

**University of Twente**  
**European Studies**

**Bachelor Thesis (Second Draft)**

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**Title:**

*The dynamics of an evolving European Security and Defence Policy  
being accelerated by a shift in global security governance  
with the end of the cold war.*

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## **Introduction:**

Within the European Community attempts to integrate in the field of security and defence during the cold war failed, such as the European Defence Union. It did not work out due to the impossibility of finding consensus among the Member States on this issue on which national interests seemed to diverge too much, but also due to the predominant role of the NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). These two organisations were in charge of decision-making concerning security and defence matters in Europe during the cold war. After the cold war the role of the WEU and NATO in this respect became however a different one. This had to do first attempts of integration since the failed European Defence union were taken in 1992 with the establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty and its three pillar structure whose successive treaty amendments lay the ground for the integration of security and defence into the Union framework. Member States, and especially France and the UK, had not been able to reach unanimous decisions and thus to foster integration in the policy field of Security and Defence until the European Council of Nice in 2000.

These two key countries have been playing a significant role and do so until today in matters of European security and defence. Prior to their initiative of St. Malo in 1998 the European security and defence had mainly remained an issue of intergovernmental policy-making. How came the shift about in the end of 1990 towards more integration in the field of European defence and security? Why were the EC/EU not able to integrate in this field already during the cold war? At first sight, the answer to these questions seem to be self-evident concerning the predominant role of NATO and WEU, but regarding the fact that integration was reached in other fields, such as economics through the establishment of the Internal Market, they are not. One can thus assume that the EC/EU was facing obstacles on the way towards integrating security and defence into a common policy framework. This is exactly what will be examined in this paper: the factors which led to the European integration process in this field and the sudden intensification of the latter. Therefore I will focus on the following research question:

**Why has the EC/EU been struggling with institutionalising an effective and autonomous security and defence policy (ESDP) until the end of the 1990s?**

*Effective* refers here to supranational, community-based rather than intergovernmental decision-making resulting in integration of policy fields into the Union framework and *autonomous* to decision-making in the field of security provision distinct from that exercised by NATO and transatlantic (US) authorities. The latter refers to the development of an own independent EU security and defence mechanism for Europe covering all member states (not only Western European countries). Obviously the development of the ESDP and thus the development of more European autonomy in this policy field has to be put in the context of the dissolution of the Western European Union (WEU) and its provisions being taken over by the EU and NATO and to the changing role the latter would play on the ground of an economic and political strong Western Europe and a liberalizing and democratising Eastern Europe (subsequent to the dissolution of the Soviet Union).

Other factors that will be examined in this paper are for examples new modes of security governance addressing the new threats to security having come up with the end of the cold war. The end of the bipolar order entailed also a shift from the initial war-fighting to a peace-building paradigm within Western militaries. Civil war has been the most occurring phenomenon of conflict since then and has led to a blurring of the initially distinctive areas of the military and the humanitarian sector. This led to new tasks and targets for the NATO, UN, the EU and other international organisations (such as peace-building, conflict prevention

missions, fight against terrorism) and thus also to different role of the NATO, WEU and EU as security providers. Within this context, one has also to account for the continuing globalisation process that clearly has an impact on the change in global security governance as well the further institutionalisation of the EPC into the CFSP from which the ESDP emerged as an own institutionalised policy field.

### **Research methodology and Data collection**

For answering my general research question, I will first need to sketch the historical development of Europe as a security provider as we know it today. This refers to the very first attempts of establishing common European defence and security approaches during the cold war under the EC framework until today under the EU framework in form of the ESDP. The assessment of this development is needed to be able to answer the sub-question why integration has not taken place earlier in this field. Therefore I will rely on a descriptive analysis based on primary (treaties) and secondary sources (policy documents such as the St. Malo declaration of the key member states France and UK) as well as on literature review of scientific journal articles relevant to the subject matter of this paper. In order to find a comprehensive answer to the research question of this paper, I will test three different assumptions that have been established prior to the conduction of the descriptive analysis. For answering the first two hypotheses, I will rely on literature review based on the existing grounded theory of the respective research fields (see below). I will conduct the literature review for the purpose of theory verification. The empirical evidence gained from that will help me to answer hypotheses I and II. Addressing the third hypothesis, I will account for the results of a survey, by reviewing a public opinion poll conducted by Eurobarometer and for this matter thus also rely on empirical evidence gained through a quantitative research method. The latter is part of the overall qualitative research design chosen for this thesis. The analysis on the empirical evidence gained through testing the hypotheses will be of an explanatory nature.

Grounded theory and concepts relevant to the field of European integration and security and defence policy such as (neo)-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, institutionalisation) will be applied for shedding light on the development of the European security and defence integration during and after the cold war. In the attempt to conceptualise the development of European security and defence from an issue of high politics to one of low politics, one has also to account for new forms of global security governance. Therefore I will rely on the constructivism and related concepts such as security governance and securitization.

### **Development of specific research questions**

The research question will be addressed by first looking at the approaches taken towards common European security and defence mechanism during the cold war and then by considering this development in the post-cold war era as described above. The following two sub-questions address these issues:

- I. a) What integration approaches in the field of security and defence were being taken under the EC framework *during the cold war*?

Answering this question implies a descriptive approach. The historical development towards common defence and security approaches in Western Europe during the cold war needs to be assessed here (referring to the failed European Defence Policy and the role of the NATO and the Western European Union).

I. b) What changes have been taking place since the end of the bipolarised order *with the end of the cold war?*

This also implies a descriptive analysis of the developments of the European Foreign and Security since the end of the cold war towards the distinction between Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy. It also implies an internal and external dimension of the European integration process in this field. The former refers to the role of the Members States, especially the strategic key states France and UK; whereas the latter refers to the changing role of the NATO and transatlantic relations and the general changing dynamics of the global order.

**Descriptive Analysis I: Security and Defence policy approaches in Europe during the Cold War**

The establishment of a common external foreign policy for Western European states can be traced back to the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. The disagreement during the time following these two treaties among Western European states about the military status of West Germany hindered any decision-making within the European Defence Community. The treaty establishing the latter had been signed by Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux states in 1952, but never went into force due to the French Assembly's rejection to ratify it in 1954. The political lock-in was overcome in the same year by the transformation of the Brussels Treaty into one establishing the Western European Union (WEU) (cf. Deighton, 2002, p. 721) which led to the inclusion of West Germany and subsequently to the accession of the latter into the NATO framework in 1955. This change also refilled the strategic vacuum that had existed in Europe for four years from 1950 on when the NATO had come into effect. For the next 40 years, the use of military tools was totally excluded from the foreign policy agenda of the Community (Deighton, 2002, p. 721).

Despite this taboo, the framework for a common European foreign policy further developed under the EC which was well institutionalised even before the cold war ended (Deighton, 2002, p. 721-22). The NATO and the EC member states themselves were in charge of 'governing' the provision of security and defence in Europe. Also the second attempt to establish a common European foreign policy through the creation of the European Political Union in 1962 by the Fouchet Plans failed (Deighton, 2002, p. 722). The third approach in this direction was launched in the 1970s, the European Political Co-operation (hereafter abbreviated EPC) which was less ambitious than the previous attempts, but much more successful regarding the development of European foreign policy in the long-run over the two following decades. It was less ambitious because it was from the outset a pure intergovernmental forum trying to co-ordinate and establish common procedures for European multilateral actions (see elaboration on the development of the EPC and its transformation into the CFSP below).

Parallel to this development, the WEU became almost dispensable during the 1970s as it was hardly charged with political or security issues. During the 1980s and 1990s however, its significance was kind of reanimated<sup>1</sup> as the London Report had not been very successful in fulfilling its promise to create more coherency as regards international issues and in particular

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<sup>1</sup> The failing Genscher-Colombo attempt to widen the framework of the EPC framework beyond economic competencies, made the then 10 Member States decide during a meeting in 1984 to sign the 'Rome Declaration' extending European security and defence competencies under the WEU framework (see website of the WEU on 'the reactivation of the WEU': <http://www.weu.int/>)

those relating to security questions<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless foreign policy cooperation continued steadily after the London Report seemed to have failed. At least the latter illustrated the Member States' perceived need to reach further progress with regard to the policy goals established under its preceding reports, the Luxembourg Report which had led to the establishment of the EPC in 1970 and the Copenhagen Report in 1973<sup>3</sup>.

Even though the WEU experienced some revival during the 1980s and 1990s, its role was not very significant regarding security provision in Europe. NATO and thus also US presence in Europe still seemed to be self-evidently anchored in the European mindset (Deighton, 2002, p. 722). Thus there was no call for an autonomous European security and defence regime yet. And this despite the fact that there had emerged some tensions between West-Europe and its transatlantic alliance at some point, namely when Charles de Gaulle decided to withdraw France from the military structure of the NATO in 1966 as he opposed the common military structure of the latter. Fearing 'the hegemony of the NATO' concerning the security and defence regime in Europe, the French president envisaged an autonomous defence regime for France.

During the cold war, the Commission was focusing on the principle 'no war ever again', thus on the objective of peace-making which originated from the first European Treaties and entailed the creation of the European Community (Deighton, 2002, p. 722). It can thus be assumed that the European Community defined itself as a civilian-power<sup>4</sup> abnegating the use of military tools or at least to establish common military capabilities. Over the time, the Commission gained executive competencies in the field of external policies, although only quite slowly and mainly in the area of the internal market only (Deighton, 2002, p. 722). Alongside this long-term process, the EPC developed further by creating and fostering common procedures in foreign policy while the member states increasingly adapted their own national security and defence structures to these. Subsequent to the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the Commission also gained more competency in the field of foreign policy by virtue of the fact that it received participatory status within EPC 'summits' (cf. Deighton, 2002, p. 722). It was however after the cold war, when the Commission's power in European foreign policy were remarkably extended and thus also its perceived role as pure civilian power changed (see below).

### **Descriptive analysis II: Redefining the relationship between the NATO and the EU after the cold war**

After having assessed in how far there was already something laying the ground for convergence towards a common European foreign policy, the next step is naturally to look at those factors that stimulated the further development of the latter towards the creation of a Common Security and Defence policy. In the following answers to the second sub-question will be provided by also referring to the change in transatlantic relation and the role of key EU member states within the starting integration process of European security and defence policy.

The end of the cold war and the bipolar order entailed the need for the NATO to redefine its objectives as a defence alliance, because there were no real grounds anymore for the latter to

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<sup>2</sup> see London Report available at the website of the European navigator  
[http://www.ena.lu/report\\_european\\_political\\_cooperation\\_london\\_13\\_october\\_1981-020003519.html](http://www.ena.lu/report_european_political_cooperation_london_13_october_1981-020003519.html)

<sup>3</sup> The former has been approved by the Heads of State and Government whereas the latter has been first approved by the Foreign Ministers (see  
[http://www.ena.lu/report\\_european\\_political\\_cooperation\\_london\\_13\\_october\\_1981-020003519.html](http://www.ena.lu/report_european_political_cooperation_london_13_october_1981-020003519.html))

<sup>4</sup> see for example Manner's concept of civilian power below

exist. Moreover, a general shift in the international security paradigm from interstate to intra-state conflicts led also to objectives which would be more coined by humanitarian purposes and thus rely more on the use of civilian than on military tools. Likewise, but in a different way, the EU became challenged by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the former satellite states of the latter towards independent European states: the EU institutions were not covering the interests of these states.

Deighton distinguishes between two different areas that should be accounted for when considering the competition between the NATO and the EU tackling these new challenges: membership and role or function (2002, p. 723). The former refers naturally to the necessity of enlargement. Even though this had actually not been on the NATO agenda for the post-cold war era, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were admitted in 1999 thanks also to pressure from the US (Deighton, 2002, p. 723). Further enlargement was promised and realized parallel to the European Union's Eastern enlargement in 2004<sup>5</sup>. The EU also decided for further enlargement during the 1990s and thereafter (as we all know) even though it had to put up with immense costs and obstacles concerning especially the last two rounds of enlargement towards east and central European states in 2004 and 2007 (2008). Both sets of enlargement processes (of the NATO and EU respectively) have thereby been taken place apart from each other. (Deighton, 2002, p. 723).

The second area distinguished by Deighton, role or function, can be considered as another line of conceptualising the relationship between EU and the NATO and their respective competencies in the field of security and defence since the 1990s. The NATO developed in 1991 a new strategic concept<sup>6</sup>. Moreover, further involvement in co-operation with third countries was key to this new concept. It was also the first time that a NATO strategy was published<sup>7</sup> from which the question emerged whether it should maintain a regional role or enhance it towards the global level (Deighton, 2002, p. 724). From the mid-1990s on, the NATO developed the 'European security and defence identity concept (ESDI)<sup>8</sup>'. On the backdrop of this development, a Partnership Coordination Cell was created under the heading of SHAPE, the NATO's senior military command headquarters in Europe. At the same time, coordination efforts with the European Union were intensified by the NATO Council's introduction of the European Security and Defence Identity concept. The latter comprised the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces<sup>9</sup> to reduce overlapping multinational military assets and to achieve subsequently more flexibility and mobility as adequate to the post-cold war security and defence needs for stimulating co-ordinated security provision such as combined and joint task forces or 'coalitions of the willing' (Deighton, 2002, p. 724).

## **The Coming into effect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy**

After the establishment of the Internal market in 1986 and the European monetary Union, further progress in creating also a political union were undertaken (Deighton, 2002, p. 724). These developments led to the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty and the succeeding

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<sup>5</sup> The countries that accessed the military structure of the NATO in 2004 are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; Albania and Croatia were invited to the summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008 and signed the protocols of accession on July 9 of the same year, see website of the NATO, <http://www.nato.int/>

<sup>6</sup> The new Strategic Concept was issued by the allied leaders during the Rome summit and demonstrated their determinism to streamline NATO military assets, to further reduce nuclear forces and to restructure the lines of NATO's military command.

<sup>7</sup> see news archive of the NATO for the year 1991, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1991/summarye.htm>

<sup>8</sup> In 1994 the 'Allied' summit in Brussels lay the ground for the establishing Partnership for Peace initiative launched by the NATO initiative in order to strengthen its external relationships.

<sup>9</sup> see news archive of the NATO for the year 1994, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1994/summarye.htm>

treaties leading to the drafting of a Constitution for the European Union. It was hoped that this would result in more effectiveness and coherence of Community policies. But as is known it failed through Dutch and French rejection.

The European Political Co-operation was transformed into the CFSP and received an own pillar under the newly established three pillar structure of the EU. According to M.E. Smith, the EU thereby still preserved its civilian power status and intergovernmental character in the field of foreign and security policy acknowledging the NATO's primacy in the latter (cf. Deighton, 2002, p. 724).

At that time, the only way to 'calm' American concerns about a more and more independent becoming EU while preserving at least indirectly competence in this field was by delegating power to the WEU (Deighton, 2002, p. 724). As already mentioned above, the WEU experienced in the 1980s and 1990s something like a renaissance. This development was very useful as it created a kind of buffer zone between EU and NATO overlapping competencies (or functions as termed by Deighton). According to Forster *et al* the EU could thereby 'at least in theory' (cf. Deighton, 2002, p. 724) access military force by virtue of inter-institutional linkages between the EU and WEU on which both had been beforehand agreed.

Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, the CFSP was being made even more effective as it was 'equipped' by the new post of a EU High Representative and secondly by the inclusion of the 'Petersberg tasks'<sup>10</sup>. The Petersberg tasks cover three task areas: one, 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, second, peace-keeping tasks, and third, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making'"<sup>11</sup> overtaken from the WEU defining the realm of security provision. This inclusion was undertaken to enable the EU to respond effectively to the new threats to Europe's security that had emerged subsequent to the ethnic and intra-state conflicts in the regions covering ex-Yugoslavia. At the same time the WEU provisions were brought even closer to the strategic realm of the EU which resulted in a big step towards the creation of the common European Defence and Security Policy<sup>12</sup>. One can assert that by this point of time, the EU Member States were ready to converge their interests in order to ensure European security and *that* by using both civilian and military instruments. In order to be able to create and use own military capacities, the creation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy could not be delayed any further.

As mentioned above the decisive factor for the further development of the CFSP and thus the Union's external policy agenda was the willingness of the member states, to be more precise of the two key states in this context: the UK and France. But it was also in the interest of the Community itself to make further progress towards establishing a common framework for external policies in a world which was no longer coined by two superpower states and which made it indispensable to establish itself as an global actor or security community. The latter is the main concern of the attempt to conceptualise the new role of the EU in foreign policy matters in the post-cold war era. To the EU's own redefinition of its role in the new world order the use of military tools within a range of competencies started to be considered as well (Deighton, 2002, p. 725). Even though the intergovernmental character of the CFSP kind of protected the sensitive national interests of this field, the Member States enhanced their cooperation further by co-ordinating some of their military capacities. This resulted in the development of the Eurocorps which had been initiated by a French-German commitment to

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<sup>10</sup> These tasks were later integrated under the heading of the ESDP and included in the framework of the European Union (TEU Article 17)

<sup>11</sup> see EU Glossary, [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg\\_tasks\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm)

<sup>12</sup> see EU website on the Amsterdam Treaty, <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm>

intensify military co-operation between the two countries in 1987. Four years later, when the French-German brigade became operational, the latter invited the other member states of the WEU to participate. French-German brigade became operational. By 1993 the Eurocorps were effectively integrated into the WEU (in line with the provisions the latter had received through the Petersberg Declaration in 1992). In the same year, its status within the NATO framework was clarified through the SACEUR Agreement defining the ‘entrance conditions’ of Eurocorps<sup>13</sup>.

### **The coming into effect of the European Security and Defence Policy**

The CFSP’s further developed steadily towards more community-wide effectiveness and more autonomy in the field of security and defence alongside the EU’s obligations under the NATO in the end of the 1990s. This development towards an autonomous security and defence mechanism was further boosted through the St. Malo declaration which was signed between France and UK in 1998. According to the two key states of this process “the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage” (paragraph 1). “To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO” (paragraph 2)<sup>14</sup>. The UK and France, both hard-power players in this policy field (Deighton, 2002, p. 725) were key to this new development even though they came together in St. Malo for different purposes.

Blair had different motives in mind: First of all, he had from the start of office always envisaged a leadership role for Britain in both Europe and the rest of the world. Regarding the fact that the UK had decided to opt-out for the membership of the EMU, St. Malo was *the* opportunity to regain some ground for realizing these objectives. Britain therewith also hoped to support its good relations to its close ally, the US as it was always feared that this relationship could become subject to change with every new US president taking office. (Deighton, 2002, p. 725). Another motive behind signing this commitment in St. Malo to enhance cooperation in the field of European security and defence was Blair’s concern about NATO’s failure to adapt to the new security post-cold war paradigm as was revealed during its disastrous response to the wars emerging in the Balkans (Deighton, 2002, p. 723).

As regards the competing motives of France behind the St. Malo commitment from which the ESDP was born, one can also see a change in strategic behaviour. France perceived the creation of an autonomous European military capacity more important than insisting on its isolations position vis-à-vis the NATO. Thus, here one can also see that increasing willingness of a state, in this case, a key state that was willing to open up its insulated security strategy, had a significant impact on the political outcome of enhanced cooperation within the CFSP towards a community-wide approach in the field of security and defence policy.

What was revolutionary about the St. Malo declaration was the proposition by the UK to extend the EU’s competency in the military sphere. This need was urged by fact that the EU lacked military capabilities to adequately respond to political crises as the insufficient response to the Bosnian war had revealed (Deighton, 2002, p. 726).

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<sup>13</sup> see Eurocorps website, <http://www.eurocorps.net/history/>

<sup>14</sup> see original text of St. Malo declaration:  
<http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>

The forty years-long taboo of using military instruments was broken by this event which entailed a radical shift within the European strategy or strategic culture as Cornish and Edwards put it (see elaboration on this concept below). This proposal was realized by creating an own institutional framework for it which happened during the succeeding European Council summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Laeken (Deighton, 2002, p. 726). The operationalization of the Union security and defence framework was made dependent on the Member states' contributions, also in terms of a civilian security provisions e.g. co-ordinating police forces and legal procedures in criminal matters as through Europol and Eurojust. The latter are matters falling under the third pillar of the Union structure, Justice and Home Affairs. This relates to the internal change within the European Union resulting and which also led to the development of an own European security and defence Policy.

Regarding the strategic space provided for by CFSP and especially the evolving ESDP which started to rival that of the NATO, the WEU's role as Europe's security provider effectively ended. (Deighton, 2002, p. 726). Effective refers here to the fact that the WEU's role was reduced to operational tasks, but no the strategic planning of military missions. The ESDP thus also stimulated external change as regards the emancipation of the EU from the NATO concerning European defence.

Moravsk stressed in this time which was coined by the Balkan crisis subsequent to a change in the world order, the impact of Member States that was needed to bring about such a breakthrough towards the establishment of the ESDP (cf. Deighton, 2002, p. 726). Even though a steady progress towards the integration of security and defence could be assessed over time could be assessed over time, the further development of the ESDP was only feasibly by the increasing role the Commission overtook in this process and the support of neutral states. In brief, the key states' initiative at St. Malo had worked as a kind of catalyst laying the ground for further co-ordinating efforts among the Member States towards an ESDP not only comprising non-military, but also military instruments.

### **The intensification of the European security and defence mechanism**

The emergence of the ESDP as kind of an offspring of the common foreign and security policy, was not a slow process, but happened out of the sudden and continued to evolve rapidly. As a result, the EU is now in the possession of own troops thanks to the initiative on the formation of European Battle Groups which was launched by the same key states that were responsible for the St. Malo revolution plus Germany. In 2004 France, the UK and Germany adopted the Battle Group concept which was the concrete response to the plan to set-up a European rapid reaction force. The latter had been introduced during the Helsinki European Council summit in 1999<sup>15</sup>. Battle Groups were also on the agenda of the European Council meeting in 2004 when the further development of the Union's capabilities was discussed under Headline Goal 2010<sup>16</sup>.

Moreover, the EU has been and still is undertaking a number of civilian and military missions as part of crisis management tasks<sup>17</sup>. The Headline Goal 2010 was adopted to reflect on the

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<sup>15</sup> EU Battle Groups: [http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=34631&contentlan=2&culture=en-US#The\\_EU\\_Battle\\_Groups](http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=34631&contentlan=2&culture=en-US#The_EU_Battle_Groups)

<sup>16</sup> see original text, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> see list of ongoing and completed EU operations of both military and non-military nature on website of Council on ESDP: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en)

shortfalls regarding the Headline Goal 2003 whose objectives turned out to be too ambitious and thus not realisable. The new Headline Goal is still based on the provisions of the European Security Strategy, but includes the critical reflection of the latter. Moreover, it also accounts for the further development of the strategic environment and technology. Last, but not least the new Headline Goal also incorporated 'lessons learned' from EU-led missions (e.g. the autonomous EU intervention during the Congo crisis).

The establishment of the Headline goal 2010 points to the fact that the EU is aiming at acquiring and developing own military capabilities for being able to also respond with military assets to crises of urgency to also prevent or stop a crisis from (further) out-breaking. This means that the EU Member States are willing to extend the range of crisis management operations from civilian ones hardly allowing for the use of military forces (just in case of peace-keeping missions) to those that allow for rapid crisis response. By 2010 the Member States want to have established a rapid reaction force in order (see paragraph 2 of the Headline goal 2010).

In paragraph 3 of the new Headline goal the importance of this new decisive and rapid reaction element in military terms is emphasized. There it is stated that "interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of the Member States efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces". The latter should take the form of minimum force packages as enshrined in the Battlegroup Concept (see paragraph 4 of Headline goal 2010). Since the first of January 2007, the Battle Groups are fully operational which means that Union is now capable to deploy military troops for a period of six months and that for two different missions at the same time (see footnote 14 for resource).

Moreover, the EU was able to install an own planning cell within the operational structure of the NATO through the Berlin-Plus agreement which was concluded between the Secretary General/High Representative of the EU and the Secretary General of the NATO subsequent to the NATO Summit in Washington in 2003<sup>18</sup>. Based on this comprehensive 'framework agreement' the EU can directly access NATO planning capabilities but also make use of NATO capabilities and assets for EU-led missions as was the case in the first autonomous EU operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. The Berlin-Plus agreement can thus be considered as the foundation for the practical work between the European Union and the NATO.

Furthermore, progress was reached by means of further broadening the Petersburg Tasks in the Draft Constitution Treaty of 2003, also including a solidarity clause and a mutual defence clause (the former referring to the common commitment to combat terrorism<sup>19</sup>). These provisions are also enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2008 which is supposed to come into effect on 1 January 2009 (if all Member States will have managed its ratification until then, and in particular Ireland whose citizens voted against it during the referendum held on 12 April 2008).

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<sup>18</sup> NATO on the Berlin-Plus agreement: [http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape\\_eu/se030822a.htm](http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm)

<sup>19</sup> see point 37 of Treaty of Lisbon Declaration on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: "Without prejudice to the measures adopted by the Union to comply with its solidarity obligation towards a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of natural or man-made disaster, none of the provisions of Article 222 is intended to affect the right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards that Member State"

Another innovation contributing to the rapid development of the ESDP was achieved by the creation of a European Defence Agency through a Joint Action of the Council on 12 July 2004<sup>20</sup>. Article 2 thereof provides for the mission of this agency which is “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future”. The functions and tasks of the European Defence Agency can be summarized to involve basically the development of defence capabilities (Art. 3.1), the promotion of Defence Research and Technology (Art. 3.2) and of armaments co-operation. Further it should contribute to the creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market (Art. 3.3) and strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base (Art. 3.4).

All these functions contribute to the Headline goal 2010 (and thus also to provisions of the European Security Strategy) which focuses on the improvement of the EU’s defence performance and that through promoting a more coherent defence approach. More coherency with respect to the development of capabilities would indeed lead to better planning of future requirements, for example concerning co-operation in issues such as armaments, R&T, but also in the operational domain or the restructuring of the defence industry.

### **Explanatory Analysis I: Conceptual framework for testing Hypothesis I**

After having undertaken the descriptive analyses envisaged for this paper, the first hypothesis will be tested as part of the explanatory analysis examining the factors contributing to the creation of a common security and defence policy and its enhanced speed of integration since the end of the 1990s. For that matter, Ulusoy (2003) model<sup>1</sup> of security communities based on a grounded theory perspective will be introduced. Ulusoy did not only take into account the constructivist approach, but also the other extreme of a wide theoretical spectrum, that is the mainstream approach. With the latter he refers to “realist paradigms” (Ulusoay, 2003, p. 12), thus state-centric visions of security governance. The constructivist approach is close to the theoretical approach of “neo-liberal institutionalism” (Ulusoay, 2003, p.12). The latter focusing on forms of inter-state co-operation (or institutionalisation) for guaranteeing the mutual interest in state sovereignty is however a distinct theory as constructivism goes further by also looking at the role of identity sharing and how it can be influence through the “interstate and transnational interactions” of a security community. All the three approaches have in common that they attempt to explain the absence of war which is itself an objective of security communities. Considering the accelerated pace with which integration in the field of security and defence took place with the end of the cold war, one can assume that it is indispensable to account for the relevance of constructivism as a key approach for explaining how an own European defence and security policy could evolve.

Taking the definition of constructivism as provided for by Ulusoy as the conceptual framework for testing the development of the European foreign policy towards the sudden and rapid emergence of a European security and defence policy, I come up with the following, first hypothesis.

Hypothesis I.): The end of the bipolar order of the cold war era resulted in new forms of global and European security governance which have been giving ground to an

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<sup>20</sup> Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency

intensification of the European integration process in the field of Security and Defence.

‘The end of the bipolar order of the cold war era’ is established as the cause of the development in European security and defence policy that is being examined in this paper. It forms the independent variable investigating the dependent variable of this assumption which is the ‘intensification of the European integration process in the field of Security and Defence’. As mediating variable different notions of constructivism will be used for examining whether it reinforces or undermines the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

Using constructivism as the independent variable would be a too abstract concept for testing the dependent variable, the intensifying integration in the field of European security and defence. The constructivist approach as interpreted by Ulusoy involves however several interrelated notions from various scholars. In order to test the suggested assumption of Hypothesis I, the following concepts will be considered: ‘normative power Europe’, ‘civilian power’, ‘security community’, ‘strategic culture’, ‘securitization’, and ‘security governance’. All these concepts can be related to the constructivism as defined by Ulusoy as they attempt to capture the role of the European Union as a security actor taking into account the shift in global security governance subsequent to the end of the cold war. And that also by considering at internal change, e.g. enhanced co-operation between the Member States based on common interests and needs leading potentially to building-up a unified identity. Further, the concepts also capture the EU’s definition as an international security actor, accounting for its relations towards third countries. The constructivist perspective forms the theoretical framework of the mediating variable of Hypothesis I which is the new global order and involved change in the international security system of the post cold-war era. As the above mentioned concepts involve a constructivist perspective in terms of Ulusoy’s definition chosen for this paper, they serve well as variables whose varying mediating dynamics between the constant held independent and dependent variable will be respectively assessed.

In the following each concept will be reviewed and then, in a second step used as a tool of analysis in order to assess their explanatory power with regard to the dependent variable. The empirical evidence needed for this will be based on an analysis of the implications that follow from the different constructivist conceptualisations of the EU’s status as a security provider in the international system of the post-cold war era. These implications will be related to the question to what extent they have an impact on the intensification of the EU integration process in the field of security and defence. As the concepts are part of the same theoretical framework (constructivism), one can expect that their implications with view to the dependent will overlap to some extent. Therefore it will be also necessary to investigate how the concepts relate to each other, whether they rather reinforce or oppose each other. This is important to verify as they might provide more explanatory power being tested in form of one compounded independent variable (consisting of two interrelated concepts).

### **The concept of Normative power Europe**

The first concept being reviewed refers to Manners’ notion of the EU as a normative power. In his reconsideration of *Normative Power Europe*<sup>21</sup>, he argues that increasing the military capacities of the EU is something that can be considered apart from its role as normative power when the latter is being evaluated through critical reflection rather than by a discourse

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<sup>21</sup> referring to his first contribution in 2002 on this issue “Normative power European a contradiction in terms?” (see Manners, 2000b, 2002, cf. Manners, 2006, p. 183)

based on the logic of power politics (Manners, 2006, p. 1). He further argues that the process of militarization beyond the targets as anticipated in the European Security Strategy is actually weakening the normative ethic prescribed to the EU in the global order after the events of 9/11 which is coined by the trend towards “martial potency” (2006, p.194) and a growing Brussels-based “military-industrial simplex” (2006, p. 193). Manners introduced the notion of NPE to be able to better account for the shift in European foreign policy from “cold war and neo-colonial approaches” (2006, p. 184) towards normative approaches such as they developed during the 1990s under the headings of the EC and EU. According to Manners the conceptualisation of the European Union as a civilian power has become obsolete as the assumptions of the latter are based on the static nature of the nation state, the impact of direct physical capabilities and national interests (cf Manners, 2006, p.184). Therefore he claims to focus on the EU’s normative power when analysing its actions in word politics to also cover such questions as to “what it is, does and should do” (Manners, 2006, p. 184).

Further, Manner names four factors that underpin his argumentation about the NPE having become ‘threatened’ through the unreflexive process by which the EU has been militarised during the last two years which means between 2004 and 2006 (at the time of writing on the last contribution to NPE). The first factor relates to the imbalance between “short-term problem-solving and long-term structural solutions” (Manners, 2006, p. 194) and to that between “freedom from fear and freedom from want” (Manners, 2006, p. 194) and does therefore not comply to the normative outlook of the EU’s sustainable peace objective. In this context, Manners goes further and warns that the EU will face serious problems in the future if it gives more weight to short-term responses by increasing its military assets than to its traditional civilian approach which incorporates long-term structural objectives such as conflict prevention and transformation (2006, p. 194).

Secondly, Manners refers to the EU’s trend to rely on own military personnel when running a peace-keeping mission as this could easily turn out in a peace-making one due to the nature of the today’s wars which are coined by intra-state violence and thus involve guerrilla and terrorist warfare<sup>22</sup>. As third factor reinforcing his argument about the loosening of the ENPs, Manner refers to EU efforts in post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq arguing that “mixing of military, political, civilian, and humanitarian agenda is both guaranteed and dangerous” (2006, p. 194). Finally, he points to the fact that EU military forces have been introduced in situations where there used to be ‘deployed’ EU civilian staff only. This trend seems to risk the peaceful mindset of the ENP which is to win the hearts and minds of the receiving population.

The EU does not necessarily need to adopt the power politics approach of the nineteenth-century while increasing its military assets according to Manner. He suggests instead that the acquiring, deploying and analysis of EU military capability should be done in a more reflexive way. This would involve “both reflexive research characterized by interpretation and reflection, and an understanding of the monitored character of social life in order to provide a means of returning to the normative path of sustainable peace as the central norm that guides the external actions of the EU” (2006, p. 194-195). By adapting such a comprehensive sustainable peace approach, it is, according to Manner, also likely that the EU is able to participate in a wider peace-building mission mandated by the UN. These tasks could include most of the Article III-309 tasks of the UN Charter (‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks’<sup>23</sup>). Considering purely military tasks (‘tasks of combat forces in crisis

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<sup>22</sup> a peacemaking mission usually involves the use of military force

<sup>23</sup> see original text of Title III, Article 309 of the UN Charter: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization') should according to Manners not be attempted under a wider mission, but only under a narrow UN authorized one, in a even more reflexive manner, and not without an explicit, normative basis (Manners, 2006, p. 195).

### **Analysis of the concept *Normative Power Europe* in view of the intensification of the European integration process in the field of security and defence**

According to Manner the EU is a civilian power which should focus on its initial *raison d'être*, the sustaining of peace through interstate cooperation. He does in this conceptualisation of the EU in the post-cold war era not exclude that the EU might acquire military capabilities in order to comply to this peace-sustaining approach. However, this should not be done without reflecting on it in terms of its peace-sustaining ideal which governs the today's modern societies. With view to the dependent variable of Hypothesis I, this seem rather to constrain the intensification and integration of the ESDP as military capabilities should according to Manner only be used for peace-keeping missions and not for securing Europe's own interests. One could argue now that it is also in the interest of the EU to build peace elsewhere, but by establishing an own Security and Defence policy the EU anticipates much higher ambitions as it is intensification has been mainly stimulated by the development of own military capabilities. This in turn relates to the increasing emancipation of the EU from NATO military capabilities (and only if during peace-keeping operations outside of Europe). The development of an self-standing security and defence policy also in terms of military capabilities involves also the ambition to be taken seriously as a security actor on the global level by third countries and, in particular, by other (rather great) 'powers'. The conceptualisation of Europe as a Normative Power may serve as explanation for the intensification of integration process in S&D if one accounts for the military capabilities that are comprised in Manner's concept of the NPE. The latter putting emphasis on the non-military instruments of the ESDP and admitting the use of EU military forces only if mandated by the UN and embedded in the NATO-military structure, does however not provide enough explanatory power to fully capture the role of the EU as a security actor with regard to its military ambitions. Without the latter, the ESDP could not have developed with such an accelerated pace since the end of the 1990s (see development of EU military capabilities from St. Malo as described above). Therefore, I conclude that the conceptualisation of the EU as a Normative Power does not provide significant evidence for explaining the intensification of the European integration process in the field of Security and Defence.

### **The concept of civilian power (of the post-cold war order)**

Considering the success of the European integration process, one may easily come up with the assumption that the EU can have an influence as an international actor, or even as a global actor facing the new evolving international order by the globalisation process. According to Maull, the influence of the EU on the global level of international relations is however constrained by its very nature, *sui generis* and its equally unique *modus operandi* (2005, p. 778). He argues further that the EU has not always had much concern about ensuring a sense of collective security (Maull, 2005, p. 778). This is however due to the fact that this was traditionally a task of the US and the NATO during the Cold War. Due to a lack of such a common felt responsibility, a striving for autonomy vis-à-vis other great actors, such as the United States could not be revealed either during that time. This was even the case for other policy fields such as energy supply where the EU has not shown a strive for more autonomy from. It has always been hard to foresee the development of power-enhancing policies in the

realm of the second and third pillar which are sensitive to the national-state. The European Union's biggest power to influence international relations lies in its core assets: the internal market, capital and technological resources and last but not least its 'European way of life' being conveyed not only internally to its citizens, but also externally to major trade partners for instance. Furthermore, the EU can also influence external relations through its power that is has as a model for organizing the governmental structure of a integrated region. Especially through its ENP, the EU is able to steer its closer neighbours to become democratised and states of the rule of law (to be civilized so to say). It thereby certainly also relies on its strengths of diplomatic capability.

According to Maull 'power', the sub-concept of civilian power constitutes three distinct notions: "first, it refers to an actor of some stature in international relations, with substantial power resources at its disposal, second, it describes an actor with significant ambitions (including appropriate strategies) to transform international relations, and third, it denotes the specific means, the power resources on which civilian powers can and will draw" (2005, p. 781). The common held assumption that civilian powers do distance themselves from the use of military force and that the EU can not be considered to be a civilian power regarding the fact that it is developing an own security and defence policy, the ESDP, is not justifiable at this point as Maull argues (2005, p. 781). Already Duchêne emphasized the military capacity that the European Community and that without the purpose of conceptualising a European security policy. (cf. Maull, 2005, p. 781). Maull applied the concept of civilian power from Duchêne<sup>24</sup> on the European Union by turning it into a tool of for comparative foreign policy analysis relying on the definition that "civilian powers strive to civilize (or in terms of Duchêne to 'domesticate') relations between states along the lines of their own, democratic, domestic politics" (Maull, 2005, p. 780).

The concept of civilian power as further developed by Maull as an ideal-type construct does not provide for any constraints avoiding the use of military force on grounds of individual and collective self-defence or humanitarian as long as it does not conflict with the aim of civilizing international relations (Maull, 2005, p. 781). Maull goes even further in elaborating the distinction between civilian and great powers asserting that the former may in some cases more ready to rely on the use of military force than the latter. As reasons for this assumption, Maull refers to the civilian power's greater interest in the transformation of international relations. At the same time he recognizes however that the use of military force and the consequences thereof is much more critically treated by civilian powers than traditional major powers (2005, p. 781).

### ***Analysis of the concept **civilian power** in view of the intensification of the integration process of the European Union in the field of security and defence***

Applying the conditions that Maull determined as defining features of his conceptualisation of a civilian power to the European Union, the following can be stated. With regard to the first requirement, the EU is indeed an actor that plays a significant role at the global level as it is involved in multilateral agreements with third countries, for example through trade policy or through its European Neighbourhood Policy. It has thus a say in international relations. Regarding power resources, the EU disposes of a stable economy which give it strong economic power. It does however rely on energy supply from Russia to a great extent and with regard to security provision it is embedded in the NATO structure. Secondly, the EU has

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<sup>24</sup> In the aftermath of the cold war the bipolar order was dissolved and new global order started to evolve in which Europe's influence as an international actor changed from its former role as a minor partner to the US to one of a what Francois Duchêne called 'civilian power' (cf. Maull, 2005, p. 778).

great strategic ambitions in that it has been developing own military capabilities and was able to establish a military planning cell for EU mission within the NATO which increases its military capability in terms of higher autonomy in decision-making. Through its enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy the EU has also been an actor promoting ‘good governance’, democracy, the rule of law and respect to human rights in the former satellites states of the Soviet Union and in the new emerging national-states covering the region of Ex-Yugoslavia. The EU does thus imply the ambition to transform the international order through ‘civilizing’ actions. Third, the EU does indeed specify the instruments to be used for attaining more military capability through its European Security Strategy and, in particular, the Headline goal 2010. Therein one can find the Petersberg tasks to play a significant role which involve both non-military and military instruments as power resources.

The EU does thus comply very well to Maull’s interpretation of a civilian power, even if more in terms of the second and third condition and less with regard to the first one as it does not possess a unified army. Maull thereby seems to emphasize the use of non-military instruments as power resources for the purpose of transforming the international order which is according to him the main role of the EU in the international system. He does however not exclude the use of military instruments per se. Referring to the responsibility of collective and individual self-defence, Maull recognizes the need for also using military forces. He stresses in this context however the balance that should be upheld between the need for collective self-defence and the its envisaged goal of “civilizing international relations between states” (see above). Referring to the latter, he maintains that this should be done “according to their own, democratic and domestic politics” (see citation above). This includes the need to account for Human rights and the Rule of law as enshrined in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the EU Charter on Fundamental and Human Rights and other international law obligations (e.g. the UN Charter or customary law as enshrined in the traditional constitutions of the Member States).

Maull provides a very specific conceptualization of Europe with regard to its role as a security actor. Conceptualizing the EU as a civilian power provides significant evidence for explaining the integration of security and defence policy. Assessing the EU’s possession of power resources, establishing ambitious security strategies and the specification of power instruments to be used (see elaboration above and descriptive analysis of this paper), reasonable ground can be revealed also with regard of the intensification of the ESDP. As Maull however also provides conditions for collective self-defence, the further development of own military capabilities seems to be constraint to some extent by this view. Therefore, this conceptualisation of the EU does not provide overwhelming evidence for explaining the intensification of the ESDP.

### **The concept of strategic culture**

In their progress report on “The Strategic Culture of the European Union”, Cornish and Edwards (2005) examined the EU’s role in world politics in terms of addressing its potential to become a strategic actor. They based their analysis on the strategic culture discourse. According to Cornish and Edwards “strategic culture” is defined “as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere” (2005, p. 802).

Cornish and Edwards argue that the near- and medium term development of the ESDP remain uncertain and thus in a similar vein as Manner speaking of EU’s weakness in short-term problem solving. They question further the potential of the EU to become a security actor

with competencies (or capabilities in terms of Manner) in the field of crisis management and other relevant areas. To put it in a nutshell, they question the potential of the EU to develop a durable (long-term) and foremost a unique or apart strategic culture. This means that they also question the success of the European Security Strategy and the reflection on that in form of the headline goal 2010. The authors however acknowledge that the EU has reached significant progress in “gaining practical experience in planning and managing such deployments, and in terms of organizing the necessary politico-military machinery and processes” and therefore, “the right to be taken seriously” (2005, p. 818).

Cornish and Edwards emphasize that these developments within the ESDP show that a civilian power is capable of acquiring ‘hard power’ capabilities and a security culture while maintaining and developing its influence emanating from its soft power attributes. The authors define ‘soft power’ as “exercising influence through attraction as a model rather than through the use of forces” (2005, p. 818). Cornish and Edwards emphasize that the development of a European strategic culture is indispensable for reaching a rationalized estimation of the range of capabilities needed in order to cope with humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks envisaged for the EU (2005, p. 802). In their progress report on the European strategic culture of 2005 they conclude that the ESDP developed remarkably since its slow, but promising start in 1999. This recognition of the EU to be able to increase its military capability was probably influenced by new provisions such as the Headline goal 2010 pronouncing a much more realistic security strategy than the headline goal 2003 which had been announced in the European Security Strategy of the same year.

#### ***Analysis of the concept strategic culture in view of the intensification of the integration process in the field of security and defence***

In order to be able to attain own military operability, the EU needs to develop a strategic culture according to Cornish and Edwards. The rapid emergence of the European security and defence policy and the accelerated integration process of the latter since the late 1990s point to the fact that this has been indeed possible by virtue of the development of an own European security culture. The question is however whether the EU’s development towards a strategic culture with hard power capabilities will also extent those of a soft nature, such as diplomacy or influence through functioning as a model of integration for other regional organization in the world. According to Cornish and Edwards, a civilian power can comprise both military and non-military competencies. Even though they are sceptical about the EU’s ability to develop long-term strategy which is a precondition for being able to form a strategic culture, they acknowledge the considerable progress of the EU within the field of security and defence which they also trace back to their acquired capability of planning and conducting own military operations. This concept also emphasizes the need of the EU to emancipate from the NATO structure in order to attain more autonomy which is a key requirement for establishing an own strategic culture. The EU has indeed been able to increase its competence in deploying armed forces. It remains however to be seen in how far that will entail external recognition which refers to the question in how far the EU will co-ordinate its military assets within the NATO-military structure. This core question touches upon sensitive transatlantic relationship which have been challenged the latest by 1998, when Blair an anglo-anglo proponent, made a revolutionary step together with France towards establishing own EU military competencies under the heading of the ESDP.

The conceptualisation of the EU as a civilian power that has steadily been developing and adapting an own strategic culture seems indeed a very strong explanation for the intensification of the integration process in the field of security and defence. Moreover, this

concept provides strong evidence with regard to the fact that the ESDP has further developed as this concept clearly emphasized military competencies as a key to success for becoming a security actor that is being taken seriously at the European, but also at the global level.

### **The concept of securitization**

The traditional concept of security which is national security meaning the security of the state is closely tied to the military capabilities of a state. Some so-called ‘widerners’ such as Waever have come up with a redefinition of the concept to better account for the shift in security governance in the post-cold war era. These scholars have however been subject to criticism as their conceptualisation of security seem to be too unspecific and unambiguous and that to such an extent that everything could be defined in terms of security.

On the other hand, this so-called ‘securitization’ perspective enables politicians, academics and other involved actors in the security discourse to make a choice, when something is to be treated as a issue of security. In terms of Waever’s concept of security, “threats and security are not objective matters, security is a way to frame and handle an issue”(1996, p. 108). As an example he suggests the securitization of the environment which dramatizes the issue of environment to be treated as a security issue with a long-term objective (sustainability) rather than to integrate it into the related field of economics for instance (1996, p. 108). Waever further argues that security is a dynamic term implying a distinct meaning, but which appears in different forms. Essentially, he established that ‘security’ can be equalized with ‘survival’ and that two conditions have to be in order to put an issue up to the higher level of the security debate, namely that there has to prevail an existential threat to survival which leaves no other point of return than to handle on time and by prioritising this issue to other issues (1996, p. 108). At the same time Waever emphasizes that survival has a different meaning to different categories of units. Concerning the state, survival is clearly about sovereignty. If there is no sovereignty, a state ceases to exist and thus also can not be considered as a member of the international political order (1996, p. 108). With regard to the concept of identity, Waever explains that the latter is a precondition for a society to survive. (1996, p. 108).

The neo-conventional security approach offered by Waever makes a more differentiated security analysis of the prevalent units of the international order possible. Relating this empirical evidence to the European Union, one can ask if the latter is capable of manifesting itself as a self-referential unit of security in order to secure its survival. According to Waever’s widened concept of security, not only states, but also other units, such as confederate states, international communities etc. can claim this demand. This distinction presupposes that the definitions of state and nation are separated and not complementing each other anymore. That makes it possible that among other identity communities the EU becomes an apart referent of security (Waever, 1996, p. 110). States, nations, EU/Europe, and the environment appear thus as different units of security with different objectives, but which have in common to be political constructions that are legitimised by the public even if to varying degree. These entities share the self-referential claim to survive which itself is again subject to different interpretations and involved thus more complexity. Even though Germany and France are both states, they have different security approaches for fulfilling their demand of survival. On the Community level it becomes now even more clear and at the same time indispensable, that a common denominator among the varying security units has to be reached in order to obtain a secure and stable Europe (Waever, 1996, p. 125). That there has already been reached a considerable degree of mutual accommodation is clear with regard to the fact that the EU established an identity that does not conflict with the different cultural identities

of its Member States each being respective nations. The EU rather aims at reinforcing its force as a political identity by concentrating on a delicate security logic (1996, p. 128).

### **Analysis of the concept *securitization* in view of the *intensification of the integration process in the field of security and defence***

In order to avoid any further war in Europe the EU focuses on peacemaking and integration and thus establishes a referent point in terms of securitization. In this context the integration process has to be seen not as an alternative among several, but as a last resort, a point of no return, in order to be able to be framed as a security issue that demands survival. This means basically that without integration, the EU would not be able to exist any longer. Waever conceptualised the European Union as security actor with a common security identity via the logic of securitization. Thus, the latter should be considered rather as a tool for framing a concept and not as a concept in itself. Subsequently, it makes more sense to assess the explanatory power of *security identity* with regard to the dependent variable. In view of new or accumulating threats such as terrorism, climate change, and natural disasters the Member States have increasingly been confronted with common security needs which led to the formation of a collective security identity. The latter, in turn entails the need to enhance cooperation in security and defence matters.

Thus, one can generally expect that a collective security identity also stimulates the integration of defence and security policy into the Union framework. It is however hard to detect whether this common security identity of the European Union also stimulates the rapid development of the ESDP since the end of the 1990s. The common security identity of the European is based on shared interests and common threats. The latter involve however not only threats that would require an increase in military capabilities. Thus, one cannot assess whether the presence of a European security identity has an impact on the recent speed with which the ESDP has been developing. It gives however a good explanation for the integration of this field into the Union Framework as it clearly reveals the increased willingness of the Member States to co-operate in this field. The concept security identity provides thus some, but not convincing evidence for explaining the dependent variable of Hypothesis I.

### **The concept of security governance**

Security governance can be split into two different concepts: security and governance. With the end of the cold war the conceptual scope of the two terms 'security' and 'defence' have become increasingly broadened to include not only military elements, but also economic, ecological, political, social and cultural criteria (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 949). The inter-state war paradigm changed to one focusing on intra-state conflicts. Additionally, there appeared, in general, new or rather more distinct security threats that seemed less predictable and visible in nature. In this context, security began to be framed in terms of how security threats were perceived as covered by the concept 'securitization' explained above.

The other sub-concept 'governance', focuses on the question of how political actors are involved in the regulation of the national or international system. Considering the diverse and multiple relations and interconnections between different actors and regulatory bodies that are accounted for within this approach, the concept makes it hard to assess the connections of cause and consequences between the various and institutions of the established security governance system. With regard to long-term developments that involve a lot of change, it becomes even harder to detect what or who caused what. That is why most governance studies look for a common denominator, the clearest definitions possible on this issue.

Kirchner referred in his elaboration on this concept to Gamble (2006, p. 950) who sees governance as ‘steering capacities of a political system without making any assumption as to which institutions or agents to the steering’.

### ***Analysis of the concept security governance in view of the intensification of the integration process in the field of security and defence***

One can assert that the concept of governance and thus also that of security governance is not very suitable in terms of its applicability as a theory. Yet, it remains an often used framework of analysis for comprehending and explaining the different forms of interaction between the various political actors on the international level, thus for the EU but also for national states<sup>25</sup>. The concept of security has undertaken a shift towards an interpretation that fits the new circumstances of the global order after the cold war. Governance captures the fact that notwithstanding the globalisation process the international political system is not operating in a vacuum, but involves tensions among its sub-units: international organisations, regional organisations, nation states and also engages non-governmental actors or multinationals. Taken the two concepts security and governance together, they form a useful basis for explaining why these actors all become interdependent on security issues. With regard to the intensification of the integration process of the ESDP, security governance also serves as a logical conceptual framework for explaining the institutionalising efforts of the Community itself and its Member States.

As opposed to the three previous concepts, normative power Europe, civilian power and strategic culture, this conceptualisation does not try to capture the Union’s potential as a security provider at least not by giving it more weight to either civilian or military capabilities. It rather sheds light on the complex dynamics involved in the integration process of the ESDP in terms of interdependencies among Member States having emerged through increased interactions in the field of security and defence and steering the further intensification process of the latter rather unpredictably. Security governance thereby not only provides evidence for explaining the increasing willingness of the Member States to co-operate in security and defence matters. It also provides a good explanation for how the Community itself may enhance the development of the ESDP through increased co-operation among its institutions and as a whole (embodied by Commission or the High Representative for external affairs) when it comes to relations with third countries. Security governance constitutes an own theoretical framework apart from constructivism. It nevertheless shares one basic element with the constructivist framework which is the presence of interdependence or interactions between different stake holders. Therefore security governance was included as a ‘constructivist concept’ in the conceptual framework for Hypothesis I. With regard to its explanatory power for testing the latter, the ‘concept’ security governance seems to provide only some evidence concerning the integration of security and defence into the Union framework, but not sufficiently when it comes to explaining its intensified development since the St. Malo declaration in 1998.

### **The concept of security community**

Adler and Barnett define the concept of ‘security community’ as “a region of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 949). Both scholars rely on the discourse introduced on this term by Karl Deutsch *et al* who in 1957

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<sup>25</sup>In the realm of governance studies, Rhodes is especially famous for relying on this framework (‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’, 1996).

had concluded that “where there is more interaction, together with shared norms, values and identity, among a group of states, there is less likelihood of war or mutual violence, which subsequently opens the way towards a security community” (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 949). Directly applying the concept of a security community to the EU, Wendt claims in that the latter consists of “a co-operative security system, in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all” (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 949). The failed Constitution of the European Union incorporated this collective spirit pronouncing that “the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster”(see Art. 42 (1) of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2003<sup>26</sup>).

The role of institutions seems to be a rather contentious issue among proponents of the concept *security community*. Karl Deutsch attributed not much influence to institutions concerning the forming of a European security community<sup>27</sup>. He considered “institutions in the process of European integration as inferior to relations of trust between states and the knowledge and beliefs they hold of one another” (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 950). As a contrast to this, Adler and Barnett attributed a much more important role to institutions within the integration process of the European Union, seeing them as “sites of socialization and learning, which help promote mutual trust and foster a regional culture around commonly held attributes” (cf. Kirchner, 2006, p. 950).

Notwithstanding this divergence on the importance of institutions within the European integration process, it can be stated that the concept of security community generally consider that they play a role in this development (if only to varying degrees).

### ***Analysis of the concept security community in view of the intensification of the integration process of the European Union in the field of security and defence***

The interpretation of the concept security provided for by Adler and Barnett is quite unspecific as it relates to the general purpose of peace-making as reason for neighbouring states to co-operate in security matters. It serves well for explaining the integration of security and defence into the Union framework, but not for giving more evidence to the intensification of the ESDP. Sustaining the peace in Europe has also been anticipated and attained and through economic integration as it entails more stability and welfare which fosters peace. Moreover, the pursuance of the peace-sustaining objective among several states building up a regional entity, does not give any hints as regard the instruments to be used for attaining this goal. It does not say anything about what it gives emphasis: to civilian instruments or purely military ones. Therefore it is hard to detect an impact on the intensification of the ESDP emanating from conceptualising the European Union as a security community as defined by Adler and Barnett.

The other two definitions on the security system provided by Deutsch and Wendt involve much more specific terms which even build on the core elements of the pure theory of constructivism: the emphasis is on interaction being driven by shared values and norms accumulating to the forming of a common identity. In this respect it is very close to the concept of security identity. The concept of security community does however not only stress common values and norms, but also the condition that there must be observable a sufficient level of interaction among states in security matters that leads to the mutual obligation to ensure each other’s security.

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<sup>26</sup> European Convention of 18 July 2003: <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> see Deutsch et al (1957), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*

Relying on this interpretation of a security community, not only the integration of security and defence into the Community framework appears as a logical consequence. The emphasis on collective responsibility for ensuring the security of all Member States of the Community sheds more light on the need to develop also a collective self-defence mechanism. The latter is clearly expected to include military forces and this in turn refers to the need to increase the Union's military capabilities which has taken much more concrete forms during the last decade (e.g. the Battle group concept described above). Thus, one can assert that the definitions of security community provided for by Deutsch and Wendt gives more evident with regard to the intensification of the ESDP than the one developed by Adler and Barnett.

### **Synthesis: Analysing the interconnections between the concepts**

Referring to the connection between the concepts security governance and security community, Kirchner concludes that “the emphasis on shared understanding, norms and purposeful acts, on the one hand and the regional dimension on the other illustrates the intersection between security governance and security communities” (2006, p. 950). In this context, he referred however also to the main difference between the two concepts which is that security communities makes a difference between members and non-members. Those, that are not in the group, the security community, have been excluded after having been attributed with less importance or even as ‘the other’ (Kirchner, 2006, p. 950). This feature of exclusion can easily be detected with regard to EU in terms of the enlargement and integration process. By maintaining a European neighbourhood policy, the ENP, the EU seem to turn this definition into a much more fluid and not static feature as security strategies towards ‘outsiders’ are maintained in forms of associated and partnership agreements. Wolfers’ use of the term ‘milieu goals’ serves well for illustrating the idea behind these security strategies (cf. Kirchner, 950). With regard to the EU, the traditional boundaries of the concept security community (to refer to insiders and outsiders) are not adequate anymore and need to be extended to the interstate relations in post-cold war Europe. This could be reached by accounting for the notion of “concentric circles”<sup>28</sup> providing for a ‘circle of insiders’ (the supposed security community), a bigger circle including associate partners and even a one bigger circle for countries to which more loose relations are maintained.

Another distinction between the security governance and security community can be drawn regarding the role they give to institutions. Whereas institutions play a role in the European integration process within the concept of security community only if to a different degree, the same can not be stated with regard to security governance. The latter involves the role of institutions just when emphasizing the interrelations between various actors, such as states, non-governmental organisations. The concept of security governance involves a dynamic approach in that it is much less state centric oriented than the concept of security community. As a contrast to the latter, security governance comprises a multi-level dimension involving multiple actors from the governmental, non-governmental, public and private spheres. That the institutions of the European Union can be also considered as actors being involved in governance and interacting among themselves and with other Member States is clear. It does however not give a priority or special role of institutions therein nor does it attribute a stimulating potential for European integration to them.

If one want to assess the relevance of the EU as a security provider, one has first to point out which definition of security is used, thus also which security threats the security provider has to tackle. Thereby the conceptual framework of securitization comes into play as well as it

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<sup>28</sup> see EU glossary on concentric circles: [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/concentric\\_circles\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/concentric_circles_en.htm)

involves the broadening of the security issues to include not only threats to the nation of a state, but also common threats to a collective of states held together by a common identity, another form of conceptualising a security actor. This means that the scope of security which the EU is expected to provide is significantly broadened. The provision of non-military means is covered by such measures as conflict prevention and peace-building missions that the EU maintains in its role as a civilian actor. The concept of security governance includes the civilian tasks of the EU to its security provisions tasks, thus considers them as relevant to the characteristics of a security actor (according to Kirchner). This relates to the other three concepts embedded in the constructivist framework used for testing Hypothesis I.

The concept of civilian power as established by Maull does not constrain the use of military power as such, but rather the way in which it should be used, namely not individually and autonomously, but as part of a collective identity and not without international legitimacy and the purpose to promote the ‘civilizing’ of the global order (2005, p. 781). Similarly, Manner does not exclude within his concept of Normative Power Europe the use of military capabilities, but puts emphasis on the need to rely on them in a ‘reflexive way’ and also favours EU military operations as part of a wider UN mandated mission. He also puts emphasis on the peace-sustaining objective which the EU should endorse as a security actor rather than objectives involving the deployment of military assets.

Cornish and Edwards acknowledge the recent success of the ESDP regarding the building-up of own military assets, question however in general whether the EU is able to also establish near- and medium objectives and argue thus in a similar vein as Manner speaking of EU’s weakness in short-term problem solving. They consider it as indispensable that the EU possess and acquires further military capabilities in order to be able to establish an own strategic culture.

### **Comparing the explanatory power of the various concepts with regard to the dependent variable**

Whereas the concept of security community is closely interconnected to the concept of security identity as the former relies on building a collective sense or identity, security governance serves rather as a tool of analysis and does not involve the idea of a collective identity per se. The same can be assessed for ‘securitization’ which serves as a tool for framing common threats that are revealed and thus entail the sense for a common responsibility to face such threats. Thus security governance and securitization can be considered as prerequisites for the establishment of a security identity which in turn can involve the conceptualisation of a security actor as a security community. This compounded way of conceptualising the EU as a security actor helps well to explain not only the integration of security and defence policy into the Union framework, but also the intensification of the ESDP, once being institutionalised therein. Threats that are commonly perceived and that lead to establishing a common identity reinforce the need and thus the willingness of the EU Member States to co-operate in the field of security and defence. The urgency of such threats does not leave time for further delaying co-operation in the field of security and defence. This urgency even puts national interests besides or on the 2<sup>nd</sup> rank on the ‘list of interests’. The building up of a common defence and security policy and a realizable implementation of common goals (such as headline goal 2010 revising headline goal 2003) also seems to put national interests behind. The establishment of a unified defence approach seems to have become itself a predominant national interest of the EU member states.

The other three concepts reveal the balance between non-military and military capabilities that the EU should possess as a security actor. They all tend to conceptualise the EU rather as a security provider with foremost non-military capabilities, but also own military assets. The concept of strategic culture does necessitate the possession of the latter in order to legitimise the EU's ability as a global security provider.

To put it in a nutshell, all the concepts treated above do approve the assumption behind Hypothesis I. The concepts of security community, security identity and strategic culture provide *per se* the most explanatory power with regard to the dependent variable of Hypothesis I. In methodological terms it can be asserted that they have a strong mediating effect on the dependent variable. The other concepts rather complement or undermine the explanation for why the development of the ESDP has been intensifying since the St. Malo declaration in 1998. They are rather weakening the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable acting as mediating variables.

### **Explanatory analysis: Testing Hypothesis II: The conceptual framework for testing Hypothesis II**

The grounded theories of integration studies are neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. In the following they will be applied for the purpose of 'theory verification' from the post-cold war perspective. This implies a comparative analysis with regard to their capacity to provide explanatory power not only for issues of low politics<sup>29</sup> such as economic and monetary integration, but also for nationally sensitive areas such as security and defence. Both theories are generally referred to when explaining the establishment of the Internal Market and the European Monetary Union. The conceptualisation of European integration mechanisms in terms of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism will be introduced as new independent variable(s) for testing an alternative explanation that might contribute to answering the research question of this thesis. Basically, their verification will be conducted in order to assess their explanatory power with regard to the emergence and further progress of the European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP. As a consequence, the following Hypothesis is based on the same dependent variable as Hypothesis I:

**Hypothesis II.):** The Internal Market being established and the subsequent European monetary Union being nearly accomplished, the European integration process also intensified in the field of Security and Defence.

Another theory within the integration studies will function as independent variable and its explanatory power with regard to the dependent variable assessed: The concept of Institutionalisation as developed by Smith. This approach is very distinct from grounded theory in the field of integration studies, as it involves another perspective: not that between states, but also between institutions and the autonomously becoming mechanism stimulating further integration through the Community institutions themselves and not only through enhanced co-operation between the Member States. After having reviewed this concept as it was applied by Smith on the transformational development from the EPC to the CFSP, its explanatory with regard to the dependent variable of this thesis will be assessed as well. Even though the review of the theory of institutionalisation as provided by Smith does not directly reflect on the emergence of the ESDP, it does provide significant evidence for explaining at least how security and defence became subject to the European integration process. This can be expected as the CFSP 'gave birth' to the ESDP. Moreover, the arguments provided for

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<sup>29</sup> policy fields/issues that do not touch upon national sovereignty

explaining the integration of foreign (security) policy may also be useful for explaining the emergence and further development of the ESDP.

### **Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism on defence and security approaches in Europe during the Cold War**

The establishment of the European Economic Community and the further development of the European integration process challenged the prevalent realist assumptions of that time concerning the behaviour of states towards each other. The realists perspective seemed no longer suitable to explain the progress of European integration as states were no longer reluctant to co-operate with each other even if this meant to put national interests behind. Haas provided in *The Uniting of Europe* (1985) a reasonable explanation for this phenomenon by defining integration in terms of spill-over mechanisms: “integration equals the formation of a new political community. In the process of integration, national political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities for a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states” (cf. Ojanen, 2006, p. 58-59).

In 2001, Haas supplemented this definition by another dimension: “demands for additional central services would intensify as the central institutions proved unable to satisfy the claims of their new clients. In the background, there were elements of soft rational choice: actors seek to realize their interests with whatever means available, and the interests are value-derived, changing through, for instance, learning” (cf. Ojanen, 2006, p. 59). He accounted thereby for the general trend among states to co-operate on the basis of common values.

Facing the continuing success of the integration project between Western European states, the realist-based intergovernmentalists redefined their perspective in the early 1960s to explain why integration was possible despite the predominance of national interests. According to the proponents of intergovernmentalism integration could be perceived as being in the interest of a state if it strengthened the position of the latter in international relations and if this occurred through own choice (Ojanen, 2006, p. 59). Accounting for this condition, one can conclude that realist proponents assumed that states are indeed willing to integrate their policies if it suits their interests.

This is line with the argument provided by Hoffmann in 1982 explaining why European integration worked well in the field of economics. According to him, “economic and monetary regimes were understandable, following as they did the logic of state interest” (cf. Ojanen, 2006, p. 59). Hoffmann further elaborated on this by asserting that the economic and monetary regimes would not be a proof of real integration if the latter was about weakening the state. His explanation fits well to Haas’ renewed definition of integration in 2001 regarding the fact that a common defence policy is certainly weaken a state’s interest in that it results in a zero-sum situation. Hoffmann had already argued in 1966 that in a situation where losses exceed gains, as is the case in political integration or fields of high politics (cf. Ojanen, 2006, p. 59) real integration is impossible. This argumentation illustrates very well why the Member States were willing to co-operate in win-win situations, as was the case when establishing the Single Market and the European Monetary Union.

Confronted with the defeat of the European integration process in the field of defence (referring to the failing of the EPC and EDC in the 1960s), (neo)functionalism had to admit that the spill-over mechanism would not necessarily reach every policy field. Haas explained this by asserting that ‘not all sectors would have equal spill-over potential’ (cf. Ojanen, 2006,

p. 60). Rosamond further elaborated on this functional autonomy among different policy fields suggesting that a central institution could overcome this problem (cf. Ojanen, 2006, p. 60). Following this argumentation a supranational body, such as the Commission, can stimulate integration also in national sensitive areas if it is just empowered sufficiently to be able to do so. This means the Commission needs to receive the decision-making competencies in such fields of high politics in order to avoid that national policy goals of the Member States inhibit policy-making at the Union level.

Other reasons that inhibited the creation of a common policy in the area of security and defence at that time were of the too diverging approaches among the Member States and a common held assumption that the NATO was the right organization to be in charge of European security and defence provision. The essential reason for the Union's inability to integrate in this area was of course that security and defence touched upon the sovereignty of the national state (Ojanen, 2006, p. 60). At that time it was not in the interests of the Member States to give up some of their autonomy in decision-making concerning these areas.

### **Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism on the emergence of a common European defence and security policy**

It seems illogical to consult again the same integration theories for explaining the rapid development of the security and defence policy into what resulted in the ESDP as they proofed – if only by redefining their original interpretations on this issue – to be very suitable for explaining the impossibility of integration in this field until nearly the end of the cold war. Ojanen argues that neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism nevertheless provide sufficient evidence to explain the integration of security and defence policy. According to her, one only has to neglect one assumption that is shared by both theories, namely “that there is something particular in the field itself that distinguished it from other policy fields, rendering it immune to political transformations occurring elsewhere” (Ojanen, 2006, p. 61).

Taking this condition into mind when elaborating on the security and defence integration in intergovernmentalist terms, integration is perceived as a logical consequence according to Ojanen (2006, p. 61). Following her argumentation, member states could only benefit from integration in terms of establishing joint forces, common planning and standards. Further the market for the defence industry would be open for competition and states enabled to reduce costs by co-ordinating their defence assets. Additionally, also non-material gains would be gained for example when states are ready to bargain over other policy fields in exchange for further integration in the field of defence (Ojanen, 2006, p. 61). Thus, one can state that security and defence integration as interpreted by this adapted intergovernmentalist perspective (see condition introduced by Ojanen above) amounts to ‘real integration’ (referring to Hoffmann’s terminology above) as it no longer weakens the national interests having become itself an interest of member states.

Considering security and defence not as specific in itself, there would be no ground to not adopt the spill-over explanation of the neo-functionalism perspective. Actually this would even serve as a good explanation: no policy field, not even that of security and defence could avoid the force of spill-over effects. Ojanen argues that from the neo-functionalism point of view it is no longer possible to exclude security and defence policies from the Community framework as it gained equal importance compared to other already integrated and interrelated policy fields (assuming no longer that it is too specific to be integrated) (2006, p. 61). Moreover, she argues that the institutionalisation of security and defence would become needed for acknowledging the Member States’ co-operative aspirations in this field. Its importance

would certainly be demonstrated by integrating it into the Union framework which in turn would raise both the Member States' trust in common security and defence 'project' and the respect of the rest of the world towards the Union as a security actor (Ojanen, 2006, p. 62).

### ***Analysis of the neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist interpretations with view to the intensification of the integration process of the European Union in the field of security and defence***

Through modifying Haas initial concept on spill-over mechanism that explained the absence of European integration in the field of security and defence, Ojanen simply assumes that the latter should not be considered as specific in itself which renders it no longer immune to integration. Ojanen therewith attributes explanatory power to both the neo-functionalist and the intergovernmentalist perspectives with regard to the integration in the field of security and defence. However this is only possible after having declared this field as not specific in comparison with other fields. She does however not explain why she assumes that this policy field is no longer specific as she obviously thought it was during the cold war. It seems to be to easy to just equalize the field of security and defence with other fields where integration already took place without including the circumstances that led to this equalisation.

Ojanen does not provide enough inside into the circumstances that led to the fact that security and defence can be considered no longer as specific. She just refers to the Member States' willingness to co-operate for raising the recognition of the EU as a security both internally (among the Member States) and externally (among third countries). Also she does not explain how the integration of security and defence became a competitive advantage for the Member State and a bargaining issue or at least not why this became the case during the post-cold war era. She also does not elaborate on what she exactly means by "that there is something specific in this field that distinguishes itself from other policy fields". This is not a concrete definition of the assumed diverting nature of the field of security and defence as compared to other fields. With regard to the dependent variable, the grounded theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism as interpreted during the cold war, do not provide convincing explanations for the integration of the field of security and defence nor its intensification.

Instead of arguing that this field is specific without being able to really detect this specificity in concrete terms, it makes more sense to declare the dynamics of the European integration process as specific. To also provide an explanation for this specificity, I argue that it is not the field of security and defence that is specific or no longer specific, but the Union's ability to transform issues of high politics into ones of low political sensitivity and thus to make initial high political issues subject to integration. The assumption that the Union is able to stimulate integration by itself relates to the theory of institutionalisation being reviewed in the following section.

### **The Development of the EPC towards CFSP explained by the theory of institutionalisation**

With regard to the institutionalisation process of the European Foreign policy, Smith distinguished between three processes that form together a continuous and steady progress concerning policy adaptation within this field since 1970. These are first the establishment and structure of the first intergovernmental forum in the foreign policy of the European Union, the EPC, second the strengthening of the latter by means of a transgovernmental network between EPC and CFSP, and third the emerging government structure for the

Member States and the institutions of the European Union in this field by means of codified foreign policy rules (Smith, 2004, p. 104).

Smith further elaborated on what he termed the “aggregate measures of European foreign policy adaptation” (2004, p. 109). He established four different indicators for examining effective foreign policy outcomes under the EPC/CFSP by looking at the performance record of the latter<sup>30</sup>. One, *actions* which refer to the increase in numbers of EPC/CFSP actions that have been taken on an annual basis since 1970. Two, the widening of the EPC/CFSP agenda towards the inclusion of new issues that would fall under the umbrella of this gradually institutionalising structure phrased as *functions*. Three, the widening of policy *instruments* that are needed for tackling the issues falling under the EPC/CFSP, thus to comply with the objectives of the latter. Four, *consistency* measured by looking at the connection between the external policy issues of the EC and those developed under the EPC/CFSP (Smith, 2004, p. 110).

In the following the evidence that these four measures provide concerning the performance of the EPC/CFSP will be described in more detail as this will also serve to grasp the general trends in cooperative foreign policy that have led to the development and progress of a common defence and security policy of the European Union. The focus is thereby on convergence between the Member States and not on the individual preferences of some member states.

As one can expect, the cooperative policy outcome in the field of foreign policy was quite low under the EPC during the 1970s. Only a few issues were put on the common agenda and only a handful of policy decisions were taken, such as the relations towards the Middle East and of course between the Eastern and Western blocs of the bipolar order (Smith, 2004, p. 110). Through the launching of the London report, the EPC became more and more institutionalised during the 1980s by fostering common procedures such as *démarches* and joint declarations that already had been introduced during the first decade of its existence (see descriptive analysis).

Relying on Roy Ginsberg’s substantial surveys of EU foreign policy activity, Smith could observe a permanent increase of coordinated EU foreign policy actions alongside the development of the EPC and its transformation into the CFSP (Smith, 2004, p. 110). Considering notable multilateral efforts<sup>31</sup> under European foreign policy taken prior to the establishment of the EPC, thus before 1971, one can only recognize two incidents: when the EC imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia (1965) and two years later against Greece (Smith, 2004, p. 110). This is however not surprising as defence policy issues were during that period discussed individually by the EU member states under the framework of the NATO as the EU approach in this area totally failed (see descriptive analysis above).

Decade	Number of multilateral foreign policy actions under the EPC
1970s	< 20
1980s	50
1990s	> 100

Smith (2004), p. 110

<sup>30</sup> Effective refers here to substantive outcomes exceeding those known under the rather intergovernmental and soft policy character of the first decade of the EPC such as *inter alia* coordination reflex, *acquis politique* COREU, coutumier, *receuil*, domains reserves (Smith, 2004, p. 109)

<sup>31</sup> with ‘real multilateral efforts’ are those meant that involved all EU member states and not only the largest or “core” states;

The reason for the low profile of collective European foreign policy actions during the first decade of the ECP is that external actions consisted mainly in demarches and joint declarations as mentioned above. There existed no sufficient institutionalise provisions for establishing joint actions during the 1970s (Smith, 2004, p. 111). The London Report in 1981 functioned as a kind of catalyst opening the way for a widening of EPC actions. This increase became however less significant regarding the number of actions that arose with the CFSP coming into force in 1993, one year after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 (Smith, 2004, p. 111). During the 1980s the issues of policy actions and external relationships increased however significantly so that that a common EU foreign policy was institutionalised even before end of the Cold war (Smith, 2004, p. 111). This means that even before the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, the EU could already launch cooperative multilateral actions with any other state in the world. Another new development within the European foreign policy was evoked by the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, when smaller states could set issues on the foreign policy agenda through the principle of rotating presidency. As a result, there emerged numerous Common Positions under the CFSP on diverse issues and that through concerted efforts of both the Council and the Commission.

This widening of the foreign policy agenda relates directly to the second indicator established by Smith for measuring the effectiveness of European foreign policy output parallel to the transformation of the EPC into the CFSP. On specific issues, the member states were – under the ECP - only able to find consensus for making decisions on a long-term basis. On other functional aspects they agreed however on actions going beyond those of a soft policy nature such as 'declaratory diplomacy'. This led to an increase in medium and long-term objectives based on common positions as mentioned above. This is also how the range of foreign policy objectives expanded to include also responses to political crisis in Portugal, Cyprus, Afghanistan, the Falklands etc. (Smith, p. 111). Also in terms of conflict resolution, EPC measures proved to be useful in the realm of East-West relations, Central America and the Middle East. With the transformation from the EPC into the CFSP in the early 1990s, a further step was taken towards including tasks such as conflict prevention, democratisation (subsequent to peace-building efforts) in the satellite states of the former Soviet Union, in the Mediterranean region, but also South Africa (after the overthrow of the apartheid regime) for instance. (Smith, 2004, p. 111).

A significant new development took place under the second EU pillar: The Member States set more and more security issues on the CFSP agenda. The latter comprised economic sanctions against Iran, Iraq, the former Soviet Union, Argentina, Libya and Syria as well as trade embargos on chemical weapons and dual-use items (Smith, 2004, p. 111). In this context, it must be stressed that these actions did not – as one might assume – emerge as a consequence to US pressure from or to Member States' obligations under the NATO. Either these actions had been established by a common European response or by individual EU Member States pushing for a common action as they felt the need to frame the EU's status as an autonomous global player. The latter phenomenon has been phrased by Ginsberg as 'self-styled logic of cooperative action' (cf. Smith, 2004, p. 111) and accounts for a diversity of actions such as combating terrorism or supporting democratisation processes. One can thus conclude that the Community is now empowered to enact or discuss any kind of function existing in the sphere of external relations.

Coming to the Smith' third indicator, *instruments*, another increase in numbers can be stated: the sorts of policy measures used (2004, p. 112) And again as for the first and second indicator this increase occurred against the backdrop of the evolving ECP and its transformation into the CFSP of the European Union.

The first instruments used since 1971 were economic and financial aid and sanctions whose imposition was usually coordinated with the Commission. Over the years, additional instruments were included, such as “political dialogues, association agreements, embargoes on weapons and other products, anti-terrorism policies, peace plans and peace-keeping” (Smith, 2004, p. 112). By the 1990s, when the CFSP came into being, the EU foreign policy was even ready to coordinate police and military capabilities in specific areas which climaxed in the idea of establishing a European rapid reaction force (see Headline goal 2010). The inclusion of the use of military forces on the foreign policy agenda of the EU was a big step towards the establishment of the common European Security and Defence policy. Under the EPC the member states had not been willing to even discuss this issue which has not been settled until today as it touches upon the national interests of every Member States, also the neutral ones.

The fourth indicator, established by Smith, *consistency* reflects the increase of EU states’ willingness to rely on Community resources instead of own national ones for actions falling under the EPC/CFSP network (Smith, 2004, p. 112). That had been not the case under the single responsibility for foreign policy in hands of the EPC during the 1970s. An increasing number of issues covered by the EC/EPC became so interlinked that it turned out to be too unpractical and bureaucratic to treat them as separate in line with the two apart sets of procedures. (Smith, 2004, p. 112) The crucial reason for the increasing willingness to coordinate efforts between the EC and the EPC was – as Smith asserts - that the EU realized its aims of representing itself to the rest of the world by means of speaking with a single voice and conveying an own identity (2004, p. 122) These two aims had already been pronounced during the Copenhagen summit. The CFSP introduced a new procedure allowing for regular reliance on competencies of the first pillar (the Union pillar) for financing and implementing joint actions falling under the 2<sup>nd</sup> pillar, the CFSP.

#### ***Analysis of the concept institutionalisation with view to the intensification of the integration process of the European Union in the field of security and defence***

The empirical evidence gained through reviewing Smith’ four indicators measuring the EU’s effective foreign policy outcomes under the EPC/CFSP structure, reveal a general trend among the Member States to be more willing and active in implementing common foreign policy actions even if these do not reinforce national ambitions. The transformation from a pure intergovernmental forum, the very beginnings of the EPC into a Common European foreign policy structure, the CFSP, shows that the role of institutions had a significant impact on the integration of foreign and security policy into the Union framework. The conceptualisation of the integration in the field of European foreign policy provided by Smith in terms of institutionalisation does thus not only provide evidence with regard to the development towards a common CFSP since the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 but also what concerns the emergence of the ESDP thereafter and its intensified integration of the latter. The institutionalisation of security and defence into the framework of the European Union was not only facilitated by virtue of co-operative efforts and willingness between the Member States, but also involved the communitarisation of this field through automatic forces emerging from interactions between Community institutions (e.g. Common Positions and Joint actions between the Commission and the Council). This conceptualisation thus serves well for explaining the dependent variable of Hypothesis II, the intensification of European Security and Defence integration by means of automated and interdependent integration dynamics emerging from common procedures enacted in this field between the Community institutions.

## Comparing the explanatory power of the two investigating variables

Once, security and defence policy had been admitted to the Union's framework (through the Treaty of Nice in 2001), it underwent the same transforming procedures as the Common Foreign and Security policy and any other already integrated Community field. In this context it is useful to rely on Ojanen's terminology, a 'process of supranationalization' started (2006, p. 64). Defining this process, Ojanen does not stress that it involves the use of majority voting, but that it actually comprises three parallel processes. One, 'socialisation of national actors', two, 'inclusion of supranational actors', and three 'complex linkages between issue areas' (2006, 64). What makes European states pool and limit their sovereignty? Keohane explains that this mostly the case in areas where European states become interdependent to an increasing extent (2002, p. 749). This statement holds also true for the security and defence policy. The conditions for common action is of course facilitated by further institutionalisation of this area within the Union framework. That's where the two concepts of supranationalisation and institutionalisation seem to intersect.

The transformation of the intergovernmental structure of the EPC into the CFSP pillar of the European Union mirrors the three processes of supranationalisation as defined by Ojanen very well, but rather as accumulating than as simultaneously occurring ones. European foreign policy started to be institutionalised through the increasing adoption of common procedures and standards which in turn entailed that the national governments ('national actors' to borrow from Ojanen's terminology) surrendered sovereignty to the Union level in this field and that subsequently foreign policy became embedded in the Union structure. The concept of supranationalization seems very similar to the one of institutionalisation. The latter does however put more emphasis on the power of the Community institutions themselves to stimulate further the integration of a policy field into the Union framework.

Whereas the adapted neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalist interpretations provided by Ojanen serve well to explain the integration of European Security and Defence policy into the Union Framework, they lack sufficient explanatory power with regard to the intensification of the latter since the late 1990s. Ojanen's concept of supranationalization complemented by Keohane's concept of pooled sovereignty serve however well for filling this conceptual gap between the interstate perspectives of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism and the 'institution perspective' with regard to the dependent variable.

## Explanatory analysis: Testing Hypothesis III

With regard to the dependent variable of the research question of this thesis, "intensified European integration in the field of Security and Defence", it might be also interesting to look how this development was affected by public opinion of the EU citizens. Within the long integration process towards a common security and defence policy, the European public opinion might have played (and still does) a significant role for its further progress. Therefore it is indispensable to account for the support of the European public opinion on this issue.

I will test this assumption by testing a third hypothesis using results of a public opinion poll on European defence policy conducted by EUROBAROMETER in 2000. This was exactly the year in which the European Council summit of Nice led to the decision to establish permanent political and military structures within the European Union in order to comply with its ambition concerning crisis management operations. The most important findings of this survey will be reviewed in the following.

*Hypothesis III.): The launching of a common European security and defence policy and its further development and intensified institutionalisation into the Union framework was facilitated through support of the European public.*

Reviewing the results of this public opinion survey, I will investigate the dependent variable by assessing the public support for a common Security and Defence Policy and for other related issues that could have stimulated the further integration of this field into the Union framework. The following questions will be the focus of this ‘assessment’. First, are the EU citizens favouring a Common Security and Defence Policy for the Europe or rather against it? Second, do other questions posed within this survey provide relevant empirical evidence regarding the fostering of the ESDP? And third, are the Member States rather converging or diverting on this issue? The level of public support functions thus as the independent variable of Hypothesis II.

In order to answer the guiding questions of this analysis, I will rely on the findings of a large comparative survey on this issue that was held among the citizens of the then fifteen EU Member States. This survey was initiated by André Flahaut, the Belgian Minister of Defence and published in the Eurobarometer survey wave 54.1 of autumn 2000.

<b>1. a) The three most feared risks among Europeans citizens:</b>	
Organised crime	77%
Accident in a nuclear power plant	75%
Terrorism	74%
<b>b) Other (less) feared risks:</b>	
Nuclear conflict in Europe	44%
Conventional war in Europe	45%
World war	45%

<b>2. The most important functions of the military for Europeans</b>	
Defence of one's country	94%
Non-military tasks (helping the own country during a natural, ecological or nuclear crisis)	91%
Peace-keeping and peace-making missions	80%
Defending and sustaining values such as democracy and freedom	70%

<b>3. a) The most trusted institution among European citizens in their nation-state<sup>32</sup>:</b>	
Military	71%
<b>b) less trusted institutions</b>	
Press	38%
Big companies	35%
<b>c) the least trusted institution</b>	
Political parties	18%
<b>d) The countries in which trust in the military is below the European average (71%)</b>	
France	68%
Belgium, Italy	67%
Denmark	66%
Spain	65%

<sup>32</sup> out of 16 institutions among which respondents could choose

**4.) European average regarding the question which authority should be in charge of decision-making concerning European defence and security policy, the EU, the NATO, or the national government<sup>33</sup>**

a) EU	43%
b) NATO	17%
c) National government	24%

**d) National distribution among pro-EU Member States concerning the same question**

Italy	63%
France	56%
Luxembourg	53%
Belgium	49%
Finnland	41%
Netherlands	40%
Germany	38%
Ireland, Austria	36%
United Kingdom	31%
Denmark	27%

Among the member states favouring the EU as security provider are four founding countries of the EC above the EU average of 43% of this issue. The countries that are less favouring the EU for taken decision on defence policy are those that have bee neutral states during the cold war and the traditional less ‘pro-European’ states which are both islands and have been opting-out from community legislation or rejected community treaties at the first referendum. So this seems no surprise. Netherlands and Germany seem to be divided on this issue. Denmark was the only country which chose the NATO clearly as number one among the three options (is the only outlier of this sample).

<b>5. a) The % of Europeans that think that in case of a military intervention, the governments that are willing to send the troops should be in charge of decision-making</b>	47%
<b>b) The % of Europeans favouring the ‘maximalist’ option (majority vote) which forces each Member State to send troops</b>	7%
<b>c) The % of Europeans that agree with the decision taken to set-up a European rapid intervention force<sup>34</sup> comprising 60, 000 soldiers</b>	73%
<b>d) National distribution among EU Member States strongly supporting the setting-up of a rapid intervention force</b>	>50%

<sup>33</sup> Within a Eurobarometer survey (n. 32) conducted in 1989 on the same issue (but framed differently) by the US Information Agency, the support for the NATO was much higher. Thus support for the NATO has decreased during the 1990s and support for the Union or national governments to take care of security and defence provision has increased.

<sup>34</sup> as decided by the European Council at the Helsinki summit subsequent to the declaration thereof announced during the Cologne summit

When it comes to the practice and reality, thus to a case of a military intervention the European citizens seem to be divided on the issue of who should decide on the sending of troops. This becomes evident when looking at the low percentage of people supporting the ‘maximalist’ option, the approach that comes close to the idea of a unified EU army. There seems to exist a wide gap between the support for a European defence and security policy as integrated in the European legal framework (thus on paper) and its realization in case of a military mission, thus when it comes to mobilizing troops. In brief, Europeans seem to support the integration of European defence and security on paper, but not regarding the obligation to contribute to that idea in reality by sending own troops. This means the idea of a common European army is less supported than the idea of a common regularized defence and security framework.

73% of the European citizens agreed with the initiative of setting-up a European rapid intervention force. The results of this survey further provided that 23% thought it is ‘a very good’ and 50% ‘a rather good thing’ whereas 16% had no opinion about it. This means that only 14% disagreed. From this low percentage one can conclude that just a few of the European citizens are against this intensified integration in the field of European security and defence as this initiative clearly entailed further co-operation and higher competency of the EU to act as a security actor by further acquiring and developing own military capabilities.

In every Member State (at that time 15) more than 50% of the national population agreed that the setting-up of a rapid intervention force would be a very good or rather good initiative. In three of the founding EC Members, Belgium, France and Italy more than 80% of the citizens (respectively) agreed with this initiative as the survey further revealed.

<b>6. The form of a European army most favoured among European citizens (in %)</b>	
<b>a) Permanent European rapid intervention force as supplement to the national armies</b>	37%
<b>b) Single European army replacing the national armies</b>	19%
<b>c) ‘Ad-hoc’ European rapid intervention force (only mobilized in situations of urgency)</b>	18%
<b>d) No European army at all, no matter the form and content</b>	12%

Considering the results of question 6 (a, b, and c) one can conclude that the percentage of Europeans being in favour of European military co-operation whatever the form is 74%. This is an overwhelming majority. This might be due to the fact that EU citizens have been becoming aware that national armies were becoming less relevant and important at the end of the 1990s. It even hints to an impression of the European public that national armies are not sufficient for making the EU able to tackle the ambitions in the area of security and defence policy and to respond to its the new threat challenging the new global order after the cold war and also with regard to future challenges. This assumption can be even more strengthened when concluding from the findings above, that the percentage of European citizens being totally against the setting-up of a European army, no matter the form and content is only 12 %. Thus, one can assert that only a minority of Europeans want no military co-operation at the Union level at all and favour national armies for providing security and defence.

Another remarkable finding is that after national armies, the citizens of the then 15 EU member states preferred a Permanent Rapid intervention force and as one might expect on the

second position an ad-hoc rapid intervention force. The second choice is however not strongly supported by European citizens (only 37%).

Among the Member States favouring the evolution towards establishing a European army very strongly, whatever the form, were again five of the six EC founding countries: Belgium, Italy, Netherlands (81%), France (80%) and Luxembourg (79%) (see further details on results of the survey).

<b>7.) The most important roles attributed to the European army by Europeans (in %)</b>	
Defence of the EU's territory	71%
Sustaining peace in the European Union	63%
Intervention in case of a natural, ecological or nuclear catastrophe in Europe	59%

This complies with the most important role of the national army which is to defend the own nation and that idea is transferred to the EU level. One could conclude from that there has been arising a sense of European citizenship or European nation. This in turn complies with the concept of a security community which is build-upon a common identity. This findings reinforces the empirical evidence gained from testing the conceptualisation of the EU in terms of security community whose characteristics have an impact on the accelerated path of integration in the field of European security and defence (see first hypothesis).

<b>8.) The % of Europeans mentioning the three Petersberg tasks</b>	< 50%
<b>The % of Europeans favouring EU participation in peace-keeping missions outside the EU <i>without</i> a UN mandate</b>	15%
<b>The % of Europeans favouring EU participating in peace-keeping missions <i>with</i> a UN mandate (blue helmets)</b>	34%

The three Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions) are mentioned by less than 50% of the European citizens. This means that they are not supported by a strong majority of the European public. Apparently the EU governments were not able yet to show the relevance of this missions for the Union to its citizens. An increase in support of these mission would ensure higher level of legitimacy and thus more (enthusiastic) support by the EU citizens.

15% of European citizens favour EU participation in peace-keeping missions outside the EU, without a UN mandate which means autonomous EU missions whereas 35% of the European public favoured the participation of EU military troops in peace-keeping missions under a UN mandate, known as the blue helmets. Thus the latter options is favoured by twice the percentage of the other option. Even though at first sight the majority of the EU public supports EU peace-keeping missions, there seems to be a clear distinction among EU citizens on this issue namely between those favouring autonomous EU missions and those favouring EU missions under a wider UN-missions.

#### **Analysis of the findings with view to the dependent variable**

For European citizens the most important task of the military is defence be it on the national or European level. They appear to support the institutionalisation of the European Security

and Defence policy into the Union framework for better being able to respond to common threats also in terms of crisis prevention missions. There was however also revealed that EU peace-keeping missions should be conducting under a UN mandate and not under autonomous responsibility. This seems to undermine the further development of the ESDP which envisages the development of military capabilities (see rapid reaction force and headline goal 2010.)

Even though there is a large majority of European citizens (74%) favouring a common European defence approach, the percentage of people choosing for a permanent European rapid reaction force, a quasi-European army is low. This mean that European citizens support the integration of security and defence into the Union framework as they consider it important that these issues should be tackled by the whole Community. This might have to do with the common perceived threats and a feeling of a common identity. When it comes to intensifying the ESDP in form of military deployments which are the practical result of this intensification, the EU citizens show however less acceptance for co-operation. This is understandable as the sending of troops is a delicate issue especially when it affects own national troops being send to peace-keeping missions. The latter involve the use of military force which is still not a generally accepted instrument of the European Union which built upon economic stability, rule of law, democracy for sustaining the peace in Europe.

The support of European citizens has well an stimulating effect on the acceptance and recognition of the ESDP, but the same can not be asserted concerning ambitions to enhance military capabilities. Thus, it was not through support of the European public that the development of the ESDP has been intensified. The assumption behind hypothesis III has thus to be partly rejected with regard to the findings of this survey: European public opinion does support the integration of security and defence in the legal Union framework, but not facilitate its further intensification of this process as the reluctant support for such ambitious goals as the rapid intervention force revealed. The debate around the latter has been stimulating the accelerated path with which security and defence policy has been developing since its integration into the Union framework in the end of the 1990s.

## Conclusion

This paper aimed at grasping the factors driving the development of the European integration process of security and defence policy. The various concepts that I framed as constructivist notions on the basis of sharing key common elements of constructivist approach taken by Ulusoy, provided different explanatory power with regard to the research question of this paper which *was why the European Union has been struggling with institutionalising an effective and autonomous security and defence policy (ESDP) until the end of the 1990s*. Acting as mediating variables, the concepts of strategic culture, security community and security identity provides the most powerful empirical evidence with regard to explaining not only the emergence of the ESDP, but also its intensified integration process since the 1990s. This is when the EU was finally able to come up with an own security and defence policy independent from the NATO.

Examining the factors that have led to fast development of the ESDP, I also took account of empirical evidence gained from the traditional integration theories. The testing of Hypothesis II revealed that the grounded theories in this field, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism seemed only to provide evidence to the dependent variable, the intensification of the integration process of security and defence policy after it has been adapted to a new interpretation by Ojanen. In my view this adaptation did however lack

explanatory power as it did not reveal the causal factors lying behind the assumption that security and defence policy are not to be considered as specific. It was however interesting to see how the Union developed kind of automatic integration dynamics as provided by Smith' concept of institutionlisation. This concept helped to approve Hypothesis II which was less the case with regard to the two 'eminent' integration theories. The latter explained well the integration of security and defence into the Union framework, but only after having been adapted by Ojanen whose interpretation itself lacked convincing explanatory power. This adapted interpretations did also not contribute to the explain the intensification of the ESDP. Acting as independent variables of Hypothesis II, they did only partly help to approve the assumption behind it.

The testing of Hypothesis III did not result also not result in a total approving of the assumption behind it which was that support would facilitate the integration process of ESDP. The support of the European public did however not prove to be strong enough with regard to also enhancing the development of the ESDP further. The enhanced development of the latter is mainly been driven by the establishment and deployment of own military capabilities.

Applying not only a descriptive analysis on the historical development of security and defence approach und the EC/EU structure, I wanted to test also more modern concepts of security governance that have been arising after the end of the bipolar order. The results gained through my explanatory analysis proved that it is was indeed not only historical determinism that 'steered' the establishment and establishment of the ESDP, but also internal and external dynamics. The former relate to the interactions between the member states and an increasing institutionalising foreign and security policy, the latter to the emancipation from the NATO by overtaking the assets of the WEU into the EU structure and by also acquiring own military capabilities and more impendence with regard to the planning and access thereof. (The latter was realized through the Berlin-plus agreement). The study proved that the emergence of common European identity also involving security and defence matters is not a pathetic idea and utopian ideal, but a reasonable and already existing phenomenon. In my opinion the legitimacy of the enhanced co-operation within the integration process of the ESDP is still lacking, but can be outweigh to some extent when the Treaty of Lisbon will come into effect and introduce the co-decision procedure also to issues of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> pillar. I am also convinced that it the willingness of Member States, especially those of the key states France and UK (and maybe also Germany) will be the continuing driving force besides the own institutionalisation mechanism of the European Union.

### **Limitations of the study and grounds for further research**

The results of this study are constraint in several ways. First, the examination of the research questions focused mainly on internal dynamics (UK and France, institutionalisation), but not so much on the development of transatlantic relations. This was also not relevant to my research question. It would however been interesting when assessing the further progress of the European Security and Defence policy to address the changing terms of the US-EU relationship. The same applies to the question of how the future relation between the EU and the NATO will look like. Will it be built upon a 'division of roles or functions' between the NATO and EU concerning military and non-military functions (respectively) or is there any potential for a kind of fusion between the two organisations? In this context it will also be essential to look at the further redefinition of the NATO's role in a world coined by intra-stat conflicts mainly and being dominated by the US, as the single super power. Moreover, further NATO and EU enlargement will necessitate a redefinition of their respective relations to Russia which might also affect the further development of the ESDP.

Adopting a long-term perspective considering the development of the international system and the EU's role of a security actor therein, one has surely to take into account the achieved super power status of China in approximately 20 years.

As this study focus on the intensification of the ESDP from 1998 on (St. Malo), it will be also interesting to look what exactly will dominate the further internal development of the ESDP. Thereby it will be interesting to look at the enhanced co-operation in this field stimulated by the Sarkozy and Brown that have already met twice this year for this matter. Further, France's ambition to re-enter the military structure of the NATO will have to be accounted for in this context as well as it seems to become the only way for France to sustain a say in European security and defence provision regarding the further enlargement process of the NATO. Last but not least it might be indispensable to look in how far the Headline goal 2010 will have been attained.

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