Collective action as a means for social equity

Two mediation models predicting collective action intentions in situations of structural versus incidental inequality

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Abstract

The question why people demonstrate, even though the consequences are by definition not always positive or visible, is posed as this paper's main focus. Many studies have demonstrated that social identity, injustice, emotions and efficacy are explanatory variables of collective action intentions (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). In the current study we investigated whether type of disadvantage is an important moderator variable explaining the question why sometimes social identity is the strongest predictor of collective action and at other times perception of injustice. We therefore present two models of collective action. Our conducted research supports our models; however, we found little support concerning the designated role of disadvantage. Only the relation between identification with the overarching identity and collective action was moderated by type of disadvantage: in the structural, and not in the incidental situation identification with Europe showed a negative relation with collective action intention among Kurds. The findings are reviewed and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Key-words: incidental, structural disadvantage, social identity, injustice, efficacy, emotion, collective action intentions

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A year has passed since the first demonstration in Syria, the situation for the Syrian civilians, however, does not appear to have improved (CNN, 2012). Nevertheless, to this day there are still civilians who are demonstrating against the Syrian government. This makes one wonder what it is that motivates these civilians to demonstrate despite the hard repression by the regime. This question, why individuals participate in protest (i.e. collective action), has been the subject of interest of social psychologists for several years now (for an overview see Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2007).

Various studies have shown a positive link between collective action and variables such as social identity, perceived injustice, emotions and perceived efficacy (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). An individual must feel a sense of belongingness to a group (social identification), perceive a form of injustice done to his group (and thus to himself; perceived injustice), feel upset about the situation (emotions) and lastly perceive the collective action as effective (perceived efficacy) in order for him to show a readiness to collective action.

Van Zomeren and colleagues (2008) also mention the role of disadvantage in their model, labeled as the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA). One of their main assumptions is that the type of disadvantage, that the demonstrators perceive, has an effect on the relationship between the predictive variables and collective action intentions. This disadvantage concerns a *structural* social inequality that is either constantly present (e.g., among ethnic minorities), which may result in the belief of generating an alternative to the present status quo (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999). Or, the status quo is abruptly changed (e.g., increasing tuition fees) causing *incidental* social inequality, which in turn may result in dissatisfaction among the affected individuals (e.g., students). These latter

individuals aspire to change the allocated status quo into a desired status quo. In the first situation, the affected individuals are displeased with the present status quo and want to alter it, while in the latter case the status quo is altered by external factors leading to a discrepancy in the assigned and the desired status quo and thus discontent (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

This fairly new aspect in collective action, the type of disadvantage, also has an important role in the current study. We too assume that the type of disadvantage functions as an important moderator variable. In addition, we believe type of disadvantage may provide insight regarding the question why sometimes social identity is the strongest predictor of collective action and at other times perception of injustice. More specifically, we propose that the type of disadvantage offers a good explanation about why there can be two different situations leading to collective action intentions. The purpose of this study is therefore to integrate the existing work on collective action intentions with the theory on the type of disadvantage and give rise to a new theoretical explanation of collective action participation with regard to its relation with type of disadvantage.

Firstly, we give a summary of two relevant theories of collective action intentions and their respective variables, after which we turn to an outline of this thesis hypothesis, ending with the results and discussion of the conducted research.

Collective Action

According to Tajfel and Turner (1979) collective action includes all actions aimed at improving certain conditions, the status, the power or the influence of a group. In order to change the condition of the group, one must take concepts as social identity, perceived injustice, emotions and perceived efficacy into account (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). These explanatory variables of collective action intentions are derived from two important theories, namely Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT). Both theories explain intergroup behavior such as collective action intentions among

social groups, where SIT is more focused on the cognitive aspect of identification while RDT emphasizes the role of expressive emotions (Mummendey et al., 1999). In the next section, we will explain each theory in turn.

Social Identity Theory (SIT)

According to SIT, the self-concept consists of a personal identity and a social identity (Ashforth & Mael, 2009). A personal identity is formed by personal traits or interest, while the social identity is shaped by the social group(s) to which the individual belongs to (Tafjel, 1982). The individual understands and positions himself by looking at the group he belongs to. The social identity thus contains group-based attributes and beliefs (Jasper, 1999); it does not only results in a perception of belongingness to a group, it also specifies what is important in this world to the individual and how he should act within it (Haslam, Platow & Reicher, 2010).

Social Identity. The self is flexible since it can be cognitively categorized into both levels of identity ("I" versus "We"); this process is called self-categorization (Tajfel, 1982). The process of categorization can influence the perceptual, affective and therefore the behavioral reactions of an individual (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002; Reicher, 1982). Social identity is particularly influential when the individual perceives a threat to the status of the group (Van Vught & Hart, 2004). According to Ellemers and colleagues (2002), threats to a group can lead to a higher degree of cognitive and affective commitment of the individual to the group, which in turn can induce behavioral reactions such as collective action intentions. As a result, social identities are both on societal and individual level important, since it can motivate individuals to transform the status quo of their group, and thus their position in society when it is regarded as unjust (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

For that reason, social identification will be included in the present study as we are interested in the willingness to collective action among individuals belonging to particular

social groups. In line with SIT and other studies about collective action, we therefore believe that social i.e. group identification is a (direct) predictor of collective action intentions.

For the present research we approached an ethnic minority group and asked them to what extent they identify themselves with their subgroup and subsequently with the overarching group. This is to see whether the latter identification affects the collective behavior of the individual, and if so, in what way it does. To avoid confusion, when we speak of social identity we refer to one of the two identities (subgroup identity versus overarching identity); but when we mention social or group identification, we refer to the strength of the commitment to a social group.

Van Vught and Hart (2004) have demonstrated that when an external threat is imposed to the group, high group identifiers show greater expression of group loyalty and investment in the group, in order to maintain group stability and integrity. We therefore assume that identification with the subgroup will lead to more readiness to collective action than the individuals who identify themselves with the overarching identity.

Perceived Efficacy. According to SIT, individuals will be more inclined to protest when they strongly identify with their group the moment they feel threats toward their group (Tausch et al., 2011). "They [social identities] are [therefore] the motors of both social stability and social change" (Haslam et al., 2010, p. 64). In line with the reasoning of Abramson and Eldrich (1982), Hornsey and colleagues (2006) believe that this motor can only put in motion when the individuals believe that the collective action is effective. The more the individual perceives the action as effective, the more likely he will take action in order to preserve group stability. Perceived efficacy is hence dependent on the extent to which the individual believes the situation is changeable by means of collective action.

Perceived efficacy can be broken down into three components, namely individual, group and participative efficacy (Van Zomeren, Saguy & Schellhaas, in press). Individual efficacy

refers to the belief that certain individual actions will lead to the achievement of individual goals. The belief that one can achieve group goals or solve group-related problems through collective action is called group efficacy. Participative efficacy is mentioned when the individual beliefs his actions can contribute to the achievement of group goals.

Since we are interested in the efficacy of group actions, we exclude individual efficacy from the present study and will only focus on the latter two types of efficacy. We combine both types of efficacy to one variable and name this (the overall) group efficacy. We presume that group efficacy is a good predictor of collective action intentions.

Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT)

RDT also provides insight regarding participation in collective action. Deprivation is the result of discrepancy between the actual level and the desired level of satisfaction; in case of deprivation, the current level of satisfaction is lower than the expected level of satisfaction (Corning, 2000). The discrepancy arises for example in situations in which individuals compare themselves to others and as a result perceive their situation as unjust.

Perceive Injustice. This perception of injustice can be caused by an incidental event or, like Klandermans (1997) describe it, a suddenly imposed grievance whereas the newly created status quo leads to an emotional reaction (Corning, 2000; Jasper, 1998; Runciman, 1966) and in turn motivates the individual to reduce or rectify the injustice done to him (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Therefore, perceived injustice appears to be an important factor for collective action intentions: “The common element in the norms of most, if not all, movements is the conviction that existing conditions are unjust" (Jasper, 1998).

Injustice can be perceived either in individual or in collective terms. In the first case, the deprivation arises after an individual compares himself with another individual; this is called egoistic relative deprivation. Is the deprivation the result of a comparison of the group with an out-group, then it is called fraternal relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966). Mummendey and

colleagues (1999) demonstrated that fraternal relative deprivation has an important role in collective action. In line with other work on collective action, we too believe that (fraternal) perceived injustice is a (direct) predictor of collective action intentions.

Emotions. In accordance with RDT, group-members will participate in collective actions the moment they feel deprived while experiencing something unfair done to their group (c.q., fraternal relative deprivation). In addition, some researchers have found that besides perceiving injustice, group members also experience emotions such as anger and contempt (Jasper, 1998; Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). This is consistent with the model of intergroup emotions as this theory asserts that when an individual considers himself a member of a group, he will also experience emotions on behalf of the group (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Combined with the perception of injustice, emotions can also motivate the individual to minimize the perceived fraternal deprivation together with other group members (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

This process of collective action is in line with the framework of justice developed by Hegtvedt (2006). In her paper she describes that individuals will feel tension after experiencing injustice done to them and hence will react emotionally (Hegtvedt, 2006). These emotions motivates the individuals to reduce this either cognitively (by restoring the psychological sense of justice) or behavioral (by restoring the actual justice through demonstrations).

As protests are focused on unjust events, negative emotions have a more prominent role in collective action (Jasper, 1998). Positive emotions are not sufficient for a person to take action. In his paper Jasper connects emotions to the moral values of the individual (1998). He believes that when an unpleasant and unexpected event occurs (the status quo is abruptly and negatively changed), the individual experiences moral shocks which in turn leads to emotions such as surprise, sadness, anger or contempt. This emotional reaction is, according to Japer,

the first step toward social movements (1998). With all of this in mind, we suppose that emotion is a good predictor of collective action intentions as well.

Tausch and colleagues (2011) also mentioned negative emotions in their research on collective action; however, they link emotions to three forms of collective actions in combination with a certain degree of group efficacy. If the individual experiences anger and a high degree of efficacy, he is more inclined to (non-) normative non-violent actions, since both variables are viewed as constructive that mostly likely will result in supportive actions. Conversely, the individual will be more liable to non-normative violent actions in case he experiences contempt and a low degree of efficacy, given that both variables are linked with hostile reactions, situations and extreme means of social change (Tausch et al., 2011).

In line with their reasoning, we assume that anger and group efficacy will lead to normative actions and non-normative non-violent actions while feelings of contempt will lead to non-normative violent actions.

Lastly, Javeline demonstrated that while individuals experience injustice and negative emotions as anger and moral outrage, they also need a target to unleash these emotions in order for them to demonstrate (2003). The more specific the source of threat is, the more intense the feelings of anger or contempt the individual will experience and subsequently will show more resistance to the suddenly changed status quo (Jasper, 1998; Javeline, 2003). In her research among Russians, Javeline (2003) confirmed that specification of blame-attribution is a good explanation as to why some individuals demonstrate and some not, despite perceiving the equal injustice done to them. Results showed that Russians demonstrated more when they ascribed their grievance to a specific person.

The Present Study

Both Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory provide a good explanation of what can elicit collective action behavior. As Mummendey and her colleagues mentioned

in their work (1999), SIT is more focused on the cognitive aspect of collective action as it stresses social identity and perceived efficacy are good predictors. RDT on the other hand mainly highlights the expressive aspect of collective action by hypothesizing that collective action is focused on perceived injustice and emotions as anger and contempt (Mummendey et al., 1999). One could speak of a cognitive and an affective pathway to collective action, in which, with their respective variables, SIT offers a good explanation of the cognitive route and RDT to the affective route.

Interestingly, the situation described by both theories (i.e., pathways) fits the moderation variable type of disadvantage that Van Zomeren and his colleagues use in their model, SIMCA (2008). On the one hand, social identification can act as a motivator since it can encourage individuals to change their status quo once they perceive their group situation as unfair (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002; Reicher, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Vught & Hart, 2004). Perceived injustice has on the other hand a more prominent feature in situations in which individuals are suddenly imposed with injustice (Corning, 2000; Hegtvedt, 2006; Jasper, 1998; Runciman, 1966; Van Zomeren et al., 2008); that is to say, the status quo of the group is abruptly changed into a new dissatisfying status quo. This explanation of status quo corresponds to the description of a structural and incidental disadvantage, respectively.

Taken together, the theories concerning SIT and RDT and the SIMCA-study, leads to two processes of collective action: one process concerning structural disadvantage, with social identity and perceived efficacy as explanatory variables and one process relating to incidental disadvantages with perceived injustice and emotions as explanatory variables (see Figure 1).

The present study revolves around these two processes. Our first hypothesis was focused on the structural condition, namely that a) social identity is a good predictor of collective action intentions in which we believe that the ethnic identity has a greater predictive power than the overarching identity b) perceived efficacy predicts collective action intentions, and



Figure 1. Structural and incidental disadvantage. The process in blue represents the process of collective action in response to a structural disadvantage, while the red one represents the process of collective action in response to an incidental disadvantage.

c) perceived efficacy mediates the process between social identity and collective action intentions. Our second hypothesis concerned the incidental condition, in which we assumed that a) perceived injustice is a good predictor of collective action intentions b) emotions predicts collective action intentions too, and c) emotions mediates the process between perceived injustice and collective action intentions. Our third and last hypothesis is derived from a research conducted by Tausch and colleagues (2011). Namely, in line with study 1, we predicted that a) anger and group efficacy are positively related to normative actions and non-normative non-violent actions and b) contempt is positively related to non-normative violent actions.

Method

Participants

One-hundred-and-fifty-three respondents living in the Netherlands and Germany (96 men, 57 women; mean age 30.82 years, range 18-58 years) participated in the study. All of the participants had a Kurdish background. With regard to the educational level, almost half of

them finished secondary school (primary school: 14, pre-vocational secondary education: 30, secondary school: 67, higher professional education/university: 31, other/no education: 11).

Lastly, of the 153 respondents only 59 participants actually attended the demonstration mentioned in the survey (incidental condition 27, structural condition 32).

Design and Procedure

We used a one-factorial design with two conditions to examine collective action intentions, with the first condition being a structural disadvantage and the second condition being incidental disadvantage.

As there are two conditions, the *incidental* versus *structural* demonstration, the questionnaire used in this study has two different versions with articles concerning real-life disadvantages. The 'structural' version of the questionnaire begins with an article about how Kurds constantly try to change their status quo through annual festivities and demonstrations. Every year Kurds demonstrate on the 21st of March, the day of their spring festival, with the objective of gaining recognition for their identity. In the 'incidental' version, a sudden change of the status quo is the main topic of the article. After the closure of the Kurdish television channel, Roj TV on 19 January, 2012 Kurds felt like their voice of humanity was abruptly silenced (Alliance for Kurdish Rights, 2012). This incident is a good example of how people cope with suddenly imposed grievance. In the months July and August 2012, a total of 75 respondents filled in the survey after reading the article with references to the structural social disadvantage and 78 participants filled in the questionnaire with the article about the closure-incident. For the articles (i.e., manipulation texts) see appendix A.

Given the fact that the respondents lived either in the Netherlands or Germany, we provided the questionnaire in Dutch and in German. Via the snowball method, we approached individuals with a Kurdish background either personally of via the internet (e.g., Facebook). We assigned the participants randomly to one of the two conditions in case the respondent

filled in the survey by hand. The program used for making the online survey (Qualtrics Labs Inc, 2012), was set so that the respondents were automatically assigned to one of the conditions. In the personal approach, the majority of the respondents filled in the questionnaire alone (i.e., in their own house) and in few cases two or three respondents filled in the survey at the same time, for instance during social gatherings, but still separately from each other.

Most respondents completed the questionnaire individually and in few cases with a little explanation from us, in which we provided some help regarding the meaning of some words. After completing the questionnaires, we checked the surveys to see if the respondent filled in everything, whether he understood the recoded items correctly and finally whether he knew other potential respondents.

Measures

Using a seven-points Likert-scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), the respondents rated items about identification with the Kurdish group, identification with the European group, perceived injustice, emotions, perceived efficacy and collective action intentions. For the scale means, standard deviation and the inter-scale correlations, see Table 1. Since we have two conditions, structural versus incidental disadvantage, we have two questionnaires in which the items are formulated in the same way; only the references to the designated disadvantage is different per questionnaire.

As previously stated, all respondents have a Kurdish background hence we considered the Kurdish identity as the subordinate identity (European identity as the overarching identity). Since all the participants lived and demonstrated in Europe, we regarded the European government as the (partly) cause of injustice done to the Kurds concerning their situation. This is in line with Javeline's study (2003) about blame attribution. We therefore designated the European Government as the main antagonist in the surveys.

Table 1

Summary mean, standard deviation, correlations.

Variable	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**a	**4**b	**5**	**6**a	**6**b	**6**c
1. Identification Kurds	(6,05 0.87)	-.210**	.475**	.446**	.319**	.377**	.569**	.273**	0.18
2. Identification European		(3.93 1.09)	-.112	-.221**	-.237**	-.139	-.187*	-.132	-.081
3. Perceived Injustice			(4.67 1.22)	.578**	.513**	.366**	.562**	.263*	.038
4a. Anger				(5.19 1.74)	.651**	.269**	.609**	.351**	.091
4b. Contempt					(4.19 1.72	.317**	.475**	.324**	.160*
5. Group Efficacy						(5,40 1,28)	.511**	.211**	.167*
6a. Normative actions							(5.69 1.45)	.462**	0.091
6b. Non-normative nonviolent								(3.14 2.11)	.498**
6c. Non-normative violent									(1.60 1.47)

**p< .01 *p<.05

We assessed identification with the Kurdish group with seven items[1] (α = .73) and similar seven items for the European group (α = .74). Based on Leach et al. (2008) research about identification, the items focused on different dimensions of identification. Two items focused on the centrality of identification (“*Being a Kurd is an important part of how I see myself”),* two items measured solidarity (“*I feel connected to Kurds*”), two items determined satisfaction (“*Being a Kurd gives me a good feeling*”) and one item assessed individual self-stereotyping (“*I have a lot in common with the average Kurd*”).

The participants rated perceived injustice with eight items[2] (Tausch et al., 2011; α = .81). The participant first responded to three items about injustice in general (“*Kurds are treated*

1. Identification was originally measured with eight items, but it was reduced to seven items since the reliability was higher without it (α = .70 for the European group).

2. Perceived injustice was originally measured with nine items, but one item describing incidental inequality led to a low reliability scale (α = .40), hence we removed it from the analyses.

unfairly in Europe"), after that two items describing an incidental inequality ("*The Kurdish identity is sometimes accepted in Europe"*) and lastly three items relating to a structural disadvantage ("*Kurds in Europe are always discriminated*").

Subsequently, we assessed the emotions anger and contempt (Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; α = .88). Anger was measured with three items ("*I am angry with Europe";* α = .85*)* and contempt as well with three items ("*I feel contempt toward Europe";* α = .82).

Respondents also evaluated items indicative of their group efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2012; α = .83), for example: *"I think, as a group, Kurds can prevent that Kurds must adopt another identity"* and "*I think, as an individual, I could help my group to promote the rights of Kurds regarding their identity*".

Lastly, we incorporated a 13-item measure of collective action assessing one's willingness to engage in collective action in the questionnaire (Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Seven items measured the willingness to normative collective action intentions ("*I am willing to participate in a signature campaign*"; α = .93), three items assessed the willingness to non-normative nonviolent actions ("*I am willing to block a highway*"; α = .90) and lastly we included three items about non-normative violent actions ("*I am willing to throw with bottles or stones during protests*"; α = .96).

Results

Manipulation check

To test whether our manipulation was successful, we performed repeated measures analysis of variance, rANOVA, with type of injustice (structural and incidental injustice) as within-subject factor and condition (structural and incidental disadvantage) as between-subject factor. The results showed no main effect of the within factor, $F(1, 151) = 1.920$, $p = .168$); no main effect of the between factor on collective action, $F(1, 151) = 0.209$,

p = .648; and also no interaction effect between perceived injustice and condition, F(1, 151), p = .363. Summarized, in contrast to what we expected, we did not find significant evidence for the assumption that perceived injustice interacts with condition.

We did however find some supportive findings, albeit modestly. Our intention was for the respondent who, after reading an article in the incidental condition, would score higher on items indicating incidental injustice than on items representing structural injustice; and vice-versa for the structural condition. We found a slightly higher rating of incidental injustice (M = 4.60, SD = 1.35) than structural injustice (M = 4.35, SD = 1.52) in the incidental condition. Furthermore, we found that structural injustice (M = 4.27, SD = 1.76) was somewhat higher rated than incidental injustice (M = 4.20, SD = 1.61) in the structural condition (see Figure 2). So, even though the results are not as significant as we wished for, they do show an outcome of the desired direction of the manipulation.

Hypothesis 1

Our first hypothesis related to the process concerning a structural disadvantage (see Figure 1), in which we hypothesized that a) social identity predicts collective action intentions, specifically that the Kurdish identity has a greater predictive power than the European identity b) group efficacy predicts collective action intentions and c) group efficacy mediates the process between social identity and collective action intentions.

Hypothesis 1a. The hypothesis that social identity predicts collective action in the structural condition only, was tested with a regression model with the standardized scores of social identity (for both the Kurdish and European identity) and the interaction term (both identities and type of disadvantage) as independent variables, and collective action as dependent variable. We found a significant positive relation between the Kurdish identity and collective action, β = .59, t(153), p < .001 but no interaction with the type of disadvantage, β = -.03, t(153), p = .782. For the European identity, we found that this variable does not



Figure 2. Manipulation check. Means of incidental versus structural injustice in the incidental and structural condition.

predicts collective action intentions, β = -.08, *t*(153), *p* = .405. Identification with Europe, however, interacted with a type of disadvantage, β = -.23, *t*(153), *p* = .012 (see Figure 3). Specifically, simple slope analyses showed that the European identity only predicted collective action in the structural condition, negatively though: β = -.41, *t*(153), *p* < .001. In the incidental condition it predictive power of collective action was very low, β = .05, *t*(153), *p* = .697.

Summarized, the Kurdish identity predicts collective action intentions positively but it was not dependent on the type of disadvantage as we presumed; which means it predicts collective action intentions both in the structural and incidental condition. The European identity, on the other hand, predicted collective action intentions only in the structural condition; this relation was however negative[1].

1. We also tested whether the results would differ when putting the standardized score of perceived injustice into the same regression model as extra independent variable, since we believed that it is a good direct predictor of collective action and would influence the results. The outcomes, however, showed no different results.



Figure 3. Results of the simple slope analyses of the interaction European identity and condition.

Hypothesis 1b. The hypothesis whether group efficacy predicts collective action in the structural condition only, was tested with a regression model with the standardized scores of group efficacy and the interaction term (group efficacy with the type of disadvantage) as independent variables, and collective action as dependent variable. We found a significant positive relation between group efficacy and collective action, $\beta = .57$, $t(153)$, $p < .001$, but no interaction with the type of disadvantage, $\beta = .07$, $t(153)$, $p = .460$.

As assumed, group efficacy predicted collective action intentions positively, but it did not interact with type of disadvantage; which means group efficacy predicts collective action intentions in both the structural and incidental condition.

Hypothesis 1c. Subsequently we tested whether group efficacy mediates the direct relation between social identity and collective action. For this hypothesis we used PROCESS, a procedure that is suitable for studies on moderation and mediation analysis (Hayes, 2012). Collective action was set as the outcome variable (Y); Kurdish identity as independent variable (X); group efficacy, anger and contempt as mediator variables and bootstrap samples was set on 5000. Lastly, we had perceived injustice set as covariate.



Figure 4. Standardized regression coefficients of the mediation process concerning a structural disadvantage with perceived injustice as covariate. Solid lines represent significant relations, while dashed lines represent non-significant relations.

The results showed that the Kurdish identity was positively related to group efficacy, β = .31, *p* = .014, and to anger, β = .44, *p* = .003, but not to contempt: β = .19, *p* = .222[1]. Both group efficacy and anger predicted collective action positively, respectively β = .21, *p* = .002 and β = .17, *p* = .008. But contempt on the other hand did not predict collective action intentions, β = .09, *p* = .134[1]. The indirect relation of Kurdish identity on collective action through group efficacy was positively significant, β = .07, [.01, .16], through anger as well, β = .08, [.02, .19] but through contempt it was not significant: β = .02, [-.01, .09]. The direct relation of Kurdish identity on collective action was positively significant: β = .30, *p* = .005 (see Figure 4).

The same analysis was done with the European identity as independent variable, instead of the Kurdish identity. We found that the European identity was not significantly related to

1. Without perceived injustice as covariate, the results showed a significant positive relation between the Kurdish Identity and contempt: β = .63, *p* < .001, a nearly significant relation between contempt and collective action: β = .10, *p* = .083 and lastly a nearly significant indirect effect of the Kurdish identity on collective action through contempt (β = .07, [-.00, .18]).



Figure 5. Standardized regression coefficients of the mediation process concerning a structural disadvantage with perceived injustice as covariate. Solid lines represent significant relations, while dashed lines represent non-significant relations.

group efficacy: β = -.12, p = .195. To anger and contempt however it was negatively related, respectively β = -.25, p = .017 and β = -.29, p = .009. Both group efficacy and anger predicted collective action positively, respectively β = .24, p < .001 and β = .21, p = .002; contempt did not predict collective action intentions: β = .08, p = .216. The indirect relation of the European identity on collective action through group efficacy was not significant: β = -.03, [-.09, .01], through anger it was negative in direction and significant: β = -.05, [-.14, -.01] and through contempt it was not significant: β = -.02, [-.09, .01]. The direct relation of the European identity on collective action was also non-significant: β = -.06, p = .443 (see Figure 5).

Taken together, the Kurdish identity predicts collective action intentions positively; this process can be mediated by group efficacy and anger. However, this process works in both condition and not as we presumed only in the structural condition. On the other hand, the European identity only predicts collective action intentions in the structural condition, negatively though, and additionally can only be mediated by anger in this process.

Hypothesis 2

Our second hypothesis concerned the incidental condition (see Figure 1), namely a) perceived injustice identity is a good predictor of collective action intentions b) anger and contempt predict collective action intentions and c) both emotions mediate the process between perceived injustice and collective action intentions.

Hypothesis 2a. The hypothesis that perceived injustice predicts collective action in the incidental condition only, was tested with a regression model with the standardized scores of perceived injustice and the interaction term (perceived injustice and type of disadvantage) as independent variables, and collective action as dependent variable. We found a significant positive direct relation between perceived injustice and collective action, $\beta = .57$, $t(153)$, $p < .001$, but no interaction with the type of disadvantage, $\beta = -.13$, $t(153)$, $p = .145$.

Summarized, perceived injustice predicts collective action intentions positively but it is not dependant on the type of disadvantage as we presumed. Thus it predicts collective action intentions both in the structural and incidental condition.

Hypothesis 2b. The hypothesis whether anger and contempt predict collective action in the incidental condition only, was tested with a regression model with the standardized scores of anger and contempt and the interaction term (anger & contempt and type of disadvantage) as independent variables and collective action as dependent variable. We found a significant, positive relation between anger and collective action, $\beta = .68$, $t(153)$, $p < .001$ and no interaction with the type of disadvantage, $\beta = -.10$, $t(153)$, $p = .232$. Furthermore, we found a significant positive relation of contempt with collective action, $\beta = .58$, $t(153)$, $p < .001$, and an interaction with the type of disadvantage $\beta = -.23$, $t(153)$, $p = .010$ (see Figure 6). Specifically, simple slope analyses showed that contempt only predicted collective action in the structural condition, in the negatively direction though: $\beta = -.33$, $t(153)$, $p = .009$. In the Incidental condition it predictive power of collective action was lower and non-significant,



Figure 6. Results of the simple slope analyses of the interaction contempt and condition.

β = .12, *t*(153), *p* = .332. As assumed anger predicts collective action intentions positively, however it showed no interaction with type of disadvantage which means it predicts collective action intentions in both the structural and incidental condition. Contempt, on the other hand, predicts collective action intentions only in the structural condition, though negatively.

Hypothesis 2c. Next we tested whether anger mediates the direct relation between perceived injustice and collective action. Here too, we used PROCESS. Collective action was set as the outcome variable (Y), perceived injustice as independent variable (X), group efficacy, anger and contempt as mediator variables, Kurdish identity as covariate and lastly bootstrap samples was set on 5000.

The results showed that perceived injustice was positively significantly related to group efficacy, anger and contempt, respectively β = .28, *p* = .002, β = .67, *p* < .001 and β = .66, *p* < .001. Both group efficacy and anger predicted collective action positively, respectively β = .21, *p* = .002 and β = .17, *p* = .007. On the other hand, contempt did not predict collective actions, β = .09, *p* = .134. The indirect relation of perceived injustice on collective action intentions through perceived efficacy was positively significant: β = .06, [.02, .14] and



Figure 7. Standardized regression coefficients of the mediation process concerning an incidental disadvantage with Kurdish identity as covariate. Solid lines represent significant relations, while dashed lines represent non-significant relations.

through anger as well: β = .12, [.03, .24], but through contempt it was not significant: β = .06, [-.02, .16]. The direct relation of perceived injustice on collective action was however not significant: β = .08, p = .318 (see Figure 7).

The same analysis was done, only now with the European identity as covariate. We found that perceived injustice was positively related to group efficacy, anger and contempt, respectively β = .38, p < .001, β = .80, p < .001 and β = .70, p < .001. Both group efficacy and anger predicted collective action positively, respectively β = .25, p < .001 and β = .24, p < .001. On the other hand, contempt did not predict collective action, β = .08, p = .216. The indirect relation of perceived injustice on collective action through group efficacy was positively significant: β = .09, [.03, .18] and through anger as well: β = .16, [.06, .30], but through contempt it was not significant: β = .05, [-.03, .17]. The direct relation of perceived injustice on collective action was non-significant: β = .15, p = .070 (see Figure 8).

Taken together, perceived injustice predicts collective action intentions positively only when it is mediated by group efficacy and anger; independent of the covariate. However, this



Figure 8. Standardized regression coefficients of the mediation process concerning an incidental disadvantage with European identity as covariate. Solid lines represent significant relations, while dashed lines represent non-significant relations.

process works in both condition and not as we presumed only in the incidental condition.

Hypothesis 3.

Lastly, we tested whether a) anger and group efficacy are related to normative actions and non-normative non-violent actions and b) whether contempt relates to non-normative violent actions. In line with the study conducted by Tausch and her colleagues (2011), we excluded the items measuring participative efficacy and only used the items assessing group efficacy in the analysis.

Hypothesis 3a. The hypothesis regarding normative actions was tested with a regression model with the standardized scores of anger, group efficacy and contempt as independent variables and normative actions as dependent variable. We found that both anger and group efficacy were positively related to normative collective actions, respectively β = .70, $t(153)$, $p < .001$ and β = .38, $t(153)$, $p < .001$. Contempt however did not predict normative actions β = .11, $t(153)$, $p = .351$. Regarding non-normative non-violent actions, we found that anger was positively related: β = .43, $t(153)$, $p = .043$ but group efficacy did not predict this type of

action: β = - .03, *t*(153), *p* = .870. Striking was that the results not only revealed that contempt had a marginal significant positive relation with non-normative non-violent actions, β = .41, *t*(153), *p* = .055 but it also showed an interaction with a type of condition: β = -.57, *t*(153), *p* < .01. Simple slope analysis showed that contempt was a good predictor in the structural condition, although negatively, β = -.86, *t*(153), *p* < .01 and in the incidental condition it predictive power is lower and non-significant : β = .27, *t*(153), *p* = .299.

In sum, the results are partly in line with our prediction namely that only anger and group efficacy are related to normative actions intentions and contempt not. But with regard to non-normative non-violent actions, the results revealed that both anger and contempt are good predictors whereas the latter one only predicts this type of collective action in the structural condition and negatively in direction.

Hypothesis 3b. The hypothesis whether contempt is related to non-normative violent actions, was tested with a regression model including the standardized scores of anger, group efficacy and contempt as independent variables and non-normative violent actions as dependent variable. We found no significant relations among the three variables and this type of action; anger: β = -.06, *t*(153), *p* = .699, group efficacy: β = .06, *t*(153), *p* = .680 and contempt: β = .26, *t*(153), *p* = .114 did not predict violent actions.

The results showed no support for our prediction that, at least, contempt would be related to non-normative violent action intentions.

Discussion

In continuation of the SIMCA-study (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) and several studies conducted on collective action intentions (for an overview see Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007), we tried to provide new empirical support for two mediation models predicting collective action in the context of two types of disadvantage. The main question of our study was whether the process of collective action intentions is controlled by a type of

disadvantage, be it structural or incidental disadvantage. That is, we presumed that in the structural condition, social identity predicts collective action intentions through perceived efficacy and that in the incidental condition, perceived injustice predicts collective action intentions through anger. We were able to draw three conclusions from our study, namely 1) we found support for the process with social identity set as predictor and group efficacy as mediator, however, this process worked both in the structural and incidental condition 2) we also found support for the process with perceived injustice as predictor and anger as mediator, yet this process worked in both conditions and not only in the incidental condition and lastly 3) in contrast to what Tausch and colleagues (2011) have demonstrated, we found no relation between contempt and violent collective action intentions. We will discuss these conclusions in more details.

Regarding the first mediation model with social identity as predictor and group efficacy as mediator, we found that this process is not limited to a type of disadvantage. In other words, an individual is willing to act in favor of the group, the moment when he is confronted with both a structural and an incidental inequality. However, this only applies to the individual who is committed to the ethnic subgroup. One could say that the ethnic identity is a good predictor of collective action at all times; whether or not group efficacy (or anger) is involved in the process. Remarkably, contempt also comes into the picture the moment perceived injustice is removed as covariate from the analysis. We presumed that both social identification and perceived injustice are good predictors of collective, and therefore we controlled for perceived injustice. The results showed that contempt had no relation with one of the variables and thus had no role in this process. Nonetheless, when perceived injustice was removed as covariate, contempt was significantly related to the Kurdish identity and almost significantly related to collective action. Due to the limitation of our study, we

therefore suggest areas for future research on the relation between ethnic identity, perceived injustice and more extreme emotions as contempt.

On the other hand, our research showed a negative relation between the European identity, the overarching identity, and collective action intentions in the structural condition. In contrast to the ethnic identity, the overarching does not unconditionally predicts collective action intentions and on top of that is negative in direction. This means that those individuals, who identify themselves with the overarching identity, are less willing to demonstrate when confronted with a structural inequality (e.g., status of the group within society). Furthermore, our study revealed that anger also plays a key role in this process. It seems that when individuals identify themselves with the overarching identity, they feel less angry and therefore are less inclined to demonstrate when structurally confronted with inequality. We believe that these individuals have accepted their (structurally unequal) situation in such a way that they do not feel compelled anymore to demonstrate. For them, their current situation is apparently sufficient and acceptable. Because the findings, with reference to the ethnic and overarching identity on collective action, are contradictory and raise more questions, we therefore encourage future research that addresses this aspect of identification and it effects on collective action in the context of possible mediators or moderators.

Concerning the second collective action process with perceived injustice as predictor and anger as mediator, the results showed that this process also works both in the structural and incidental condition. In other words, individuals who perceive injustice done to his group and on top of that experience anger, are ready to act as a group irrespective of the type of inequality (structural of incidental) done to him and his group.

In short, both mediation processes, starting with ethnic identity and perceived injustice (see Figure 1), can be seen as independent explanatory models of collective action. Both models provide an explanation as to why individuals demonstrate when confronted with both a

structural and an incidental inequality. Only those individuals with a strong identification with the overarching group react less emotional and show lesser willingness to collective action.

Lastly, the results concerning the three types of collective action partially confirmed our assumptions. As expected and in line with the study of Tausch and colleagues (2011), only anger and group efficacy are positively related to normative actions. Rational assessment and constructive emotions are apparently requirements for displaying normative behavior. With regards to non-normative non-violent actions, only anger was significantly related to this type of action. This does not correspond to the study of Tausch and colleagues (2011); according to their first study, group efficacy also relates (positively) to this type of action. However, in this study, group efficacy can only be linked to normative actions. Yet another difference in our results in comparison with that of Tausch and her colleagues' (2011) is the role of contempt. According to Tausch and colleagues (2011) contempt is only related to violent actions. However, our results showed that contempt is not related to violent actions (anger and perceived efficacy do not predict violent actions as well). In fact, contempt is negatively related to non-normative non-violent actions in the structural condition. In short, we demonstrated that the more the individual feels contemptuous when thinking about his structurally unfair status quo, the less likely he will show non-normative non-violent behavior. Even though the individual is lesser inclined to resort to non-violent actions, he is still not willing to resort to more extreme, violent methods.

The connection that one has with a social group can act as a buffer against violent acts; the bond that an individual has with his group can withhold him from resorting to violent actions, especially if the group does not approve of violent actions. In addition, violent actions are generally associated to unaccepted and uncivilized behavior; by using violent actions one could cause image degradation of the subgroup (e.g., being labeled as terrorists) and this may be another reason for not acting violently. Apart from these convictions, it is also not socially

appropriate to state that one will throw stones during a demonstration. Because of the contradiction in our findings, we encourage future researchers to conduct more studies on the three types of collective action and their respective predictors.

Throughout and after our research, we experienced several limitations. As we mentioned in our result section, our manipulation check was not quite successful as we hoped it would be. We were not able to construct items representing our condition well (structural versus incidental injustice). Regardless of the condition and it respective manipulation text, the respondent felt about the same amount of injustice done to him and his group. A possible explanation can be found in the respondent himself. The fact that the respondent belongs to a minority group can be seen as a cause, because being a member of a minority group can result in the belief that an incidental inequality is actually a confirmation that he and his subgroup are structurally the target of unfairness. For that reason, inequality is always felt and therefore it makes no difference whether the individual reads an article about structural or incidental injustice done to his subgroup; the amount of perceived injustice remains the same. One way of avoiding this limitation, is to use two groups of respondents of which each group is exposed to only one type of disadvantage. That way, one can avoid overlap in the manipulated variable and prevent failures in the manipulation.

Another shortcoming of this study is the use of snowball sampling. This was used for enlarging the amount of available respondents in a month time. However, this method only targets a (few) selected people and therefore it is questionable whether the sample is a good representation of the target population. Additionally, we wonder whether the sample can be generalized to other social groups, since this particular group has been demonstrating for over twenty years now and has ever since been the subject of repression. It is questionable whether the results are applicable to groups such as students who mostly demonstrate because of material interest (e.g., increased education costs).

A different weakness of this study lies in the method in which the survey was administrated. The survey was filled in a couple of months after the protest concerning the social inequality mentioned in the survey. At least 4 months were elapsed after the protest that was held because of a structural inequality and at least 6 months for the incidental inequality. Because of this time gap, the feelings regarding the inequality and the reasons for participation may have blurred; it is possible that this affected the results. Therefore it is recommendable to administrate surveys as soon as possible, to prevent occurrences of unclear feelings or reasoning for participating in collective actions.

A further failing is the use of recoded items in the surveys. The use of recoded items can be useful, since it prevents the respondents to easily answer or easily agree on a certain item. However, the items are as easily misunderstood; moreover, it makes the survey more complicated since the direction of the items is occasionally changed. From the very start we noticed this development and therefore we always checked these items and asked the respondents if they understood these items well. Our interference might have affected the results, in a way that the respondent unwillingly changed the rating of the item. Even though we were cautious in our way of questioning, we however cannot say for sure that by doing so we did not influence the respondent and therefore the results of this study.

During the completion of the survey, we also noticed that some of the items were formulated a bit complicated (e.g., using difficult words or long sentences). More than once, youngsters and elderly asked for explanation for some of these phrasing. We were at fault for not using simple and easily read items.

To our knowledge, this is the first research to consider the moderator, type of disadvantage, to be the main reason as to why sometimes social identity is a good predictor of collective action and at other times perceived injustice. Even though we did not found as much as supportive findings as we hoped, concerning the role of the moderator, our results

did show an interaction and a negative relation between identification with the overarching group and collective action intentions. This has important implications for work on identification with the subgroup and superordinate group at improving intra- and potentially intergroup relations as well. Further research of these and other possible moderators should provide more insight into achieving social equity among and between social groups.

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Appendix A

Manipulation text

Version 1: structural inequality

All across Europe, Kurds fully celebrate Newroz. Newroz - the spring festival among Kurds - is not only a celebration; it has a demonstrative character as well. During the preceding demonstration Kurds claim their right to an own identity.

"We are proud of our Kurdish identity." A statement you hear every Kurd say. In the Middle East, however, they agree on one thing: there are no Kurds and thus also no Kurdish identity. They have therefore no rights or saying regarding their situation.

For years, Europe silently has agreed with this view. The formal recognition of Kurdish identity has failed to materialize. Under the European Kurds, the indignation about the lack of formal recognition in Europe has increased. They will, as long there is no acknowledgment, continue draw the attention of Europeans to their rights.

To bring this matter to the attention, Kurds, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe celebrate their annual Newroz-feast. During this annual feast (and the preceding protest) Kurds claim their right to an own identity.

The future will tell whether Europe will put in some effort for the recognition of the Kurdish identity or whether they will keep themselves structurally aloof from this matter.

Version 2: Incidental inequality

The verdict was pronounced: the Kurdish television station ROJ TV is no longer airing in the Middle and Western Europe. The closure of ROJ TV in Europe has led to many demonstrations.

"We are proud of our Kurdish identity." A statement you hear every Kurd say. In the Middle East, however, they agree on one thing: there are no Kurds and thus also no Kurdish identity. They have therefore no rights or saying regarding their situation.

Although the EU has not formally recognized the Kurdish identity, the position of the European Kurds have been more favorable compared to the Kurds in the Middle East. Unlike the Kurds in Turkey, European Kurds can openly assert their identity and speak freely in their own language, without having to fear of being physical threatened and / or imprisoned by the government.

For years, Kurds, under the supervision of the European Union, have enjoyed a private television channel. Recently, however, in agreement with the EU, the Kurdish ROJ TV television station was taken off the air. To bring this matter to the attention, Kurds in Europe regularly have been protesting in all of Europe.

The future will tell whether the EU will respond to the ongoing protests, in response to the closure of ROJ TV, and whether this remains an incident.