Defining Germany's Military Engagement

Stuck Between Ambition and Reluctance

Bachelor Thesis

FACULTY OF BEHAVIOURAL, MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE

INSTITUT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER

SUPERVISORS:

Prof. Dr. Ramses A. Wessel

Prof. Dr. Sven B. Gareis

Christiane Suchanek

Public Administration (Special Emphasis: European Studies)

Submission Date: 12.08.2015

WESTFÄLISCHE
WILHELMS-UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNSTER

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

Declaration of Academic Honesty

I hereby declare that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the bachelor thesis in hand on the topic

Defining Germany's Military Engagement. Stuck between Ambition and Reluctance

is the result of my own independent work and does not make use of other sources or materials than those referenced and that quotations and paraphrases obtained from the work of others are indicated as such.

Coesfeld, 12.08.2015

Contents

List of Tables

Abbreviations

EU	European Union
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MTF	Maritime Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTC	National Transitional Council
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
UCK	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës
UN	United Nations
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

1. Introduction

Germany's foreign policy is continuously in the centre of scientific research trying to identify and formulate the underlying policy conception. This aims to enhance the comprehension and predictability of the Federal Republic's decisions in international politics. In particular decisions about the deployment or refusal of troops have been examined several times as there seems to be no clear explanatory pattern for this (Milosevic, 2012, pp. 1-3). However, different role conceptions have been developed which all claim to describe the foreign policy style of the Berlin Republic, though they range from Germany as a civilian power to Germany as a leading power (Maull, 1990; Mützenich, 2015). The only consensus about Germany's foreign policy seems to be that it changed after the unification (Maull, 2011, p. 97).

After Germany's reunification in 1990, political stakeholders had to redefine Germany's foreign policy goals. With new conflicts and dangers arising, the Berlin Republic had to develop its very own way to gain international influence without scaring its international partners with a too straightforward– thus as hegemony striving interpretable – foreign policy. (Janes, 2009, p. 294)

One of the most used role conceptions to describe Germany's foreign policy is the aforementioned civilian power-conception by Hanns Maull which was developed to describe Bonn's foreign policy strategy during the Cold War (Maull, 2014, p. 121). This approach has been refined and is still commonly used in foreign policy contexts (as in Kappel, 2014). Basically, it describes the multilateral, value-orientated foreign policy style of German governments. More specifically, it claims that the Federal Republic is only willing to use military power in an extreme emergency - all civil means have to be absolutely exhausted. (Maull, 2011, p. 100; 2014, pp. 143-144)

Over the last two decades Germany has combined its civilian power-conception, its foreign policy ambitions and the expectations of its international partners. Due to its greater political and economic weight, but also because of its regained sovereignty, Germany was expected to shoulder more responsibility. Security issues such as the Srebrenica massacre (1995) and the Kosovo conflict (1998/1999), the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, and recently arising threats by the Islamic State are just a few examples demanding a transparent and comprehensible German strategy. Nevertheless, the domestic and external debates about Berlin's foreign policy attitude seem to state that there is no clear continuity in the state's decisions and regarding the civilian power-concept, Germany lacks behind its potential and moral claims because of its military reluctance (Hacke, 2011). Additionally, there has been developed a phrase for the German habit to pay for military efforts

instead of actually contributing troops: the "chequebook diplomacy" (Swistek, 2012, S. 84). German politicians claimed that Germany is ready to assume more responsibility, but in contrast to this ambitious statement, the Federal Republic has denied to engage in joint operations in the past signalling military restraint. Hence the deployment of German military depends on specific circumstances. (Hofmann, 2014)

For its international partners, it seems to be unclear in what kind of situations they can count with German military contribution. Due to Germany's integration and influence in international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN) it is an important issue for other governments to understand and predict Germany's decisions as joint military efforts require reliable associates. Therefore, the key question is:

> **Under which conditions is Germany willing to deploy its military forces within the antagonism of ambition and reluctance?**

In order to answer this research question, the bachelor thesis will examine cases with and without German military participation in order to identify the decisive factors for the deployment of troops. Because of the reunification and its implications, there are only cases after 1990 included into the research. Within the study, Maull's civilian power theory is used as a guideline in order to explain foreign policy decisions. The concept provides a useful framework to identify possible changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation.

The comparative case study will be merged in a general overview of the most significant factors. This approach enables to specify the conditions in which German troops are deployed to international operations, thus providing a better comprehension and prediction of future German military participation or its refusal.

2. Theory: The civilian power-concept by Hanns Maull

Germany's foreign policy attitude has been subject to a number of studies from which derived several concepts about its underlying role conception. These provide perceptions about the general foreign policy orientation, guidelines which reflect the identity of a state and beyond that, specific assumptions for appropriate foreign policy actions. Role conceptions are not only of scientific, but of practical relevance for stakeholders as they help to understand and predict decisions of actors and states respectively. (Maull, 2011, pp. 98-99) Moreover, role conceptions illustrate a state's self-image, but also expectations of external actors about its behaviour (Maull, 2010, p. 52).

The debate about Germany's foreign policy conception has developed several theories about its foreign policy orientation. They vary from the view of the Berlin Republic as a civilian power (Maull, 1990), as a "Mittlermacht" which means a mediating power (Speckmann, 2006), to the description of Germany as a leading power (Mützenich, 2015). However, the most prominent approach in international relations theory is the civilian-power concept by Hanns Maull. The detailed description and the amount of studies conducted about this conception provide a suitable ground for a bachelor thesis, whereas other theories about Germany's foreign policy behaviour are not comparably well elaborated.

His first essay on this topic dates back to the year 1990 when Maull applied the civilian power term of François Duchêne to Germany and Japan for the first time (Maull, 1990; 2014, p. 121). It constituted a contrast to the statements of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer who predicted that the united Germany will reorientate towards power politics and jeopardize the international status quo (Maull, 2014, pp. 123-124). Their realist assumptions that the Berlin Republic would pursue a great power policy have been proven wrong when the united Germany further worked towards institutionalising international politics instead of striving for a hegemonic position. The civilian power concept won broad recognition when Volker Rittberger (2001) published a study that constructivist approaches were comparably better (though not exhaustively) able to explain Germany's political behaviour than traditional realist or liberal approaches. (Maull, 2014, pp. 132-135)

The civilian power concept identifies different guiding principles for Germany's foreign policy than Waltz and Mearsheimer assumed. Maull defines three basics of German foreign policy actions:

1) **"Never alone":** Germany's foreign policy has a distinctive multilateral and Western orientation. Its most important allies are the United States of America and France reflecting also the most significant multilateral institutions in which Germany acts: the NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Germany is strongly engaged in the United Nations and its Security Council which underlines its opposition of unilateral actions.

2) **"Never again":** Germany defines itself as part of the Western community of values. It has committed itself to a value based foreign policy in order to stress its rejection of its National Socialist and militaristic past. This includes the active promotion of certain western values such as international cooperation, peace, democracy and human rights.

3) **"Politics before force":** Due to fundamental reservations against the military instrument of power, Germany only uses its military forces if all civilian possibilities

of conflict resolution (e.g. mediation and economic sanctions) are exhausted. Because of this so-called 'culture of military restraint' military force is used only as 'ultima ratio' (last resort).

(Maull, 2011, pp. 100-101)

Obviously, the three principles do not only provide a descriptive, but also a normative dimension for Germany's external policies. This additionally includes solidarity with the alliances, as well as the central maxims predictability, reliability and trust in German foreign policy which stress the rejection of power politics. (Maull, 2011, p. 103)

Several studies identified Germany as the country best matching the ideal type of a civilian power (Maull, 2014, p. 132). Nevertheless, Maull found indicators for the erosion of this conception in German foreign policies. Foreign policy decisions are increasingly based on short-term preferences or opportunistic electoral calculations and further lack of proactive, innovative elements. Moreover, the reluctance and refusal of active contributions to international operations may be interpreted as a run from responsibility. This trend damages the persuasiveness and political binding force of the civilian power concept and adds to the impression that the German foreign policy has become 'disorientated'. (Maull, 2011, pp. 97-98, 116-117)

In order to examine the conditions under which Germany is willing to deploy its military forces, the civilian power concept gives specific analytical categories (Figure 1, Annex). Nonetheless, as there are clues of erosion of the concept, one sub-question for the thesis asks how well the civilian-power-concept by Maull still describes the conditions under which Germany is willing to engage militarily. Merging the main research question with Maull's theoretical approach leads to the main hypothesis which reads:

> **The civilian power concept by Maull and its principles of German foreign policy actions still adequately describe the conditions under which Germany is willing to deploy its armed forces.**

3. Research Methodology

In order to reveal the conditions under which Germany is willing to deploy its military forces, a comparative case study will be used as the research design of this thesis. The analysis of the international operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon aims to detect the crucial factors for Germany's decision to contribute or to refuse its military forces for international actions.

A comparative case study has the advantages that it compares different decision procedures and conditions of military engagement over time. This can be conducted as a multi-level-analysis which includes several actors. The juxtaposition of different cases with and without active engagement offers the opportunity to identify key variables. Therefore, two decisions of military engagement (Kosovo and Lebanon) are contrasted with two cases where the deployment of troops was rejected (Iraq and Libya).

At the same time the drawbacks of this methodology are kept in mind: a limited set of cases always means limited explanatory power. In order to simplify reality into scientific studies this disadvantage is unavoidable. The inclusion of more cases may provide a broader and more exact picture of the decisive variables, but this would exceed the scope of this thesis. Still, a comparison of four grand decisions provides a sensible ground for the evaluation of Germany's willingness to use military force.

The analysed cases are located in a time frame since 1990 as the unification of Germany changed the main features of the Federal Republic and its self-definition. It also marks the achievement of full sovereignty with the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" (Two plus Four Treaty, Article 7). Furthermore, Maull's civilian power concept was derived from Germany's foreign policy during the Cold War (Maull, 1990). That stresses the question whether the conception still correctly describes Germany today.

The choice of the included cases can be explained in connection with the domestic and international reactions to Germany's decisions. Figure 2 in the Annex summarizes the selected cases of this thesis. To start with, Germany's engagement in Kosovo since 1999 was the first great active engagement of the Federal Republic's military forces after the unification. The controversial participation at the Operation Allied Force (OAF) and the Kosovo Force mission (KFOR) is even called a turning point in German foreign policy. (Milosevic, 2012, p. 5; Hamilton, 2014, pp. 7-8)

The disputed Iraq war and the Operation Iraqi Freedom enjoyed great public attention in Germany and around the globe as it was not legitimized by the UN Security Council. Germany's refusal to participate is broadly discussed as it may have damaged the diplomatic relations with the USA. (Milosevic, 2012, pp. 5-6; Chitalkar & Malone, 2013, p. 1)

In 2011, Germany abstained from the vote of the UN resolution 1973 on Libya which provided the legal basis for the Operation Unified Protector (OUP). This contested decision was criticized to have harmed Berlin's reliability, solidarity with the alliance and diplomatic relations with the United States. Moreover, it sparked a debate about Germany's reluctance to defend human rights in the name of the "Responsibility to Protect". (Hacke, 2011)

Germany's military engagement at the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2006 did not spark such great public debates, although it can be labelled as the breaking of a taboo. The Middle East was seen as a taboo zone for Germany's military forces because of the special relations to Israel. However, the decision making process ran relatively smoothly compared to the aforementioned cases. (Brummer, 2013, p. 105)

In order to distil the analysis down to the crucial factors for Germany's willingness to use military force, a number of independent variables have been selected for the comparative case studies. Despite the applicability of the civilian power conception, the use of compensating measures (also called "chequebook diplomacy") will be examined (Swistek, 2012, p. 84). Furthermore, the influence of certain actors is included in the independent variables. The results will then be summarized in a table providing an overview of the factors. Figure 3 in the Annex gives a complete overview of the operationalization. This approach allows drawing a conclusion about the relevant conditions for Germany's decision to use its troops and whether the civilian power-conception by Maull is still valid.

4. Comparative Case Study

4.1. The Kosovo-War

4.1.1. History of the Conflict

The origin of the Kosovo conflict can be dated back to the year 1389 when the legend of the Battle of Kosovo was born. This legend was instrumentalised to underline the belonging of Kosovo to Serbia by the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in 1989 – the 600th anniversary of the battle. At the same time, rumours were fuelled that the Albanian majority (representing 81.6% of the Kosovan population) prepared genocide of the Kosovo-Serbians (counting only for 9.9% of the population). Milošević used this worries and the growing nationalism in the population to suppress Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. Furthermore, discrimination against the Kosovo-Albanians got worse since the mid-1980s. (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, pp. 91-93) Albanian was abolished as official language and Albanians were removed from all public offices, the education and health system. However, the situation remained mostly peaceful as the Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova organised an Albanian shadow state in Kosovo. A parallel state structure was installed (though without an own police system) which was tolerated by the Serbian government. Rugova tried unsuccessfully to awaken international attention for the problems of his country before violence would break out. His attempts ultimately failed when the Dayton negotiations in 1995 did not pay attention to the Kosovan situation at all. (von Krause, 2013, p. 248)

The Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UCK), which means Kosovo Liberation Army, fought forcibly for Kosovo's independence. Since 1996 some kind of guerrilla warfare was going on between the UCK and Serbian forces (von Krause, 2013, p. 248). The breakdown of the Albanian state in 1997 provided the paramilitary organisation with cheap military equipment which contributed to the aggravation of the conflict (Maull, 2000, p. 2).

Due to excessive violence committed by both parties of the civil war, the conflict gained international attention in 1998 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the intense fightings and established an arms embargo against Yugoslavia including the Kosovo. Nevertheless, the measures proved to be ineffective. (von Krause, 2013, p. 249)

An agreement between the Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Milošević in June 1998 raised hopes of an ending of the fights. Indeed, the Serbian forces reduced their activities, but this was utilised by the UCK which conquered around 40% of the Kosovan territories after that. This in turn provoked the Serbian army to crack down on the UCK including the purposeful destruction of villages and expulsion of civilians in order to trace the insurgents. (von Krause, 2013, p. 249)

In September 1998, an increasing number of refugees (around 265.000) were raising worries about a humanitarian catastrophe in the upcoming winter as around 50.000 of them were camping outside. As a reaction, the UNSC's resolution 1199 affirmed the arms embargo and called upon the realization of the Yeltsin-Milošević-agreement urging a peaceful solution of the conflict. The resolution threatened with further measures to restore peace and security in the region in case of non-compliance, but the Russian president formally declared that this does not include forceful interventions as the resolution was not based on Chapter VII of the UN-Charter. His declaration referred to the NATO's examination of military intervention options. (Maull, 2000, p. 2; von Krause, 2013, p. 250)

The deterioration of the refugee problem also prompted the NATO to send an "Activation Warning" that demands the member states to convey their possible military resources for a potential military operation. This threat was unsuccessful as two days later on 26 September 1998 Serbian forces shot at two villages killing 18 people. (von Krause, 2013, p. 252)

In October progress was made with the Holbrooke-Milošević-agreement. Milošević made several concessions including the fulfilment of resolution 1199, the permission of the NATO air observation Eagle Eye and authorising the OSCE to install the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 95; von Krause, 2013, p. 252) At the same time, the United States pressured a NATO Activation Order in order to corroborate their bargaining position towards Milošević. This order would have meant that

the NATO General Secretary had the power to start a military operation. The then recently elected German Chancellor Schröder explained to President Clinton in Washington that Germany would in principle support air raids for humanitarian reasons, but due to the Germany's historical burden, it would not engage militarily – especially not without a UNSC mandate. Although Clinton seemed to agree at that point in time, Berlin was pushed under extreme time pressure from Washington to authorise the Activation order shortly thereafter. In an extraordinary meeting of the Bundestag on 16 October 1998, the parliament adopted the motion of air operations in Kosovo with an overwhelming majority of 500 in favour, 62 against and 18 abstentions. (von Krause, 2013, pp. 253-254)

After the UNSC resolution 1203 in October 1998 and the Holbrooke-Milošević-agreement, the situation in Kosovo improved, but the events in 1999 transformed the conflict into an international war. First, the KVM found 45 dead people in and around the village Račak in January 1999. Even before a thorough forensic examination, the leader of the KVM, the American William Walker, declared it a massacre committed by Serbian government security forces. The press release gained great public attention, though later forensic examinations raised doubts about the version of Ambassador Walker. Anyhow, due to the similarities with the Srebrenica genocide 1995, Walker's statement had great political impact. Washington now turned to press for the renewal of the Activation Order which implied the start of international military actions. Germany, by contrast, still preferred a political solution. In return for the renewal of the Activation Order on 30 January 1999, Germany initiated the Rambouillet conference. (Maull, 2000, p. 3; von Krause, 2013, pp. 261-262)

The Rambouillet conference, where Germany was not part of but diplomatically very active, started on 6 February 1999. Core issue was a non-violent conflict resolution between Yugoslavia and the Kosovan-Albanians. The negotiations failed on 22 and 23 March as the Yugoslavian delegation did not accept the draft treaty. It included a far-reaching Kosovan autonomy with possible future political independence. Moreover, Annex B of the draft would have harmed territorial integrity and sovereignty as it allowed the NATO almost unrestricted freedom of movement on Yugoslavian ground. (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 97; von Krause, 2013, pp. 262-263)

The NATO thereupon started Mission Allied Force on 24 March 1999 – without a UNSC mandate. And yet, Germany contributed 14 Tornadoes aircrafts which flew more than 500 operations including more than 200 times of weapons deployment until the end of the aerial war on 10 June 1999. (von Krause, 2013, pp. 269-270)

Diplomatically, Berlin played an important role for the final conflict resolution. Foreign minister and Vice-Chancellor Joschka Fischer proposed the so-called "Fischer Plan" proposing a conflict resolution strategy in Kosovo. To promote his ideas, Fischer included many

international institutions such as the EU, NATO and the UN. Many aspects of his co-operative multilateral approach were eventually adopted in the peace contract. (Maull, 2000, p. 4; von Krause, 2013, pp. 270-271)

The subsequent UNSC resolution 1244 based on Chapter VII of the Charter legitimized among others the erection of international security forces in Kosovo. This was performed by the NATO with its KFOR. The Bundestag passed the motion for a German participation at KFOR on 11 June 1999 with a great majority of 505 votes in favour, 24 against and 11 abstentions. (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 100; von Krause, 2013, pp. 273-274)

Although the war officially ended in June 1999, the situation in Kosovo remains unstable. Even today Germany is greatly engaged in the post-war democratization and peace build-ing process in Kosovo by contributing the largest national KFOR contingent. Sustainable peace for all ethnicities in Kosovo, however, seems still out of reach. (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 107; Hamilton, 2014, p. 14)

4.1.2. Application of the Civilian Power Concept

Germany engaged in both missions: the non-legitimate OAF and the legitimate KFOR. Keeping in mind the great time pressure Washington exerted on Germany, it is question-able if the shortly before elected Red-Green government could have decided in a different way without affronting an important ally (Maull, 2000, p. 11). Chancellor Schröder argued that non-participation at the mission would have greatly harmed Germany's reputation and importance. Furthermore, he saw the operation necessary to prevent a humanitarian ca-tastrophe. (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998, pp. 23135, 23138) Foreign minister Fischer ex-plained that Germany needs to prove its reliability and solidarity which implies an active role. (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999, p. 3564) Their arguments are in line with the "never alone"-aspect of the civilian power concept, showing solidarity with the alliance and multi-lateralism as the key determinants (von Krause, 2013, p. 255). This part of the civilian power concept can be found again in the way the German diplomacy tried to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way: the Fischer plan was presented and discussed within several multilateral institutions (von Krause, 2013, p. 271).

The debates about the military operation, especially the moral arguments that were pre-sented to the public demonstrate a strong need for moral legitimization. Political leaders tried to avoid naming the conflict a "war" in the beginning which illustrates the German re-luctance to use force. Additionally, strong depictions were used to promote public support for the mission. The most famous example for this is the so-called "Operation Horseshoe". On 8 April 1999, German minister of defence Scharping presented a plan by the Serbian government for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo that intended to herd together Kosovo-

Albanians in a horseshoe formation. The actual existence of this plan is strongly questioned. Yet, it underlines the need for moral legitimization with humanitarian reasons. (von Krause, 2013, pp. 266-268)

Fischer's statement "Never again Auschwitz" also belongs to this category of normative arguments and emphasises the rejection of Germany's National Socialist past, but also the changed perception of force which evolved since the Gulf War 1991 and climaxed in Bosnia 1995 (Maull, 2000, p. 5; Stark Urrestarazu, 2015, p. 177). This change embraced the German public as well. They supported the NATO's aerial warfare and Germany's participation in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe (Milosevic, 2012, pp. 44-45). The strong accentuation of norms and beliefs in the context of Germany's military engagement in Kosovo thus count to the "never again"-principle of the civilian power concept. Material interests did not matter for the decision to deploy troops (Maull, 2000, p. 17).

"Politics before force" can also be recognized in the German preference to the initiate the Rambouillet conference rather than using force. When the deployment of troops was finally put on the agenda, the missing legitimacy of the OAF was noticed by politicians, but humanitarian goals were given preference over further efforts to convince the UNSC (von Krause, 2013, pp. 255-257). In other words: "never again" was chosen over "politics before force". Nevertheless, Maull states that the "normatively charged political rhetoric during the Kosovo war reflected how unsure the German government felt" (2000, 21). This indicates tensions between the culture of military restraint and other core norms of the civilian power concept such as the defence of human rights which the governmental elite did not unequivocally solve during the Kosovo conflict (Maull, 2000, p. 21).

4.2. The Iraq-War

4.2.1. History of the Conflict

The history of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which Germany did not participate, finds its very beginning in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Many countries including Germany expressed their full solidarity with the United States of America, and the attacks were interpreted as being directed against all western societies. A military reaction was perceived unavoidable and legitimate leading to the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Germany among others actively participated in this operation. The mission aimed at the eradication of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a root of terror and managed to overthrow the regime still in 2001. (Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, p. 112; Palm, 2011, p. 43)

However, US-president Bush did not declare the end of war on terror, but concentrated now on North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the 'axis of evil'. In his State of the Nation Speech delivered on 29 January 2002, Bush explained that these countries jeopardized world peace with their armament strategy and by allying with terrorists. (Palm, 2011, p. 43) Special emphasis was laid on the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein who was accused to support Al-Qaida, the terrorist organisation responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, p. 113). More frequently, there were indications that America prepared a war against Iraq. German foreign minister Fischer distanced himself from Bush's 'axis of the evil'-metaphor in an interview and explained his dissatisfaction with US-policies. (Fischer, 2002; Staack, 2004, S. 206-207).

In August 2002, US vice president Richard Cheney demanded a forceful regime change in Iraq. As a reaction to this, Chancellor Schröder stated that Germany would not participate in a war against the Iraq without or even with a legal UN mandate. On earlier occasions, the German chancellor and the foreign minister already expressed their opposition to a military operation in Iraq. This issue became very dominant in Schröder's election campaign in 2002. (Palm & Schulz, 2011, p. 81) After the German federal elections and Schröder's re-election in September 2002, the tensions with the US government exacerbated. The White House presented its National Security Strategy that legitimized preventive wars without UNSC mandates if great danger was perceived. This so-called Bush doctrine implicitly undermined the UNSC's authority and international law which was greatly criticized by Germany. (Staack, 2004, S. 209-2010; Milosevic, 2012, p. 85)

An important stage marks the UNSC resolution 1441 that issued an ultimatum for Iraq to continue the UN weapons inspections and to reveal its weapons programmes. Though it threatened with further measures in case of non-compliance, the resolution did not legitimise the use of military force. This aspect is mainly owed to France's, Russia's and Great Britain's engagement to prevent unilateral military operations by America. At this point in time, Germany was not member of the Security Council. (Staack, 2004, S. 210)

Since January 2003, Berlin formed a coalition with France against a military mission in Iraq. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, both governments affirmed their aim of peaceful conflict management. This was also supported by Russia that joined the German-French position forming the 'axis Paris-Berlin-Moscow' (Staack, 2004, S. 212). On the one hand, 11 out of 15 UNSC members supported their international coalition against the Iraq war. On the other hand, a deep division occurred among the European states as Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic declared their solidarity and willingness to engage in Iraq in the so-called Letter of the Eight. Their position was shared by the Vilnius group as well. (Aßmann, 2004, p. 2) The European Heads of States declared on 17 February 2003 that a war in

Iraq would only be the last resort if all diplomatic means failed. In line with Russia, they called for more effective UN weapons inspections limited in time. Poland and other Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries disagreed and backed Washington's direction. (Staack, 2004, S. 213)

Although UN weapons inspector Hans Blix did not find definite proof of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, US secretary of state Colin Powell presented evidence that Iraq possessed these arms. He asked the UNSC to pass a resolution if Iraq did not meet the disarmament obligations presented in resolution 1441. Powell's speech did not convince the Security Council and the presented evidence was criticized to be fictitious. (Security Council, 2003)

Thereafter, President Bush declared diplomacy had failed. A regime change would be inevitable to stop a regime supporting terrorists and threatening friends and allies with mass destruction weapons. The US administration was not willing to make concessions anymore or to wait for an UN mandate which resulted in the ultimatum issued to Saddam Hussein on 17 March 2003. Hussein was granted 48 hours to leave Iraq; otherwise the Iraq's disarmament would be enforced with military means. When he did not retreat, the Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on 20 March 2003. America, Great Britain and a coalition of the willing invaded and obtained quickly control. April the 9th marks the fall of Baghdad and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. On 1 May the combat operations formally ended. (Palm, 2011, pp. 44-45; Milosevic, 2012, p. 85) However, the region could not be stabilised and US-troops were present there up to 2011. Still today, violence and tensions between the Iraqi ethnicities shape the everyday live in Iraq. (bpb, 2013)

4.2.2. Application of the Civilian Power Concept

Berlin's rejection of the Operation Iraqi Freedom is special since it was the first time that a German federal government opposed the United States in a foreign policy issue of such importance (Staack, 2004, S. 203). From a legal point of view, Germany's unwillingness to deploy troops is unproblematic as the military operation lead by America was not legitimized by the Security Council. Politically, the interpretations of the decision and its implications vary. This becomes even more evident by applying the civilian power conception to the decision.

Already at an early stage, Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer expressed their rejection of a military operation in Iraq. Fischer argued that the current containment strategy worked despite Saddam Hussein being a dictator. Secondly, there is no evidence for a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Quaida. Thirdly, the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan needed to be settled before starting another military operation. (Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, pp. 116-117)   Furthermore, the German government

feared that a war would lead to greater instability, the aggravation of the security situation in the region, the loss of coherence within the international anti-terror-coalition and the complication of the peace process between Israel and Palestine (Staack, 2004, S. 212).

Fischer's statement that allies were not satellites and alliance did not mean unquestioningly allegiance, does not mean the termination of cooperation with the United States, but the aspiration of collaboration on an equal basis (Fischer, 2002; Staack, 2004, S. 227). The diplomatic attitude especially of Chancellor Schröder was nevertheless counterproductive for a multilateral conflict resolution as he rejected German participation with or without a legitimising UN resolution on an early stage. This predetermination without even waiting for the result of the UN weapons inspection greatly limited Germany's multilateral bargaining position. A compromise with the United States was now impossible. At the same time, Schröder implicitly ignored the United Nation's monopoly on legitimate use of force. He also impeded a common position within the European Union that was separated over this topic. (Palm & Schulz, 2011, p. 82; Milosevic, 2012, pp. 89-90, 94) Therefore, the norm "never alone" in the sense of active multilateral efforts is harmed by the predetermination of the German chancellor, even though the government strove for a peaceful conflict resolution within the United Nations together with partner states such as France (Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, p. 122).

Moreover, Schröder was accused to have used the issue for election purposes. The great majority of the German population stood against military operations in Iraq and eventually Schröder was re-elected in September 2002. That leads to the assumption that his position was determined by domestic power calculations (Palm & Schulz, 2011, pp. 81-82).

Turning to the aspect "never again", there are two sides of the medal. Hacke (2003, 9) states that Germany ignored its past by ignoring the mission's goal of liberating the Iraqi people from Dictator Saddam Hussein. However, the USA have explicitly explained beforehand that they would overthrow Hussein even without a legitimating resolution (Palm, 2011, p. 46). Neglecting this aspect, Germany would have ignored its value based foreign policy and its devotion to use military force as the ultima and not the prima ratio.

The Bundestag did not have great influence on the Iraq-decision as the chancellor excluded the deployment of troops, thus making a parliamentary vote unnecessary. The debates within the parliament show a cross-party consensus about seeking a peaceful conflict resolution. Hence the decision of the government was endorsed, though the opposition claimed that it was made out of power calculations and would impair the transatlantic relations. (Milosevic, 2012, pp. 106-108)

The rhetoric used to defend the rejection is compatible with the civilian power concept which finds its expression in Schröder's statement that Germany has the historical duty to

promote alternatives to war (Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, p. 119). At the same time, the chancellor's early predetermination of a categorical rejection hints for a unilateral, domestically orientated decision not compatible with the elements of Maull's approach. Indications for the application of the chequebook diplomacy can be found in granting overflight rights or the relief of American forces through Germans guarding American military installations (Staack, 2004, S. 211). Furthermore, wounded forces of the Iraq mission were treated at Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre in Germany and the German airfield in Ramstein was used for transport (Korzeniewski & Bochniak, 2011, pp. 72-74).

Concerning the Operation Iraqi Freedom, the civilian power conception can only inconclusively explain Germany's military reluctance. It seems that internal electoral concerns determined the decision that lead to the usage of compensatory means, although civilian power rhetoric was used. In other words, Germany did not deploy its troops because it would have been an unpopular decision. Berlin opposed important partners, but it managed to largely 'normalise' its damaged transatlantic relations afterwards which reiterates Germany's adherence to multilateralism, but also its emancipation from America (Schneider & von Trott, 2011, p. 54). Even though Germany also gained appreciation for its position during the Iraq war, the diplomatic measures of the federal government stay controversial – especially in the light of the civilian power concept (Staack, 2004, S. 220, 227).

4.3. The Libyan-Conflict

4.3.1. History of the Conflict

After the insurgencies in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February 2011, the democratic uprisings spread to Libya mid-February 2011. The protests escalated after the human rights activist Fathi Terbil was arrested in Libya's largest city Benghazi on 16 February 2011. Even after Terbil's release, the riot continued and spread all over the country. (Gerhold, 2014, p. 18)

The conflict aggravated quickly. During the 'Days of Rage' after 18 February, Libyan forces shot several demonstrators and used warplanes against the riots according to unverified reports. The Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi named the protestors 'rats' and 'cockroaches' and announced a bloodbath if the rebels did not lay down their arms (Gerhold, 2014, pp. 18-19; Harnisch, 2015, p. 100).

While the Arab League condemned the violence and encouraged the rebels, the European foreign ministers were divided over the issue. France and Italy plead in favour of conciliating policies as they had some diplomatic relations to the Gaddafi regime. In con-

trast to them, Germany advocated calling upon Gaddafi to renounce the use of force against the demonstrators. In the UN Security Council, Berlin urged for a quick adoption of resolution 1970 in the UNSC. Adopted on 26 February, it demanded to end the violence and included economic sanctions, the activation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), an arms embargo, travel bans and the freezing of Libyan assets abroad. (United Nations Security Council, 2011a; Rinke, 2011, pp. 45-46)

As the violence in Libya continued, Germany promoted the suspension of Libya from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) which was realized on 1 March 2011. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, a member of this Council has been excluded. (Gerhold, 2014, p. 22; Harnisch, 2015, p. 100)

Shortly after the adoption of resolution 1970 on 27 February, the French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie was dismissed due to her support of the Tunisian regime. With her resignation, the French government changed its attitude and publicly supported the Libyan opposition that meanwhile took over control in East Libya. (Rinke, 2011, p. 46; Gerhold, 2014, p. 22)

In the rebel stronghold Benghazi, the insurgents formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) on 5 March 2011 and claimed to be the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. On 8 March, a delegate of the NTC visited the European Parliament requesting the formal recognition of the NTC and the establishment of a no-fly zone without the deployment of ground troops (Rinke, 2011, p. 46). Due to Gaddafi's counteroffensive, the demands became more urgent as the regime troops reconquered important cities (e.g. Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega). France and Great Britain now preferred active military support of the transitional council including the delivery and financing of weapons for the rebels by third countries. Furthermore, they announced assistance through military advisers and drill instructors. (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 103-104, 107)

On 10 March, French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron addressed the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy in a letter naming the NTC the voice of the Libyan people and announcing military operations if the UNSC gave its approval. On the same day, the French president, unilaterally and without consulting his own foreign minister or international partners, formally recognised the transitional council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 104-105)

In the NATO, London and Paris promoted the establishment of a no-fly zone and reached the compromise that a NATO mission would be realized under a legal UNSC mandate and if the Arabian States supported it. Under these premises Berlin approved the Initiating Directive within the NATO Council for the planning of a military operation. The decision was unproblematic because such a Directive only constitutes the preparation of options

and not the actual deployment of troops. (Rinke, 2011, p. 49; Harnisch, 2015, pp. 105-106)

Germany and America expressed their scepticism about a military intervention. On the G8 summit in Brussels on 14 and 15 March, Germany presented its doubts about the effectiveness of military means and requested stricter economic sanctions. The United States still promoted the endorsement of the Arabian States preventing the impression that the no-fly zone constitutes a Western solo action. When the support of Arab countries was assured, Washington joined the French and British proposition and pushed forward an authorising resolution in the UNSC. (Rinke, 2011, pp. 48-49)

On 17 March 2011 resolution 1973 was adopted in the Security Council. This resolution was based on chapter VII of the UN-Charta. Among others, it authorised in paragraph 4 "all necessary measures" to protect the Libyan civilians and in the establishment of a no-fly zone in paragraph 6 to 12 (United Nations Security Council, 2011b). Germany, Russia, Brazil, China and India abstained from the vote (Stahl, 2012, p. 588).

Based on the resolution, France, Great Britain and the United States launched military operations including air and missile strikes on 19 March 2011. Their operations were merged within the NATO's Operation Unified Protector starting on 31 March in which Germany refused to deploy its forces. (Stahl, 2012, p. 588) Even though several western countries contributed to the mission and supported the rebels, it took the insurgent fighters until August to conquer the capital Tripoli. Gaddafi did not surrender, but urged his followers to strike back. The revolt advanced, so that only Sirte and Sabha were yet governed by the Gaddafi-regime at the end of August 2011. Still, the poorly organised opposition could not conquer Sirte until 20 October 2011. On the very same day the NTC announced that Gaddafi was killed. The Operation Unified Protector terminated on 31 October 2011 – around seven months after its beginning. (Gerhold, 2014, pp. 24-28)

4.3.2. Application of the Civilian Power Concept

Germany's abstention in the UNSC and refusal to deploy any troops to the following operation has been broadly discussed. It was the first time that Germany voted differently than all its NATO- and EU-partners in the Security Council (Rinke, 2011, p. 44). The main criticism was that Berlin dismissed multilateralism, isolated itself internationally and disappointed its most important partners the USA and France (Stahl, 2012, pp. 593-594).

It seems questionable, why Berlin refused its vote and engagement, although the resolution was legitimized by the UNSC. At the beginning of the conflict, Germany participated as an agenda-setter on the international stage. Already on 11 February 2011, Westerwelle called on the UNSC to support the democratic struggles in Northern Africa and campaigned for a condemnation of the Gaddafi-regime within the EU. At this point in time,

France still preferred an appeasement approach. Furthermore, Berlin urged for a quick adoption of resolution 1970, the activation of the ICC and the suspension of Libya from the Human Rights Council. On the one hand, these actions illustrate Germany's multilateral engagement. This is in turn mitigated by the fact that the inclusion of the ICC and the exclusion from the UNHRC virtually mean jettisoning a negotiated settlement with Dictator Gaddafi (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 99-102) That Germany never actively conducted mediation between the conflict parties themselves contributed to the failure of a political solution and inflicts the credibility of the "politics before force"-aspect (Harnisch, 2015, p. 121).

Foreign Minister Westerwelle defended the abstention arguing, though he supports the political aims of the resolution 1973, a military intervention in Libya holds massive dangers and risks. In his point of view, stricter economic and financial sanctions were needed instead of force. Nevertheless, Germany would not abandon its international partners, but shoulder responsibility with greater air force contribution in a different mission in order to relieve its partner's forces. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011a, pp. 11137-11139) Chancellor Merkel used the same arguments in her speech in front of the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011b, p. 11251). Thus, both actors made use of arguments deriving from the civilian power concept.

Problematic was the highly unclear situation in Libya, hence the necessity to intervene. Some studies show that it is hard to estimate the actual numbers of casualties, but there were indeed information that Gaddafi's forces tried to save the civilians' lives (Kuperman, 2013, p. 111). It is questionable if the operation was legitimately based on the assumption of a humanitarian emergency and an imminent genocide alluding to the "Responsibility to Protect"-norm (Pradetto, 2014, p. 78). This corroborates the doubts that the intervention would have been necessary to protect civilians and constitutes a legitimate military action in accordance with "never again" and "politics before force".

The German population viewed a military operation in Libya ambivalently: surveys in April and May 2011 revealed that 71% of the respondents advocated an active regime change strategy for Libya, whereas 80% of the interviewees rejected a militarily enforced overthrow. As state elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate came up, some critics claim that the German government abstained for internal policy reasons. Against this reproach speaks that Merkel assured the British government the German vote if the resolution 1973 risked failing. It indicates that the political aims of the resolution were of higher priority to the government than electoral calculations, although it cannot be denied that the decision was in line with the broad public. (Rinke, 2011, p. 52; Harnisch, 2015, p. 113)

Critics say that Berlin could have voted in favour of the resolution 1973 and thus proved its loyalty without contributing to the following intervention. However, such a behaviour would have also – probably even greater – harmed the German reputation as the Bundeswehr possessed the AWAC and naval squadrons needed for the NATO operation (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 117-118). To abstain was a feasible strategy to express political support while rejecting the deployment of own troops which might have overloaded the German capacities considering other missions during that period (Pradetto, 2014, p. 83).

In the run-up to the resolution 1970 and 1973, around 260 European citizens were evacuated from Libya within the Operation Pegasus by the Bundeswehr and other forces in February. The government did not ask the parliament for its approval as the soldiers were only lightly armed without expecting the actual use of the weapons. As a result, the German opposition strongly criticised the government to deliberately circumvent the parliamentary scrutiny reservation that requires a Bundestag approval for each deployment of armed forces abroad. (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 102-103)

Foreign Minister Westerwelle met the Bundestag group chairmen on 17 March. Speaking about a possible intervention in Libya, it seemed that the opposition faction shared the government's scepticism about military actions (Rinke, 2011, p. 51). Considering this and the parliamentary reaction to the Operation Pegasus, a parliamentary approval to the deployment of German forces in Libya seemed unlikely. The federal government had to expect that the Bundestag rejected deploying forces in a military operation (though the parliament later criticised the abstention). Therefore, Germany did indeed abstain in the UNSC, but contributed to the Operation Unified Protector under the threshold for a parliamentary vote. Alliance solidarity was realized by taking over certain tasks of the allies and thus enabling them to realise the joint aims. (Harnisch, 2015, pp. 109-115) Additionally, Germany deployed specialists for target tracking of NATO warplanes in Libya and delivered bomb parts for the war against Gaddafi to the participating NATO-states (Naumann, 2011). This suggests that Berlin did not run from responsibility, but estimated the responsibilities it was able to shoulder within the alliance.

Therefore, Germany did not isolate itself internationally or dismissed multilateralism. Nevertheless, the findings conclude that though its rhetoric was used by the government, the civilian power concept does not sufficiently explain the German attitude to reject an intervention, but applying the chequebook diplomacy to support the mission with other means. According to Westerwelle, political sanctions were not exhausted in Libya (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011a, p. 11137). While this refers to "politics before force", Germany did not seek for peaceful mediation between Gaddafi and the rebels - limiting the impression of force as ultima ratio (Harnisch, 2015, p. 121). Due to the complex situation in Libya, it was not definitely a case for the Responsibility to Protect, hence a legitimate cause to inter-

vene in line with the values of "never again" (Harnisch, 2015, p. 111). Voting differently than its closest partners, but supporting them in the aftermath, indicates a conflict between the pillars "never alone" and "politics before force". This leads to the impression that Germany suffers from a foreign policy identity crisis (Stahl, 2012, p. 598)

4.4. The Lebanon-War

4.4.1. History of the Conflict

The history of the United Nation's involvement in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict began in 1978. On 14 March 1978, Israel invaded South Lebanon as a reaction to an attack of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) located there. Several Israeli civilians died provoking the occupation of southern Lebanon in order to create a buffer zone against the attacks. As a result, the UNSC adopted the resolutions 425 and 426 on 19 March 1978 demanding an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli troops and creating a blue helmet mission, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Its tasks were to observe Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, to restore peace and security in the region and to re-create Lebanon's territorial integrity and authority in South Lebanon. The mission was originally only mandated for six month, but it had little success in sustainably stabilising the situation. In 1982, the conflict between the PLO and Israel flare up again. Israeli forces overran the UNIFIL guards and occupied Lebanon up to the capital Beirut. They partially withdrew in 1985, but did not completely withdraw until 2000. During the Israeli occupation, the radical-Islamic Hizbollah was founded as a paramilitary resistance group aiming at the liberation of Jerusalem and Lebanon. Over the years, it evolved into one of the most influential and well-equipped parties in Lebanon. (Albrecht, 2009, pp. 364-635; Brummer, 2013, p. 106)

The hostilities between the Hizbollah and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) could not be ceased in the 2000s. In summer 2006 the conflict aggravated into the Israel-Hizbollah War which lasted 34 days long. On 12 July 2006, the Hizbollah launched missiles in South Lebanon on Israel. Moreover, Hizbollah militiamen crossed the border and attacked an Israeli patrol killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting two others into the Lebanon. Israel reacted with an extensive military campaign including air strikes plus an air and sea blockade. In turn, Hizbollah also launched rockets towards northern Israel. (Albrecht, 2009, pp. 366-367; Brummer, 2013, p. 107)

International requests to stop the violence, for instance by the G8 on 16 July 2006, hardly had direct impact on the events. On 19 July 2006, Israeli ground forces crossed the Lebanese border and 4 days later, Israel launched a broad ground offensive deploying more than 1.000 tanks. (Albrecht, 2009, p. 367; Brummer, 2013, p. 107)

On the international stage, calls got louder to start a multilateral campaign in Lebanon. The "International Conference for Lebanon" on 26 July 2006 did not only decide for humanitarian support for Lebanese civilians, but also envisioned a ceasefire and an UN mission to support the Lebanese army in providing security. On the European side, the EU foreign ministers signalised on 1 August their willingness to participate within such an UN-mandated military mission in Lebanon. This approach was appreciated by the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who declared on 3 August 2006 that Israel would halt its military operation by the time an international protection force was established in Lebanon. He particularly highlighted his wish for a German participation at such a military operation. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2006; Brummer, 2013, pp. 109-110)

On 11 August, resolution 1701 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council (in which Germany did not have a seat back then). It urged the immediate cessation of all hostilities by Hizbollah and Israel, demanded the liberation of the two abducted Israeli soldiers, and expanded the UNIFIL-mandate. The resolution increased the number of UNIFIL forces from 2.000 to a maximum of 15.000 and also extended the missions tasks. The more robust mandate included observing the cease fire, taking all necessary measures to protect UN staff, facilities and civilians within their area of deployment, and monitoring the withdrawal of the IDF. (Security Council, 2006)

The resolution 1701 resulted into an indefinite cease fire established on 14 August 2006. The IDF beat a retreat three days later while the United Nations still planned the implementation of the extended UNIFIL-2. On 25 August, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met the EU foreign ministers to probe the European contributions to UNIFIL-2. The ministers agreed to commit up to 9.000 forces to the mission and Germany, prior reluctant to determine its position, promised naval units. Still, the first UNIFIL-reinforcement was not sent to Lebanon until September 2006. (Mahony, 2006; Brummer, 2013, pp. 111-112)

The erection of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) within UNIFIL was delayed even longer as an official request by the Lebanese government was missing until 6 September 2006. It was forwarded to Germany four days later and after the Bundestag voted in favour of the deployment of the army on 20 September 2006, the German marine forces debouched. (Brummer, 2013, pp. 112, 141)

Although UNIFIL-2 was originally mandated until end of August 2007, the mandate has been renewed several times up to today (Security Council, 2014). It underlines the fragile peace in Lebanon as the political roots of the conflict have not been solved yet. This is stressed by several incidents such as extremists' attacks on UNIFIL and Israel or Israeli forces unlawfully entering the Lebanese airspace. Additionally, the arms smuggling in Lebanon cannot be effectively prevented as UNIFIL's mandate only concerns South

Lebanon. The resurgence of the war cannot be ruled out as long as a political settlement including the mutual recognition of borders has not been reached. (Albrecht, 2009, pp. 370-371; Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 124)

4.4.2. Application of the Civilian Power Concept

Germany's engagement within UNIFIL can be described as the breaking of a taboo as it was the first time German soldiers were deployed within a Middle East conflict (Geis, 2006). Still, the debates about the mission within the decisive entities remained quite trouble free due to a consensus about the German contribution between the main political stakeholders. Chancellor Merkel, Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Minister of Defence Jung favoured the same policy option: to engage within an UN-mandates peace keeping operation only with air or naval, but without ground forces, and only on condition that Israel and Lebanon accepted a German participation. (Brummer, 2013, pp. 105, 132) Participating at a combat or peace enforcement mission was rejected at an early stage (Brummer, 2013, pp. 115-116)

The preferred policy illustrates the core argument against a German engagement in Lebanon: a possible confrontation between German and Israeli soldiers was unacceptable in relation to Germany's historical responsibility for Israel deriving from its past (Asseburg, 2007, p. 71). Contributing with the navy meant reducing the risks which would be much higher for the deployment of ground forces. This normative argument - included in the "never again"-category - required careful handling of the situation. The sensitive issue elucidates Germany's reluctance concerning concrete proposals about its military participation until late August while already actively engaging in diplomatic conflict management and providing humanitarian aid (Brummer, 2013, pp. 126, 136).

In accordance with "never alone" and "politics before force", the Berlin Republic activated all relevant diplomatic channels to settle the conflict. Merkel multilaterally engaged at the G8 summit on 16 July 2006 that demanded a cessation of the hostilities. She also tried to re-energise the Quartet on the Middle East as the main facilitator in the peace process. Furthermore, she bilaterally tried to de-escalate the conflict with phone calls with the Jordanian King Abdullah II and Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and deliberated with US President Bush, Russia's President Putin, British Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac. (Asseburg, 2007, p. 74; Brummer, 2013, pp. 117-118)

Foreign Minister Steinmeier was diplomatically very active as well. In the beginning of the conflict, he talked on the phone with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the foreign ministers of several Arabic states (such as Egypt, Syria) and western states (such as the United States). In the following period, Steinmeier intensified his shuttle diplomacy travelling to the Middle East three times until mid-August. There he consulted with key stake-

holders in the region about diplomatic solutions and the upcoming peace mission. (Brummer, 2013, pp. 128-129)

Simultaneously, Germany provided extensive humanitarian support. It granted financial assistance for humanitarian aid in the amount of 26 million Euros, and also used the Bundeswehr for relief flights to Lebanon transporting relief supplies since 21 August 2006; a parliamentary approval was not needed for this deployment (Brummer, 2013, p. 137).

On the contrary, Germany's active involvement in UNIFIL was delayed until September. That was primarily a result of a missing petition from the Lebanese government without Germany could not organise the MTF. The official request for naval support was transferred to Berlin on 11 September 2006. Two days later, the federal government decided in favour of the motion and on 20 September the Bundestag voted on the deployment of the army. The motion was adopted with a great majority of 442 in favour, 152 against and 5 abstentions. The refusing parliamentarians were the whole faction of The Left and the majority of the Free Democratic Party.(Brummer, 2013, pp. 141-144, 150) They criticised that Germany did not have the necessary neutrality to participate at an UN blue helmet mission in the Middle East and that the political concept behind the operation was not clear enough (Pillath, 2008, pp. 65, 75). Contrarily, advocates of Germany's participation such as Chancellor Merkel argued that contributing to UNIFIL meant contributing to a sustainable cease fire which was required for a political peace process (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006, p. 4832).

The precondition that Israel had to accept a German participation was already met on 3 August when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed his wish for German soldiers participating at UNIFIL (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2006). In Merkel's point of view, this significant sign of trust could hardly be declined (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006, p. 4831). The protection of Israel's right to exist had great legitimating power as part of Germany's reason of state deriving from its National Socialist past. Contributing to UNIFIL demonstrated solidarity, reliability, responsibility and effective multilateralism to the partner states. (Brummer, 2013, pp. 118, 130-131)

The German public was not yet convinced about a foreign assignment within UNIFIL. Surveys in the run-up to the parliamentary decision present ambiguous findings: Die Welt (2006) states that the majority rejected contributing to UNIFIL, while infratest dimap (2006) found out that the population was two-minded and the Spiegel (2006) even published that 58% of the German supported a Bundeswehr operation. That the public was quite divided into two parts underlines the delicate matter and historical significance of the decision to engage militarily in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the arguments for participating – mainly the leitmotif of Israel's protection – outweighed the doubts (Brummer, 2013, p. 253). Germany contributed two frigates, six speedboats, two supply vessels and around 960 soldiers and even took command of the MTF between 15 October 2006 and 29 February 2008. After the critical phase of the conflict, Germany reduced its contribution significantly, so that currently only one German ship and 89 soldiers are involved. (Albrecht, 2009, p. 361; UNIFIL, 2015)

Generally speaking, the arguments and participation requirements used by German stakeholders for legitimising the deployment, but also their multilateral diplomatic efforts indicate that Germany's foreign policy during the Lebanon War 2006 constitutes a good example for the application of the civilian power concept.

5. Merging the Results

In the beginning of the analysis, the question was raised under which conditions Germany is willing to deploy its military forces within the antagonism of ambition and reluctance. The civilian power conception by Hanns Maull provided the necessary theoretical framework for the comparative case study in which two cases of military participation are juxtaposed with two decisions of military refusal. Merging the defined variables (Figure 3, Annex) and the results, the following table can be derived:

		Kosovo	Iraq	Libya	Lebanon
1)	Military Engagement	OAF + KFOR +	–	–	+
2)	Legitimized under international law	OAF – KFOR +	–	+	+
3)	Proven or assumable violations of human rights in the target area	+	–	/	+
4)	Applicability of the "civilian power"-concept:				
	a) "Never alone"	+	/	/	+
	b) "Never again"	+	/	/	+
	c) "Politics before force"	+	+	+	+
5)	Application of the "cheque-book diplomacy"	–	+	+	–
6)	Influence of certain actors				
	a) Chancellor	+	+	+	+
	b) Foreign minister	+	+	+	+
	c) Parliament	+	+	/	+
	d) International partner states	+	/	–	+
	e) Public	+	+	+	/

Table 1: Results of the comparative case study (source: own presentation)

First, the engagement within the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo indicates that the legitimization under international law is not a disqualifier of Germany's military engagement. The decision was made in the dilemma between legitimacy and legality of an operation as weighty humanitarian reasons have been put forward that indicated a case of emergency (von Krause, 2013, pp. 257, 267). Foreign Minister Fischer argued, that an intervention was needed to prevent a repetition of Auschwitz referring to the "never again"-aspect of Maull's civilian power concept (Stark Urrestarazu, 2015, p. 177).

Central arguments for intervening in Kosovo have been used in the debate about the Lebanon War again, especially the recourse to Germany's commitment to a value-based foreign policy (in Lebanon in particular Germany's special relationship to Israel), its multilateral orientation and the claim to shoulder more responsibility (Stahl, 2012, p. 587). Both the Kosovo and the Lebanon participation have been legitimized with normative arguments deriving from the "never again"-aspect of the civilian power concept.

Referring to Iraq and Libya, it becomes evident, that the normative reasons to intervene were not comparably evident. The domestic situation in Iraq and Libya was more ambiguous and the urgency to step in to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe was questionable as diverging reports and evidences existed. In both cases, military means have been rejected arguing that civil means as sanctions have not been exhausted (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011a, p. 11137; Friedrich & Schulz, 2011, p. 117).

Scepticism towards military means in line with "politics before force" exists within the German population and political elite as surveys on this topic confirm (Göler, 2012, pp. 9-10). Those arguments played a central role in the discourse about refusing forces in Iraq and Libya, while normative rationales as grave human rights violations were disputed (Maull, 2011, p. 113). This indicates that Berlin does not deploy its troops if there is a doubt about the emergency situation and the exhaustion of diplomatic channels.

Furthermore, the criticism of Germany's engagement (according to Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, pp. 192-193) and reluctance (according to Hacke 2011) prove that there is a conflict within the "never again"-norm. The threshold between "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" seems blurred leading to recurring irritations about the case-by-case decisions to send or refuse troops.

However, the deployment of German troops seems to be more likely if the operation focuses on peace keeping, not on peace enforcement as the discourse about the Lebanon operation indicates (Pillath, 2008, p. 72). Nonetheless, this hurdle can be overcome in extreme emergency cases as the Kosovo participation suggests.

Concerning the "never alone"-aspect, the case study demonstrates that Germany only engages within a joint task force and rejects military solo actions. In Iraq and Libya, Germany has conveyed the impression to play a lone hand and to reject its multilateral partners, especially the United States of America (Hacke, 2011, S. 53). This underlines that the USA have become less important for Germany since 1990 (Maull, 2011, p. 102). Germany seems to be less willing to bow to pressure by its international allies if their motives and the situation in the target country are not clearly referring to or even opposing the normative "never again"-category. This assumption could well be issued in future research on this topic.

At the same time, it is hard to tell if Germany's willingness to participate at joint missions differs depending on the international organization coordinating the military operation (UN, NATO, EU). Brehm, Koch, Ruf and Strutynski (2012, pp. 86-88) offer an overview about the different foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr between 1990 and 2010. The difference between NATO- and UN-lead military operations does not become evident, but the importance of EU-lead missions increased for Germany. Starting in the 2000s, joint European military mission became more frequent and since the European Union has implemented a more ambitious security and defence strategy with the Lisbon Treaty, the military importance of this institutions is about to rise. (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, pp. 86-90; EEAS, 2015) Besides the increasing importance of the European Union as a military actor, the nature of the operation's mandate and Germany's contributions highlights Berlin's tendency to engage within humanitarian rather than combat missions and preference given to civil means (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, pp. 86-90).

Concerning the specific actors within Germany, the chancellor and the foreign minister have institutionally great influence on the decision about foreign assignments. The comparative case study illustrates that the decision about Germany's engagement can be deduced from the publicly expressed opinion of these actors (which have shared a similar point of view in the examined cases). In other words: if the German chancellor and the foreign minister express their doubts about the necessity of an intervention, the deployment of troops becomes less likely. In this context, future work could focus on the decision-making process in case of political disagreement between these actors.

Although there is a parliamentary scrutiny reservation, the parliament has decided in favour of all motions to deploy forces within the last 20 years (Brehm, Koch, Ruf, & Strutynski, 2012, p. 17). Therefore, the actual - not the institutional – influence of the Bundestag on foreign assignments is questionable and should be examined in other essays.

The case study exhibits that the decision to deploy or refuse troops was in three of four cases in conformity with the public opinion. Only concerning the Lebanon War the findings are inconclusive as the population was divided. Due to domestic elections at times of the Iraq- and Libya-decision, it was criticised that the politicians have adjusted their policies to the public opinion in order to gain votes (Maull, 2011, p. 113). According to Maull, this domestication of foreign policy led to the erosion of the German civilian power concept (Maull, 2014, p. 141). Referring to the research question, Germany seems less willing to deploy troops if the public opposes an intervention and if an election lies ahead. Again, this statement could be examined in further studies.

Still, the arguments used to deny military interventions match the pillars of the civilian power concept. In this context, it has to be stressed that alliance and multilateralism do not automatically mean blind allegiance. However, the implementation of the civilian power concept and the sincerity of the military refusal are strongly limited by compensatory means in the aftermath. In both cases, Libya and Iraq, Germany supported its allies with civil, but also military efforts justified with its alliance solidarity. This impedes not only Germany's international reputation and reliability, but also the trust of its citizens and evokes the impression of misleading the electorate (Von Großbongardt, Hipp, Pieper, & Szandar, 2002). Nevertheless, it can be stated that even if Germany decides against a military participation, it will compensate its international allies with other means.

6. Conclusion

The comparative case study demonstrated that the civilian power concept by Hanns Maull is still able to describe Germany's foreign policy actions. A central assumption of the role conception is validated by the findings: the more exhausted civil means are ("politics before force"), and the more undoubted normative plus legal reasons ("never again") and international allies ("never alone") legitimate an intervention, the more likely is a foreign assignment of the Bundeswehr.

Nevertheless, the application of the chequebook diplomacy after rejecting a military deployment indicates that the hypothesis can only be partially verified. The civilian power concept matched the decisions to militarily engage and also the argumentation to deny operations, but compensatory means limit the explanatory power of the concept in cases of military refusal. Referring to the research question, the chequebook diplomacy is still the preferred way to solve the dilemma of ambition and reluctance when international allies expect a German contribution, but Germany is unwilling to deploy its troops for a military operation.

The comparative case study revealed that a foreign assignment of German troops is the more likely, the more the following criteria are satisfied:

- the domestic public, the chancellor and the foreign minister support an operation,
- political solutions are exhausted,
- the impression of a humanitarian emergency prevails among the German public and stakeholders,
- the UNSC has mandated a mission,
- normative reasons justify the engagement,
- and the mission focuses on peace keeping.

These criteria seem to reflect the pillars of the civilian power concept corroborating its explanatory value even after the republic's unification. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, further studies on the principles of Germany's military engagement are needed in order to validate these findings.

Generally speaking, Berlin's foreign policy still suffice the requirements of Maull's civilian power concept, but unsettled conflicts within and between the pillars of the concept and the repeated use of compensatory means (chequebook diplomacy) lead to the impression of a identity crisis (Stahl, 2012, p. 598). The recurring normative disputes over the appropriate foreign assignment strategy and Germany's common rejection of combat missions constitute the roots of the impression that Germany is stuck between its military ambition and reluctance. Therefore, a foreign political debate is needed aiming at the definition of clear thresholds for Germany's foreign assignment in order to enhance its predictability, reliability and trust in German foreign policy (Maull, 2011, p. 117).

References

Albrecht, M. (2009). Einsatz im Nahen Osten: Die UNIFIL und die Maritime Task Force im Libanon. In H. J. Gießmann, & A. Wagner (Eds.), *Armee im Einsatz. Grundlagen Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr* (pp. 361-371). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Asseburg, M. (2007, March). UN Resolution 1701, UNIFIL-2 ande the "New Greater Middle East Project" - A German Perspective. *The Cultural Movement. "UN Resolution 1701: Horizons and Challenges (National Conference, held January 13th, 2007)"*, pp. 69-74.

Aßmann, J. (2004, June 15). *Europäische Mitglieder der US-Koalition im Irak: Bereitwillige Teilnahme oder blinde Gefolgschaft?* Retrieved June 03, 2015, from Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen: http://www.sicherheitspolitik.de/uploads/media/wus_10_2004_assmann_koalition.pdf

bpb. (2013, July 17). *Zehn Jahre Irak-Konflikt: Kein Ende der Gewalt in Sicht.* Retrieved June 03, 2015, from Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: http://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/165263/irak-kein-ende-der-gewalt

Brehm, M., Koch, C., Ruf, W., & Strutynski, P. (2012). *Armee im Einsatz. 20 Jahre Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr.* Hamburg: VSA: Verlag Hamburg.

Brummer, K. (2013). *Die Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik. Die Große Koalition, "Governmental Politics" und Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr.* Springer VS: Wiesbaden.

Chitalkar, P., & Malone, D. M. (2013, November - Number 01). *The UN Security Council and Iraq.* Retrieved May 21, 2015, from United Nations University Working Paper Series: https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5/wp01_theunscandiraq1.pdf

Deutscher Bundestag. (1998, October 16). Plenarprotokoll 13/248. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenographischer Bericht. 248.Sitzung.

Deutscher Bundestag. (1999, June 11). Plenarprotokoll 14/43. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenographischer Bericht. 43.Sitzung.

Deutscher Bundestag. (2006, September 20). Plenarprotokoll 16/50. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 50. Sitzung.

Deutscher Bundestag. (2011a, March 18). Plenarprotokoll 17/97. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 97.Sitzung.

Deutscher Bundestag. (2011b, March 24). Plenarprotokoll 17/99. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 99.Sitzung.

Die Welt. (2006, August 19). *Deutsche laut Umfrage gegen Beteiligung.* Retrieved June 18, 2015, from Die Welt: http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article146680/Deutsche-laut-Umfrage-gegen-Beteiligung.html

EEAS. (2015, June). *Ongoing missions and operations.* Retrieved August 06, 2015, from European Union External Action Service (EEAS): http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/

Fischer, J. (12. February 2002). *Wir sind keine Satelliten.* Abgerufen am 03. June 2015 von Die Welt: http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article373709/Wir-sind-keine-Satelliten-I.html

Friedrich, C., & Schulz, D. F. (2011). Die Beteiligung am Irak-Krieg - eine Frage von Normen und Identität? In M. M. Müller, *Casebook Internationale Politik* (pp. 88-112). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Geis, M. (2006, July 31). *Bundeswehr. Die Armee, die nicht verweigern darf.* Retrieved June 18, 2015, from Zeit Online: http://www.zeit.de/2006/31/Afrika_Historie

Gerhold, C. (2014). *Die Friedensbedrohung gemäß Art. 39 UN-Charta im Libyen-Konflikt 2011.* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH.

Göler, D. (2012). Die Europäische Union in der Libyen-Krise: Die ‚responsibility to protect' als Herausforderung für die strategischen Kulturen in Europa. *integration*(1/2012), pp. 3-18.

Hacke, C. (2003, June 10). Deutschland, Europa und der Irakkonflikt. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, pp. 8-16.

Hacke, C. (9. September 2011). *Deutschland und der Libyen-Konflikt: Zivilmacht ohne Zivilcourage - Essay.* Von Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: http://www.bpb.de/apuz/33124/deutschland-und-der-libyen-konflikt-zivilmacht-ohne-zivilcourage-essay?p=0 abgerufen

Hacke, C. (26. September 2011). Deutschland und der Libyen-Konflikt: Zivilmacht ohne Zivilcourage - Essay. (B. f. Bildung, Hrsg.) *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, S. 50-53.

Hamilton, A. (2014). *Germany's Foreign Policy towards Kosovo. A Policy Perspective.* Prishtina: Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS) and The Prishtina Council on Foreign Relations (PCFR).

Harnisch, S. (2015). Deutschlands Rolle in der Libyen-Intervention: Führung, Gefolgschaft und das angebliche Versagen der Regierung Merkel. In M. Kneuer (Ed.), *Standortbestimmung Deutschlands: Innere Verfasstheit und internationale Verantwortung* (pp. 85-122). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Hofmann, M. (2014, June 20). *Von der Leyen: "Wir wollen mehr Verantwortung übernehmen".* Retrieved June 03, 2015 , from Deutsche Welle: http://dw.de/p/1CN3v

infratest dimap. (2006, September). *ARD-Deutschlandtrend. September 2006.* Retrieved June 18, 2015, from infratest dimap: http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2006/september/#more3401

Janes, J. (2009). Neue außenpolitische Spielräume und Verpflichtungen des geeinten Deutschland. In D. Schipanski, & B. Vogel, *Dreißig Thesen zur deutschen Einheit* (pp. 294-299). Freiburg: Herder Verlag.

Kappel, R. (2014, September/Oktober). Zivilmacht reloaded. Zur neuen deutschen Außenpolitikdebatte. *WeltTrends. Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik*(22. Jahrgang), pp. 142-143.

Korzeniewski, K., & Bochniak, A. (2011). Medical support of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. *International Maritime Health, 62*(1), pp. 71-76.

Kuperman, A. J. (2013, Summer). Reconsidering the Libyan Intervention: A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign. *International Security, 38*(1), pp. 105-136.

Mahony, H. (2006, August 25). *EU to provide 'backbone' of Lebanon force.* Retrieved June 17, 2015, from euobserver: https://euobserver.com/defence/22266

Maull, H. W. (1990, Winter). Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. *Foreign Affairs*(69), pp. 91-106.

Maull, H. W. (2000, August). German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civilian Power'? *German Politics*(Vol.9, No.2), pp. 1-24.

Maull, H. W. (2007). Deutschland als Zivilmacht. In S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann, & R. Wolf, *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik* (S. 73-84). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Maull, H. W. (2010). The European Union as a Civilian Power - Aspirations, Potential, Achievements. In R. S. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø, & T. Zhang, *US-China-EU Relations - Managing the New World Order* (pp. 48-74). London and New York: Routledge.

Maull, H. W. (2011). Deutsche Außenpolitik: Orientierungslos. *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*(21. Jahrgang. Heft 1), pp. 95-119.

Maull, H. W. (2014). "Zivilmacht": Ursprünge und Entwicklungspfade eines umstrittenen Konzeptes. In S. Harnisch, & J. Schild (Eds.), *Deutsche Außenpolitik und internationale Führung* (pp. 121-147). Baden-Baden.

Milosevic, N. (2012). *Deutsche Kriegsbeteiligung und -verweigerung. Analyse der Einflussfaktoren im politischen Entscheidungsprozess der Fälle Kosovo, Afghanistan, Irak und Libyen.* Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag GmbH.

Mützenich, R. (2015, January). Deutschland - Vom Trittbrettfahrer zur Führungsmacht wider Willen? *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*(8), pp. 273-287.

Naumann, N. (2011, August 08). *Deutsche Soldaten in der Libyen-Einsatzführung.* Retrieved June 10, 2015, from Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.de/deutsche-soldaten-in-der-libyen-einsatzf%C3%BChrung/a-15330199

Palm, P. M. (2011). Zum Hintergrund: Irak-Krieg. In M. M. Müller, *Casebook Internationale Politik* (pp. 43-47). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Palm, P. M., & Schulz, D. F. (2011). Die Beteiligung am Irak-Krieg - eine innenpolitische Frage? In M. M. Müller, *Casebook Internationale Politik* (pp. 64-87). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Pillath, S. (2008). *Motive und Rollenkonzepte deutscher Außenpolitik - Die Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr im Kongo und Libanon* (Heft 1/2 2008 ed.). Hamburg: Studien zur Internationalen Politik.

Pradetto, A. (2014). Normen, Interessen, Projektionen: Deutschland und die militärische Intervention in Libyen 2011. In G. Beestermöller (Ed.), *Libyen: Missbrauch der Responsibility to Protect?* (pp. 65-113). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Rinke, A. (2011, July/August). Eingreifen oder nicht? Warum sich die Bundesregierung in der Libyen-Frage enthielt. *Internationale Politik*, pp. 44-52.

Rittberger, V. (Ed.). (2001). *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Schneider, S., & von Trott, F. W. (2011). Die Beteiligung am Irak-Krieg - eine Frage von Macht und Sicherheit? In M. M. Müller, *Casebookk Internationale Politik* (pp. 48-63). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Security Council. (2003, February 05). *SC/7658. Briefing Security Council, US secretary of state Powell presents evidence of Iraq's failure to disarm. Security Council. Press Release.* Retrieved June 03, 2015, from United Nations: http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7658.doc.htm

Security Council. (2006, August 11). *SC/8808. Security Council calls for end to hostilities between the Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously adopting resolution 1701 (2006).* Retrieved June 17, 2015, from United Nations: http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm

Security Council. (2014, August 26). S/RES/2172 (2014). *United Nations Security Council.*

Speckmann, T. (2006, March). Mittlermacht Deutschland. Perspektiven künftiger Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. *Die Politische Meinung*(51.Jahrgang, Nr.436), pp. 17-22.

Spiegel Online. (2006, Sepember 14). *Umfrage: Bevölkerung unterstützt deutschen Libanon-Einsatz.* Retrieved June 18, 2015, from Spiegel Online: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-bevoelkerung-unterstuetzt-deutschen-libanon-einsatz-a-437078.html

Staack, M. (2004). Nein zur Hegemonialmacht. Deutschlands außenpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse im Irak-Konflikt. In M. Staack, & R. Voigt, *Europa nach dem Irak-Krieg. Ende der transatlantischen Epoche?* (S. 203-230). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Stahl, B. (2012, November). Taumeln im Mehr der Möglichkeiten: Die deutsche Außenpolitik und Libyen. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Volume 5, Issue 4,* pp. 575-603.

Stark Urrestarazu, U. (2015, January). Neue Macht, neue Verantwortung, neue Identität? "Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt" aus identitätstheoretischer Perspektive. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*(8), pp. 173-195.

Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2006, August 04). *"Niemand kann uns stoppen" (Published online on 17 May 2010).* Retrieved June 17, 2015, from Süddeutsche Zeitung:

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/israels-premier-niemand-kann-uns-stoppen-
1.739376

Swistek, G. (2012). The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in
Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy. *Connections. The Quaterly Journal*(Volume XI,
Number 2), S. 79-86.

Swistek, G. (2012). The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in
Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy. *Connections. The Quaterly Journal*(Volume XI,
Number 2), pp. 79-86.

Two plus Four Treaty. (September 1990). *Treaty on the final settlement with respect to
Germany.* Moscow.

UNIFIL. (2015). *UNIFIL Maritime Task Force*. Retrieved June 18, 2015, from UNIFIL.
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon:
http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11584

United Nations Security Council. (2011a, February 26). Resolution 1970 (2011).
S/RES/1970 (2011).

United Nations Security Council. (2011b, March 17). Resolution 1973 (2011). *S/RES/1973
(2011).*

Von Großbongardt, A., Hipp, D., Pieper, D., & Szandar, A. (2002, December 02).
Aussenpolitik. Die Kosten des Wahlsiegs. *Der Spiegel*, pp. 22-26.

von Krause, U. (2013). *Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik.*
Wiesbaden: Springer Vs.

Annex

Figure 1: Analytical categories of the civilian power conception

Political long-term ambitions	Policy shaping power in the sense of civilisation of international relations
	Member with a key function in the institution
National objectives	Maximizer of prosperity, absolute welfare gains
	Rejects: maximization of power, relative gains
International objectives regarding world order and global governance	supranationalist
	Initiator of processes of regime building and –deepening
	Advocate of binding agreements according to international law and of the deepening and extension of international law
	Supports the expansion of memberships in international institutions and regimes
	Advocates the enhancement of the United Nations
International objectives in terms of content	Propagator of interdependent interests
	Value-based foreign policy
	Promoter of 'good governance'
	Promoter of human rights and democracy
	Promoter of sustainable development
Foreign policy style	Collective actor
	Opponent of unilateral actions
	Supporter of negotiations, compromises and mediation
	User of regimes and institutions, partner
	Supporter of sanctions
Tools of foreign policy	Supporter of collective security
	Advocator of cooperative security
	Advocator of multilateral, legitimate actions

Source: own translation of Maull, 2014, pp. 143-144

Figure 2: Overview of the selected cases

State	Date	Military engagement?	Operation	Selection Reason
Kosovo	since 1999	Yes	Operation Allied Force (OAF) Kosovo Force (KFOR)	▪ First peace enforcing engagement of Germany's military forces after unification ▪ called a turning point in German foreign policy ▪ engagement in a peace enforcing mission perceived as a breach of continuity
Iraq	2003	No	Operation Iraqi Freedom	▪ Controversial war (disputed under international law) ▪ great public attention ▪ Germany's refusal to participate is highly discussed as it may have damaged the diplomatic relations with the USA; crisis
Libya	2011	No	Operation Unified Protector (OUP)	▪ Operation in principle legitimized under international law by UN Security Council ▪ Contested decision to abstain from the vote of the UN resolution 1973 ▪ debate about Germany's reluctance to defend human rights in the name of the "Responsibility to Protect" ▪ attention as it may have disturbed the diplomatic relations with the USA
Lebanon	Since 2006	Yes	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	▪ legitimized under international law ▪ Breaking of a taboo: Middle East was seen as a taboo zone for military engagement of the Germany's military forces

Source: own presentation

Figure 3: Dependent and Independent Variables

- Dependent Variable: Willingness to use military force
- Independent Variables:

    1. military engagement: yes/no
    2. legitimized under international law: yes/no
    3. proven or assumable violations of human rights in the target area: yes/ambiguous/no
    4. applicability of the "civilian power"-concept: (as defined in the chapter "Theory: The civilian power-concept by Hanns Maull")
        a) "Never alone": yes/ ambiguous /no
        b) "Never again": yes/ ambiguous /no
        c) "Politics before force": yes/ ambiguous /no
    5. applicability of the "chequebook diplomacy" defined as the use of compensating measures for non-deployment of troops at military operations: yes/ ambiguous /no
    6. influence of certain actors: defined as in accordance of the final decision with the actor's opinion to engage/not engage
        a) Chancellor: yes/ ambiguous /no
        b) foreign minister: yes/ ambiguous /no
        c) parliament: yes/ ambiguous /no
        d) international partner states: yes/ambiguous /no
        e) public: yes/ambiguous /no

Remarks:

- Signs used in the table:
    o yes **+**
    o ambiguous **/**
    o no **-**
- for the definiteness of the thesis "ambiguous" should be avoided as far as possible
    o "ambiguous" may only be used if the influence of a variable is unclear, e.g. if public opinion was divided in two or contradictory results are found