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WELFARE STATE ATTITUDES: A THEORY-BASED COMPARISON OF IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate to what extent self-interest theory can explain differences in welfare state attitudes between natives and immigrants in general and between 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. Data on more than 30,000 people from 19 European net immigration countries are taken from the European Social Survey from 2008. The results of the multiple regression analysis indicate that self-interest theory can only partly explain differences in welfare state attitudes between immigrants and natives.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction 1

2. Theoretical Framework 3

2.1. Self-interest theory 3

2.1.1. Employment Status 6

2.1.2. Education 6

2.1.3. Contractual type 7

2.1.4. Language proficiency 8

2.2. Summary 9

3. Methodology 10

3.1. Data collection 10

3.2. Case selection 10

3.3. Dependent variable 10

3.3.1. Component analysis 10

3.4. Independent variables 13

3.4.1. Control variables 13

3.4.2. Migration status 13

3.4.3. Self-interest variables 14

3.4.3.3. Language proficiency 14

3.5. Analytical Strategy 15

3.6. Descriptives 15

4. Analysis 21

5. Discussion 25

6. Conclusion 27

References 29

Internet sources 31

Appendix 32

Declaration of academic integrity 36

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1. Introduction

The welfare state is one of the most important aspects of European democracies. Through a welfare system a state guarantees that all its inhabitants get a sufficient amount of relevant resources. This is not only achieved through redistributive measures from those who have enough to those who are in need, but also on the individual level over time. People contribute to the welfare system through taxes when they are working and get their benefits from the system when they are pensioners. Citizens' attitudes towards the state and its functions have always been an important source of legitimacy. It is therefore relevant to see how citizens perceive the welfare state. Are they in favor of the redistributive measures or against them? How are their opinions motivated? A further relevant issue in current European societies is the integration of immigrants. Immigrants form an increasingly larger part of European societies and it is therefore important to take into account their opinions as well. The aim of this bachelor thesis is to compare the welfare state attitudes of immigrants and natives in Europe and to explain differences with self-interest theory. Self-interest theory places emphasis on the rational thinking of individuals and is probably the most popular theory in the field and can be applied to both immigrants and natives. In this thesis, it is distinguished between 1st and 2nd generation immigrants, in order to see whether and why there are differences between these groups.

Next to the question of legitimacy, the topic is further relevant because of the negative view some of the natives have on immigrants. Immigrants are often accused of abusing the welfare system of their host country without contributing to it in terms of work. Welfare state abuse is currently a very heated and politically charged topic, because a lot of people think that next to the big stream of refugees from war zones, there are a lot of economic migrants from safe countries. While refugees are generally perceived as deserving social services in the host country, economic migrants are by the public often perceived as not deserving this (Yarris & Castañeda, 2015). Although refugees shall not be further discussed in this thesis, due to the current debate on them, the topic of this thesis is even more of interest.

Looking at previous research reveals that immigrants can indeed come to a certain state for welfare state benefits. These magnetic effects were examined by De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009). The authors analyzed whether different extents of welfare generosity of the EU-15 countries did affect the location decisions of migrants. As especially the migrants from Eastern European countries were expected to rely on welfare benefits relatively more often than natives, the authors hypothesized that migrants would prefer countries with generous welfare systems. Their hypothesis was reinforced by their empirical findings. Especially males older than 25 years preferred destination countries with more generous welfare systems (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009).

As for the immigrants' perception of the welfare state, relatively little research has been done. The question how immigrants perceive the welfare state and why they do so, has furthermore no uniform answer yet.

Reeskens and van Oorschot (2015) found that immigrants indeed seem to have stronger preferences regarding the role of government namely that the government should take care of the unemployed, the sick and the old, thus demanding more welfare. The results are explained by a more vulnerable economic position of immigrants, a more leftist political ideology and a generally less positive view on society. Their findings are thus in line with the self-interest argument, that people with a weak economic position are in favor of redistributive measures because they benefit from them.

Furthermore the authors include social integration theory, concluding that immigrants that are better integrated than others have a more similar opinion of the welfare state as natives have (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2015).

Jaeger (2006b) analyzed the support for welfare state principles in Canada by natives and immigrants and related a difference to self-interest and political ideology there. His findings are thus compatible with those of Reeskens and van Oorschot. Dancygier and Saunders (2006) however found that immigrants in Germany are not more in favor of high levels of social spending than natives are. This is not in line with the self-interest theory.

Welfare state attitudes in general have been examined by various scholars. It has to be noted that self-interest theory has been predominant in the literature and is applied in almost all studies on welfare state preferences. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) analyzed welfare state attitudes across 24 different nations. Their findings show that in nations with high unemployment rates the support for unemployment benefits was higher than in countries with low unemployment rates. This was however especially the case at the country level and less at the individual level. The authors attribute this to a rising consciousness of the risk of getting unemployed which is triggered by high unemployment rates and thus let people feel positive about welfare state measures. Differences between the nations are furthermore attributed to different social ideologies. In egalitarian nations, people are more supportive of unemployment benefits than people in non-egalitarian nations (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003).

Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) deal with ideologies of citizens and contrast economic individualism with social equality. Economic individualism emphasizes self-reliance of people in a capitalist society, while social equality on the other hand emphasizes the role of the government in ensuring equal economic opportunities and a sufficient standard of living. The authors mention that support for either of the ideologies is a function of self-interest. In line with the self-interest argument, they found that identification with social rights and government intervention was stronger among people receiving benefits, being lower educated and having a low income (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989). Svallfors (2004) analyzed differences in welfare state attitudes among different social classes in four different Western countries. The findings show that there is indeed a split between the classes in each of the countries, yet to different extents. Nonetheless, the unemployed are found to be more supportive of the welfare state than the employed in all four countries, which is compatible with self-interest theory. Fong (2001) found that income is a poor predictor of redistributive beliefs, which was not necessarily expected applying self-interest theory.

The current state of the debate is thus relatively clear concerning the role of self-interest in welfare state attitudes. Self-interest has been found to be very relevant in previous literature. The only contentious aspect in self-interest theory is income as it is still unclear whether a high income leads to positive or negative welfare state attitudes. In contrast, other factors such as employment status and level of education have uniformly been found to be correlated to welfare state attitudes. More information on these factors will be provided in the theoretical section of this thesis.

Next to self-interest theory there are however several other theories that have been used in the literature on welfare state attitudes. Especially different kinds of ideologies were found to have an influence. On a political scale, leftist people have a more positive attitude towards the welfare state than rightist people. Furthermore the extent to which someone ideologically supports either economic individualism or social equality plays a role as well as the kind of nation someone lives in. Regarding the welfare state attitudes of immigrants, the situation is similar. Differences to natives

have been attributed to self-interest and different ideologies. Social integration is expected to play a role as well.
This thesis clarifies whether self-interest theory holds to be true in the light of immigrants' welfare state attitudes compared to natives in Europe. Another paper was published on this using the same dataset, namely the study of Reeskens and van Oorschot (2015). This thesis however has a different scope. Not only is the selection of countries slightly different, but most importantly different indicators of self-interest are used. Next to employment states and education, the focus lies on the type of contract and on language skills of immigrants. Reeskens and van Oorschot furthermore explain differences between natives and immigrants by different political ideologies. This could however not be seen in the dataset itself, because the sample actually does not show any differences in political ideologies between immigrants and natives so that this is left out of this thesis.

The Research Question of this thesis reads as follows:

> "*To what extent do welfare state attitudes differ between immigrants and natives in Europe and to what extent can this difference be explained by self-interest theory?*

Subsequently to this introduction, self-interest theory will be presented in the theoretical framework with special attention to its indicators. They will be the basis for the hypotheses that will be worked with. The methodology chapter then deals with research design and the operationalization of the main variables. The data is from the fourth round of the European social survey from 2008. The study includes 19 European countries. In the analysis, multiple regression analysis will be performed. It will then follow a discussion of the findings and a final conclusion.

2. Theoretical Framework

The key concept of this paper is *welfare state attitudes*. In former literature on welfare state attitudes a lot of articles miss a concrete definition of this concept. The welfare state itself has several tasks. The main task is to provide some social security to the state's citizens (Jaeger, 2006b). Moreover, the welfare state is responsible for correcting labor market outcomes, which means that the state intervenes in the free market in order to help relatively poor people (Jaeger, 2006b; Svallfors, 1997). Income redistribution from the rich to the poor is probably the most frequently mentioned task of the welfare state in literature (Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Jaeger, 2006b; Svallfors, 1997). Aside from that Gelissen (2000) describes the welfare state as a system of institutionalized solidarity.
In this thesis, the focus lies on an active welfare state and its redistributive aspects. With respect to self-interest theory, which emphasizes the rational behavior of people on the basis of their socio-economic position, it makes sense to focus on the aspects that relate to economic outcomes such as redistribution rather than on more ideological aspects such as notions of solidarity. Thus, positive welfare state attitudes are defined in this paper as being supportive of an active welfare state which mainly functions through monetary redistribution.

2.1. Self-interest theory

Self-interest is about the socio-economic position of an individual. This socio-economic position determines what is in the interest of that individual. The indicators on self-interest that will be

central to this thesis are the employment status, education, the type of contract and language proficiency.

Self-interest theory is one of the most popular theories in the field of welfare state attitudes (see Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989), Kangas (1997), Andreß and Heien (2001)). The underlying idea is that people make decisions on the basis of rational thinking and accordingly have certain opinions based on rationality. Someone will be supportive of measures that suit his own interests. Applied to the welfare state, this means that those who benefit from a certain facet of the welfare state will have a more positive opinion of this facet than someone not benefitting from it. According to Andreß and Heien (2001) there are three different groups of people in the context of welfare state attitudes. They are all linked to the respective socio-economic position of the individuals. The first group is formed by the *consumers* of welfare state services and redistribution. They rely on the welfare state and typically include pensioners, persons with low income and/or low education, ethnic minorities, the unemployed and disabled, but also young families who receive welfare state benefits (Andreß & Heien, 2001). The second group consists of *tax payers*. This group contains citizens that are well-off within the society and who therefore lose part of their income through taxes. It is unclear whether this leads to a positive or negative effect in the attitudes towards the welfare state. The redistributive aspect of the welfare system has a negative financial effect on the tax payers, which is why some scholars argue that this class is likely to be averse to redistribution through the welfare state (Cnaan, Hasenfeld, Cnaan, & Rafferty, 1993). Others stress that this group benefits from the health and education system to such an extent that the tax payers have a positive attitude towards the welfare state (Andreß & Heien, 2001). The third group is formed by *producers* of welfare. This group contains workers employed in the welfare bureaucracy, including teachers, doctors and social workers. These people have a direct interest in the welfare state as it is ensuring their jobs. Consumers of welfare are part of the so called 'transfer class' (Gelissen, 2000) also referred to as 'underdogs' (Cnaan et al., 1993) or 'outsiders' (Svallfors, 1997). The debate on insiders and outsiders is widely spread in the context of self-interest. Insiders belong to the group of people which are well-off in the society. They typically have good jobs and a high level of education. Outsiders, on the other hand, are not well-off compared to the rest of society (Svallfors, 1997). The relationship between being part of the transfer class and welfare state attitudes has been examined by various scholars in the past. An important aspect here is the stratification that takes place in societies and which is according to Gelissen (2000) even a task of the welfare state. Ergo, the stratification is the reason why there are insiders and outsiders within a society. The social location of an individual is crucial when determining the support for redistribution. Bean and Papadakis (1998) have identified three different approaches to determining the support for the welfare state. Next to 'class politics' and the 'self-interested predispositions of the middle-classes', the interests of the 'transfer classes' are an approach which emphasizes that the unemployed and aged pensioners have a common interest because they directly rely on the welfare state (Bean & Papadakis, 1998). This is in line with Gelissen (2000) who says that due to the collective interest of the transfer class in redistribution, the opinion of this class will differ significantly from the rest of society. Gelissen studied the support for institutionalized solidarity in European welfare states on the basis of a Eurobarometer and divides people into two groups: those who agree with state intervention and those who do not agree with it. He then makes a distinction between extensiveness and intensiveness of welfare state measures. The author further mentions two different types of self-interest that are relevant in the context of attitudes towards redistribution. Long-term self-interest is connected with strategic behavior,

meaning that an individual does not only consider his/her current situation, but also the situation in the (near) future. Short-term self-interest emphasizes the opportunistic nature of people to only take into account current situations and to act accordingly (Gelissen, 2000). A link can here be made from long-term self-interest to upward mobility. Upward mobility has been dealt with by several scholars and aims at explaining the mechanisms through which individuals can rise up the social ladder and get from a lower class to a higher one. Linos and West (2003) state that attitudes of individuals are related to their perceptions of social mobility. A person believing in opportunities through social mobility would accordingly be less affected by the current situation than someone not believing in it. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) also suggest that thanks to upward mobility, currently poor people could be opposing redistribution because they might not depend on it in the future, as well as rather rich people might be in favor of redistribution if they are on a downward trajectory. In fact, the impact of social mobility on welfare attitudes is not very strong. In line with Ravallion and Lokshin's findings, also Corneo and Grüner (2002) find that poor people are far more in favor of redistribution than rich people. They further bring up the *homo oeconomicus effect,* according to which an individual would always favor a program A to a program B if his/her own net income is higher under program A (Corneo & Grüner, 2002). Arts and Gelissen (2001) analyzed the extent of solidarity, that individuals have, by data from the International Social Survey Program 1996 and the European Values study 1999. Their main purpose was to find a relationship between the type of welfare regime and the degree of solidarity and justice beliefs. The authors distinguish between three principles of justice. *Equity* means that people get the resources they deserve, while *equality* means that everybody gets the same amount of resources. The principle of *need* emphasizes the support of people in need with sufficient resources. Unsurprisingly, the justice belief of a person has influence on his welfare state attitudes.

Another important aspect regarding self-interest is a potential future risk. In his famous book "A Theory of Justice" John Rawls (1971) deals with distributive justice. His most important statement for this thesis is probably that individuals uncertain about their future societal status tend to favor policies that support those who are not well-off compared to the rest of society. Acting this way, a person ensures himself against the risk of losing everything. This means that insecurity about the future is a clear motive for redistributive spending (Rawls, 1971). This insurance principle has been dealt with by other scholars as well. Varian (1980) is convinced that people's demand for redistribution is not caused by an ideological wish for equity, but that people are in favor of it as a mean of social insurance.

Before going into detail with the different indicators of self-interest, two general hypotheses are formulated. They are the basis for further – more specific – hypotheses. The basis for the first hypothesis is the literature presented in the introduction. However, the second hypothesis might need some more factual ground at this point. For this purpose, one can borrow evidence from a different, but related field of research. Maxwell (2010) analyzed the political attitudes of migrants and natives in 24 European countries. His analysis shows that 1st generation immigrants have the most positive political attitudes, while the attitudes if natives and 2nd generation immigrants are less positive, but very similar to each other. The author explains this with the fact that 2nd generation immigrants were raised in the same society as natives unlike the 1st generation immigrants.

H_1: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives do.

H_2: 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 2nd generation immigrants have.

2.1.1. Employment Status

The employment status of an individual has the most direct link to self-interest with regards to redistribution, because those who are unemployed are relying on redistribution while those who are employed do in most cases not rely on redistribution. Unemployed people are, as mentioned earlier, part of the transfer class. Gelissen (2000) found that the unemployed do not only have stronger preferences in the extensiveness of the welfare state but also in the intensiveness. Furthermore, the earlier mentioned missing positive effect of upward mobility was also found among the unemployed (Corneo & Grüner, 2002). Following the authors' logic of the homo oeconomicus effect, unemployed people would always prefer strong redistribution, because they get their 'income' out of this redistribution. That is exactly what has been found by Svallfors already in 1997. He analyzed different types of welfare regimes and assessed in which of the regime types insiders and outsiders are especially in favor of or against redistribution. Strikingly, his analysis shows that in all the countries there has been a similar pattern: the unemployed are in all cases more in favor of redistribution than the employed are (Svallfors, 1997).

On the basis of the paragraph above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H_3: Unemployed people have more positive welfare state attitudes than employed people.

Previous literature indicates that immigrants in Europe have higher unemployment rates than natives (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_4: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are more often unemployed than natives.

2.1.2. Education

The role of education has found relatively little in-depth theoretical attention in previous literature. In most cases, education was solely used as an additional dummy variable without further explanation on why the educational level of an individual would lead to a certain attitude towards redistribution. However, education is an important factor in self-interest theory. A lowly educated person is not only more likely to end up in unemployment than a highly educated person, but he/she is also likely to earn only very little money in unskilled labor. In either case, an individual with low education is more likely to benefit from redistribution and is therefore, following the rational of self-interest theory, more likely to favor redistribution than an individual with high education. However there have been scholars who expected the relationship between education and attitude towards redistribution to be different. Arts and Gelissen (2001) hypothesized that individuals with high education are more in favor of the need and the equality principle and less in favor of the equity principle, which means that highly educated people were expected to show more solidarity than lowly educated people. This expectation was in line with Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989), who argued that socialization to the basic principles of democracy would be a strong determinant of welfare state attitudes. It was further argued, that formal education would lead to this socialization to democratic values and that therefore people with higher formal education would be more in favor of social equality and therefore also for redistribution (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989, p. 1031). However the

analysis of Arts and Gelissen showed that their hypothesis had to be rejected. Contrary to the hypothesis, education showed a negative relationship to solidarity. The higher the education of an individual, the lower was his degree of solidarity (Arts & Gelissen, 2001). Applying the self-interest theory, this is not a surprise - given the fact that highly educated people are relatively better off than lowly educated people and have therefore less interest in redistribution. The negative relationship between education and support for redistribution has also been found by other scholars. Andreß and Heien (2001) analyzed the support for welfare state measures in four different welfare states and found in all four countries a negative relationship between education and support for governmental action. Even in East Germany, where a lot of people were raised in the former GDR, the relationship was negative. Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) and Jæger (2006a) found the negative relationship of education and support for redistribution as well.

On the basis of the paragraph above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H_5: People with low education have more positive welfare state attitudes than people with high education.

Previous literature suggests that immigrants are on average lower educated than natives. Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi (2008) analyzed the effect of education on labor market outcomes. They found that 1st generation immigrants have not only lower education than natives, but also have a disadvantage on the labor market because their education was attained in a foreign country. The latter aspect is not present for 2nd generation immigrants. The paper however indicates that also 2nd generation immigrants have lower education than natives in European countries (Heath et al., 2008, p. 216). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_6: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are relatively lower educated than natives.

2.1.3. Contractual type

The contractual type is an important aspect of self-interest in the context of welfare state attitudes. There is a strong connection between the type of contract and labor market risks. Paul Marx (2014) has connected the earlier mentioned labor market risks and the related redistributive preferences with the type of contract a person possesses. He found that the contract type indeed has an influence on the political preferences of an individual. The author embeds his findings into the discussion on insiders and outsiders. According to Marx, people with short term contracts are part of the group of outsiders. A big part of labor market risks is concentrated on temporary workers because permanent workers have a lower risk of getting into unemployment in the future. Unsurprisingly, this leads to low subjective job security among temporary workers (Marx, 2014).

Rawls (1971) and Varian (1980) emphasize the role of uncertainty of future income on attitudes. Marx links temporary work to this uncertainty of future income (Marx, 2014). Concerning income as such, it should be noted that a high income does not prevent people from job insecurity. Temporary work is spread across all income groups. Thus even highly educated people can have a short term contract and therefore feel uncertain about future income (Rehm, Hacker, & Schlesinger, 2012). Rehm et al. (2012) further argue that future risks are as important as current risks, which strengthens the argument that short term contracts lead to demand for redistribution. Moene and Wallerstein

(2001) add that it is difficult to insure oneself against future income loss and that redistributive schemes are thus the only possible insurance.
To conclude it can be said that someone who is not scared to lose his/her job in the future does not have a personal interest in redistributive measures. A person feeling insecure of his/her job has however a strong interest in redistributive measures such as unemployment benefits. People with short term contracts feel more job insecurity than people with long term contracts and can therefore be expected to have a more positive attitude towards redistribution than workers with permanent contracts.

On the basis of the paragraph above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H_7: People in temporary employment have more positive welfare state attitudes than people in permanent employment.

There are only very few studies that have dealt with the question whether immigrants are more often in temporary employment than natives. Andersson and Wadensjo (2004) studied the effects of temporary employment agencies in Sweden and found that immigrants are overrepresented in these agencies. This indicates that immigrants are more often in temporary employment than natives. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_8: Immigrants have more positive welfare attitudes than natives because they are relatively more often in temporary employment than natives.

2.1.4. Language proficiency

Language proficiency is especially relevant for immigrants. Speaking the language of the host country has in previous research been shown to improve not only chances to get into employment, but also to be positively correlated to earnings. Leslie and Lindley (2001) studied the effect of speaking English among non-white males in Britain. They found that poor language skills are partly responsible for a higher unemployment rate in this group than among white males. Chiswick and Miller (1990) analyzed the impact of language proficiency on labor market outcomes of immigrants in the U.S. and Canada. Speaking the language of the host country fluently has in both countries shown to increase the immigrants' earnings significantly. Euwals, Dagevos, Gijsberts, and Roodenburg (2007) analyzed the labor market outcomes of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. In both countries, immigrants with high skills in the host country's language show better labor market positions than immigrants with low skills. 2nd generation immigrants are furthermore found to have better labor market positions than 1st generation immigrants, which is also partly explained by better language skills.
In previous research, skills in the host country's language have thus shown to not only increase chances to get into employment, but also to receive higher wages. This means that those immigrants with poor language skills are more likely to belong to the group of 'outsiders'. This in turn leads to the following hypothesis:

H_9: Immigrants with low skills in the host country's language have more positive welfare state attitudes than immigrants with high skills in the host country's language.

Previous literature indicates that 2nd generation immigrants have better language skills than 1st generation immigrants (Euwals et al., 2007). Research has shown that the younger the immigrant at his arrival in the host country, the better his skills in the host country's language develop (Stevens, 1999). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_{10}: 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 2nd generation immigrants because they have relatively lower skills in the host country's language than 2nd generation immigrants.

2.2. Summary

Figure 1: Overview of the expected relationship



Figure 1 gives a summary of the presented theoretical framework. It has been hypothesized that there is not only a difference in welfare state attitudes between natives and immigrants, but also between 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. The different groups are expected to have different socio-economic characteristics. Differences in the welfare state attitudes of the groups are expected to be explained by self-interest theory, which takes into account these socio-economic characteristics. In order to better link the most relevant hypotheses to the overview above, they are mentioned at this point again.

H_4: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are more often unemployed than natives.

H_6: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are relatively lower educated than natives.

H_8: Immigrants have more positive welfare attitudes than natives because they are relatively more often in temporary employment than natives.

H_{10}: 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 2nd generation immigrants because they have relatively lower skills in the host country's language than 2nd generation immigrants.

3. Methodology

3.1. Data collection

The data that is used for the analysis of this thesis comes from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS was initiated in 2001 and has been carried out every two years since then. It covers 31 countries that are European and/or OECD members and aims at measuring the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of the people living in the different countries. As the survey is conducted every two years, it allows identifying changes in the just mentioned aspects. The sampling occurs through strict random probability methods and covers persons from age 15 on. The survey consists of a main questionnaire which the respondents are supposed to answer with the help of 'showcards' which indicate how to interpret certain questions when in doubt. The questionnaire always has a core section which does not change throughout the years and one rotating section. This means that every round of the ESS has one special focus (ESS Homepage, n.d.).
For this thesis various information about European people are needed. The aim is to explain differences between different groups – natives, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants – in their welfare state attitudes. This requires a large-scale survey including several European countries and questions that ask respondents about their welfare state preferences. There are not a lot of surveys fulfilling these criteria. The fourth round of the ESS, which was conducted in 2008, deals with the welfare state and aspects related to it. It is furthermore carried out in almost all relevant European countries and it is possible to distinguish between natives, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. This makes it appropriate to collect data from.

3.2. Case selection

Not all 31 countries of the ESS are included in the analysis. Since the focus lies on Europe, Israel, Russia and Turkey are excluded. Clear net emigration countries are further ruled out (ESPON, n.d.). These countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Austria, Italy and Luxembourg were not included in the fourth round of the ESS and can thus not be included in the analysis. The case selection method thus leads to the following 19 countries: Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

3.3. Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this research is 'welfare state attitude'. Positive welfare state attitudes are defined as being supportive of welfare state measures carried out by the government with a special emphasis on redistribution. In the survey, there is no item on the general attitude towards the welfare state, but there are several items on welfare state aspects. The dependent variable will thus be operationalized through a scale of various items.

3.3.1. Component analysis

The component analysis is done in order to ensure that the items that are used for the dependent variable 'welfare state attitudes' do all relate to the same factor and to rule out that they relate to more than one underlying concept. The component analysis is performed with SPSS. The survey contains a lot of different items related to welfare state attitudes. Some of them are however not included in this component analysis because they do not correspond to the theoretical

understanding of welfare state attitudes of this thesis. Welfare state attitudes are here related to government intervention and taking an active part in the redistribution process. This component analysis thus only includes items that are expected to best reflect this interpretation of welfare state attitudes. The used items intend to measure the extent to which the respondent thinks it is the government's responsibility to take care of certain things. On an ordinal 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates 'not government's responsibility at all' and where 10 indicates 'entirely government's responsibility', respondents are asked to evaluate government's responsibility to provide (i) a job for everyone who wants one, (ii) health care for the sick, (iii) a reasonable standard of living for the old and for (iv) the unemployed, (v) child care services for working parents and (vi) paid leave from work to care for sick family members. Although the measurement of this scale is strictly speaking of an ordinal level it can and has to be treated as interval measurement in this paper.

Table 1: Correlation matrix of the factor analysis

		Job for everyone	Health care for the sick	Standard of living old	Standard of living unemployed	Child care services working parents	Paid leave from work to care for sick
Correlation	Job for everyone	1					
	Health care for the sick	0.411***	1				
	Standard of living old	0.440***	0.689***	1			
	Standard of living unemployed	0.483***	0.403***	0.464***	1		
	Child care services working parents	0.409***	0.451***	0.459***	0.479***	1	
	Paid leave from work to care for sick	0.372***	0.422***	0.466***	0.428***	0.559***	1

*** $p < 0.01$

Determinant = 0.115

On a 11-point scale one can assume that respondents perceive a one-point difference to have the same value between all the scores. Treating it as an interval measurement is furthermore necessary in order to cope with the requirements of a regression analysis which will be carried out at a later stage.
The correlation matrix in Table 1 shows that all items are correlated to each other. With p-values of less than 0.01 all correlations are significant.
The determinant of the correlation matrix is 0.115. This indicates that the items are sufficiently correlated to each other to perform a factor analysis in the first place. With a p-value of lower than 0.001 in the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (see appendix Table 16), the factor analysis is statistically significant.

Table 2 shows the Eigenvalues of different components. The cut-off point is the Eigenvalue of 1. This means that a component with an Eigenvalue lower than 1 is no relevant component. The table confirms that there is only one component with a value of 3.317. This component explains 55.3% of the total variance.

Table 2: Eigenvalues and variances of the component analysis

Component	Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.317	55.3	55.3
2	0.743	12.4	67.7
3	0.691	11.5	79.2
4	0.507	8.4	87.6
5	0.438	7.3	94.9
6	0.304	5.1	100.0

Table 3 shows the component matrix of the factor analysis. It also reveals only one component, as all values are relatively close to each other. A value close to 0 would indicate that an item refers to a different component. If there would have been two or more components, a pattern matrix would have been the adequate table to reflect different components. The fact that the component analysis reveals only one component reconfirms the expectation that the items relate to the same underlying factor.
As the six items lead to only one component they are a good set of items to create the scale for the dependent variable 'welfare state attitudes'. For this purpose the items are added up and the total score is then divided by the number of items. This leads to an average score of the six items.

The new item has the same ordinal 11-point scale as the initial six items ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates very negative welfare state attitudes and 10 indicates very positive welfare state attitudes.

Table 3: Component Matrix of the Factor analysis

	Component
	1
Job for everyone	0.688
Health care for the sick	0.765
Standard of living old	0.798
Standard of living unemployed	0.726
Child care services working parents	0.753
Paid leave from work to care for sick	0.726

The Cronbach's alpha for the scale is 0.827, which means that the internal consistency of the scale is given and that it is therefore a good mean to operationalize the dependent variable (see appendix Table 17). All items fit the scale very well. Deleting one of the items would not lead to a substantially higher Cronbach's alpha, which is why none of the original items should be left out (see appendix Table 18).

3.4. Independent variables

3.4.1. Control variables

The analysis includes several general characteristics of the respondents. The respondent's country as well as gender and age are controlled for in order to see whether there are country-related differences and differences between men and women and the different age groups. Gender is re-coded into dummy variables for male and female. The variable for being female will be included in the analysis then and the male will function as the reference group in this case. Similarly 18 of the 19 countries will be included in the analysis through dummy variables; the last country being left out will also function as reference. This country is Denmark. It is chosen because the average welfare state attitudes in Denmark are almost exactly the same as the average of all countries.

3.4.2. Migration status

The migration status of the respondent is central to the research. It is distinguished between natives, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. The welfare state attitudes of these three groups will be compared. In the dataset there are three items that help to identify the group the respondent belongs to. One item asks whether the respondent was born in the country. Those who answer "No" to this question can be identified as 1st generation immigrants as they were born in another country than that they currently live in. Those who answer "Yes" are either natives or 2nd generation immigrants. The items "Father born in country" and "Mother born in country" show whether one of the respondent's parents is an immigrant. When a respondent answers with "Yes" to both items, he can be identified as a native. When a respondent's answer to either of the two items is "No", he is

considered a 2nd generation immigrant. Natives function as the reference category so that the effects of belonging to either of the immigrant groups are displayed in the results of the analysis.

3.4.3. Self-interest variables

The variables on self-interest have been theoretically introduced in the theoretical framework. They are operationalized through different items in the survey.

3.4.3.1. Employment Status and contractual type

The employment status of the respondent is covered by a combination of several items of the survey on the main activity, the employment relation and the type of contract of the respondent. They are then re-coded into dummy variables. As it has to be made sure that respondents do not belong to more than one group, the new items are relatively specific. They are: "Permanent employment", "Temporary employment", "Unemployment", "Self-employment" and "Other", the latter one comprising students, retired, sick disabled people and people whose main activity is housework and childcare. Those in permanent employment will function as the reference group in the actual analysis.

3.4.3.2. Education

In the analysis it will be distinguished between low, middle and high education of the respondents. The initial item "Highest level of education" has five values ranging from 1 to 5. The new dummy variable "Low education" comprises those who had a 1 or a 2 on the former item, meaning that the respondent has completed lower secondary education or less. The new item "Middle Education" comprises those who had a 3 on the former item, meaning that they completed upper secondary education. The new item "High Education" comprises those respondents who had a 4 or a 5 on the former item, meaning that they completed either post-secondary or tertiary education. In the actual analysis it will be checked for the effect of having low education and the effect of having high education. Middle education will be the reference category in this case.

3.4.3.3. Language proficiency

Language proficiency is operationalized through the item "Language most often spoken at home: first mentioned". The possible answers have been re-coded into dummy variables. The countries included mostly have only one official language. In some cases (e.g. Switzerland) there is more than one official language. All official languages of a country have been assigned a score of 1; while all other languages have a score of 0 for that specific country. In the example of Switzerland, the languages German, French and Italian thus have a score of one. If the respondent in Switzerland answers the item with one of these languages, he is considered speaking the language of the country. In some countries there are languages official only in very small parts of the country and are therefore disregarded. The dummy variables of all countries are then used to compute a new dummy variable which indicates whether or not someone speaks the language of the country he lives in. In the analysis it will then be included whether the respondent speaks a language that is not official in the host country to see whether this has a positive effect on welfare state attitudes, which is expected.

3.5. Analytical Strategy

In order to test the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable multiple regression analysis will be used. This is the most useful way to analyze the influence of the individual variables, as they can all be tested holding every other variable constant.

3.6. Descriptives

This chapter provides relevant tables that reflect how the different groups (natives, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants) score at different items. This is essential for the correct interpretation of the analysis, which will be performed in chapter 4.

Table 4 shows minimum and maximum values of the relevant variables as well as the means and standard deviations. All variables will be examined hereunder in more detail. Table 4 however already gives an overview. As for the dummy variables, the mean can be interpreted as the percentage of respondents who fall under the specific category. This means that e.g. 35.3% of the respondents are in permanent employment and 4.9% of the respondents are unemployed.

Table 4: Overview of variables

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	15	105	47.75	18.186
Male	0	1	0.469	0.499
Female	0	1	0.531	0.499
Low education	0	1	0.319	0.466
Middle education	0	1	0.388	0.487
High education	0	1	0.294	0.455
Permanent employment	0	1	0.353	0.478
Temporary employment	0	1	0.092	0.289
Unemployment	0	1	0.049	0.216
Self-employment	0	1	0.084	0.277
Other	0	1	0.428	0.495
Non-official language among immigrants	0	1	0.189	0.393
Welfare state attitudes	0	10	7.581	1.509

Table 5 shows two things about the sample, the first one being the gender of the respondents. There are slightly more women than men in the sample. The distribution of men and women is however very similar in all groups. The second and more important aspect is the share of the different groups

in the sample. 85.6% of the respondents are natives. 8.3% of the respondents are 1st generation immigrants, which means that they were born in another country. 6.1% of the sample's respondents are 2nd generation immigrants, who were born in the country they live in but have at least one foreign born parent.

Table 5: The sample (N=34,436)

	Native		1st generation		2nd generation	
	total	Within group	total	Within group	total	Within group
Male	40.2%	46.9%	3.9%	47.0%	2.8%	46.9%
Female	45.4%	53.1%	4.4%	53.0%	3.3%	53.1%
Total	85.6%	100%	8.3%	100%	6.1%	100%

Table 6 shows the shares the different groups hold in the different countries and the total number of respondents from each country. There are in fact quite large differences between some countries. In Switzerland only 65% of the respondents are natives, which is a very small rate compared to Finland (96.2%), Slovakia (92.5%) or Portugal (92.1%). The high rate of natives leads in some countries logically to very small rates of migrant generations. In the Czech Republic only 1.7% of the respondents are 1st generation immigrants. In Finland and Spain only 1.4% are 2nd generation immigrants. Other countries have in return rather large rates of migrants among their respondents. 1st generation immigrants in Ireland (16.1%) and Switzerland (22.8%) as well as 2nd generation immigrants in France (11.2%) and Switzerland (12.2%) constitute a relatively large part of the respective migrant group. This fact requires careful interpretation of the data, because only two out of the 19 countries could distort the performances of a migrant group on a certain variable.

Table 7 shows the unemployment rates of the different groups. The rates are not calculated on the basis of all respondents but only on those respondents relevant for the employment status. The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed people who are unemployed but actively looking for a job divided by the number of people who are in the labor force. The labor force includes all working people and those unemployed actively looking for a job. Applying this definition, unemployed people who are not actively looking for a job - also called discouraged workers - would be excluded from the calculation. At this point they will however be included for two reasons. First, in the survey they only indicated that they have not looked for a job during the past seven days. The definition of a discouraged worker however implies that the person has not looked for a job for four weeks. Therefore it is hardly applicable to the dataset. Second, the fact that someone does not look for work does not change the fact that he has an interest in the welfare state. As we want to measure the effect of being unemployed on the welfare state attitudes, it makes sense to include discouraged workers in the calculation of the unemployment rate. On the other hand, students, people working in the household or caring for children as well as pensioners and sick disabled people are not included in the labor force.

Table 6: Respondents per country in total count (N=34,436)

Country	Native	1st generation	2nd generation	Total
Belgium	1,376 (80.0%)	163 (9.5%)	181 (10.5%)	1,720 (100%)
Croatia	1,134 (82.8%)	121 (8.8%)	114 (8.3%)	1,369 (100%)
Cyprus	1,035 (89.7%)	93 (8.1%)	26 (2.3%)	1,154 (100%)
Czech Republic	1,765 (91.5%)	33 (1.7%)	131 (6.8%)	1,929 (100%)
Denmark	1,336 (89.7%)	82 (5.5%)	72 (4.8%)	1,490 (100%)
Finland	2,058 (96.2%)	52 (2.4%)	29 (1.4%)	2,139 (100%)
France	1,602 (81.1%)	152 (7.7%)	221 (11.2%)	1,975 (100%)
Germany	2,160 (83.4%)	212 (8.2%)	217 (8.4%)	2,589 (100%)
Greece	1,843 (90.4%)	118 (5.8%)	78 (3.8%)	2,039 (100%)
Ireland	1,372 (80.4%)	275 (16.1%)	59 (3.5%)	1,706 (100%)
The Netherlands	1,447 (85.0%)	153 (9.0%)	103 (6.0%)	1,703 (100%)
Norway	1,332 (87.5%)	119 (7.8%)	71 (4.7%)	1,522 (100%)
Portugal	2,107 (92.1%)	134 (5.9%)	46 (2.0%)	2,287 (100%)
Slovakia	1,512 (92.5%)	43 (2.6%)	80 (4.9%)	1,635 (100%)
Slovenia	1,000 (81.8%)	99 (8.1%)	124 (10.1%)	1,223 (100%)
Spain	2,074 (89.6%)	209 (9.1%)	33 (1.4%)	2,316 (100%)
Sweden	1,397 (80.4%)	195 (11.2%)	146 (8.4%)	1,738 (100%)
Switzerland	1,085 (65.0%)	381 (22.8%)	203 (12.2%)	1,669 (100%)
United Kingdom	1,837 (82.3%)	225 (10.1%)	171 (7.7%)	2,233 (100%)

The unemployment rate of 2nd generation immigrants (11.5%) lies below the one of 1st generation immigrants (12.9%). The difference between natives and the two immigrant groups is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The difference between the two migrant groups however lacks statistical significance (see appendix Table 19).

Table 7: Unemployment rates per group (N=19,689)

	Native	1st generation	2nd generation
Employed	15,301 (92.1%)	1,613 (87.1%)	1,086 (88.5%)
Unemployed	1,309 (7.9%)	239 (12.9%)	141 (11.5%)
Total	16,610 (100%)	1,852 (100%)	1,227 (100%)

Table 8: Level of education per group (N=34,436)

	Native	1st generation	2nd generation
Low education	9,575 (32.5%)	842 (29.5%)	550 (26.1%)
Middle education	11,444 (38.8%)	1,003 (35.1%)	911 (43.3%)
High education	8,453 (28.7%)	1,014 (35.5%)	644 (30.6%)
Total	29,472 (100%)	2,859 (100%)	2,105 (100%)

The educational levels of the respondents are shown in Table 8. Contrary to the initial expectation, compared to both migrant groups, natives have a lower level of education. The differences between natives and the migrant groups are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Between 1st and 2nd generation immigrants there is no difference. Their averages are so close to each other that the small difference is not statistically significant (see appendix Table 20). This has implications for hypothesis H_6, which was formulated under the assumption that natives are better educated than immigrants. The consequence of this will be discussed at a later stage.

Table 9: Temporary employment per group (N=17,292)

	Native	1st generation	2nd generation
Permanent contract	10,381 (70.6%)	1,002 (65.0%)	769 (73.5%)
Temporary contract	4,324 (29.4%)	539 (35.0%)	277 (26.5%)
Total	14,705 (100%)	1,541 (100%)	1,046 (100%)

Table 9 shows how many of the respondents have a contract of limited duration for each group. Respondents without a contract count as having a limited contract, as it is expected that both situations have a similar effect on welfare state attitudes. With 35% 1st generation immigrants show to have relatively most often limited contracts followed by natives with 29.4%. 2nd generation immigrants have the lowest rate of limited contracts with 26.5%, which was not expected initially. The difference between the 1st generation immigrants and the two other groups is statistically

significant at the 0.01 level. The difference between natives and 2nd generation immigrants is however not statistically significant (see appendix Table 21). This however has implications on hypothesis H_8, which was formulated under the assumption that immigrants were more often in temporary employment than natives. The consequence of this will be discussed at a later stage.

Table 10: Self-employment rates per group (N=18,240)

	Native	1st generation	2nd generation
Employee	12,770 (82.3%)	1,392 (85.6%)	932 (84.7%)
Self-employed	2,744 (17.7%)	234 (14.4%)	168 (15.3%)
Total	15,514 (100%)	1,626 (100%)	1,100 (100%)

Table 10 shows how many of the respondents are self-employed. In the calculation only respondents active on the labor market are included so that the rate reflects the share of the self-employed within the group of the employed. The self-employed include in this case also those respondents who indicate that they work for their own family business, because this is expected to have a similar effect on welfare state attitudes as being self-employed. According to the table, natives have the highest self-employment rate, followed by 2nd generation immigrants and then 1st generation immigrants. However, only the difference between natives and 1st generation immigrants is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (see appendix Table 22).

Table 11 shows the rates of the two immigrant groups in speaking the language of the host country at home. 94.2% of the 2nd generation immigrants speak the language of the host country at home. This is significantly higher than the 73.3% of the 1st generation immigrants and thus in line with the initial expectation (see appendix Table 23).

Table 11: Language most often spoken at home per migrant group (N=4,694)

	1st generation	2nd generation
Non-official language	763 (26.7%)	123 (5.8%)
Official language	2,096 (73.3%)	1,982 (94.2%)
Total	2,859 (100%)	2105 (100%)

Table 12 shows the mean scores on the dependent variables of the different groups as well as the standard deviations. A comparison of the means shows that natives have the highest score. This is not what has initially been expected; still all differences are statistically significant (see appendix Table 24). However, this is not a sufficient ground to make a statement yet. Later in the multiple regression analysis it will be seen what effect on welfare state attitudes it actually has to belong to either of the groups.

Table 12: Means of welfare state attitudes per group (N=34,436)

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Native	7.598	29,472	1.508
1st generation	7.517	2,859	1.506
2nd generation	7.422	2,105	1.517

Table 13: Welfare state attitudes per country per group

Country	Natives	1st generation	2nd generation	Total
Belgium	7.16	6.86	7.16	7.13
Croatia	8.17	8.36	8.11	8.18
Cyprus	8.12	7.98	8.12	8.10
Czech Republic	7.32	7.75	7.30	7.33
Denmark	7.59	7.68	7.55	7.59
Finland	7.84	7.58	8.09	7.84
France	7.03	7.25	7.03	7.04
Germany	7.37	7.37	7.10	7.35
Greece	8.66	8.39	8.88	8.65
Ireland	7.32	7.34	7.37	7.32
The Netherlands	6.76	6.83	6.89	6.77
Norway	7.87	7.93	7.66	7.86
Portugal	8.08	8.50	8.37	8.11
Slovakia	7.22	7.19	7.47	7.23
Slovenia	7.72	8.27	7.99	7.79
Spain	8.31	8.17	8.21	8.30
Sweden	7.75	7.82	7.60	7.74
Switzerland	6.27	6.75	6.67	6.43
United Kingdom	7.21	7.14	7.43	7.22

Table 13 displays the welfare state attitudes of the different groups per country. In none of the countries there are very big differences between the groups. However, in some countries there are some differences. In Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives. This is notable especially in Switzerland, where 1st generation immigrants form 22.8% of the respondents and thus a very high share. In Greece 2nd generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 1st generation immigrants.

4. Analysis

The multiple regression includes two different models. Model 1 includes the migrant status and the general control variables age and gender as well as the country dummies. Model 2 then introduces the self-interest variables that are relevant and chosen on the basis of the theoretical framework.

Table 14 shows the unstandardized coefficients of Model 1 and 2. Being female leads in both models to significantly more positive welfare state attitudes. Being an immigrant has in both models a significant and positive effect on welfare state attitudes. The effect is however slightly lowered for 2nd generation immigrants going from Model 1 to Model 2. As initially expected, temporary employment and unemployment have positive effects on welfare state attitudes. The same holds for low education. High education on the other hand leads to less positive welfare state attitudes. This is also the case for self-employment. The R^2 values indicate that Model 1 explains 13.9% of the total variability of the data while Model 2 explains 14.4% of it. The fact that the changes in the coefficients on the migrant groups do not change (1st generation) and only decrease slightly (2nd generation) going from Model 1 to Model 2 indicates that the self-interest indicators have a rather low impact on these groups. Otherwhise the effect of belonging to the specific immigrant group should be lowered stronger.

Table 15 displays Model 2 with respect to the three different groups. Being a woman leads to significantly more positive welfare state attitudes within all groups. The positive effect of temporary employment is only significant for natives. Unemployment shows a positive effect in all groups, but is only statistically significant for natives and 1st generation immigrants. Self-employment has significant negative effects on welfare state attitudes among natives but not among immigrants. The positive effect of low education is significant for natives and 1st generation immigrants but not for 2nd generation immigrants. High education on the other hand leads to significant negative effects among natives and 2nd generation immigrants, but not among 1st generation immigrants. The values of R^2 indicate that Model 2 explains 14.7% of the data's variability among natives, 15.4% among 1st generation immigrants and 12.9% among 2nd generation immigrants.

Table 14: Unstandardized coefficients of variables in Model 1&2 (N= 34,436)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Constant	7.367***	0.042	7.440***	0.044
Age	0.002***	0.000	0.002***	0.000
Gender (ref: Male)	-	-	-	-
Female	0.204***	0.015	0.193***	0.015
Group (ref: Native)	-	-	-	-
1st generation	0.088***	0.028	0.088***	0.030
2nd generation	0.060*	0.032	0.055*	0.032
Employment status (ref: permanent employment)	-	-	-	-
Temporary Employment	-	-	0.051*	0.028
Unemployment	-	-	0.217***	0.037
Self-employment	-	-	-0.119***	0.029
Other	-	-	0.016	0.019
Education (ref: Middle education)	-	-	-	-
Low education	-	-	0.076***	0.020
High education	-	-	-0.153***	0-019
Non-official language	-	-	-0.016	0.045
R^2	0.139		0.144	

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Strong country effects under Model 2: Greece (1.024***), Netherlands (-0.855***), Switzerland (-1.198***). See appendix Table 25 for all country effects.

Table 15: Unstandardized coefficients of variables in Model 2 per migrant group

	Native		1st generation		2nd generation	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Constant	7.446***	0.046	7.427***	0.174	7.511***	0.197
Age	0.002***	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002
Gender (ref: Male)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	0.197***	0.017	0.148***	0.054	0.182***	0.063
Employment status (ref: permanent employment)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Temporary Employment	0.062**	0.031	0.009	0.087	0.143	0.123
Unemployment	0.215***	0.042	0.301***	0.102	0.128	0.134
Self-employment	-0.123***	0.031	-0.051	0.105	-0.125	0.127
Other	0.013	0.021	0.092	0.067	-0.061	0.077
Education (ref: Middle education)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low education	0.076***	0.022	0.112*	0.068	0.018	0.083
High education	-0.163***	0.021	-0.050	0.064	-0.155**	0.077
Non-official language	-0.262***	0.084	0.048	0.062	0.367***	0.136
R^2	0.147		0.154		0.129	

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Strong country effects natives: Greece (1.032***), Netherlands (-0.865***), Switzerland (-1.340***)
Strong country effects 1st generation: Belgium (-0.851***), Netherlands (-0.870***), Portugal (0.776***), Switzerland (-0.930***)
Strong country effects 2nd generation: Greece (1.288***), Portugal (0.761***), Switzerland (-0.912***). See appendix Table 25 for all country effects.

Having these results, the hypotheses can now be discussed one by one.

H_1: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives do.

H_1 can be confirmed on the basis of Table 14. In both models, being part of either of the immigrant groups leads to significantly more positive welfare state attitudes than among natives.

H_2: 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 2nd generation immigrants have.

H_2 can be confirmed as well. Table 14 shows stronger positive effects on welfare state attitudes among 1st generation immigrants than among 2nd generation immigrants.

H_3: Unemployed people have more positive welfare state attitudes than employed people.

H_3 can be confirmed on the basis of Model 2 in Table 14. Unemployment has a significant positive effect on welfare state attitudes.

H_4: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are more often unemployed than natives.

H_4 cannot be fully confirmed. Table 15 shows that unemployment does indeed lead to more positive welfare state attitudes among 1st generation immigrants. However, this effect is not significant among 2nd generation immigrants. The higher unemployment rates do therefore only affect 1st generation immigrants, but not 2nd generation immigrants with regards to their welfare state attitudes.

H_5: People with low education have more positive welfare state attitudes than people with high education.

Table 14 shows that the effect of low education on welfare state attitudes is significant and positive. At the same time, the effect of high education is significantly negative. Therefore H_5 can be confirmed.

H_6: Immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives because they are relatively lower educated than natives.

H_6 has to be rejected for two reasons. First, the educational level of immigrants is - contrary to the initial expectation - higher than the one of natives. Second, the positive effect of low education is not significant among 2nd generation immigrants. The negative effect of high education is on the other hand not significant among 1st generation immigrants.

H_7: People in temporary employment have more positive welfare state attitudes than people in permanent employment.

Temporary employment has a relatively low, but significantly positive effect on welfare state attitudes as can be seen in Table 14. H_7 can therefore be confirmed.

H_8: Immigrants have more positive welfare attitudes than natives because they are relatively more often in temporary employment than natives.

H_8 has to be rejected for two reasons. First, only 1st generation immigrants are more often in temporary employment than natives. Second, temporary employment has no significant positive effect on either of the immigrant groups as can be seen in Table 15. Thus, even if 2nd generation immigrants were more often in temporary employment, this would not affect their welfare state attitudes positively.

H_9: Immigrants with low skills in the host country's language have more positive welfare state attitudes than immigrants with high skills in the host country's language.

Speaking a non-official language at home is perceived as the indicator of poor skills in the host country's language. Table 14 shows a slightly negative effect of speaking a non-official language on welfare state attitudes. However, this coefficient also takes into account the few natives who speak a foreign language at home[1]. In order to assess whether H_9 can be confirmed, the coefficients in Table 15 are thus of more value. Poor language skills only have significant positive effects among 2nd generation immigrants. The effect among 1st generation immigrants is not significant. Due to this, the hypothesis cannot be fully confirmed.

H_{10}: 1st generation immigrants have more positive welfare state attitudes than 2nd generation immigrants because they have relatively lower skills in the host country's language than 2nd generation immigrants.

In line with the argumentation on H_9, the hypothesis H_{10} has to be rejected. Although it is true that 1st generation immigrants have not only more positive welfare state attitudes but also poorer language skills than 2nd generation immigrants, Table 15 shows that poor language skills have no significant effect on 1st generation immigrants' welfare state attitudes.

5. Discussion

We have seen in the methodology chapter that the sheer scores on welfare state attitudes are highest among natives, followed by 1st generation immigrants and then 2nd generation immigrants. The regression analysis however indicates that being an immigrant per se does lead to more positive welfare state attitudes. There are several reasons why these, at first sight contradicting outcomes, are actually true.

It has been hypothesized that temporary employment, unemployment and low education have a positive effect on welfare state attitudes, while high education has been expected to have a negative effect. It has been expected that immigrants are more often unemployed, more often in temporary employment and less well educated than natives. However, as we have seen, this is actually only partly true. In the sample, immigrants showed indeed higher unemployment rate than natives. When it comes to education, both immigrant groups however score higher than natives. 2nd generation

[1] The number of natives speaking a foreign language at home is 298. This equals 1% of all natives. As Table 14 shows, speaking a foreign language leads to less positive welfare state attitudes among natives. A reason might be that speaking a foreign language at home indicates a high education of the respective respondents.

immigrants are furthermore less often in temporary work than natives. Yet this does not explain why natives have the highest score on the dependent variable. A view at the regression analysis per group reveals several reasons why 2nd generation immigrants actually have the least positive welfare state attitudes. For this specific group, neither temporary employment, nor unemployment, nor low education show any significant positive effect on welfare state attitudes. The only significant effects are the effect of high education, which is negative and thus lowering the score on the dependent variable, and the effect of poor language skills. The share of 2nd generation immigrants speaking a non-official language at home however is relatively small, so that the impact on the overall average of that group is not very high.

1st generation immigrants show significant positive effects for unemployment and low education, which explains why their attitudes towards the welfare state are more positive than those of 2nd generation immigrants. Poor language skills however do not affect 1st generation immigrants' welfare state attitudes. Natives show the expected positive effects on all variables. However, they also show significant negative effects on self-employment and high education.

The country effects should not be disregarded at this point. We have seen that some countries have larger shares of immigrants than other countries. Switzerland has 22.8% 1st generation immigrants and 12.2% 2nd generation immigrants. Strongly negative country effects on either of these groups could therefore already distort the picture. The country effects of Switzerland on both immigrant groups are indeed quite strong and negative. They are however even stronger for natives, so that this can hardly account for less positive welfare state attitudes of immigrants compared to natives. Other countries such as Belgium, which also has a relatively large share of 1st generation immigrants (9.5%) shows strong negative country effects on this immigrant group and a lot less negative effects for natives. This might thus contribute to the fact that 1st generation immigrants have, on average, less positive welfare state attitudes than natives. However it has to be emphasized that such differences in one country cannot be accountable for big differences in the dependent variable. We have seen that in all countries the welfare state attitudes of the three different groups are more or less at the same level. In fact, it has to be emphasized that the models cannot fully explain the exact scores on the dependent variable welfare state attitudes.

A further aspect that should be discussed at this point is that the dependent variable 'welfare state attitudes' comprises six different items. On the one hand, all items are directly related to attitudes towards the welfare state as has been seen in the component analysis. On the other hand, some of them might be of importance to one group while others might be important for another group. The question whether it is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone and to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed might be more of interest for the unemployed than for the employed. At the same time, child care services for working parents and paid leave from work to care for sick family members might be more of interest for the employed parents than for the unemployed or unmarried workers. Including all different items separately in the analysis would have extended the scope of the analytical chapter. However it has been controlled what happens if the different items are used individually in the regression analysis instead of the scale of items. The outcomes can be found in the appendix (Table 26)[2]. The effects of low and high education are very

[2] The tables only include the migration status and the indicators on self-interest. Country dummies were included in the analysis, but are left out in the tables.

strong on whether it is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone. Unsurprisingly, also being unemployed or in temporary employment leads to a higher score here. Similarly, temporary employment and unemployment have a positive effect on the opinion whether the government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed. The opinions on the provision of child care services for working parents and paid leave from work to care for sick family members are both not positively affected by temporary employment or unemployment. There are thus indeed differences in the effects of self-interest indicators on the different items.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to answer the following research question:

> "*To what extent do welfare state attitudes differ between immigrants and natives in Europe and to what extent can this difference be explained by self-interest theory?*

The positive effect of being an immigrant on welfare state attitudes shows that immigrants are more in favor of an active government and redistribution than natives. They have thus more positive welfare state attitudes than natives. This is in line with self-interest theory, according to which immigrants should have more positive welfare state attitudes than natives. In the insider/outsider debate immigrants are considered outsiders. The findings of this thesis do however not support this entirely. Immigrants are on average better educated than natives. 2nd generation immigrants are furthermore less often in temporary employment than natives. It can thus not generally be said that immigrants have more vulnerable economic positions. They are indeed more often unemployed than natives, however this does not have an effect on 2nd generation immigrants as self-interest theory suggests. The theory actually fails quite strongly when it comes to immigrants. Only high education and poor language skills show a significant effect for 2nd generation immigrants' welfare state attitudes. For 1st generation immigrants, only unemployment and low education have significant effects. In this respect the theory therefore fails to predict welfare state attitudes. As to natives, however, the theory solidly predicts changes in welfare state attitudes. To what extent does self-interest theory thus explain differences between natives and immigrants in welfare state attitudes? The answer is twofold. On the one hand self-interest is less reliable on predicting effects of certain circumstances (e.g. temporary employment) than expected. On the other hand, it has shown that the variables do have an effect at least for natives and this explains why their sheer score on welfare state attitudes is actually higher than those of the immigrant groups. Still it has to be concluded that self-interest theory is not as reliable on predicting welfare state attitudes as suggested by other literature.

Reflecting the analytical strategy of this thesis, it has to be said that the analysis successfully revealed the intended results. However, as mentioned in the discussion already, choosing different items for the scale would have led to different results. This thesis does not take into account whether a respondent has children and might therefore score high on one item of the scale, namely that the government should provide child care services for working parents. Another item, namely whether the government should provide health care for the sick, is actually little related to the self-interest argument assuming that the theory is used to explain differences in welfare state attitudes on the basis of different levels in unemployment, temporary contracts, education and language proficiency. Furthermore, income has been left out of the analysis because other literature fails to indicate

whether it would have a positive or a negative effect on welfare state attitudes. Including income might however have increased the quality of the results, as it is possible that those who are considered employed in any way in this thesis might earn so little money that they still rely on monetary redistribution. It is also possible that e.g. temporary workers have a very high income but are considered to be in a vulnerable economic position.

There are several recommendations for future research. On the one hand, researchers might create different, more sophisticated scales to measure welfare state attitudes. On the other hand, the effects of income and the family status of the respondents would have to be taken into account when one wants to broaden the picture why some people have certain welfare state attitudes. A further recommendation is to examine welfare state attitudes from a different angle than self-interest theory. Especially when it comes to the welfare state attitudes of immigrants, the extent of social integration is interesting. This theory could in this thesis not be used because the dataset from the European Social Survey does not provide the relevant items. In order to use social integration theory appropriately, it is necessary to gain insight into the extent to which immigrants have adapted to the host society. Social interaction with natives and other immigrants could be measured in a survey as well as whether the immigrant upholds traditions from the country of origin.
In this thesis, there were 19 different European countries included. The welfare state attitudes of the migrant groups have been displayed for all countries. In future research, one could look in more detail at the country level, especially with regards to the indicators of this thesis. The fact that the share of immigrants in Switzerland is so much higher than in other countries, might be of special interest if immigrants in Switzerland would also have higher unemployment rates than in other countries. Such an in depth analysis of the countries would have extended the scope of this thesis, but is still interesting for future research.

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Appendix

Table 16: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity factor analysis

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approximated Chi-Square	74,481
	Df	15
	Significance	0.000

Table 17: Cronbach's Alpha scale

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0.844	0.827	6

Table 18: Cronbach's alpha of the scale when item deleted

	Job for everyone	Health care for the sick	Standard of living old	Standard of living unemployed	Child care services for working parents	Paid leave from work to care for sick family
Cronbach's alpha if item deleted	0.816	0.800	0.791	0.798	0.793	0.801

Table 19: Significance of difference in unemployment rates

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
Native	1st generation	-0.050	0.007	0.000
Native	2nd generation	-0.036	0.008	0.000
1st generation	2nd generation	0.014	0.010	0.509

Table 20: Significance of difference in level of education

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
Native	1st generation	-0.098	0.015	0.000
Native	2nd generation	-0.083	0.018	0.000
1st generation	2nd generation	0.016	0.022	1.000

Table 21: Significance of difference in temporary employment

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
Native	1st generation	-0.056	0.012	0.000
Native	2nd generation	0.029	0.015	0.137
1st generation	2nd generation	0.085	0.018	0.000

Table 22: Significance of difference in self-employment rates

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
Native	1st generation	0.033	0.010	0.002
Native	2nd generation	0.024	0.012	0.121
1st generation	2nd generation	-0.009	0.015	1.000

Table 23: Significance of difference in language use

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
1st generation	2nd generation	-0.208	0.005	0.000

Table 24: Significance of difference in welfare state attitudes

Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Significance
Native	1st generation	0.081	0.030	0.017
Native	2nd generation	0.177	0.034	0.000
1st generation	2nd generation	0.095	0.043	0.083

Table 25: Country effects in Model 2 per group

Country (ref: Denmark)	All	Natives	1st generation	2nd generation
Belgium	-.488***	-0.449***	-0.851***	-0.435**
Croatia	0.521***	0.514***	0.599***	0.538**
Cyprus	0.501***	0.508***	0.352*	0.517
Czech Republic	-0.301***	-0.308***	0.001	-0.306
Finland	0.232***	0.231***	-0.080	0.541*
France	-0.587***	-0.595***	-0.484**	-0.580***
Germany	-0.251***	-0.219***	-0.312*	-0.466**
Greece	1.024***	1.032***	0.731***	1.288***
Ireland	-0.310***	-0.315***	-0.335*	-0.202
The Netherlands	-0.855***	-0.865***	-0.870***	-0.692***
Norway	0.290***	0.298***	0.277	0.090
Portugal	0.396***	0.359***	0.776***	0.761***
Slovakia	-0.425***	-0.412***	-0.564**	-0.171
Slovenia	0.152***	0.087	0.519**	0.404*
Spain	0.645***	0.659***	0.490***	0.615**
Sweden	0.124**	0.129**	0.142	0.022
Switzerland	-1.198***	-1.340***	-0.930***	-0.912***
United Kingdom	-0.396***	-0.403***	-0.545***	-0.137

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 26: Unstandardized coefficients in Model 2 with individual items (N=34,436)

	Job for everyone	Health care for the sick	Standard of living of old	Standard of living of unemployed	Child care services for working parents	Paid leave from work to care for sick family
Group (ref: Native)						
1st generation	0.227***	-0.007	0.022	0.059	0.191***	0.035
2nd generation	0.021	0.027	0.080**	-0.033	0.147***	0.085*
Gender (ref: Male)						
Female	0.279***	0.078***	0.135***	0.123***	0.266***	0.275***
Employment status (ref: permanent employment)						
Temporary Employment	0.163***	0.049	0.050	0.124***	-0.030	-0.049
Unemployment	0.427***	0.095**	0.097**	0.590***	0.077	0.015
Self-employment	-0.206***	0.033	-0.044	-0.198***	-0.130***	-0.168***
Education (ref: Middle education)						
Low education	0.313***	-0.035	0.021	0.064**	0.042	0.050*
High education	-0.402***	0.022	-0.168***	-0.076***	-0.070***	-0.224***
Non-official language	0.208***	-0.208***	-0.105**	-0.037	0.101	-0.055
R^2	0.133	0.055	0.085	0.126	0.125	0.081

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Declaration of academic integrity

I hereby confirm that the present thesis on the welfare state attitudes of immigrants and natives is solely my own work and that if any text passages or diagrams from books, papers, the Web or other sources have been copied or in any other way used, all references – including those found in electronic media – have been acknowledged and fully cited.

Enschede, April 25, 2016

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