



EU Autonomous Sanctions:

An Attempt for Passive Revolution?

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Abstract

The notion of *sanctions paradox* remains debated to the extent that forms of states continue on applying new sanctions including the EU. This thesis intends to explore why there has been an increase in the imposition of EU autonomous sanctions in the last decade although they are ineffective. Based on the coercive nature of sanctions within the areas of International Relations and International Political Economy, the emphasis has been put on a historical materialist approach, which advocates that the relationship between market intentions and political culture of sanctions is not necessarily deterministic, but rather dialectical. To understand to what extent market intentions play role in this strike, the multidisciplinary theory of Neo-Gramscianism is chosen to conduct an empirical analysis of case comparison. The concept of 'hegemony' that the relevant theory has brought forward, has motivated a research question of "How does the EU utilize the increase of implementing autonomous economic sanctions taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policies as an instrument to obtain its political and cultural hegemony?". This research follows a non-positivist explanatory approach to add the scholarship to what extent the historical materialist perspective is able to explain the main reasoning behind increasing the implementation of autonomous sanctions not only in economic terms but from a dialectical viewpoint.

Keywords: *Autonomous Economic Sanctions; Neo-Gramscian; Hegemony; International Political Economy; Transnational Capital Movement*

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	5
1. Introduction	6
1.1. Background.....	6
1.1. Research Question(s).....	8
1.2. Approach	10
2. Theoretical Framework	12
2.1. Origins of Neo-Gramscianism: Marxism and the Italian School.....	12
2.2. The Critical Theory of Hegemony	13
2.3. Social Structure: World Orders and International Organizations	17
2.4. Social Action: Sanctions as a Historical Framework of Action.....	18
2.5. Social Change: Increasing Autonomous Sanctions as the Passive Revolution	21
2.6. Neo-Gramscianism in the EU Governance	23
2.7. Concluding Remarks	24
3. Methodology	25
3.1. Research Design	25
3.2. Country Selection	25
3.3. Data Collection	27
3.4. Data Analysis	30
3.5. Concluding Remarks	34
4. Analysis	36
4.1. World Order: IOs to Stabilize Hegemony	36
4.2. Social Action: Hegemonic Project of Economic Sanctions	43
4.3. Social Change: Targeted Autonomous Sanctions.....	50
4.4. Concluding Remarks	56
5. Conclusion	58
6. References	61
7. APPENDICES	69
APPENDIX I: GRAPHS	69
APPENDIX II: FIGURES	69
APPENDIX III: TABLES	70

List of Abbreviations

ACA	<i>Arms Control Association</i>	IO	<i>International Organization</i>
AES	<i>Autonomous Economic Sanctions</i>	IPE	<i>International Political Economy</i>
CCS	<i>Coercing, Constraining, Signalling</i>	IR	<i>International Relations</i>
CD	<i>Council Decision</i>	ISSG	<i>International Syria Support Group</i>
CFSP	<i>Common Foreign and Security Policy</i>	JCPoA	<i>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</i>
CJEU	<i>Court of Justice of the EU</i>	JPoA	<i>Joint Plan of Action</i>
CR	<i>Council Regulation</i>	KEDO	<i>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</i>
CSDP	<i>Common Security and Defence Policy</i>	MoP	<i>Mode of Production</i>
CVID	<i>Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible and Dismantlement</i>	MS	<i>Member State</i>
DPRK	<i>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</i>	NGO	<i>Non-Governmental Organization</i>
EBRD	<i>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</i>	NPT	<i>Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>
ECFR	<i>European Council on Foreign Relations</i>	OECD	<i>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
EEAS	<i>EU External Action Service</i>	OSCE	<i>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>
EIB	<i>European Investment Bank</i>	P5	<i>Permanent Five</i>
ENP	<i>European Neighbourhood Policy</i>	SOC	<i>National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces</i>
ESG	<i>External Security Governance</i>	TCA	<i>Trade and Cooperation Agreement</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>	TCM	<i>Transnational Capital Movement</i>
G7	<i>Group of Seven</i>	TEU	<i>Treaty of the EU</i>
HR	<i>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</i>	TFEU	<i>Treaty on the Functioning of the EU</i>
IAEA	<i>International Atomic Energy Agency</i>	THB	<i>Transnational Historical Bloc</i>
IC	<i>International Community</i>	TSC	<i>Targeted Sanctions Consortium</i>
IGO	<i>International Governmental Organization</i>	UN	<i>United Nations</i>
ILSA	<i>Iran and Libya Sanctions Act</i>	UNSCR	<i>United Nations Security Council Resolution</i>
INP	<i>Iranian Nuclear Program</i>	US	<i>United States of America</i>
		WMD	<i>Weapons of Mass Destruction</i>

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has always been a *sui-generis* entity, with reference to its external legal capacities, which started to pursue diplomatic aspect in terms of external security through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Wessel, 2000). This situation developed simultaneously with the end of the Cold War. External security governance (ESG) of the EU has been maintained by the CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) albeit it has changed shape in terms of internal and external context. Although the foreign policy has always been *intentionally* kept separate from the general legal order, this situation didn't keep the EU from applying the CFSP in order to maintain external integration and crisis management process. In that sense, sanctions are used as the main instruments of the CFSP. The international community (IC) witnessed implementation of sanctions by the EU in cases of violation of international law or human rights or impudent policies against the rule of law and democratic doctrine (EEAS, 2008). Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015) reveal that the EU has made escalating number of implementation of sanctions, even comparable to the United States (US), which has been 'world's biggest sanctioning power' so far. Therefore, to the extent that the history of sanctions, which are implemented by the EU, is complementary to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), the reasons behind the status change of sanctions, that the EU imposed recently, requires to be paid attention.

1.1. Background

The EU explicitly reveals that sanctions are 'long-term strategies' which are designed with a diplomatic and economic nature (EEAS, 2003). The use of sanctions under the CFSP claims that sanctions are also a form of *political* methodologies aiming to achieve a *certain goal* by creating an intersection with the *international trade and finance*. Therefore, the EU broadens ontological functioning of the CFSP by creating an interdisciplinary area of International Relations (IR) in terms of policy and diplomacy, and International Political Economy (IPE) in terms of trade and finance. There are several interpretations on the reasons behind this integration: One the one hand, some argue that the EU is governed by supranationalism in terms of internal security and intergovernmentalism in terms of external security, meaning that the EU uses its power in external relations *if and only if* all of the Member States (MSs) have *consensus* on, even though their contribution varies from time to time (Corduneanu,

2014). Sanctions are the most commonly used instruments conducting *consensus* within the foreign security policies. Efsandiary (2013) debates this issue on the basis of not having a military power and states that during the times when diplomacy is impotent and military action is costly, since the EU does not have the competence to implement foreign policy by force, sanctions have become the 'mid-point' between diplomacy and military force. On the other hand, some interpret this situation with reference to the relationship between foreign security policies and sanctions, which are based on economic power that the EU holds globally. According to Leenders (2014), since the EU has an economic power that it implements while managing the global economy as 'the biggest player on the global trading scene', it started to separate its autonomous sanctions¹ from complementary sanctions. Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015) advocate this statement by referring to the EU having a comparative advantage in implementing sanctions as a form of 'coercive diplomacy' since it is 'the largest trade entity of the world', 'a major global investor' and 'the largest global aid donor'.

Alongside of debating over the use of sanctions as instruments for foreign policy, great number of the researches have been done in order to understand the functioning of sanctions in terms of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness. So far, politicians and scholars evaluated the functioning of sanctions, especially the unilateral ones, in a cost-benefit analysis. While some politicians claim that sanctions are 'the worst foreign policy tools'², some scholars emphasize that although they are 'cost-effective instruments', they perform an attractive option when there is not alternative means of coercion (ibid, 2015). Moreover, sanctions 'fail' or 'succeed' in terms of having the desired impact on the target. Giumelli (2013) names the perspective of evaluating sanctions as failures since they don't change the behaviour of the target, as 'pain-gain approach', and rejects to understand the effectiveness by seeing only 'one aspect of the story'. However, the EU increases implementations taken under the CFSP and the implementation of autonomous sanctions is more frequent than the implementation of UNSCRs³. This 'sanctions paradox' as mentioned by Taylor (2010) leads this research to its

¹ Autonomous sanctions are applied in the absence of UNSCRs. To the extent that the EU is a sui-generis entity with reference to its external legal capacities, unilateral acts form the secondary law of the EU confer institutions of the EU to act in an entirely autonomous manner (Article 288- Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).

² According to economist and political advisor C. Fred Bergsten (1998) sanctions almost never work when they are applied unilaterally rather than multilaterally.

³ De Vries, Portela, and Guijarro-Usobiaga (2014) reveal statistics that claim sanctions regimes in force increased from averagely 5 % to more than 25 % between 1991 and 2014, especially in the autonomous sanctions after 2003, and evaluate this situation as an 'evolution' that starts

focus: If sanctions are so ineffective, why does the EU (continue to) increase the implementations of autonomous sanctions? What are the reasons that led the EU to support the ‘sanctions-can-work’ school despite its ‘seemingly limited capacity’ to influence the target (ibid)?

1.1. Research Question(s)

Existing literature reveals that there are several motivations behind the increase in autonomous sanctions. On the one hand, Lehne (2012) explains the reasons behind the ‘boom’ by favouring three factors: initiation of implementation of systematic ‘targeted sanctioning’ (so-called smart sanctions) by the EU; recently experienced financial crisis; and political developments regarding the Iranian Nuclear Program (INP). On the other hand, Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015) claim that the implementation of sanctions increased because they co-exist with other policy instruments such as active negotiations, threats, use of force etc. Meanwhile, Portela (2016) posits a similar argument from a different point of view: Until 2010⁴ only appraisals that the MSs brings to the Council meetings were shaping the formulations and reviews of sanctions. This situation suggests both those restrictive measures of the EU are different than the regular economic boycotts and main focus has been put on the transferred political message rather than the effects of sanctions. Consequently, both perspectives expose that sanctions policies are actually *strategically* designed. Therefore, to study sanctions, which have a strong economic nature, a *multidisciplinary* analysis and an evaluation from an *integrated* approach are necessary.

Overall goal of this thesis is to explain a relatively *not* new but increasing type of ESG by the EU with reference to not only its characteristics of being a *legal* and *economic* entity, but also a *political* unit. Power relations that are based on foreign policies of crisis situations and ‘types’ of sanctioning measures are given reference to explain *how* the EU controls both political and economic affairs in the *new world order* created after the Cold War as a sui-generis entity. In order to conduct this research, a theory, which has its roots not only in IR but also in IPE, has

to become a ‘routine behaviour’ that the EU takes. The graphs related to the increase in the autonomous sanctions can be seen under the part of Appendix I under the title of Graph 1 and Graph 2.

⁴ Portela (2016) refers the year of 2010 as the year that the EU agreed to implement the restrictive measures which went **beyond** the demands of the UNSC.

been chosen: **Neo-Gramscianism**. The *non-positivist* Italian school of thought has brought the theory of Neo-Gramscianism to political reality as an approach rejecting positivist and problem-solving perspectives since they all rely on a perspective whose main purpose is to define social science through causal relationships (Buddharaksa, 2010). In this research, it is assumed that this theory constructs the most relevant framework to explain the relationship between the EU being the biggest manager of global economy and the increase in the volume of AES, not necessarily from a deterministic, but rather a *historical materialist* point of view. By basing the aim of this research on the relationship between primarily *ideological* and *cultural*, secondarily *economic* competences of the EU within the framework of the CFSP, the research question of this study can be revealed as: **How does the EU utilize the increase of implementing autonomous economic sanctions (AES) taken under the CFSP as an instrument to obtain its political and cultural hegemony?** In order to answer this main research question, several sub-questions need to be explained. The relevant sub-questions are listed follows:

1. *To what extent does the EU form a transnational historical bloc, which promotes common interests through increasing the implementation of AES as collective action?*

This question has been asked to understand the methodology behind the EU using its economic power as an instrument of the CFSP. By looking at properties of Neo-Gramscianism, which differ from the others in the first place with reference to the perspective of transnational historical materialism creating the collective action, the first sub-question helps to have a historical materialist analysis of the EU and actions taken collectively. With this question, it is aimed to add the scholarship how the EU reformulates its political sovereignty with respect to the external restructuring of its 'sui-generis' entity.

2. *To what extent does the EU conduct coercion through intellectual and cultural persuasion via increasing the implementation of AES?*

With this question it is aimed to fill the gap behind the functionalization of the ideas, institutions and the material capabilities of the EU from a socio-political perspective. By doing so, it is analysed how the EU conducts its hegemonic power globally through linking the leadership with the coercion methods which are assumed to be both 'intellectual and moral in character'. Moreover, according to the definitions given above, sanctions are coercive by

nature. Therefore, by asking this question, it is aimed to add the scholarship to what extent the use of diplomacy or a credible coercive mechanism, which exists within the IC itself, protects the link between leadership and hegemony.

3. *To what extent does the EU reveal the characteristics of a passive revolution by increasing the implementation of AES?*

By asking this question it is analysed to what extent the EU created a discursive struggle to break traditional position of implementing the policies. The methodology of how the EU internalizes the conventional sanctions can be seen as the road starting from UNSCRs. However, since the EU has recently increased the implementation of autonomous sanctions, it is questioned whether the EU intends to create a new world order by restructuring the prevailing orders through increasing the volume of the change. By answering this question it is aimed to add the scholarship to what extent the historical materialist perspective is able to explain the main reasoning behind increasing the implementation of AES not only in economic terms but within a dialectical viewpoint.

1.2. Approach

In this thesis, Neo-Gramscianism is utilized via transnational historical materialism with reference to the methodological challenges of having an empirical research. The main reason behind using this approach is to close the gap of debating behind *why* the EU increased its sanctions, especially after 2003 and 2010. It is also aimed to understand to what extent the EU being the biggest economy plays a role in the 'boom'. This research does *not* aim to discuss and/or improve the effectiveness of sanctions implemented with reference to their nature of being unilateral or multilateral. What is expected from this research is to make clear that the EU increases its political hegemony as a consequence of its achievement of domination over important *Neo-Gramscian social forces*. The evidence is also expected to be found in the increasing ability of the EU to maintain a *consensus* over different international problems through the assertion of sanctions autonomously. This evidence is planned to be gained by having an *interpretative* analysis of striking positions of sanctions, with reference to their functioning as the main ESG instruments. This analysis is maintained by conducting a content analysis since the behaviour of the EU behind increasing the adoption of AES does *not* necessarily need a causal reason but rather an *explanatory* one. Moreover, since sanctions are

one of the most commonly used communication mechanisms between countries as well as International Organizations (IOs) like the EU and the United Nations (UN), the relationship between the EU and its ESG is revealed through an empirical research of sanctions.

While formulating the empirical research, in order to minimize methodological challenges of engaging social world through consolidating a theory in practice, two articles structuring the Neo-Gramscian perspective in the framework of research design are taken as the bases. While the former, which is structuralized by Bieler and Morton (2003), introduces methodological challenges of the Neo-Gramscian perspective in IPE, the latter, which is structuralized by Levy and Egan (2003) regulates the reasons and advantages behind choosing the case study of comparison to explain the use of Neo-Gramscianism in EU governance and the role that the EU undertakes within the international arena as one of the executors of sanctions policy. That is why the remaining part of the thesis has been designed to reveal the cases that are studied in comparison. The following chapter entails the conceptions of Neo-Gramscianism with an intention of providing background information in order to internalize the following analysis. Chapter 3 is the section which reveals the methodology for examining the cases of multilateral sanctions converted over the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and autonomous sanctions converted over the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic by the EU. By executing contextual analysis, secondary qualitative data is functionalized in terms of content analysis through exemplifying collected citations and quotes of former and current sanctions policies. The relevant data is used to examine on the one hand to what extent the relevant IR scholarship would promote the methodological, theoretical and conceptual innovation of *targeted AES* as the most recent idea of integral history in EU ESG, and on the other hand to improve the insights towards the historical study of re-emerging world order. Lastly, a concluding chapter is designed to summarize the fundamental findings and introduce the comparable answers to the research questions.

2. Theoretical Framework

Second chapter of this thesis has been designed with the aim of enlightening the reader with regards to Neo-Gramscianism, which structures the fundamental basis of the actual analysis. By revealing conceptualization of the notion of *hegemony* with reference to the concepts of *coercion*, *consent*, *leadership* and *counter-hegemony*, the notion of *theory* itself from a Neo-Gramscian perspective is revealed. Each section is structured to express the difference between the relevant theory and its origins. These differences are assumed to be the starting point to discuss Neo-Gramscian approach in terms of social science.

2.1. Origins of Neo-Gramscianism: Marxism and the Italian School

Neo-Gramscianism is an interdisciplinary theory which originates from the Italian School of political thought, which is mainly represented by Gramscianism. Although it bases its roots to such a Marxist theory, Neo-Gramscianism has differences on the bases of constructed concepts, especially within state and society relations from both of the relatively conventional approaches. The basic difference of Gramscianism from Orthodox Marxism and other normative approaches, as much as positivist IR theories; and the difference between Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism respectively lead the researcher to give an appropriate answer to *why* Neo-Gramscianism is the necessary approach to understand *how* and *why* there has been a strike on the implementation of AES under the CFSP. The basic difference between Gramscianism and Marxism emerges from Gramscianism criticizing orthodoxies, which dividend the issue of being built upon subject-object and agent-structure dichotomies that are based on positivist epistemology. That's why, Gramscianism extends Marxian critique of classical political economy through a historical *economist* explanation to a historical *materialist* one towards a more dynamic form of political economy explanation (Gill, 1993). This smooth transition from the economist to a *materialist* approach can be seen via the emphasis that Gramsci puts on *social relations of production* founded within dialectical terms.

On one hand, they both try to understand the interaction between 'social reality' and the products of social science through the use of historicism as the methodology, on the other hand, they vary on the thoughts which shapes the relations between state and society. While the former refers to a methodology, which is involved more with the explanation rather than deterministic relations of causality, the latter refers to Gramscianism rejecting the

reductionism that Orthodox Marxism applies on the relations within the society: According to Orthodox Marxism, society is composed of two layers, in which the base, or so-called the infrastructure, consists of the means and relations of production; and the superstructure is composed of all other legal and political relations, referring mainly to *culture*.

However, what distinguishes Gramscianism from this Orthodox Marxist perspective could be its characteristics of applying to the dialectical dimension of social realism. While in Orthodox Marxism, there cannot be seen an independent analysis of superstructure since the base determines the superstructure in a one-way direction, Gramscianism extends this relationship of determination to a relationship of domination, so-called the '*hegemony*', in which the society is composed of two levels of superstructure (Williams, 1977). The first level is named political society, which consists of the governmental organization, while the second level is named civil society, which has been the habitat of domination of the ruling class through the popular culture of political ideology. Since there is not a causal web of relations, neither material, nor discursive ideational dimensions of social existence cannot be excluded from or reduced to each other. Therefore, as much as the *political culture* has an impact over *economy*, the reverse relation is also highly possible. The importance of the notion of culture can be seen on the basis of social science. Gill (1993), with reference to Gramscian perspective, describes the task of the social science as to explain *social action*, *social structure*, and *social change*. Therefore, in Gramscianism, the use of historicism can be interpreted as the methodology to understand the organic and dialectic bonds between these *social factors*.

2.2. The Critical Theory of Hegemony

Neo-Gramscianism is an approach that saves the perspective of Gramscianism from being limited, but rather via representing a theory called the 'critical theory of hegemony', which disavows from a point of view with reference to the *time* and *space*. Robert Cox (1981) explains this statement as "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (p. 87). Cox's attempt to create an approach goes beyond positivism via conceptualizing the structural changes by not only fundamental features of the IC, which are also constant, but also the dominant norms, institutions and practices due to their dynamic nature of change. In that sense, three characteristics separate Neo-Gramscianism from positivist approach (Germain and Kenny, 1998): Firstly, a 'non deterministic grounded explanation of social change' can be

observed, meaning that *ontologically* and *epistemologically* social changes *cannot* be explained within causal relationships. Secondly, social, political and economic structures are explained with reference to influential (relational) power which is supported by an analytical framework of history with reference to the concepts of *hegemony*, *historical bloc* and *civil society* that comes from Gramscianism. Lastly, Neo-Gramscianism does not *count on* any empiricist mode of observation, but it is an interpretive and normative approach that focuses on criticism over social relations that are happening within the contemporary IPE. Consequently, although Gramscianism has been an approach that has been *indirectly* critical to the IR and IPE according to Cox (1993), Neo-Gramscianism puts special emphasis on those fields. This emphasis can be seen as the reason behind *why* there are differences between two approaches on the use of basic concepts by nature. Therefore, Neo-Gramscian scholars create a differentiation between social relationships depending on which period of timing reveals the relevant conditions. To understand this theory, a comparative analysis of Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism is given with regards to their perspective towards the concept of 'hegemony'. Although Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism use similar terminologies, those concepts' definition slightly differ from each other.

To start with, the concept of 'hegemony' is used in two different manners in those two perspectives. While in the former it is an "ability of a social group to direct society both politically and morally", in the latter, it is an "*order within world economy* with a dominant mode of production (MoP) which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production" (İşeri 2007, p. 2; p. 3). These definitions exhibit that while Gramscianism talks about gaining the *consent* of the society without employing any *coercion* in any terms, Neo-Gramscianism talks about a *structural power* which gains its legitimacy under the name of *mutual interests*, or so to say 'common sense' in Gramscian terms. Therefore, in Gramscianism, hegemony is the field in which the ideas and discourses are produced and consent of the civil society is maintained. Robert Cox utilizes Neo-Gramscianism as one of the most recent critical theories in order to analyse the power structures that are shaped within the framework of IPE, explaining the relationship between *ideas*, *institutions* and *material capabilities* to the extent that they form the distinct delineations of a *state formation*. Cox also names these features the 'social forces' and utilizes them to understand the world orders and

the dominant ideology created with every kind of social change within the framework of *globalization*.

Bieler and Morton (2003) explain the relationship between the social forces and hegemony with the following sentence: "Hegemony is understood as an expression of broadly-based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions" (parag. 1). The relationship between the social forces and the hegemony reveals the relationship between *universalism* and *the hegemony* as well since the ideas and ideologies are parts of social forces. As Riley (2011) mentions, the hegemony is 'a form of rationalized intellectual and moral leadership' which also leans on *liberal democratic institutions*. Consequently, to the extent that the EU is accepted as the world's biggest player in global economy, the ideology pursued behind is *neo-liberalism* with the social practices of *capitalist* MoP. In social practices, to the extent that the EU structures a state formation with reference to its sui generis nature, the sanctions policy that the EU applies, covers social force of ideas created by *international norms and values*, institutions and material capabilities such as accumulated resources.

As mentioned, both Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism utilize historical materialism, which allows the critical theory of hegemony to describe the notion of hegemony differently, as well. In Gramsci's historical materialism, the ideas and material capabilities are connected to and affect each other, however, they *cannot* be reduced to each other. That's why, ideas have to be understood with regards to their relationships with material capabilities. For instance, while political and cultural practices cannot be reduced to economic forces, arts and philosophy can serve to politics. By this way, 'culture' starts to become the battlefield for strategic struggle, because "culture is political" (Linger, 1993, p.3). At this point, the 'ideology' starts to become the raw material for hegemony. However, ideology cannot be what constructs the hegemony on its own; with the help of the 'culture', they create the 'common sense', which can be defined as the "crudely neophobe and conservative mishmash of unreflective popular thought" (ibid, p.4). In that sense, the concept of 'common sense' becomes a tool, used by the intellectuals to gain the consent in order to maintain the cultural hegemony. However, in Neo-Gramscianism, hegemony refers to a "consensually supported modus of transnational development that goes beyond the relationship between states" (Bieling, 2005, p. 37). In that sense, sanctions policy demonstrates a reaction towards a

discomfort due to violating an international norm which mostly gain its legitimacy from international agreements such as the violation of human rights or construction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Therefore, when another state formation does not want to accept an already decided idea, the policy-making elites (the political society) tend to convince that state through social forces. Thus, the sanctions policies are one of the best examples of coercion and consent mechanisms.

When the differences between Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism on the state and society relations are examined, it can be seen that Gramsci distinguishes the state and the civil society, where the former is amalgamation of the latter and the economic structure. However, in Neo-Gramscianism, to the extent that hegemony is transnational, state is “a specific institutionalized arena of social (class) struggles” (ibid), in which the governmental practices and legitimation can only be gained through consensus and compromise. In both of the perspectives, the state cannot be an instrument only for coercion but the hegemony itself, which consists of *both* coercion and consent and are conducted by the *political society* and *civil society*, respectively. Moreover, hegemony has been interpreted in different dimensions depending on IR perspective that it relies on. According to Susan Strange (2002), power can be accepted at two levels: structural and relational. To the extent that the structural power produces relational power, the hegemonic power in terms of Neo-Gramscian perspective would be achieved. At this point, structural power defines the power to decide how every relation is going to be structured through the frameworks within which the main actors of states connect to each other and to people (Strange, 1997). Therefore, structural power has been the designer of a new type of power, which would gather all subordinate social forces in order to operate together, which she also names as ‘the modes of operation’ (ibid). This situation is equal to what hegemony means in Neo-Gramscian terms. It is interesting that while the EU forms the political society to its own civil society of MSs as well as the countries subject to international agreements and norms, the ideology of neoliberalism come to existence. To the extent that IPE prepares the insights to conduct its governmental mechanisms such as the sanctions to maximize the *common sense* in order to gain *consent* such as the incentives (carrots) within an international trade market as well as to imply *coercion* such as restrictive measures (sticks) of transnational capital with the other state formations.

2.3. Social Structure: World Orders and International Organizations

Understanding the critical theory of hegemony is necessary to catch the difference between the notion of state both with reference to being borderless and relations towards the (civil) society. To the extent that the EU reveals both political and economic transnational relations while producing sanctions, it is possible for the EU to create a relational power in order to stabilize the hegemony due to being an IO but with the nature of 'sui generis entity'. The critical theory of hegemony is interested in domestic fractures within the framework of understanding and explaining the *changes* happening in the world order. This means that the state, which composes the source of hegemony, internationalizes its civil society and institutionalizes its competence. Therefore, the historical structures that the state has influenced over, create the behavioural frameworks of the state and civil society complexities that it actually penetrates. Consequently, Neo-Gramscianism rejects reducing power in to only military, economic or other 'value-based' realms as described in realist and liberalist perspectives. Rather, it supports that the hegemony can be created *if and only if* there is the acceptance of *consensus*. What makes this approach very special is not only its interpretation of power dynamics through more than one dimensional relationship between social forces, but also adaptation of these social forces into the IC in terms of economic relations. The main factor that would permit to have an alternative world order is to create hegemony first domestically and then internationally (Rupert, 2009).

As much as all other IR theories, Neo-Gramscianism pays attention to global system configuration and describes it as "an outward expansion of hegemony of a certain historic bloc once it is consolidated in domestic sphere" (Durmaz, 2012, parag, 4). The point that is emphasized here is *how this expansion would grow* rather than it is formulated. Neo-Gramscianism puts focus on the role of IOs, as the mechanisms that would further support the enlargement of this hegemony by *stabilizing the hegemony* (Bieler and Morton, 2003). Cecon (n.d.) interprets the role of the IOs within the 'liaison' between the states and civil societies with reference to Cox (1993), who has interpreted the same phenomenon as "one mechanism through which the universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed" (p. 62). Therefore, to the extent that the complexities between the state and civil society as the fundamental arena constitutes the world order, IOs operate as the entities which lead the institutions of hegemony and ideology to be established. IOs employ their hegemonic roles by

demonstrating the rules which promote the enlargement of hegemonic world orders; being an output of hegemonic world order themselves; ideologically accrediting the norms of the world order; homogenising the elites from 'peripheral countries'; and absorbing the counter-hegemonic ideas.

In that sense, the EU exemplifies an IO which stabilizes the hegemony because it deploys the hegemonic rules with its promotion of Union law (*acquis communautaire*); it is an output of liberalism after the World War II in terms of being an economic community in the first place and neoliberalism after the Cold War; ideologically empowers the norms and values of the IC (such as the objectives and principles that UNSCRs promote); it 'homogenizes' the elites with reference to the programmes such as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with reference to the sanctions policy as well. However, giving the EU as the primary example of an IO that employ hegemonic rules requires the EU to be accepted as a historical bloc which has reinforced its domestic hegemony already. Therefore, by answering the first sub-question of this research, the common interests of both MSs and non-MSs are evaluated. The choice of adopting autonomous sanctions is not assumed as revealing the existence of internal hegemony but debated in Chapter 4 with reference to the interests. The existence of an internal hegemony is accepted only when autonomous sanctions are adopted by the Council of the EU since they are subject to CFSP legislation.

2.4. Social Action: Sanctions as a Historical Framework of Action

Although the EU reflects complex relationships of societal relations and socioeconomic, cultural and ideological reproduction framework as a state formation, it is not the only entity that produces ideologies which create their own civil society in terms of having the MSs. The critical theory of hegemony is necessary to discuss the security relations created between the main IOs such as the EU and the UN within a capitalist MoP since they are *internally* related to trade and financial accumulation of the transnational capital. In order to discuss the security relations of the EU, it is necessary to understand the nature of the hegemony of a state or *state-like* organization. According to Stephan (2011) there are three different layers of hegemony because "the concept of hegemony enables us to analyse both material and discursive aspects" (p. 5): First layer is called the 'historical bloc', which has been explained before as the structural level which constructs the network in which a particular MoP is

created. Historical bloc is a structural level which involves “all material and discursive elements, forming the structure of a specific MoP with a corresponding set up in the political and civil society” (ibid, p. 5). In that sense, the historical bloc does not determine the action itself, but rather refers to the content within which the action has been taken. To the extent that the relationship between the adoption of the sanctions under the CFSP and the use of sanctions with reference to preventing or providing the transaction of transnational capital reveal the content of the importance of the global economy within the external security nexus, the EU is questioned whether to be qualified enough to form a historical bloc.

To the extent that a historical bloc is conducted by intellectuals, collective actions start to be undertaken by collective intellectuals. According to Bieler and Morton (2003), “A historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a relationship over contending social forces” (parag. 7). The second layer is named as the ‘hegemonic bloc’, which refers to the dominant actors created by alliances among social forces and also in adherence with the historical bloc. According to Bieling (2005), it can be the process to widen internationally to the extent that it seizes a structure of power whose features are developing discursive consensus and succeeding material concession. Consequently, to the extent that common interests create alliances among social forces, the UN seizes the competence to make decisions. Therefore, to the extent that the EU is an observer member of the UN, the EU is obliged to implement the decisions that the UNSC takes. Thus, the UN creates the hegemonic bloc in compliance with the EU. Moreover, it is the process in which the dominant social forces are able to connect with other dominant forces in order to advocate their own ideas. While the first two layers refer to two of the spheres that the action would take place within, ‘hegemonic project’ refers to the ideologies which are created as a response to social, economic and political, even ecological problems as the last layer. As a result, the economic restrictive measures reveal the hegemonic project that the hegemon bloc has created as a response to violations of international norms.

This interpretation of layers of hegemony also reveals the basis of how Cox explains the dialectical relationship between the social forces, which are accepted as the three elements of state formation in historicism. In that sense, while Gramsci puts the *individual* in the centre of action, Cox puts *social forces* as the main actors, however, both accept that the change comes through a *collective action* with reference to dialectical relations or so to say

‘antagonisms’. Ünay (2010) interprets the adoption of methodological perspective of historical dialect as the “identification of the antagonisms generated within that order which could develop into turning points for structural transformation” (p.42). To the extent that the basic agent, who conducts the social action, is the individual, a *social change* can be resulted as the *consequence of collective action*. This means that the society can be the agency for a social change as much as it acts as the home for the (cultural) ‘hegemony’. Therefore, hegemony as the basic feature of state, which grants the hegemonic class to execute its own interests by going beyond economic level throughout ideological and cultural aspects.

Hegemony provides intellectual and moral leadership which supplies fundamental elements for state formations to become the network of all social, political and economic relations. Therefore, political society becomes the state to the extent that it has a balanced relationship with the civil society (Tok, 2003). This shows that the Gramscian understanding of state is composed of both governmental (political) and non-governmental (civil) society. Due to this integrated structure, relationship between the state and civil society has been ‘organic’. Moreover, it differs from the conceptualization of civil society in Orthodox Marxism, which is taken within the realm of economic relations under the name of ‘structure’, to the ‘superstructure’, which is not necessarily determined by the structure but also able to determine the structure, thus, relationship between them is based on ‘the idea of historical dialectics’ (ibid). However, according to Neo-Gramscianism, state and civil society interactions cannot be within national boundaries. According to Neo-Gramscianism, state cannot be standardized, but the state formations depend on the quality of the relations that they create with their own civil society.

According to Cox (1981), the historical structure is “a picture of a particular configuration of forces, which does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints” (p. 167). The historical structure of hegemony has ‘three spheres of activity’ to be applied on (Bieler and Morton, 2003): The first sphere is the ‘social relations of production.’ At this point, the production is ‘(re)production of knowledge and social relations, morals and institutions’ and the social relations of production is the “starting point of analysing the operation and mechanisms of hegemony” (ibid, parag. 6). Strange (1997) names it as ‘the modes of operation’ as mentioned before, while Stephan (2011) names it the ‘system of production’. Both claim that the actors within the Neo-Gramscian perspective emerge as

long as and to the extent that the configuration of the 'systems of production' occurs and varies. As mentioned, those actors are called the 'social forces' and they cannot be reduced to material aspects. Second sphere of the historical structure of hegemony is the forms of state which can neither be within a single form nor pre-constructed. Rather the state is constructed with reference to historical materialism and to the extent that it enlarges and includes relations within the civil society, it starts to be called the 'transnational historical bloc' (THB). The last sphere is the world orders because as mentioned, the hegemony is artificial and based on structural power, which requires the existence of a 'historical framework of action' in order to make the interests of the hegemonic bloc universalized (Cecon, n.d., p. 4).

2.5. Social Change: Increasing Autonomous Sanctions as the Passive Revolution

So far, the foundation of world orders has been discussed on the bases that dialectical relations between social factors create the bases for the change. As mentioned, unilateral sanctions do not instigate multilateral sanctions, rather they are used to reproduce transnational capital, which is created by trade and capital, via changing the structure of both inner and outer environment. However, then, what is the relationship between transnational capital and sanctions? How have sanctions as a historical action evolved as targeted sanctions? The domination of the UN over the sanctions create a historical action since they became 'intimately linked' to international institutions by being embedded to the UN Charter (Stein, 2012). What binds sanctions organically with these social forces is their nature of being a *collective action*: Sanctions create a marketplace in which the UN has the monopoly of collective sanctioning⁵.

To the extent that the EU creates a subaltern class of the UN, targeted sanctions have been a *prototype* to achieve success. Reasons behind the general evaluation of sanctions through coercing, constraining, signalling (CCS) technique is to understand whether the targeted sanctions have material expectations or rather 'bargaining chips' (Portela, 2014) in order to create a process in which the EU does not only establish new social forces during the dialectical process of negotiations inside such as the E3/EU+3⁶, but also outside the formal context such

⁵ It is assumed that the UN has the monopoly over collective sanctioning due to its competence to create multilateral sanctions in relation with the EU: Although the US has the leadership on implementing the unilateral sanctions with reference to being the world's biggest sanctioning power', to some extent that the US is a member of P5, so the multilateral sanctions that it would like to undertake are limited.

⁶ E3/EU+3 reveals the grouping which includes the EU-3 (known as France, Germany and the UK) and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and China, Russia and the US, created during the negotiations over Iranian Nuclear Program.

as the P5+1⁷ or the Six-Party Talks⁸. To the extent that new alliances are created and new institutions are formed, a new world order can be maintained through a new hegemony, which challenges the existing one. It has been discussed that Gramsci was interpreting this situation using two methods, or to say political strategies of, 'counter-hegemony'. In Gramscianism, the term of 'war of manoeuvre' refers to 'tactic of engaging in frontal attack' (Mayo, n.d.) through controlling political and economic contest, which happens while the state power fails to create a dominant ideology within civil society. As opposed to the relevant term, 'war of position' refers to a 'cultural predominance' created by the institutions of civil society and proceeded within a long struggle through also controlling a cultural and ideological contest (ibid). The second terminology has been also used under the name of 'passive revolution', so it can be understood as "the process of constant reorganization and restructuring of state power and its relationship to society" (Xing, 2004, p. 7). However, in Neo-Gramscianism, this concept of counter-hegemony has been prepared to be used again beyond the borders. Cox (1981) claims that the passive revolution occurs when the hegemony expands on *horizontal* basis, because as terminology notifies in the counter-hegemony there occurs a struggle of social forces against the ideology of existing hegemonic order and to the extent that the struggle succeeds, new social forces replace the previous ones.

Stephan (2011) interprets that the condition of a passive revolution emerges if the social change does *not* takes its origins from an economic development but rather as a "reflection of international development which transmits their ideological currents to the periphery" (p. 6) through introducing a *new policy*, by the governmental and bureaucratic elites which would break the conventional policies. As much as the hegemony, creating a counter-hegemony also requires the consciousness of social classes. The consciousness is created through dialectical relations between and within the structure and superstructure. Moreover, for a counter-hegemonic ideology to create the hegemony, it requires to be universalized, and according to Cox (1993), the main mechanisms can be pointed as the IOs. To the extent that the security relations are a part of superstructure, the consciousness might lead to new institutionalizations of global economic and security relations, which would be exercised by

⁷ P5+1 refers to the same negotiation bloc of E3/E3+3. While the UN prefers to use this terminology, the EU prefers to use the former.

⁸ Six Party Talks refers to the meetings that are created to find solution to nuclear weapons program of DPRK.

the IOs, including the EU. However, the political and economic interests are not stable, rather develop and change and vulnerable to the actor's impact. Then, to what extent do we see the influence of actors on political and economic interests within EU governance? *Can EU ESG be interpreted within the Neo-Gramscian terms?*

2.6. Neo-Gramscianism in the EU Governance

So far, there have been several interpretations of the EU governance within Neo-Gramscian framework both in terms of internal and external governance. Interestingly, EU governance has started to be interpreted within Neo-Gramscian perspective more recently. Stephan (2011) uses the approach to explain the reasons behind the EU as being one of the greatest players to implement domestic CO₂ emissions trading system within a discourse of 'historical framework of action', through which the hegemonic actor creates a common sense among the other actors. The author evaluates the implementation of emissions trading in Europe as a 'passive revolution', which the EU engaged in through collective action among its institutions together with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Moreover, with regards to EU ESG, also rather recently, the existing literature puts the focus more on the defence policies. For example, while Oikonomou (2012) explains the historical materialism behind the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), he prefers to put the focus on European integration theory with reference to the economic development and defence relations. Moreover, while Kempin and Madwdsley (2013) discuss the civilian and military aspects of the CSDP, they refer to the neo-Gramscian model of hegemony as an inheritance of the US achievements.

On the CFSP, there have been few articles that are *indirectly* relevant to the topic of EU ESG. Kammel and Zyla (2013) constitute the starting point of my own research since they do not only explain the Neo-Gramscian perspective through production relations but rather how these relations show their impact on knowledge, institutions and products as well as in EU ESG. The thesis that the authors put forward is that the networks, which the EU has created after Lisbon Treaty, shall be seen as the replication of already existing hegemony as an answer to the question of "How are dominant states configured and do they transport ideas and construct institutional structures?" (p. 46). Therefore, not from a purely economic perspective of production relations but from a perspective of social relations of production, the dialectical ideas that are created through these relations can form a legitimate bases for intellectuals and

elites. This sometimes can be referred to have *transnational hegemony* and most appropriate examples can be seen within the transatlantic security partnerships. On the other hand, Williams (2014) intends to explain the partnership agreements that the EU has, for influencing and shaping the structures in the Caribbean as a form of its hegemony under Structural Foreign Policy. Thus, while the CSDP have been discussed through Neo-Gramscianism, although it is a sub-topic, the CFSP lacks of being debated in terms of its own leadership characteristics that enable the EU to implement its hegemony through the combination of coercion and consent. As a result, although EU governance is explained through Neo-Gramscian perspective in terms of actors who create the THB and hold the hegemony, there is a lack of research over the hegemony of the EU created by coercion or consent to manage the CFSP, *via sanctions*.

2.7. Concluding Remarks

The main concepts, which are explained under the headlines of relations between the Neo-Gramscianism and social science, reveal to what extent the EU is able to go beyond economic determinism. The idea that the IC is subordinate to the deceptions that are explained through a normative requirement of how the IPE needs to operate. Since it locates its fundamentals on transnational historical materialism, which brings the interdependency as a condition to each and every relationship between social forces, Neo-Gramscianism favours to debate the relations between social forces not by the discourse of power, but rather by the hegemony. Therefore, power dynamics can be seen as a dialectical process between coercion and consent. Lastly, the formations of ideology and state have been brought with the concept of hegemony itself, because the ideology is accepted as the 'dominant' idea, while alliances also create a 'successful historical bloc' that would exercise an 'intellectual and moral leadership' between the political and civil society. Therefore, the hegemony refers to the proceeding of each institution preserve the particular order.

3. Methodology

In order to structure a discerned analysis, first it is questioned to what extent the increase in EU AES reveals necessary basis to gain the political hegemony. Functioning of the conceptualizations is used to have a case comparison. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to enlighten the reader about the methodological discussions of Neo-Gramscianism. Although it has some methodological challenges, an empirical research is executed. In order to illustrate the pattern of theoretical framework of Neo-Gramscianism, the methodological steps that Bieler and Morton (2003) promote is followed by analysing empirically “how certain social forces have attempted to construct hegemonic projects through neoliberal globalization and how these have been contested by subaltern classes” (parag. 5). As a result, it is hoped to have an explanatory analysis of these social forces attempting to codify a *new* hegemonic project.

3.1. Research Design

Approach to qualitative inquiry of this research is revealed by a comparative case study, which is exemplified with reference to the *transnational* nature of the relevant theoretical framework. The reason behind choosing a case study is its nature of being parallel to Neo-Gramscianism with respect to its perspective towards being *unlimited* in terms of *time* and *space*. A case study is the most ‘appropriate’ methodology to analyse a topic from Neo-Gramscian perspective because it helps to understand the complex relations among the actors and put attention to the historical processes (Levy and Egan, 2003). With case study, it is aimed to have the depth of information to allow a descriptive, explanatory and deductive analysis. Although Neo-Gramscianism interprets Gramscianism indirectly applicable to IR, Femia (2005) claims that numerous scholars utilize this theoretical framework as an ‘alternative theoretical approach’ to the dominant consensus in IPE. Moreover, Cox’s reinterpretation of the relationship between Gramscianism and social science, including looking the social structure from a transnational historical materialist viewpoint, requires explaining relationships between social forces through case comparison selected through transnationalism. Following section clarifies why the sanction policies have been chosen as the basic data in detail.

3.2. Country Selection

While keeping in mind that this thesis and the methodological considerations are led by the selected theoretical framework, the foremost importance of choosing countries with reference to data collection are revealed as an overview in this section. In order to conduct a *transnational* case study, cases are selected with reference to categorization of restrictive measures within the IC. Sanctions as CFSP instruments have increased steadily since early 1990s (De Vries et al., 2014). Moreover, according to the European Commission (2014), the EU is also ‘the biggest player on global trading scene’, which means that the EU’s roles in trade and ESG have an internal relationship with reference to importance of sanctions within the CFSP. This relationship reveals also another fact on the methodology of how the EU internalizes obligations that come from another international security organization: the UN. To understand the relationship between the two IOs, what kind of sanctions the EU implements requires to be investigated.

According to Biersteker and Portela (2015) the sanctions can be categorized within three groups: implementing, supplementary and autonomous. The first refers to sanctions that “give effect to UN measures...and adopted shortly after the UNSC resolution” (ibid, p. 2). The main issue here to be concentrated on is how the EU implements those resolutions that are taken *externally*. The answer is by the exclusive competence of the EU in external trade, where the MSs have to implement the measures through the European Community. The second and the latter slightly differ from each other, but have a huge distinction in terms of implementation from the first. Second type of sanctions are also taken after UN measures, however, “they can be politically sensitive, which explains why they sometimes refer to language of UNSC resolutions” (ibid). This is the hardest category to distinguish from the first, because they are also relatively ‘autonomous’ due to being not taken under a legal obligation. That’s also why it has a small difference on discourse with the latter, which involves the cases where the EU cannot be agreed by the UNSC, and still they are considered as a result of ‘cooperation with other senders’ (ibid). Therefore, although legally the EU is obliged to obey the provisions that it receives on behalf of UNSCRs, the EU applies its own coercion with respect to the international relations terms. Consequently, sometimes the coercion, which is supplied by one actor, might have more than one sender. Thus, this research intends to appraise the EU as a foreign policy actor mainly in the field of ESG.

Consequently, country selection has been made with reference to the literature mentioned above, as a case comparison between the second and the third category of sanctions. The cases that are taken under EU supplementary sanctions are additional measures to strengthen UNSCRs on Iran and DPRK, and EU AES are applied in the absence of these UN sanctions on Syria and Russia. The main methodology behind choosing these cases is to examine the *similarities* and *differences* in the objectives of the actors with reference to their level of 'embeddedness' to each other (Biersteker and Portela, 2015). Since this 'embeddedness' also reveals the 'implementing sanctions' in which the EU is obliged to take actions due to its legal bonding to the UN under the status of 'observer state', the relevant cases are chosen from the samples which the EU *prefers* to undertake. The main reason behind choosing these autonomous sanctions cases are based on the level of internationality of security threat⁹. While the supplementary sanctions are "primarily devoted to non-proliferation goals" such as in Iran and the DPRK, autonomous sanctions associate claims "where the UNSC *cannot* agree" (ibid, p. 3). That's why the objectives of sanctions give the researcher the starting point. Therefore, this research mainly focuses on EU AES, rather than UNSCRs, although the EU implements the UNSC measures quite often. However, those resolutions are evaluated when necessary, or not possible to evaluate separately, otherwise, evaluation on the EU as a foreign policy actor in the field of ESG would be deformed.

3.3. Data Collection

The qualitative data is collected with reference to the reasons behind the case selection. While gathering the data, several searching engines such as Scopus Google Scholar, Web of Science etc. are used. Differently from a regular sanctions policy data sets, the emphasis here is put on the Targeted Sanctions Consortium/ Initiative (TSC) project, which is an international consortium of scholars and practitioners that analyse and evaluate UNSCRs within the framework of their relations towards non-UN sanctions. The reason behind putting the emphasis on this project is due to the data revealed by TSC indicating the importance of the EU as the main actor that applies preceding UNSCRs. Data sets are structured as the collection of several sanctions policy documents which can be categorized mainly under seven groups:

⁹ The researcher is aware that the EU applies autonomous sanctions on several more cases such as Zimbabwe and Myanmar. However as Portela (2014) mentions, "Situations of autocratic rule such as in Myanmar and Zimbabwe hardly amount to a threat to international peace" (p. 8). Therefore, the reason behind choosing the cases of Syria and Russia is their capacity to violate sovereignty of other forms of states and norms and values on international scale.

Basic Principles and Guidelines¹⁰, UNSCRs¹¹, Decisions and Regulations taken by the EU Council¹², the factsheets, TSC project papers and reports, several press releases and academic books about (especially targeted/smart) sanctions referring relevant cases. Since Neo-Gramscianism leads the research to use historical materialism, historical background of sanctions is aimed to be understood. In the first group, since Council Regulations (CRs) imposing sanctions and related Council Decisions (CDs) are an essential part of the EU 'Community Law' (European Commission, 2008), their legal bases are examined with reference to their nature of being *collective actions*. Moreover, to put more emphasis on the historical background of EU restrictive measures, "Basic Principles on the use of the Restrictive Measures" (2004) and "Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the framework of the EU" (2012) are exemplified within the data sets.

While the UNSCRs vary between the years of 2006 to 2015 taken mainly under the objective of non-proliferation against Iran and the DPRK, EU sanctions have wider range of time span starting from 2002 since some sanctions that are taken against terrorism are related to the targeted individuals, groups or entities that are announced under current sanctions. While the former are collected from the general website of the UNSC, the latter are adopted from the Official Journal of the EU (EUR-Lex). The factsheets that the UNSC has published are gained from the general website of the Arms Control Association (ACA), while the factsheets that the EU has published are collected from EU External Action Services (EEAS) website. The choices that are made while selecting these sources are their capability of exhibiting the common ideas, norms and ideologies with reference to the approaches and strategies based on legal background. While sanctions themselves reveal the material capabilities, the factsheets are the proof of negotiation process that display alliances created with reference to the common interests and international agreements that actually reveal what kind of roles the institutions undertake during the process of creating sanctions. Additionally, TSC project papers and press articles are necessary to understand how the EU uses targeted sanctions as a tool of its intention towards coercion or consent.

¹⁰ Documents with regards to the legal background can be found under the Appendix III Table 1.

¹¹ The UNSC Resolutions, which are going to be analysed, can be found under the part of Appendix III under the title of Table 2.

¹² CFSP Decisions and Regulations taken by the Council can be found under the part of Appendix III under the title of Table 3.

In order to understand to what extent the secondary data reveals the information necessary to conduct a data analysis, the collected data needs to be explained in depth. EU Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of sanctions (2012) is formed of 57 pages, created by the Council of the EU and basically introduces the principles (objectives and legal issues with reference to the conceptualization of targeted sanctions) which lead the researcher and the reader to understand how the EU interpret the international norms and values with reference to the relationship between universalism and hegemony and exhibits on its legal documents. Moreover, by exemplifying how the EU implements the UNSCRs, it creates the bases to read the use of an ideology including the allocation of transnational capital by an international class is assimilated by another (subaltern) international class. Secondly, the UNSCRs and EU sanctions are the main documents of this research. There are 12 UNSCRs analysed with reference to the social forces that Neo-Gramscianism introduces. While their unanimously adopted or abstained status by the MSs reveals the common interests between the key actors, the context of restrictive measures displays the international norms and values that the accepted hegemonic bloc assumes. The EU on the other hand, adopts CRs and CDs to interpret these international norms and values, therefore, 9 CRs and 8 CDs, concerning the additional measures and autonomous sanctions related to each four cases, are analysed with reference to the concept of targeted sanctions. Although there is a clear parallelism between the UNSCRs and the supplementary sanctions that the EU takes, the roles that the EU and the UN undertake during the negotiation processes vary from each other as much as the strategies vary as exemplified by AES.

Nevertheless, the factsheets basically refer to the legal documents concerning the negotiation processes between parties of the cases, however, they also reveal a proper chronology of the formation of approaches and strategies, as well as the international agreements creating the common interest between the MSs. Secondly, the roles of the IOs concerning CCS are analysed via this chronology with reference to the TSC reports. Three books concerning targeted sanctions and the state forms' 'grand strategies' (Taylor, 2010; Preeg, 2008; Solingen, 2012) are analysed to understand the coercion and consent that they pursued through material capabilities and to what extent they comply with the cultural hegemony through the leadership of their institutions deploy. Lastly, 2 TSC reports are analysed; while the former has 41 pages written by political scientist professors and political advisors (Biersteker, Eckert and

Tourinho, 2012), the second has 140 pages concerning all qualitative database of the UNSCRs with reference to the objectives and the international norms that they carry and their effectiveness with reference to their capability to CCS the targets.

3.4. Data Analysis

It is intended to conduct a qualitative data analysis in order to answer the main research question by giving answers to the sub-questions with the help of basic content analysis. The main reason behind choosing this methodology is due to the nature of content analysis being parallel to the nature of sanctions. Sanctions are very typical communication instruments between two political units and best explained by the content analysis, because the relationship between the social factors that create sanctions are assumed to be best explained by a dialectical discovery. Therefore, here the qualitative data analysis is introduced as more than non-qualitative data, which would refer to selected i.e. visual and textual information, it rather refers to the meanings of the conceptualization given by the theoretical framework. According to Dey (1993), meanings are fundamentally conducted through 'language' and 'action'. Consequently, a dialectical approach would be relevant to the sanction policies that are taken against the selected countries and problems within the IC, in order to understand the interaction between *language* and *action*. To be more open and specific, the *nature* of sanctions requires to be understood.

Sanctions are created to serve as the factor that has an impact on the behaviour of the 'target' and create a 'desired change' (Smith, 2004). Since actions are formed by the trigger of one or more international actors, which are called the 'sender(s)', in opposition to one or more others, named as 'receiver(s)', they pursue goals either "to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important" (Galtung, 1967, p. 379). According to Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015), sanctions realize these goals through serving "multiple purposes by the way of coercing a change in proscribed behaviour, constraining a target's capacity for discretionary action, or acting as a signalling device to deter future transgressions of international norms" (p. 7). Therefore, sanctions are the contents due to their nature of being the diplomatic communication instruments. To conduct a content analysis with reference to the nature of sanctions, a 'coding scheme' is revealed. Although there are several interpretations on how a

coding scheme requires to be created, rather than tending to create a new theory after coding like Saldana (2008)¹³ prefers, using the coding scheme to utilize the content of the collected documents in terms of themes before categorizing and coding, would be more beneficial. Consequently, unlike the coding scheme that's been created by Saldana, a totally new coding scheme has been created through first defining the themes/ concepts, then categorizing them and revealing the codes under each category which would refer to the 'key words' of the thesis in the end. In order to understand the dialectical relationship behind the sanctioning process, the 'coding scheme' is derived from the grand theory of Neo-Gramscian method of analysis.

The aim of this research is to exhibit what is in the background of increasing EU AES with reference to the dialectical historical materialism. Therefore, evaluation of sanctions policies are essential for the coding scheme since they refer to the design of relevant *collective action*. Due to all these reasons, the scheme is created to understand the process leading to the implementation of AES from a dialectical historical materialist perspective. Therefore it takes the 'language' and the 'actions' that are structured in a pattern in correlation or diverse relations to each other. In other words, the language and all kind of actions that are undertaken during the process of designing the multilateral and unilateral sanctions until their implementations are going to be examined in terms of their similarities and differences under the names of supplementary and autonomous sanctions. At this point, the methodological steps that Bieler and Morton (2003) have put forward, requires to be explained to understand the path that the data analysis follows. Bieler and Morton (2003) suggest two methodological routes to conduct an empirical research based on the Neo-Gramscian perspective. The first option suggests to have an evaluation of deducted cases by relating the production process of sanctions behind them to three levels of activities of the hegemony, namely the social relations of production, form of state and world orders. However, in order to manage this route, several steps require to be followed.

First step is to examine a 'production structure' to describe the social forces as the 'key collective actors'. Therefore, investigating the production of economic sanctions as an example of 'transnationalization of capital by trade and finance' is going to lead to classify the ideas, institutions and material capabilities that are used during the production process. In

¹³ Scheme created by Saldana (2008) can be seen under the part of Appendix II under the title of Figure 2.

that sense, both UNSCRs and sanctions that the EU adopts, reveal what kind of a relationship exists between capitalist MoP and neoliberal social forces such as trade asset freezes, embargoes on export and import of goods and services, prohibition of investment etc. Second step is to reduce the distinct positions of these ideas, institutions and material capabilities of the IOs from their location into the production process of the sanctions. Thus, in order to understand the alliances created within the production of sanctions, the locations of the social forces are deducted to the common interests of the main actors and the approaches and strategies that they utilize. This step reveals the explanatory answer to the first sub-question of whether the common interest created in adopting sanctions is enough to promote the EU as a THB, as well. In that sense, negotiations processes, international agreements and strategies behind them, supplied by the factsheets and the books respectively, enable the researcher to analyse whether the locations of the ideas, ideologies and the material capabilities match with the *common sense*.

Third step is to demonstrate the attempted hegemonic project within a *form of state*. Therefore, how the transnational forces of capital, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, transnational and multinational corporations etc. become embodied or confronted as a particular form of state has already exemplified that the EU is analysed with reference to its sui generis nature with reference to its external competences. However, the sanctions concern not only the IGOs but also the NGOs related to the targeted individual, group or entity as much as banks (including the Central Banks of the targets), transportation companies and business enterprises. Last but not least, the fourth step is interested in the diffusion of the dominant ideology created by asking the question of “how neoliberal hegemony, achieved within particular forms of state, is transferred to the world order sphere of activity?” (ibid). Consequently, in order to understand the transnationalization process of neoliberal sanctions, the perspective of the EU towards the market within selected countries through the implementation of sanctions is investigated. Therefore, this last step requires more attention than the other steps since it concerns whether the EU forms coercion through the prohibitions in foreign trade and investment or employs positive sanctions (inducements) by providing support for the foreign trade and investment as well as including further development of general bilateral relations. This very point emphasizes the importance of giving an appropriate answer to the second sub-question of to what extent do the politically

and/or economically assumed norms, values and objectives lead the EU gain an intellectual and cultural persuasion.

On the other hand, the second route to empirical research has been described as an 'alternative' since it deals with the historical background of subaltern classes that play role in the process of production. By analysing the developments that arose in the production of sanctions, it is assumed to have the 'objective' formation of these classes such as the policy elites. The common point with the primary route is the 'ideologies' laying behind the motivations of these subaltern classes to associate actively or passively with the dominant social forms of political entity. To the extent that the EU forms the subaltern class of governance, the UN creates the dominant social form so that the EU complies with targeted sanctions. Bieler and Morton (2003) claim that this methodological approach has been extensively utilized to display the 'ideological interests at stake in the writing of history' (ibid). Analysing how the political institutions that function under the EU such as the EEAS react towards the 'targeted sanctions' as a policy innovation is assumed to lead the research to be concluded with a satisfactory explanation to the third sub-question of whether targeted sanctions supply the counter hegemony to assign a 'war of position' declared by the EU.

The reason behind taking the elements of social forces as the categories and deciding to code their concrete reflections is to reveal the dialectical process behind the autonomous sanctions, the differences of targeted sanctions between the supplementary and autonomous sanctions in terms of objectives, negotiations and agreement processes, which reveal the "market place where diverse interests and ideas are traded among the members of the network" (Kammel and Zyla, 2013, p. 449). Moreover, the elements, which are described under the headline of 'multiple purposes' of sanctions by Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015) before, are the capacities that go beyond economic capabilities (i.e. trade and financial restrictions, diplomatic and social bans) that reveal how the coercion and consent are formed. Lastly, the role of the actors within the process of designing this collective action is analysed to see whether they reveal the characteristics of a 'passive revolution' by becoming the leader through having the intellectual and cultural persuasion of the selected units of analysis.




Figure 1 The Coding Scheme: How to analyse the process of targeted autonomous sanctions

Source: Own compilation

3.5. Concluding Remarks

To conclude, the motivation to answer the main research question consists of analysing three concepts of Neo-Gramscianism with reference to the codes that are exhibited in the coding scheme. In order to execute Neo-Gramscianism, the research activities are planned to analyse the designing process of the sanctions policies, not in terms of their effectiveness and success but rather the dialectical diplomatic and economic dialogues taken towards each other by the political units:

1. The crucial point to conduct a political and cultural hegemony for a (subaltern) class is to become a THB. This can happen and get legitimized between the social forces to the

extent that the class creates the *common sense* through mutual interests between the alliances. Alliances are the key collective actors which are defined as the primary step with reference to their roles within the production process of sanctions. The question of internal hegemony within the EU is discussed as an initial part of this step.

2. Common approaches and strategies behind EU sanctions policies are the factors that reduce distinct position of social forces from their location into the production process. Therefore, as the second step, the values and objectives that form the mutual interests of the alliances are classified in order to understand to what extent the EU forms a THB.
3. The social relations of production between the EU and social forces such as policy institutions and transnational forces of capital that are affecting or affected by the sanctions policy (i.e. the banks or business enterprises), are investigated to understand to what extent the EU builds a form of state although it is a sui-generis entity and attempt to demonstrate its hegemonic project throughout the capitalist MoP.
4. The hegemony of the subaltern class is attempted to be created via the diffusion of ideology that it adopts. This diffusion of the neoliberal ideology can be revealed by the market relationships of the EU, not only economically but also diplomatically. This situation concerns the economic and diplomatic merges between the alliances created within the framework of sanctions policy. Consequently, the performance of the EU and its alliances towards building (or not building) market power through investment and trade relations with the selected countries is analysed through the coercing, constraining and signalling features of the diplomatic and economic restrictions, which is assumed to give a satisfactory answer to the second sub-question.
5. For the last step, EU perspective towards smart sanctions are evaluated in order to see to what extent the imposition of the smart sanctions by the EU has led a path towards a passive revolution.

4. Analysis

After conceptualizing the EU sanctions policy with reference to its social forces, introducing the contextual background with reference to Neo-Gramscianism, Chapter 4 exhibits the analysis of the collected data revealing to what extent the EU utilizes the increase of implementing AES taken under CFSP as the instruments to create a *passive revolution* in order to replace the international hegemon as the *new* historical bloc. It is crucial to keep in mind that the relationships between each and every social force leads to a network of political dialogue, financial and trade markets thanks to the use of the capitalist MoP within diplomacy. By the help of methodological steps driven by Bieler and Morton (2003) and case comparison, the analysis sheds light on whether there is a correlation between the adoption of supplementary and autonomous sanctions, and interests of the EU to become intellectual and cultural leader through supplying *both* coercion and common sense.

4.1. World Order: IOs to Stabilize Hegemony

World order is an organically emerged arena in which power structures conflict through promoting and innovating their *own* social forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. Operationalization of these social forces are important since the state is not ontologically questioned as the central actor, but in contrast, the forms of state need to be focused to the extent that they are in adherence with transnational capital accumulation through the social forces, which are in the hands of subaltern classes. The world order is dominated by a formerly historical bloc that becomes a hegemonic bloc to the extent that it creates a *transnational system of production*. Therefore in this research, historical materialism is utilized to analyse how the subaltern classes, as a part of power structures, functionalize their struggle over diplomacy through the transnational capital accumulation. The UN has been the major historical bloc through the social forces of foundation treaty of the UN Charter that diffuses the basic principles to maintain *collective action* with respect to the Chapter VII of 'Threats of the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression'.

The UNSC started to implement restrictive measures on the countries that violate international norms starting from 1946. With reference to the objective of 'restoring international peace and security' that is presented within the scope of the UN Charter Chapter VII, the UN has *subjugated* the sovereignty of the states and the state formation of the EU

through making them its members. By this way, the subaltern classes such as the EU does not only form the dominant alliances to maintain *collective action* that the political elites offer in terms of *consent* as the social force of the UNSC reveals, but also the *bloc* to sustain restrictive measures that the political elites oblige in terms of *coercion* as the Permanent Five (P5) implies. These subaltern classes emerged as a part of UN's civil society as well as they started to become subject to international *norms* and *values* that are taken under the foundation treaty of the UN and following agreements that it has undertaken. Therefore, the historical framework of sanctions became the *means* to impose *coercion while* the UN has syndicated the *hegemonic bloc* through developing comprehensive sanctions as the *hegemonic project*. Consequently, this section answers the first sub-question of whether the EU has capacity to create a new historical bloc by sustaining the mutual interests through implementing supplementary and autonomous sanctions. In other words, this part analyses to what extent the EU promotes roles of an economic *and/ or* political IO while applying measures beyond the hegemon has set.

General and specific provisions on the CFSP taken under the Treaty of the EU (TEU)¹⁴ reveal the greatest examples of how the EU is dedicated to imply international norms and values that are taken under UN leadership. However, in the cases of supplementary sanctions, the relationship between the EU and its willingness to create a THB is correlated to the EU having a market relationship with the target country. In other words, to the extent that the EU is economically interested in the target country, it applies negotiations for both diplomatic and economic relations to maintain a THB; otherwise it only promotes an *external* leadership. For example in the case of Iran, international norms that were on agenda was the access to WMD and the violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), however, the EU has altered its whole economic and financial relations primarily in order to promote the international values through sanctions. Although the negotiations between the EU and Iran were made through the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) preparations until 2002; when the government of Iran failed to explain why they started the project of Arak and Natanz nuclear plants, for the *first time* the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) started political and economic dialogue with Iran over nuclear revelation.

¹⁴ Article 21, Article 34 and Article 42 of the Chapter V (TEU), specifically refer to the principles of the UN Charter.

However, in case of the DPRK, the EU has been an *additional* social force that has intended to motivate the key actors to negotiate. Although the EU has too little diplomatic and economic relations with the DPRK, the EU has formed its own approaches towards creating common interests between the transnational actors. As in the case of Iran, responding to violation of the international norm of constructing WMDs, the world order originates from the implications of comprehensive sanctions by the UN since 1993 although the comprehensive regime of the US goes back to Korean War (Reynolds and Wan, 2012). Non-proliferation of the DPRK is a relatively *new* problem in terms of EU diplomatic relations; the EU's position in sanctions as a social force has been different when compared to Iran as well as the strategies and approaches that it takes. The EU has been one of the 'most enthusiastic' (Taylor, 2010) sanctioning powers (as well as Japan and the US) on the DPRK since it interpreted the case as an *intimidation* against Pyongyang's provocations as well as Iran's. This enthusiasm is demonstrated via the willingness to persuade Pyongyang engaging with the Six-Party Talks, which has been the core of the common sense between the actors since the DPRK has violated an international norm by breaking down the Agreed Framework¹⁵. The EU has expressed its intention towards additional autonomous targeted measures as 'impressing the upholding global non-proliferation agreements' (EEAS, n.d.). The EU also names its own approach towards this international non-proliferation regime as a 'defence' (Press 53, 2013), which reveals to what extent it reacts as a *form of state*.

Consequently, to the extent that the state formation is shaped through certain configurations of ideas, such as cooperation between the states in terms of trade as well as the international norms provided through agreements; institutions of the EEAS and the HR to accelerate stabilizing neoliberal ideology of international norms; and material capabilities of sanctions in general reveal that the EU act as a form of state, the cases of supplementary sanctions reveal to what extent being an economic IO has an impact over creating a THB. *While in both of the cases the EU promotes international norms through changing the shape of social relations of production between social forces by creating common strategies and interests, only in the first case it innovates its own social forces.* In the case of Iran, interests of the EU and the common interests of alliances during bargaining process are revealed under the leadership of the HR and the social forces created under the EU such as the E3/EU+3 respectively. Interests of the

¹⁵ Agreed Framework is a bilateral agreement, signed between North Korea and the US in 2002, 'characterizing' the nuclear sanctions regime in the DPRK (Reynolds and Wan, 2012).

EU are negotiated by E3 bloc with reference to the use of 'incentives over sanctions' which ended with 'frustration' since Iran continued enrichment-related activities (Taylor, 2010). This 'carrots over sticks' strategy continued until 2006 with motivations driven *commercially* (ibid) as opposed to the US support towards Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) threatening the international trading system including companies within the EU.

However, in case of the DPRK, interests of the EU have been *more* diplomatic and *less* economic in terms of engaging the target country into IPE compared to Iran. Since they originate from being a member of the Executive Board of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), they do become a *broker* rather than a *leader*. To the extent that the EU *opposed* deploying economic sanctions against the North Korea, its approaches have been described as 'negligible' (ibid). Moreover, not being a party of the negotiations reveal that the EU had the intention to utilize the sanctions as the *means* rather than the *end*; meaning that supplementary sanctions have been the instruments to create the *common sense* from a position of a *mediator*. Brokering to pursue the DPRK to engage with Six-Party Talks has been the strategy of the EU to gain the *consent* from North Korea as well as the already formed alliance of the US, Japan and North Korea in order to become the *cement* between political and civil society.

As a result, the cases of Iran and the DPRK are relatively different than the other in terms of their capability to create a *common sense* within the framework of a state formation. In the case of Iran, to the extent that the economic interests of the EU started to mismatch with Iran, the EU started to pursue the 'dual-track' strategy as an example of *both* constraining and coercion through imposing sanctions and gaining consent via 'trying to engage with Iran through several offers of cooperation' (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013, p. 14). However, this tendency to maintain collaboration on regional security and global economic affairs could not create a domestic *collective action* since it was *not* presenting a common interest: While France and the UK have been the leading powers that support American efforts and in favour of adopting additional EU sanctions that do not involve rulings for any preconditioned UN mandate, Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain have been in favour of the adoption of unilateral sanctions if UNSCRs would create a 'deadlock' (Taylor, 2010). In that sense, Germany and Italy resisted the US pressure as well as aforementioned French proposals since they were the leading European trading partners with Iran, which is the major market for industrial products.

Intentions of the EU towards promoting mutual consent is quite different while applying autonomous sanctions than supplementary ones because it is characterized with the motivation of creating a *common sense* through the objectives that the EU qualifies itself. The framework of taking a collective action in terms of EU ESG, the legal background which is provided by the Basic Principles (2004) and the Guidelines (2012) as well as the differentiations of creating internal hegemony demonstrate the differences between how the EU behaves under the conditions that a hegemon has set. In that sense, like the Neo-Gramscianism has foreseen, *in the cases of autonomous sanctions, the relationship between the EU and its willingness to create a THB is correlated with the EU having the competence of obtaining **collective action** through creating a **transnational** common sense of protecting the neoliberal international norms and values against the hegemonic bloc including the dominant state formations.* Consequently, the spheres of hegemony including the social relations of sanctions created by the social forces, the dominant forms of states in terms of subaltern classes and a world order lacking hegemony lead to the production process of the social structure in which the economic relations are not *primary* but *secondary*.

For example, although the current world order has seen ‘the world’s worst humanitarian disaster’ (EEAS, n.d.) in Syria, the UNSC was not able to create a *common sense* to continue its hegemony over restrictive measures¹⁶. Unlike the previous cases, the IC could not create an *alliance* in terms of designing sanctions: Not only those two of the P5 members blocked the draft but also 4 states (Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa) abstained while the other 9 states including the UK, France and Germany voted ‘yes’. The gap, which has been created due to the case of not taking economic sanctions as a widespread reaction towards human rights violation and the use of WMD on civil society by the hegemon, triggered the leadership intentions of the EU. With a strategy of ‘isolating’ Syrian Government (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013), the EU intended to get the consent of the civil society including Russia and China, who

¹⁶ Although, the UNSC has taken 8 resolutions between the years of 2012 and 2015 concerning the Syrian Civil War, which emerged due to the violent response of the Syrian government against the civil society’s search of political rights following the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya in 2011, neither of them applied sanctions since Russia and China have vetoed “a British-sponsored resolution that would have punished the Syrian government with economic sanctions for failing to carry out a peace plan” (Gladstone, 2012, parag. 1).

were in favour of the objective of 'not meddling in Syria's internal affairs', with backup intention of keeping economic relations with Syria (Yan, 2013)¹⁷.

Moreover, the EU has followed US-like measured sanctions that do not take any economic restrictions. This situation made autonomous sanctions the *trend* of some states like Turkey and regional organizations like the Arab League through changing the *common interests* and consequently affecting the collective action taking. Therefore, the will of the EU to create a *common sense* under its leadership has been represented by the Geneva Communiqué (2012) with the objective of 'reaching a political solution by *mutual consent*' (Council Decision of the EU, 2014). This 'comprehensive approach' of the EU *explicitly* reveals its intention to get consent by creating alliances through the Joint Communication (2013) taken by the Commission¹⁸ under the name of 'comprehensive response'. This situation also shows how the 'comprehensive EU regional strategy' that the Foreign Affairs Council has adopted as another social force of ideological institution, actually turned into a leading international response by itself and the MSs through exemplifying how the EU intends to diffuse its dominance through *language*: While Article 2 of the strategy reveals the objective as the 'close coordination with the activities of MSs', Article 6 expresses the 'collective work' to actively support the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) within intra-Syrian negotiations and help Syrian civil society through cross-border assistance (Council of the EU, 2016). This situation exhibits not only the intention of the EU to get the consent of the Syrian civil society but also the inner civil society of the EU; the MSs themselves.

AES against Russia demonstrate to what extent the EU has the competence to form a THB, within the cases that include already maintained socio-economic and political relations from the most objective perspective. They illustrate whether the infrastructure of economic relations determine the superstructure of political relations or the intellectuals of EU policy-elites are able to take initiatives to promote the collective action towards realizing international norms in the first place while putting economic interests in the second. With the

¹⁷ Yan (2013) has reported to CNN "China has said foreign countries shouldn't meddle in Syria's internal affairs -- and perhaps for good reason. China has had its own share of international controversies over its policies with Tibet as well as allegations of human rights violations. Finally, China doesn't want to reprise what happened with Libya".

¹⁸ Under the Joint Communication by the Commission, the response of the EU is expressed by the sentences of "The EU should continue to actively support the US/Russia efforts to revive political negotiations on the basis of the June 2012 Geneva Communiqué... The EU should also stand ready to provide any support to the UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative and to the UN in this regard. In view of a possible "Geneva II" conference, the EU should prepare a substantial contribution and ensure a robust EU position".

annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, the diplomatic status of Russia within the IC has changed as well as the economic relationships. The basic EU approach towards Russia has been implementing diplomatic measures in order to influence another social force of Group of Seven (G7)¹⁹ in terms of suspending the negotiations with Russia joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Europa Newsroom, n.d.). Moreover, utilization of diplomatic bans rather than economic sanctions reveal that the use of social forces in order to create a common sense has been deployed through creating mutual interests with the other actors of IC as much as constraining the target country to change behaviour via not concluding New Agreement²⁰.

Despite the UN was not the primary social force to dominate the IC in that case, the EU was in favour of protecting the international norms as well as the sovereignty of some of its MSs through the consent of Russia to cooperate within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-based world order. Intentions of creating a *transnational collective* action originate from their nature of offering 'gold-plating' alternative solutions to international crisis (Taylor, 2010). Thus, AES are rather taken by state formations of mainly the EU and the US, followed by Norway, Canada and Australia; and create a totally different alliance compared to previous ones. In that sense, not applying another 'carrots over sticks' approach reveals that the economic ties with Russia has a secondary moment of relations. Especially the bifurcation created within the EU in order to impose sanctions since Russia creates the violation of sovereignty and forms a 'security threat' can be seen as the *clash* of importance of political and economic relations rather than a challenge to maintain the internal hegemony. The opposition of alliances between Poland, Romania, Baltic States (and Sweden, Denmark and Finland as supporters of Polish position) and remaining state formations, who have strong trade and energy ties with Russia (PISM, 2015), have shaped the social relations of production in terms of sanctions policy design. However, the multidimensional competence of the EU in terms of collective decision making to promote THB has come into existence in the case of Russia, with the help of another state formation; the US. The alliance, which was created by the EU and the US with Norway, Canada and Switzerland in terms of financial restriction imposed on banks, has spoken 'with nearly one voice' (ibid).

¹⁹ The Group of Seven (G7) is the bloc of states of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, gathering at ministerial level as the representatives of the advanced major economies.

²⁰ The EU and Russia started negotiating on visa-free regime in 2011, however, with the annexation, they were suspended.

The EU has maintained the behaviour of a state formation. It has promoted an *alternative* transnational system of capital accumulation such as utilizing the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the major material capability that it has, in order to affect foreign relationships as well as finding a long-term solution, underlined as ‘potential multilateral mechanism’ (European Council, 2014) of governmental meetings at the Statement of Heads of State or Government in Ukraine. While the European Council’s request from the EIB to call new financing operations off in Russia in July 2015 reveals the intention of the EU to control the transnational capital through its *own* social forces including European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), introducing a long-term multilateral mechanism exhibits the will to create new EU social forces to create common sense in order to internationalize the ideology of fighting against the human rights violation as well as the annexation. To the extent that the sanctions over Russia are related to the crises in Ukraine, which is known as the Donbas conflict, the process of Minsk has been started by France and Germany. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) authors Melnyk and Umland (2016), Europe has used the process as a ‘mediation’ instrument. The ‘3-fold strategy’, which consists of diplomatic sanctions, visa bans and asset freezes as the ‘sticks’, and Minsk agreement as a ‘diplomatic vehicle’ by ECFR, however, the EU is still in search for a ‘carrot’ to persuade Russia to oblige with an OSCE-based world order.

4.2. Social Action: Hegemonic Project of Economic Sanctions

Social action as mentioned refers to the collective action taken by the THB in order to actualize its moral and intellectual leadership through creating new social relations of production within other form of state. To the extent that the UN forms the hegemonic bloc, sanctions within the framework of historical action *universalizes* the neoliberal interests of the UN and create the hegemonic project. Within the historical framework of action of sanctions and market relations, sanctions are enabling the social forces to control the transnational capital movement (TCM) through diplomatic relations. The competence that enables the hegemon to create a hegemonic project out of a historical framework of action has been the tacit consent which is maintained via *coercive intellectual potency*. In this thesis, CCS has been used as a technique to *not* to evaluate the effectiveness of the sanctions but rather to understand to which extent the measures create coercion in terms of intellectual and cultural persuasion. The current hegemon has dealt with the problem of implying a non-violent coercion through

gaining a moral interpretation of sanctions. Indeed the smooth transition from comprehensive to targeted sanctions reveals how this hegemonic project was formed in terms of creating the intellectuality through *specifying target*. Consequently, this section answers the second sub-question of whether the EU has capacity to conduct coercion through intellectual and cultural leadership. In other words, this part analyses to what extent the EU promotes targeted sanctions as the means of imposing its own political sovereignty.

The concept of 'comprehensive sanction' has been developed after the 1990s as a response to different international problems. First implication during the Iraq invasion was over Kuwait as 'the most powerful sanctions in history' (Friedman, 2012). However, to the extent that they are powerful, they sustain 'a frisson of moral satisfactions' (Gottemoeller, 2007) and bear a moral burden over civil population. As a response to the comprehensive sanctions, which have impact over the entire state, the targeted sanctions are introduced through their characteristics of reshaping the borderline of the economic sanctions. After the comprehensive sanctions employed 'gargantuan costs' (Gonzales, 2016) on the civil society in the case of Iraq (1991), sanctions targeting particular individuals, government institutions, and private enterprises created a practically challenging trend in terms of application costs. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq formally ended the comprehensive sanctions and the UNSC created blacklists under the objectives of *counter-terrorism* and *human rights* concerns. According to Giumelli (2013), the UN has legitimized non-state actors' accountability within the sanctions framework by emerging the *principle* of 'individual international responsibility'. With the internationalization of the targeted sanctions by the UNSC, targeted sanctions as the *hegemonic project*, as well as the relationship between the transnational capital and sanctions, have started to be implemented because the targets in economic sector are determined with a motivation of impacting the policies in that sector.

Creating political changes through key actors in economic sector has been the rationality behind creating targeted sanctions. Stein (2012) interprets this relationship as an 'exchange' of a market price by a political price because sanctions create 'monopsony' if there is no competitive market. Since most of the time trade is in private hands as in the case of Iran, TCM depends on the ability of state formations to coerce or persuade the target state through

using international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group²¹ as the means. Therefore, the UN has transformed into a 'hegemonic bloc' by maintaining alliances who assist the UN to stabilize its hegemony through ratifying international agreements and taking actions under UN measures. In that sense, the way of hegemon revealing its constraints has been *different* than how the EU utilizes the language of the sanctions when applied *autonomously*. As a result, by using both UNSCRs and EU sanctions, what are the similarities and differences to carry international norms as well as to what extent EU AES carry coercion and consent than supplementary sanctions are being answered. While the UNSCRs imply CCS as a form of restrictive measures, CCS as a method of coding the sanctions reveal the pattern of coercion.

Although CCS is generally used as a method to analyse the effectiveness in UNSCRs (TSC, 2012), they represent the methodology to analyse how the EU behaves as a state form and intents to diffuse the ideology of obliging to the international norms through controlling the transnational capital by creating a counter-hegemony. *In the cases of supplementary sanctions, the EU has been taking constraining and signalling sanctions rather than coercing sanctions parallel to the measures set by UNSCRs with reference to its economic relations with the target country.* In other words, to the extent that EU measures are taken in adherence to UNSCRs, they provide coercion under UNSC cultural and intellectual leadership because the hegemonic project has capacity and intention to control TCM in the first place. For example in the case of Iran, CCS structured nature of EU intentions are kept hidden in the *language* that the EU uses within its autonomous sanctions and international agreements. While CR 359/2011 and CD 2011/235/CFSP are taken against human rights violation (with 15 amendments in total) and apply signalling through targeting specific names of the 'certain persons' whose funds require to be frozen, CR 267/2012 and CD 2010/413/CFSP are taken against nuclear issues (with 50 amendments in total) and constrain the trade in dual-use goods and technology that can be used in petrochemical industry, and ban the import of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. They exhibit the parallelism to the UNSCR 1696, which is taken by 14 countries voting 'yes' except Qatar and consists of *signalling* 'confidence building' measures through 'exercising vigilance' and *constraining* via preventing the transfer of any items, materials etc. that could contribute to the INP (Article 5).

²¹ World Bank Group is a bloc of five international economic organizations including the World Bank, founded under the UN System.

Most importantly, as a demonstration of signalling towards the state, it targeted the Government of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran in terms of restricting the trade of gold, precious metals and diamonds, and printed banknotes respectively. These examples demonstrate to what extent the EU can specify its competences in order to fulfil the requirements of the UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 that increased constraint via freezing the funds and financial assets of listed 28 individuals and entities including the first established bank of Iran (Bank Sepah), and preventing 'specialized teaching on the training of Iranian nationals who would contribute to INP (Article 17). Last but not least, publishing chapters on "Restrictions of financing of certain enterprises" and "Freezing of funds and economic resources" in both CD and CR on the nuclear issue answer to what extent the EU maintains its political hegemony of diffusing the ideology of obliging international norms through using material capabilities of control over transnational capital and institutions as well as governmental institutions. Consequently, although the action has been taken to sustain non-proliferation in the first place, the signalling dimension of EU targeted sanctions left its place to constraining element through slowing the development of the INP down by limiting the access to certain technologies.

Also in the case of the DPRK, all of the UNSCRs demonstrate how the control over TCM creates the coercion on policy making level through the assistance of transnational sources of capital. The UNSC has taken 5 resolutions since the nuclear testing in 2006, and unlike the case of Iran, they all passed. While the first sanction of UNSCR 1718 demonstrates signalling through 'calling for' suspending ballistic missile program and 'urge' the DPRK to negotiate, it constrained the exports and imports of luxury goods as well as nuclear technology weapons. As a result, to the extent that trade relations between the EU and the DPRK are *negligible*, the CR 329/2007 and CD 2013/183/CFSP mirror the UNSC measures more similarly than the case of Iran. As additional measures, they refer to the internal hegemony as well. While the former, which has been taken with regards to the Treaty Establishing European Community (the Treaty of Nice), was applying measures constraining the trade of dual-use technology that was strengthened in the following UNSCR 1874, the latter has been the main signalling document that shows what kind of sectorial restrictions are taken including a transnational capital force of Central Bank of the DPRK.

Consequently, the tacit consent of the IC has been maintained through the UNSCRs within which the hegemonic project was once more emphasized due to diffusing the idea of 'remaining vigilant' in monitoring the targeted individuals and entities who are in relationship with the nuclear program of North Korea. *However, to the extent that the EU was not a party to negotiations and alliances, its capacity to coerce has remained limited with following the constraining and signalling of UNSCRs.* While the two new UNSCRs of 2094 and 2270 reveal the signalling and constraining respectively through targeting specifically the Kim family regime in terms of blocking the access to cash transfers and ties to international banking system and imposing asset freeze on economic resources of the target government or the Worker's Party of Korea that are placed outside the DPRK, the EU had to follow this trend of controlling the TCM rather than creating one.

The most important point that requires to be emphasized here is to what extent the hegemon has been able to create its own institutions since they are the basic social forces that would carry the intellectual and cultural leadership over the subaltern classes. In that sense UNSCR 1737 has created a social force of monitoring mechanism called the '1737 Committee'. However, to the extent that UNSCR measures require to be applied through the national authorities of the EU, their capacity of persuasion is challenged due to the EU's intensions of expanding the hegemony of international norms with reference to its own structuring of policy-making elites to gain the common sense. For example in the case of Iran, the EEAS has created a policy-design framework of not combining the UNSCRs and nuclear related economic and financial EU sanctions, but rather terminating them and creating new interests. In the case of the DPRK as well, the UNSCR 1718 constraints target country through creating a monitoring mechanism of the '1718 Committee' (Article 8). Additionally within UNSCR 1874 another new social force of '7-member expert panel' (Article 26) has been created to monitor the prohibitions on MSs to supply financial transfers and commitments for grants that are able to be used to promote WMD, exceptionally with humanitarian purposes (Article 19). While constraining the transaction of transnational capital and signalling the protection of human rights aspect both underline the definition of targeted sanctions, they also emphasize the capacity of the hegemon to dominate the civil society through created neoliberal ideas.

However, within a world order in which there is no application of the hegemonic project since there is no common sense within the hegemonic bloc, the gap of tacit consent is intended to

be maintained by the subaltern classes to persuade the civil society via coercive methods of intellectuality. *Therefore, the EU tends to promote its intellectual and cultural persuasion through the application of autonomous targeted sanctions because with reference to the economic relationships, it promotes coercion in terms of seeking a behavioural change in target through altering the cost-benefit calculation via controlling the TCM with the support of constraining and signalling.* In that sense forming a single regulatory regime of such a historical framework, the legal framework of EU AES reveal to what extent the EU internalizes this transnational system of capital accumulation. As the case of Syria illustrates, although there are two types of AES that the EU applies (direct targeted sanctions towards terrorist groups and humanitarian rights sanctions which are targeted under constraints), the first targeted sanction for human rights violation (CD 2011/273/CFSP) has been an example in terms of *signalling* since it condemned the violent repressing and extended to Assad's family, and *constraining* since it has planned target list of individuals to be banned from travelling and assets frozen. While the number of individuals and entities target to restriction was 179 and 53 in 2013, currently the number concerns more than 200 people and 70 entities (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013; EEAS, n.d.).

Following the first Decision, CR 36/2012 and CD 2013/255/CFSP have shown the examples of *constraining* rather than signalling, where *signalling* fits the nature of applying targeted sanctions due to not implying coercion and having minimum impact on civil society. While the former displays constraining through 'prohibition on the export of telecommunications monitoring equipment for use by Syrian regime', the latter takes export and import restrictions 'with the exception of arms and relate material' which can be used for repression. Therefore, one the one hand, the absence of the signalling nature prevented the communication between international actors, meaning a lack of alliance while imposing material impact led a lack of intellectual and moral leadership. On the other hand, the EU not only represented its will to create an *alternative* in the absence of UNSC hegemony through the CSS technique within the use of language, but also applied practical coercion and constraint methods like humanitarian aid and encouraging the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) as well as decreasing the diplomatic activities in the host country.

However, since there are two important actors imposing AES, it would be better to have a comparison of CCS technique to understand to what extent this historical action differs from each other in terms of maintaining the intellectual and moral leadership through coercion and/or consent. Coercion and constraining show themselves more than signalling due to the intensity of diplomatic and economic relations in the case of Russia, as well. Russia has been the EU's biggest neighbour and 3rd biggest partner in trade (EEAS, n.d.). Therefore, not only material capabilities that the EU imposed such as in the areas of access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies or diplomatic sanctions such as suspension of Group talks, but also the intention of creating a common sense with new alliances including target country demonstrate the *coercion* than an intention towards *consent*. Moreover, assigning the EIB and the EBRD for suspending new financing operations in Russia as a country reveals constraining characteristics of the political society (policy-makers within the EU). Nevertheless, sanctions that are taken against Ukraine government in terms of reacting towards human rights violation in the Donbas region reveal to what extent AES have the capacity to coerce the determined target through playing on *additional* TCM of another country: Trade and investment restrictions that the EU adopted for Crimea and Sevastopol targets the sectorial cooperation and exchanges within Russia (EEAS, n.d.). Most importantly, intention of *coercion* towards Russia through *signalling*, applied within the process of negotiations, has been triggered by the main social force of the HR herself in September 2015, claiming that the EU aims to put pressure on Russia via ensuring 'swift and comprehensive implementation of the Minsk agreements' (Council of the EU, 2015).

CDs taken against Russian Federation with reference to TEU Article 29²² and CRs having regard to TFEU Article 215²³ generally constrain the trade relations through prohibiting the direct and indirect purchases and sales of bonds, equity or similar financial instruments, transfer or export of arms and related materials including military vehicles and equipment, and most importantly all dual-use goods and technologies²⁴. *The gap of a hegemonic bloc due to the lack of UNSCRs wanted to be fulfilled by the 'maximized impact of the measures' in order to encourage 3rd states to obtain alike measures of the EU* (CD 2014/ 512/CFSP, Article 5).

²² Article 29 of the TEU: "The Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions".

²³ Article 215(2) of the TFEU: "Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities."

²⁴ Summarized with reference to the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP; Articles 1-4.

Restrictive measures taken under the headline of Ukraine, however, reveal the role of the policy-making elites as the *main* social forces clearer than the ones against Russia because they regulate constraints such as the travel bans in terms of shaping the political dialogues by preventing the limitations on participation to the intergovernmental meetings that the EU hosts (CD 2014/145/CFSP, Article 1). Consequently, promotion of *signalling alliances* demonstrates the will of *consent* through diplomatic dialogue has become an objective of the restrictive measures. Moreover, the restrictive measures against Ukraine focus on *constraining* and *signalling* rather than *coercion* compared to the former since it prohibits the trade relations ‘originating in Crimea and Sevastopol’ (CF 2014/386/CFSP and CR 692/2014) as the primary region and listing the persons, who are ‘identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and...human rights violations in Ukraine’, as target in terms of freezing funds (CD 2014/119/CFSP, Article 1).

4.3. Social Change: Targeted Autonomous Sanctions

The counter hegemony is a phenomenon that is actualized to the extent that the historical action is utilized as an instrument by subaltern classes in order to renew the hegemony that does not respond to requests of the *consciousness* that the subaltern class has gained through being the intellectual and cultural leader. To the extent that the EU reveals the characteristics of a THB that has the intellectual and moral leadership of collective actions, a counter-hegemony of conventional sanctions is created by the UN. In the cases which the EU finds UN measures insufficient or lacking and decides to take AES, UN hegemony is challenged in terms of filling the gap of controlling the transnational market through a new perspective of targeted sanctions via its *own* institutions and policy-elites. Targeted sanctions as policy innovation differs between the UN and the EU due to their nature; while the former is a security and international cooperation organization, the second is an economic and diplomatic organization. In order to create a *new* world order through a ‘passive revolution’, the EU interprets targeted sanctions as the *breaking point* of the hegemonic project is evaluated. *Consequently, this section answers the third sub-question of whether the EU has capacity to create a passive revolution by increasing the implementation of AES.* In other words, this part analyses to what extent EU AES are policy inventions to promote the passive revolution.

AES as a part of the political culture that the EU as one of the subaltern classes deploy against the other powerful social forces within the framework of a state formation, there are two

dimensions of the perspective of the EU towards autonomous sanctions to be discussed. To start with, to maintain hegemony internationally, first it should be obtained domestically. Moreover, as mentioned before the passive revolution occurs if and only if the hegemony expands *horizontally* (Cox, 1981). In that sense, within this section of the thesis, it is analysed to what extent the EU was able to maintain the hegemony over civil society that those particular sanctions are subjected to and to what extent the EU was able to influence other forms of state through creating a new perspective of AES. *Consequently, it is analysed that the EU has promoted counter-hegemony by applying supplementary sanctions through its own social forces as a demonstration towards not only the hegemon but also to other powerful state formations to the extent that it had economic relations to protect. However, the point view towards autonomous sanctions has been the policy innovations to take social change in terms of altering hegemonic measures.*

For instance, while engagement dimension of the dual-track strategy reveal the enlargement horizontally through getting consent from Iran, 'repackaged' proposals that the EU offered to Iran between 2006 and 2008 demonstrate the beginning of a *new* hegemonic project since it aimed at establishing a nuclear fuel production through syndications in various locations in the world. To the extent that the EU has opposed to ILSA and its application, the EU not only developed a *counter-hegemony* towards the UN but also to the attempt of the US to become the international leader by 'shaping the sanctions strategies of the other governments' through supporting the akin measures by the 'coalitions of concerned' countries (Taylor, 2010). Moreover, the response of the EU towards UNSCRs 1803 and 1835 (which have changed the alliances of interests) via using 'comparatively stronger language' in order to strengthen constraints to exercise restraint and vigilance is a demonstration of political strategy to trigger 'counter-hegemony'. The greatest example of this ideology can be seen as EU resistance of taking sanction against Bank Saderat of Iran although it was in the target list of UNSCR 1803 but not on the EU's blacklist. As a result, applying strengthening sanctions the UN and differentiated sanctions than what the US has wished for, is a consequence of the EU keeping its purpose of bargaining through its *own* social forces of negotiation.

The dual-track strategy exhibits the trial of achieving domestic hegemony by engaging political society's interests represented in neoliberal expectations with common sensed ideology of fulfilling international norms within civil society. With the implementation of dual-track

approach, the EU became a member of EU+3 bloc so that the 'long-term comprehensive solution' approach²⁵, which the EU has emphasized since the beginning with an objective of 'developing a constructive partnership with Iran' as a demonstration of consent, could be maintained via the negotiation process led by this *new* social force. By taking the law in its own hands through utilizing the social force of the HR with the assistance of the EEAS, the EU managed to reduce the interests of all subaltern state formations to mutual concerns. For example, although the main objective of the EU was to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons and of Iran to maintain high-enriched uranium, at the end of the international agreements taken²⁶, neither the EU+3 could terminate the INP nor Iran could achieve its goal. Consequently, the Geneva process, in which EU+3 negotiations were chaired by the HR as the most important social force of the EU in ESG, *changed* the initial objective of terminating the INP to main low-enriched uranium (LEU)²⁷.

The language that the EU uses does not only reveal the aim of CCS but also how the EU responds towards UNSCRs and US interests. In that sense the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which was chaired by the former HR Ashton and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, also reduced the objective of negotiations to guaranteeing the peaceful nature of the INP with a coercing footnote of 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' (JPOA, 2013). Moreover, the EU has created another social force of Joint Commission under the roof of EU+3 and Iran as the dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), which has been concluded appropriate with the *long-term comprehensive approach* in terms of ensuring the application of *international norms*. However, to the extent that the hegemony is maintained first of all domestically, targeted sanctions applied by the EU have been challenged by two categories of: the MSs and the Court of Justice (CJEU).

There are two indicators that show the internal hegemony between the MSs: despite that common interests of the MSs as the first factor have been debated so far, reactions of some MSs towards the oil embargo in 2012 exhibit whether the core strategy of the EU demonstrates coercion or consent: Greece; Italy and Spain were not in favour of the embargo since the Iranian crude oil represented oil imports of these countries by 30%, 14% and 12%

²⁵ Information on the long-term comprehensive approach and its call for partners to support EU autonomous sanctions can be found under Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (2004), Articles 4 and 5.

²⁶ The JPOA, also known as the Geneva interim agreement, and the JCPoA, also known as Iran deal, have been signed respectively in 2013 and 2015.

²⁷ For the next 15 years, Iran is only able to enrich uranium up to 3.67% without building new heavy-water facilities (Article 5).

respectively (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013). Nevertheless, as the second factor internal cooperation can be debated with reference to the principle of 'sincere cooperation'¹⁴. However, since it is an 'internal EU principle', its functions are limited with the capability of the Council to re-examine the national authority decision in supplementary sanctions. Moreover, as an exception, although travel bans that are given in target lists do not fall under EU competence (Eckes, 2014), carrying them out under national laws of the MSs shows that the internal hegemony is maintained to the extent that the EU keeps the competences that are brought with the treaties as its internal social forces of consent. For instance, the CJEU ruled against EU decisions in several cases since there is not sufficient proof to demonstrate involving in the INP such as the case of Bank Mellat of Iran (EPRS, 2014).

On contrary, the EU is mostly concerned about monitoring 'non-diplomatic' activities (Emmott, 2016) as in the case of the DPRK although diplomatic relations only consist of delegations (embassies) of seven EU MSs in North Korea. In that sense, the perspective of the EU towards targeted sanctions in this case has emerged as the *instrument* which provides diplomatic ties to control the 'non-diplomatic' (economic) relations. Moreover, supplementary sanctions were the *means* to not only diminish the military concerns related to target country but to 'stigmatize' (Portela, 2014) the target leadership specifically. Thus, compared to Iran case, the EU has *not* taken actions that would promote any counter-hegemony, but rather follow the hegemonic project from a relatively *neutral* point. However, most importantly, when the starting point of both of the cases are taken as the insufficient promotion of measures by the UN or the willingness to create its own hegemony over the current historical action, having intense or rare financial and trade relations reveal the *difference* of perspectives towards targeted sanctions in the cases of Iran and North Korea. At this very point, intention of creating internal hegemony comes directly from the limited investments in the DPRK of EU origin; there have been 6 Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties signed with 6 MSs, and currently 5 of them are still in force (EEAS, 2016). To the extent that the EU interprets the political dialogue as an 'integral part' of critical engagement strategy, it tries to promote its internal hegemony through the social force of the EEAS since the EU has an 'interest to develop bilateral relations' (EEAS, 2015). This situation demonstrates that the EU uses inducements to expend its neoliberal ideology of TCM since its economic relations with the DPRK are based on non-diplomatic social forces that the EU has created.

Due to not being one of the biggest trade partners, the case reveals to what extent the EU promotes the protection of international norms and values through *not* being able to control the TCM. The strategy defines the market power through not a *direct* relationship with the target state but rather target state's trading partners, as well as opposition parties, in terms of creating a historical bloc for deploying supplementary sanctions. In that sense, although the Six-Party Talks reveal the importance of inducements' and constraints' capacity to shape the interest to become a leader; the emphasis given on the Six-Party Talks demonstrates how material concerns do not necessarily shape the political agenda. The accession of US approaches since they differ after almost every round of the Six-Party Talks illustrates this situation; while after the 1st round 'the complete, verifiable, irreversible and dismantlement' (CVID) approach was taken against 'conditional intentions' of the DPRK, after the 4th round, the 'action for action' approach was taken in order to strengthen the restrictions until they 'worked' (Haggard and Noland, 2012) until Pyongyang decided to withdraw from Six-Party Talks and had the 2nd nuclear testing in 2009.

However, a social change is a *collective action* due to its nature of being a transnational growth of cultural persuasion as mentioned (Stephan, 2011). Therefore, in the cases of lacking collective actions taken by the hegemon, AES intervene into the IC through taking a strategic position of struggle against the hegemon, called the 'war of position'. Not only being the cultural and intellectual leader carries this position within the proposed hegemony of policy innovation into a counter-hegemony but also adding a new perspective towards this innovation determines the capability of subaltern classes to control the TCM. In that sense, EU AES have the potential to carry out a counter-hegemonic characteristic compared to supplementary actions because the MSs become the civil society which would produce both social forces to stabilize its own hegemony and political society that would form the policy-elites. The autonomous targeted sanctions taken against Syria demonstrate the means to resist to UNSCRs since the EU supports the opposing groups with the US. Since they are only foreign policy instruments that the EU utilize against the civil war, their 'rapidly developed' (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013) process show how the EU binds the MSs, as well as the civil population of Syria, a form of state. Although they had no impact over the government of Syria afterwards, the oil embargo on Syria which was applied in December 2011, as well as the

energy embargoes on Iran, revealed the 'readiness' of the EU to 'move to broader measures', signalling the keyword for a *social change*.

Moreover, the discussion of internal hegemony shows itself within the use of *language* by the EU. 'Commitment' has been the keyword for both MSs and the EU in many dimensions. Through the application of AES by the MSs due to their commitment towards the CFSP, the MSs became social forces themselves rather than a bloc for *alliances*. Therefore, the *irony* in the case of Syria is that the hegemonic idea of carrying international norms through neoliberal sanctions creates the counter-hegemony *itself*. The duty of stabilizing the hegemony by IOs has been the motivation to create a *new intellectual leadership* in terms of *policy-making* in the first place. This is demonstrated most obviously with the transnationalization of the ideology of changing target behaviour through 'using the UNSC to gather international support' in the case of Syria (ibid).

Since the EU does not create any social force in order to persuade the target to change behaviour, the national authorities assert the application of sanctions. To the extent that the MSs become *social forces*, coordination has been accepted to be provided by the EU towards the MSs as well as the EU's intentions to create the alliance by 'seeking complementarity with the measures implemented by other international and regional partners, and the Iraqi government' (Council of the EU, 2015, Article 5). Consequently, by the application of AES, the EU has intended to influence beyond Syrian Government not in terms of influencing but rather creating an *objective* of 'encouraging the members of the international community with influence over the Syrian parties to take a special responsibility for ensuring the success of such efforts' (ibid, Article 17). As a result, although the EU sanctions over Syria have been illustrations of *peaceful* suppressions concerning the search of consent from the Syrian Government as well as the MSs of the UNSC and the EU itself, still the EU could not currently create an alliance through a *common sense* just like many dimensions of the arms embargo has not been applied since June 2013 due to the difference of MS interest. This situation is a challenge for international hegemony, as well.

Lastly, since it tends to be a THB, the EU's utilizing a 'progressive approach' (PISM, 2015) in the case of Russia refers to the nature of targeted sanctions definition compared to the case of Syria: phase by phase, restrictions on limited framework of individuals and legal entities, and specific areas of EU-Russia cooperation (also known as the Common Space Partnership)

including Russian operators are checked. Moreover, compared to the US and its *relatively* frequent unilateral sanctions history, the motivations behind the EU AES towards Russia come from the *will of punishing* the individuals who were directly a part of the annexation and advocates of Russian expansion towards Ukraine (PISM, 2015). The EU has employed constraining rather than signalling like the US does; the motivation of US sanctions over Russia targeted directly the persons who are able to have impact over Kremlin policy, which fits the definition of targeted sanctions more due to targeting the policy elite as well as the layer, who serves for the business and defence industry. As a result, EU perspective over targeted sanctions in the case of Russia is totally different than the other cases because the targets that are listed are not only the social actor of Russia which is mainly condemned, but another actor of Ukraine which triggered the human rights violence against its own civil society in the first place. Therefore, the Council who notably introduced targeted sanctions over Ukraine on 20 February 2014 showed the scope of its *competence* to challenge the hegemon due to the gap of *hegemonic project*.

However, the EU's intention to create a multilateral mechanism of *common sense* has altered EU perspective towards the definition of targeted sanctions. To the extent that the sanctions reveal a marketplace for negotiations, whose objectives are to allow 'different economic systems' to gather on a mutual ground to protect the diplomatic relationships, sanctions applied on Russia are the most 'far-reaching' ones compared to other cases because they have not only covered the sectorial cooperation but also export and import embargoes in financial, oil-drilling and defence sectors (Europa Newsroom, n.d.). Moreover, unlike the case of Iran, there was *not* any other invention of social force that would monitor the implementation of the case. Rather, sanctions have been implemented on MS level meant that the Commission has been the *social force* necessary to be informed. At this very point, adoption of AES is challenged by the CJEU because the adopted measures require to be adequate with the Union Law justification in terms of targeting the individuals and/ or non-state entities. Nevertheless, Russian companies and banks challenge the autonomous sanctions 'before the CJEU' since there are Russian lenders who employ sectorial sanctions on borrowers under the regulations of finance agreements (Territt and Saxston, 2015).

4.4. Concluding Remarks

When the researcher started to examine the process of negotiations behind the EU sanctions policy, the main aim was to understand whether the increase in implementation of AES was going beyond economic determinism. Through the method of case comparison between two categories of sanctions, the answers to the sub-questions that have been introduced to lead to the answer of the main research question. In that sense, the main concepts, which are explained under the headlines of relations between the Neo-Gramscianism and social science, have revealed step by step how the EU operationalizes the autonomous measures to maintain its political and cultural hegemony through comparing them with supplementary sanctions in terms of the common sense they have inherited, coercion they have implemented and counter-hegemony they have created.

Consequently, although there is a widespread belief that an international consensus has been created by the UNSCRs, taken on behalf of the IC and endorsements of these measures by Brussels, going beyond UNSCRs by adding *own* restrictions and resisting to imply sanctions over targets which are not subject to its own measures, reveal that the EU tends to endorse an *alternative* diplomacy towards international problems. In that sense, as an answer to the first sub-question, *the EU forms a THB to the extent that it creates the web of social relations of sanctions production through its own social forces and transnational system of capital control*. As the cases of Syria and Russia illustrate, collective actions are taken by the EU to complete the gap of restrictive measures that subjugate the interests of the IC in terms of autonomous sanctions which mutual interests reveal the consent. *Secondly, the EU conducts coercion through emphasizing coercing dimension of targeted measures which promote intellectual and cultural leadership through language*. Rather than following signalling measures that the hegemon applies as in supplementary measures taken against Iran and the DPRK, the EU promotes coercion through changing the cost-benefit calculation via controlling TCM. *Lastly, AES exhibit the characteristics of a passive revolution to the extent that the EU utilizes targeted sanctions as the instrument to undertake the duty of providing international norms under its own measures in the first place*. As in the cases of Syria and Russia demonstrate, although AES have not yet been able to complete the passive revolution, they tend to create an intellectual struggle through the rapid development of targeted autonomous sanctions as the *new* political culture strategy.

5. Conclusion

Starting point of this thesis has been the *paradox* behind implying sanctions as the foreign policy tools not only by the EU but also other IOs such as the UN although they have costly application process in the first place. The main goal of this master thesis is to understand the intentions behind the incline of EU AES, especially after 2010. In order to examine to what extent market interests play role within this increase, the relationship between sanctions as a culture of foreign policy and the control of TCM are evaluated. Moreover, due to their coercive nature, sanctions are able to alter the policies of target country. Since this relationship is two dimensional, the theory of Neo-Gramscianism, which has the necessary basis to understand this two-fold structure of explaining IR conflicts through utilizing IPE, is assumed to reveal an exploratory answer. Consequently, this thesis reveals that a Neo-Gramscian perspective is beneficial to analyse **“How does the EU utilize the increase of implementing autonomous economic sanctions taken under CFSP as the instrument to obtain its political and cultural hegemony?”**. As a result, this thesis concludes the answer as *the EU promotes its political and cultural hegemony through creating a form of state that consists of a relatively new political society and operationalizes autonomous sanctions as an instrument to induce its neoliberal interests through its own social forces to the civil society within which the practical hegemon (the UN) has not created common sense under the language of targeted measures.*

This thesis sketched out the essential properties of material and discursive settings in terms of THB within which the autonomous sanctions policy became the political culture of foreign affairs against the hegemonic project. With reference to the theory explained before, the analysis has been based on three sub-questions that lead to one main question. The main difference between the intentions behind supplementary and autonomous sanctions reveal the answer to the first sub-question. To the extent that the UN has expanded its hegemonic bloc into the IC and Europe, although supplementary measures of the EU go beyond the UN, forming a THB is limited with the transnational system of capital accumulation since it stabilizes the hegemony as an IO. However, implication of AES through comprehensive regional strategies demonstrate the intention to conclude violation of international norms. *The EU forms a THB to the extent that it promotes common sense of transnational collective action via creating mutual political intensions through its own social forces and mutual economic intensions by influencing other IOs that promote the target in the IPE.*

The EU's support to the UN hegemony until 2006 and domestically maintaining neoliberal ideology of TCM through its own social forces such as the oil companies or banks, reveal to what extent the EU wants to create alliances in economic terms while applying supplementary sanctions. The year of 2009 has been the milestone for the EU to accept targeted sanctions as instruments to promote its diplomatic status since it applied strengthened 'targeted' sanctions over gas and oil exports, which were not directly subjected to targeted multilateral sanctions before (Reynolds and Wan, 2012). EU supplementary sanctions against the DPRK are also the means to secure its diplomatic place through influencing other states such as Iran. In that sense, getting the consent of target country while controlling TCM, which has been in the hands of the US such as targeting measures against the banks i.e. Bank Delta Asia, advocates although the economic intentions are not primary, they are not enough to form THB. However, AES are naturally coercive tools since they serve to a civil society which is not under any hegemonic obligation to take economic measures. As a result, to the extent that they create common sense, their competence of coercing under intellectual and cultural leadership increases. In that sense, the cases of Syria and Russia exemplify the world order under potential political leadership of the EU since they apply coercive measures through a single regulatory regime of such historical framework of sanctions as opposed to follow the mainly signalling measures taken by the hegemon. *Consequently, the EU has managed to behave as an intellectual and cultural leader under the altering measures of cost-benefit calculation of the target country.*

Moreover, political perspective of the EU towards targeted sanctions are different than the UN's. Although the aim of targeted sanctions is to minimize the negative effects over the civil population, as mentioned, the UN and the US have put the emphasis of the targeted sanctions over financial measures to increase constraining and signalling while the EU has put its own target list beyond and resist applying measures to targets that are not on that list. This situation can be read as the EU's implying targeted sanctions to propose an alternative to the hegemonic project. Since the EU takes strategic position to provide international norms in terms of economic relations during the gap of an obligation, *the war of position* is strengthened through the motivation behind the passive revolution, which is to maintain consent through the application of the international norms themselves, although it cannot be created since the EU could not form a THB, yet. In that sense, the cases of Russia and Syria are

the examples of a passive revolution that can happen, if and only if an active backing is maintained by co-opting elites i.e. other social forces of IOs or subaltern classes.

To conclude, this master thesis has indicated that targeted AES have been intended to create a *new hegemonic project* to the extent that it expands horizontally until it reaches a global transformative character. The EU has promoted targeted AES as an *alternative* to secure the protection of international norms and values with reference to the relationship between universalism and hegemony. In that sense, this research has indicated the concentrations of the critical theory of hegemony in terms of the roles of neoliberal ideas within EU EGS, mainly the cooperation of alliances behind protecting the international norms and values, from both diplomatic and economic positions to empirical pluralism which would encourage the ideologies not from a dependent but rather from an independent explanatory answer of social relations of production of sanctions.

Lastly, there are several dimensions of this thesis as additional insight to Neo-Gramscian scholarship. Studying EU AES responds to the critique of Drainville (1994) claiming that the critical theory of hegemony lacks the engagement of innovative structures of struggle or potential alternatives to world order with the current hegemon by suggesting that an alternative route of hegemony is plausible to the extent that a subaltern class functions as a form of state. Secondly, as opposed to Germain and Kenny (1998), this empirical analysis indeed presents 'theoretical and practical translation of past ideas to present conditions'; however, not with the concern of restraining the concepts of Neo-Gramscian approach which are limitless in terms of time and space (Cox, 1981), but rather to promote the circulation of social relations of production in terms of transnational networks as Kammel and Zyla (2012) advocate. In that sense, this master thesis is a challenge against the 'orthodox view' of Marxism within the framework EU ESG since the global policy of sanctions has been challenged since it lacks producing different perspectives of the historical social action although the social relations of productions are the demonstrations of replicated hegemony.

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
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
7. APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: GRAPHS



Graph 1 Evolution of CFSP Sanctions

Source: Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera (2015), p. 9



Graph 2 Number of new autonomous sanctions regimes imposed by the EU per year (1990-2014)

Source: Portela (2016), p. 38

APPENDIX II: FIGURES




Figure 2 The Coding Manual For Qualitative Researchers: A streamlined codes-to-theory model for qualitative inquiry.

Source: Saldana (2008), p. 12

APPENDIX III: TABLES

Table 1: Documents with regards to the legal background

- Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) (2004)
- Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of restrictive measures (2012)

Table 2: Resolutions taken by the United Nations

Table 2.1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions taken only towards Iran

- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1696 (2006)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1737 (2006)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1747 (2007)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1803 (2008)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1835 (2008)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1929 (2010)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 2231 (2015)

Table 2.2. United Nations Security Council Resolutions taken only towards DPRK

- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1718 (2006)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 1874 (2009)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 2087 (2013)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 2094 (2013)
- Non-Proliferation Resolution 2270 (2016)

Table 3: CFSP Decisions and Regulations taken by the Council and the Commission

Table 3.1. The Council Regulations taken against Iran

- Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011
- Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012

Table 3.2. The Council Decisions taken against Iran

- Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP

- Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP Table 3.3. The Council Regulations taken against DPRK

- Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007

Table 3.4. The Council Decisions taken against DPRK

- Council Decision 2013/183/CFSP

Table 3.5. The Council Regulations taken against Syria

- Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012
- Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002

Table 3.6. The Council Decisions taken against Syria

- Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP

Table 3.7. The Council Regulations taken against Russian Federation

- Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014

Table 3.8. The Council Decisions taken against Russian Federation

- Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP

Table 3.9. Restrictive Measures in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea under the Headline of Ukraine

Table 3.9.1. Council Decisions

- Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP
- Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP
- Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP

Table 3.9.2. Council Regulations

- Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014
- Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014
- Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014

