Despite concerns regarding further EU-relations stated by the government, Kalantzis (2018) points out Poland’s open support for a Common Energy Policy and its active participation in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In 2018, the Polish government stressed the importance of the EU’s eastern policy by naming it a key dimensions of Poland’s foreign policy (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Through the EaP, Poland aims to strengthen its international position by extending its dominance in the east (Potocki, 2014; Kalantzis, 2018). Poland’s position in the debate on EU-integration is reflected in the statement of Krzysztof Szczerski (PiS): “[…] we must pursue an active policy of securing our national interests in Europe, especially in areas where strengthened integration can impinge on these interests.” (Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2014, p. 19)

4.2.5. Summary of the Poland-EU relationship throughout the years

Reflecting on Poland’s history since accession, we can conclude that the EU brought new challenges on the one hand and new opportunities on the other hand, with both of these aspects shaping Poland’s stand towards Brussels. Poland has embraced its economic development, the freedom to work and travel abroad and its new international position as a EU-member and active shaper of EU-policies (EaP). At the same time, the country stated fears to loose its independence and identity by supranational governance. It can be assumed, that Poland perceives the EU as both strengthening and weakening at the same time. Styczyńska (2014) calls this contradicting attitude on European integration the Polish dilemma, shaped by the fear to be absorbed and to be excluded at the same time. Poland’s somehow contradicting attitude on European integration goes in accordance with the multi-dimensional character of Euroscepticism, derived from the discussion in the theoretical chapter.

In consideration of the second and the third sub question, we can conclude that Poland’s relationship towards the EU underwent changes throughout the years. These changes are among others marked by the rejection to join the Eurozone in 2011, the election of a party with a more eurosceptic stand and increased EU-criticism stated by the Polish government since 2015. All these aspects mentioned are indicators for Euroscepticism, according to the model of political and instrumental Euroscepticism by Lubbers and Scheepers (2005). The increased emphasis of national values and national identity in the Eurosceptic debate, that can be seen since the election of the PiS, goes in accordance with the theory of affective Euroscepticism by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). With the current government, Poland resembles the old member states more strongly than before, considering that distrust in surrounding states, strong demands for cultural preservation and a uniform media were all mentioned as distinguishing factors between the new and the old member states (Guibernau, 2004; Toomey, 2007; Hartleb, 2012). Due to Poland’s active role in European policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, it can not be claimed that at any point of time, Poland showed serious ambitions to leave the EU. Still, the current Polish government expresses Euroscepticism more strongly than did the country’s
governments before. It can be claimed, that since 2015, Poland shows a decline in specific support as defined by Kopecky and Mudde (2002). This means that criticism is aimed on how the idea of the EU is implemented rather than challenging the idea of the European Union in general.

Despite the changes that can be seen on the Polish elite-level, we cannot surely claim that attitudes on the Polish mass-level changed equivalently. It is interesting to examine, in how far the government’s decision to reject the Eurozone is also reflected in the Polish population. Based on the model of Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) and the model of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), we assume to find possible changes on the institutional dimension. In addition, it is worth to investigate whether the election of the PiS is indeed a result of increased Euroscepticism on the mass-level. The analysis shows, that distrust with the national government was among the main factors that lead to the election of a party with a more eurosceptic stand. This is in accordance with Hooghe and Marks (2007), who describe the positive correlation between distrust in national institutions and European institutions as an important aspect of Euroscepticism on the integration dimension. An indicator for Euroscepticism on the mass-level is the increase of mass-protest with an anti-EU tenor since 2007. In this case, an increase of Euroscepticism should reflect on the integration and affective dimension, since the protest mainly addressed the issues of perceived threat to the nation and rejection of supranational governance.

5. Results

In this chapter, I will present the outcome of this study. First, I will present the outcomes of the independent and dependent variables, hence the influence years and age have on Euroscepticism according to my statistical analysis. Thereby, I will answer the four sub-questions of this study.

5.1. Euroscepticism in the general population

Differences between the years. In order to examine the nature of Polish Euroscepticism, the dependent variable Euroscepticism was measured twice, with each testing examining a different dimension of Euroscepticism. As described in the methodology chapter, the two different dimensions are institutional Euroscepticism and affective Euroscepticism. Figure 2.1. and 2.2. present the outcome of the statistical analysis, hence the influence the independent variable (year) generates on the two different dimensions of Euroscepticism.
As we can see in Figure 2.1., support on the institutional dimension is higher than scepticism in all years. There is a significant difference in answers between the years ($\chi^2(6) = 13.120, p = .041$), concerning the distribution between Eurosceptic, Eurosupportive and Neutral answers. A measures of association indicates a weak association between the two variables ($\text{Cramer’s } V = 0.04$). Therefore, the p-value can be probably explained by the large sample size rather than a significant change over the years, since also smaller differences can lead to a significant p-value in a large sample size (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Looking at the figures, there is no consistent negative correlation between Eurosupport and Euroscepticism throughout the years. Eurosupport stayed steady at 62 percent from year 2005 to 2010, only to decrease in 2015 (58 percent) and to slightly increase again in 2018 (60 percent). Also Euroscepticism rates were the same in 2005 and 2010 (26 percent), but increased in 2015 (29 percent) and continued to increase in 2018 (30 percent). The simultaneous increase of both Eurosupport and Euroscepticism from 2015 to 2018 can be described by a decline of answers in the Neutral category (14 percent in 2015 and 10 percent in 2018). To sum up, two trends can be observed regarding attitudes on the institutional dimension. Institutional Euroscepticism rose slowly but steadily throughout the years, with the biggest increase happening in 2015. The other trend can be observed from 2015 to 2018, with results becoming more divided and ranging less at the Neutral category. 2015, the year of the first change detected was marked by the parliament election in Poland. Dominant themes of the campaign were among others unpopular social reforms associated with budget deficits due to the economic crisis and the great influx of refugees to the EU. The year 2018 is internally marked by 

\[ \text{Figure 2.1.: Relation between the independent variable “year” and the dependent variable Institutional Euroscepticism} \]
the governing term of the PiS and controversial reforms associated with the new government. EU-wide, the so-called refugee crisis remains one of the dominant topics discussed.

Figure 2.2.: Relation between the independent variable “year” and the dependent variable Affective Euroscepticism

![Graph showing the results for the affective dimension. Support rates are higher than scepticism rates in all time spans tested. No significant influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable could be found, hence a rise in eurosceptic attitudes on the affective dimension cannot be confirmed ($\chi^2(6)> = 10.694, p = .98$, Cramer’s V = 0.37).](image)

**Differences within the years.** Figure 3.1., 3.2., 3.3. and 3.4. present the difference between the two dimensions of Euroscepticism at each time span assessed. As described in the methodology chapter, the dependent variable is Attitude and the independent variable is Dimension.
In year 2005, there is a significant difference between the institutional dimension and the affective dimension ($X^2(2) = 8,241, p = .016$). However, we can only find a weak association between the independent and the dependent variable (Cramer’s $V = 0.066$). Support rates are higher on the institutional dimension (62 percent) than on the affective dimension (55 percent). Scepticism rates on the institutional dimension are 26 percent, in comparison to 30 percent scepticism rate at the affective dimension (see fig. 3.1.).
In year 2010, there is a significant difference between the institutional dimension and the affective dimension ($\chi^2(2) = 12,255$, $p = .002$). However, the association between the independent and the dependent variable is still only weak (Cramer’s $V = 0.078$). Support rates are higher on the institutional dimension (62 percent) than on the affective dimension (55 percent). Scepticism rates on the institutional dimension are 26 percent, in comparison to 29 percent scepticism rate at the affective dimension (fig. 3.2.)
In year 2015, there is a significant difference between the institutional dimension and the affective dimension ($X^2(2) > 10,858$, $p = .004$). However, the association between the independent and the dependent variable is weak (Cramer’s $V = 0.074$). Support rates are higher on the institutional dimension (58 percent) than on the affective dimension (52 percent). Scepticism rates between the two dimensions differ less than in the years before (29 percent on the institutional dimension and 30 percent on the affective dimension). Neutral rates are higher on the affective dimension (18 percent) than on the institutional dimension (14 percent) (fig. 3.3.).
In year 2018, there is a significant difference between the institutional dimension and the affective dimension ($\chi^2(2) = 7,234, p = .027$). However, there is only a weak association between the independent and the dependent variable (Cramer’s $V = .06$). The differences are smaller than in the year before, following the trend of 2015. Support rates are slightly higher on the institutional dimension (60 percent) than on the affective dimension (58 percent). Scepticism rates between the two dimensions differ less than in 2005 and 2010 (30 percent on the institutional dimension and 28 percent on the affective dimension). Neutral rates are higher on the affective dimension (14 percent) than on the institutional dimension (10 percent) (fig. 3.4.).

To sum up, the institutional dimension enjoys higher support than the affective dimension consistently throughout the years. However, the differences between the dimensions are smaller since 2015. This is also because of increased rates of scepticism on the institutional dimension that can be seen in 2015, the year of elections in Poland and in 2018, the most actual year under the current Polish government. The current Polish government has introduced a number of reforms, described as eurosceptic by the international public and is also criticized for using negative rhetoric against the EU and its member states. This negative rhetoric is mainly aimed at institutional factors of the EU. However, the government also expresses concerns regarding polish culture and values. Throughout all years, the Cramer’s $V$ value was low. It can be
concluded that the significant p-value was partly caused by the large sample size and that the differences between the dimensions throughout all years, although present, were only small.

5.2. Euroscepticism in the youth population

As shown in figure 4, support rates are higher and scepticism rates are lower in the youth population. The difference between the youth population and the general population is significant ($\chi^2(1) = 6.167, p = .013$). However, the association between the independent and the dependent variable is just weak (Cramer’s V = 0.061), despite the significance depicted by Pearson’s chi-square. Thereby, the claim that Polish youth depicts higher levels of Euroscepticism cannot be supported. On the contrary, the results indicate slightly higher levels of Eurosupport among the Polish youth.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to understand recent developments in Poland in the larger picture of Euroscepticism and its impact on member states. Despite cultural and historical differences among member states, various studies aim to identify an underlying pattern of factors and causes that shape the face of a phenomena referred as Euroscepticism both in scientific and non-
scientific literature. This study intends to examine the case of Poland according to these patterns pointed out by scholars. Moreover, the aim was to test whether the concept of Euroscepticism and its existence in a population throughout the years could be examined with an existing study measuring general satisfaction with the EU, in this case the Eurobarometer. The Eurobarometer was chosen due to its large database and its coverage of multiple topics.

6.1. Discussion of Results

The research question this study aims to answer is: How has Euroscepticism in Poland developed since the great enlargement? Four sub-questions were formulated in order to answer this research question. The first sub-question refers to the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. Two dimensions of Euroscepticism were examined, in order to gain a deeper understanding of this topic. The dimensions rely on theoretical discussions of the concept of Euroscepticism. A more specific look at the Polish case in the analysis indicates a relevance of these two dimensions in the discussion of Polish Euroscepticism. The first part of the analysis shows the importance of the integration dimension in shaping Polish attitudes towards the EU. The relevance of the integration dimension is indicated in the way the Catholic Church influences attitudes towards the EU and in Poland’s active participation in common European neighbourhood policies. The Catholic Church and its attempts to protect Polish values highlights the importance of the affective dimension for the nature of Polish Euroscepticism. The affective dimension also gains relevance with a deeper look into Polish history. As revealed in the theory and the analysis of this study, Poland is a country that repeatedly struggled for independence, hence the fear of loosing independence and national identity is a fear grounded in the country’s experiences in the last decades and centuries. The second sub-questions aims at describing Polish Euroscepticism towards the years. The third sub-question aims at describing events that came parallel to changes in attitudes. The integration dimension is of relevance for the second sub-question because of the Polish call for sovereignty, that especially shows in the decision against a common currency and the Polish refusal to agree on a shared European responsibility for handling the great influx of refugees since 2015. Furthermore, the Polish government after 2015 criticized the EU for being intransparent and undemocratic, thereby expressing institutional Euroscepticism. The affective dimension is of relevance as well, which can be seen in the rhetoric used by the Polish government, depicting Poland as a country surrounded by enemies rather than by neighbours and cooperation partners.

The statistical analysis through Pearson’s chi-squared test shows a significant change in attitudes over time in the case of Institutional Euroscepticism. However, a closer examination through Cramer’s V analysis shows that the differences over time were still small. Due to this conflicting results, it can be claimed that there is a slight change in attitudes throughout the years, but it remains unsure whether attitudes on the institutional dimension indeed underwent a significant change throughout the years. Moreover, the results do not show a linear change in attitudes,
hence this study could not confirm a clear trend in attitude change for the Polish population regarding integration Euroscepticism. A significant change over time in the case of affective Euroscepticism could not be proved in this study. The assumption of a rise in eurosceptic attitudes on the affective dimension in the Polish population since the election of the PiS could not be undermined.

The fourth research question aims to examine differences between the youth population and the general population concerning EU-attitudes. This research could not undermine the assumption, that Euroscepticism is more prevalent among the youth generation. Far more, the analysis shows that Polish people from the age group of 15 to 24 currently show a higher rate of EU-support and a lower rate of Euroscepticism than the general population in the country. The findings might be explained by the fact, that it is especially the Polish youth that takes advantage of opportunities delivered by the EU, such as the freedom to study, work and travel abroad. Also, it might be explained by the fact, that young Poles were more prone to have formed a European identity than the generations above them. While the Pearson’s chi-square shows a significant difference between the age groups, Cramer’s V only shows a weak association between age and attitude. Hence, it can be said that there is a slightly higher support for the European Union among the Polish youth, but also in this case it cannot be clearly claimed that the differences between the age groups are indeed significant.

6.2. Limitations and incentives for future research

This research relies on an existing survey, the Eurobarometer, which brought several limitations to this research. The data drawn from this study come in aggregated form, hence a factor analysis could not be conducted in order to test whether the choice of questions were indeed rightly applied to the different dimensions. Instead, the choice of questions relies merely on the theoretical part. For further research, it would be advisable to undermine the choice of questions through statistical means. Moreover, the questions included in the Eurobarometer survey differ from year to year. That means, that a number of questions had to be excluded in this study. Though meaningful and relevant to this study, these questions could not be included because they did not cover the time span examined in this study. This fact rendered a limited set of questions applied to the two dimensions. A higher number of questions is advisable for future research. Limitations regarding the choice of questions also showed up when assessing youth Euroscepticism. The theoretical part of this study indicates the relevance of a third dimension of Euroscepticism, namely Instrumental Euroscepticism. This dimension is not included in the statistical analysis due to limitations set by the Eurobarometer as explained in the methodology part. However, also the analysis shows the relevance of the instrumental dimension. Poland underwent huge economic changes, a high number of Poles studies and lives abroad, thus embraces new opportunities that came with the Schengen Area. Furthermore, the Polish government shows intentions to extent its international influence, using EU-programmes and
alliances. The instrumental dimensions could be taken account in further research. Specification of results according to demographic characteristics are only presented for a certain number of questions. That means, that this study could not use the same set of questions as used for the first three sub-questions when comparing attitudes of the Polish youth to attitudes of the general population. The questions included did now allow to measure Euroscepticism on different dimensions. Instead I had to tread Euroscepticism as a one-dimensional phenomena.

The results of this study lead to following suggestions: First, future research should focus more on means and possibilities to measure the concept of Euroscepticism. The concept of Euroscepticism remains a relevant topic in academic literature, however, means to grasp this term by statistical measurements remain limited as they mostly rely on existing surveys as the Eurobarometer. For further research, it is advisable to develop an own instrument that measures Euroscepticism directly. This instrument should especially give justice to the complexity of this issue, hence delivering a mean to examine not only the mere presence of Euroscepticism but also its specific nature. For example, questions should relate to the different dimensions of Euroscepticism that can be derived from theory. Also, in order to make comparisons over time more possible, the questions of a long-term instrument should remain identical over the years. All question should make use of a uniform answer-scale. Secondly, more research should be devoted into the link between elite- and mass-level Euroscepticism. The results of this research indicate that the level of Euroscepticism on the elite-level is not necessarily equivalent to the level of Euroscepticism on the mass-level. Also, the reciprocal influence of both levels deserves deeper examination. Further studies could rely on existing examinations on mass- and elite opinions such as by Steenbergen et al., but address the issue of Euroscepticism more directly. Finally, voting eurosceptic parties is not solely a reflection of dissatisfaction with the EU. In the case of Poland, dissatisfaction with the national government led to the electoral success of a party with a more eurosceptic stand. It is recommendable for further research to investigate the positive correlation between distrust in the national and the supranational government and in how far this correlation differs between the new and the old member states.
References


Winstone, A. (2018). *To what extent has Euroscepticism impacted upon policy development within the European Union?* Retrieved August 6, 2018, from *Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities* Web Site https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/64600/s2093898thesis_deposit.pdf?sequence=1


