THE EMOTIONAL ROUTE TOWARDS (NON)NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR

Individual and group factors that influence anger and contempt in becoming radicalized

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Abstract

This study aims to gain more insights in both individual and group factors leading to radicalization by investigating the roles of emotions (anger and contempt) and personal life events of respondents. A survey was conducted among Dutch citizens (n = 150) in which an experiment was embedded to examine the potential moderating effects of personal life events. Results found that collective emotions mediate the relationships between personal emotions on legitimization of (non)normative actions. Also, collective deprivation affects collective emotions and personal deprivation influences personal emotions. Personal life events did not moderate these relationships. These results confirm the study of Tausch et al. (2011), which emphasizes the necessity to insert personal and group anger and contempt in radicalization models. More research is needed to know if and how negative life events can trigger an individual to radicalize and should attempt to identify factors and/or mechanisms which facilitate the relationship between personal and collective emotions in radicalization processes.

The Emotional Route Towards Nonnormative Behavior

Recently there has been much discussion in the Netherlands about newly built refugee centers to accommodate refugees fleeing from the war in Syria, which led to heated debates, demonstrations and lately even to incidents needing police intervention. This is an illustrative example of how a society suddenly becomes polarized in anti- and pro-groups and how individuals become engaged in or start supporting radical collective actions. Although there are many theories and models that attempt to provide insight into the process of radicalization, no single factor, personality trait, or (group) processes can be identified (e.g. Merret et al., 2013; King & Taylor, 2011). A problem is that most discourse of radicalization often takes on an individualistic perspective to study collective actions (Borum, 2003, in: King & Taylor, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005, Wiktorowicz, 2004, in: King & Taylor, 2011). Veldhuis and Bakker (2007) state that radicalization can only be explained by understanding the behavior of individual people in those groups in contrast to Kühle and Lindekilde (2012) who argue for a more complex relationship between the individual and the group. This present study strives to gain more insight into the combination of both individual and group factors that lead to radicalization. Radicalization is hereby defined as the perception of legitimization of nonnormative actions by oneself or one's group (Tausch et al., 2011). Nonnormative actions can be explained as actions that violate the laws and regulations of the social system (Wright et al., 1990), in contrast to normative actions, which fall within the boundaries of the social system.

Models of radicalization explain how radicalization is enhanced by comparing the in-group with the out-group, hereby targeting an 'enemy' group (e.g. Borum, 2003, in: King & Taylor, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005), which stems from an in-group bias (Scheepers et al., 2010). However, it does not explain how this could lead to radicalization. A related stream of research studying extreme group behaviors attributes radical actions of groups to emotions, especially anger and contempt, because emotions have to power to motivate an individual towards a certain action, which is dependent on the context, the type and the intensity of the emotion (Frijda, 1986).

Negative emotions: anger and contempt

The difference between anger and contempt is that the first is based on an evaluation of negative intentions, and the latter on an evaluation of low controllability. Anger would hereby lead to actions towards a person or group, whereas contempt would lead to avoidant behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; in: Ufkes et al., 2012). Essess et al. (2008) state that

contempt stems from outgroup dehumanization, ‘we’ vs ‘them’, which can serve as a stepping stone to legitimize extreme actions (e.g. nonnormative actions) and social exclusion, because it is related to perceptions of inferiority of the out-group (Izard, 1977). Contempt in this study is defined as an emotion where there is a psychological distance to another person (Tausch et al., 2011).

Although emotions are typically viewed from an individual perspective, they can also be studied on group level. However, individual emotions differ from collective emotions because in order to experience collective emotions, individuals need to identify him- or herself with a social group and have to feel they belong to and are a part of that group (Smith et al., 2007). This means that collective emotions are only experienced within the context of a social identity, in contrast to personal emotions, which can be experienced independent of the group an individual is part of. Thus group membership is a necessary precondition in order to experience collective emotions (Goldenberg & van Zomeren, 2015). Taking these considerations into account, several studies have investigated collective anger and contempt (e.g. Gordijn et al., 2006; Goldenberg & van Zomeren, 2015). Similar to personal anger, collective anger is also an action-driven emotion, and collective contempt implicates an avoidant attitude, namely the social exclusion of a person or group. Collective anger and contempt are normally directed towards out-groups that have harmed or are posing a threat to the in-group (Gordijn et al., 2006, Van Zomeren et al., 2004, Van Zomeren et al., 2008 and Yzerbyt et al., 2003; in: Goldenberg & van Zomeren, 2015).

Relationship between anger and contempt

Tausch et al. (2011) propose that a person’s previously experienced incidents with anger can lead to contempt. However, it is not clear how intention towards a person or group could eventually lead to avoiding those people. De Vos et al. (2013) explain that anger should not always be considered as a negative emotion, but that communication of ‘pure’ anger indicates that the out-group seeks to establish a positive relationship with the in-group. However, when anger persists over a longer period of time, it could well develop into contempt, indicating a desire to exclude another person or group (Fischer & Roseman, 2007, Frijda et al., 1989, Ufkes et al., 2012). This would imply that anger has the ability to turn into contempt, as Tausch et al. (2011) suggest, when the out-group feels that the in-group does not value a positive relationship with the out-group, or when multiple attempts of the out-group to establish a positive relationship are turned down by the in-group. Further, personal and collective anger, as a more constructive action-driven emotion, would have a higher effect on

the legitimization of normative actions, whereas personal and collective contempt, as an avoidant emotion, would sooner induce nonnormative actions instead of normative actions. This leads to the following hypotheses.

H1a: *Both personal and collective anger have a direct positive relationship with legitimization of normative actions*
H1b: *Both personal and collective contempt have a direct positive relationship with legitimization of nonnormative actions*

Catalyzing effect of social identification

In the radicalization models of Sageman (2008) and Wiktorowicz (2004, in: King & Taylor, 2011) the group serves as a catalyst and is considered crucial for any form of radicalization to take place. In-group identification is one of the background variables in the model of Doosje, Loseman and Bos (2013) that are necessary for an individual to engage in the radicalization process. Kruglanski (2013) also takes on this perspective, and states that social processes influence a person in becoming radical. It also suggests that an individual does not have to possess a large network of 'radical' people within an organization, as proposed by Moghaddam (2005) and Borum (2003, in: King & Taylor, 2011), but only one or two close friends, relatives, etc., could already suffice for an individual to take over the radical ideology of the group. This is similar to the precondition of Goldenberg and van Zomeren (2015) that social identification needs to take place in order to experience collective emotions. Based on this premise, it is hypothesized (1) that personal emotions will affect collective emotions when social identification is present and (2) that collective anger and contempt have a stronger effect on the legitimization of nonnormative actions than personal anger and contempt, because of the fact that the group itself serves as a catalyst. This leads to the following hypotheses.

H2a: *Personal anger has a direct positive relationship on legitimization of normative actions, but this effect is lower than the relationship between collective anger and legitimization of normative actions.*
H2b: *Personal contempt has a direct positive relationship on legitimization of nonnormative actions, but this effect is lower than the relationship between collective contempt and legitimization of nonnormative actions.*
H3a: *Personal emotions (anger and contempt) have a positive relationship with collective emotions (anger and contempt).*
H3b: *The relationship between personal and collective emotions is positively moderated by social identification with the group the individual identifies him-or herself with.*

Relative deprivation

Relative deprivation is often mentioned as a factor that can influence a person to become radical (Doosje et al., 2013; King & Taylor, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005; Wiktorwicz, 2004; Sageman, 2008; Van den Bos et al., 2012). It does not consist of the actual deprivation,

but of the perception an individual has on certain elements or treatments that he or she feels deprived of. In the study of Doosje, Loseman, and Bos (2013) and Moghaddam (2005) the individual perception about one's own relative deprivation and their group's relative deprivation determines if a person would adopt a radical belief system.

Doosje, Loseman, and Bos (2013) found that individual relative deprivation is a precursor of 'distance to other people', as is contempt, according to the definition that contempt indicates a psychological distance to another person (Tausch et al, 2011, Fischer & Roseman, 2007). They found significant results for this relationship because relative deprivation would be considered a threat for the economic status of one's own group. Most models place collective relative deprivation parallel to individual relative deprivation (Doosje et al., 2013, Moghaddam, 2005; Borum, 2005, in: King & Taylor, 2011). Collective relative deprivation is said to affect feelings of group disadvantages (e.g. Doosje et al., 2013; van den Bos, 2012; Moghaddam, 2005). Moghaddam (2005) argues that individuals want to improve the status of their group. Here, perceptions of unfairness and collective relative deprivation are mentioned as psychological factors that influence a person to want to 'do something' against this injustice and unfairness of their group. By 'punishing' the other group through nonnormative actions, the individual is thus hopeful in finding retribution for the perceived relative deprivation and injustice towards him/herself and his/her group.

This suggests a parallel pathway between on the one hand collective relative deprivation and collective anger and contempt and on the other hand individual relative deprivation and individual anger and contempt, even more because of the fact that experiencing collective emotions can only take place when an individual identifies himself with a particular group (Goldenberg & van Zomeren, 2015). This leads to the formulation of the following hypotheses.

H4a: *Personal relative deprivation has a positive relationship with personal anger and contempt.*
H4b: *Collective relative deprivation has a positive relationship with collective anger and contempt.*

Negative life events

Wiktorowicz (2004, in: King & Taylor, 2011) and Sageman (2008) suggest that it is not just the perception of relative deprivation, as proposed by Doosje et al. (2013) and Moghaddam (2005), but also actual personal events that could trigger a person to become radical. After experiencing a negative personal life event, an individual would be more receptive to extreme religious ideologies. Adverse life events, or strains, have often been mentioned as precursors to nonnormative behavior, such as violence and criminality (Agnew,

2006). Further studies have sought and found relations between these strains and criminal/violent behavior (Delisi, 2011; Flouri & Panourgia, 2011). A distinction needs to be made between negative life events that most people experience, such as going to a new school, which are normative adverse life events, and nonnormative negative life events, such as being homeless, attacked, etc. (Thompson & Greve, 2013). It is argued that only the latter would influence nonnormative behavior (Wright et al., 1990). Tausch et al. (2011) explain this by stating that previous experiences with anger can lead to contempt, and thus to legitimization of nonnormative actions, although Wiktorowicz (2004, in: King & Taylor, 2011) suggests that other negative experiences, which are not necessarily related to the out-group, would also affect the relationship between relative deprivation and negative emotions.

H5: *The relationship between (individual and collective) relative deprivation and (personal and collective) anger and contempt is positively moderated by negative life events of an individual.*

Hypothesized model

Based on the above mentioned hypotheses, a model of these relationships is constructed and can be viewed in figure 1.



Figure 1. Hypothesized model

Method

Participants, design and procedure

A total of 150 Dutch citizens (75 men and 75 women) participated in an online experimental questionnaire in exchange for a small fee (€ 3,-). The experiment was set up within a general research survey to investigate the hypothesized model. It consisted of respondents being allocated to one of two conditions (positive vs. negative life events) to measure possible different effects of personal life events on the relationship between relative deprivation and emotions. Using an external bureau (ISO certified) an online panel was approached. The respondents received a link to open the questionnaire. They had to agree with the informed consent form in order to fill in the survey. First, they were asked about their just-world beliefs. Then, they were randomly assigned to one of the two life event groups. The negative life event group read the following information (all original research questions were in Dutch):

I want to ask you about certain events that happened in your life and how these have affected your current daily life. I want to ask you if you could think back to negative and/or tedious events in your life. Could you indicate if you ever have experienced one of the following events? If so, could you please fill out some questions about this event?

For the positive life event group, the second line was altered into: "*I want to ask you if you could think back to positive and/or happy events in your life*". Next, in order to identify an out-group towards which they would possibly legitimize nonnormative events, this study was embedded within the current discussion about asylum centers in the Netherlands. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Dutch: Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, COA) was hereby specifically targeted as the out-group. All respondents read the following information:

The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is the leading governmental institution responsible for the accommodation, assistance and outflow of refugees in the Netherlands. Among other tasks, the COA is looking for locations for emergency shelters and refugee centers. Lately, in many villages and cities refugee centers are built to accommodate the growing number of Syria refugees. Could you image that a proposal to build a COA refugee center is approved in your village or city? With this in mind, could you please answer the next questions?

Then the respondents had to fill in the remaining questions based on the constructs which will be explained in the next paragraph. At the end all respondents were thanked for their participation and they could leave their email addresses for a full debriefing.

Measures

The main constructs are (personal and collective) relative deprivation, personal life events, personal anger, collective anger, personal contempt, collective contempt, social

identification and legitimization of (non)normative actions. Also, additional constructs were included in the questionnaire for explorative analyses. These are (personal and general) just-world beliefs, perceived group action efficacy, social support and social action support.

Personal life events. The positive and negative life events were derived from Scully et al. (2000). Positive life events included marriage, having a child, vacation, promotion, achieving a personal goal, a new hobby, a financial break or fortune, meeting new friends and following a new study. Negative life evens included a small violation of the law (e.g. speeding ticket), divorce, fired from work, problems with boss or manager, quarrel with friend(s), health problems, decease of a close friend/relative, victim of a robbery, victim of burglary. After each life event of which the respondent stated he or she had experienced this, he or she was asked four items, namely 'How long ago did this happen/ Where took this event place/ Do you often think back to this event/ On a scale of 1-10 (10 being the highest) how much do you experience the consequences of this event in your current daily life?". It was expected that people in the negative life events condition would have higher feelings of relative deprivation, and vice versa. A manipulation check revealed however that this manipulation was not effective, since no significant differences between the two conditions were found.

Relative deprivation. Personal and collective relative deprivation was measured with respectively seven and eight items based on the measurement requirements for relative deprivation by Smit et al. (2012), namely that it would require (1) a clear comparison referent, (2) a measure for angry resentment, and (3) avoid ambiguity between personal and general relative deprivation. Personal relative deprivation was measured with seven items (α = .94; i.e. "I feel that I am personally disadvantaged by this proposal of the COA to place a refugee center in my village or city/ I feel personally more unsafe in my village or city when there is going to be a refugee center placed here"). Collective relative deprivation was measured with eight items (α = .94; i.e. "I believe that my village or city is disadvantaged by this proposal of the COA to build a refugee center here"). All items of both constructs were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "totally disagree" (1) and "totally agree" (6).

Personal anger. Personal anger was measured with three items derived from Ufkes et al. (2012). A reliable scale was obtained (α = .99; i.e. "I feel angry/irritated/annoyed about the refugee center in my village or city"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "totally disagree" (1) and "totally agree" (7).

Personal contempt. Personal contempt was measured with three items derived from

Ufkes et al. (2012). A reliable scale was obtained (α = .98; i.e. "I feel contempt / aversion / disdain about the refugee center in my village or city"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "totally disagree" (1) and "totally agree" (7).

Collective anger. Items for collective anger were adapted from De Vos et al. (2013), based on the notion that anger indicates an action towards the out-group. It was measured with three items (α = .96; i.e. "As a citizen of this village or city I would actively try to change/hamper/argue with this proposal of the COA"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7).

Collective contempt. Collective contempt was measured with three items based on the definition of Fischer & Roseman (2007), based on their definition that contempt consists of (1) the derogation of the object of contempt, (2) the deterioration of social relationship, and (3) social exclusion. A reliable scale was obtained (α = .95; i.e. "I feel part of my village or city/ I feel connected to the other residents in my village or city/ I am happy to live in this village or city"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7).

Social identification. This study measured social identification based on the three items of van Zomeren et al. (2004). A reliable scale was obtained (α = .84; i.e. "I feel part of my village or city/ I feel connected to the other residents in my village or city/ I am happy to live in this village or city"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7).

Legitimization of extreme group actions. This construct consisted of three subscales, namely (1) legitimization of normative actions, such as attending discussion meetings, distributing flyers, signing petitions, (2) legitimization of nonnormative nonviolent actions, for example blocking streets and buildings, and (3) legitimization of nonnormative violent actions, such as attacking the police, throwing stones and bottles. These scales were derived from Tausch et al. (2011) and were all found reliable (normative actions, α = .97; nonnormative nonviolent, α = .97; nonnormative violent actions, α = .92). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7). Explorative factor analyses with varimax rotation (25) and correlation higher than .6 identified only two dimensions, namely legitimization of normative and nonnormative actions. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .94, above the recommended value of .6 and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (χ^2 (*91*) = 3121.43, $p < .001$).

Just-world beliefs. Personal and general JWB was measured using the 'Personal belief in a just world' scale and the 'General belief in a just world' scale by Dalbert (1999). Reliable scales were obtained, for both personal JWB (α = .87; i.e. "I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me / Overall, events in my life are just") and general JWB (α = .81; i.e. "I think basically the world is a just place / I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve") and items were rated on a six-point Likert scale with endpoints "totally disagree" (1) and "totally agree" (6).

Social (action) support. This construct was measured with five items based on Zomeren et al. (2004). A reliable scale was obtained (α = .97; i.e. "I believe other citizens of this village or city will be annoyed by this proposal / I believe the other citizens of this village or city are prepared to take action against this proposal of the municipality"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7).

Perceived group action efficacy. Three items were used to measure perceived group action efficacy, which were derived from Tausch et al. (2011). A reliable scale was obtained after deleting one item (α = .86; i.e. "I believe our village or city can prevent placing of the refugee center / I believe the village or city has already lost their fight to prevent the placement of the refugee center"). The items were rated on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints "not at all" (1) and "very much" (7).

Results

Hypothesis 1a suggests that personal and collective anger both have direct positive relationships with legitimization of normative actions. Linear regressions support this hypothesis, since both personal anger *(B* = .79, *SD* = .04, *t* = 18.29, *p* < .001) and collective anger *(B* = .88, *SD* = .04, *t* = 22.4, *p* < .001) have significant relationships with legitimization of normative actions. Linear regressions also found that personal contempt *(B* = .47, *SD* = .06, *t* = 8.26, *p* < .001) and collective contempt *(B* = .49, *SD* = .06, *t* = 8.49, *p* < .001) have significant effects on legitimization of nonnormative actions, hereby supporting hypothesis 1b. Further analyses was conducted using both anger and contempt as input, hereby combining personal and collective anger and personal and collective contempt, for legitimization of normative and nonnormative actions. This showed that for legitimization of normative actions only anger was significant *(B* = .88, *SD* = .13, *t* = 6.76, *p* < .001) versus contempt *(B* = .005, *SD* = .13, *t* = .04, ns.). However, for legitimization of nonnormative actions, also only anger was significant *(B* = .43, *SD* = .19, *t* = 2.32, *p* < .05) in contrast to contempt *(B* = .09, *SD* = .19, *t* = .45, ns.).

Hypotheses 2a and 2b assume that the relationships of collective anger and contempt on legitimization of (non)normative actions are stronger than the relationships of personal anger and contempt on legitimization of (non)normative actions. These hypotheses are not supported. By conducting a Fisher test on the correlations between personal and collective anger on legitimization of normative actions, and the correlations between personal and collective contempt on legitimization of nonnormative actions, no significant differences were found between personal and collective anger and personal and collective contempt (z = -1.61, ns.).

Hypothesis 3a suggests that personal emotions have a positive relationship with collective emotions. Linear regressions found support for this hypothesis, since personal emotions have a strong significant relationship with collective emotions *(*B = .86, SD = .03, t = 27.24, p < .001). Also, personal anger has a strong significant relationship with collective anger *(*B = .84, SD = .04, t = 22.72, p < .001) and personal contempt with collective contempt *(*B = .86, SD = .04, t = 23.77, p < .001). Hypothesis 3b further suggests that these relationships are moderated by social identification, but no significant interaction between social identification and personal emotions was found *(*B = .04, SD = .03, t = 1.30, ns.).

It was expected that personal relative deprivation would have a positive relationship with personal anger and contempt (hypothesis 4a) and that collective relative deprivation would have a positive relationship with collective anger and contempt (hypothesis 4b). As expected, linear regression analyses found that collective relative deprivation has a strong significant effect on both collective anger *(*B = 1.04, SD = .06, t = 16.53, p < .001) and collective contempt *(*B = 1.09, SD = .06, t = 19.87, p < 0.001), and that personal relative deprivation has a strong significant effect on both personal anger *(*B = 1.12, SD = .04, t = 29.09, p < .001) and personal contempt *(*B = 1.06, SD = .04, t = 23.93, p < .001). This confirms hypothesis 4a and hypothesis 4b.

Lastly, hypothesis 5 suggests that the relationship between (personal and collective) relative deprivation and (personal and collective) anger and contempt is positively moderated by an individual's negative life events. In order to validate this assumption univariate ANOVA's were conducted. These analyses showed that personal life events did not have a significant interaction between personal relative deprivation and personal negative emotions *(*B = -.06, SD = .08, t = -.77, ns.) and between collective relative deprivation and collective negative emotions *(*B = -.04, SD = .11, t = -.33, ns.).

In table 1 an overview of the correlations between the constructs, as well as the means and standard deviations, is provided.

Table 1
Correlations, Means and Standard deviations of the main constructs

	Pearson's Correlation Factor									*M*	*SD*
	Pers. rel. depr.	Coll. rel. depr.	Pers. anger	Coll. anger	Pers. contempt	Coll. contempt	Soc. id.	Norm. actions	Nonnorm. actions		
Pers. rel. depr.	x	.90**	.92**	.85**	.89**	.89**	.26**	.80**	.49**	4.00	1.62
Coll. rel. depr.	x	x	.87**	.81**	.85**	.85**	.26**	.73**	.37**	4.31	1.44
Pers. anger	x	x	x	.88**	.95**	.90**	.25**	.83**	.55**	3.82	1.96
Coll. anger	x	x	x	x	.84**	.90**	.22**	.88**	.62**	3.69	1.86
Pers. contempt	x	x	x	x	x	.89**	.24**	.80**	.56**	3.70	1.91
Coll. contempt	x	x	x	x	x	x	.27**	.84**	.57**	3.83	1.85
Soc. id.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.21**	-.04	5.29	1.07
Norm. actions	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.73**	3.22	1.86
Nonnorm. actions	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	2.34	1.58

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Mediating role of collective emotions

Since both personal and collective anger influence the legitimization of normative actions and there is a significant relationship between personal and collective anger, mediation analyses were conducted in order to establish whether the relationship between personal anger and legitimization of normative actions is mediated by collective anger. A partial mediation was revealed. Direct influence of personal anger on legitimization of normative actions remains significant *(B* = .25, *SD* = .08, $t = 3.23$, $p < .01$), but the influence of personal anger through collective anger on legitimization of normative actions has a stronger significant relationship, as proven by a Sobel test (Sobel $z = 7.65$, $p < .001$), since there is a strong relationship between personal anger and collective anger, but also between collective anger and legitimization of normative action *(B* = .65, *SD* = .08, $t = 8.06$, $p < .001$). Similar results were detected for personal and collective contempt. Mediation analyses reveal the mediating role of collective contempt in the relationship between personal contempt and legitimization of nonnormative actions (Sobel $z = 2.34$, $p < .05$). Below in figure 2 the mediating relationships of anger and contempt are illustrated.



Figure 2. Mediations between personal emotions (anger and contempt) on legitimization of (non)normative actions

Additional explorative analysis

Personal life events did not moderate the relationship between relative deprivation and the negative emotions anger and contempt. Therefore ANOVA's were conducted to see if just-world beliefs (JWB) would possibly moderate this relationship. However, no clear moderating influence of personal JWB on the relation between relative deprivation and negative emotions for both the personal (*B* = -.01, *SD* = .04, *t* = -.32, ns.) and the collective (*B* = .02, *SD* = .05, *t* = .28, ns.) route and also no clear moderating influence of general JWB on the relation between relative deprivation and negative emotions for both the personal (*B* = .00, *SD* = .04, *t* = -.3, ns.) and the collective (*B* = .01, *SD* = .06, *t* = .20, ns.) route were found. Because JWB did not have a moderating role, it was sought to see if it possibly had a direct relationship on relative deprivation. Linear regressions identified significant negative relationships for personal JWB on personal relative deprivation *(B* = -.42, *SD* = .14, *t* = -2.94, *p* < .01) and collective relative deprivation *(B* = -.35, *SD* = .13, *t* = -2.71, *p* < .01). General JWB did not have significant relationships with personal and collective relative deprivation. These results indicate that high personal JWB leads to lower scores of the relative deprivation felt by participants.

Next, since the mediation between personal and collective anger on legitimization of nonnormative actions was weaker than the direct effect, hereby indicating another factor influencing this relationship, social action support was integrated in a path analysis as a mediator between collective contempt and legitimization of nonnormative actions. Significant relations were found between collective contempt and social action support (*B* = .4, *SD* = .01, *t* = 9.07, *p* < .001) and between social action support and legitimization of nonnormative actions *(B* = -.34, *SD* = .1, *t* = -3.43, *p* < .001). However, the direct effect of collective contempt on legitimization of nonnormative actions still remained significant, so only a partial mediation is revealed. Interesting is the negative relationship of social action support on legitimization of nonnormative actions, indicating that high collective contempt leads to high social action support, which leads to lower legitimization of nonnormative actions.

Lastly, the potential mediating effect of perceived group action efficacy was measured. Path analyses identified significant relationships between personal anger and contempt and collective anger on perceived group action efficacy. Collective anger *(B* = .46, *SD* = .11, *t* = 4.26, *p* < .001) and personal contempt *(B* = .55, *SD* = .16, *t* = 3.35, *p* < .01) show significant positive correlations with perceived group action efficacy. However the significant relationship between personal anger and perceived group action efficacy is negative *(B* = -.43,

SD = .18, *t* = -2.33, *p* < .05), meaning that high personal anger leads to lower perceptions of group action efficacy. Further, perceived group action efficacy had a significant relationships with legitimization of normative actions *(B* = .012, *SD* = .06, *t* = 2.06, *p* < .05) and nonnormative actions *(B* = .27, *SD* = .08, *t* = 4.44, *p* < .001).

Adaptation of the research model

Based on the above mentioned results, the hypothesized model needs to be altered accordingly. The new research model can be viewed in figure 3. The most important changes in this model are (1) the non-existing moderating effects of personal life events, (2) the direct effect of personal JWB on relative deprivation, (3) the mediating role of perceived group action efficacy on legitimization of (non)normative actions for both personal anger and contempt and collective anger, and (4) the negative relationship between personal anger and perceived group action efficacy, (5), the mediating roles of collective anger and contempt for personal anger and contempt, and (6) adding the mediator social action support between collective contempt and legitimization of nonnormative actions.



Figure 3. Adapted research model

Discussion

This study attempted to gain more insights into the individual and group factors leading to the legitimization of (non)normative actions. It illustrates the relationships between personal and collective emotions while investigating the role of personal life events in the path towards radicalization.

The main effects found in this research show that anger is related to legitimization of normative actions and that contempt is related to nonnormative actions. This confirms the

results previously found by Tausch et al. (2011). A combined effect of anger and contempt on normative and nonnormative actions revealed that only anger has significant relationships with both normative, as expected, and nonnormative actions. This latter relationship is in contrast to previous studies investigating the relationships between anger and contempt and collective action tendencies, where contempt is found as the emotion influencing nonnormative actions. However, these studies assume that when anger is experienced over a longer period of time, it eventually would develop into contempt. Within the current study this timeframe is not taken into consideration, which could explain why, where the main effects are in accordance with previous research, the combined analyses revealed that the effects of contempt are surpassed by anger.

Further, a partial mediation of collective anger and a full mediation of collective contempt is identified for respectively personal anger and personal contempt. Therefore, it seems that while legitimization of normative actions is affected by anger on both individual and group level, legitimization of nonnormative actions, in this study defined as radicalization, only has a direct relationship with collective contempt. So although the process of radicalization can be triggered on an individual level, these negative emotions need to be embedded in a group or collective in order to lead to nonnormative actions.

Although previous studies have emphasized the presence of individual and collective relative deprivation as a precursor to radicalization (e.g. Doosje et al., 2013; Moghaddam, 2005; Van den Bos et al., 2012), also acknowledging the differences in relationships with other constructs, the reasons why individual relative deprivation takes another route than collective relative deprivation did not become evident. Where Doosje et al. (2013) found confusing effects, that individual, not collective relative deprivation affects intergroup anxiety, and collective, not individual, relative deprivation influences personal emotional uncertainty, this current study found a parallel pathway between (1) personal relative deprivation on personal anger and contempt, and (2) collective relative deprivation on collective anger and contempt. This suggests that the model of Doosje et al. (2013) is failing to establish a connection between the integration of personal and collective negative emotions in order to explain the individual route towards radicalization. The present study further shows how collective emotions serve as (partial) mediators for personal emotions. This suggests that individual relative deprivation affects intergroup anxiety through personal and collective emotions, and that collective emotions, which are influenced by personal emotions, serve as mediators between collective relative deprivation and personal emotional uncertainty.

Wiktorowicz (2014) states that when an individual experiences negative life events, he or she will be more responsive to extreme ideologies. Previous studies have often found strong results between negative life events and nonnormative behavior (Agnew, 2006; Delisi, 2011; Flouri & Panourgia, 2011). This study took on this perspective by asking individuals about their negative or positive life events, in order to find differences in the relationship between relative deprivation and negative emotions. No such effects were found, because the manipulation check of personal life events on relative deprivation found no significant relationships, indicating that the manipulation was not effective.

Explorative analyses attempted to identify whether a person's just-world beliefs, their perceptions of this world's justness and fairness, would negatively affect the effect of relative deprivation on negative emotions. Explorative analyses found that personal, not general, JWB negatively affects the relative deprivation, suggesting that when a respondent has high feelings of personal JWB, this would lead to lower feelings of personal and collective relative deprivation. These results are interesting because they, at least partially, are in contrast to other studies which found significant results that general JWB, not personal JWB, leads to less aggressive behavior (Poon & Chen, 2014) and that general JWB is related to interpersonal trust and social attitudes towards minorities, whereas personal JWB is related to positive mood levels, high self-esteem and life satisfaction (Bègue, 2002; in: Bollman et al., 2015).

By exploring additional factors in the relationships between emotions and legitimization of (non)normative actions, perceived group action efficacy was identified as a mediator for personal and collective anger and personal contempt. Interesting is that the relationship between personal anger and perceived group action efficacy is the only negative relationship. Because anger is defined as an action-driven emotion (Gordijn et al., 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), this is a very contrasting result. A possible explanation for this difference between personal and collective anger is that group action is perceived as more effective when a person feels part of that particular group, since group membership is a precondition in order to experience group emotions (Smith et al., 2007) and this could also have an effect on a person's perception of the group. However, following this theory, it would imply that personal contempt would thus also have a negative relationship with perceived group action efficacy, but this is not the case. Tausch et al. (2011) state that contempt is related to nonnormative actions, since this emotion indicates that the out-group is not or no longer interested in resolving issues that could lead to problems with the in-group. This

definition implies a form of group membership, something which is absent from personal contempt. The results would suggest that lacking a feeling of contempt on group-level would enhance the perception of group action efficacy on an individual basis, because of the fact that individuals that are combined together in a group are more able to reach their (common) goals.

A contrasting finding was that, although social action support partially mediated the relationship between collective contempt and legitimization of nonnormative actions, a negative relationship was found between social action support and legitimization of nonnormative actions, where a positive relationship was expected. Possible explanations for this relationship could be that the items of social action support are more related to anger instead of contempt, and/or that social action support is more related to normative actions. Since the found effects arose from explorative analyses more research about the relationships between emotions and social action support will be necessary.

Limitations

First, the results of this study should be treated carefully. In order to generalize the results and conclusions in this study to the whole Dutch population, a larger sample size is necessary. Second, the manipulation of personal life events was not successful. One of the reasons could be that, by not asking about negative life events in relation towards a specific out-group, in this case the COA, there is no record of or insight into previous anger towards the out-group as Tausch et al. (2011) state should be present. Therefore, it would seem that the statement of Wiktorowizc (2004; in: King & Taylor, 2011), that negative experiences which are not related towards an out-group can also affect radicalization, is invalid. But this needs to be examined in a larger experiment in order to be able to draw conclusions. Another reason for the failed manipulation could be that ‘happy’ people recall more life events than ‘unhappy’ people (Seidler & Deiner, 1993), which could indicate that respondents in the negative life events condition would have more difficulty in recalling negative life events. Future studies should therefore attune for this life event recall bias.

Third, the hypothesized model assumed a parallel route between individual and collective relative deprivation based on the studies of Doosje et al. (2013) and Van den Bos et al. (2012) and did not investigate possible factors and correlations between these two constructs. More research is needed to learn whether similar to the relations between personal and collective emotions, also relationships or mediations between personal and collective relative deprivation could be established.

Suggestions for future research

In contrast to earlier studies (e.g. Borum, 2003, Doosje, Loseman, and Bos, 2013; Goldenberg & Van Zomeren, 2015), the current research was unable to find the moderating role of social identification on the relationship between personal and collective emotions. This could be explained by the model of Kruglanski (2013) who states that individuals do not need to identify themselves with a large network or group, but that only a small number of 'radical' people in one's environment would suffice to embrace a group's ideology and possibly also the collective emotions. Following this theory new questions for further research should be raised, such as (1) what influence has the proximity or closeness of radical persons and (2) is it possible that this proximity of a few radical persons is more important to the individual's process of radicalization than a larger distant radical group influencing the individual in question?

Second, this research studied the relationships between personal and collective emotions, but did not investigate the relationship between anger and contempt. Tausch et al. (2011) found that anger can turn into contempt when the in-group has experienced multiple negative events with the out-group. This is in accordance with De Vos et al. (2013) who argue that people experiencing anger want to engage in (normative) actions, to enhance the relationship with the out-group, instead of engaging into actions which drive the groups even further apart. However, when those actions are failing, there is a probability that the anger will change into contempt, thus leading to nonnormative actions. In order to measure this suggested relationship between anger and contempt, a longitudinal study is necessary because (1) both Tausch et al. (2011) and De Vos et al. (2013) assume a longer timeframe in which anger turns into contempt, and (2) the effects of multiple incidents between the in- and the out-group need to be measured and analyzed.

Thirdly, contrasting results were found that personal JWB instead of general JWB affects relative deprivation. In order to validate whether personal JWB or general JWB affects the relative deprivation of respondents, it is necessary to target a specific minority group, since general JWB is related to interpersonal trust and attitudes towards minorities. This study specifically chose not to let the out-group consist of refugees in order to not contribute to or influence respondents about the current heated and gradually aggravating discussion about refugees in the Netherlands. For future studies it will be recommendable to use a fictitious out-group in order to establish whether (1) these factors influence one another and if so, (2)

how these relationships actually are construed to get a better insight into the underlying mechanisms of these relationships.

Concluding remark

This study took on a new direction in order to identify underlying factors and processes leading towards radicalization. Where previous research was limited to either group processes or personal emotions regarding relative deprivation, in this study investigations were conducted to acquire more information about the interaction between personal and group level feelings and emotions, related to relative deprivation and the intention to engage in nonnormative actions. The results of this study illustrate how persons with strong feelings of anger and contempt are more inclined to radicalize when sharing these emotions with others on a group level. The main findings show that, where nonnormative actions are concerned, these are directly affected by a collective feeling of contempt, whereas people induced by anger can be both individually and on a group level affected to engage in normative actions. This would imply that to prevent radicalization the focus of our attention should not just on the large collective, but also and perhaps even more stressing, on the individuals that are bound together by a mutual feeling of contempt for they could become engaged in nonnormative actions.

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