Protest Strategies and their Influence on the Political Debate in the Dutch Parliament on Matters of Climate Change and Coronavirus

Bachelor Thesis

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Table of Contents

Declaration of independency

I, Tim Schippers, certify that I have written this paper independently, using only the sources and aids indicated.

I further declare that the present work has not yet been submitted within the scope of any other examination procedure.

Enschede, the 30th of June, 2021   _____

Abstract

This research is exploring which strategies protest groups use in trying to influence the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus and to what extent these strategies are able to influence these topics in the Dutch parliament. The research question is therefore: "To what extent do the protest strategies influence the political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus?". In order to answer the research question, there is chosen for a cross-sectional research design that tests the causal relationship between protest strategies and its influence on the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus. Literature and interviews with protesters from protest groups must provide the necessary information. This research will add something to the existing literature, because effectiveness of protest strategies is not a topic that has been discussed a lot recently, while political protests are rising in the Netherlands. There can be seen a difference in the way of protesting within the protest groups, but there cannot be stated that there is a direct influence on the political debate in the Dutch parliament nor can be stated that there are differences especially between protest groups against the corona measures and the climate change protest groups.

Introduction

Political protests are a normal social appearance and not new in the Dutch society. However, some protests do reach their goals and some do not. The obvious question that pops up is why this is the case. The amount of political protests in the Netherlands is high at the moment. Within five years, protests have almost doubled in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Pols, 2021), which are the four biggest cities in the Netherlands. However, a high quantity can lead to a low quality. This research will look into this quality of protests. This quality is measured by the political debate in the Dutch parliament. Dutch politicians sometimes show up at protests, but that does not mean that the protesters always feel heard by politicians. As already mentioned, this research will focus on the effectiveness of protest strategies. There will be made a comparison between two movements: the climate change protest movements and the coronavirus protest movements. The climate change protest movement basic ideology is that there must be done more to fight extreme climate change. For the coronavirus protest movement, it is important that the measures taken by the government in order to fight the coronavirus pandemic must be removed or at least be adapted. Within both movements there are differences in ideology and protest strategies. There is chosen to take the same time periods for both movements, because the coronavirus protest movements started in 2020. So, the time focus will be 2020 until 2021.

Social and scientific relevance

As the amount of protests is rising, it is important to understand why citizens are protesting. Protests are explainable via different perspectives. The sociological aspect focuses on the individuals who are protesting and why they take part. This research takes the sociological aspect into account, but mainly focuses on the effectiveness of protests. The question posed here is whether it is necessary to go on the streets or if it is wiser to seek the conversation with politicians and relevant civil servants. The social relevance of this, is that the amount of protests is rising, while the government cannot go along with every protest. So, this research will take a look if protest groups are taking the right approach to get their ideas discussed and if the approach really matters. The latter refers to the chances citizens get to have their ideas discussed in parliament, without directly mobilising themselves. It is generally known that mobilisations can lead to aggressiveness by protesters. It often happens that political protest mobilisations lead to disruption of social order. Therefore, this research will take a look whether violent mobilisations can be prevented or that it is inevitable, because it is the most effective way. The scientific relevance is that the strategies will be combined with the political opportunity structure and that the effectiveness is measured. Every aspect, except for effectiveness are much studied separately, but not combined. Although, protest strategies are already discussed in a lot of literature, there is still scientific relevance, because most literature about protest strategies are before the era of social media. Use of media is one of the strategies that is often used. Social media and their effect on protest mobilisations are often discussed in the existing literature, but the combination with protest strategies is not.

Research question and sub-questions

As mentioned, the focus of this research is on the strategies of protest movements and if these strategies have effect on the political debate in the Dutch parliament. To measure the effectiveness, two social movements and protest groups within the movements will be compared and there is taken a look if there is a difference between the two. The movements compared are the climate change movement and the coronavirus movement. This leads to the following research question: "To what extent do the protest strategies influence the political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus?".

To provide an answer to this research question, the definition and characteristics of protesters will be taken into account. Furthermore, the political opportunity structure is an important aspect. The first two lead to a certain way of protesting. These protest strategies are therefore essential. The effectiveness, so the results, will eventually be measured looking at the influence the protest groups had on the political debate in the Dutch parliament.

The first sub-question, "To what extent do the characteristics of both the climate change protest movements and coronavirus protest movements have influence on the protest strategies?", is an explanatory question and it will analyse first the definition of protesters, then the differences within the protest movements and between the different protest movements, and what the eventual reasons and goals of both movements are.

The second sub-question is: "To what extent does the political opportunity structure of the Netherlands influence the protest strategies". In this explanatory sub-question, the opportunities the Dutch political system provides for protesters will be discussed and if the protesters think that these opportunities are there. This sub-question will be answered via a combination of literature and data from interviews.

The third sub-question is "To what extent do the protest groups of both movements use direct and indirect strategies?". For this descriptive sub-question, the strategies of the protest groups are discussed. The categorisation of strategies is based on literature. Interviews will provide answers to what extent these strategies are used by the protest groups.

The last sub-question is again a descriptive one: "what are the results of the two protest movements?". Here, there is taken a look into what both protest movements think they have achieved with their protests. The results will be measured through data from the interviews and the actions that followed in parliament.

Theory

In this section, relevant theory is used as theoretical arguments and empirical findings will be discussed. The theory will form the basis of the analysis and therefore this section will be divided into four parts. The first part is about the definition and characterisation of protesters and protest groups. The second part is about the political opportunity structure. The third part is about the definition of strategies. The fourth part is about how to measure effectiveness of strategies. The theory section has the following structure: definitions and characterisations and the political opportunity structure are influencing why protest groups choose for certain protest strategies, while the political opportunity structure also influences the reasons why certain protest groups behave as they do. The influence of protest strategies on the results is the general research question. The structure is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Research Structure

Definition and characterisations

First, it is necessary to find a definition for protesters. One of the books that is useful to identify a protester is "Rellen om het Rellen" by Van Leiden, Arts and Ferwerda (2009). Although, this book is not focused on especially political protest groups, it is a useful book to identify the notorious public order disturbers and distinguish them with the concerned citizen. This is important in explaining why a protest can be aggressive. In short, a public order disturber is someone who structurally and purposefully is involved in public order disturbances (Van Leiden, Arts, & Ferwerda, 2009, p. 9), while a concerned citizen, or sometimes called an angry citizen, is a person who actively protest against a certain policy that is conducted by a governmental body (Verhoeven, 2009). Van Leiden, Arts and Ferwerda (2009, p.

13) state that there is not only one specific factor that causes an aggressive protest. However, an escalation is normally based on a 'we against them feeling'. In the book they distinguish three kinds of aggressive protests or riots. Aggressive protests can be steered by the mass. These protests are not planned beforehand. Second, there are riots that are planned and be prepared. Third, there are emotion-guided riots, which occur when something intense happened. Thus, a protest group can normally choose for a peaceful approach, but due to emotions or public order disturbers in the group, it still can lead to an aggressive protest. A report from the 'Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestriding en Veiligheid' (NCTV) (2021, p. 3) about the aggressive corona protests in 2021 states that many protesters are not political or ideological motivated, but they act on basis of feelings of injustice, discomfort or a different perspective of reality. Grasso and Giugni (2016, p. 675) state that decreasing living conditions are a reason why people start to protest. The example that they use is that unemployment is treated as a social illness and therefore widely discussed. Therefore, the citizens who already feel deprived, are more likely to realise that decreasing living conditions is not an individual problem, but a general problem that is shared by many others. This way of politicising private living circumstances can lead to political action or mobilising.

Within protest movements, there are different protest groups. One important characterisation of protest groups is their trust in the government. According to Hooghe and Marien (2013, p. 145) political trust have a negative relationship with non-institutionalised forms of political participation. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2018, p. 790) confirm that citizens who distrust parliament are more motivated to take part at mobilisation protests. Therefore, political trust is an important variable in this research. Furthermore, Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2018, p. 786) noticed that distrusted demonstrators are often low educated and from the working class. Next to that, distrusted demonstrators are more tended to vote radical, are less satisfied about how democracy works in their country and are less interested in politics. Sawyer and Korotayev (2021, p. 17) notice that protests rise when citizens are becoming higher educated. However, the protests are often less violent if the protesters are high educated. Also, education is therefore taken into account as characterisation. Stockemer (2014) researched the micro-level constituents of peaceful protests, with which he means demonstrations, boycotting and signing petitions. He also makes a distinction between 'conventional' and 'unconventional' forms of political actions. Conventional forms of political actions involve for example voting and membership of political parties. With unconventional is meant that citizens take part in non-institutionalised means, such as demonstrations (Stockemer, 2014, p. 202). There are seven constituents: income, education, age, gender, voting, satisfaction with the government and membership of civil society organisations (Stockemer, 2014, p. 204). Stockemer (2014, p. 209) concluded that especially education and in lesser extent membership in a civil society boosts the likelihood that citizens partake in unconventional forms of political actions. Also, young people are often more engaged in unconventional forms of protests than older people. Furthermore, men are more often demonstrating

and boycotting than women, while women more often sign petitions. Income is only relevant for signing petitions, but not for boycotting and demonstrating.

Political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure is a concept that cannot be missed if there is talked about effectivity of protest groups. The political opportunity structure will be based on the research of Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992) According to them, a political system can be separated into three broad sets of properties: formal institutions, informal procedures and prevailing strategies. The first two constrain relevant configurations for power, which, together with the general setting, specifies the strategies of both the 'authorities' and the 'members of the system'. These strategies define if collective action is facilitated or repressed by the members of the system, if the chances of such actions are likely to succeed and the chances of success if no action has taken place. These chances are positive if a government is reform-oriented, but they are negative if the government is hostile to the movement. This eventually decides if the protesters will mobilise or not, if yes, which form they will use, how often they will mobilise and what their target of their campaign is (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, p. 220).

The authors make a comparison between four European countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Within the structure of formal institutions, there is made a separation between weak and strong states. Weak states are states that have openness on the input side, but are lacking capacity to impose themselves to the output side. Strong states are often closed, but can impose themselves. The strength of a state is based on the internal coherence of a country. Federalist countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, are therefore 'weak', while centralised countries, such as France and the Netherlands, are seen as 'strong'. Within the structure of informal procedures and prevailing strategies, there is made a distinction between exclusive and integrative. Exclusive means repressive, confronting and polarising, while integrative means facilitative, cooperative and assimilative (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, p. 222).

Eventually, the openness of the political system is based on the combination of the formal institutional structure and the dominant strategy. This leads to four cases. The first, full exclusion is a situation in which the protester can neither get formal or informal access to political system. In this case, the state can choose for ignoring the protesters and will not facilitate. The protester does not have a veto and cannot expect concessions. Full exclusion is a combination of a strong state and an exclusive dominant strategy. This system can be found in France. In the contrary, there is full procedural integration, which is a combination of a weak state and an integrative strategy. For the protester it is easy to get formally and informally access to the system. The protester can block with veto rights, but concessions are often not made. Switzerland is an example of this. An intermediate case is that of formalistic inclusion. This is a combination between a weak state and an exclusive strategy. There is

formal access but no informal access to the political system. Next to that, there is much repression. There is a possibility to veto, but the protester does not have to expect any concessions. Germany fits to formal inclusion. The other intermediary case is that of informal cooperation. This is a combination of a strong state and an integrative dominant strategy. In this case, there is almost no formal access to the political system, but informal access is possible. As a result, many concessions are made, but vetoing can be prevented. The Netherlands is an informal cooperation (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, pp. 223 - 224).

According to Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992, p. 226) there three forms of mobilisation: unconventional events which mobilise people in the streets, such as demonstrations or violent events, petitions and direct-democratic events. Following the results of their investigation, full exclusion leads to the most violence protests, followed by formalistic inclusion, informal cooperation and last full procedural integration (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, pp. 228 - 229). Koopmans (2007, p. 7) agrees with this and add that disruptive and radical forms of mobilisation follows from countries that offer relatively low amount of political channels, while an inclusive political system offers moderate forms of movement mobilisation.

Protest strategies

For protesters it is important to raise awareness of their cause and keep sympathy among the public. To be a collective as a group, it is necessary to create identification and among bystanders and build a psychological connection (Thomas & Louis, 2014, p. 273). For that they need protest strategies.

Throughout history there has been many debate whether protesting can shape the opinion of the mass and the political debate among the politicians and policy-makers. One the one hand, there are the so called elite theorists that argue that average citizens and interest groups have almost no influence on the political debate, while others, the democratic theorists think that they can strive for winning coalitions (Wasow, 2020, p. 638). Wasow (2020, p. 656) argues that a subordinate protest group can seed political agendas and can shrink elite coalitions through strategic disruption. He also states that the strategies of these groups play a critical role in the framing of media.

There are different forms of protest strategies. Binderkrantz (2005, p. 696) separated four different protest strategies. She made a difference between direct and indirect strategies. Direct strategies refer to the administrative and the political strategies of the protest groups. They are often seen as strategies for privileged protest groups. Meaning that they have much contact with 'insiders'. Administrative strategies refer, for example, to the contacts with relevant ministers and public servants. Parliamentary or political strategies refer to contact with parliamentary committees, parliament members and political parties in parliament. Next to direct strategies, there are indirect strategies. With media strategies is meant the access to traditional media and journalists. Through media strategies, protest groups try to get public attention to their ideas. They try to get the public behind their ideas and

to recruit members. In addition to traditional media, the role of social media must be taken into account. Social media came up in the past decade and citizens, politicians and protesters all make use of social media. Therefore, the role of social media and the strategies protesters use on social media will also be taken into account. The start of the Arab Spring in 2010 is the most famous example in which social media is used widely for protesting. Social media makes the spreading activist materials, such as videos and images, easier (Poell & Van Dijk, 2018, p. 1). Jost et al. (2018, p. 111) give three reasons social media are useful tools with exchanging information about protests. Social media effectively provide information. Next to that, social media messages can be emotional or motivational. Last, social media provide social networks. The mobilisation strategies refer to four forms of mobilisation according to Binderkrantz (2005, p. 696): arranging public meetings, organising letter-writing campaigns, arranging strikes and conducting public petitions. Also here, social media play a role, because protesters mobilise themselves through social media a lot since the Arab Spring (Poell & Van Dijk, 2018, p. 1). Much literature states that indirect strategies are a fall-back if protesters are cut off from the decision-making process. They often do less succeed than direct strategies (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 697). However, according to Binderkrantz (2005, p. 710), there is no increase shown in using indirect strategies when protesters are cut off from the decision-making process. Next to that, there is shown a positive correlation between both direct and indirect strategies and effectiveness. Often, protest groups choose for both direct and indirect strategies despite the contradiction. However, disruptive actions are hard to combine with direct strategies.

Then, if a protest group wants to mobilise, there are different ways to do this. A mobilisation can be peaceful and non-violent, but it can also be aggressive and violent. Feinberg, Willer and Kovacheff (2020, p. 24) argue that engaging in violent protests can have some benefits, but that it reduces popularity among the public. Berrebi and Klor (2008, p. 297) say that the electorate shows a highly sensitive reaction on violence protests or terrorism and that it can result to a political shift. Wasow (2020, p. 656) sees also differences between non-violent and violent protests in political outcomes. He eventually states that subordinate groups should focus on their tactics, but that an 'eye for an eye' tactic is not the most strategic choice. It is more useful to try to influence and frame the news, to direct the elite discourse, influence public opinion and win during the elections (Wasow, 2020, p. 657). Thomas and Louis (2014, p. 273) conclude that the effectiveness of violent and non-violent are depending on the context. They argue that it is depending on the political opponents. Even if a violent protest is not effective in mobilising sympathisers, it can be effective in changing the opinion of political opponents. If political opponents feel intimidated or oppressed into complying with the demands of the protesters, then violence is an effective strategy.

Effectiveness of protests on politics

Throughout history a lot of protests took place. The one more successful than the other. In literature examples of successful protests are sometimes given. Wasow (2020) referred for example to the peaceful protest march of Martin Luther King in the sixties of the previous century. Kriesi (2016) takes three cases in his research. He compares three protest groups in three countries: a conservative protest group in the United States, an old left protest group in Greece and a protest group that is neither left- nor right-wing. The governments of the three countries were quite similar: democrats in the United States and socialists in Greece and Spain. However, the protest groups challenged the governments in different ways. The protest groups had one thing in common and that is that their mobilisation had a major impact on the electoral politics, the party system and the political process (Kriesi, 2016, pp. 86 - 87). There are 250 to 300 protests in the Netherlands and this number does not take the online protests into account (Van Stekelenburg, 2014, p. 12). 30% of the protests are effective, which makes it a quite effective tool (Van Stekelenburg, 2014, p. 10).

Methods

In this section, the methods of the research will be discussed. The section is split up in three parts: research design, case sampling and operationalisation.

Research design

The chosen research design for this research is a cross-sectional research design. In a cross-sectional research design all variables and units are measured at the same time and the variables are not manipulated by another unit. Also, there must be causality, which means that the dependent variable causes the independent variable. This is the case in the posed research question. The dependent variable is in this case "protest strategies" and the independent variable "the political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus". The unit of analysis are the protest groups. There can occur some problems with a cross-sectional research design, because reversed causation can arise. This means that the variables are reversed, meaning in this case that the political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus has influence on the protest strategy. This is hard to exclude, because many side factors play a role. For example, citizens can be unhappy with the situation and feel cut off from the decision-making process and therefore choose to strike or to go on the streets instead of trying to protest via a direct strategy or they are feel underrepresented in parliament. As reversed causality is possible, some questions to test the reversed causality will be asked in the interviews.

As already mentioned, the protest groups will be interviewed. They get in the basics the same question. However, the interviews will be semi-structured, which means that there is a standard list with questions, but depending on how the interview goes, there can be deviated from the list. However, the interview must lead to the same kind of information. The data that follows from the interviews must provide information about who the protest groups are and what they do. They get questions about how they feel about the political system and the government. Also, the data must give an answer on the amount of using direct and indirect strategies, which eventually are compared with the results they achieved in the Dutch parliament. The results they have achieved are also asked about in the interviews. The data from the interviews are too limited, so there is chosen to compare the retrieved data with claims from other researches. When it is possible, new claims are made with the data from the interviews.

Case selection and sampling

In this section, the case selection and sampling will be discussed. First, the population has to be stated. The population are protesters from the protest groups and one expert who knows the climate change movement very good. There is chosen for this, because they can provide the information about the groups that is needed for the research. There is only need for interviewing the protesters, because the information that needs to be retrieved from interviews is about the protest groups. The purpose is to

interview one person from every protest group that is researched. All interviewees gave permission to use all relevant data they provided in the interviews for this research. This also includes names of the protester and protest group. The amount of population was aimed on eight persons. Due to the short time limit, this number decreased to four. As it was harder than thought beforehand to find interviewees, the number of protest groups kept limited to three: one protest group from the climate change protest movement and two from the coronavirus protest movement. Next to the interviewed climate change protest group, also an expert is asked for an interview. This is Richard Wouters from scientific bureau GroenLinks. He speaks a lot of protesters from the climate change movement and was therefore able to give a clear picture of the climate change movement in general. Also, the protesters from the protest groups provided useful answers. The intention was to speak protesters at the top of the protest group. Fortunately, this has succeeded. The first interview was with the chairman and the face of Viruswaarheid: Willem Engel. He started the protest group with a few others and knew therefore a lot about the protest group. The second interviewee was Benito Walker from Youth for Climate NL. He is the chairman of the Dutch branch of this global climate change protest group. Also, Walker could provide useful answers. Last, Martijntje Smits is a researcher and activist regarding the 'Coronawet' in the Netherlands. She was one of the initiators of a local movement called Coronawet Nee to get rid of Coronawet through a letter to the Dutch parliament. Being one of the initiators she could tell a lot about this protest group. The interviewees are asked via email and contact forms. Engel and Walker are found directly, while Wouters is proposed by the first supervisor and Smits is proposed by Wouters.

Operationalisation

In this part, the operationalisation of the main concepts and the data collection methods will be explained. First, the two main concepts are identified. Then, the operationalisation of the main concepts and data collections are explained with respect to the sub-questions that are explained in the theory section. The first-sub-question does provide an operationalisation of a main concept, but is important to mention nevertheless.

The main concepts of this research will be "protest strategies" and "political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus". These concepts are respectively the independent and the dependent variable. The protest strategies are referring to the different ways of protesting. Do they use direct or more indirect strategies and are the protests violent or non-violent?

The protest strategies will come back during the whole research, despite the fact that only the third chapter of the data analysis is called this way. It will be operationalised in both a quantitative way and qualitative way. On the basis of literature, the different strategies are categorised and explained. Also, the difference between direct and indirect political access will be explained through literature. However, which strategies are used will be research through qualitative data. In interviews there will be asked what their direct and indirect strategies are and if they have direct political access. Examples are

questions about if the protest groups have contact with politicians or lobbyists or if they approach the minister directly. As already mentioned, the structure of the interviews will be semi-structured. The interviewee will receive open questions on the basis of a formalised list. This list will not be strictly followed, but will provide a guideline.

The other main concept, "political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus", will mostly refer to the last section. This concept will be operationalised by measuring the results. With results are meant the achievements they achieved and if they feel if their problems are more discussed in parliament.

The characterisation and the political opportunity structure are meant as variables that explain how protest groups come to a decision to choose for direct or indirect strategies or for violent or non-violent protests. These two variables are discussed in the first two chapters of the data analysis. Both are explained by literature in the theory. Through qualitative data it must become clear what the interviewed protest groups consists of and how they feel about the government and the political opportunity system in the Netherlands. The characterisation includes dominant level of education, dominant level of status of work, trust in government and trust in traditional media. Also, age, gender and size are known, but less relevant.

So, in short the first two chapters provide an answer on the why-question, the third chapter on the how-question and the fourth on the what-question. Together with the answers on the sub-questions, which are partially answered in the data analysis section and partially in the conclusion, they must from a well formulated answer on the general research question, which is also answered in the conclusion.

Definitions and characterisations

For the upcoming four chapters, collected data provide data that will be analysed. Every paragraph discusses a part of the theory section and eventually it provides data for answering the sub-questions in the conclusion chapter.

Before beginning, there is need for determining that if the interviewees are protesters. Therefore, there motivation has to be discussed. This will be done in the next paragraph. Next to that, they have different characterisations. In table 1 the important characterisations are shown. As Wouters is not a protester, but an expert, he received questions about what he thinks that the characterisations of climate change protest groups are in general.

Protest group / expert	Dominant level of education	Dominant Status of work	Trust in government	Trust in traditional media
Viruswaarheid (CV)	High educated	High income	Low	Low
Youth for Climate NL (CC)	High school	Students	Medium	Medium
Coronawet Nee (CV)	High educated	Diverse situations	Medium	Low
Richard Wouters (CC)	High educated	Students / diverse situations	High	High

Table 1: characterisations of protest groups

Motivation and violent protests

The three protesters that are interviewed gave different responses to the answer what motivated them to become a protester. Engel is worried that the government is violating human rights too much and that the government wants to have more control on its citizens under the guise of the Covid-19 pandemic (Engel, 2021, p. 1). Walker is worried about what climate change can do in the future. His reason for joining Youth for Climate NL is that he wants to help youth think about what they can do in order to tackle the climate change problem (Walker, 2021, p. 1). Smits is especially worried about the containment of freedom rights (Smits, 2021, p. 1) and also the limitations of the parliament caused by the so called 'Coronawet' (Smits, 2021, p. 2). The three persons interviewed can, because of these reasons, not be identified as public order disturbers, because they all have a specific reason for joining the protest group. Looking at the protest group, Engel acknowledged that during a big demonstration he does not know everyone (Engel, 2021, p. 6), meaning that it is hard to control if there are some public order disturbers. On the other hand, Walker said his organisation never had to deal with aggressive

protesters, but that some other climate change organisations who have more aggressive participants (Walker, 2021, p. 5). Both protesters say that they want to prevent aggressiveness during protests (Engel, 2021, p. 1), (Walker, 2021, p. 5). For Smits it was not necessary to ask this, because 'Coronawet Nee' have not been protesting via demonstrations or strikes, automatically meaning that she does not intent to force her ideas through violence.

This data seems to agree with the claim that clearly motivated protest groups are less likely to have aggressive protests. The three protesters are clearly motivated by an ideal and do not tend to have any forms of aggression. The corona protests that escalated in 2021 could be explained by the fact that in a big demonstration the organisers of the protest do not know everyone and therefore, it is hard to control everyone and to check if there is a public order disturber.

Decreasing living conditions and violent protests

The interviewees are asked what the average work situation is within their protest group. This work situation can be that there are many people who lost their job, have a low income or that they have a high income. It could also be that the group is very diverse. Viruswaarheid its dominant level of education is high. The most people are high educated and have good jobs, which automatically result in a high amount of income according to Engel (2021, p. 6). However, Engel emphasises that there is much diversity, but that in general the organisation has high educated people with high incomes (Engel, 2021, pp. 6 - 7). On the other hand Engel (2021, p. 5) thinks that decreasing living conditions raises aggressiveness among citizens. The most members of Youth for Climate NL is adolescent and therefore almost everyone is in high school or still studying. Walker did not know from everyone which form of education they follow on high school, but from the board everyone is doing VWO and one HBO (Walker, 2021, p. 2). These are high forms of education. Coronawet Nee is a group of mostly high educated people, but in this case it did not mean that everyone had a high income. Smits (2021, p. 2) argued that putting time in political interests can have an impact on a career. Wouters thinks that there is an overrepresentation of high educated people in the climate change protest groups. Wouters also mentions that there are all kinds of people that care about climate change, but that young people in general are more committed than elderly people (Wouters, 2021, p. 6).

As all the interviewed protest groups do not have a significantly decreasing living conditions, it is hard to say anything about the claim by (Grasso & Giugni, 2016, p. 675) that decreasing living conditions have influence on violent protests.

Education and trust in government

Another question that is asked to the interviewees is the level of education and their trust in parliament. As the level of education is already discussed in the previous paragraph, the level of trust in parliament will be discussed here. The interviewees are asked whether or not they have trust in the government. It

could be that a protest group has a low trust in the government, that the protest group does trust the government in general, but has its serious doubts about the decisions made by the government. It could also be that a protest group trusts the government and think that they are doing a good job at the moment. Viruswaarheid has a low trust in the government. Engel calls the Netherlands as one of the most undemocratic societies in Europe. He also says that citizens are not taken seriously by the government, that corruption is legalised and that election fraud has taken place (Engel, 2021, p. 5). Next to that, according to him, many parties, especially the old parties, are morally bankrupt (Engel, 2021, p. 2). He wants to get rid of the current government as well (Engel, 2021, p. 7). Last, also government agencies, such as the 'Rijksintituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu' (RIVM) and the 'Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport' (VWS) are not trustworthy, because the wrong people have the central positions (Engel, 2021, pp. 2 - 3). Walker says that he trusts the government in general, but that the government is doing too less regarding climate change and he thinks that they do not care enough about the young generation, but he believes that the government tries to be there for the people (Walker, 2021, p. 5). She trusts the government in general and sees the government as an addressee and there cannot be talked if there is no trust. However, she is critical on the government and especially in the democratic sense. She called the decision to implement the Coronawet an interference in the democratic rule of law that was out of proportion (Smits, 2021, p. 2). Also, the transparency is of the government and also the government agencies, such as the RIVM and the Outbreak Management Team (OMT), is too low according Smits (Smits, 2021, p. 3). Wouters think that climate change protest groups trust the government in general, because he thinks that both moderate and radical climate change protest groups realise that they need the government and that there will be collaborated from global to local level (Wouters, 2021, p. 2).

Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans (2018, p. 786) claimed that protesters who have a low trust in parliament are often low educated and from the working class. Comparing this claim with the data received from the interview, there seems to be a contradiction. The only protest group from the three protest groups is Viruswaarheid the only group with a low trust in government. However, the educational level and the income of the protesters from Viruswaarheid is generally high.

Education and age and participation in unconventional protests

The interviewees received the question which kind of mobilisation protest strategies they used. As mentioned in the theory section, there is a difference between conventional and unconventional political action. Conventional forms are for example voting of party membership, while unconventional forms are protest actions, such as demonstrations, boycotting or signing petitions (Stockemer, 2014, p. 202).

Stockemer (2014, p. 209) stated in his research that education has influence in partaking in unconventional protests. Higher education leads to more unconventional forms of political action. All the protest groups take part in unconventional forms of political action and they are all high educated or

doing a high form of education. So, the data received from the interviews are in line with the claim of Stockemer.

Stockemer (2014, p. 209) also stated that young people are more engaged in unconventional protests. Youth for Climate, which member base is mostly young is indeed taking part in unconventional forms of protest, but Viruswaarheid and Coronawet Nee, which have an average or diverse age group are also participating in unconventional protests. So, it could be that younger people in general are taking more part in unconventional forms of political action, but this cannot be stated from the data retrieved from the interviews.

Conclusion

One of the characteristics is being political or ideological motivated. All the interviewed protest groups are motivated politically or ideologically, which seems to result in a non-aggressive protest strategy. Also, it seems to be that higher educated people are often more tended to seek unconventional forms of political action, meaning that they are more likely to mobilise. Age on the other hand, cannot be confirmed as a characteristic that influences protest strategies. The same goes for decreasing living conditions and their effect on violent protest strategies. Between both movements, there are no big differences shown regarding their characterisations. The only difference that can be shown is that it seems that the climate change movement has a bit more trust in the traditional media.

Political opportunity structure

According to Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992, pp. 223 - 224) the Netherlands has an informal cooperation. This means that it is hard to get formal access to formalistic institutions, but informal a lot is possible. The Netherlands is a strong state with a closed, but powerful system. However, it has an integrative strategy, meaning that the Dutch strategy is facilitative, cooperative and assimilative (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, p. 222). The interviewees are asked about this during the interviews to see if they feel as included as the Dutch strategy tends to be according to the research of Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992). There are two aspects that are compared with the conclusions of Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992). Also, the inclusion by politics is compared with violent protests.

Dutch political system and citizen participation

The protesters and the expert are asked if they have the feeling that the Dutch political system offers possibilities for citizen participation. Engel (2021, p. 5) thinks that the Netherlands is one of the most undemocratic societies in Europe. He takes as example the polder model which is a typical Dutch political system in which the government tries to reach consensus with other parties, such as employers, labour unions and in this case protest groups. The polder model is characterised by concessions. Engel (2021, p. 5) sees the polder model as an example of legalising corruption, because according to him, there is no real consultation, but it is making deals behind closed doors, in which citizens are marginalised. Walker (2021, p. 6) says the opposite. He thinks that this system offers a lot of possibilities for citizen participation. He takes as example that he is handing over a manifest at the Binnenhof to start a civil deliberation. Smits (2021, pp. 3 - 4) is sceptical about the possibilities for citizen participation. She thinks that citizen participation is done via an inept way. Smits says that the problem starts with science, because science is imposed via an authoritarian way. Citizen participation is impossible if this is the way of doing science, because the so called non-experts are not taken seriously, while everyone was an expert according to Smits. Everyone has to deal with the virus. Wouters (2021, p. 2) thinks that the government is doing their best to make citizen participation possible. He takes as example consultations about laws, local participatory routes for climate change measures regarding renewable energy and sustainability of neighbourhoods. Also, protest groups that make use of lobby will see that there is listened to them and that initiatives can be seen back in parliament.

Comparing the data, there can be shown a difference between the climate change movement and the movement against the coronavirus measures. While Youth for Climate seems to be satisfied with the possibilities of citizen participation offered by the government, Viruswaarheid and Coronawet Nee are more sceptical. Many reasons for this difference can be thought off, but a possible reason cannot be stated from these data, because this would be mainly based on speculations.

Dutch political system and concessions

Also, the protesters are asked if they think that the Dutch political system are open to concessions. Engel (2021, p. 6) has the feeling that the government does not want to talk with Viruswaarheid and that the political system is not open to concessions. Engel also says that concessions are not able to make on ideals. However, there can be made concessions on a common ground, but to find a common ground is not possible before having a discussion on definitions and facts according to Engel. Engel says that juridical and scientifically the debate is killed on this matter. Walker (2021, p. 7) says again the opposite. He thinks that it is necessary to do concessions, because there is no way to govern without multiple parties. He thinks that it is not possible to get anything he wants, so concessions are needed from the government and from the protest group. Smits (2021, pp. 4 - 5) says that there were made concessions, but she thinks that the government especially made concessions if there was a societal pressure on it. However, there was no understanding for the riots about the curfew and there was no concession possible. According to Smits, concessions were not made via a democratic conversation. Wouters (2021, p. 2) thinks that climate change protest groups are often able to make concessions with the government, but it is depending on the development of the protest group. He thinks that climate change protest groups are becoming lobby organisations in a later stage. Wouters says that lobby is a good tool to be heard by the government, but the ultimate goal is often not reached, due to concessions. So, climate change protest groups are more willing to make concessions when they are in a later stage.

Also on this matter, there is a difference between climate change protest groups and protest groups against the coronavirus measures. Youth for Climate NL and Wouters think that the government is open to concessions, while Coronawet Nee is sceptical about this and Viruswaarheid thinks that there is no room for making concessions with the government.

Inclusion and violent protests

Looking at the previous two paragraphs, there can be stated that only Youth for Climate NL feels included in the political system, while Coronawet Nee feels this to a much more lesser extend and Viruswaarheid does not feel included at all. According to Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni (1992, p. 226), violence protests are not as common in informal cooperation as in a full exclusion or a formalistic inclusion. The interviewers are asked if they think that the current Dutch political system raises or reduces aggressiveness among protesters.

Engel (2021, p. 5) thinks that citizens become frustrated due to decreasing living conditions and polarisation, but for a big part the frustration can be explained by the lack of inclusion in political procedures. He thinks it would be better if citizens could choose a minister and a coalition. Walker (2021, p. 6) thinks that an inclusive system raises satisfaction among many citizens and protesters, but he also thinks that for some groups dissatisfaction is too ingrained. Smits (2021, p. 4) does not see a direct causal relationship, but she thinks that there is intermediate step. Not being included lead to a

more we against them feeling and a feeling of not being taken seriously. She thinks that this creates a climate in which the government can expect more aggression. Wouters (2021, p. 2) thinks that the current political system in the Netherlands is suitable to prevent aggressive protests, because there is much space for talking and doing concessions.

The protesters and the expert agree that inclusion is important to reduce aggressiveness among protesters. However, they disagree whether or not the Dutch government is doing a good job in preventing aggressive protests. Viruswaarheid and too lesser extend Coronawet Nee think that the Dutch government its strategy can eventually lead to more aggressiveness, while Youth for Climate NL and Wouters are thinking that the political system in the Netherlands is doing good in reducing aggressive protests.

Conclusion

Whether or not the Dutch political system feels as an informal cooperation is hard to state with these data. However, about feeling included a difference can be shown among the climate change movement and the movement against the corona measures. While the climate change movement seems to have trust in the current political system and feels included, the coronavirus movement does not feel included and are sceptical about the system. Both movements agree that inclusion is an important factor to reduce violent protests. However, despite the fact that both protest groups within the coronavirus movement do not feel completely included, they both do not have any intention to have violent protests.

Protest strategies

Protest groups can choose for direct and indirect strategies. Direct strategies are referring to political and administrative strategies, while indirect strategies refer to media and mobilisation strategies (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 696). There can be chosen for violent mobilisation strategies, such as riots, but also for non-violent protests, such as peaceful demonstrations. The interviewees are asked if they make use of each of these strategies. The following table presents the strategies of the protest groups. Wouters thinks there is a difference in strategies among moderate and radical climate change protest groups. This is also shown in the table. Furthermore, CV stands for coronavirus protest groups and CC for climate change.

Protest group	Political strategies	Administrative strategies	Media strategies	Mobilisation strategies
Viruswaarheid (CV)	Low	Low	Medium	High
Youth for Climate NL (CC)	High	Medium	High	Medium
Coronawet Nee (CV)	High	Low	Low	Medium
Richard Wouters (CC)*	Medium / High	Medium / High	High / High	High / Medium

Table 2: Protest groups strategies

*First is for radical groups, the second for moderate groups

In the interviews, Engel mentions (2021, pp. 1 - 2) that Viruswaarheid uses political strategies. However, Viruswaarheid only speaks politicians who are on the same side and do not make use of lobbyists (Engel, 2021, p. 1). Administrative contacts are limited, because the relation between the relevant government agencies and Viruswaarheid is not optimal (Engel, 2021, p. 2). Viruswaarheid tries to make a lot of use both traditional and social media. Engel speaks many journalists, but he believes that journalists do not always want him to talk and therefore it is hard to reach traditional media (Engel, 2021, p. 3). Viruswaarheid also makes use of social media, especially Facebook. The protest group uses social media for mobilisation and to inform (Engel, 2021, p. 4). Also, Engel uses social media to challenge people who have another opinion. Viruswaarheid mobilises themselves via many ways: demonstrations, broadcasts, newsletters, public meetings et cetera (Engel, 2021, p. 5).

Youth for Climate NL tries to have much contact with politicians and that is important to have them (Walker, 2021, p. 3). Walker acknowledges that it is not as much as he hopes, but that the amount higher than expected. They regularly have contact with D66 and GroenLinks, but they try to also have

contact with other parties as well (Walker, 2021, pp. 2 - 3). Also, they try to make use of lobbyists. However, they are still in the procedural phase (Walker, 2021, p. 3). The protest group does not have direct contact with ministries or other government agencies, but they do have indirect contact. This contact is via its mother organisation 'De Jonge Klimaatbeweging', with whom they sometimes go to a meeting with a deputy from a ministry (Walker, 2021, p. 3). Therefore, the administrative strategies are medium. Youth for Climate NL has regular contact with journalists and sometimes they appear on TV or the radio. Walker emphasises that media contact is a dependent on the momentum. Social media is also used a lot to mobilise and to inform (Walker, 2021, p. 3). Walker mentions that the protest group tries to mobilise themselves via petitions and strikes. Demonstrations are seen as the last option (Walker, 2021, p. 4). Also, Walker said that they worked this year more on their internal structure and focused a bit less on mobilisation actions.

Coronawet Nee speaks some parliamentarians, who are all from GroenLinks, and had regular contact with them during their protest action. The protest group made efficient use of these contacts during their protest letter, which was sent to parliament (Smits, 2021, p. 5). Coronawet Nee sent the letter not only to parliament, but also to VWS and 'Ministerie van Algemene Zaken'. However, Smits noticed that it was difficult to get in contact with civil servants or ministries. Smits knows many journalists and tried to use traditional media, but she noticed that it was hard to reach traditional media during the Covid-19 period (Smits, 2021, p. 6). Social media was used in the beginning, but because the protest group noticed that good debates on social media were hard to hold. Mobilisation strategies are for example sending a letter to parliament, having public meetings (Smits, 2021, pp. 7 - 8).

Wouters thinks that the climate change protest groups have much benefit with having contacts with politicians and that the protest groups, both moderate and radical, are realising that they need the government to discuss their ideas (Wouters, 2021, p. 2). However, moderate groups are more focussing on political and administrative strategies, while radical groups are more focussing on getting attention and create awareness via demonstrations (Wouters, 2021, p. 1). He thinks both moderate and radical are using a lot media strategies, because politicians can be reached and both awareness can be created (Wouters, 2021, p. 4).

Trust in government and direct strategies

In chapter 1, the variable trust in government is already discussed. The direct strategies are only separated discussed. Viruswaarheid is a group which makes not a lot of use of direct strategies. They have difficulties with having contact with both parliamentarians, ministries and governmental institutions. Their trust in government is also low. Youth for Climate NL has scores medium to high concerning direct strategies. They succeeded in talking with every parliament fraction (Walker, 2021, p. 2) and are focussing on getting lobbyists. Indirectly they have contacts with ministries and governmental institutions. Their trust in government is high. Coronawet Nee scores medium regarding

direct strategies. Coronawet Nee has only a few contacts with parliamentarians, but they used them very effectively. With ministries and governmental institutions, they noticed that it was hard to reach them. Their trust in government is medium.

There could be a relationship between trust in government and using direct strategies. For all protest groups the score on direct strategies are as high as the score on trust in government. This means that it is plausible that a low trust in government results in a low use of direct strategies, while a high trust in government can result in many or effective contacts with politicians, ministries and civil servants.

Indirect strategies and fall-back options

Indirect strategies are often seen as fall-back options, because they are seen as less successful (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 697) than direct strategies. On the other hand, many protest groups choose for a combination of both direct and indirect strategies (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 710). The protesters and the expert are asked if they use indirect strategies. Viruswaarheid tries to make a lot of use of media, but has not an optimal relationship with traditional media, so they try to reach many people via social media. Viruswaarheid mobilises themselves quite often. So, Viruswaarheid scores medium to high on use of indirect strategies. Youth for Climate NL uses both traditional and social media much and they mobilise themselves often. However, this year it was less than usual, because they wanted to focus more on internal structure of the organisation (Walker, 2021, p. 3). Youth for Climate NL scores medium to high on using indirect strategies. Coronawet Nee wanted to use traditional media, but did not succeed very much in reaching them despite the fact that they have a lot of contacts. Social media was especially used in the beginning, but not much anymore. Mobilisation strategies are especially in forms as public meetings and a letter to the parliament. Demonstrations and strikes are not held. Coronawet Nee scores therefore low to medium on using indirect strategies.

From these data there cannot be stated that indirect strategies are fall-back options. Only for Viruswaarheid it looks a fall-back option as their use of direct strategy is low. The data from Youth for Climate NL contradicts this, because they score as high on use of direct strategies as use of indirect strategies. Coronawet Nee scores a bit in the middle on both, so also nothing can be concluded from these data.

Trust in traditional media and use of traditional media

In chapter 1 the trust in media is discussed and in the first paragraph of chapter 3 the use of traditional media is discussed. Viruswaarheid has a low trust in traditional media and has a low use of traditional media. Youth for Climate NL has a medium trust in traditional media, but uses traditional media regularly. Coronawet Nee has low trust in traditional media and also a low amount of use of traditional media.

From these data it seems that there is a correlation between the trust in and use of traditional media. However, both Viruswaarheid and Coronawet Nee both say that traditional media are not open to them. They both give the reasons that traditional media do not want too much criticism on the current corona policy of the government. This reason cannot be refuted nor substantiated in this research. Therefore, it is hard to say if trust in traditional media and use of traditional media are correlated with each other.

Traditional and social media

The interviewees are asked if social media are more useful than traditional media and if social media are replacing the role of traditional media. Engel (2021, p. 4) says he uses a lot of social media, but he believes that both traditional and social media are useful. According to Engel, an advantage of traditional media is that there are people who write papers, but a disadvantage is that traditional media are selective. If they do not want to speak with you, you cannot express your opinion, while it is easier on social media to reach people. A disadvantage of social media is that social media are regulated by algorithms. Walker (2021, pp. 4 - 5) thinks that both traditional and social media are important. Traditional media are crucial in transporting the message and social media are especially useful in reaching younger public. Smits (2021, p. 7) says that the advantage of social media is also the disadvantage. It is easy to share opinions, but at the same time this causes a polarised debate between both sides. Traditional media offers a bit more quality. Wouters (2021, p. 4) thinks that the most people still get their information from traditional media with side note that there is a group of young people that get their information from social media.

The protesters all value the usefulness of traditional and social media equally high. They all think that both forms of media have advantages and disadvantages and both are useful in creating awareness and sharing ideas. So, the role of social media has been increased the last decade, but it seems that they have not replaced traditional media. Therefore, they are seen as equally important.

Conclusion

They all use direct and indirect strategies, but there can be shown a difference in the amount. Viruswaarheid has low amount of use of direct strategies, but a high amount of using indirect strategies. Youth for Climate NL has a medium to high amount of direct strategies and a medium to high amount of using indirect strategies. Coronawet Nee has a medium amount of using direct strategies and low to medium amount of using indirect strategies. A difference between the coronavirus protest groups and the climate change protest groups are difficult to see, because there are differences within the coronavirus protest movement. So, it could depend on the protest group instead of the protest movement.

It could be that the strategies can be partially explained by the trust of government, but this not particular means that indirect strategies are a fall back option. Zooming in on the media strategies, it is

hard to state about the relationship between trust in traditional media and the amount of using traditional media. What can be stated is that all groups value traditional and social media equally high.

Results protest groups

In this chapter there are taken a look into the results that are achieved by the protest groups in parliament. In the interviews there are questions asked to the protesters which results they have achieved. On the basis of these answers and other found results, the achievements will be measured. Also, an answer will be given on the sub-question: "What are the results of the two protest movements?"

Starting with Viruswaarheid, Engel (2021, p. 7) mentions some results they have achieved. He thinks that due to their way of protesting, there is partially a societal debate and also creating awareness among the public is successful. They gave resistance against the government, especially in the courtroom, where they won two times a case. However, also many cases about the obligation to wear facemasks for example, are lost (Van Gestel, 2020). Looking specifically in parliament, politicians from Forum voor Democratie represent their opinion and open the debate in parliament, such as motion to cancel the obligation to wear facemasks (Tweede Kamer, 2021) or the motion about abolition of the one and a half meter rule by the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and Group Van Haga (Tweede Kamer, 2021). Both motions are rejected. It seems that this is not enough, because Engel himself was almost electable for the parliament election in March 2021. However, he withdrawn himself from the list. All in all, there can be seen that ideas from Viruswaarheid are discussed in parliament. It does not mean that their ideas are embraced by the majority of the parliament, because there is a majority government, which can also sometimes trust on a support by some parties outside the coalition. However, sometimes a law had to be adapted due to a won law case.

Walker (2021, p. 7) thinks that the organisation is invited more structurally. They are asked to help to sustainable companies internally for example. Also, he is sure that the voice of young people is more heard. Looking at the parliament, he notices that the strike has reached parties, such as GroenLinks, D66, Party for the Animals and the Christian Union. Although Walker states that climate change is a theme that more is discussed in parliament, Walker also noticed that still the same parties talk about it. He emphasises that climate change is something that everyone must concern. He hopes that there more results will be booked in the future. However, he thinks that there is an increasing in discussion about the climate topic, because there is more pressure from the society, especially young people.

Smits (2021) and Coronawet Nee had two goals: a new and better Coronawet in which democratic rights are guaranteed (2021, p. 2) and to have a moderate debate about it (Smits, 2021, p. 8). The first has partially succeeded, because the parts of the letter are discussed in the debate about the Coronawet and moreover, the Coronawet has been heavily amended. Smits hoped that the Coronawet would completely get abolished, but she is satisfied that their protest action had effect and that the parliament discussed it. About the second goal, she thinks that there is a bit more space for a moderate discussion, but that there is still a controlling attitude from especially left-wing parties. Also, she thinks

that left-wing politicians are rejecting her invitations to debate about a pandemic proof democracy, because they are afraid to smear their name (Smits, 2021, p. 8).

The conclusions that can be drawn from these results in comparison with the rest of the analysis will be discussed in the conclusion of this research.

Conclusion

The last part of this research is about the general findings with an answer on the general research question, which is: "To what extent do the protest strategies influence the political debate in the Dutch parliament on matters of climate change and coronavirus?". This is done on the basis of the three concluding paragraphs and the results from the data analysis chapter. After that, the limitations and recommendations are discussed.

The first sub-question is: "To what extent do the characteristics of both the climate change protest movements and coronavirus protest movements have influence on the protest strategies?". It seems that the characteristics have a limited influence on protest strategies. From this research, there can be seen that ideologically or politically motivated protesters are trying to prevent violent protests. The other characteristic that seems to have an influence is education, because all groups have many high educated people and use mobilisation strategies. For other variables like decreasing living conditions and age cannot be said that they influence the way of protesting. Between both movements, only the level of trust in traditional is significantly different. Climate change protest groups seems to have more trust in the traditional media than coronavirus protest groups. It seems that this have an impact on their media strategies, because Youth for Climate NL uses more media strategies than the coronavirus protest groups. However, the low to medium and not effective use of media strategies are based on the feeling that they are ignored by the traditional media.

"To what extent does the political opportunity structure of the Netherlands influence the protest strategies" is the second sub-question. The protesters do not agree with each other on the way the Dutch political system is organised. The coronavirus protest groups think that there is too les inclusion, while the climate change protest group and expert think there is enough inclusion. Both agree on the other hand that inclusion lead to less aggressive forms of protest. Comparing Youth for Climate NL and Viruswaarheid it seems that the political opportunity structure does have an influence as Viruswaarheid chooses less for direct strategies, while Youth for Climate NL does. Comparing Youth for Climate NL with Coronawet Nee, then there seems less influence, because both wants to use direct strategies. However, important to note is that both Viruswaarheid and Coronawet Nee have low administrative strategies and they both think that this can be caused by the lack of transparency and inclusion of governmental institutions, while Youth for Climate has indirect contact with governmental institutions and feels included. The openness of governmental institutions possibly plays a role in the use of administrative strategies.

The third sub question is: "To what extent do the protest groups of both movements use direct and indirect strategies?". It is difficult to compare both movements, because there are differences within the protest groups within the coronavirus protest groups. Viruswaarheid has a focus on indirect strategies, while Coronawet Nee had its focus on political strategies. Youth for Climate NL has both. The choice for these strategies, could be based on the level of trust in government. However, it does not

mean that indirect strategies are especially fall-back options. Looking in particular to the media strategies, there cannot be stated that the low trust in traditional media influences the use of media strategies. This is probably caused due to the fact that all the interviewed protesters value the use of traditional media as useful.

The fourth sub-question is: "What are the results of the two protest movements?". Looking at the general goal of both movements, it seems that the climate change protest group has a small success in getting attention that the topic is a bit more discussed in parliament. This is probably caused by pressure from young citizens, which means that awareness is created among citizens. However, the climate change problem is far away from being solved, as the Netherland is still one of the least sustainable countries in Europe (Van Mersbergen, 2020). Looking at the goal of the protest group, the same can be said. They are being more invited to talk about the sustainability of companies. Also, they have the feeling that young people are more heard on the matters of climate change. For the coronavirus protest movement, there is also a partial success. Convincing the government to get rid of the measurements has not been succeeded, but some laws are adapted via political ways or via legal ways. Coronawet Nee succeeded with a political letter campaign to get the Coronawet heavily amended and Viruswaarheid forced the government via legal cases to change laws regarding the coronavirus.

To provide a concrete answer on the research question, more protest groups should be interviewed. Looking at these particular protest groups and their ways of protesting, it seems that protest strategies do not have a significant influence on the political debate in the Dutch parliament. Comparing both movements, there can be seen that there are differences in strategies within the coronavirus protest movement. However, both protest groups use different strategies than Youth for Climate NL. Despite the differences in protest strategies, they all had their successes. Coronawet Nee provides a successful example of how political strategies can have a big influence on the debate. Youth for Climate NL on the other hand emphasises that things only change if there is a broad understanding of the positive effects on fighting climate change on which they are focussing now. The possible effects of that can only be seen in the future. However, its combination of direct and indirect strategies led to be more invited to talk about sustainability and more awareness for young people their problems concerning climate change. Viruswaarheid, having low direct strategies and high indirect strategies, did not have their successes due to one of these forms of strategies, but it shows that legal cases can also be a strategy to be successful and that the current strategy categorisation is possibly not broad enough.

Limitations and recommendations

The latter implies a recommendation. Next to the current four strategies, there can be taken a look into the effectiveness of legal strategies, meaning that protest groups can lay their focus on finding judicial mistakes in laws. For example, laws that are not in line with fundamental rights. Also, it could be interesting to research if traditional media is operating different in a time of crisis, such as the COVID-

19 pandemic, as both coronavirus protest groups indicate that they are ignored by traditional media. Furthermore, it can be interesting to research why some protest groups do not feel included by the current political system, while others do.

A limitation of this research is validity. The number of researched protest groups is too limited. Therefore, no hard conclusions can be stated, but only indications. A way to prevent this limitation in the future is too contact many protest groups and to ask them to fill in a survey with clear questions. In this way, a comparison is much easier to make. Another limitation is that is still hard to state whether the dependent variable influences the independent variable or the other way around.

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