University of Twente

Faculty of Management and Governance

Bachelor Thesis

The Members of the European Parliament: heavyweights or not?

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August 17, 2015

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1 Introduction

The European Parliament has developed since the start in 1952 in to "one of the most powerful institutions of the European Union" (Hix, 2002, p.688). The Members of the European Parliament are able to enact legislation, "veto the nominee for the European Union Commission President, censure the Commission, and amend the European Union budget" (Hix, 2002, p.688).

Recently there has been a debate on how much political experience the Members of the European Parliament have before voted into the European Parliament. This debate has not gone unnoticed by the media, as the BBC reported "France's EU heavyweights, Green MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Joseph Daul, president of the Parliament's largest grouping, the centre-right European People's Party (EPP), are both retiring this year. And candidates of their caliber have yet to emerge" (The BBC, 2014).

The quality of "the candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies elected, of the resultant parliament, often of the members of the government and, to some extent, of a country's politics" (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988, p.1). What is not know yet is why the political experience of the elected national candidates that are serving in the European Parliament is different between the several Member States. This is what will be the main focus of this research. This research can add to a wider understanding of the candidate selection methods and whether the candidate selection method can influence the result of the European Parliament elections. As David Cameron said before the European Parliament elections in 2014:

> "When you vote, you're sending people to the European Parliament who will legislate on the regulation faced by British business and the bills paid by British taxpayers'. (...) When you think of voting, think of the competence of people that you're going to send to Brussels or Strasbourg" (Cameron, 2014).

1.1 Background of the thesis

A previous research done by W. Voermans and J. Uzman will be the starting point for this research proposal (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). Their research examines eleven Member States (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Czech Republic) for the period between 2004-2014. Not all the MEPs have been included in the dataset, but more than 65% of the MEPs have been analyzed for the eleven Member States.

The political experience of MEPs can be seen in the external interest of the European Parliament. The European Parliament has both an internal and external interest. The external interest, is the influence (in terms of representation) the European Parliament has in the direction of the Member States and the electorate. The internal interest are the developments in the institutional relations of the European Parliament, derived from the output and outcomes from the European Parliament on the decision-making process in the European Union.

The external interest is partly determined by the political experiences of the Members of the European Parliament (or MEPs). The authors conclude that the Netherlands sends, in comparison with Austria, relatively few heavyweights to the European Parliament (Voermans & Uzman, 2014) (figure 1). The exact way Voermans and Uzman measure the level of heavyweights and give each MEP a score is to be discussed later. In the figure 1 the differences are shown for the eleven examined Member States.

According to W. Voermans and J. Uzman, the overall percentage of heavyweights did not change a lot between 2004 and 2014. There were, however, substantial differences between the Member States. The Member States Belgium, Portugal and Luxembourg show a relatively high average of heavyweights, while the Netherlands is doing badly in all the three examined periods (Voermans & Uzman, 2014).

1.2 Scientific and Social Relevance

This research is focused on national politicians that are elected to the European Parliament, it will look at the results throughout the several European Parliament elections. It can provide an explanation of the differences between the Member States, and for the political parties in the national parliaments, on why



Figure 1: The average weight per candidate per Member State
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

there is a difference between the previous political experience of MEPs that Member States send to the European Parliament.

The external interest could be essential for the future of this institution. The political experience can be seen as contributing to the external interest, with the European Parliament getting more power. The European Parliament elections often has a low voter turnout, in every Member State the voter turnout is lower for the European Parliament elections than in the national elections. The voters appear to use the European Parliament elections as a "referenda on the performance of national political parties rather than opportunities to influence EU politics" (Voermans & Uzman, 2014; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988). Besides are political leaders not elected nor on the voting list for the European Parliament. These two developments seem to move in the direction that the European Parliament will lose importance (Voermans & Uzman, 2014; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988). This can be reflected in the way that people vote during the European Parliament elections. With the election of political heavyweights in the European Parliament, the voters give more importance to this institution. This research can provide the insight that voting people in the European Parliament and their political experience can depend on several variables.

1.3 Research Question and Sub-Questions

The research question that will be addressed in this research is:

> Why do some political parties in the European Parliament have more heavyweights in the European Parliament than other parties?

The units in this research question are the Members of the European Parliament and the dependent variable is the number of heavyweights. There is no independent variable in this research question, these are the possible reasons why some political parties send more heavyweights to the European Parliament than other parties.

This research question is focusing on why the political experience that the national candidates have before they are elected in the European Parliament differs between the European political parties. There

are sixteen Member States selected. Thereby is the political experience of all the MEPs that have been in the European Parliament taken into account as well as the different parties that are present in the European Parliament.

The research question is an explanatory merely because it examines why there currently is a difference between the average weight for the candidates selected in the Member States. To do this there is looked at the specific parties that participate in the European Parliament, because the MEPs are not ordered by country, but by their political party.

The research question is about the political parties and not about Member States, as was the case in the research from W. Voermans. The difference in heavyweights that are send to the European Parliament between Member States, can also depend on the political parties that each MEP is part of. These parties are selecting the candidates for the European Parliament and so provide a big influence on the eventual MEPs that are elected in the European Parliament.

The sub-questions used in this paper are:

1. To what extent do parties in the European Union send heavyweights to the European Parliament?

In this sub-question the units are the Members of the European Parliament. The dependent variable is the number of heavyweights and the independent variable(s) will be found in the theory section.

2. Which differences can be found between parties from various countries and from various EP party groups?

3. How can differences between parties and between countries be explained?

In these two sub-questions the units are the Members of the European Parliament and the dependent variable is the level at which a political party is active and/or participating. Also here there is no independent variable. The first sub-question is related to the previous research from W. Voermans and is trying to see how the differences in the number of heavyweights are related for each Member State. The second sub-question is finding explanations for the differences between the several Member States and political parties in the European Parliament. The third sub-question is related to the outcome. The hypotheses that are made in the theory will be tested using data about the MEPs.

2 Theory

Competitive democratic elections provide citizens a choice between several parties, policies and eventually governments. Which candidates are on the ballot is depending on the recruitment process, prior to the elections. The legislative recruitment is referring to individuals that are moving from lower levels in a possibly parliamentary career (Norris, 1997). In the recruitment there can be four levels identified, these are:

- The political system, notably the legal regulations, party system and electoral system, which structure candidate opportunities in the political market-place;
- The recruitment process, particularly the degree of internal democracy within party organizations and the rules governing candidate selection;
- The supply of candidates willing to pursue elected office, due to their motivation and political capital;
- The demands of gatekeepers (whether party members or political leaders) who select some from the pool of aspirants (Norris, 1997, p.1).

Important with the four levels identified is that they reflect different phases of the selection process. There can also be looked at factors that are lying outside the party arena, when addressing the issue of who and why becomes candidate, for example the voters of the party (Norris, 1997). To limit the number of possible cases these outside factors will not be considered during this study.

These four levels that are identified will be in this research brought back to two levels in order to find difference in the number of heavyweights that are send to the European Parliament. The first level is that of the Member State, as it was the political system level with in previous research (Norris, 1997, p.1). The Member States differ in the legal regulations and in their electoral rules.

The second level identified is the level of the political party, or in the previous research this level was the recruitment process, the demands of the gatekeepers and the supply of candidates (Norris, 1997, p.1). The recruitment process differs between the political parties and is influenced by the rules, culture and organization of a party. The supply of candidates is consisting of those that would like to pursue an elected office, but their ideas have to be in line with the demand of the gatekeepers. Through the big influence of the party, the level identified is the party level.

2.1 The Member States

Important is the Treaty of Amsterdam, that was signed in 1997 and went into force in 1999. This Treaty sets the term of office of the MEPs to five years and in "addition to the aim of a uniform procedure in all Member States, it also provided for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with principles common to all Member States" (Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2011). With this amendment in place the European Parliament adopted a draft paper for the electoral procedure and thereby incorporating common principles for the election of the MEPs. This followed a debate between the Council and Parliament with four key points in the final Council's decision:

- Members of the European Parliament are to be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using either a list system or single transferable vote;
- Member States became free to establish constituencies or subdivide their electoral areas as they wished, provided this did not affect the proportional nature of the voting system;
- Member States were permitted to establish a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats, provided this did not exceed five per cent of vote cast;
- The Office of Member of the European Parliament became incompatible with that of member of a national parliament (Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2011).

The nature of how the voting is done varies between the Member States, but for the European Parliament elections the voting has to be done according to proportional representation (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014a). Two systems most commonly used are the list system and Single Transferable Vote (or STV) system. In an STV system the voter can rank "individual candidates in order of preference and voters are allocated according to a formula by which excess votes of the first candidate chosen are transferred to voters' second choices and so on" (Gallagher, 1992, p.480). The system that is used for the European Parliament elections is depending on the Member States themselves.

Besides the option between list systems and STV systems there are the 'open', 'ordered' and 'closed' ballot structures. The open system is were candidates electoral fates are depending on the personal vote. On the other hand are the closed systems where "the candidates' electoral fates are determined by their party placement" (Farrell & Scully, 2005, p.975). In the ordered list systems the candidates have a limited scope to improve their placement on the list by personal votes. The difference between the systems is noted in table 8.

There is a general agreement "that electoral institutions are an important factor affecting the levels of women's representation" (Matland & Studlar, 1996, p.708). Several researchers have "observed a positive relationship between proportional representation (PR) and women's opportunity for election to parliament" (Matland & Studlar, 1996, p.708). Within countries with a single member district system the underrepresentation of women in parliament is considerable, thereby confirming the hypothesis: *In district systems there are less women in the parliament voted than there are in list systems* (Tremblay, 2008, p.XVI). In district systems a person often well know in the region is selected, as well as a good representative of the region (Lovenduski & Norris, 1994). The individuals are elected in the parliament per district and the districts cannot influence each other.

For the European Parliament elections however this is not the case. Malta is the only Member State that is using the STV method, however this electoral system is also a proportional representation system, there is only no party list. The system can benefit the women candidates, since "they are more likely to be recruited by party elites than they are in single-member district majority and plurality systems" (Gallagher, 1992, p.480). This makes that testing this hypothesis is not possible when considering the European Parliament elections.

Still, the outcomes of "some elections held under PR methods are clearly less proportional than others, by any criterion, this is often a function of district magnitude as much as of the PR formula employed" (Gallagher, 1992, p.494). The PR methods themselves, one cannot be more or less proportional than the other PR methods. With this insight the STV method differs much from the list systems used in the European Parliament elections. The STV methods nature is candidate-centred and not party-centred as it is the case with the list system. This raises the hypothesis:

1. *In Member States with a STV-system there are less heavyweights in parliament voted than there are in list systems.*

However, an influential factor for the candidate selection might also be the region of the European Union a Member State is. In the southern region the candidate selection is more centralized than it is in the northern region (Lundell, 2004). With a more centralized decision-making, the candidate selection is done by the most important party members and so more politically familiar people or people important in the party are selected. Therefore the following hypothesis is constructed:

2. *In southern regions more political heavyweights are elected in the European Parliament than in the northern regions.*

This research is will be using the same database made by W. Voermans. One of the conclusions was that the electoral lists in 2014 exists for a very important part of incumbent MEPs (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). Luxembourg was deviating however from this case. Luxembourg is a small Member State with not many seats in the European Parliament so this might form an explanation why the percentage of incumbent members is low. However, this can deviate when looking at all the seventeen Member States considered. Therefore the hypothesis is:

3. *Smaller Member States have fewer incumbent members in the European Parliament than larger Member States.*

The percentage of incumbent members might also be related to the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament for each Member State and is related to the political party. A political party can choose to have a higher percentage of incumbent members, because these already have political experience or are familiar within the society. This can give them more votes. When the MEPs are elected in the European Parliament, they have a high or low score. However, the longer they are in the European Parliament the more their scores for their previous political jobs will decline, as is the case for all MEPs, but the pace may differ. The MEP is also awarded a score when it is a MEP. However, the scores from the previous political experiences will be lower. From this the following hypothesis is constructed:

4. *Smaller Member States have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger Member States.*

2.2 The Political Party

The second level identified is the Political Party (Norris, 1997, p.1). The candidate selection is "one of the defining functions of a political party in a pluralist democracy" (Hazan & Rahat, 2006, p.368). The selections of candidates that compete during the elections is separating parties from other organizations. A candidate defines the characteristics, not only ideologically, but also demographically as well as geographically, more than the organizations it belongs to. The candidate selection is determining the choices for the voters, but also the composition of parties and opposition. In short, the candidate selection is affecting the essence of the modern democratic governance (Rahat & Hazan, 2001; Katz, 2001).

A political party can influence the candidate selection for the elections from its members. Most party members have an age around the 40 years. However, the voters of the political party are younger, the same, and older than 40 (Norris & Lovenduski, 1993; Quandt, 1970). To attract more voters a political party can place younger as well as older candidates on the list, with more age groups present it can be easier for people to identify themselves with a political party. Smaller parties may not have enough seats in the European Parliament to represent all age groups, whereas larger parties have.

The representation of the different age groups might also have an influence on the number of heavyweights in a political party. The more experienced politicians or people that had high functions in a large company are often older, around the 40 - 50 years years old. The younger people, around 25 years old, did not yet had the time, and maybe did not have the opportunity, to gain much political experience or have an important function in an international company. Therefore can is the hypothesis made that:

5. *Smaller national political parties have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger political parties.*

The members of the political party are often key in the candidate selection process in parties, because some of these members will be candidates for their party. This candidate selection differs not only for each party, it is also changing over the years (Hopkin, 2001). The candidate selection process became more decentralized as well as the individual party members role in the process became greater starting from the 1960s towards the beginning of the 1990s (Bille, 2001).

The significance of the candidate selection method is easily underestimated. The quality of "candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies elected, of the resultant parliament, often of the members of the government and, to some extent, of a country's politics" (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988, p.1). A change in the selection that is applied by the parties' might therefore have a direct consequence "for the way that the politics operate there" (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988, p.1). Besides, the way that the political parties select their candidates can also be used as "an acid test of how democratically they conduct their internal affairs" (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988, p.1).

Elections are in democratic societies open and often well-publicized events. However, before the outcome of the election there is the process of the candidate selection, this often receives little attention in the media.

All parties select candidates do this often for the same reasons. The candidate has a high ability to win votes, is good potential as MEP, is able to get on with parties that have overlapping goals, or are good potential as government minister. The selectors of candidates are thereby looking with specific characteristics in mind, the most named characteristics are: well educated, sincerity, good on local problems, local person, good speaker and is hard working. It seems that the voters are more concerned with the "personal qualities and characteristics than with political views, experience or ability" (Bochel & Denver, 1983, p.54). This is confirmed when looking at what selectors perceptions are of undesirable qualities in a candidate, often named are: not a local, poor speaker, lazy, lacking charisma above not matching the left/right-wing of the party. There is a feeling from selectors concluding from this that "the voters would prefer a local person and/or one who is conversant with local problems but it seems clear that despite having electoral considerations in mind, selectors do not hold a stereotype of candidate whom they see as having special electoral appeal" (Bochel & Denver, 1983, p.52).

Lacking political experience is seen as a negative perception by only four percentage of the selectors. This indicates clearly that the selectors are not looking at the political experience of the candidates (Bochel & Denver, 1983).

The underrepresentation of women in the parliament is an often read argument (Murray, Krook, & Opello, 2012). The individual Member States have quota's for the proportion of women in the parliament and/or party. Although each country adopted a different form of this gender quota "these policies stipulate that women constitute a minimum proportion of candidates and/or representatives" (Murray et al., 2012, p.529) often justified on the ground that women constitute a minority of the elected officials (Silvester & Dykes, 2007). These gender quota's can for larger parties more easily to respond and fulfill than smaller parties. Therefore the hypothesis can be made that:

6. *Smaller national political parties have fewer women in the European Parliament than the larger political parties.*

The percentage of women in a political party might also have an influence on the number of heavyweights in a political party. Women are traditionally not as focused on their career as men, and still take care of their children, although there are countries that try and break with this pattern. There is also the possibility that there still is some discrimination between women and men when it comes to the possibilities of getting an important position in an international company or party. This will cause that women have less political experience than men (Gorman, 2005; Roos & Reskin, 2007; Roth, 2004; Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011; Gardiner, 1997). Therefore is the hypothesis made that:

7. *National political parties that have more women have fewer heavyweights in the European Parliament than parties that have a lower percentage of women.*

2.3 Summarizing the argument

In this section the independent variables are noted and how these will be measured. The independent variables introduced will related to the number of heavyweights in the European Parliament. To provide a better overview of the hypothesis proposed so far there is a causal model made. The hypothesis formulated are on the Member State level and party level, however, some independent variables are characteristics of a person, and therefore in the model a third level is added, the individual level. The hypothesis proposed are processed in a causal model, this is shown in figure 2.



Figure 2: Causal model for the proposed hypotheses

3 Methods

3.1 Research Design

The research design that is selected is a cross-sectional. A cross-sectional study is a "study based on observations representing a single point in time" (Babbie, 2012). In this research these observations will be made at three different elections in time. The three different points in time are the years, 2004, 2009 and 2014, in which the European Parliament elections are held.

In this research there will be tried to find an explanation why there is a difference in the number of heavyweights send by each Member State to the European Parliament. There is looked at a correlation between two variables. This criterion is obvious, "it emphasizes the need to base social research assertions on actual observations rather than assumptions" (Babbie, 2012). This criterion is covered in this research by making hypotheses, and using observations, made at the time of the European Parliament elections, these hypotheses are tested.

The time order could pose a potential threat to this research, because a "causal relationship exists unless the cause precedes the effect in time" (Babbie, 2012). In explanatory cross-sectional studies there is an inherent problem, "although their conclusions are based on observations made at only one time, typically they aim at understanding causal processes that occur over time" (Babbie, 2012). To still control the time order in this research there is looked at three different elections, 2004-2009, 2009-2014 and 2014-now. The conclusions will be based on the time points, 2004, 2009 and 2014, and the different outcomes of the different years can be compared. Besides will the cause precede the effect over time in this research. So the outcome (if a MEP is a heavyweight or not) will depend on the cause(s) (for example, region or gender).

The third requirement "for a causal relationship is that the effect cannot be explained in terms of some third variable" (Babbie, 2012). To reduce the effect of third variables, the most important third variables have been tried to identified in the theory and also formed into hypotheses. These hypotheses will be taken into account in this research. Following the third requirement of third variables is the problem of multicollinearity, because the third variables may be related somehow to each other or there are likely causal relationships among them. Another related threat is that one cannot find all the different variables that have an influence on why some Member States are sending more political heavyweights to the European Parliament than other Member States. This threat will be hard to adjust before the research and most likely will be found when drawing the conclusions. The controlled third variables now identified shall be rejected and this should give an indication that there could be more or different third variables that have an influence.

Besides is there no control group in this research design. This potential threat will be controlled by having multiple observations made in three points in time.

3.2 Case Selection and Sampling

To get an answer to the research question there will be secondary data used, and the literature will be reviewed. The secondary data will consist a previous research that has been done by W. Voermans and J. Uzman (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). This research is about the external interest of the European Parliament and is examining seventeen Member States for the years, 2004-2014. The authors made a database that includes the information of the national candidates jobs before they were elected into the European Parliament, but also the party they joined in their native country and in the European Parliament, as well as their previous jobs. The scores awarded to each MEP can be used to search for difference between in previous political experience.

The dataset used for this paper is based on the database W. Voermans and J. Uzman used. However, there have been five more countries examined and included in the dataset, these five countries have been examined after the research from W. Voermans and J. Uzman and therefore was not included in their dataset. These five new countries will be included in this research. Besides is there for this research the Member State Bulgaria examined and therefore will also be included in the dataset. For the Netherlands the data was not made available, so this country had to be excluded. The Member States that are included in the

database are: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech-Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

These Member States are also selected for this research for two reasons. Firstly because these countries from the widest possible range in size, electoral system, political system, system of government and region in the European Union (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). Secondly, is that there is not more data available or made available. To increase the database the coding for the country Bulgaria will be performed and included in the database, but there are still countries part of the European Union but not included in the database.

There are also MEPs that do not finish their term in the European Parliament through several circumstances. These MEPs will be replaced. The time that these MEPs will be in the European Parliament is depending on their predecessor, but it can range from just a few months to almost five years. Through his long possible time span the MEPs that replace the MEPs that left the European Parliament early will be included in this research.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

The data used in this research is from W. Voermans and J. Uzman (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). These researchers got their data for the years 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 by looking at all the MEPs that are elected in the European Parliament. This research is still ongoing, therefore for the selected Member States the majority of the MEPs, more than 65%, is included in the database. For the elections of 2014, the electoral lists of all parties represented in the European Parliament is selected[1] and from these the top-4 is included in the database[2].

When known which MEPs have been in the European Parliament for each Member State, the researchers got the corresponding curriculum vitae from the site of the European Parliament. Each MEP can put on this site his/her own curriculum vitae. This information is than, when possible or necessary, completed with information about the MEP from the Wikipedia site. This gives problems with the validity of this research and will be dealt with in a separate paragraph.

The dataset made by W. Voermans and J. Uzman is not a single file. To work with this database the relevant data needs to be put into one single file, this will be done in Excel. Currently the information is for each separate MEP available on the internet, access was gained through the Montesquieu institution. To put it into Excel one clear dataset was put into place for each country and could be used for testing the hypotheses.

After the data has been set in an Excel file, for each MEP there political party he/she joined in the European Parliament and his/her date of birth needs to be added. The information about the political party and the date of birth of each MEP is available on the site of the European Parliament.

3.4 Operationalization

In the hypotheses several variables were mentioned, including heavyweights, size of the Member State and party and age groups. This section discusses the way in which these variables are operationalized.

3.4.1 A heavyweight

This research is focusing on why the political experience that the national candidates have before they are elected in the European Parliament differs between the Member States. The coding will be explained in more detail as well as the reliability and validity of the scorecard.

[1]The researchers limited themselves to the existing parties, incumbent MEPs that divestitures are not included in the study. Besides were not all electoral lists, at the time of the study, available. The information on the site `www.europedecides.eu` was leading.

[2]For countries with a district system, for example the United Kingdom, France and Germany, there was a different settlement. For these countries only the party leaders of the regional lists are included in the research.

3.4.1.1 Coding of the individual MEPs

The information that is needed for this research is what the political functions of the MEPs were of the years before they were elected for the European Parliament, as well as the MEPs that were in office for each electoral period. For the electoral periods 2004-2014 the information is already found and given a score (this is coming from the database developed by W. Voermans). These scores are given to individual MEPs. The biographies as well as the curriculum vitae's are analyzed using a scorecard. Each function is provided with a weight (a score). For each function, the candidate can earn a number of points. This gives a total weight per candidate per electoral list. The scorecard is shown in table 1.

Scorecard	Immediately before	> 2 year before candidate EP	> 8 year before candidate EP
Membership national (federal) parliament	190	110	30
President of a parliamentary chamber/Group leader	500	300	50
Member of a regional parliament entity >1.000.000 citizens	100	60	10
Member of a regional parliament entity >100.000, but <1.000.000 citizens	40	20	0
Member of a regional parliament entity <100.000 citizens	10	5	0
Member of the European Parliament	100	50	10
Chair of a Group in the EP	200	75	20
(Vice-)President of the EP	300	200	50
Member of the European Commission	300	200	50
Prime Minister/President of a national (federal) government	700	500	200
Cabinet Minister in a national (federal) government	500	350	150*
Junior Minister (Secretary of State) in a national (federal) government	230	130	50
Member of a regional government entity >1.000.000 citizens	230	130	50
Member of a regional government entity >100.000, but <1.000.000 citizens	100	50	0
Member of a regional government entity <100.000 citizens	55	25	0
A leading position in industry, civil service or civil society	200	0	0
Member of the national (federal) party executive	100	50	0

Table 1: The scorecard
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)
*Note: in the original scorecard a Cabinet Minister in a national (federal) government that had this functions more than 8 years ago should be awarded a score of 150 points. In the dataset however there is only a score awarded of 50 points.

To measure the weight of a MEP W. Voermans and J. Uzman based their scores on a previous research done by S. de Pauw and S. van Hecke in the Benelux in 2006. S. De Pauw and S. van Hecke inventoried the MEPs that were elected in the European Parliament of the three countries and compared the importance of the politician on a number of criteria. There was a broad emphasis put on the background of the MEP, and

allowed in their research to compare the backgrounds of the MEPs, but not to weigh it. Both W. Voermans and J. Uzman as S. de Pauw and S. van Hecke agree that the most important indicators for the background of the MEP are the membership of a national parliament or national government.

To elaborate on the table, there are three further comments that can be made. Firstly there is looked at the administrative layer in which a function is exercised (national, regional and/or European). For functions at the national level are awarded the highest scores. For functions at the regional (or sub-state) level the points are decreasing, relative to the proportion of inhabitants of the area. Secondly there is looked at the nature of the political function, is it administrative or representative. In the research from W. Voermans and J. Uzman there assumption is made that an administrative function is exercised is more important than a representative function. Another choice that has been made is that direct experience before elected in the European Parliament is awarded a higher score than less recent political experience. The political weight of a political function is decreasing over time. The time blocks taken are: directly before elected in the European Parliament, between two to eight years before elected in the European Parliament and more than eight years before elected in the European Parliament.

The coding that was done with the research of W. Voermans is mainly done by the computer, with the researchers only putting a code behind each political function. None political functions are not taken into account during the research, nor in this research, and will not be awarded any points. To still explain how the coding works, there will be an example used. In this research the country Bulgaria will be coded and included in the dataset, the example taken is from Nedzhmi Ali, a MEP from Bulgaria from 26-09-2005 till 05-06-2007 and from 01-07-2014 till now. This MEP has put on the website of the European Parliament his curriculum vitae and there is no additional information used from Wikipedia.

This MEP has got a Master's degree in economics at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia. This is not a political function, but about the education followed, therefore this is not awarded a score. The following point on the curriculum vitae is that this MEP was Member of Parliament in the 40th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, between 2005 till now. This is a political function, and the scores awarded need to be looked up in table 1 and is shown as well in table 2.

	Immediately before	>2 years before candidate EP	>8 years before candidate EP
Membership national (federal) parliament	190	110	30

Table 2: Scores awarded for: The Membership national (federal) parliament
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

Following from this table it is important to know during which years Nedzhmi Ali was MEP. The next point on the curriculum vitae is that this MEP has been Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria. This function is awarded a different score, that is shown in table 3.

	Immediately before	>2 years before candidate EP	>8 years before candidate EP
Junior Minister (Secretary of State) in a national (federal) government	230	130	50

Table 3: Scores awarded for: Junior Minister (Secretary of State) in a national (federal) government
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

Also in this case, to award Nedzhmi Ali points for his function, the period for which Nedzhmi Ali was MEP needs to be known. The next point on the curriculum vitae of this MEP is that he has been Chief economist of a joint stock company. This is no political function nor has the MEP been the managing director of a large company (more than 2500 employees), so this function is not awarded any points. This will continue till all the functions have been identified. When part of the European Parliament a MEP is also awarded a score for this, these are shown in table 4.

	Immediately before	>2 years before candidate EP	>8 years before candidate EP
Member of the European Parliament	100	50	10

Table 4: Scores awarded for: Member of the European Parliament
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

For all the three functions shown in the above three tables, the points for each function decrease over time. This still needs to be put into a table and awarded the correct scores, the first draft of the table looks like one in table 5 for this specific MEP.

Function	Date	2004			2009			2014		
		<2	2-8	>8	<2	2-8	>8	<2	2-8	>8
MP in the 40th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria	2005/now									
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria	00-00-2003/00-00-2005									
Chief economist of a joint stock company	00-00-1998/00-00-2001									
Member of the European Parliament	26-09-2005/05-06-2007 and 01-07-2014/now									
Total Score										

Table 5: Setup score table

In table 5 on the most left column is standing the parliamentary functions from the MEP and next to this column are the years standing. The other columns are related to the years from the European Parliament elections and in the row below the years the time blocks: directly before elected in the European Parliament (or less than 2 years before elected in the European Parliament), between two to eight years before elected in the European Parliament and more than eight years before elected in the European Parliament.

For the function Member of the Parliament in the 40th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria is starting in 2005 till now. This is covering three different parliamentary elections in Bulgaria and for each election the scores are different. To elaborate on this point Nedzhmi Ali started his first term in the 40th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria in 11-07-2005 and ended in 27-06-2009. This term is in between the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections. When awarding a score the end date of the political function is key for awarding the scores. In this case the term ended in 2008 and for the year 2009 the MEP got a score of 190 points, table 2. This term is immediately before the European Parliament elections. For the elections of 2014 however, this parliamentary term has been 5 years before these elections, and according to table 2, the MEP is awarded a score of 110 points.

For the function Member of the Parliament in the 41th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria the second time is covering the time period of 14-07-2009 till 14-13-2013. This term started before the 2009 European Parliament elections, but because there is specifically looked at the end date of the term, there is no score awarded at the year 2009. The term ended in 2012, and is still less than 2 years before the 2014 European Parliament elections, so the MEP is given a score of 190 points.

This will continue for the other functions and in the end will produce a table as shown in table 6. When the specific start and end date of the function is unknown, only the year is known, it will look like this: 00-00-year.

Function	Date	2004			2009			2014		
		<2	2-8	>8	<2	2-8	>8	<2	2-8	>8
MP in the 40th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria	11-07-2005/27-06-2009				190				110	
MP in the 41th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria	14-07-2009/14-03-2013							190		
MP in the 42th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria	21-05-2013/06-08-2014							190		
MP in the 43th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria	27-10-2014/now									
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria	00-00-2003/00-00-2005	230				130				20
Chief economist of a joint stock company	00-00-1998/00-00-2001									
Member of the European Parliament	26-09-2005/05-06-2007				100				50	
Member of the European Parliament	01-07-2014/now									
Total Score		230			290	130		380	160	20

Table 6: Part of the score table for Nedzhmi Ali
Note: Not all the functions of this MEP have been taken into account in this example to provide a short overview and therefore the total scores are not the eventual total scores this MEP got. Besides is for a better overview the year 2009 not included.
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

Now the scores for the years can be calculated. That is done by adding the scores for the three time blocks for each year, this is shown in table 7.

Year	2004	2009	2014
Score	230	420	560

Table 7: The total scores for the years 2004, 2009 and 2014

Table 7 is also showing the scores for each year for Nedzhmi Ali for the three years. The scores are the scores for the MEP at the day of the European Parliament elections for the year.

3.4.1.2 The Reliability and Validity of the scorecard

The score of 400 points or more is a score that is decided by the researchers themselves, as are the scores that are awarded for each function. It can be that other researchers would disagree with the score system and/or that a heavyweight has a score of 400 points or more. For this research the scores are equal to the scores used by W. Voermans.

The score system that is developed by W. Voermans is consisting of scores that are determined on the basis of how important the specific political function is. A drawback of this score system is that it places a high weight on the opinion of the author who developed the scorecard (shown in table 1). The scores are awarded by hand and computer. The scores have to be introduced in the computer and awarded a letter. When the coding is done for the MEPs the letter is given and the computer will calculate the total scores. It can also happen that there is a difference of opinion. This comes forward when for example a specific political function can be seen as part of the regional government or regional parliament. This might be a slight difference, but there is a big difference in the scores that are awarded. To tackle these problems partly,

first of all the scores for a country, who's MEPs are already awarded a score, will be done again. The country selected is Luxembourg.

When awarding the MEPs a scores this is done in two main steps. First the person award each MEP the for him/her correct scores, when a specific job is doubtful for awarding scores this can be noted. Then someone who is working for the Montesquieu institution controls his/her work. However, it is possible that there is a mistake made and has gone unnoticed or, as earlier said, the correct specific function can be seen as part of, for example, the regional government, but is placed at the regional parliament.

When looking at the scores for Luxembourg, most of the scores are given according to the score system. However there are some MEPs that the scores did not have the second look or an error is shown. These scores are taken into considerations, because there are many cases in this research and they were also included in the research from W. Voermans as it seems. There are somehow slight deviations, because as an example, Robert Goebbels has been 'State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses' between 1984-1989, and is awarded the correct score for this. However, when coding the political function 'State Secretary for Foreign Affairs' and 'State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses' should be seen as two distinct functions (although the time period is the same), now its seen as one. This can cause that the MEP, Robert Goebbels, is not awarded enough points.

Another doubtful point is coming forward with the MEP Frank Engel, he has been Secretary-General of the parliamentary group of the Christian Socialist Union (CSV) in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies between 2001-2009. He is awarded the points for being a member of the national (federal) parliament. However, he has been the secretary-general of this group, if he has been in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is needs to be find out. When controlling this it appears that this is not the case. It is therefore doubtful if this MEP got the correct score. This is showing that there are inter-coder reliability problems. When examining Estonia, it seems that the scores are awarded consistent with the idea without problems. There may therefore be not always be the correct scores awarded, but with the large dataset this should be leveled out.

The second way to tackle the problems is to make changes to the scorecard and see how much the outcome is influenced. When there are changes made to the score system this might affect the outcome. There could also be simply changed the heavyweight score, but this will not represent flaws in the scorecard itself (table 1). There is a changed scorecard made, based on the earlier scorecard from W. Voermans, however in this changed scorecard the political functions that are performed on a national level and/or European level are awarded a higher score. This higher score is the same score that W. Voermans gave +10% increase. The new changed scorecard will look like is shown in Appendix A table 11. Estonia will serve here as an example, because this country did not show any inter-coder reliability problems. The new scores for the MEPs and their previous scores are shown in the Appendix A table 12 (with the use of the standard scorecard) and table 13 (with the use of the modified scorecard). The tables show that the scores do hardly change, and there are no new heavyweights added to the list with existing heavyweights when looking at the results for the changes scorecard.

3.4.2 Region classification

The European Union can be split up into a several regions and for this paper the European Union can be split up into three different regions. There is the "Nordic countries (Denmark, Estonia, Zweden), Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), and the Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Spain)" (Lundell, 2004).

This variable is considered in the first hypothesis: *In southern regions more political heavyweights are selected than in the northern regions.*

3.4.3 Electoral system

The type of electoral system is one of the variables that may seen to have an influence on the candidate selection, as earlier identified.

Member State	Number of MEPs in the EP	Electoral formula
Austria	18	Open-list proportional representation
Belgium	21	Open-list proportional representation, with 4 constituencies
Bulgaria	17	Open-list proportional representation
Croatia	11	Open-list proportional representation
Cyprus	6	Open-list proportional representation
Czech-Republic	21	Open-list proportional representation
Denmark	13	Open-list proportional representation
Estonia	6	Open-list proportional representation
France	74	Closed-list proportional representation, with 8 constituencies
Germany	96	Closed-list proportional representation
Luxembourg	6	Open-list proportional representation
Malta	6	Single transferable vote
Portugal	18	Closed-list proportional representation
Poland	51	Open-list proportional representation, with 13 constituencies
Spain	54	Closed-list proportional representation
Sweden	20	Open-list proportional representation
United Kingdom	73	Closed-list proportional representation, but Northern Ireland uses the Single transferable vote. There are 11 + 1 constituencies

Table 8: The electoral formula for the countries examined
Source: (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014a; Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2011)

The type of electoral system that the Member States have is shown in table 8. Thereby do the countries Belgium, France, Poland and the United Kingdom use multiple constituencies and/or do some Member States have an electoral threshold (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014a).

Table 8 shows that to test the hypothesis: *In district systems there are less women in the parliament voted than there are in list systems* is hard to confirm or reject, because only one Member State is using a single transferable vote, this is Malta. Northern Ireland uses the single transferable vote as well, but is seen as a part of the United Kingdom when it comes to the seat distribution.

This will cause problems with the reliability, because there is only one case, from the in total sixteen countries selected. Sixteen countries is already a small sample size and provided that only one of these countries has a different voting system than the other fifteen countries.

This variable is considered in the second hypothesis: *In STV systems there are more heavyweights in parliament voted than there are in list systems.* Through a lack of cases this hypothesis cannot be evaluated, although it still might have an influence on the number of heavyweights elected in the European Parliament.

3.4.4 Small or large Member State

The seventeen Member States do differ in size and number of inhabitants. This is reflected in the number of MEPs that the people can vote for in each Member State. The distinction between a small and large Member State will cover the different proportion of seats in the European Parliament. The Member State with most seats in the European Parliament is Germany (with 96 seats) and the smallest Member States are Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta (all with 6 seats). The threshold for being a large Member State is, for this research, set at 27 seats in the European Parliament. This figure is the average of seats of all the Member States.

The definition of a small and large Member State can be arguable. Not using the average of seats of the sample, but from all the Member States should make the clear border between small and large Member States comparable for more countries (also those not yet included in the dataset). The clear definition should make it reliable.

This variable is considered in the third hypothesis: *Smaller Member States have fewer incumbent members in the European Parliament than larger Member States*, as well as in the fourth hypothesis: *Smaller Member States will have a higher percentage of political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger Member States.*

3.4.5 Age groups

The age groups will be starting from the year that the people are allowed to vote, which is in all the European Union Member States 18 years, except Austria, where it is 16 years. With the youngest MEP is 21 years (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014d), the oldest MEP however is 92 years old (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014c). With these big differences the age groups are as follows: <30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, 60-70, 70-80, $\geq$ 80. When a person is 30 years old, this person will fall in the category of 30-40 years old.

The age groups defined can have validity problems, because there has never been an MEP that has an age lower than 21 years. However, with Austria where the voting age is 16, and the possibility to enter the European Parliament also set at 16 years old, it can be possible in the future to happen. The age groups still start at <30 years, this is chosen because the range of the ages starts at 21 years and is till 92 years. The age group <20 years would not be included, because there has never been yet an MEP that has had an age lower than 20 years old. The age groups are taken in steps of 10 years to make the results clearer, especially with such big differences between the ages of the MEPs. The reliability can be lower because of including these age groups.

This variable is considered in the fifth hypothesis: *A larger political party would have candidates from many age groups in the party than a smaller party.*

3.4.6 Small or large political party

When looking at party there can be looked at European political parties and national political parties. For this research there will be looked at the national political parties. The European political parties consist of national parties. When the European political parties are taken into consideration the difference between Member States cannot be examined clearly, because this European political party consists of members from Austria, Belgium, etc. The different backgrounds of the MEPs related to their national party, as well as the difference in heavyweights between Member States, cannot be examined when looking at a party that expands across the national borders of the Member States.

The size of each national legislature differs, and do some member states have a bicameral legislature, others only consist of only one chamber. For this research there is only looked at the House of Representatives. The definition of a small or large political party will not be given a number, because of the big differences in size of the House of Representatives in the Member States. This difference in the size of the House of Representatives in each Member State can make it hard to give a clear number as to what a small or large political party is. The size of the House of Representatives is the relevant variable, because it reflects the opinion of the voters and can provide a clear border for determining the parties size. For a large political party the party needs to have at 15% of the seats or more in the House of Representatives, a score of less than 15% will be classified as a small political party (an overview of the national political parties, their size and to which European political party they belong is given in Appenidx B).

This variable is reliable, but as with the variable heavyweights, the definition of a small and large political party can be arguable. However, a small political party has less than 15% seats and a large political party has at least 15% seats, there is a clear definition of the concept.

This variable is considered in the sixth hypothesis: *Smaller political parties have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger political parties.*

3.4.7 Comparing the variables

Variables	Year								N
MEPs score	2004	Range	0-399		400-1000		1000-2000	2000+	
		Cases	440		109		33	3	585
	2009	Range	0-399		400-1000		1000-2000	2000+	
		Cases	427		115		26	1	569
	2014	Range	0-399		400-1000		1000-2000	2000+	
		Cases	354		83		12	3	452
Age	2004	Range	<30	40	50	60	70	80	90	
		Cases	1	26	90	138	205	105	20	585
	2009	Range	<30	40	50	60	70	80	90	
		Cases	2	32	106	161	188	71	9	569
	2014	Range	<30	40	50	60	70	80	90	
		Cases	4	48	99	156	119	24	2	452

Table 9: The number of cases and the range for the variables: age and the MEPs score
note: N is the number of cases

3.4.8 Overview of identified independent variables

The hypotheses have all their own independent variables and how these are defined and measured will be explained in the following subsections, however a short overview is given in table 10.

Variable	
Region	The region is taken over from the paper from Lundell and noted in the dataset.
Electoral system	There are two main electoral systems used, STV and list, both PR, which one used is depending on MS. The system used for the European Parliament elections is key for determining the electoral system.
Incumbent members	The definition of incumbent members is taken over from the European Parliament and are those MEPs that have already served in the European Parliament at least once (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014b), and can be found in the dataset from W. Voermans.
Size MS	The border between a small and large MS is set at 27 seats in the EP, determined as the average figure of seats and MS in the EP. The proportion of seats for each MS found on site EP.
Size political party	Political party is defined as the national political parties and the size of these parties is determined as 15% of the seats in the national parliament (House of Representatives). The size of the political parties is given in appendix B, as well as to which EP party they are part of. The information is found on the sites of the different national parliaments.
Age	Benchmark between young and old is set at 40 years, below, young, over it, old. Is in the dataset from W. Voermans.
Gender	The division of men and women exists and is found in the dataset from W. Voermans.

Table 10: The independent variables and how these are measured.

4 Results

In this section the results will be shown towards each hypothesis. However, before moving to the hypotheses there was a difference noticed when working with the results. The difference found is related to the average heavyweight score per MEPs per country that was stated by W. Voermans (Voermans & Uzman, 2014). The average heavyweight score per candidate per country is shown in figure 1 in the introduction. When the new Member States are added to the existing graph, this is shown in figure 3.



Figure 3: The extended figure from W. Voermans
Note: not all the Member States are awarded for all the three years a score, this is because two reasons. The Member State is not part of the European Union yet, or the data for the specific year was not allowed to be used.
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

However, when trying to rebuild this figure, it seems that the results differ. When awarding the scores to each MEP there was no attention paid to when the MEP was in the European Parliament. If the MEP was serving the European Parliament in for example the year 2004, the MEP will also get a score for the year 2009 and 2014. When the average of these scores were included, even though the person was not part of the European Parliament. This can give biased results. When only using the scores for the MEPs that have been in the European Parliament at the correct year (also a MEP that has served in the European Parliament in 2004, only considering the score for the year 2004 and ignoring the scores awarded for the other years) the figure changes, as shown in table 4.



Figure 4: The changed average heavyweight score per candidate per Member State
Note: not all the Member States are awarded for all the three years a score, this is because two reasons. The Member State is not part of the European Union yet, or the data for the specific year was not allowed to be used.

Figure 4 shows that the changes differ for the Member States. When comparing the two figures, it appears that for example for Belgium the scores differs with 18%. When looking more specific at Luxembourg for the three years individually it appears that the new scores for the year 2004 are 189 points higher, in 2009 with 381 points lower and in 2014 with 11 points higher again.

When now continuing with the the results for the hypotheses, hypothesis 1 did not have enough cases to be considered and is therefore not considered in this section. Hypothesis 5 is divided into two subsections, each subsection reflecting a different reasoning. To find an answer to the hypothesis, firstly there will be looked at if there is a difference found between the variable heavyweights and the relevant independent variable. The dataset is made and prepared in excel and SPSS, however the SPSS dataset will be used to work with, mainly because it provides a clearer overview when doing a t-test. The independent sample t-test is to compare the means of two groups that are independent of each other and can be expressed in the way:

$H_o : \mu_1 = \mu_2$ (the means of the two populations are equal)

$H_1 : \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$ (the means of the two populations are not equal)

Whereby μ_1 and μ_2 are the means for group 1 and group 2. However an independent t-test requires the assumption of the homogeneity of variance (both groups are having the same variance). This is done in SPSS via the Levene's Test. The Levene's test consist of two hypotheses:

$H_0 : \sigma_1^2 - \sigma_2^2 = 0$ (group 1 and group 2 have equal population variances)

$H_1 : \sigma_1^2 - \sigma_2^2 \neq 0$ (group 1 and group 2 do not have equal population variances)

The independent t-test is a two-tailed test, for this research only a one-tailed test is applicable and can be expressed as:

$H_o : \mu_1 = \mu_2$ (the means of the two populations are equal)

$H_1 : \mu_1 > \mu_2$ (the mean of the group 1 is smaller than the mean of group 2)

To still use the output of the independent sample t-test, the direction of the t-statistic is important, besides the Levene's test p-value. If it is expected that the mean of group 1 is higher than the mean for group 2, there needs to be a positive t-value. To determine if the difference is significant or not the p-value needs to be divided by two. Since there is a symmetrical distribution expected the probability stays the same $\alpha = 0.05$. However the p-value for the independent sample t-test is for a two tailed distribution, and when looking at only a one-tailed distribution the p-value needs to be divided by two.

With $\alpha = 0{,}05$ and therefore a 95% Confidence Interval, the hypothesis can be rejected when $p < 0{,}05$ and cannot be rejected when $p > 0{,}05$.

$$95\%CI = \bar{x} \pm \frac{1.96\sigma}{\sqrt{n}} \tag{1}$$

Where $\bar{x}$ is the mean, σ the standard deviation and n the sample size.

Equation 1 shows the relation between the mean, standard deviation and sample size with a 95% confidence interval.

4.1 Region and heavyweight

The second hypothesis is: *In southern regions more political heavyweights are elected in the European Parliament than in the northern regions.* After performing a t-test in SPSS the following output was given (figure: 5):

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Score (heavyweight or not)	North	106	464,387	548,0219	53,2286
	South	333	333,949	356,5906	19,5410

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Score (heavyweight or not)	Equal variances assumed	18,825	,000	2,847	437	,005	130,4378	45,8141	40,3945	220,4812
	Equal variances not assumed			2,300	134,437	,023	130,4378	56,7022	18,2942	242,5815

Figure 5: T-test performed in SPSS: the region (North and South) and the heavyweight score analyzed

When looking at the mean value for the Northern and Southern Member States it shows that on average the Northern Member States have more heavyweights in the European Parliament then the Southern Member States. The relation is not in the expected direction and the results of the t-test are not analyzed in more detail.

4.2 Member State size and number of incumbent members

The third hypothesis is: *Smaller Member States have a less incumbent members in the European Parliament than larger Member States.* SPSS cannot directly read if a person is an incumbent member or not, therefore the MEPs got a separate score awarded, 15 points for it a person is an incumbent member and 5 points if this is not the case. The scores are selected at random. After performing a t-test in SPSS the following output was given (figure 6):

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Incumbent MEPs	Large	1451	12,78	11,481	,301
	Small	616	15,11	11,397	,459

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Incumbent MEPs	Equal variances assumed	12,381	,000	-4,223	2065	,000	-2,327	,551	-3,407	-1,246
	Equal variances not assumed			-4,236	1167,232	,000	-2,327	,549	-3,404	-1,249

Figure 6: T-test performed in SPSS: the country (large or small Member State) and the number of incumbent members analyzed

When looking at the mean value of the small and large Member States it shows a higher score for the smaller Member States, and indicates that smaller Member States have a more incumbent members in the European Parliament than larger Member States. The relation is not in the expected direction and the results of the t-test will not be analyzed in more detail further.

4.3 Member State size and heavyweight

The fourth hypothesis is: *Smaller Member States will have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger Member States.* After performing a t-test in SPSS the following output was given (figure 7):

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Country	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Score (heavyweight or not)	Small	499	433,707	474,9056	21,2597
	Large	1034	264,323	270,3182	8,4065

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Score (heavyweight or not)	Equal variances assumed	134,651	,000	8,873	1531	,000	169,3844	19,0906	131,9378	206,8310
	Equal variances not assumed			7,409	658,149	,000	169,3844	22,8614	124,4943	214,2745

Figure 7: T-test performed in SPSS: the country (large or small Member State) and the heavyweight score analyzed

When looking at the mean value and the t-value it indicates that the relation is moving in the expected direction. The p-value of the Levene's tests is $p < 0.001$, therefore we can reject the null of Levene's test and conclude that the variance in heavyweight score is significantly different between smaller and larger Member States. Therefore, there needs to be looked at the "Equal variances not assumed" row for the results of the t-test. With a p-value of 0,001 is less than the chosen significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we can conclude that the heavyweight score between smaller and larger Member States is not significantly different. Based on the results there was no significant difference in heavyweight score between large and small Member States

($t_{658,149} = 7,409, p = 0,001$). The average heavyweight score for smaller Member States was 169,3844 larger than for the larger Member States.

4.4 Political party size and heavyweight

The fifth hypothesis is: *Smaller national political parties have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger political parties.* As can be seen clearly in the causal model the size of the national political party can have an influence on the number of women in the political party as well as the average age of its members.

4.4.1 Party size and heavyweight score

In the upoming two sections there is looked at if the size of the national party has an influence on age and gender and if these two variables influence the number of heavyweights. What is not considered is however, if there size of the national political party is influencing the heavyweight score. If this is not the case, it can be unnecessary to look for variables that explain this difference. Therefore a t-test is performed (figure 8).

T-Test

Group Statistics

	National party	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Score (heavyweight or not)	Small	381	301,562	388,2796	19,8922
	Large	840	326,530	329,8129	11,3796

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Score (heavyweight or not)	Equal variances assumed	2,050	,153	-1,158	1219	,247	-24,9681	21,5623	-67,2713	17,3352
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,089	638,445	,276	-24,9681	22,9171	-69,9701	20,0339

Figure 8: T-test performed in SPSS: the party size (large or small national political party) and the heavyweight score analyzed

When considering the mean value for the small and large political parties it seems that the larger parties have on average more heavyweights in the European Parliament (the t-value is negative in this case because the large political party is in this case group 2). The p-value of the Levene's tests is p = 0.153, therefore we cannot reject the null of Levene's test and conclude that the variance in heavyweight score is not significantly different between smaller and larger political parties. Therefore, there needs to be looked at the "Equal variances assumed" row for the results of the t-test. With a p-value of 0,124 (that is: 0,247/2) is higher than the chosen significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we can conclude that the average heavyweight score between smaller and larger political parties is significantly different. Based on the results there was a significant difference in heavyweight score between small and large national parties ($t_{638,445} = -1,089, p = 0,124$). The average heavyweight score for larger national political parties is 24,9681 higher than for the smaller national political parties. There first will be looked at the variable gender and than followed by the variable age.

4.4.2 Gender, political party size and heavyweight

The size of the national political party is expected to have a negative influence on the variable gender. A smaller political party is expected to have less women in the European Parliament. Besides is argumented that women are often less likely to be a heavyweight than men. This is reflected in the sixth hypothesis: *Smaller political parties have fewer women in the European Parliament than the larger national political parties.* Therefore is expected that: Smaller national political parties have more political heavyweights in

the European Parliament than larger political parties. To test this relation there first is looked at if smaller political parties have less women than larger political parties. SPSS cannot perform a t-test with the variables "m" and "v", therefore there are points awarded regarding the gender, m = 10 points and v = 2 points.

T-Test

Group Statistics

	National party	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
m/v	Small	385	7,15	3,835	,195
	Large	844	7,39	3,752	,129

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
m/v	Equal variances assumed	3,971	,047	-1,033	1227	,302	-,240	,232	-,696	,216
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,025	729,138	,306	-,240	,234	-,700	,220

Figure 9: T-test performed in SPSS: the party size (large or small national political party) and the gender differences analyzed

When looking at the mean variable in figure 9 it seems that smaller national political parties have a lower mean than the larger national political parties. This indicates that smaller parties have more women in the European Parliament on average than the larger political parties. The relationship is not going in the expected direction and the t-test will not be analyzed any further.

When than looking at if women are indeed less likely to be a heavyweight than men a t-test is performed (figure 10).

T-Test

Group Statistics

	m/v	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Score (heavyweight or not)	m	811	321,899	351,9355	12,3581
	v	410	312,488	343,8830	16,9832

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Score (heavyweight or not)	Equal variances assumed	,013	,908	,445	1219	,657	9,4111	21,1640	-32,1108	50,9330
	Equal variances not assumed			,448	838,148	,654	9,4111	21,0036	-31,8148	50,6369

Figure 10: T-test performed in SPSS: the gender (m/v) and the heavyweight score analyzed

When looking at the mean variable in figure 10 and the t-variable the relation is going in the expected direction. The p-value of the Levene's tests is p = 0.908, therefore we cannot reject the null of Levene's test. Therefore, there needs to be looked at the "Equal variances assumed" row for the results of the t-test. With a p-value of 0,327 (that is: 0,654/2) is higher than the chosen significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we can conclude that the heavyweight score between men and women differs significantly. Women are less likely to be a heavyweight than men. Based on the results there was a significant difference in the heavyweight score between men and women ($t_{1219} = 0,445, p = 0,327$). The heavyweight score for men was on average 9,4111 higher than for women.

4.4.3 Age, political party size and heavyweight

The size of a national political party is expected to have an influence on the age of the persons for the party in the European Parliament. It is expected that smaller national political parties have more members that are older than 40 years old. Besides is argumented that the MEPs that have an age above the 40 years old are more likely to be a heavyweight. First there will be looked at if the size of a political party does have an influence on the age of its MEPs, the performed t-test is shown in figure **??**.

T-Test

Group Statistics

	National party	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Age	Small	385	67,98	137,433	7,004
	Large	844	57,05	10,817	,372

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Age	Equal variances assumed	7,470	,006	2,297	1227	,022	10,937	4,760	1,597	20,276
	Equal variances not assumed			1,559	386,172	,120	10,937	7,014	-2,854	24,727

Figure 11: T-test performed in SPSS: the party size (large or small national political party) and average age analyzed

When looking at the mean variable an the t-value it seams that smaller national political parties indeed have on average MEPs that have a higher average age than the larger political parties. The p-value of the Levene's tests is p = 0.006, therefore we can reject the null of Levene's test. Therefore, there needs to be looked at the "Equal variances not assumed" row for the results of the t-test. With a p-value of 0,060 (that is: 0,120/2) is higher than the chosen significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we can conclude that the average age between smaller and larger political parties is significantly different. Based on the results there was no significant difference in the heavyweight score between men and women ($t_{386,172} = 1,559, p = 0,060$). The mean age for small national parties was on average 10,937 years higher than for larger national parties.

Than there needs to be looked at if MEPs that are a heavyweight are on average older than than MEPs that are not a heavyweight. After performing a t-test in SPSS the following output was given (figure **??**).

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Score (heavyweight or not)	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Age	>= 400,0	335	70,71	147,078	8,036
	< 400,0	886	56,64	11,117	,373

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Age	Equal variances assumed	8,755	,003	2,827	1219	,005	14,064	4,975	4,303	23,825
	Equal variances not assumed			1,748	335,444	,081	14,064	8,044	-1,760	29,888

Figure 12: T-test performed in SPSS: the average age and the heavyweight score analyzed

When considering the mean variable and the t-value the relation is moving in the expected direction. The p-value of the Levene's tests is p = 0.003, therefore we can reject the null of Levene's test. Therefore, there needs to be looked at the "Equal variances not assumed" row for the results of the t-test. With a p-value of 0,041 (that is: 0,081/2) is lower than the chosen significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$, we can conclude that the average age between MEPs that are heavyweight or not is not significantly different. Based on the results there was no significant difference in the heavyweight score between men and women ($t_{335,444} = 1,748, p = 0,041$). The mean age for heavyweights is on average 14,064 years higher than for the MEPs that are not a heavyweight.

4.5 More women is fewer heavyweights?

The seventh hypothesis is: *National political parties that have more women have fewer heavyweights in the European Parliament than parties that have a lower percentage of women.* The relation between the percentage of women, percentage of heavyweights and the European political parties are already covered in the previous subsection. It showed that larger political parties have on average more women than the smaller political parties.

Custom Tables

	m/v	
	m	v
	Mean	Mean
Score (heavyweight or not)	321,9	312,5

Figure 13: The mean heavyweight score for men and women in the European Parliament

Custom Tables

			m/v	
			m	v
			Mean	Mean
National party	Large	Score (heavyweight or not)	328,1	323,3
	Small	Score (heavyweight or not)	307,6	290,6

Figure 14: The mean heavyweight score for men and women in the European Parliament, sorted for large and small national political parties

Figure 13 show the average heavyweight score for both men and women. The mean value is higher for men than women, and as earlier stated, is this difference significant. Figure 14 shows the mean values for the heavyweight score for men and women for both small and large national parties. The table shows that for large national political parties as small national political parties there men have on average a higher heavyweight score than women. However this difference is bigger for smaller national parties than for the larger parties.

5 Discussion

After analyzing the results it can be noted that not all expected relations are found or move in the expected direction. This change can be the result from several reasons. The hypotheses will be considered and the possible reasons why the relation was not moving in the expected way or was significant will be given.

The first hypothesis covered in the results is: *In southern regions more political heavyweights are elected in the European Parliament than in the northern regions.* The found relation is going in the expected direction, however it is not significant. The reasoning for a difference in heavyweights is described in an article (Lundell, 2004) that notes that Southern regions apply a different selection method than the Northern regions. The difference in selection method can explain the difference in heavyweights. It appears that Northern Member States elect more heavyweights than the Southern regions. This can happen, because Estonia has a relatively high average of political heavyweights (for example: according to the dataset, there were 100% heavyweights in the year 2004). There are only three Nordic countries included in the dataset and five southern Member States, this small number of countries can influence the results.

The second hypothesis is: *Smaller Member States have a less incumbent members in the European Parliament than larger Member States.* The relations is moving in the different direction than expected. This reasoning is based on one of the conclusions of W. Voermans. Luxembourg is a small Member State with few seats in the European Parliament and few incumbent members. Whether Luxembourg is the only small country that has a small number of incumbent members was not know. It was expected that the other smaller Member States would have the same characteristic as Luxembourg. However, this is not the case. That this could differ was acknowledged in the theory, but without exact knowledge about the other Member States no concrete reasoning was formed. This can explain that the relation is moving in the different direction.

The next hypothesis is: *Smaller Member States will have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger Member States.* The relationship is present, however not significant. It was expected that the incumbent members have an influence on the number of heavyweights. However, the influence of the number of incumbent members might be less than expected and even other variables might influence the relation between the size of the Member State and the number of heavyweights. One of the variables can be the number of candidates for the European Parliament elections.

The fourth hypothesis covered in the results section is: *Smaller national political parties have more political heavyweights in the European Parliament than larger political parties.* It was expected that the variables age and gender would influence this relationship. First it was examined whether smaller national political parties indeed have more heavyweights in the European Parliament, and this is not the case. This might be caused because larger national parties can attract more candidates. The larger national parties are often not only in parliament, but also in government. These larger national political parties can have more candidates that have more political experience.

First the variable gender was covered. According to the results the smaller national political parties have more women than larger national parties on average and following, that women are less likely to be a heavyweight than men. As was expected in the theory section women are less likely to be a heavyweight than men. However, smaller national political parties have in comparison more women than larger national parties, this was not as expected. A possible explanation for this is hard to find in the literature, but can be that smaller national parties have fewer members. When the smaller party has more women in the party itself than the minimum set with the gender quota this will influence the results more than is the case for larger parties. To have the same influence for larger national parties, they need to adopt more women than in comparison with the smaller national parties.

Than the variable age was covered. This variable is also covered in the hypothesis: *Smaller political parties have fewer women in the European Parliament than the larger national political parties.* As expected did the smaller national parties have on average older members than the larger political parties. However, the age of the members did not have a significant influence on the number of heavyweights. It can be that the age is not only dependent on the party, but also on the Member State, i.e. smaller Member States have on average older MEPs than the larger Member States.

What should also be considered is the dataset itself. Currently the dataset is still incomplete, from the

Member States that are included in the dataset there are at least 65% or more MEPs covered. The missing part can influence the results slightly, although no big differences are expected. The other issues that were already found have already been covered in the methods section.

For further research on this topic, several points of interests are identified:

- The research could cover more independent variables, as for example the voters of a political party or the way how the candidate selection process is done.
- The dataset includes only the age, start and end date in the European Parliament, and the heavyweight score. If the functions, for example prime minister, could be added, it could make the dataset more interesting for examining if the political functions could be potential independent variable.
- The research from W. Voermans and J. Uzman included the countries in their dataset that had at least 65% of the MEPs. How this 65% is selected has not been investigated and could be seen if this selection has been done randomly and could influence the outcome.
- More countries could be included in the dataset or the dataset, that now starts in the year 2004 could also cover MEPs that have been in the European Parliament for example in the year 1994. This could maybe show if there is a trend that certain Member States are sending more heavyweights to the European Parliament than others.
- The heavyweight score per candidate differs and it could be investigated if candidates with a higher score have more influence in the European Parliament than candidates with a lower score. This could be done on a individual level, but also party level or Member State level.

6 Conclusion

The research question that was introduced in the beginning of this research is:

> Why do some political parties in the European Parliament have more heavyweights in the European Parliament than other parties?

Heavyweights have completed 402 terms out of the 2067 terms included in this research. This gives that 19% from the number of MEPs there are a heavyweight. There are differences between the national political parties as well as the Member States related to how many heavyweights are send to the European Parliament. This research identified several variables that could have an influence on this.

When looking at the level of the Member State, there is one possible reason that can be found to have an influence the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament, that is the number of incumbent members. When parties are active in a smaller Member State are more likely to have a higher percentage of incumbent members send to the European Parliament than larger Member States. However, the size of the Member State cannot be seen as a potential influence for the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament.

When taking into consideration the political party level, a possible reason that can have an influence on the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament is the national political party size. It appears that larger national political parties have more heavyweights in the European Parliament than the smaller national political parties. Besides do the variables gender and age support this reasoning, smaller national political parties have on average older MEPs than the larger national parties.

That a candidate is elected in the European Parliament means that the voters as the corresponding national political party has faith in the candidate. However, the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament can have an influence on the decision making and can say something about the strategy of a political party. With many heavyweights send to the European Parliament there is no guarantee that the party or Member State can have more influence on the decision-making process, than a party with less experienced politicians. However there is a chance that a heavyweight can exercise more influence. This is preferential for the national political party as well as the associated Member State.

The possibility that the number of heavyweights send to the European Parliament will differ rapidly will be unlikely. When looking at the average heavyweight score per candidate per Member State in figure 4 it seems that the scores differ per term widely and no real connection is present. However, for a trend to be seen, the information for more years is needed. Also the voters can have an influence on this. Though the European Parliament elects are often still seen as second order elections. The attitudes of the voters first needs to be changed will there be a change that more experienced or suited people will be elected in the European Parliament.

A causal model was made and is shown in figure 15.



Figure 15: The improved Causal Model.
Note: A solid black straight line: the relation is going in the anticipated way and is significant, a blue +/- sign: the relation is moving in the other direction and a dotted blue line: the relation is not significant.

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A The changed scorecard and effect on the scores for the MEPs

Scorecard	Immediately before	> 2 year before candidate EP	> 8 year before candidate EP
Membership national (federal) parliament	209	121	33
President of a parliamentary chamber/Group leader	550	330	55
Member of a regional parliament entity >1.000.000 citizens	100	60	10
Member of a regional parliament entity >100.000, but <1.000.000 citizens	40	20	0
Member of a regional parliament entity <100.000 citizens	10	5	0
Member of the European Parliament	110	55	11
Chair of a Group in the EP	220	82,5	22
(Vice-)President of the EP	330	220	55
Member of the European Commission	330	220	55
Prime Minister/President of a national (federal) government	770	550	220
Cabinet Minister in a national (federal) government	550	385	55*
Junior Minister (Secretary of State) in a national (federal) government	253	143	55
Member of a regional government entity >1.000.000 citizens	230	130	50
Member of a regional government entity >100.000, but <1.000.000 citizens	100	50	0
Member of a regional government entity <100.000 citizens	55	25	0
A leading position in industry, civil service or civil society	200	0	0
Member of the national (federal) party executive	100	50	0

Table 11: The changed scorecard whereby functions at national and european level are awarded a 10% higher score.
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)
*Note: when changing the scores for each MEP there seems to be an error made in the used scores for each MEP. In the original scorecard a Cabinet Minister in a national (federal) government that had this functions more than 8 years ago should be awarded a score of 150 points. In the dataset however there is only a score awarded of 50 points. The changed scores should be 165 and now is in the case of the modified score only 55. To not make the changes bigger with the modified scorecard this error is taken into account and adjusted.

MEP	Start term EP	End term EP	2004	2009	2014
Ansip, A.	01-07-14	31-10-14	150	1460	2200
Ilves, T.H.	24-04-03	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	08-10-06	1000	1350	1460
Kallas, Kaja	01-07-14		0	0	290
Kelam, Tunne	20-07-04	13-07-09			
	14-07-09	30-06-14			
	01-07-14		490	430	350
Lauristin, Marju	01-07-14		650	490	330
Mikko, Marianne	20-07-04	13-07-09	0	100	240
Ojuland, Kristiina	14-07-09	30-06-14	1300	1240	540
Ovirr, Siiri	01-05-04	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	13-07-09			
	14-07-09	30-06-14	1590	1040	650
Padar, Ivari	14-07-09	06-04-14	1345	1715	1070
Saks, Katrin	09-10-06	13-07-09			
	07-04-14	30-06-14	690	610	230
Savi, Toomas	24-04-03	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	13-07-09	1440	760	260
Savisaar-Toomast, Vilja	14-07-09	30-06-14	410	1050	615
Tarand, Andres	20-07-04	13-07-09	1530	940	480
Tarand, Indrek	14-07-09	30-06-14			
	01-07-14		30	30	130
Toom, Yana	01-07-14		0	0	240

Table 12: The scores for the MEPs from Estonia, with the standard scorecard
Source: (Voermans & Uzman, 2014)

MEP	Start term EP	End term EP	2004	2009	2014
Ansip, A.	01-07-14	31-10-14	150	1576	2398
Ilves, T.H.	24-04-03	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	08-10-06	1080	1580	1596
Kallas, Kaja	01-07-14		0	0	309
Kelam, Tunne	20-07-04	13-07-09			
	14-07-09	30-06-14			
	01-07-14		529	430	380
Lauristin, Marju	01-07-14		715	539	363
Mikko, Marianne	20-07-04	13-07-09	0	110	264
Ojuland, Kristiina	14-07-09	30-06-14	1380	1308	572
Ovirr, Siiri	01-05-04	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	13-07-09			
	14-07-09	30-06-14	1713	1122	695
Padar, Ivari	14-07-09	06-04-14	1464	1869	1172
Saks, Katrin	09-10-06	13-07-09			
	07-04-14	30-06-14	759	666	251
Savi, Toomas	24-04-03	19-07-04			
	20-07-04	13-07-09	1579	857	285
Savisaar-Toomast, Vilja	14-07-09	30-06-14	429	1130	669
Tarand, Andres	20-07-04	13-07-09	1683	1024	528
Tarand, Indrek	14-07-09	30-06-14			
	01-07-14		33	33	143
Toom, Yana	01-07-14		0	0	259

Table 13: The scores for the MEPs from Estonia, with the modified scorecard

B The national political parties

Table 14: The European political parties, the national political parties that are part of the European political parties and the percentage of seats the national political parties have in the House of Representatives for the respective Member State
Note: For some national political parties there is noted "NP", this means that the there are no national political parties member for the specific European political party

Member State	**European Parliament party**	**National party**	**Percentage of seats in the 2014 House of Representatives**
Austria	Group of the European People's Party	Österreichische Volkspartei	26%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	28%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	New Austria	5%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Die Grünen	13%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Belgium	Group of the European People's Party	Chirsten-Democratisch en Vlaams	12%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Parti Socialiste and Socialistische Partij Andersa	24%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Aliantie)	22%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Mouvement Réformateur	13%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Ecolo/Groen	8%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

Bulgaria	Group of the European People's Party	GERB	35%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Bulgarian Socialist Party	15%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Bulgaria Without Censorship and Bulgarian National Movement	9%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Movement for Rights and Freedoms and National Movement for Stability and Prosperity	15%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Zelena Partija Bulgaria and Zelenite	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Croatia	Group of the European People's Party	HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	27%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Social Democratic Party of Croatia	37%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Hrvatska Konzervativna Stranka (Croatian Conservative Party)	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Croatian People's Party - Liberal Democrats and Croatian Social Liberal Party	9%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	ORaH	1%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Cyprus	Group of the European People's Party	Dimokratikos Synagermos (Democratic Rally)	36%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Movement for Social Democracy	9%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	United Democrats	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Progressive Party of Working People	34%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Cyprus Green Party	2%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Czech-Republic	Group of the European People's Party	TOP 09	13%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Czech Social Democratic Party	25%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Hrvatska Konzervativna Stranka	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	ANO 2011	24%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	17%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Strana Zelených / Czech Greens	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	Party of Free Citizens	0%
Denmark	Group of the European People's Party	Det Konservative Folkeparti	3%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Social Democrats	26%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF)	21%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Radikale Venstre and Venstre Danmarks Liberale Parti	23%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	People's Movement against the EU	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Socialistisk Folkeparti	4%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

Estonia	Group of the European People's Party	Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit, IRL	14%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Social Democratic Party	15%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Eesti Keskerakond and Eesti Reformierakond	56%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Eestimaa Rohelised	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
France	Group of the European People's Party	Les Républicains	34%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Socialist Party	51%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	NP	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Left Front	2%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Europe Ecologie - Les Verts	3%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	Independent MEP	0%
Germany	Group of the European People's Party	Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU	40%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Social Democratic Party of Germany	31%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) and Family Party of Germany (Familien-Partei Deutschlands)	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Freie Demokratische Partei	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	The Left	10%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	10%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Luxembourg	Group of the European People's Party	Chrëschtlech Sozial Volleksspartei, CSV	38%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	22%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Parti Démocratique	22%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	déi gréng	10%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Malta	Group of the European People's Party	Partit Nazzjonalista ,PN	42%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Labour Party	57%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	NP	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Alternattiva Demokratika - the Green Party	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

Portugal	Group of the European People's Party	Partido Social Democrata, PSD	47%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Socialist Party	32%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	MPT	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Left Bloc and Democratic Unity Coalition	10%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Partido Ecologista "Os Verdes"	1%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Poland	Group of the European People's Party	Platforma Obywatelska, PO	44%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union	7%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Law and Justice Party and Right Wing of the Republic	32%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Partia Demokratyczna	0%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	NP	0%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Zieloni	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	Independent MEP	0%
Spain	Group of the European People's Party	Partido Popular, PP	53%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	31%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Convergncia Democrtica de Catalunya	0%

Table 14 - - *Continued from previous page*

	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	United left	3%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds	1%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	NP	0%
Sweden	Group of the European People's Party	Moderata samlingspartiet (Moderaterna), MOD	24%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Swedish Social Democratic Party	32%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	NP	0%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Folkpartiet Liberalerna and Centerpartiet	9%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Left Party	6%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Miljöpartiet de Gröna	7%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	Sweden Democrats	14%
United Kingdom	Group of the European People's Party	NP	0%
	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	Labour Party	36%
	European Conservatives and Reformists Group	Conservative Party and Ulster Unionist Party	51%
	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Liberal Democrats	1%
	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	Sinn Féin	1%
	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Greens	0%
	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	UK Independence Party	0%