Citizens’ initiatives

How municipalities regulate community self-organisation

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Preface

In the period that I studied Public Administration at the University of Twente, I became increasingly interested in how rules are used by the public sector. To me, the book *Red Tape, Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses* by Herbert Kaufman has always been a favourite. Because the book’s title includes the negatively connoted ‘Red Tape’, it is easy to misinterpret its message for a critique of rules and bureaucracy in general. It actually contains a much more nuanced message: On the one hand, rules are controversial and associated with compliance burdens and inefficiency. On the other hand, rules and procedures are formulated in an attempt to offer democratic guarantees such as equal treatment, legality and predictability. In the course of my studies, with the ‘Regulation & Innovation’-specialisation, I was given the opportunity to further explore the inner workings of these two sides of legal regimes in the public sector. The final product of that exploration lies on your desk - or more likely, is displayed on your screen.

Writing this thesis would not have been possible without my supervisors, Dr. Pieter-Jan Klok and Prof. Dr. Bas Denters. Their help has been of tremendous value. Pieter-Jan and Bas, thank you for your time, patience, ideas, suggestions and feedback. I admire your expertise in this field.

Thank you, Erna, for being part of this journey, and for the many more to come.
Thank you, mom and dad, for being the best parents I could have wished for.

That leaves me with the hope that this thesis will give you, the reader, pause for thought. If you wish to discuss this subject with me after reading this thesis, please do not hesitate.

Alexander ter Avest
Abstract

This research discusses that citizen participation and citizens’ initiatives are part of a widely observed trend in the Dutch public administration: a transformation from government to governance. The national government has high expectations of citizen participation, self-sufficiency and a ‘DIY-ethic’. However, the control-focused culture of municipalities seems to frustrate this transition from government to governance (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016, p. 12). Therefore, this study researched how two municipalities that have partially transitioned to governance by employing wijkbudget policies, formulated legal regimes that simultaneously provide enough policy freedom for citizens (or rather, neighbourhood councils) and adequate control for municipalities.

In this context of citizen participation, some municipalities opt to subsidise citizens’ initiatives with wijkbudget. By providing wijkbudget (a financial subsidy aimed at improving a neighbourhood’s social cohesion, participation or quality of life), to be distributed by neighbourhood councils that consist of local residents, municipalities give substance to those high expectations of the Dutch public administration. In the practise of wijkbudgetten, municipalities find themselves in the difficult position where they must cooperate on a level playing field with other actors, but experience a disproportionately large responsibility for the spending of public money. The hardship that some municipalities experience in this regard, is reflected by a recent report of the Dutch National Ombudsman. The report states that, besides the control-focused culture, laws and regulations are notable impeding factors in the context of citizen participation (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2018, p. 6).

In this thesis, a systematic way to analyse the content of municipalities’ wijkbudget-related legal regimes has been developed based on work of Ostrom (2005) and Brandsen et al. (2006), providing a framework to assess how much policy freedom and control a regulatory regime provides. When the framework was applied to two empiric cases, it exposed several similarities in how the regulatory regimes provide policy freedom and control:

- First, the regimes place very minimal restrictions in terms of which organisations may fill the position of neighbourhood council (providing relatively much policy freedom for potential neighbourhood councils and little control for municipalities);
- Second, the regimes prescribe only generally formulated goals of wijkbudget policy (e.g., improvement of quality of life, cleaner living environment), creating policy freedom that can be filled in more specifically by neighbourhood councils (providing
relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and a limited amount of control for municipalities); 

- Third, the regimes provide a ‘bare bones’ description of how neighbourhood councils should reach their decisions, while simultaneously reserving the right for municipalities to intervene in exceptional cases (providing a moderate amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and a moderate amount of control for municipalities); 

- Fourth, the regimes provide room for neighbourhood councils to formulate additional rules to the municipalities’ regulatory regime (e.g. ‘we shall prioritise initiatives aimed at the interest of the elderly’) at their own discretion (providing a moderate amount of freedom for neighbourhood councils and a moderate amount of control for municipalities). 

Even though there is room for improvement of the framework, this explorative first use of the framework demonstrates that the balance between policy freedom and control in participative arenas can be systematically exposed in a meaningful way, based on a content analysis of written rules.
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1. Introduction

The premise is simple. A democracy is not truly democratic when its inhabitants do not participate. When citizen participation is limited to the occasional vote on election day, society is left to be governed by politicians and their staff from the political realm. But in how far will these administrators be able to rule in accordance with the will of the people, when the people are generally disengaged?

1.1 Motivation

There are signs that the gap between the political world of those who rule, and the ordinary world of those who are ruled, is widening. Political participation is low, and those who do participate are often at the top end of the distribution of income and wealth (Parvin, 2018, p. 32) – resulting in a concentration of power of the already rich and wealthy. As such, low election turnout, decreased political party memberships and empty audience seats at municipal council meetings can be seen as signs that indeed, politics and society are becoming ever more estranged from each other. As the former Dutch National Ombudsman put it: *Our representative democracy increasingly demonstrates an inability to provide the dialogue and participation that citizens ask for* (Brenninkmeijer, 2019, p. 46). Underneath the surface of a seemingly functioning system, a democratic deficit lurks.

To stymie the democratic deficit, local governments seek to further develop and revitalise democracy (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016, p. 7). One of their options is to expand citizen participation in the public realm. The government’s expectations of citizen participation are high (Van Haperen, 2014, p. 8), and unsurprisingly so: “The vast majority of democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory in particular, either implicitly or explicitly assumes the need for widespread citizen participation. It requires that all citizens possess the *opportunity* to participate and also that they *take up* this opportunity” (Parvin, 2018, p. 31). Citizens are expected to build social bridges between themselves, but also between themselves and the local government, and “are ought, invited, stimulated, begged, tempted to be active citizens” (Tonkens, 2006, p. 5). In the Dutch setting, wijkbudget\(^1\) policies have been developed by municipalities to provide financial support for just that: an opportunity to participate, while keeping the threshold to take up this opportunity as low as possible.

\(^1\) Wijkbudget: Dutch noun, literally ‘neighbourhood budget’. Plural: ‘wijkbudgetten’.
Wijkbudget policies are one of many possible options to revitalise democracy, but are especially relevant because they are part of a contemporary transformation of government; from a hierarchy-based approach towards a network-based approach. In this new era, governments are increasingly “expected to work more in networks where they have less authority” (Herranz, 2007, p. 2). Traditionally, the government policy process was “hierarchically organized” (Herranz, 2007, p. 10), with a clear distinction between a deciding authority (government) and citizens. In the case of wijkbudget policies however, the policy process is much more organised like a network, which means that deciding power is evenly spread between actors. Under wijkbudget policies, governments are an equal party to other actors in the policy arena. Van Heffen & Klok (2000) have elaborated on the differences between the hierarchy-based approach and the network-based approach. On the basis of their book chapter, the two approaches can be distinguished as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hierarchy-based approach</th>
<th>Network-based approach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participant positioning</strong></td>
<td>Clear distinction between those with authority and those without authority. The number of authority positions is fixed; the number of non-authority positions (citizens) may vary greatly.</td>
<td>Clear distinction between members (those who are in) and non-members (those who are out). The number of network members may vary greatly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision taking</strong></td>
<td>Decisions are taken by those in authority positions. Authority positions are assigned by legal rules, which state which actions can/cannot be taken. Not all participants are equal.</td>
<td>Decisions are taken on a collective basis by network members; non-members take no part in decision making. Network members are predominantly equal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource access</strong></td>
<td>Authorities have access to bureaucratic and political resources.</td>
<td>Network members are mutually interdependent in terms of their resources. Individuals have access to personal resources, which are supplemented by other members’ resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Resource distribution | Authorities decide on the distribution of resources, but are bound to a general legal framework. | Resources are distributed through (usually) collective and (sometimes) individual decisions, aimed at the mutual benefits of network members.

Information sharing | Information is shared by authorities, who motivate decisions in the public debate. | Information sharing is restricted between network members.

Actor motivation | Authorities serve the common interest; citizens serve their personal interest. | Network members are motivated by shared common interests and personal interests.

Table 1. Main differences between a hierarchic- or network-based government approach. Based on Van Heffen & Klok (2000, pp. 161-165).

Table 1 shows that the transformation from a hierarchy-based approach to a network-based approach, the transformation from government to governance, places all actors on a much more level playing field. No longer can a government be the authoritative, principle actor in the policy arena. Cooperation with other stakeholders, as fellow network members, is the new norm.

And indeed, the Dutch government increasingly steers for governance instead of government. In participation society, Dutch citizens are expected to actively participate in order to make society a better place for all. Participation society aims to let “citizens and local communities take more responsibilities” (www.tweedekamer.nl, 2014) and is assumed to improve society’s well-being (Oude Vrielink, 2017, p. 1), which in turn may stymie the democratic deficit.

Wijkbudgetten policies set a framework through which society can improve upon itself, with as little governmental interference as possible. In network terms, it is a form of member-to-member policy making: neighbourhood councils (consisting of local residents) voluntarily handle wijkbudget requests (made by local residents); and eventually determine who is granted some of the available budget. In light of the transformation of government to governance, this research aims to provide a timely study of the particular legal regimes that are installed when a government takes a network approach.
1.2 A dilemma between policy freedom and control

Wijkbudget is conceptualised as a financial subsidy, made available by municipalities, for local citizens’ initiatives; aimed at improving a neighbourhood’s social cohesion, participation or quality of life (Lunsing, 2009, p. 73). The idea behind wijkbudget is that locals know best what their neighbourhood needs in terms of social cohesion, participation and quality of life. Therefore, they are allowed ‘policy freedom’ to spend wijkbudget on what they deem necessary. This policy freedom to take decisions on wijkbudget spending, based on the assumption that locals know best, is a key element of wijkbudget philosophy.

Policy freedom for citizens is not unlimited, though. Wijkbudget policies are undoubtedly shaped by a legal regime because municipalities, being public institutions, will have to show that money is spent responsibly and controllably. One will agree that when wijkbudget is used to fund a leisurely city trip, public money is not spent responsibly. In this situation, where citizens need policy freedom and where municipalities need control over the wijkbudget allocation process, a dilemma arises. Citizens require policy freedom to act in what they think is their best interest – the key element of wijkbudgetten. The dilemma is not just the fact that policy freedom is required, it is also in how municipalities justify the behaviour of citizens. How do they make sure that citizens solely operate within the boundaries of that given policy freedom? In general, most will agree that we should treat government money in a just way. But when citizens feel that they need to ‘jump through hoops’ in order to obtain wijkbudget, they may not use this opportunity to participate at all.

So how can municipalities compose a legal regime that maximises policy freedom, while still fulfilling its duty of spending public money responsibly and controllably? This research aims to understand how municipalities handle this dilemma. Through a case study of two municipalities’ wijkbudget policies, it aims to explore how municipalities set up legal regimes that provide policy freedom for citizens’ initiatives. To that end, the following research question and sub-questions have been formulated.

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2 Literal translation of Dutch ‘beleidsvrijheid’: freedom to make decisions without involvement of another actor.

A further elaboration of policy freedom is included in chapter 2.


1.3 Research questions

On the basis of the dilemma between policy freedom and control, a research question has been formulated. The research question will be answered through two corresponding sub-questions, also presented below. The selected municipalities, Enschede and Hellendoorn, will be further elaborated upon in chapter 3 of this thesis.

Research question:
- How do municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities?

Sub-questions:
- What legal regime applies to wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn?
- How can these legal regimes be described in terms of how they handle the dilemma between policy freedom and control?

1.4 Societal and scientific relevance

Research into the legal regime of wijkbudgetten is relevant to society because public institutions assume an increasingly smaller role. We might argue that the government, in the context of a broad societal move from welfare state towards participation society (Vreugdenhil, 2012, p. 13), assumes that citizen participation will increase as the government withdraws. As citizens are increasingly expected to take matters into their own hands, wijkbudgetten may become a key resource to success. From society’s perspective, insight into how policy freedom is provided will help to maximise the impact of wijkbudget policies. For municipalities that wish to implement wijkbudgetten policies, this thesis will help in their quest to find a balance between policy freedom and control.

Research into the legal regime of wijkbudgetten is relevant to science because to the author’s knowledge, no research into how the formulation of legal regimes handles the balance between policy freedom and control has been conducted. This research aims to provide a first exploration of that field. Also, this research is embedded in a larger field on how rules function in the public sector. Known for its tendency to bureaucratise, the public sector finds itself in a bad light. While legal regimes may result in burdensome excessive administrative procedures, this research theorises that legal regimes may also result in certainty, absence of conflicts, and increased equality. Almost two decades ago, Goodsell (2000, p. 375) already pointed out that rules are often regarded “a problem to be solved rather than an indispensable feature of democratic governance”. To this day, that view does not seem to have changed.
much. A study of legal regimes will help assess how municipalities approach citizens’ initiatives and other participatory issues. In that way, this research helps to acquire a better view on how rules function as features of democratic governance.
2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, an overview of relevant literature will be presented. It provides an outline of what can be learnt from previous contributors to this field.

2.1 Community self-organisation

Municipalities provide wijkbudget for a specific type of citizen participation: citizens’ initiatives. While citizen participation may consist of participating in government policy, citizens’ initiatives are emphatically un-rooted in government policy, and instead initiated by community members themselves.

Citizens’ initiatives, or community self-organisation, is no new phenomenon. Forms of community self-organisation in Western Europe can be traced back to the years of 1000-1500, when village members “voluntarily contributed to collective provisions to take care of the local poor” (Denters, 2016, p. 231); and when “urban workers developed forms of voluntary mutual aid and self-management to make provisions to unemployment, sickness and disability and old age” (Denters, 2016, p. 231). As such, community self-organisation predates the twentieth century policies of the welfare state. In the twentieth century, the welfare state gradually replaced these voluntary measures of solidarity, ‘formalising’ them into collective policies controlled by the state. The organised, professional welfare state took over from local, semi-organised communities. Recently however, calls for the reverse of this ‘state takeover’ have been made – modernising the democratic welfare state by strengthening civil society.

Denters (2016) mentions that this new context of democratic welfare state reform is determined by an ideological zeitgeist rooted in Christian-Democracy and Leftist political thinking. Christian-Democratic political theory adheres to the principle of subsidiarity: “[T]he state should not be active in domains where families or communities themselves can adequately take care of the needs of their members” (Denters, 2016, p. 232). Leftist political thinking stood at the basis of nineteenth century forms of community self-organisation - such as cooperatives, mutual aid groups and cooperative savings groups -, aimed at improving the lives of the urban poor.

With citizens’ initiatives and participation being a sensitive political topic, the need to clearly conceptualise the concept rises. Citizens’ initiatives are conceptualised as a type of “public governance, based on principles of self-governance” (Denters, 2016, p. 233), and will be ideal-typically understood as an activity with five characteristics:
1. The activity is initiated by citizens;
2. Citizens act in groups;
3. The activity is aimed at the common interest;
4. Citizens themselves decide about the aims and means of the project;
5. Citizens actively participate in the implementation of the project.

### 2.2 Wijkbudget

Wijkbudget is aimed at improving a neighbourhood’s social cohesion, participation or quality of life (Lunsing, 2009, p. 73). It is a financial subsidy to support certain citizens’ initiatives. By financially supporting citizens’ initiatives, municipalities answer the call for democratic welfare state reform. Through what Denters (2015, p. 3) describes as *the socialisation of the local public administration*, this type of citizen influence in local public administration is growing. In the transformation from government to governance, wijkbudget helps citizens to implement their own policy proposals, independent from the government’s policy agenda. Figure 1 presents a common path of wijkbudget distribution, flowing from government into participation society. Wijkbudget is transferred to neighbourhood councils, who in turn transfer wijkbudget to citizens that wish to fund their initiatives.

Because municipalities are public institutions, accountability for wijkbudget spending becomes an inevitable part of the equation. After all, elected officials’ accountability to citizens is a “cornerstone of democratic governance” (May, 2007, p. 11). With the public administration moving away from hierarchical instruments, towards more collaborative government forms, accountability is becoming an “increasingly complex and difficult concept for public administration” (Peters, 2014, p. 212). Traditionally, public accountability is arranged on the presumption that “to legitimately call someone to account requires that the
actor has autonomy and discretion that can be used or misused” (Olsen, 2015, p. 427). Therefore, municipalities demand that neighbourhood councils justify their allocation of wijkbudget (see Figure 1).

The result is a “careful balancing act” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 133) between municipalities’ accountability for spending, and neighbourhood councils’ acquired policy freedom to spend acquired wijkbudget. To handle this tension, municipalities have to set a legal regime. Government officials are advised that citizens’ initiatives work best with “less rules” (lokaledemocratieinbeweging.nl, n.d.) – suggesting as little rules as possible. However, rules also serve “to ensure that government processes are representative and accountable and to meet the demands, often fragmented, of citizens and interest groups” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 275). This suggests that to some degree, rules are a necessity for good governance. So how do municipalities set a legal regime that is light enough to promote citizens’ initiative; but dense enough to provide the desired warrants that rules provide?

### 2.3 The concept of rules

Perhaps the most common association with government rules and guidelines is the association with bureaucracy. While bureaucracy has a negative connotation to it, the available literature argues that government rules and guidelines also provide benefits. The concept of bureaucracy in the form of red tape shall now be briefly considered, followed by a more substantial conceptualisation of what rules are. This chapter concludes with a discussion of green tape – red tape’s counterpart.

#### 2.3.1 Red tape


Indeed, governments appear particularly sensitive to the instalment of rules, and are therefore at the risk of producing red tape. As stated before however, rules also “ensure that government processes are representative and accountable and to meet the demands, often fragmented, of
citizens and interest groups” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 275). So, a legal regime may produce red tape for some actors, while simultaneously producing merits for other actors.

### 2.3.2 The concept of rules in the wijkbudget context

The red tape viewpoint reflects the idea that rules are either ‘bad’ or ‘good’. The sentiment that public institutions produce bureaucracy and unnecessary rules is widespread. To those versed in public administration theory, this is not entirely unsurprising. Governments deal with wicked problems, with unclear causes, consequences and solutions – contrary to market parties, which have a clear indicator or performance: profit. Keeping (budgetary) control in a wicked environment is comparatively hard, which leads to the implementation of rules in an attempt to minimise uncertainty and risk. In this way, rules provide control and certainty – which proves that one person’s unnecessary and burdensome rule may very well be another person’s very necessary guarantee. With this in mind, we shall now further conceptualise what a rule is.

Ostrom (1999, p. 36) defines a rule as an enforced prescription “about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted”. In her conceptualisation, which will be adopted for this research, she theorises that rules arise from human efforts to achieve order and predictability in a specific social space of interaction (action arena\(^3\)) between citizens.

Rules formulate obligations: \(x \text{ shall do/not do } y\). While it may be tempting to view those obligations as unnecessary and burdensome bureaucratisation, another important function of rules is that they formulate rights (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 133). Lastly, the wording of rules sets the size of the policy freedom in which actors can move. The manner in which rules are formulated does “not always have to be detailed and cover all possible situations” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 133) to still produce a viable amount of order and predictability.

To illustrate how rules formulate both obligations (a) and rights (b), and how they set the size of the policy freedom (c), it may be best to use an example.

Let us suppose that the following rule is part of a legal regime concerning wijkbudgetten:

*The decision to allow or deny wijkbudget will be publicised in writing within 10 days after submission of the request.*

\(^3\)The conceptual unit of action arena will be elaborated upon later in this thesis.
This rule obliges (a) the wijkbudget-providing actor to decide and publicise on wijkbudget requests within a 10-day period. As such, the rule may very well be experienced as unnecessary and burdensome by whoever is tasked to make this decision. On the other hand, this rule also formulates a right (b) for the wijkbudget-requesting actor to have their request decided on within 10 days. As such, the rule may very well be experienced as beneficial by whoever requested wijkbudget. Lastly, we see that this rule does not specify the form of written publication. Because it leaves open options like letter or e-mail, it provides a certain amount of policy freedom (c) – which would have been less if the rule had specified the form of written publication.

The above example shows that rules formulate obligations, rights and set the policy freedom size. We must also be aware of the opposite: when rules are not present, they provide no obligations and provide no rights. The key in setting up a proper legal regime therefore lies not in the presence or absence of rules, but in finding the right balance between the policy freedom and controls that these rules provide. After all, from the wijkbudget logic of ‘locals know best’ follows that these local citizens need adequate policy freedom to properly carry out their initiative – while government logic prescribes that public money cannot be spent without some form of control over how that spending is done.

2.3.3 Green tape

To comment on the merits that rules have, we shall borrow the term “green tape” from DeHart-Davis (2009, p. 362) Her point is that where red tape represents ineffective rules, green tape represents effective rules. A framework that elaborates on the merits of rules, has been provided by Klok & Denters (2018). They argue that rules in the form have the potential to eliminate “frustration, distrust and lack of motivation to participate in future processes” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 133). They discern three main functions of effective rules in the public sector:

*Generating certainty*

Perhaps the most obvious result of ineffective rules is the “uncertainty of participants once they become active in participatory arenas” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 132). As a result of rule uncertainty, citizens feel compelled to develop their own rule formulating procedure: they discuss the current rules’ content, and will try to clarify and specify these current rules until they seem fit for purpose. The benefits gained by not clarifying the rules in advance, are then mitigated by forcing citizens into a rule formulating process. Citizens may actually regard the rule formulating process they
have to go through as a form of transaction costs, that could have been prevented if the process were decently organised from the start. The result is frustration, not only because of the transaction costs experienced, but also because the main project’s progress is stalled during the rule formulating process. As such, municipalities that provide clear ex ante rules for wijkbudgetten, will prevent frustration among those who handle the wijkbudgetten.

**Preventing conflicts**
While a discussion on the rules’ content can be harmful to the wijkbudgetten process, actual conflict between citizens on the meaning of the rules will frustrate the process to an even greater extent. Open conflicts between participants in the policy arena will result in an impasse for the duration of the conflict, but also in frustration, non-cooperative attitudes of participants, and even in participants exiting the process altogether. Again, clear ex ante rule formulation by the municipality will be able to prevent conflicts and their undesirable results.

**Increasing equality**
A lack of clear rules will allow participants with higher levels of skill and resources to have more influence than those who have lower levels of skill or resources. As such, unclear rules lead to what is known as a “big mouth democracy or […] diploma bureaucracy” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 132), where those with better skills or resources call the shots. This contrasts with wijkbudgetten policies, that are aimed at consensus and shared support for decisions. Therefore, clear rules on how decisions are to be established in an equal manner will grant all participants with equal opportunity and equal influence in the process.

### 2.4 The IAD Framework
The wijkbudget distribution process takes place in a context organised by rules. In order to describe these rules, this research will use the institutional analysis and development (IAD) Framework. The IAD framework introduces a conceptual unit called an action arena, which can be used for “analysis, prediction and explanation of behaviour and outcomes” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 153). For an analysis of wijkbudget legal regimes, this research shall borrow the action arena conceptual unit from the IAD framework. Action arenas consist of two components: an action situation and an actor.
The action situation

An action situation concerns the social space in which individuals interact. It involves “(1) participants in (2) positions, who must decide among diverse (3) actions in the light of the (4) information they possess about how actions are (5) linked to potential (6) outcomes and the (7) costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 153).

The actor

An actor is a participant in the action situation, who has “(1) preferences on outcomes, (2) information processing capabilities to make decisions based on (3) selection criteria for actions using (4) resources that enable them to take these actions” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 153-154).

Furthermore, action arenas are characterised by three exogenous variables: (1) attributes of the physical world, (2) attributes of the community in which the action arena is situated and (3) the rules in use. Figure 2 presents a graphic representation of the above information:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 2. Exogenous variables characterise an action arena.

The rules-in-use variable is particularly relevant to this research, as it pertains to the legal regime of wijkbudgetten. The first step of this research will be to identify the rules-in-use regarding wijkbudgetten, and the next step will then consist of a content analysis of these rules in terms of the policy freedom they provide.

The rules-in-use

This research will use the IAD framework to systematically identify the rules-in-use in the selected legal regimes. It is useful because in terms of rules, the framework provides “a basic set of ‘things to look for’” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 140). The IAD Framework explicitly includes the notion that rules are formulated through a multi-layer system of operational and collective action arenas: “The rules that apply to any operational arena (where participants
directly affect day-to-day decisions) are set by (are the outcome of) collective action arenas” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 126). We may very well imagine that the municipality has competences to set rules for the arena in which wijkbudget is distributed. In turn, the rules for the collective action arena are set by constitutional arenas: arenas on the state level that decide on the content of the laws that define the competences of the municipality to even set rules in the first place. So, a quest to find the rules that provide freedom and control in the specific arena of wijkbudgetten would inevitably snowball from one arena into the next. Therefore, this research limits the analysis to those rules that are (a) laid down on paper and (b) pointed to by municipal staff when asked where the rules on wijkbudget distribution can be found.

The IAD framework suggests the following rule types:

**Position Rules**

Position rules create positions, which are “anonymous slots that are filled by participants and to which specific action sets are assigned” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 193). By obtaining a position, participants become authorised for certain actions that correspond to the position. In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of a position rule would be:

\[ \text{A neighbourhood council is chaired by a chairman.} \]

Another important aspect of position rules is that they may set the number of participants. In terms of policy freedom, a position rule may narrowly define a fixed number of participants per position; or broadly define an upper and lower bound of participants. An example of a narrow position rule in this regard would be:

\[ \text{A neighbourhood council consists of five participants.} \]

These two rules are position rules because they create chairman and participant positions; while also limiting the number of participants that may enter said positions.

**Boundary Rules**

Boundary rules determine how positions can be obtained. They are often called entry and exit rules, and define “(1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the process that determines which eligible participants may enter (or must enter) positions, and (3) how an individual may leave (or must leave) a position” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 194). In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of a boundary rule would be:

\[ \text{A neighbourhood council position can only be obtained by a neighbourhood resident.} \]
This rule is a boundary rule, because it determines how neighbourhood council positions can (exclusively) be obtained by participants who live in a certain geographic area.

**Choice Rules**

Choice rules determine which actions must, must not, or may be performed by participants, based on the position that these participants hold. In other words: choice rules provide an action set for a position. In relation to the policy freedom of participants, choice rules may broaden or narrow the range of actions that participants have access to. As such, they set “the basic rights, duties, liberties” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 201) of participants in wijkbudget policies. In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of a choice rule would be:

| A neighbourhood council will hold a meeting at least every 4 weeks to assess wijkbudget requests. |

This rule is a choice rule because it provides a ‘can do’ and ‘cannot do’: This neighbourhood council can hold a meeting every 4 weeks or less to assess wijkbudget requests; while it cannot wait more than 4 weeks to hold a meeting to assess wijkbudget requests.

**Aggregation Rules**

Aggregation rules determine whether decisions need to be taken by one or by multiple participants of the action arena. In other words, aggregation rules decide whether decisions are taken collectively or not. We may imagine a situation of ‘shared power’, where choice rules have assigned “multiple positions partial control over the same set of action variables” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 202). Aggregation rules then make clear who decides on certain actions or activities. In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of an aggregation rule would be:

| Decisions on wijkbudget allocation are made by all members of the neighbourhood council, on a majority vote basis. |

This rule is an aggregation rule because it determines how wijkbudget decisions are to be made: By members of the neighbourhood council, through a majority vote.

**Information Rules**

Information rules determine which information is available to participants. They channel the information flow, and “assign the obligation, permission, or prohibition to communicate to participants in positions at particular decision nodes, and the
language and form in which communication will take place” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 206). In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of an information rule would be:

\[
\text{A motivated decision to grant or deny wijkbudget will be sent via e-mail to the applicant.}
\]

This rule is an information rule because it provides an information flow from a neighbourhood council to an applying citizen on whether their request for wijkbudget will be met.

**Payoff Rules**

Payoff rules are about the costs and benefits of attendance in the action arena. They “assign external rewards or sanctions to particular actions that have been taken or to particular readings on outcome state variables” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 207). In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of a payoff rule would be:

\[
\text{The municipality provides a meeting room for neighbourhood councils’ meetings, free of charge.}
\]

This is a payoff rule, because it provides an example of a benefit of attendance of the action arena: a free-of-charge, suitable meeting room for neighbourhood councils to hold their meetings in.

**Scope Rules**

Scope rules determine the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected in the situation. They pertain to the entire action arena. As such, they are ‘end-of-pipe’-rules, because regulatees may choose how to comply under condition that the formulated end goal be reached. We will have to take note of the fact that scope rules are similar to choice rules, in the regard that they both determine what ‘must, must not, or may’ be done. However, they are different in the sense that scope rules are about the final outcomes of the entire arena, where choice rules are about mid-process actions per position that can be undertaken.

This research makes a further theoretical distinction between content scope rules and procedural scope rules. Content scope rules pertain to the general outcomes of the arena that that must, must not, or may be reached. In specific cases, such an outcome is a decision. We may imagine that, to keep control of wijkbudget spending, municipalities take extra care that wijkbudget is spent responsibly: “particularly in participative arenas, a final decision is often reserved for formal public bodies like a municipal council, a mayor or a specific governmental organization” (Klok &
Denters, 2018, p. 124). As such, ‘having the final say’ is an obvious strategy through which municipalities can keep control of wijkbudget spending. So, to conclude, we discern scope rules that set the scope in terms of the actual content of the arena’s outcome; and scope rules that set the scope in terms of the procedural content of the arena’s outcome. This is demonstrated by the following example.

In the action arena of wijkbudgetten, an example of a content scope rule would be:

\[
\text{Wijkbudget spending must help to improve the neighbourhood.}
\]

This is a scope rule, because it pertains to an outcome that must be achieved in this situation. It is specifically a content scope rule, because it pertains to the content (improved neighbourhood) of what the arena may affect. In terms of policy freedom, a content scope rule provides regulatees with a broad spectrum of options on how this particular outcome must come about.

An example of a procedural scope rule would be:

\[
\text{If a citizens’ initiative is granted a sum of wijkbudget larger than €999, the neighbourhood committee’s decision needs confirmation by the municipality.}
\]

This is a scope rule, because it pertains to an outcome that must be achieved in this situation. Specifically, it is a procedural scope rule, because it specifies the status of the arena’s outcome in procedural terms: is the outcome final or not? In the same vein, rules about timing will be classified under procedural scope rules, because they specify when certain (final or non-final) decisions will be made. In terms of policy freedom, a procedural scope rule provides regulatees with a broad spectrum of options on how this particular outcome must come about.

**2.5 Policy freedom**

To determine the available policy freedom that is provided by the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn, we shall adapt an instrument developed to measure the experienced policy freedom of municipalities. The instrument defines municipalities’ policy freedom as *the extent to which municipalities have the ability to formulate and implement their own policies in relation to the central government* (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 6). On the basis of this definition, we shall define policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten as *the extent to which neighbourhood councils have the ability to formulate and implement their own policies while distributing wijkbudget, independent from the municipality*. The instrument distinguishes 8 dimensions to policy freedom, which each dimension consisting of different gradations. We must consider that, while using the framework by Brandsen, et al. (2006) to
describe policy freedom, it is a framework initially designed to formulate policy freedom in organisations. This research focuses on the policy freedom regarding one specific task, namely the distribution of wijkbudgetten by neighbourhood councils. Some elements may be meaningful to policy freedom in organisations, but not so much in the context of this research. If that is the case, the framework will be adapted to omit irrelevant elements.

A second consideration is that this research aims to explore how municipalities set a legal regime that provides policy space and control at the same time. To analyse these legal regimes, this research uses the IAD framework. As stated before, a quest to find the rules that provide freedom and control in the specific arena of wijkbudgetten would inevitably snowball from one arena into the next. Thus, to research the rules of participatory processes like wijkbudget distribution, we will have to define the boundaries of the particular (sub)arenas in which these processes take place (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 130).

The analysis on the basis of Brandsen, et al. (2006) will be focused on the relationship between municipalities and neighbourhood councils. Even though there likely is another relationship that is interesting in terms of the dilemma between freedom and control, namely the relationship between neighbourhood councils and citizens that request wijkbudget, this relationship is beyond the scope of this study – not in the least because this relationship probably varies between different neighbourhood councils within the same municipality, which will further complicate the analysis. Thus, the analysis on the basis of Brandsen, et al. (2006) will focus on the dilemma between policy freedom and control in the relationship between municipality and neighbourhood council, displayed in Figure 3:

![Figure 3](image.png)

*Figure 3. The dilemma between policy freedom and control that will be analysed using Brandsen, et al. (2006).*

An adaptation of Brandsen et al. (2006)’s framework to perform this particular research will be presented further below. The original framework is designed to assess policy freedom in the relationship between the national government and a municipality. Translated into
hierarchical terms: the framework assesses policy freedom in the relationship between a higher government unit and a lower government unit.

This research will apply Brandsen et al. (2006)’s framework to assess policy freedom in the relationship between another higher unit and lower unit, this time with the municipality as the higher unit and the subordinate neighbourhood council as the lower unit. Translated into the relationship between municipalities and their subordinates, the 8 dimensions of the framework by Brandsen et al. (2006) can be described as such:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Pertains to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>The extent to which a subordinate unit has the freedom to perform a task, or the subordinate unit is obligated or prevented from performing it (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy goals</td>
<td>The extent to which the subordinate unit is free to set policy objectives (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making procedure</td>
<td>The extent to which the subordinate unit is free in the manner of decision-making about the objectives and the method of performing a task (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>The extent to which the subordinate unit is free to determine the organization and instrumentation of policy implementation (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>The extent to which the subordinate unit is free to adopt its own regulations and to apply any municipal regulations (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>The degree of freedom in the use of the financial resources available to the subordinate unit (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>The extent to which the subordinate unit is free to enter into and set up partnerships with external - public or private - organizations (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>The extent to which the actions of the subordinate unit are supervised (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 19).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. A summary of the dimensions of policy freedom for municipalities (Brandsen, et al., 2006).
Now that we are aware of the general framework by Brandsen et al. (2006), the framework shall be adopted. After all, the original framework is aimed at policy freedom for municipalities in relation to the central government, while we need a framework to analyse the dilemma between policy freedom and control in arenas in which neighbourhood councils distribute wijkbudget. In the use of this framework, policy freedom and control will be understood as opposites: when policy freedom for neighbourhood councils increases, control for municipalities decreases (and vice versa). As such, the grades of each dimension presented below are not only ordered from least to most amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils, but also from most to least amount of control for municipalities.

The following adaptation has been made:

**Task**

Task will be defined as *the extent to which a neighbourhood council has the freedom to perform their task, or is obligated or prevented from carrying it out*. The task dimension includes four grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:

- Mandatory task: the municipality legally requires the neighbourhood council to perform the task.
- Recommended task: the municipality recommends neighbourhood council to carry out the task, but provides no legal obligation to do so.
- Optional task: municipality makes performing a task legally possible but does not make performing this task mandatory.
- Own initiative: the neighbourhood council will take on the task on its own initiative.

**Policy goals**

Policy goals will be defined as *the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to establish policy objectives*. The policy goals dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:

- Objectives: the objectives are set by the municipality.
- Bandwidth: the bandwidth of the policy goals is prescribed.
- Result agreements: the municipality and neighbourhood council agree (through mutual consultation) on the results that need to be established.
- Dimensioning: it is prescribed on which aspects goals will be formulated.
- No target regulations: there are no municipal regulations for the content of policy goals.
Decision-making procedure

Decision-making procedure will be defined as *the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free in the manner of decision-making about the objectives and the method of performing a task*. The decision-making procedure dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:

- Prescribed procedure: the decision-making procedure is minutely prescribed.
- Limited space: the procedure is largely laid down, but there is still room for input from the neighbourhood council.
- Minimum requirements: there are minimum requirements or preconditions to which the procedure must comply.
- Guide: there are recommendations from the municipality about the design of the procedure.
- No prescriptions on the manner of decision-making.

Implementation

In the framework by Brandsen et al. (2006), ‘implementation’ pertains to ‘the extent to which the ‘lower unit’ (thus: the neighbourhood council) is free to determine the organization and instrumentation of policy implementation’ (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 15). This dimension will not be included in the analysis of this research, because a neighbourhood councils sole task is to *distribute* wijkbudget – not to implement any citizens’ initiatives that may be funded by wijkbudget.

That is not to say that municipalities or neighbourhood councils cannot influence how citizens’ initiatives are implemented. Requirements set by the municipality are reflected in the *decision-making procedure* dimension, while neighbourhood councils’ freedom to set additional rules is reflected in the *regulation* dimension. During the actual implementation of the initiative however, neighbourhood councils are not involved. Because any influence on how citizens’ initiatives are implemented is reflected in two other dimensions (1); and because neighbourhood councils are not involved in the actual implementation of initiatives (2); the implementation dimension will not be used to analyse policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten.

Regulation

Regulation will be defined as *the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free to adopt its own regulations and to apply municipal regulations*. The regulation dimension includes three grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:
- Prescribed application: the neighbourhood council must exclusively apply regulations prescribed by other authorities.

- Co-governance: the neighbourhood council as co-governing regulator which may set rules in addition to the municipality.

- Regulatory authority: the neighbourhood council as an autonomous regulator.

**Finance**

In the framework by Brandsen et al. (2006), ‘finance’ pertains to the municipality’s degree (thus: the *lower unit’s degree*) of freedom in the use of obtained financial resources’ (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 17). For municipalities, the degree of financial freedom is a direct result of the *origin* of the provided financial resources. Brandsen et al. (2006) mention that finances that originate in the *Gemeentefonds* can be freely spent at municipalities’ own discretion, providing maximum policy freedom on the finance dimension. On the other end of the spectrum, Brandsen et al. (2006) mention that municipalities obtain finances that originate in very specific payments meant for very specific goals such as educational disadvantage prevention, providing minimum policy freedom on the finance dimension (Brandsen, et al., 2006, pp. 6-7).

This dimension is not relevant in the context of wijkbudgetten, because the *origin* of neighbourhood councils’ finances does not change: wijkbudget is always provided by the municipality. This renders the spectrum that Brandsen et al. (2006) provide to score the finance dimension on, meaningless in this context. As a result, the finance dimension will not be used to analyse policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten.

**Cooperation**

In the framework by Brandsen et al. (2006), ‘cooperation’ pertains to ‘the extent to which the municipality is free to enter into and set up partnerships with external - public or private - organizations’ (Brandsen, et al., 2006, p. 18). This dimension is not relevant in the context of wijkbudgetten, because cooperation specifically pertains to municipal options of inter-municipal cooperation on certain policy areas. Because a neighbourhood councils specific task is to distribute wijkbudget, cooperation is meaningless in this analysis. Therefore, the cooperation dimension will not be used to analyse policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten.
Supervision

Supervision will be defined as the degree to which the actions of the neighbourhood council are supervised by the municipality. The supervision dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:

- Intervening supervision: the supervisor can actively intervene in the event of deviations from set standards.
- Inspection: the municipality inspects the neighbourhood council’s method of performing duties.
- Testing output/outcome: the municipality assesses output/outcome achievements.
- Information obligation: the neighbourhood council must provide information on the activities undertaken to the municipality.
- No supervision.

As a result, we are left with five dimensions of policy freedom that are relevant to this research: Task, Policy goals, Decision-making procedure, Regulation, and Supervision. Each dimension is displayed as a spectrum, ranging from least amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils (and thus most amount of control for municipalities) to most amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils (and thus least amount of control for municipalities). The dimensions are treated as ordinal variables with ordered values, with an unknown distance between these values. Through content analysis, each legal regime will be scored on the provided scale. The spectrum for each respective dimension is displayed in Figure 4 on the next page. Figure 4 will be used again later in this thesis, to plot the data after the analysis has been performed.
Figure 4. The relevant dimensions of policy freedom, adapted from Brandsen et al., (2006).
3. Research design

In this chapter, the research design will be elaborated on. The research design serves to connect the research questions to data (Punch, 2000, p. 52).

3.1 Subjects

This research aims to provide a first exploration of the dilemma between policy freedom and control in the context of wijkbudgetten policies. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, we can suffice with an analysis of two municipalities. These municipalities have been chosen for pragmatic reasons: they are relatively easily accessible to the author, and have experience with wijkbudget policies. Therefore, two municipalities have been selected as units of observation whose legal regimes will be researched: Enschede and Hellendoorn.

Enschede

With a total population of 158,140 in 2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 2017), Enschede is the largest municipality of the Overijssel province. In the size-based categorisation of municipalities, Enschede is classified as a large municipality. They employ wijkbudgetten policies as part of their *Jij maakt de Buurt* (www.jijmaaktdebuurt.nl, n.d.) project. As such, the municipality of Enschede is relevant to this research. Since 2014, Enschede has been continually evaluating and adjusting their wijkbudget policies. The analysed documents have been pointed to by municipal staff of Enschede as the complete overall framework of documented rules originating at the municipality. These documents, in which Enschede has formulated its legal regime, are attached at the final pages of this research.

Hellendoorn

With a total population of 35,772 in 2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 2017), Hellendoorn is the eleventh-largest municipality of the Overijssel province. In the size-based categorisation of municipalities, Hellendoorn is categorised as a small municipality. They employ wijkbudgetten policies as part of their Hellendoorn in Actie (Hortulanus & Bliemendaal, 2012) project. As such, the municipality of Hellendoorn is relevant to this research. When Hellendoorn last updated their subsidy policy, they planned to transfer the entire available budgets to neighbourhood organisations without any explicit restrictions on how the budgets could be spent. This was met with some resistance by these neighbourhood organisations. In response, Hellendoorn worked with these neighbourhood organisations to set up a legal regime that could (amongst other subsidised activities) be applied to wijkbudget distribution. This legal regime was laid down on paper and the documents in which Hellendoorn has
publicised this legal regime, pointed to by municipal staff, are attached at the final pages of this research.

### 3.2 Procedures and techniques

In order to analyse the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn, relevant government officials have been identified via the municipalities’ websites. Using the contact information available on these websites, an e-mail was sent to ask for all available documentation on the rules that apply to wijkbudgetten policies. This resulted in four .pdf documents, attached in Appendices A and B, in which the legal regime was formulated. When, during the analysis, additional questions about the content of these documents was needed, this has been ad-hoc requested via e-mail or phone, dependent on the government officials’ preferences.

This research follows three stages:

1. In the first stage, the first sub-question will be answered: *What legal regime applies to wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn?* Through a content analysis, the legal regimes will be described on the basis of Ostrom (2005). This provides a condensed, sharp description of the legal regimes and the arenas they are in, allowing for an answer of the first sub-question. To analyse the legal regime of wijkbudgetten policies, this research will make use of the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. As stated earlier in this thesis, the IAD framework provides “a basic set of ‘things to look for’” (Klok & Denters, 2018, p. 140) when it comes to what rules make up the legal regime. To answer the first research question, the IAD framework shall be used to make an inventory of the rules-in-use. The previous chapter discussed the different rule types at length. On the basis of that discussion, a coding frame has been composed in Table 3 that will help to answer the first sub-question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule type:</th>
<th>Function:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position Rules</td>
<td><em>Position Rules</em> “specify a set of positions and how many participants are to hold each position” (Van Heffen &amp; Klok, 2000, p. 154).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary Rules</td>
<td><em>Boundary Rules</em> “specify how participants enter or leave these positions” (Van Heffen &amp; Klok, 2000, p. 154).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice Rules (also known as Authority Rules)</td>
<td><em>Choice Rules</em> “specify which set of actions is assigned to which position” (Van Heffen &amp; Klok, 2000, p. 154).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. In the second stage, the second sub-question will be answered: *How can these legal regimes be described in terms of how they handle the dilemma between policy freedom and control?* In the first stage of this research, a condensed, sharp description of the legal regimes and the arenas they are in will be drafted. This description will provide the basis for further analysis under stage two. On the basis of Brandsen et al. (2006), the legal regimes will be described in terms of the dilemma between freedom and control in the relationship between municipality and neighbourhood councils. In order to perform that analysis, the coding scheme in Table 4 will be used to score the legal regimes on policy freedom:

- **Aggregation Rules**
  - *Aggregation Rules* “specify the transformation function to be used to map actions to intermediate and final outcomes” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 154).

- **Information Rules**
  - *Information Rules* “specify the information available to each position” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 154).

- **Payoff Rules**
  - *Payoff Rules* “specify how benefits and costs are required, permitted or forbidden in relation to actors, based on the full set of actions taken and the outcomes reached” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 154).

- **Scope Rules**
  - *Scope Rules* “specify the set of outcomes that may be affected” (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 154).

*Table 3. Coding frame for rule types and their functions in the IAD framework.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension:</th>
<th>Pertains to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task</strong></td>
<td><em>The extent to which a neighbourhood council has the freedom to perform their task, or is obligated or prevented from carrying it out.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The task dimension includes four grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mandatory task: the municipality legally requires the neighbourhood council to perform the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Recommended task: the municipality recommends neighbourhood council to carry out the task, but provides no legal obligation to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Optional task: municipality makes performing a task legally possible but does not make performing this task mandatory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Own initiative: the neighbourhood council will take on the task on its own initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy goals</th>
<th>The degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to establish policy objectives. The policy goals dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Objectives: the objectives are set by the municipality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bandwidth: the bandwidth of the policy goals is prescribed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Result agreements: the municipality and neighbourhood council agree (through mutual consultation) on the results that need to be established.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dimensioning: it is prescribed on which aspects goals will be formulated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No target regulations: there are no municipal regulations for the content of policy goals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-making procedure</th>
<th>The degree to which the neighbourhood council is free in the manner of decision-making about the objectives and the method of performing a task. The decision-making procedure dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Prescribed procedure: the decision-making procedure is minutely prescribed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited space: the procedure is largely laid down, but there is still room for input from the neighbourhood council.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Minimum requirements: there are minimum requirements or preconditions to which the procedure must comply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Guide: there are recommendations from the municipality about the design of the procedure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No prescriptions on the manner of decision-making.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>The degree to which the neighbourhood council is free to adopt its own regulations and to apply municipal regulations. The regulation dimension includes three grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Prescribed application: the neighbourhood council must exclusively apply regulations prescribed by other authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Co-governance: the neighbourhood council as co-governing regulator which may set rules in addition to the municipality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Regulatory authority: the neighbourhood council as an autonomous regulator.

**Supervision**

*The degree to which the actions of the neighbourhood council are supervised by the municipality.* The supervision dimension includes five grades, from least to most amount of policy freedom:

- Intervening supervision: the supervisor can actively intervene in the event of deviations from set standards.
- Inspection: the municipality inspects the neighbourhood council’s method of performing duties.
- Testing output/outcome: the municipality assesses output/outcome achievements.
- Information obligation: the neighbourhood council must provide information on the activities undertaken to the municipality.
- No supervision.

**Table 4. Coding frame for the five dimensions of policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten.**

3. In the third stage, the research question will be answered: *How do municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities?* Using the knowledge from both sub-questions, we shall be able to provide further insights into how municipalities set conditions for a legal regime that provides enough policy freedom for citizens’ initiatives, while attaining the desired amount of control over the spending of public money.

The legal regime will be analysed through a content analysis of the obtained documents in ATLAS.ti. Content analysis is a research method that systematically describes the meaning of qualitative data by “assigning successive parts of the material to the categories of a coding frame” (Schreier, 2014, p. 170). The coding frame of this research is based on literature from Ostrom (2005) and Brandsen et al. (2006). A content analysis has been the research method of choice because municipal legal regimes are not formulated in such a way that they can be easily classified in terms of Ostrom (2005) or Brandsen et al. (2006). Content analysis is a method that “helps with reducing the amount of material. It requires the researcher to focus on selected aspects of meaning, namely those aspects that relate to the overall research question” (Schreier, 2014, p. 170) – and in that way it will allow for a translation of raw data (.pdf documents) into meaningful insights in terms of Ostrom (2005) or Brandsen et al. (2006).
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

3.3 Validity and reliability

In the classical sense, validity and reliability allow for “a rather simple and fast credibility check about the study and its results” (Flick, 2007b, p. 5). This however, is not easily transferred to qualitative research (Flick, 2007b, p. 15). In qualitative research fields, validity and reliability are not “treated with consensus, or even as standards in research planning” (Flick, 2007a, p. 42). Instead, a “constant use of a method will increase the similarity of the research situations in which the data were produced, so that differences in the data can more likely be drawn back to […]” (Flick, 2007a, p. 43) whatever phenomenon may be under investigation. This also obliges the author of this research to display transparency on the interpretive choices made in this qualitative research. Due to the nature of content analysis, an overview the operational characteristics used to classify certain rules in terms of policy freedom can only be provided after the data has been properly gathered and analysed. Therefore, the Findings chapter will include an account of the basis on which operational characteristics the author decided to classify certain rules in terms of policy freedom.

In summary, it can be said that validity and reliability of qualitative research pertain to the quality of the proposed method. This is why, in this thesis, the research has been specifically designed through the above mentioned three stages. As such, anyone who desires shall be able to replicate this research in a different (or similar) context by following these three stages. For purposes of validity, the entire ATLAS.ti projects used for analysis, including codes and comments, will be uploaded for reference by others.

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4 The ATLAS.ti projects will be publicly available on the author’s server for a year after publication. After that period, please contact the author, who will send the files at request.
4. Findings

This chapter will present the findings of each of the three stages of this research. On the basis of theory by Ostrom (2005) and Brandsen et al. (2006), a framework has been developed to better understand the dilemma between freedom and control. This framework will now be applied to two municipalities.

4.1 Results for sub question 1

The first research question is:

What legal regime applies to wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn?

To answer this research question, the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn will be discussed separately in paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.

4.1.1 The legal regime of Enschede

Analysis on the basis of Ostrom’s IAD framework has exposed the legal regime of Enschede in terms of position rules, boundary rules, choice rules, aggregation rules, information rules, payoff rules, and scope rules. The results are the following:

Position rules and boundary rules

Position rules specify the possible positions in the action arena of wijkbudgetten. Analysis has found that the position rules of Enschede establish three positions:

1. Municipality;  
2. Neighbourhood council;  
3. Local resident;

For each of these positions, boundary rules state how participants can enter or leave these positions. By research design, no distinction between the different bodies of the municipality was made during the identification of the position rules. For the sake of completeness and for this one time, we shall now make that distinction to display how the IAD framework can be used to reveal boundary rules.

To establish how the position of municipality (1) can be entered or exited, we shall have to briefly consider how participants may become either a member of the college van B&W (the executive board of a municipality in the Netherlands), or member of the gemeenteraad (the legislative body of a municipality in the Netherlands). Participants can enter the gemeenteraad for a period of 4 years through democratic elections. To be eligible for the
gemeenteraad, participants are required to live in the municipality, be at least 18 years of age, and not be excluded from the right to vote (Article 10 Gemeentewet, 2019). The college van B&W consists of the Burgemeester (mayor), and Wethouders (aldermen). To enter the position of mayor, participants need to be nominated on the basis of predefined criteria by a confidential committee consisting of municipal council members. On the basis of the confidential committee’s proposal, the mayor is then appointed by royal decree for a period of six years (Article 61 Gemeentewet, 2019). Finally, to enter the position of alderman for a period of 4 years, participants are required to live in the municipality, be at least 18 years of age, and not be excluded from the right to vote (Article 36a Gemeentewet, 2019).

Summarising, the boundary rules for the position of municipality are the following:

Several democratic requirements that arise from Gemeentewet articles 10, 61 and 36a:

- Members of municipal council and aldermen are voted in for a period of 4 years, are required to live in the municipality, must be at least 18 years of age, and must not be excluded from the right to vote;
- Mayors are nominated on the basis of predefined criteria by a confidential committee consisting of municipal council members. On the basis of the confidential committee’s proposal, the mayor is then appointed by royal decree for 6 years.

Next, the position of neighbourhood council (2) can be entered or exited exclusively by members of any ‘organisation that represents the interests of local residents’ of that particular neighbourhood. The formulation of this rule appears to provide relatively much policy space and very little control in terms of who is eligible for the – key – position of neighbourhood council. Upon inquiry on what the official policies in Enschede are, we were provided with the following information (Municipality of Enschede, personal communication, August 21, 2019):

‘In practice, the residents' organizations to which wijkbudget is provided cover the entire municipality. These 28 residents' organizations are not appointed by the municipality and therefore have no "special status". Our system indeed contains the "danger" that a "new neighbourhood council" presents itself that believes it represents a certain area and, as a result, claims the subsidy for the wijkbudget. How we will react in such a situation is not laid down. [...] The district management has built up a strong tradition in the 5 districts in which the consultation with residents to reach a jointly supported decision can count on broad support’ (translated from Dutch to English).
This shows that the municipality has not made any preselection of organisations that are eligible to enter the position of neighbourhood council, and that there is indeed relatively much policy space and little control for the municipality of Enschede in this matter. Thus, the boundary rule for the position of neighbourhood council is:
- Being any organisation that represents the interests of local residents of the particular neighbourhood.

Finally, entering the position of local resident (3) is done by living in the general local neighbourhood, which is not tightly defined. As a result, the boundary rule to enter the position of local resident is the following:
- Living in the general local neighbourhood.

Choice rules
So far, we have exposed the position of municipality, the position of neighbourhood council, and the position of local resident. The next step of the analysis is to establish which action sets are assigned to each of these positions. Choice rules formulate these action sets. The choice rules shown here are limited to general choice rules, to prevent rules from shown twice\(^5\). Without such duplicated rules, the IAD framework is expected to provide better interpretable data for the analysis using the framework of Brandsen et al. (2006).

First, the choice rule for the position of municipality (1) is the following.
- The municipality has an exclusive right to transfer wijkbudget to neighbourhood councils;

Second, the choice rules for the position of neighbourhood council (2) will be introduced.
- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to request wijkbudget at the municipality;
- Neighbourhood councils have a right to receive wijkbudget, even when a spending plan for that year has yet to be written;
- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to, at their own discretion and on the basis of an approved spending plan, distribute this wijkbudget amongst local residents;

\(^5\) For instance, aggregation rules are a specific type of choice rule (for some positions, they provide an obligation to make a decision; for other positions, they provide a right to a decision’s outcome). The same goes for information rules (they may provide both an obligation to provide information, and a right to receive information), payoff rules (they may provide both an obligation to provide benefits, and a right to receive benefits), and even scope rules to some degree (they may provide both an obligation for all actors in the arena to produce a certain outcome, and a right to a certain outcome for some actors).
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to write a spending plan for the year in which they plan to spend wijkbudget;
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to ensure that wijkbudget-subsidised citizens’ initiatives meet stated wijkbudget policy goals (see content scope rules);

Finally, the choice rules for the position of local resident (3) are presented.
- Local residents may receive a sum of wijkbudget for their citizens’ initiative under certain conditions;
- Local residents have a right to submit a plan for a citizens’ initiative at the neighbourhood council in order to obtain a sum of wijkbudget;
- Local residents may also spend the acquired wijkbudget during the first three months in the year after the year for which the subsidy was initially granted;

Aggregation rules
Aggregation rules make clear how interactions between different position holders contribute to decisions made in the arena. In other words: if decisions are to be made, then who decides? This ‘if decision x needs to be made, then position y decides’-formula will be used to display Enschede’s aggregation rules. Based on the analysis of the legal documents, the following aggregation rules have been discovered:
- If a decision on whether a citizens’ initiative will be supported needs to be made,
  then multiple local residents decide to show/not show active support verbally, through vote, or in written form;
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget will be granted for a proposed citizens’ initiative needs to be made,
  then the neighbourhood council decides if wijkbudget will/will not be granted;
- If a decision on whether a neighbourhood council’s wijkbudget spending plan will be approved needs to be made,
  then the municipality decides if the plan will be approved/will not be approved;
- If a decision on whether neighbourhood councils are required to show ad-hoc accountability needs to be made,
  then the municipality decides whether ad-hoc accountability needs/needs not to be shown;
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget subsidies need to be altered or stopped needs to be made,
  then the municipality decides if wijkbudget subsidies need/need not to be altered or stopped;
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget regulations lead to exceptionally unfair or unreasonable consequences and must therefore be abolished needs to be made,
then the municipality decides if wijkbudget regulations must/must not be abolished.

Information rules

Information rules determine which information is available to different positions. They channel the information flow within the arena, and have been found to be the following:

- Neighbourhood councils are to request wijkbudget at the municipality using a form designed by the municipality;
- Neighbourhood councils must compose a spending plan for wijkbudget spanning the upcoming year;
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to compose a report on how wijkbudget was spent the previous year;
- Neighbourhood councils’ spending plans may be limited to the bare minimum;
- Neighbourhood councils must provide information that indicates local residents’ support for the initiative.
- The municipality may, at any time, request that neighbourhood councils show additional information on (the procedure of) wijkbudget spending;

Payoff rules

Payoff rules determine who bears the costs and benefits of attendance in the action arena, and assign rewards or sanctions to particular actions or particular outcomes. The following payoff rules have been identified in Enschede’s legal regime:

- The municipality provides wijkbudget to neighbourhood councils;
- Neighbourhood councils may redistribute wijkbudget to fund citizens’ initiatives when they meet certain criteria;
- Local residents may request wijkbudget at the neighbourhood council to fund their citizens’ initiatives;

Content scope rules

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, content scope rules pertain to the content of what the arena may affect. The following content scope rules have been discovered:

- Wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives need to pursue one or more of the following aims:
  a. promotion of labour participation;
  b. a clean and whole living environment;
  c. increasing the sense of security;
  d. stimulation of neighbourhood services for care dependent people;
  e. stimulation of sustainable behaviour;
  f. promotion of quality of life;
  g. promotion of social cohesion.
- Neighbourhood councils must ensure that wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives come about in the following way:
a. The initiative is not in conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
b. The initiative fits within applicable political-administrative frameworks;
c. The initiative does not serve a private interest;
d. The local residents propose the citizens’ initiative;
e. There is demonstrable support in the neighbourhood for the initiative;
f. The initiative must be feasible.

Procedural scope rules
Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, procedural scope rules pertain to the arena’s outcome in procedural terms (is the neighbourhood council’s decision final or not?), and to rules about the timing of the procedure. The following procedural scope rules have been discovered:
- The municipality determines the maximum amount of wijkbudget per neighbourhood council;
- The municipality can approve or deny spending plans of neighbourhood committees;
- The municipality can, in exceptional cases that go against the intention and spirit of wijkbudget policies, decide to not provide or reclaim wijkbudget;

4.1.2 The legal regime of Hellendoorn
Analysis on the basis of Ostrom’s IAD framework has exposed the legal regime of Hellendoorn in terms of position rules, boundary rules, choice rules, aggregation rules, information rules, payoff rules, and scope rules. The results are the following:

Position rules and boundary rules
Position rules specify the possible positions in the action arena of wijkbudgetten. Analysis has found that the position rules of Hellendoorn establish three positions relevant to their wijkbudget policies:
1. Municipality;
2. Neighbourhood council;
3. Local resident;
For each of these positions, boundary rules state how participants can enter or leave these positions. In the Findings paragraph on Enschede, this thesis discussed that the boundary rules for the position of municipality (1) consist of several democratic requirements that arise from Gemeentewet articles 10, 61 and 36a. The exact same boundary rules that apply to the position
of municipality in Enschede’s legal regime, apply in Hellendoorn’s legal regime and will therefore not be extensively discussed again. In summary, they are the following.

Several democratic requirements that arise from Gemeentewet articles 10, 61 and 36a:
- Members of municipal council and aldermen are voted in for a period of 4 years, are required to live in the municipality, must be at least 18 years of age, and must not be excluded from the right to vote;
- Mayors are nominated on the basis of predefined criteria by a confidential committee consisting of municipal council members. On the basis of the confidential committee’s proposal, the mayor is then appointed by royal decree for 6 years.

Next, the position of neighbourhood council (2) can be entered or exited exclusively by an ‘institution’, defined as an organization or group of persons with legal personality, with a non-profit objective of protection of local residents’ interests. In addition, this institution is required to be registered in the municipality of Hellendoorn, according to the Chamber of Commerce’s registers.

Similar to the neighbourhood council’s boundary rule in Enschede, the formulation of this rule appears to provide relatively much policy space and very little control in terms of who is eligible for the key position of neighbourhood council. Upon inquiry on what the official policies in Hellendoorn are, we were provided with the following information (Municipality of Hellendoorn, personal communication, August 27, 2019):

‘The status of ‘neighbourhood council’ is not granted by the municipality, but derived from the objective with which the organisation is initially established [by the chamber of commerce]. In theory, it is possible that another group of people from the same neighbourhood can form another neighbourhood council. […] The wijkbudget subsidies would not change for us as a municipality. A subsidy ceiling and distribution rules apply to neighbourhood councils. The more applications, the lower the contribution per council’ (translated from Dutch to English).

So, just like in Enschede, Hellendoorn has not made preselection of organisations that are eligible to enter the position of neighbourhood council. There is indeed relatively much policy space and little control for the municipality of Hellendoorn in this matter. Thus, the boundary rule for the position of neighbourhood council is the following.
- Being an institution, defined as an organization or group of persons with legal personality, with a non-profit objective of protection of local residents’ interests, registered in Hellendoorn according to the Chamber of Commerce’s registers.
Finally, entering the position of **local resident (3)** is done by being a resident of the municipality. As a result, the boundary rule for the position of local resident is the following:
- Being a resident of the municipality

**Choice rules**

So far, we have exposed the position of municipality, the position of neighbourhood council, and the position of local resident. At this point, an analysis will be performed to establish which action sets are assigned to each of these positions. Choice rules formulate these action sets. Similar to Enschede’s choice rules, Hellendoorn’s choice rules shown here are limited to general choice rules, to prevent rules from shown twice.

First, the choice rule for the position of **municipality (1)** is the following.
- The municipality has an exclusive right to transfer wijkbudget to neighbourhood councils;

Second, the choice rules for the position of **neighbourhood council (2)** will be discussed.
- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to distribute wijkbudget amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils have the right to save part of their acquired wijkbudget for projects that span multiple years;

Finally, the choice rules for the position of **local resident (3)** are presented.
- Local residents have the right to request wijkbudget at their neighbourhood council;
- Local residents are obligated to provide a detailed and specified costs overview within one month after the citizens’ initiative has ended;

**Aggregation rules**

Aggregation rules make clear how interactions between different position holders contribute to decisions made in the arena. In other words: if decisions are to be made, then who decides? This ‘if decision x needs to be made, then position y decides’-formula will be used to display Hellendoorns aggregation rules. Based on the analysis of the legal documents, the following aggregation rules have been discovered:
- If a decision needs to be made on the total amount of wijkbudget in the municipality,
  then the **municipality** decides the total amount of wijkbudget;
- If a decision needs to be made on how wijkbudget will be distributed between all neighbourhood councils,
  then the **municipality** decides how wijkbudget will be distributed between all neighbourhood councils;
- If a decision needs to be made about whether wijkbudget will be granted for a specific citizens’ initiative, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide whether wijkbudget will be granted for that specific citizens’ initiative;
- If a decision needs to be made about how much wijkbudget will be granted for a specific citizens’ initiative, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide how much wijkbudget will be granted for that specific citizens’ initiative;
- If a decision needs to be made about whether a citizens’ initiative will or will not be granted wijkbudget when the rules do not provide a definitive answer, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide if that citizens’ initiative will or will not be granted wijkbudget;
- If a decision needs to be made on how much wijkbudget will be spent on citizens’ initiatives in a certain year, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide on the amount of wijkbudget that will be spent in that year;

**Information rules**

Information rules determine which information is available to different positions. They channel the information flow within the arena, and have been found to be the following:
- Neighbourhood councils are to publicise, both during the annual meeting and on their website, a statement of wijkbudget requests that adhered to the criteria and thus were granted wijkbudget in the previous year;
- Neighbourhood councils are to publicise, both during the annual meeting and on their website, an overview of assigned subsidies and an overview of the amount of money left in account;
- Local residents are to specify, upfront, the estimated costs of a proposed citizens’ initiative;
- Local residents are to request wijkbudget using an online form prepared by neighbourhood councils;
- Local residents are to provide a detailed specification of the actual costs of the citizens’ initiative to perform a final financial settlement, in order to specify the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative which the wijkbudget is meant to compensate;

**Payoff rules**

Payoff rules determine who bears the costs and benefits of attendance in the action arena, and assign rewards or sanctions to particular actions or particular outcomes. The following payoff rules have been identified in Hellendoorn’s legal regime:
- The municipality provides wijkbudget to neighbourhood councils;
- Neighbourhood councils may redistribute wijkbudget to fund citizens’ initiatives when they meet certain criteria;
Local residents may request wijkbudget at the neighbourhood council to fund their citizens' initiatives;

**Content scope rules**

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, content scope rules pertain to the content of what the arena may affect. The following content scope rules have been discovered:

- Wijkbudget is meant to stimulate local residents to engage in mutual contact, contribute to the community, think along and roll up their sleeves. Additionally, wijkbudget is meant for:
  - a. services and activities that promote the quality of life in Hellendoorn;
  - b. apolitical cultural events and activities;
  - c. activities that positively influence social cohesion.

- Wijkbudget is in principle not meant to cover all expenses of citizens’ initiatives. Citizens’ initiatives ideally have co-financing or sponsorships to cover at least 50% of the costs. Additionally, wijkbudget is not meant to:
  - a. promote labour market participation;
  - b. encourage sustainable behaviour;
  - c. contribute to post-exploitation deficits.

- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must be concrete and feasible;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not serve private interests;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not compete with other citizens’ initiatives;
- Citizens’ initiatives must not conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
- Citizens’ initiatives should take place in Hellendoorn and be publicly accessible;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives that demonstrably enjoy support amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives for or from young people;

**Procedural scope rules**

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, procedural scope rules pertain to the arena’s outcome in procedural terms (is the neighbourhood council’s decision final or not?), and to rules about the timing of the procedure. The following procedural scope rules have been discovered:

- After approval of the request for wijkbudget, 50% of the requested sum is made available before the initiative has taken place, and afterwards, the remaining sum is made available in so far that the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative is covered;
The procedure for wijkbudget is designed in the following manner:

1. Local residents request wijkbudget at the neighbourhood council before January 31 of the year in which they plan to carry out their citizens’ initiative;
2. The neighbourhood council processes January’s wijkbudget requests in February;
3. The neighbourhood council decides on whether the proposed citizens’ initiatives will be granted wijkbudget or not in March;
4. The neighbourhood council makes known whether wijkbudget will be granted or not granted for each proposed citizens’ initiative before April 1st;
5. The neighbourhood council provides 50% of the approved amount of wijkbudget during April;
6. After the citizens’ initiative has taken place and the activity’s actual deficit is known, the rest of the granted wijkbudget will be provided;
7. In principle, wijkbudget must be requested before January 31st, but requests made after that date will still be handled in case there is adequate financial space left for that year;

4.1.3 Reviewing the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn

Based on content analysis of the documents in which Enschede and Hellendoorn have formulated their legal regimes, an overview of the rules has now been produced. This overview provides an answer to sub question 1: What legal regime applies to wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn?

We know what positions are formulated (position rules), how these positions can be entered (boundary rules), what action sets are tied to the positions (choice rules), which positions are involved when decisions need to be made (aggregation rules), how the arena’s information flows (information rules), what the costs and benefits of attendance in the action arena are (payoff rules), and what outcomes must/must not/may be affected by the arena (scope rules). This provides a condensed description of the formulated rules in the arenas.

In the dilemma between policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities, the next step is to identify the amount of policy freedom that these rules provide. With awareness of the municipalities’ legal regimes in terms of Ostrom (2005), how can we discern policy freedom in terms of Brandsen et al. (2006)? The following table provides a substantiated explanation of used rule types for the next part of the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Relevant rule types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>This dimension pertains to how free neighbourhood councils are to fulfil their duties. Are all organizations that have a certain status obliged to receive wijkbudget and to distribute it in accordance with the rules, or is that task optional – and how does one get into the position of organisation that performs this task? To answer this question, an assessment of the rules that determine how participants may enter a position is required. Therefore, <strong>boundary rules</strong> will be used to perform the analysis in terms of the task dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy goals</td>
<td>This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of fulfilling their duties with regard to the task to be delivered or the social situation to be realized. To analyse this dimension of policy freedom, we will need to look at rules that pertain to that ‘task’ or ‘social situation’ that is to be produced by the entire arena. Therefore, <strong>content scope rules</strong> will be used to perform the analysis in terms of the policy goals dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making procedure</td>
<td>This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of deciding on wijkbudget allocation. We expect that ‘the manner of deciding on wijkbudget allocation’ will be reflected by rules that pertain to how decisions come to be (aggregation rules); and by rules that pertain to the status of the arena’s decisions in procedural terms (procedural scope rules). Therefore, <strong>aggregation rules</strong> and <strong>procedural scope rules</strong> will be used to perform the analysis in terms of the decision-making procedure dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to adopt their own regulations within the general framework provided by the municipality, and the degree to which they are free to apply municipal regulations. An assessment of the rules that formulate what neighbourhood councils can or cannot do (choice rules) in terms of adopting their own regulations in addition to the general framework provided by the municipality. In addition, we will need to assess what the rules state on what a neighbourhood council may regulate in terms of content (content scope rules). Therefore, <strong>choice rules</strong> and <strong>content scope rules</strong> will be used to perform the analysis in terms of the regulation dimension.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supervision

This dimension pertains to the degree to which the neighbourhood council is supervised by the municipality. We expect that municipalities supervise through available information about the activities in the arena (information rules); and through their capacity to confirm the status of the arena’s outcome in terms of whether the arena’s outcome is final or not (procedural scope rules). Therefore, information rules and procedural scope rules are relevant for the supervision dimension.

Table 9. Dimensions of policy freedom and the associated relevant rule types.

4.2 Results for sub question 2

The second research question is:

How much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities do the legal regimes of wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn provide?

To determine the available policy freedom that the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn provide, the instrument by Brandsen et al. (2006, p. 6) has been adapted to score both municipalities’ legal regimes on five different aspects of policy freedom. Remember, we defined policy freedom in the context of wijkbudgetten as the extent to which neighbourhood councils have the ability to formulate and implement their own policies while distributing wijkbudget, independent from the municipality. To score each aspect of policy freedom, the selected relevant rule types will be involved in the analysis.

4.2.1 The legal regime of Enschede

In this chapter, the legal regime of Enschede will be scored on dimensions of policy freedom, based on the theory by Brandsen et al. (2006).

Task

Task has been defined as the extent to which a neighbourhood council has the freedom to perform their task, or is obligated or prevented from carrying it out. This dimension pertains to how free neighbourhood councils are to fulfil their duty of wijkbudget distribution. The relevant rule type is boundary rules. On the task spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘mandatory task’, ‘recommended task’, ‘optional task’, or ‘own initiative’. The following relevant rule has been found:
**Boundary rule for the position of neighbourhood council**

- Being any organisation that represents the interests of local residents of the particular neighbourhood.

As stated previously, this rule is formulated in such a manner that it provides relatively much policy space and very little control in terms of who is eligible for the position of neighbourhood council. The fact that ‘who is eligible to distribute wijkbudget’ is not formalised in the rules appears to be intentional: in practice, Enschede does not perform a pre-selection of organisations that may join the arena as neighbourhood council. As such, Enschede has formulated relatively much policy freedom in terms of who can join the arena to distribute wijkbudget – as long as the organisation represents the interests of local residents in that particular neighbourhood, they may join. From this follows that the legal regime in Enschede provides policy space for ‘organisations that represent the interests of local residents’ to not to perform the task of wijkbudget distribution. Potential participants may opt not to represent citizens’ initiative-related interests of local residents, and opt not to distribute wijkbudget.

Based on the above, we conclude that the legal regime of Enschede provides relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and relatively little control for municipalities in terms of Task. We now discovered that organisations have freedom to either perform or not perform the task of wijkbudget distribution in Enschede. As such, the task is optional and the score of **optional task** is assigned: *the municipality makes performing a task legally possible but does not make performing this task mandatory.*

**Policy goals**

Policy goals has been defined as *the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to establish policy objectives.* This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of fulfilling their duties with regard to the task to be delivered or the social situation to be realized. The relevant rule type is **content scope rules.** On the policy goals spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘objectives’, ‘bandwidth’, ‘result agreements’, ‘dimensioning’, or ‘no target regulations’. The following relevant rules have been found:

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6 By joining, an organisation is allowed entrance into the arena of wijkbudget distribution. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition to start subsidising local residents’ citizens’ initiatives.
Content scope rules
- Wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives need to pursue one or more of the following aims:
  a. promotion of labour participation;
  b. a clean and whole living environment;
  c. increasing the sense of security;
  d. stimulation of neighbourhood services for care dependent people;
  e. stimulation of sustainable behaviour;
  f. promotion of quality of life;
  g. promotion of social cohesion.
- Neighbourhood councils must ensure that wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives come about in the following way:
  a. The initiative is not in conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
  b. The initiative fits within applicable political-administrative frameworks;
  c. The initiative does not serve a private interest;
  d. The local residents propose the citizens’ initiative;
  e. There is demonstrable support in the neighbourhood for the initiative;
  f. The initiative must be feasible.

The above content scope rules show display the requirements that are set in terms of what the arena may affect. They provide a broad frame of aims that cover aspects on a spectrum ranging from physical environment to social environment. Their formulation provides relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to give substance to these rules. For instance, the meaning of ‘quality of life’ will likely differ depending on the context. For some, the quality of life will be much improved by an initiative to clean graffiti on the streets. For others, their quality of life will be much improved by an initiative to set up a shuttle bus service to the local supermarket. We can even argue that there is policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to label one aim, promotion of labour participation for instance, as priority over the other aims. After all, by the logic of Ostrom’s default conditions, if the scope rules do not state whether or not this is possible, the default condition is that “each player can affect any state of world that is physically possible” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 211). On the other hand, the rules also provide the municipality with a fair amount of control over the general goals of wijkbudget. For instance, a city trip to Prague for 2 families funded by wijkbudget may improve ‘quality of life’ and ‘social cohesion’, but lack ‘demonstrable support’ by the rest of the neighbourhood. This helps to prevent misuse of public money.

The rules regarding Policy Goals allow neighbourhood councils to take specific actions to achieve broader aims that are established by the municipality. This leads to the conclusion
that there are ‘minimum criteria’ to which wijkbudget distribution in Enschede must adhere. The rules formulate a general direction in which the arena must head on certain aspects. The score of dimensioning is assigned: it is prescribed on which aspects goals will be formulated.

**Decision-making procedure**

Decision-making procedure has been defined as the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free in the manner of decision-making about the objectives and the method of performing a task. This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of deciding on wijkbudget allocation. Relevant rule types are aggregation rules and procedural scope rules. On the decision-making procedure spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘prescribed procedure’, ‘limited space’, ‘minimum requirements’, ‘guide’, or ‘no prescriptions’. The following relevant rules have been found:

**Aggregation rules**

- If a decision on whether a citizens’ initiative will be supported needs to be made,
  then **multiple local residents** decide to show/not show active support verbally, through vote, or in written form;
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget will be granted for a proposed citizens’ initiative needs to be made,
  then **the neighbourhood council** decides if wijkbudget will/will not be granted;
- If a decision on whether a neighbourhood council’s wijkbudget spending plan will be approved needs to be made,
  then **the municipality** decides if the plan will be approved/will not be approved;
- If a decision on whether neighbourhood councils are required to show ad-hoc accountability needs to be made,
  then **the municipality** decides whether ad-hoc accountability needs/needs not to be shown;
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget subsidies need to be altered or stopped needs to be made,
  then **the municipality** decides if wijkbudget subsidies need/need not to be altered or stopped,
- If a decision on whether wijkbudget regulations lead to exceptionally unfair or unreasonable consequences and must therefore be abolished needs to be made,
  then **the municipality** decides if wijkbudget regulations must/must not be abolished.
**Procedural scope rules**
- The municipality determines the maximum amount of wijkbudget per neighbourhood council;
- The municipality can approve or deny spending plans of neighbourhood committees;
- The municipality can, in exceptional cases that go against the intention and spirit of wijkbudget policies, decide to not provide or reclaim wijkbudget;

We see that neighbourhood councils in Enschede are not entirely free in their decision to allocate wijkbudget. Several control mechanisms for the municipality have been put in place. Local residents need to show support before an initiative can be subsidised, the neighbourhood council is required to draft a spending plan, which the municipality must approve. The municipality may also stop, alter, or retract the donation of wijkbudget to neighbourhood councils. And, in case of exceptionally unfair or unreasonable circumstances, the municipality may abolish wijkbudget regulations. On the other hand, the rules do not minutely describe the decision-making procedure. For example, there is a support requirement, but it is not specified. That leaves policy freedom to neighbourhood councils to determine how much support will be enough. In the same vein, the spending plan that neighbourhood councils are required to draft each year is required to only generally describe what wijkbudget will be spent on (Municipality of Enschede, personal communication, August 19, 2019). This prevents the decision-making procedure from becoming ‘set in stone’ beforehand, which would be considered an adverse effect of the municipal request for a spending plan.

So, these rules provide a framework of requirements of the process through which the neighbourhood council may decide to subsidise or not subsidise an initiative. As such, the score of **minimum requirements** is assigned: *there are minimum requirements or preconditions to which the procedure must comply.*

**Regulation**
Regulation has been defined as *the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free to adopt its own regulations and to apply municipal regulations.* This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to adopt their own regulations within the general framework provided by the municipality, and the degree to which they are free to apply municipal regulations. The relevant rule types are **choice rules** and **content scope rules**. On the regulation spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘prescribed application’, co-governance’, or ‘regulatory authority’. The following relevant rules have been found:
Choice rules for the position of neighbourhood council

- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to request wijkbudget at the municipality;
- Neighbourhood councils have a right to receive wijkbudget, even when a spending plan for that year has yet to be written;
- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to, at their own discretion and on the basis of an approved spending plan, distribute this wijkbudget amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to write a spending plan for the year in which they plan to spend wijkbudget;
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to ensure that wijkbudget-subsidised citizens’ initiatives meet stated wijkbudget policy goals (see content scope rules);

Content scope rules

- Wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives need to pursue one or more of the following aims:
  a. promotion of labour participation;
  b. a clean and whole living environment;
  c. increasing the sense of security;
  d. stimulation of neighbourhood services for care dependent people;
  e. stimulation of sustainable behaviour;
  f. promotion of quality of life;
  g. promotion of social cohesion.
- Neighbourhood councils must ensure that wijkbudget-funded citizens’ initiatives come about in the following way:
  a. The initiative is not in conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
  b. The initiative fits within applicable political-administrative frameworks;
  c. The initiative does not serve a private interest;
  d. The local residents propose the citizens’ initiative;
  e. There is demonstrable support in the neighbourhood for the initiative;
  f. The initiative must be feasible.

Based on the above rules, we determine that neighbourhood councils of Enschede may distribute wijkbudget at their own discretion within the limits of an approved spending plan and the stated wijkbudget policy goals. This provides them with a moderate amount of policy freedom. The rules do not explicitly mention whether additional rules may be drafted by neighbourhood councils, leading us to assume the default choice condition: “Each player can take any physically possible action” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 211). We assume that neighbourhood councils may set additional rules to the regime set by the municipality of Enschede. Because
neighbourhood councils may set rules within the general framework that was provided by the municipality, the municipality also possesses a moderate amount of control over the aspect of regulation. Finally, the score of co-governance is then assigned: the neighbourhood council as a co-governing regulator which may set rules in addition to the municipality.

Supervision
Supervision has been defined as the degree to which the actions of the neighbourhood council are supervised by the municipality. This dimension pertaining to the degree to which the neighbourhood council is supervised by the municipality. Relevant rule types are information rules, and procedural scope rules. On the supervision spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘intervening supervision’, ‘inspection’, ‘testing output/outcome’, ‘information obligation’, ‘no supervision’. The following relevant rules have been found:

Information rules
- Neighbourhood councils are to request wijkbudget at the municipality using a form designed by the municipality;
- Neighbourhood councils must compose a spending plan for wijkbudget spanning the upcoming year;
- Neighbourhood councils are obligated to compose a report on how wijkbudget was spent the previous year;
- Neighbourhood councils’ spending plans may be limited to the bare minimum;
- Neighbourhood councils must provide information that indicates local residents’ support for the initiative.
- The municipality may, at any time, request that neighbourhood councils show additional information on (the procedure of) wijkbudget spending;

Procedural scope rules
- The municipality determines the maximum amount of wijkbudget per neighbourhood council;
- The municipality can approve or deny spending plans of neighbourhood committees;
- The municipality can, in exceptional cases that go against the intention and spirit of wijkbudget policies, decide to not provide or reclaim wijkbudget;

The rules indicate that in Enschede, supervision measures aim at the start of the process of wijkbudget distribution. At the very beginning, neighbourhood councils must request wijkbudget from the municipality using a form designed by the municipality. This provides the municipality with a decent amount of control in terms of who gets to distribute wijkbudget amongst citizens’ initiatives in Enschede. Then, a spending plan must be composed. Even
though the spending plan is considered a sign of goodwill and not so much a contract (the municipality has even agreed that spending plans may superficially describe neighbourhood councils’ plan for the upcoming year, precisely because it is difficult to know in advance which initiatives will be supported (Municipality of Enschede, personal communication, May 15, 2019)) – it still offers predictability in terms of what the municipality can expect in the coming year. In more extreme cases, refusing to approve a spending plan can be one way to exert control over how wijkbudget is spent. The way in which this supervision is organised, contributes to the control that the municipality can exercise on wijkbudget policies in Enschede. The fact that these most ‘impactful’ control measures for the municipality are placed at the front of the process of wijkbudget distribution, leads us to conclude that supervision in Enschede is predominantly of a preventive nature.

There are also requirements that apply during the process of wijkbudget distribution. The neighbourhood council must at all times be willing to provide whatever information the municipality requests. With regard to the support requirement, the municipality makes a distinction between 'support' and 'active support'. In principle, support is assumed for proposed initiatives, but when the neighbourhood council itself proposes a certain initiative (which is not uncommon), it must provide information that demonstrates 'active support' amongst local residents. That is another aspect that intensifies the degree to which the neighbourhood council is supervised by the municipality.

Finally, it appears that the municipality has the option to not provide or reclaim wijkbudget when they feel that wijkbudget is distributed against the intention and spirit of wijkbudget policies. This rule provides a sort of emergency brake. Based on this analysis, the score of intervening supervision is assigned: the supervisor can actively intervene in the event of deviations from set standards.
4.2.2 The legal regime of Hellendoorn

In this chapter, the legal regime of Hellendoorn will be scored on dimensions of policy freedom, based on the theory by Brandsen et al. (2006).

Task

Task has been defined as *the extent to which a neighbourhood council has the freedom to perform their task, or is obligated or prevented from carrying it out.* This dimension pertains to how free neighbourhood councils are to fulfil their duty of wijkbudget distribution. The relevant rule type is *boundary rules.* On the task spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘mandatory task’, ‘recommended task’, ‘optional task’, or ‘own initiative’. The following relevant rules have been found:

*Boundary rule for the position of neighbourhood council*

- Being an institution, defined as *an organization or group of persons with legal personality, with a non-profit objective of protection of local residents’ interests,* registered in Hellendoorn according to the Chamber of Commerce’s registers.

This boundary rule is formulated in such a manner that it appears to provide relatively much policy space and very little control in terms of who is eligible to enter Hellendoorn’s arena in the position of neighbourhood council. Hellendoorn has confirmed that it does not perform a preselection of organisations that are eligible to enter the position of neighbourhood council.

Based on the above, we conclude that the legal regime of Hellendoorn provides relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and relatively little control for municipalities in terms of Task. All ‘local legal personalities who aim to protect the interests of local residents’ have the option to join the arena of wijkbudget distribution. As such, the score of *optional task* is assigned: *the municipality makes performing a task legally possible but does not make performing this task mandatory.*

Policy goals

Policy goals has been defined as *the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to establish policy objectives.* This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of fulfilling their duties with regard to the task to be delivered.

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7 Please remember that *joining* is a necessary but not sufficient condition to start subsidising local residents’ citizens’ initiatives.
or the social situation to be realized. The relevant rule type is **content scope rules**. On the policy goals spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘objectives’, ‘bandwidth’, ‘result agreements’, ‘dimensioning’, or ‘no target regulations’. The following relevant rules have been found:

**Content scope rules**

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, content scope rules pertain to the content of what the arena may affect. The following content scope rules have been discovered:

- **Wijkbudget** is meant to stimulate local residents to engage in mutual contact, contribute to the community, think along and roll up their sleeves. Additionally, wijkbudget is meant for:
  a. services and activities that promote the quality of life in Hellendoorn;
  b. apolitical cultural events and activities;
  c. activities that positively influence social cohesion.

- Wijkbudget is **in principle** not meant to cover all expenses of citizens’ initiatives. Citizens’ initiatives ideally have co-financing or sponsorships to cover at least 50% of the costs. Additionally, wijkbudget is not meant to:
  a. promote labour market participation;
  b. encourage sustainable behaviour;
  c. contribute to post-exploitation deficits.

- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must be concrete and feasible;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not serve private interests;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not compete with other citizens’ initiatives;
- Citizens’ initiatives must not conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
- Citizens’ initiatives should take place in Hellendoorn and be publicly accessible;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives that demonstrably enjoy support amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives for or from young people;

At first, it strikes that some of these rules are formulated positively, and some are formulated negatively. While that does not necessarily influence the dilemma between policy freedom and control (rules work both ways, after all: if serving private interests is forbidden, then there is still room to serve public interests), it makes interpreting the rules a bit harder from a linguistic perspective. If we consider the policy space that these rules provide for neighbourhood councils, the situation is similar to that of Enschede. For example, we see that
Hellendoorn also intends that wijkbudget promotes the ‘quality of life’ – a rule that is open to interpretation because quality of life may have different meanings in different contexts. As per the logic of Ostrom’s default conditions (Ostrom, 2005, p. 211), neighbourhood councils may even select certain aims to prioritise them over others. The general theme appears to be that wijkbudget should benefit the general society and not specific individuals, and that the local population should support the financing of the initiatives. In addition, it is important to note that the rules specify that citizens’ initiatives should preferably be supported by local residents, or preferably benefit young people. This indicates that these wijkbudget policy goals are not strict requirements, but rather reflect a desire to achieve goals on certain aspects. This too, provides policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to choose whether or not that goal will be pursued by every citizens’ initiative that they subsidise. From the perspective of the municipality of Hellendoorn, these content scope rules provide some amount of control to ensure that public money is spent as intended – to benefit society.

So, the rules formulate a general direction in which the neighbourhood committees’ policy goals must at least head. As such, the score of **dimensioning** is assigned: it is prescribed on which aspects goals will be formulated.

**Decision-making procedure**

Decision-making procedure has been defined as the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free in the manner of decision-making about the objectives and the method of performing a task. This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free in the manner of deciding on wijkbudget allocation. Relevant rule types are **aggregation rules** and **procedural scope rules**. On the decision-making procedure spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘prescribed procedure’, ‘limited space’, ‘minimum requirements’, ‘guide’, or ‘no prescriptions’. The following relevant rules have been found:

**Aggregation rules**
- If a decision needs to be made on the total amount of wijkbudget in the municipality, then the municipality decides the total amount of wijkbudget;
- If a decision needs to be made on how wijkbudget will be distributed between all neighbourhood councils, then the municipality decides how wijkbudget will be distributed between all neighbourhood councils;
- If a decision needs to be made about whether wijkbudget will be granted for a specific citizens’ initiative, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide whether wijkbudget will be granted for that specific citizens’ initiative;
- If a decision needs to be made about how much wijkbudget will be granted for a specific citizens’ initiative, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide how much wijkbudget will be granted for that specific citizens’ initiative;
- If a decision needs to be made about whether a citizens’ initiative will or will not be granted wijkbudget when the rules do not provide a definitive answer, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide if that citizens’ initiative will or will not be granted wijkbudget;
- If a decision needs to be made on how much wijkbudget will be spent on citizens’ initiatives in a certain year, then 3 or 5 appointed members of the neighbourhood council decide on the amount of wijkbudget that will be spent in that year;

Procedural scope rules
- After approval of the request for wijkbudget, 50% of the requested sum is made available before the initiative has taken place, and afterwards, the remaining sum is made available in so far that the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative is covered;
- The procedure for wijkbudget is designed in the following manner:
  1. Local residents request wijkbudget at the neighbourhood council before January 31 of the year in which they plan to carry out their citizens’ initiative;
  2. The neighbourhood council processes January’s wijkbudget requests in February;
  3. The neighbourhood council decides on whether the proposed citizens’ initiatives will be granted wijkbudget or not in March;
  4. The neighbourhood council makes known whether wijkbudget will be granted or not granted for each proposed citizens’ initiative before April 1st;
  5. The neighbourhood council provides 50% of the approved amount of wijkbudget during April;
  6. After the citizens’ initiative has taken place and the activity’s actual deficit is known, the rest of the granted wijkbudget will be provided;
  7. In principle, wijkbudget must be requested before January 31st, but requests made after that date will still be handled in case there is adequate financial space left for that year;

It appears that these rules provide relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils in the manner of their decision-making. At the basis, the ‘hard criteria’ lie in the fact that the neighbourhood council must consist of either 3 or 5 members, and in the way the wijkbudget procedure is described based on dates with deadlines. In terms of control for the municipality of Hellendoorn over the decision-making procedure, we cannot discern any rules that tighten
the municipalities’ grip. Hellendoorn’s rules only provide a very general framework of the decision-making process. As such, the score of minimum requirements is assigned: there are minimum requirements or preconditions to which the procedure must comply.

Regulation

Regulation has been defined as the degree to which the neighbourhood council is free to adopt its own regulations and to apply municipal regulations. This dimension pertains to the degree to which neighbourhood councils are free to adopt their own regulations within the general framework provided by the municipality, and the degree to which they are free to apply municipal regulations. The relevant rule types are choice rules and content scope rules. On the regulation spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘prescribed application’, co-governance’, or ‘regulatory authority’. The following relevant rules have been found:

Choice rules for the position of neighbourhood council

- Neighbourhood councils have an exclusive right to distribute wijkbudget amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils have the right to save part of their acquired wijkbudget for projects that span multiple years;

Content scope rules

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, content scope rules pertain to the content of what the arena may affect. The following content scope rules have been discovered:

- Wijkbudget is meant to stimulate local residents to engage in mutual contact, contribute to the community, think along and roll up their sleeves. Additionally, wijkbudget is meant for:
  a. services and activities that promote the quality of life in Hellendoorn;
  b. apolitical cultural events and activities;
  c. activities that positively influence social cohesion.
- Wijkbudget is in principle not meant to cover all expenses of citizens’ initiatives. Citizens’ initiatives ideally have co-financing or sponsorships to cover at least 50% of the costs. Additionally, wijkbudget is not meant to:
  d. promote labour market participation;
  e. encourage sustainable behaviour;
  f. contribute to post-exploitation deficits.
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must be concrete and feasible;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not serve private interests;
- Proposed citizens’ initiatives must not compete with other citizens’ initiatives;
Citizens’ initiatives must not conflict with the law or municipal regulations;
- Citizens’ initiatives should take place in Hellendoorn and be publicly accessible;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives that demonstrably enjoy support amongst local residents;
- Neighbourhood councils preferably support citizens’ initiatives for or from young people;

In the rules above, no clear answer to the question of whether neighbourhood councils may adopt their own regulations within the general framework provided by the municipality is provided. The rules do not explicitly formulate that no additional regulations may be installed. As was the case in Enschede, we will assume the default choice condition: “Each player can take any physically possible action” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 211). We assume that neighbourhood councils in Hellendoorn may set additional rules to the regime set by the municipality of Enschede. As a result, the neighbourhood council has a moderate amount of policy freedom in terms of regulation, while the municipality can exert a decent amount of control on this aspect. As such, the score of co-governance is assigned: the neighbourhood council as a co-governing regulator which may set rules in addition to the municipality.

Supervision
Supervision has been defined as the degree to which the actions of the neighbourhood council are supervised by the municipality. This dimension pertains to the degree to which the neighbourhood council is supervised by the municipality. Relevant rule types are information rules, and procedural scope rules. On the supervision spectrum, we can score policy freedom in terms of ‘intervening supervision’, ‘inspection’, ‘testing output/outcome’, ‘information obligation’, ‘no supervision’. The following relevant rules have been found:

Information rules
Information rules determine which information is available to different positions. They channel the information flow within the arena, and have been found to be the following:
- Neighbourhood councils are to publicise, both during the annual meeting and on their website, a statement of wijkbudget requests that adhered to the criteria and thus were granted wijkbudget in the previous year;
- Neighbourhood councils are to publicise, both during the annual meeting and on their website, an overview of assigned subsidies and an overview of the amount of money left in account;
- Local residents are to specify, upfront, the estimated costs of a proposed citizens’ initiative;
- Local residents are to request wijkbudget using an online form prepared by neighbourhood councils;
- Local residents are to provide a detailed specification of the actual costs of the citizens’ initiative to perform a final financial settlement, in order to specify the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative which the wijkbudget is meant to compensate;

**Procedural scope rules**

Scope rules pertain to the outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by the arena. Specifically, procedural scope rules pertain to the arena’s outcome in procedural terms (is the neighbourhood council’s decision final or not?), and to rules about the timing of the procedure. The following procedural scope rules have been discovered:

- After approval of the request for wijkbudget, 50% of the requested sum is made available before the initiative has taken place, and afterwards, the remaining sum is made available in so far that the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative is covered;
- The procedure for wijkbudget is designed in the following manner:
  1. Local residents request wijkbudget at the neighbourhood council before January 31 of the year in which they plan to carry out their citizens’ initiative;
  2. The neighbourhood council processes January’s wijkbudget requests in February;
  3. The neighbourhood council decides on whether the proposed citizens’ initiatives will be granted wijkbudget or not in March;
  4. The neighbourhood council makes known whether wijkbudget will be granted or not granted for each proposed citizens’ initiative before April 1st;
  5. The neighbourhood council provides 50% of the approved amount of wijkbudget during April;
  6. After the citizens’ initiative has taken place and the activity’s actual deficit is known, the rest of the granted wijkbudget will be provided;
  7. In principle, wijkbudget must be requested before January 31st, but requests made after that date will still be handled in case there is adequate financial space left for that year;

The above rules indicate how supervision is organized in Hellendoorn. The first thing to notice is that the information rules provide an obligation to publicise certain information ‘during the annual meeting and on their website’. That means that the target audience of the information is not limited to the just the municipality, but has a broader target audience of members of ‘local legal personalities who aim to protect the interests of local residents’, and local residents. In practice, the municipality of Hellendoorn thus receives information in the same form as other interested parties. This is a deliberate choice, because the municipality does not want neighbourhood councils to have extra work in terms of external accountability.
The consequence of this choice is that the municipality only receives ex post information on how wijkbudget was actually spent. That provides neighbourhood councils with relatively much policy freedom (after all, any approval or rejection only takes place afterwards) and it limits the amount of control that the municipality has (after all, they have no guarantee of information during the process). That leads us to conclude that supervision in Hellendoorn is of a repressive nature.

Because the entire subsidy budget is transferred by the municipality to neighbourhood councils, the municipality cannot directly control how wijkbudget is spent. For instance, a rule meant to prevent overspending of wijkbudget states that ‘50% of the requested sum is made available before the initiative has taken place, and afterwards, the remaining sum is made available in so far that the actual deficit of the citizens’ initiative is covered’. The municipality can only enforce this indirectly (via the neighbourhood council) and afterwards (after the overview of assigned subsidies is publicised). In terms of policy freedom and control, this provides relatively much policy freedom and little control.

Finally, we find some rules regarding the procedure through which wijkbudget is distributed towards citizens. In terms of control for the municipality, this provides a decent amount of control: in case the municipality desires information on the plans for the upcoming year, the neighbourhood council will be able to deliver before April 1st - because the rules state that they should have their plans finished by then. All in all, the neighbourhood council must ex post provide information to the municipality on the activities undertaken. Based on this analysis, the score of information obligation is assigned: the neighbourhood council must provide information on the activities undertaken to the municipality.

**4.2.3 Reviewing policy freedom in Enschede and Hellendoorn**

The first step of this chapter has provided, on the basis of the IAD framework by Ostrom (2005), a condensed and sharp description of the legal regimes of Enschede and Hellendoorn. In the next step, this condensed description has been used to analyse the dilemma between policy freedom and control on the basis Brandsen et al. (2006). This allowed for a scoring of the legal regimes terms of policy freedom, in order to answer sub question 2: How much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities do the legal regimes of wijkbudget policies in Enschede and Hellendoorn provide? When we plot the data on policy freedom in Figure 4, the result is Figure 5:
Figure 5. Dimensions of policy freedom and the associated scores per municipality.

We must keep in mind that this is a display of ordinal data, from which we can only infer how both municipalities compare on each of the five dimensions of policy freedom, and also get a sense of how municipalities in general formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities. When we take stock of how both municipalities have overall arranged policy freedom and control in Figure 6, we notice that the balance tilts slightly towards the side of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils. However, per dimension, some remarks can be made.
In terms of the task dimension, we see that municipalities appear to provide relatively much policy freedom for potential neighbourhood councils in whether or not they can choose to perform the task of wijkbudget distribution. In both examined cases, the neighbourhood councils were free to enter or leave the arena of wijkbudget distribution at their own will. None of the examined municipalities have even established on-paper rules that apply in the event of the emergence of a competitive neighbourhood council, and both municipalities affirmed the potential danger this poses for conflicts in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, entry into the arena is a necessary but not sufficient condition to start subsidising local residents’ citizens’ initiatives – so even when neighbourhood councils compete, the municipality maintains control over how wijkbudget is spent.

In terms of the policy goals dimension, we see that municipalities have set rules that indicate a general direction of what the arena of wijkbudget distribution may or may not affect. The formulation of these rules is not very specific. A striking example of the non-specificity of these rules that was found in both cases, is the rule that wijkbudget should help promote the quality of life. After all, ‘quality of life’ may have different meanings in different contexts. By providing the general direction of what the arena of wijkbudget distribution may or may not affect, the municipality exerts a limited amount of control over what happens in the arena. This helps to prevent obvious cases of misuse of wijkbudget money: in both municipalities, a city trip to Prague for 2 families will not meet the requirements that are set in terms of Policy Goals. At the same time, the generality of the direction also provides policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to serve a multitude of citizens’ initiatives.

In terms of the decision-making procedure dimension, both municipalities have set minimum requirements that do not minutely describe the decision-making procedure. On the other hand, those minimum requirements do provide the municipality with a decent amount of control over how neighbourhood councils perform their task of wijkbudget distribution, while also providing the neighbourhood council with a decent amount of policy freedom to decide in the distribution of wijkbudget.

In terms of the regulation dimension, neither the rules of Enschede nor the rules of Hellendoorn explicitly pertained to whether neighbourhood councils are free to adopt their own regulations within the general framework provided by the municipality or free to apply municipal regulations. Therefore, based on the default choice condition set by Ostrom (2005, p. 211), we assume that neighbourhood councils may set additional rules to the regime set by the municipalities. This provides a moderate amount of freedom for neighbourhood councils to refine or supplement the existing legal regime where they find...
it necessary, and it also provides a moderate amount of control for municipalities which ensures that certain standards are met.

- In terms of the supervision dimension, it is apparent from the rules that Enschede and Hellendoorn provide different types of supervision, namely preventive supervision (Enschede) and repressive supervision (Hellendoorn). Their different approaches result in different degrees of policy freedom and control:
  
  o In Enschede, neighbourhood councils will ex ante hand in a spending plan that needs approval by the municipality. Without an approved spending plan, the neighbourhood council may not proceed to fund citizens’ initiatives with wijkbudget. As such, the municipality of Enschede has control over how wijkbudget will be used, and may intervene when they deem necessary. As such, there is little policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to not have their actions supervised.
  
  o In Hellendoorn, neighbourhood councils will ex post provide an overview of assigned subsidies. By design, the rules provide no obligation for neighbourhood councils to make known how wijkbudget is used during the process of distribution, which emphasizes the importance of mutual trust in this regime. As such, Hellendoorn can only respond to any irregularities ‘after the fact’. This provides the municipality with little control, but provides neighbourhood councils with a great degree of freedom to ‘just go ahead and do their thing’.
5. Conclusion

Now that the sub questions are answered in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide an answer to the main research question. Then, in the discussion, these findings will be placed in the social context that was presented at the beginning of this thesis. Finally, we will reflect on the limitations of this research and possible ideas for future research.

5.1 Answering the main research question

This thesis introduced the following main research question: How do municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities?

These municipalities’ approach in balancing between policy freedom and control corresponded in 4 out of the 5 dimensions on which this balance could be scored. Because Enschede and Hellendoorn are not representative of all municipalities, we will sketch a rough outline of the similarities in their approach in order to start answering the main research question. Enschede and Hellendoorn scored the same on:

- the task dimension: Both scored ‘optional task’ (the municipality makes performing a task legally possible but does not make performing this task mandatory). This indicates that neighbourhood councils have a large amount of policy freedom to take on the task of wijkbudget distribution, while municipalities have a low amount of control over who will take on the task of wijkbudget distribution. Both municipalities make no preselection of organisations that are eligible to join, which enlarges the policy freedom even more – to the degree that both municipalities even acknowledge that they have no control over who can join the arena in the position of neighbourhood council to distribute wijkbudget. Only later in the process and on the basis of other criteria (such as lacking support for proposed initiatives amongst local residents) can municipalities intervene.

- the policy goals dimension: Both scored ‘dimensioning’ (it is prescribed on which aspects goals will be formulated). This indicates that neighbourhood councils have a moderate-to-large amount of policy freedom to establish policy objectives, while municipalities have a moderate-to-low amount of control over the policy objectives. The legal regimes provide a general area of subjects which the arena may affect. The legal regimes explicitly mentioned labour participation, a clean living environment, feeling of safety, care for people in need of help, sustainable behaviour, quality of life, social cohesion, and cultural events. The legal regimes provide this framework, within the boundaries of which a neighbourhood council may subsequently determine what citizens’ initiatives fit best.
this way, the legal regimes provide control for municipalities by indicating what wijkbudget may be used for – because if a citizens’ initiative does not fit one of these mentioned general areas, this is grounds for municipal intervention. It also provides neighbourhood councils clarity in terms of what types of initiatives they may provide wijkbudget for, generating certainty for neighbourhood councils and local residents. It also provides policy freedom for neighbourhood councils to, within the stated policy areas, distribute wijkbudget at their own discretion.

- the decision-making procedure dimension: Both scored ‘minimum requirements’ (there are minimum requirements or preconditions to which the procedure must comply). This indicates that neighbourhood councils have a moderate amount of policy freedom in their method of decision-making, while municipalities have a moderate amount of control over how neighbourhood councils come to their decisions. Both legal regimes set some minimum requirements in terms of the decision-making procedure. Between both examined cases, we found some differences in their approach. In Enschede, decisions made by neighbourhood councils are essentially of an advisory nature, because the final decision power is reserved for the municipality. In Enschede, a neighbourhood council may not distribute wijkbudget before having their spending plan approved by the municipality. This provides the municipality with control, because they can deny a neighbourhood council’s spending plan and therefore deny wijkbudget spending by that neighbourhood council. In Hellendoorn, the legal regime does not provide the municipality with control over how wijkbudget is spent. The municipal control is limited to determining the amount of wijkbudget per neighbourhood council. Another difference in the decision-making procedure between both municipalities is that Enschede has laid down that citizens’ initiatives require support of local residents, while this is not explicitly required in Hellendoorn’s legal regime. As such, the amount of control over the decision-making procedure is higher for the municipality of Enschede than for Hellendoorn; while the amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils is higher in Hellendoorn than in Enschede.

- the regulation dimension: Both scored ‘co-governance’ (the neighbourhood council as co-governing regulator which may set rules in addition to the municipality). This indicates that neighbourhood councils have a moderate amount of policy freedom to adopt regulations within the framework provided by the municipality, while municipalities have a moderate amount of control over the regulation that applies to wijkbudget distribution.

In so far, these four dimensions provide a description of how two municipalities take a similar approach to the dilemma between policy freedom and control in the context of wijkbudget
distribution. Even though we cannot generalise these results for the entire ‘population’ of Dutch municipalities that employ wijkbudget policies, we will assume that other municipalities take a similar approach. If we were to assess their legal regimes, we expect to find the same scores on the dimensions of task, policy goals, decision-making procedure, and regulation. Therefore, we can answer the main research question with the following hypothesis:

_How do municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities?_

Municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules that provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities by:

a. placing very minimal restrictions in terms of which organisations may fill the position of neighbourhood council (providing relatively much policy freedom for potential neighbourhood councils and little control for municipalities);

b. prescribing only generally formulated goals of wijkbudget policy (e.g., improvement of quality of life, cleaner living environment), creating policy freedom that can be filled in more specifically by neighbourhood councils (providing relatively much policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and a limited amount of control for municipalities);

c. prescribing a ‘bare bones’ description of how neighbourhood councils should reach their decisions, while simultaneously reserving the right for to intervene in exceptional cases (providing a moderate amount of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and a moderate amount of control for municipalities);

d. providing room for neighbourhood councils to formulate additional rules to the municipalities’ regulatory regime (e.g. ‘we shall prioritise initiatives aimed at the interest of the elderly’) at their own discretion (providing a moderate amount of freedom for neighbourhood councils and a moderate amount of control for municipalities).

Furthermore, on the dimension of supervision, Enschede and Hellendoorn had different scores. Enschede scored ‘intervening supervision’: _the supervisor can actively intervene in the event of deviations from set standards_. The legal regime of Enschede provides Enschede with preventive supervision, allowing the municipality to supervise _what the neighbourhood council plans to do_. Hellendoorn scored ‘information obligation’: _the neighbourhood council must provide information on the activities undertaken to the municipality_. This legal regime provides Hellendoorn with repressive supervision, allowing the municipality to supervise
what the neighbourhood council has done. In terms of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils, we can then determine that the legal regime of Enschede provides less policy freedom than the legal regime of Hellendoorn. Because the difference in approach of the two municipalities, we cannot use this information to provide a further answer to the research question of how municipalities in general legally arrange the supervision aspect in the arena of wijkbudget distribution.

In the first chapter of this thesis, a short literature review of red tape and green tape was presented. While a full analysis of the municipalities’ legal regimes in terms of red tape and green tape is not included in the scope of this research, we feel that the results of this research show that rules are not mere impeding factors that society would be better off without (Kaufman, 1977; Bozeman, 1993; Goodsell, 2000). The results indicate that legal regimes are very well capable of providing policy freedom, while still attaining control for municipalities. Recently, the Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten argued that that, in the context of citizen participation, municipalities possess a restricting ‘culture of control and accountability’ (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2013, p. 12), which must transform into a culture of ‘facilitating, with administrators who dare to let go, representatives who give room to citizens’ initiatives and public officials who are willing to support and facilitate citizens’ initiatives’ (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016, p. 12). Based on this research, we would argue that it is very possible to have the best of both worlds, to provide both policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities.

5.2 Discussion

In this thesis, a systematic content analysis was performed to analyse how municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities. It challenges the dogma that government rules are red tape, a case of 'less is more'. Rules also provide green tape, and all parties involved have an interest in the existence of a clear legal regime. So, we would argue that ‘red tape’ or ‘green tape’ emerge not from the number of rules, but from how rules in a legal regime are configured in terms of their content. This study has theorised that certain configurations provide freedom at the cost of control; while other configurations do the opposite. Then, using a framework on the basis of that theory, this study displayed the configuration with which wijkbudget-related legal regimes are capable of providing policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities at the same time.
When the framework was applied to two municipalities, the municipalities’ scores corresponded on four of the five dimensions of the balance between policy freedom and control. But what do these corresponding scores mean? Of course, it shows that both municipalities’ balances tilt towards the side of policy freedom for neighbourhood councils. But are both municipalities’ levels of the balance between freedom and control really the same, or are the categories of each dimension of Brandsen et al. (2006)’s framework so widely formulated that it is not realistically possible to make a comparison between municipalities in terms of how free or controlling their legal regimes are? In other words: how well suited is the framework to determine whether municipality A’s legal regime provides – for instance - more policy freedom than municipality B’s legal regime? We would argue that the categories of each dimension do provide a basic level of distinction (and a distinction is better than no distinction at all), but they are wide categories indeed. In other words: the data may be spread out much more than the categories make us believe. This poses the risk that only a rough distinction can be made between municipalities – or that different municipalities would still be assigned similar scores, resulting in data that fails to reflect actually existing subtlety or complexity. If one would use this research’ framework to compare different municipalities’ legal regimes, a further distinction within the categories discussed in this study would surely increase the performance of such a future study.

We must also be aware of the fact that this has been an explorative study into municipalities’ legal regimes. The results cannot be generalised because the samples provide no accurate representation of the entire ‘population’ of Dutch municipalities. However, this research has developed a framework on the basis of Ostrom (1999; 2005) and Brandsen et al. (2006) to make a first inventory of how municipalities formulate wijkbudget rules in such a way that they provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities. By developing a framework to research the dilemma between policy freedom and control, and showing how it can be applied, this research both theoretically and practically advances the research into legal regimes in participatory arenas.

This research has certain limitations in its research design that should be mentioned. For instance, only two legal regimes have been analysed, which limits the generalizability of this study. We can only infer what legal regime works for Enschede and Hellendoorn, and assume that these types of regimes will also apply to other municipal organisations. Another weakness of this study is inherent to the research method: content analysis. Content analysis is time consuming, which raised a threshold in how much data could reasonably be analysed in this master’s thesis. The fact that content analysis is time consuming also raises a threshold for
repeating this study and assessing its reliability. To lower that threshold, a package of the analysis performed in ATLAS.ti has been made available\(^8\) — allowing other researchers to assess the validity of the choices that were made in the process of content analysis. This package also includes memos that “explicate how multiple standpoints and other contextual influences impact the interpretation of meaning in the data” (Drisko & Maschi, 2016, p. 128). To enhance this study’s rigor, coding schemes and design choices have been explicitly written down\(^9\).

Finally, this research has - albeit limited - practical implications. To municipalities who plan to implement wijkbudget policies in the future – and the Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten suggests that they do (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016) -, the modification of the framework by Brandsen et al. (2006) to fit the context of wijkbudgetten will be useful. Municipalities that plan to formulate rules that provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities, may use the framework in this thesis when they assess how they will design the rules on the five dimensions of freedom. Figure 5 will help to compare their legal design to legal regimes that are already ‘proven practice’ in Enschede and Hellendoorn.

### 5.3 Recommendations for future research

This study theorises that policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities emerges from a delicate formulation of the legal regimes on five different dimensions. Based on explorative research, it concludes that if a legal regime is to provide policy freedom for neighbourhood councils and control for municipalities, it must

- a. allow neighbourhood councils to take on the task of wijkbudget distribution as an option;
- b. prescribe only the aspects on which policy goals must be formulated;
- c. prescribe a confined description of the decision-making procedure, containing only limited requirements or preconditions;
- d. allow neighbourhood councils to set additional rules within the framework provided by the municipality.

Future research could focus on whether these findings can also be discovered in the legal regimes of other municipalities. For this research, a lot of time was spent developing the framework to research the dilemma between policy freedom and control. A future study could

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\(^8\) The package is available for download at http://bit.ly/737e9a.

\(^9\) See Table 3 and Table 4 for used coding frames; and Table 9 for a substantiated account of design choices.
focus purely on the legal regimes of more municipalities, and repeat this study with increased reliability.

Another research could explore different policy arenas where policy freedom plays is of crucial importance. In the context of citizens’ initiatives and participation society, the distribution of wijkbudget is not the only task that ‘active’ citizens can take on. Recently, the ‘right to challenge’ – active residents are given the right to take over local services (such as maintaining the greenery in the municipality) from contracted parties - has gotten more and more attention and was even mentioned in the most recent coalition agreement. The Dutch government stated (translated from Dutch to English): ‘In consultation with municipalities, we want to give citizens and local associations the opportunity to submit an alternative proposal for the implementation of collective provisions in their immediate environment through a Right to Challenge scheme’ (Rijksoverheid.nl, 2017, p. 7). Similar to the context of wijkbudget distribution, citizens require policy freedom and municipalities require control when the right to challenge is exercised: how can the service level of a certain municipal task (such as greening maintenance) be legally guaranteed when residents start fulfilling that task instead of contracted market parties? Future research may then investigate how the legal regimes of such Right to Challenge-citizen’s initiatives formulate policy freedom for participating citizens and control for municipalities.
References


http://magazine.lokaledemocratieinbeweging.nl/democratie-anno-nu#!/vraag-2


Appendix A: Legal documents of Enschede

Subsidieverordening wijkbudgetten 2017

De raad van de gemeente Enschede, gelegen het voorstel van het college van 6 december 2016, besloot,

gelet op artikel 149 van de Gemeentewet, titel 4.2 van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht, de Algemene subsidieverordening gemeente Enschede 2016, het besluit van de Raad d.d. 11 april 2011 ‘wijkbudgetten 2011’, het besluit van de Raad d.d. 12 december 2011 ‘Spelregels gebruik bestemmingsreserve wijkbudgetten’ en het besluit van de Raad d.d. 4 november 2015 ‘wijkbudgetten’,

vast te stellen de Subsidieverordening wijkbudgetten 2017

Hoofdstuk 1 Inleidende bepalingen

Artikel 1 Begripsbepalingen

In deze verordening wordt verstaan onder:

a. Wijkbudget: de door het college aangewezen bijdrage die door een bewonersorganisatie kan worden verstrekt ten behoeve van het realiseren van bewonersinitiatieven.
b. Bewonersorganisatie: een instelling, die de belangen van bewoners behartigt in een buurt, wijk of dorp.
c. Aanvager: een bewonersorganisatie in een buurt, wijk of dorp, die bij het college een schriftelijk verzoek heeft ingediend om subsidie te verkrijgen.
d. Bestedingsplan: een plan, dat onderdeel kan zijn van een wijkprogramma of anderszins, waarin de bewonersorganisatie aangeeft welke door de buurt, wijk of dorp ingediende verwachte initiatieven zij het komend jaar wil gaan realiseren.
e. Draagvlak: steun van een groep bewoners die op een actieve wijze aangeven een initiatief te ondersteunen.
f. College: college van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Enschede.

Artikel 2 Bevoegdheid college

Het college is bevoegd tot het beslissen op aanvragen om subsidie op grond van deze verordening, het besluit van de Raad d.d. 11 april 2011, ‘wijkbudgetten’ en het besluit d.d. 12 december 2011 ‘Spelregels gebruik bestemmingsreserve wijkbudgetten’.

Hoofdstuk 2 Subsidiebepalingen

Artikel 3 Toepassingsbereik: doel

1. Deze verordening is een bijzondere verordening als bedoeld in artikel 3 van de Algemene subsidieverordening gemeente Enschede 2016.
2. Het verstrekken van subsidies krachtens deze verordening heeft betrekking op het beleidsterrein stadsdeelgewijs werken.
3. Subsidieverstrekking krachtens deze verordening heeft als doel om de leefbaarheid en veiligheid te verbeteren en de betrokkenheid van bewoners bij en de inzet voor hun buurt, wijk of dorp te stimuleren.

Artikel 4 Subsidiabele activiteiten

1. Het wordt aan de bewonersorganisatie aan wie subsidie is verleend overgelaten naar eigen inzicht het aan hun toegekende deel van het wijkbudget te verdelen onder de ingediende bewonersinitiatieven.
2. Het in lid 1 van dit artikel bedoelde bewonersinitiatief moet bijdragen aan een of meerdere van de hierna te noemen activiteiten:
   a. het bevorderen van de arbeidsparticipatie;
   b. een schone en hele leefomgeving;
   c. het vergroten van het veiligheidsgevoel;
   d. het stimuleren van wijkdiensten voor zorgafhankelijken;
   e. het stimuleren van duurzaam gedrag;
   f. het bevorderen van de leefbaarheid;
   g. het bevorderen van de sociale samenhang.
Artikel 5 Subsidiecriteria
De bewonersorganisatie die wijkbudget kan toekennen ten behoeve van een initiatief dient zich te houden aan de volgende criteria:
   a. Het initiatief is niet strijdig met de wet- en gemeentelijke regelgeving.
   b. Het initiatief past binnen de genoemde politiek bestuurlijke kaders.
   c. Het initiatief dient geen privé belang.
   d. De bewoners fungeren als opdrachtgever.
   e. Er is aantoonbaar draagvlak in buurt, wijk of dorp voor het initiatief.
   f. Het initiatief dient haalbaar te zijn.

Artikel 6 Subsidieplafond
1. Als subsidieplafond geldt het in de gemeentebegroting vastgestelde bedrag.
2. Het college verdeelt de subsidie over de bewonersorganisaties op basis van het verdeelmodel in het besluit van de Raad d.d. 11 april 2011, ‘wijkbudgetten’.

Artikel 7 Vereisten subsidieaanvrager
Subsidie wordt slechts verstrekt aan een bewonersorganisatie.

Artikel 8 Bestedingstermijn en spelregels wijkbudgetten
1. De bewonersorganisatie aan welke subsidie verleend is mag deze alleen in de periode waarvoor de subsidie verleend is besteden.
2. Niet bestede subsidie wordt bij de vaststelling van de subsidie teruggevorderd.
3. In afwijking van het gestelde in lid 1 en 2 kan het college op verzoek van de bewonersorganisatie beslissen voor een periode van maximaal 3 jaar een deel van de subsidie apart te zetten met als doel te sparen voor een vooraf benoemd groot of specifiek initiatief.
4. De bewonersorganisatie kan een voorschot op de subsidie krijgen.
5. Het college kan nadere regels vaststellen ten aanzien van het bepaalde in lid 1, 3 en 4.

Hoofdstuk 3 Procedurele bepalingen

Artikel 9 Aanvraag
De aanvraag voor subsidie wordt schriftelijk ingediend bij het college met gebruikmaking van een door het college vastgesteld aanvraagformulier.

Artikel 10 Aanvraagtermijn
Een aanvraag om subsidie wordt ingediend uiterlijk voor 1 oktober, voor aanvang van het jaar waarop de aanvraag betrekking heeft.

Artikel 11 Beslistermijn; goedkeuring bestedingsplan; subsidiieverlening; voorschotten
1. Het college beslist uiterlijk 31 december van het jaar waarin de aanvraag om subsidie is gedaan, tenzij de aanvraag later dan 1 oktober is ingediend. In het laatste geval beslist het college binnen 13 weken nadat de aanvraag is ingediend.
2. Het college beslist in geval van toekennis tot subsidiieverlening onder het voorbehoud dat in het eerste kwartaal van het jaar waarvoor subsidie is verleend een bestedingsplan, dat onderdeel kan zijn van een wijkprogramma of anderszins, moet worden aangeboden ter goedkeuring aan de stadsdeelcommissie van de raad.
3. De stadsdeelcommissie van de raad beslist in het eerste kwartaal van het jaar waarvoor de subsidie is verleend of het bestedingsplan, dat onderdeel kan zijn van een wijkprogramma of anderszins, wordt goedgekeurd. Indien de beslissing niet in het eerste kwartaal kan worden genomen, wordt deze in het tweede kwartaal genomen.
4. De subsidiieverleningsbeschikking vermeldt de eventuele voorschotverlening en de wijze van betaling daarvan.

Artikel 12 Verplichtingen
1. Teneinde de besteding van de subsidie te kunnen controleren, kan het college een bewonersorganisatie verplichten verantwoording af te leggen over de besteding van subsidie voor een gerealiseerd dan wel nog te realiseren initiatief.
2. Indien een bewonersorganisatie aan wie subsidie verleend is zich niet houdt aan de in artikel 5 genoemde criteria, dan kan het college de subsidiieverlening wijzigen of stopzetten.
Artikel 13 Intrekkings- en terugvorderingsgronden
Op grond van artikel 12 Algemene subsidieverordening gemeente Enschede 2016 kan de subsidie in ieder geval geheel of gedeeltelijk worden ingetrokken en teruggevorderd indien naar het oordeel van het college:
De bestedingen niet conform het bestedingsplan, dat verwerkt kan zijn in een wijkprogramma of anderszins, hebben plaatsgevonden.
1. Een uitgave of activiteit ten behoeve van een initiatief niet heeft plaatsgevonden.
2. Het bestedingsplan, dat verwerkt kan zijn in een wijkprogramma of anderszins, niet in het eerste kwartaal van het jaar waarvoor de subsidie is verleend is aangeboden aan de stadsdeelcommissie van de raad en niet in het eerste of tweede kwartaal van het jaar waarvoor de subsidie is verleend en geaccordeerd is door de stadsdeelcommissie van de raad.

Artikel 14 Subsidievaststelling
1. De bewonersorganisatie dient uiterlijk op 1 april volgend op het jaar waarvoor de subsidie is verleend aanvraag tot vaststelling, vergezeld van een financiële- en inhoudelijke verantwoording, in.
2. In afwijking van artikel 20 Algemene subsidieverordening gemeente Enschede 2016 is voor subsidies groter dan € 50.000,- geen accountantsverklaring nodig.
3. De subsidiebeschikking vermeldt de wijze van betaling van het subsidiebedrag en een verrekening van eventuele voorschotten.
4. De subsidiebeschikking wordt niet eerder vastgesteld dan nadat:
   a. Het college de financiële verantwoording heeft goedgekeurd;
   b. De stadsdeelcommissie van de raad de inhoudelijke verantwoording heeft goedgekeurd.

Hoofdstuk 4 Slotbepalingen
Artikel 15 Hardheidsclausule
1. Indien de toepassing van deze verordening leidt tot onbillijkheden van overwegende aard, dan kan het college afwijken van bepalingen in deze verordening.

Artikel 16 Intrekkings bestaande verordening
De Subsidieverordening Activiteiten stadsdeelgewijs werken, vastgesteld door de gemeenteraad op 13 februari 2006, wordt ingetrokken.

Artikel 17 Overgangsrecht
Subsidieaanvragen die zijn ingediend voor de datum van inwerkingtreding van deze verordening worden afgehandeld volgens de bepalingen van de subsidieverordening Activiteiten stadsdeelgewijs werken.

Artikel 18 Inwerkingtreding
Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag na die van haar bekendmaking.

Deze verordening wordt aangehaald als Subsidieverordening wijkbudgetten 2017

Vastgesteld in de openbare vergadering van 19 december 2016
De Griffier, De Voorzitter,
R. Jongedijk dr. G.O. van Veldhuizen

Gemeenteblad 2016 nr. 182097 30 december 2016
Nadere regels bij de uitvoering van de Subsidieverordening Wijkbudgetten 2017

Burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Enschede,

besluiten,

gelopen op artikel 8 van de Subsidieverordening wijkbudgetten 2017,

vast te stellen de Nadere regels Wijkbudgetten 2017

Artikel 1 Sparen
1. De bewonersorganisatie krijgt de mogelijkheid om voor maximaal 3 jaar, een deel van de subsidie apart te laten zetten met als doel te sparen voor een vooraf benoemd groot of specifiek initiatief.
2. Om in aanmerking te komen voor het apart zetten van de subsidie met sparen als doel, dient de bewonersorganisatie vóór 1 oktober van het jaar waarvoor subsidie is verleend, schriftelijk of per e-mail een spaarvoorstel in bij het college.
3. Voorstellen die na 1 oktober zijn ingediend, worden niet in behandeling genomen.
4. Het spaarvoorstel bevat in ieder geval:
   a. Een beschrijving van het initiatief en van het doel;
   b. Een duidelijke beschrijving van hoe het initiatief wordt uitgevoerd met daarbij een zo concreet mogelijke planning en begroting;
   c. Een onderbouwing waarmee voldoende draagvlak voor het initiatief wordt aangetoond.
5. Het college toetst het spaarvoorstel aan de in lid 5 sub a. t/m. c. gestelde eisen en beslist hierover binnen 8 weken. De beslissing wordt schriftelijk aan de bewonersorganisatie meegedeeld.
6. Het college beheert het gespaarde deel van de subsidie.

Artikel 2 Voorschot
1. De bewonersorganisatie krijgt de mogelijkheid om (een deel van) het wijkbudget voorgeschoten te krijgen met als doel de praktische uitvoerbaarheid van initiatieven te versnellen.
2. Het college bepaalt:
   a. Of een voorschot redelijkerwijs noodzakelijk is om de realiseering van initiatieven te bevorderen;
   b. De hoogte van het voorschot, tot een maximum van de totale subsidie van het toekenningsjaar dat aan de bewonersorganisatie is toegekend.

Artikel 3 Overschrijding kalenderjaar
Indien blijkt dat een goedgekeurd initiatief wegens omstandigheden niet gedurende het jaar waarvoor de subsidie is verstrekt kan worden uitgevoerd, dan is het toegestaan om dit initiatief binnen 3 maanden van het daarop volgende kalenderjaar alsnog uit te voeren.

Artikel 4 Inwerkingtreding
Deze nadere regels treden in werking op het tijdstip dat de Subsidieverordening Wijkbudgetten 2017 in werking treedt.

Artikel 5 Citeertitel
Deze nadere regels worden aangehaald als “Regels Wijkbudgetten”

Vastgesteld in de openbare vergadering van 19 december 2016
De Griffier, De Voorzitter, R. Jongedijk Dr. G.D. van Veldhuizen

Toelichting artikelen

Artikel 1 Sparen
Lid 5: Aan het indienen van een spaanvoorstel worden een aantal vereisten gesteld. Een voorstel bevat tenminste een duidelijke beschrijving van het initiatief en de doelen die daarbij zullen worden behaald. Daarbij is het noodzakelijk om duidelijk aan te geven hoe het initiatief wordt uitgevoerd en welk tijdpad daaraan gekoppeld wordt. Dit houdt in dat redelijkerwijs inzichtelijk moet zijn gemaakt wat de start- en einddatum van het initiatief is. Een belangrijk onderdeel van het spaanvoorstel is het toevoegen van een zo concreet mogelijke begroting. Het moet duidelijk zijn hoeveel jaarlijks van het wijkbudget gespaard gaat worden. Dit betekent, waar mogelijk, het bijvoegen van offertes, dan wel een onderbouwde kos- tenraming, eventuele manieren van cofinanciering of andere manieren om de begroting te verantwoor- den, zodat inzichtelijk kan worden gemaakt hoeveel geld er met de totstandkoming van het initiatief gemoeid is. Daarnaast is van belang dat duidelijk is hoeveel bewoners betrokken zijn bij het project, om voldoende draagvlak te waarborgen.

Artikel 2 Voorschot
Het is gebruiklijk dat er voorschotten op subsidies gegeven kunnen worden. Om die reden zou het logisch zijn dit artikel in zijn geheel weg te laten. Echter, zijn deze nadere regels ook en nadrukkelijk bedoeld als een soort werkinstructie voor de medewerkers van stadsdeelmanagement en de bewoners- organisaties die zich bezighouden met de wijkbudgetten. De ‘regels wijkbudgetten’ zijn er dus mede voor bedoeld deze bewonersorganisaties houvast en richting te geven waar het gaat om het sparen, bevoorschotting en het hervendelen van wijkbudgetten. Hoewel vanuit juridisch perspectief overbodig, rechtvaardigt de praktische bruikbaarheid en de duidelijkheid voor de medewerkers van stadsdeelma- nagement en de bewonersorganisaties de opname van dit artikel in deze nadere regels

Artikel 3 Overschrijding kalenderjaar
Het kan voorkomen dat uitgaven niet synchroon lopen met het kalenderjaar, omdat tussen moment van het besluit en de uitvoering veel tijd zit. Daardoor kunnen initiatieven tegen het einde van het ka- lendarjaar goedgerekend worden, maar pas in het volgende kalenderjaar worden uitgevoerd. Door middel van een kortlopende verplichting kan een dergelijk initiatief alsnog uitgevoerd worden. In dit geval dienen projecten binnen 3 maanden worden uitgevoerd.
Appendix B: Legal documents of Hellendoorn

Nadere regels maatschappelijke ontwikkeling gemeente Hellendoorn 2014

Nijverdal, 10 december 2013 Nr. 13/N04015
Burgemeester en wethouders van Hellendoorn; gelet op artikel 2, tweede lid, artikel 4, tweede lid, artikel 5, vierde lid, en artikel 7, vierde lid, van de Algemene subsidieverordening samenleving gemeente Hellendoorn 2014; vast te stellen de: Nadere regels maatschappelijke ontwikkeling gemeente Hellendoorn 2014

Hoofdstuk 1 Algemene bepalingen

Artikel 1: Begripsomschrijvingen
In dit besluit wordt verstaan onder:

a. verordening: de Algemene subsidieverordening samenleving gemeente Hellendoorn 2014;
b. instelling: een organisatie of groepering van personen die rechtspersoonlijkheid bezit en die zich zonder winstzweck de behartiging van belangen van ideële c.q. immateriële aard van de inzetenen deze gemeente of een deel daarvan ten doel stelt;
c. instelling internationale hulpverlening: een locale organisatie of lokale groepering van personen die rechtspersoonlijkheid bezit en die zich zonder winstzweck richt op internationale hulpverlening;
d. internationale hulpverlening: hulp aan projecten in minder ontwikkelde landen;
e. welzijn: de inspanning op maatschappelijk en sociaal-cultureel terrein, die tot doel heeft, in samenwerking met het particulier initiatief en andere betrokkenen:
   1. de ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden van mensen te vergroten en hun zelfredzaamheid alsmede hun deelname aan de samenleving te stimuleren mede om te voorkomen dat mensen in een achterstandspositie geraken;
   2. de personen die in een achterstandspositie zijn geraakt mogelijkheden te bieden hun positie te verbeteren;
   3. het welbevinden van personen in de samenleving op andere wijze te bevorderen;
f. deelnemer: een persoon die al dan niet tegen betaling gebruik maakt van de activiteiten die vallen onder de reikwijdte van dit besluit;
g. vrijwilliger: een persoon, die in enig georganiseerd verband activiteiten verricht ten behoeve van de instellingen op het terrein van cultuur, welzijn of zorg zonder vergoeding voor de daaraan bestede tijd;
h. vrijwilligersorganisatie: een instelling, welke werkzaam is op het terrein van cultuur, welzijn of zorg en die geheel werkt met vrijwilligers;
i. leefbaarheid: de mate waarin de sociale en fysieke leefomgeving aan de normen en waarden van de bewoners en/of gebruikers van de leefomgeving voldoen;
j. het college: college van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Hellendoorn.

Artikel 2
Subsidieaanvragen waarop een subsidieplafond van toepassing is, worden behandeld in volgorde van binnenkomst van volledige aanvragen.

Hoofdstuk 2 Incidentele subsidies

Artikel 3
Voor de toepassing van dit hoofdstuk wordt onder ‘incidentele subsidie’ verstaan subsidie voor een activiteit ofwel een reeks van activiteiten die gericht is/zijn op internationale hulpverlening.

Artikel 4

1. Incidentele subsidie kan worden verleend voor projecten die structureel bijdragen aan:
   a. het bewustzijn, de educatie en de saamhorigheid van inwoners van de gemeente Hellendoorn in het kader van ontwikkelingssamenwerking;
   b. het bevorderen van de geestelijke en lichamelijke gezondheid in een ontwikkelingsland;
   c. het voorzieningeniveau op het terrein van openbare werken of educatie in een ontwikkelingsland.

2. De subsidie kan nooit meer bedragen dan de totale kosten van het project.

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Hoofdstuk 3 Vrijwilligersorganisaties
§ 3.1 Algemeen

Artikel 5
Subsidie wordt verleend aan in de gemeente Hellendoorn werkzame instellingen, die volgens de in-
schrijving bij de Kamer van Koophandel gevestigd zijn in de gemeente Hellendoorn.

Artikel 6
1. De volgende categorieën vrijwilligersorganisaties komen in aanmerking voor subsidie:
   a. wijk- en buurtverenigingen of verenigingen voor plaatselijk belang;
   b. muziekverenigingen; en
   c. plaatselijk vormings- en ontwikkelingswerk voor volwassenen en emancipatie.
2. De raad stelt jaarlijks de hoogte van het totale budget per categorie vast.
3. Het college verdeelt het totaalbudget onder de instellingen die voor subsidie in aanmerking komen,
on basis van de voor hen geldende subsidiegrondslag(sen).

Artikel 7
De aanvraag voor een subsidie moet middels het daarvoor beschikbare aanvraagformulier worden in-
gediend met daarbij gevoegd de vereiste bescheiden.
§ 3.2 Wijk- en buurtwerk

Artikel 8
Subsidie wordt verleend aan wijk-/buurtverenigingen of aan verenigingen voor plaatselijk belang, die
zich ten doel stellen:
   a. het aansluiten op of helpen ontwikkelen van een samenhangend aanbod van activiteiten ten
   aanzien van behoeften op sociaal en/of cultureel en/of recreatief terrein en/of activiteiten op het
   terrein van het vormings- en ontwikkelingswerk voor volwassenen en/of emancipatie;
   b. het coördineren en stimuleren van behoeften van wijkbewoners ten aanzien van de reeds in de
   wijk aanwezige voorzieningen;
   c. de mogelijkheid te bieden om gespreksoorlog te zijn, teneinde de contacten tussen de wijkbewoners
   onderling, tussen groeperingen in de wijk en tussen het gemeentebestuur en wijkbewoners/groe-
   peringen in de wijk te verbeteren.

Artikel 9
1. Subsidie wordt verleend in de vorm van een jaarlijks budget in eens en is bestemd voor activiteiten
   die de leefbaarheid bevorderen.
2. Het subsidiebedrag is gebaseerd op een bedrag per huis in de wijk, buurt of dorp en een bijdrage per
   instelling. Het college kan de hoogte van de vaste bijdrage voor de instelling afhankelijk stellen
   van de omvang van de betreffende wijk, buurt of dorp. Het college kan de hoogte van het bedrag
   per huis relativeren aan de gemiddelde woningbezetting in een bepaalde(wijk)dorp.

§ 3.3 Muziekverenigingen

Artikel 10
1. De instellingen die voor subsidie op grond van deze paragraaf in aanmerking kunnen komen zijn:
   a. harmonieën, fanfarekorpsen, brass bands, showkorpsen of drum fanfares;
   b. drumbands en slagwerkgroepen;
   c. twirler-,majorettegroepen en flaggirls.
2. De instellingen als bedoeld in lid 1 dienen:
   a. bereid te zijn jaarlijks tenminste één openbaar concert te organiseren of tenminste mede-
     werking te verlenen aan twee door het college als zodanig aan te wijzen evenementen/ma-
     nifestaties, als regel in de gemeente Hellendoorn;
   b. tenminste het hierna benoemde aantal spelende leden te hebben:
      1. harmonie- en fanfarekorpsen en brassbands 30;
      2. drumbands 20;
      3. twirler- en majorettegroepen en flaggirls 12;
   c. de kosten in verband met deelname aan evenementen te bekostigen uit de door het college
     - op grond van dit artikel - vastgestelde subsidie.
3. Subsidie wordt verleend in de vorm van:
   a. een bedrag per
      • harmonie/fanfarekorps, zijnde 16% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen, gedeeld door het aantal harmonie-/fanfarekorpsen;
      • drumband/slagwerkgroep, zijnde 6% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen, gedeeld door het aantal drumbands/slagwerkgroepen;
      • twirl-/majorettegroep en flaggirls, zijnde 3% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen, gedeeld door het aantal twirl-/majorettegroepen en flaggirls, zijnde in totaal 25% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen.
   b. een bedrag per spelend of uniformdragend lid, zijnde 25% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen, gedeeld door het totaal aantal leden;
   c. een bijdrage in de dirigents- en opleidingskosten, waarvoor 50% van het door de raad vastgestelde totaalbudget voor muziekverenigingen beschikbaar is.

§ 3.4 Scholing vrijwilligers

Artikel 11
Subsidie wordt verleend in de kosten van scholing van vrijwilligers.

Hoofdstuk 4 Slotbepalingen

Artikel 12
1. Dit besluit treedt in werking met ingang van 1 januari 2014.
2. Dit besluit wordt aangehaald als Nadere regels maatschappelijke ontwikkeling gemeente Hellendoorn 2014.

Burgemeester en Wethouders van Hellendoorn,
de secretaris, de burgemeester,
1. Inleiding
De gemeenteraad van Hellendoorn heeft een aantal budgetten overgedragen aan de dorpen en wijken in de gemeente. Ook voor het dorp Hellendoorn is daardoor geld vrij gekomen dat door de DorpsRaad verdeeld mag worden. De DorpsRaad wil dit doen in overleg met de inwoners. Om dit in overleg en naar de wensen van de inwoners te doen heeft de dorpsraad in januari van 2014, middels een openbaar toegankelijke bijeenkomst, alle inwoners en wijkraden uitgenodigd en vragen gesteld.

Men heeft zich afgevraagd welke onderwerpen belangrijk zijn voor de gemeenschap van dorp Hellendoorn, welke voorzieningen zijn gewenst? Hieronder vindt u de resultaten.

De voorkeur gaat uit naar het beschikbaar stellen van bijdragen voor:

- diensten en activiteiten die de leefbaarheid in dorp Hellendoorn bevorderen;
- culturele manifestaties en activiteiten; (geen politieke)
- activiteiten die de sociale verbondenheid positief beïnvloeden.

Het budget is niet bedoeld is om de arbeidsparticipatie te bevorderen, het stimuleren van duurzaam gedrag en voor bijdragen aan achteraf ontstane exploitatietekorten. Ook kunnen bijdragen niet gebruikt worden voor personeelskosten en mogen niet uitgegeven worden voor privé doeleinden. Activiteiten die duidelijk aan kunnen tonen dat er sprake is van een groot draagvlak (vraag) en activiteiten die eigen inkomsten inbrengen, hebben een streefje voor.

Bij voorkeur moeten gelden ingezet worden voor incidentele activiteiten. Structurele kosten van organisaties zouden niet vergoed moeten worden maar activiteiten die een zekere traditie hebben of kunnen krijgen, wel. Breed wordt de opvatting gedeeld dat het budget ingezet moet worden om bewoners te stimuleren iets te gaan doen voor de gemeenschap.

De DorpsRaad maakt een uitzondering voor buurtverenigingen in die zin dat deze meerdere jaren achter elkaar in aanmerking kunnen voor een bijdrage indien activiteiten worden geïnitieerd voor alle doelgroepen. Hetzelfde geldt voor de DorpsRaad zelf. Dat betreft de organisatiekosten die nodig zijn om de taken van de DorpsRaad uit te voeren vanuit haar doel, de belangenbehartiging voor het dorp en zijn nieuwe rol in de besluitvorming rond de verdeling van het dorpsbudgetten het uitbetalen van het dorpsbudget inclusief de finale afrekening.

Ook is nagedacht over criteria en voorwaarden op grond waarvan het budget verdeeld kan worden. U vindt ze in deze procedure. De DorpsRaad heeft een adviescommissie ingesteld van mensen die het beschikbare budget gaan verdelen op grond van de hierna beschreven kaders en spelregels.

Een jaaroverzicht van aanvragen die voldoen aan de criteria en verstrekkingen, wordt tijdens de jaarvergadering van de DorpsRaad gedeeld. Dit jaaroverzicht wordt tevens op de website van de DorpsRaad Hellendoorn gepubliceerd (openbaar).

2. Advies commissie Dorpsbudget dorp Hellendoorn
De adviescommissie bestaat uit vrijwilligers en heeft bij voorkeur een oneven aantal leden van minimaal 3 of maximaal 5 personen afkomstig uit dorp Hellendoorn. De leden hebben als taak om beargumenteerd advies uit te brengen over de aanvragen die jaarlijks binnenkomen. Het betreft niet alleen een advies over het wel of niet verstrekken van het gevraagde budget, maar tevens over de hoogte.

Het verwerken van de aanvragen wordt door een commissie uitgevoerd, met inachtneming van de hierna genoemde kaders en spelregels.
3. Kaders en spelregels

- Algemeen uitgangspunt: activiteit vind plaats in dorp Hellendoorn en is openbaar toegankelijk voor de inwoners van het dorp;
- Initiatieven dragen bij aan het verbeteren van de leefbaarheid van de gemeenschap in dorp Hellendoorn op het gebied van welzijn, cultuur(historisch) en gezondheid;
- Het betreft bij voorkeur activiteiten die onderling contact en ontmoeting mogelijk maken en stimuleren dat mensen actief betrokken raken;
- Betrokkenen leveren een bijdrage in de vorm van meedenken en handen uit de mouwen steken;
- Activiteiten die duidelijk aan kunnen tonen dat er sprake is van een groot draagvlak (vraag) en activiteiten die eigen inkomsten inbrengen; hebben een streepje voor;
- Voorkeur gaat uit naar het inzetten van het budget voor incidentele activiteiten. Structurele kosten van organisaties zouden niet vergoed moeten worden maar activiteiten die een zekere traditie hebben of kunnen krijgen, wat het oprichten of in stand houden van organisaties daarvoor is het budget niet bestemd;
- Aanvragen betreffende activiteiten voor of van jongeren genieten een voorkeur bij verdelen van budgetten;
- Er is sprake van draagvlak in wijk en/of buurt;
- Het initiatief is concreet en haalbaar;
- Het initiatief dient geen privé belang;
- Het initiatief is niet strijdig met de wet en of gemeentelijke regelgeving;
- Kosten van extra ingehuurde professionals die bij een activiteit worden betrokken worden in principe niet gehonoreerd;
- Bijdragen zijn niet bedoeld voor personeelskosten en ook moet voor privé doeleinden;
- Dorpsbudgetten zijn niet in eerste instantie bestemd voor het in stand houden van organisaties. Het is een stimuleringsbijdrage (bij voorkeur) voor activiteiten die de leefbaarheid bevorderen;
- Er is sprake van cofinanciering en/of sponsering van bij voorkeur minimaal 50%, een initiatief/activiteit wordt niet volledig gesubsidieerd;
- De te organiseren activiteiten mogen niet de bestaande activiteiten beconcurreren, overleg en samenwerking moet juist gestimuleerd worden;
- De opgenomen kosten van een aanvraag worden beargumenteerd en verklaard (er wordt dus expliciet gevraagd naar een reële begroting);
- Daar waar deze spelregels niet voorzien in specifieke omstandigheden is de DorpsRaad bevoegd om volgens de doelstelling van het dorpsbudget te besluiten.

4. Procedure

- Een budgetjaar loopt van 1 januari tot en met 31 december;
- De DorpsRaad stelt jaarlijks het te beschikken budget vast. Het is mogelijk dat de DorpsRaad besluit een bedrag in een fonds apart te houden voor eventuele grotere evenementen. Dat budget mag nooit meer zijn dan het door de gemeenteraad vastgestelde jaarlijkse budget;
- De DorpsRaad stelt jaarlijks een overzicht op van verstrekte subsidies en een overzicht van het bedrag dat per 1 januari nog in kas zit.

5. De aanvraag en behandelprocedure

- De aanvraag voor een bijdrage uit het dorpsbudget moet digitaal ingediend worden op het daarvoor geldende aanvraagformulier vóór 31 januari; Nadien binnengekomen aanvragen worden allen op basis van budgettaire mogelijkheden behandel. Mocht het budget inmiddels zijn vergeven, kan alsnog een toekenning onder voorbehoud plaatsvinden. Mocht vanuit de afrekeningen toch ruimte ontstaan, kan eventueel deels een subsidie worden uitgekeerd;
- Een aanvraag dient binnen te zijn voordat een activiteit plaatsvindt;
- In februari behandelt de commissie alle aanvragen en voorziet deze van een advies aan de DorpsRaad;
- De DorpsRaad zal in haar vergadering van maart over alle adviezen besluiten;
- Uiterlijk voor 01 april volgt een terugkoppeling van besluit naar aanvrager;
- Medio april 50% voorschot van het toegekende bedrag;
- Uiterlijk binnen 1 maand na afloop van een activiteit zal aanvrager een gespecificeerd overzicht verschaffen van de daadwerkelijke kosten en inkomsten en kan de eindafrekening plaatsvinden. Voor de overzichtelijkheid is het daarom nodig dit overzicht te baseren op de eerder ingediende begroting. Dit geldt voor alle toekenningen, ongeacht de hoogte van het bedrag.
OPGEDANE ERVARINGEN

Bij de toezegging zal ook gelet worden op begrote inkomsten. Vooral bij entreegelden zien we veel verschillen. Ingeval van collectes zullen we uitgaan van een geïndiceerd bedrag als veronderstelde inkomsten.

Bij eindafrekeningen zien we soms dat de begrote eigen bijdrage bij meevallende kosten wordt teruggerechnet, zodat het maximum van de toezegging uit het dorpsbudget blijft staan. Daarbij wordt opgemerkt dat de toezegging is gebaseerd op het begrote tekort in de begroting en bedoeld is om de activiteit doorgang te laten vinden. Als het tekort meevalt, kan ook de bijdrage uit het dorpsbudget meevalen en niet uitsluitend ten goede komen aan de eigen bijdrage.

Bij de eindafrekening gaat het om het inzichtelijk gemaakte tekort waarop afgerekend moet worden. Daarbij veronderstellen we dat de begroting als basis gebruikt wordt bij het presenteren van de gemaakte kosten of ontvangen inkomsten. Een inzicht zoals dat ook binnen de vereniging/organisatie wel gepresenteerd zal worden. Dus zo beschouwd geen extra werk!