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Westfälische-Wilhelms-Universität Münster

Policy reactions to the 2015 refugee management crisis.

Exploring determinants of restrictive asylum policy introductions in 15 European countries using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, program European Studies, University of Twente, and for the degree of Master of Arts, program Comparative Public Governance, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

Nico Hallmann
Master European Studies (double degree)
S1876503
Mail: nicohallmann92@gmx.de
First Supervisor: Dr. Le Anh Long
Second Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bernd Schlipphak

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Abstract

The 'refugee crisis' was characterized by a vast increase of people in need of international protection entering Europe and the collapse of the supranational migration management in the second half of 2015. This dynamic is defined as a 'focusing event' with a significant impact on policy agendas in Europe, resulting in a visible (re-) focus on national policymaking. The goal of this thesis is to enrich the existing case study literature on the 'refugee crisis' through a comparative analysis of six distinct theoretical concepts (policy determinants) and their ability to explain if a total of 15 Schengen countries reacted with restrictive policy introductions to the 'crisis'. For this aim, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is employed to derive typological causal pathways, illustrating which policy determinants (and combinations of them) can systematically explain restrictive policy introductions across different asylum policy areas. The main finding of the thesis is, that a core group of five major destination countries, also characterized through competitive policy dynamics, accounts for most countries introducing restrictive policies to a) physically limit the access to their territory and b) deter people from seeking international protection in their country by curtailing rights and benefits for asylum applicants and beneficiaries of international protection. Another noticeable finding is, that despite high levels and stark increases of issue salience, public opinion effects on policy decisions were not identified. In sum, these findings indicate, that structural pressures, exceptionally high migratory pressures and a certain interdependency of asylum policymaking in the Schengen Area, were the main drivers for most restrictive policy reactions to the crisis rather than government ideologies or public opinion effects for example.

1. Introduction

Especially since the peak of the 'refugee management crisis'[1] from late summer to the end of Autumn 2015, policy responses by the European Union (EU) and national governments have become a highly salient and controversial topic in Europe. While the EU failed to address evident insufficiencies of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) due to the division between Member States, the existing domestic leeway for asylum policies led to a focus on national policymaking.

What is often, particularly within the public discourse, referred to as the 'refugee crisis' should arguably rather be understood as a crisis of the supranational framework of migration management in Europe. The events of 2015 were not the first 'refugee crisis' Europe experienced, looking at the 4.2 million people seeking international protection during the 1990s mainly tied to the wars in Yugoslavia, the first Gulf War and the fall of the Berlin Wall

[1] Similar to Brekke & Staver (2018) the term refugee management crisis will be used, as it more accurately describes, that the 'crisis' is rather one of supranational failure of the Common European Asylum System leading to a drawback to national asylum policymaking throughout Europe.

(Lucassen, 2018). While at the time, these ‘waves’ of asylum applicants resulted in a dynamic of restrictive policy introductions on the national level (Joppke, 2002, Hatton 2004), they also facilitated the gradual establishment of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), aimed to harmonize various aspects of asylum policymaking in the European Union (Geddes, 2014; Kaunert & Leonard, 2011)[2]. However, throughout 2015 it became evident, that the established supranational framework lacked the necessary degree of harmonization in key areas, especially concerning mechanisms of burden-sharing, to facilitate a collective and effective crisis management. This can be seen as the root cause of the dynamics of the refugee management crisis (Niemann & Zaun, 2018).

In this vein, the 2015 ‘record’ of asylum applications mounting to 1.3 million in Europe[3] (Pew Research Center, 2016) posed an exogenous shock to the existing supranational framework, as it represented a vast increase even in comparison to growing numbers since the start of the war in Syria in 2013. Here, the Dublin system is an essential part of the CEAS, designed to regulate asylum applications as it requires asylum seekers to apply in the country of first entry into the EU respectively the Schengen Area[4] (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). However, as the main countries of arrival, Greece and Italy, were overwhelmed by large inflows of people seeking international protection, the Dublin System practically collapsed on the Mediterranean border of the Schengen Area around August 2015. This initiated vast secondary movements towards Northern Europe, particularly through Greece and the Balkan route (FAZ, 2019), facilitated by the abandonment of border checks through the Schengen Agreement (Hatton, 2016). The result of this was a de-facto institutional vacuum, as no compromise for an immediate and supranational policy response could be reached, especially concerning the establishment of a functioning relocation scheme (Zaun, 2018). In reaction to this vacuum, EU authorities focused on the so-called ‘fortress of Europe’ approach to close its external borders[5] (Weber, 2016), while various national governments used the existing domestic legislative

[2]An overview of the EU legislation on asylum in 2014, representing the rules at the beginning of the crisis, can be found in the Appendix (A1.1.)

[3]EU-28 plus Norway and Switzerland.

[4] Non-EU Schengen members (Norway, Lichtenstein, Switzerland and Iceland) as well as Denmark (various bilateral agreements) are bound to the Dublin system through formal agreements with the European Community but not (formally) to other elements of the CEAS although both show a significant harmonization with CEAS rules in practice.

[5] Ultimately culminating in the EU-Turkey agreement designed to essentially close down the Balkan route in March 2016.

leeway of common minimum standards set by the CEAS to introduce restrictive asylum policies (Slominski, 2017).

In this context, the duality of vastly increasing migratory pressures and the absence of a common European approach to address them in the second half of 2015 is understood as a 'focusing event', impacting national policy agendas. In short, such focusing events have a powerful symbolic impact on publics and policymakers and subsequently create a strong notion of political urgency to address the issue they represent (Birkland, 1997). However, policymaking is in essence a sense-making activity and the interpretation of such focusing events is therefore context-dependent, as government agendas can be influenced by a variety of factors and challenges national governments face and perceive (Campell & Pedersen, 2014; Widmayer et al., 2007)[6]. In this vein, and especially within the heterogenous group of 15 Schengen countries selected for this project, a variety of country-specific characteristics such as the number of asylum applications, government ideologies, public opinion, previous immigration experiences as well as competitive policymaking dynamics could influence if national governments reacted with restrictive asylum policy decisions to the refugee management crisis. As illustrated in the upcoming literature review, so far, this event has almost exclusively been studied through case study designs concentrating on policy dynamics and their root causes in the individual case or providing a comparative perspective on a limited number of cases. In this vein, this project aims to contribute to the existing literature by exploring which country characteristics (or combinations of them) can systematically explain the presence or absence of restrictive asylum policy introductions. This project is structured after the following research questions.

Research Question:

Can the presence or absence of restrictive asylum policy introductions by Schengen countries be explained systematically through cross-country patterns of common policy determinants across different policy areas?

Sub questions:

SQ1: Did the refugee management crisis cause restrictive asylum policy introductions across different asylum policy areas within the 15 Schengen countries selected?

SQ2: Which policy determinants (or combinations of them) can systematically explain the presence or absence of restrictive asylum policy introductions?

2. Literature review

The changes in national and supranational policy regimes and their root causes can be understood as a well-established line of research within the field of immigration and asylum policy in Europe, combining scientific branches with different focal points and methodological approaches. Aside from the topic of supranational immigration policy harmonization (Guiraudon, 2000; Luedtke, 2011; Kaunert & Leonard, 2011), the landscape of European immigration and asylum policy research concentrating on the root causes of national policy decisions can – broadly speaking – be divided in a branch characterized by qualitative methodology, mostly comprising of single/multiple case studies or books concerned with national immigration/asylum policy regimes, and a quantitative branch which aims to test the effect of policy determinants on the level of restrictive immigration/asylum policy change in larger country groups.

As there is a vast landscape of studies generally concerned with the impact of the refugee management crisis on asylum policy regimes, public opinion, the growing success of the far right and a variety of other research topics, the following will identify scientific contributions specifically concerned with causal explanations of asylum policy decisions and illustrate their findings and empirical scope across the selected group of 15 Schengen countries. For this aim, a systematic and comprehensive search through google scholar was conducted, using three criteria for consideration of scientific contributions[7]:

[7] Overall, 8 search terms referring to the refugee management crisis have been applied as well as two search terms naming each country included in the analysis individually. Each search was conducted till default (at least 5 pages without relevant results). An overview of these search terms can be found in the Appendix (A.2.)

1. Providing a causal explanation for the presence or absence of restrictive national asylum policy introductions during the refugee management crisis using distinct theoretical/empirical concepts

2. At least partially concerned with similar policy categories (access to territory, accessibility of international protection, indirect deterrence policies)

3. Published since 2015

The evaluation of scientific contributions was conducted in two stages. First, based on abstracts/introductions and conclusions over 40 research articles, book chapters and books were initially collected[8]. Second, these sources were reviewed thoroughly and a core of 16 scientific contributions specifically concerned with the causal explanation of national asylum policy introductions during the refugee management crisis was established. In line with earlier stages of the literature review, these scientific contributions largely applied single or multiple case study designs, focusing on a limited number of cases. The following table illustrates their (broad) conceptual research area, covered cases, main analytical focal points and key findings. Quite naturally, the grouping of these scientific contributions requires a certain degree of generalization, however, especially regarding their findings, common causal explanations can be identified.

[8]Between 20-21.07.2021.

	Studies	Cases	Analytical focus	Key findings
	Brekke & Staver (2018)	NO	Policy process, government statements	The lack of a supranational solution led to restrictive policy introductions on the national level in (Scandinavian) major destination countries, largely driven and justified through a dynamic of regulatory competition concerning the regional as well as the European context
	Hernes (2018)	DK, NO, SE		
	Emilsson (2020)	SE	Change party positions	Crisis narrative, need to curb immigration entered political mainstream
	Hagelund (2020)	DK, NO, SE	Construction of 'crisis' in political and public sphere	Although common adoption of 'cost-capacity-approach' in context of regulatory competition and burden-sharing narratives, different value frames affected the willingness to use certain policy instruments (e.g., social benefit cuts asylum seekers) and their level of 'restrictiveness' in Scandinavian countries
	Parveen (2020)	NO		
	Gruber (2017)	AT	Public discourse, right-wing party success	The radicalization of the public discourse and subsequent right-wing party success are main drivers for restrictive policies
	Rossel & Dudek (2020)	AT, DE		
	Ayoub (2019)	DE	Media framing refugees	The negative framing of refugees/asylum seekers in the media (likely) facilitates restrictive government positions
	Jelínková (2019), Klaus (2017), Nagy (2019), Pacek (2020), Szalai & Göbl (2015), Wondreys (2021)	CZ (3), HU (3), PL (2)	public discourse, government campaigns	The securitization of Muslim migrants as a 'threat' to security (terrorism) and social cohesion (cultural values) was used as a deliberate strategy to (re-) gain public/electoral support based on prevalent negative public attitudes
	Malešič (2017)	SL	policy process, public discourse	Public and media discourse opposed to over-securitization led to balanced securitization regarding both, government rhetoric and policy decisions
N	Kriesi et al. (2021)	AT, DE, EL, FR, HU, IT, SE	Strength/capacity national asylum systems, inflow asylum seekers, issue salience	Mainly concerned with external/internal (re-) bordering processes, several countries with high inflow turned to border measures within and at the borders of the Schengen area

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The first interesting finding depicted in the table is, that the variety of small-N case studies show a significant overlap regarding the cases they cover, focusing on the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries as well as Germany and Austria. On the one hand, it is not surprising that Western and Northern European countries characterized by particularly high migratory pressures during the crisis and Eastern European members of the Visegrad group, very vocally opposing Muslim migration, receive specific scholarly attention. On the other hand, the lack of studies concerned with a comprehensive explanation of national policy decisions in countries at the Schengen border (Italy, Greece) or other Western European countries (Belgium, France, Netherlands) is noticeable, as these countries were scrutinized mainly through descriptive accounts of crisis dynamics and policy changes (Geddes & Scholten, 2016; Duszyk, 2020). Further, a couple of interesting conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed studies going forward.

First, regulatory competition within the three Scandinavian major destination countries can be seen as the main driver for a variety of restrictive policy introductions and a path-breaking ‘U-turn’ towards (temporal) restrictive policies in Sweden. This led to a certain degree of policy convergence, although government ideologies and a certain path-dependency influenced the selection of specific policy instruments and their extent (e.g., social benefit cuts). In this vein, policymakers explicitly referred not only to the Scandinavian but also to the larger European dimension in terms of regulatory competition (Hernes, 2018; Hagelund, 2020), which illustrates a certain degree of (perceived) interdependency of policymaking in Europe after the failure of the Dublin system and in face of vast secondary movements resulting in a ‘race to the bottom’ dynamic. A similar connection between the status of major destination countries and restrictive asylum policies in form of reintroduced border controls was identified for Germany and Austria (Kriesi et al., 2021). In sum, these findings establish an interesting path to explore further, particularly a systematic and detailed account if the status as major destination countries and competitive dynamics influenced policy decisions throughout different categories of asylum policies.

Second, regarding the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland a common strategy to securitize the issue of immigration to gain public support was identified building on an existing public skepticism towards immigration. However, although these three members of the Visegrad group vocally opposed EU initiatives of burden-sharing in the form of relocation schemes through largely xenophobic narratives (Nyzio, 2017), the extent and choice of restrictive policies on the national level widely differed, particularly in Poland, which barely introduced any new asylum policies (Jelínková, 2019; Klaus, 2017; Szalai & Göbl, 2015). In this vein, it is difficult to derive a parsimonious conclusion across these countries albeit existing xenophobic government attitudes and public skepticism towards immigration, whereas the varying level of actual migratory pressures towards those countries could provide a clarifying factor regarding the discrepancy between their coherent approach on supranational stage and asylum policy introductions on the national stage (Kowalski, 2016).

Third, although the effects of the refugee management crisis on public opinion have been studied rather comprehensively and from different perspectives (Barlai et al., 2017; van der Brug, 2021; Marx & Naumann, 2018), the empirical coverage and findings of studies scrutinizing the relationship between public opinion and policy decisions are rather limited. While Gruber (2017) and Rossel & Dudek (2020) associated the radicalization of the public discourse, growing negative attitudes towards immigration and subsequent right-wing party success with restrictive policy decisions in Austria, Ayoub (2019) tied the media framing of refugees in Germany to the change of the initially welcoming approach towards more restrictive measures. Considering these existing studies, the effect of public opinion on national policy decisions in context of the refugee management crisis, for example, its relationship with other factors such as country-specific migratory pressures (Kriesi et al. 2021), should be further explored – particularly within an larger empirical scope on European countries.

In sum, the established overview of the existing literature presents a complex picture concerning the root causes of national policy decisions during the refugee management crisis derived from different theoretic focal points. For the approach of this project, this overview yields two main conclusions. First, the empirical scope of studies concerned with the explanation of national policy decisions is centered on the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany and the three members of the Visegrad group in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (in context of the 15 Schengen countries selected). Second, there is a difficulty regarding the cross-study comparison of individual case study findings, particularly concerning the identification of main causal explanations and the relationship between them. In this vein, both in empirical and theoretical terms, the existing literature can be enriched through a systematic comparison of the relationship between distinct theoretical concepts and national asylum policy decisions throughout a group of 15 European countries to identify which country characteristics can be considered as the main drivers behind the introduction of restrictive asylum policies.

This conclusion touches upon a larger debate within the field of immigration policy research about the approach to study the causes of immigration policies. Here, in reference to the perceived lack of comparability concerning case study designs, Money (1999) described the need to establish reliable (internal) determinants to study the causes of immigration policy change in (quantitative) cross-country research. Building on Money's (1999) arguments, an increasing number of comparative studies concerned with the determinants of immigration and asylum policies in Europe developed. These studies are rooted in the field of policy innovation research (Walker, 1969; Mohr, 1969) and a specific stream of comparative political science shaped by the work of Dye (1966), Sharkansky (1970) and Hofferbert (1974). Entrenched in the comparative political science perspective in particular, these studies use quantitative methodology to assess the correlation between policy determinants and the introduction of restrictive or welcoming immigration policies over periods of at least 10 years between 1975-2012 (Givens & Luedtke, 2005; de Haas & Natter, 2015; Natter, Czaika & de Haas, 2020; Abou-Chadi, 2016). Here, only a limited number of these studies are specifically concerned with asylum policies (Hatton, 2004; Han, 2013). Albeit conceptual differences, these studies largely employ similar sets of parsimonious policy determinants to explain policy introductions, focusing on immigration numbers, partisanship in governments, public opinion and socio-economic factors. This abstract view of the policy process - through the relationship of policy determinants and policy outputs - has the advantage, that it allows systematic and comparative scrutiny across cases, increasing the comparability and generalizability of results. However, this approach naturally represents a trade-off, compromising the ability to scrutinize specific policy processes to their full extent, as in case study designs.

After carefully reviewing case and policy determinant studies and their underlying literature within the field of immigration policy research, this project intends to combine two main strengths of these qualitative and quantitative branches to enrich the scholarly work on the refugee management crisis from an explicitly comparative perspective. Specifically, this entails two aspects, a) putting comparative insights at the center of the analysis and b) to apply a remained case focus in this context, identifying cross-country patterns between policy determinants and the presence or absence of restrictive policy introductions. This approach draws from the concept of 'analytical induction' put forward by George and Bennett (2005), which originally aims to build typologies through the results of qualitative cross-case research (p. 240). In line with the aim of this project, the concept is explorative in its nature, combining strings of deductive and inductive reasoning. It ultimately aims to build cross-case typologies encompassing the relationship between priorly hypothesized theoretical concepts and a defined outcome or set of outcomes. Instead of case study methodology, the software-based Qualitative

Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be employed to identify meaningful case commonalities and differences related to the (non-) introduction of restrictive asylum policies during the refugee management crisis. The upcoming section will introduce the main theoretical concepts used in the subsequent analysis.

3. Theoretical framework

This section aims to establish the policy determinants scrutinized within this project and their hypothesized effect in facilitating restrictive asylum policy introductions. Most of the selected determinants, except the arguably underrepresented factor of immigration cultures, can also be found in prior policy determinant studies, at least in some form, as they usually comprise the status quo of scholarly work concerned with the root causes of restrictive asylum policy change. Nevertheless, these concepts are refined concerning the research context and through additional insights of theoretical or empirical nature. In the following, each underlying conceptualization of the policy determinants used in this project will be briefly discussed.

Major destination countries

This concept aims to identify a core group of “major destination countries” during the refugee management crisis. This is based on the conclusion, that European countries pose very different degrees of “pull factors” to people seeking international protection, which results in the fact, that many countries can be rather considered as “transit” than “destination” countries (Zaun, 2017). Particularly in context of the refugee management crisis, where the breakdown of the Dublin system caused significant secondary movements towards Northern Europe, it is arguably more sensible to apply a strong conceptualization of those countries most affected by these movements because migratory pressures seem to have concentrated disproportionally in certain European countries (Zaun, 2018). In this context, the inflow of people seeking asylum, commonly measured through asylum application numbers, is a widely acknowledged causal factor for the introduction of restrictive asylum policies (Meyers, 2004, p. 115) but should be reflected upon carefully considering the chosen conceptualization of major destination countries. In this sense, and similar to Han (2013), this project will use a combined measure, controlling asylum application numbers with the percentage change of refugee stock during the refugee management crisis, both in relation to the size of the population. This is due to the consideration, that both, the process of seeking international protection and the registration of asylum application numbers are very dynamic. Therefore, a major destination country, as understood in this project, should not only be characterized by the fact, that a significant amount of asylum applications were filed on its territory but also by the degree to which it integrated people seeking protection into their welfare systems through the status of international protection.

H1: The status as major destination countries during the refugee management crisis facilitated restrictive asylum policy introductions.

Government partisanship

Due to the complex nature of the policymaking process, the empirical measurement of the relationship between government partisanship and policy outputs is challenging but particularly promising in the area of asylum policies. The basic argument for the impact of government partisanship within the field of immigration policy research is, that on the hand, parties left of the center favor the de-ethnicization of immigration policies, which results in a universalistic and more welcoming approach. Center-right parties on the other hand, and in extreme form in nationalist right-wing parties, with a rather conservative agenda emphasize the importance of a common cultural heritage and values subsequently favoring more restrictive policies (Helbling, 2013). However, there is a strong division within the scientific community regarding the strength of partisanship effects, which reflects conflicting empirical findings in the field (Gudbrandsen, 2010). But the specific focus on asylum policies could be a clarifying factor, as the ideological positions of government parties have different implications across immigration policy areas such as labor migration or asylum policies (Natter, Czaika & de Haas, 2020). Here, it could be argued, that conservative ideologies within a government are more likely to affect the area of asylum policymaking than that of labor migration, for example, as the latter is driven by rather practical objectives of labor demand/shortages and not mainly by ideological considerations. In this vein, several empirical findings indicate, that government partisanship is a more evident factor within the area of asylum policymaking (Gudbrandsen, 2010; Han, 2013; Natter, Czaika & de Haas, 2020).

In this context, (at least) exclusively center-right governments are used to cut through the complexity of the party spectrum based on the conclusion that center-right parties can be considered as a major driver of restrictive asylum policies in Europe in both, exclusively center-right or coalition governments with right-wing parties (Bale, 2008; Akkermann, 2012). Of course, this entails a (necessary) generalization of party ideologies.

H2: at least center-right governments facilitated restrictive asylum policy introductions.

Public preferences & issue salience

For the domain of public opinion, this project will distinguish two interrelated concepts in public preferences and issue salience. The inclusion of both concepts is designed to achieve a more nuanced picture of public opinion effects as well as to scrutinize interaction effects between them as outlined by Hatton (2017b). The concept of public preferences aims to identify a baseline of (negative) public preferences toward people seeking international protection in Europe during the refugee management crisis. Regarding the public opinion on policy issues in general, it is assumed, that in a broader context of electoral competitiveness, policymakers are wary to anticipate and subsequently avoid or mitigate the perceived effects emerging situations have on their public approval (Hatton, 2011). Therefore, public opinion effects have a specific dynamic quality in context of the understanding of the refugee management crisis as a focusing event, hypothesized to affect public preferences but especially the issue salience within national publics, causing a significant politicization of a specific issue that can hardly be ignored by policymakers (Birkland, 1997).

Here, the degree of issue salience concerning asylum seekers and asylum policymaking is considered an important factor to transform restrictive public preferences within the respective country populations into restrictive policies through public pressure on government officials. Therefore, the effects of public preferences on asylum policymaking likely depend on the salience of the political issue in question (Hatton, 2016, 2017b). This is based on the idea, that the public conflict around immigration issues directly affects policy objectives and priorities within governments (Freeman, 1994). Empirical evidence for this relationship can be found in Ford, Jennings & Somerville (2015), which illustrated, that a strong politicization of immigration issues in the public domain initiated restrictive policy responses to negative attitudes toward asylum in the United Kingdom. However, the distinction between public opinion effects through public preferences and issue salience is designed to test this assumed interaction effect during the empirical inquiry, as it is certainly a possibility that only one of these conditions can systematically explain the introduction of restrictive asylum policies, especially considering, that the degree to which public preferences and issue salience correlate tends to vary across European countries (Hatton, 2017b). Therefore, the subsequent hypotheses postulate that either public preferences or issue salience respectively or the interaction between them facilitate restrictive asylum policies.

H3: either public preferences or issue salience facilitate restrictive policy introductions independently.

H4: a high level of issue salience transforms negative public preferences to significant public pressure, increasing the urgency to act for policymakers and subsequently pass restrictive asylum legislation.

Immigration culture

The immigration culture of countries is another potential factor of influence that should be considered concerning asylum policy decisions during the refugee management crisis. Here, this project is particularly interested in countries with a minor immigration history and their reactions to the large-scale influx of people seeking protection to the Schengen Area. So far, immigration culture has not been a conceptual focal point of prior policy determinant studies. While Hatton (2004) employed the stock of foreign nationals as an additional variable without significant findings, Natter, Czaika, De Haas (2020) and Abou-Chadi (2016) only concentrated on immigration rates of the previous years. This project aims to capture the immigration culture of Schengen countries in its historical, ethnic and cultural dimension to scrutinize its influence on policy decisions during the refugee crisis.

In this regard, the conceptualization of immigration culture is a complex issue. Existing literature predominantly focuses on the effect of the ethnic and cultural makeup of country populations on public attitudes towards immigration (Berg, 2009; Hatton, 2016;2017b). But this approach can arguably be adapted to the level of policymaking. In this sense, the 'contact hypothesis' (Berg, 2009, p. 43), which concludes, that negative public attitudes decrease through multicultural personal contacts, will be translated to the level of national asylum policy regimes. Regarding the research context, this is particularly tied to two empirical conclusions. First, the historically marginal numbers of asylum applications lead to the absence of significant political discussion around the topic (Vermeersch, 2005), which evidently changed throughout all European countries during the refugee management crisis. And second, immigration policy regimes in countries with a homogenous ethnic and cultural makeup tend to favor immigration of similar ethnic and cultural composition (Carens, 1998; Meyers, 2004), which is of particular interest, since the vast majority of people seeking protection during the refugee management crisis have their origin in Arabic countries and Syria in particular. In sum, this concept assumes, that large-scale immigration events, especially of dissimilar ethnic and cultural composition, represent an external shock in those countries with minor immigration histories and cultures – resulting in a stronger effect on policymakers and the domestic political discourse.

H5: The external shock of large-scale immigration towards Europe during the refugee management crisis had a stronger effect on countries with minor than in those with prolonged immigration cultures, facilitating restrictive policy introductions.

Competitive policy diffusion

Another important aspect next to the domestic factors for asylum policy decisions during the refugee management crisis is that of competitive policy diffusion effects between Schengen countries. In short, policy diffusion can be described as a process in which policy choices are conditioned by prior policy decisions in another country (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett, 2007). Within the research context, competitive diffusion dynamics are an evident focal point. This is grounded in the specific structural constraints during the refugee management crisis in times of an external shock. Specifically, its foundation lies in the structure of the Schengen Area, where the abandonment of internal borders resulted in significant secondary movements toward Northern Europe after the peak of the refugee crisis in August 2015. As the Schengen Area therefore facilitates these secondary movements, it creates a certain degree of interdependency of policy decisions in terms of the relative attractiveness of countries for people seeking protection. Accordingly, Blatter et al. (2022) describe, that structural competition triggers the need for policy reactions within the problem definition stage through the perceived externalities of policy decisions by other countries in a state of interdependence. Particularly, competitive diffusion dynamics result from the perception that policy changes abroad affect the mobility of non-state actors such as asylum seekers (or investors etc.) to the disadvantage of the country in question (ibid.). This is supported by empirical evidence, illustrating the prevalence of a notion of regulatory competition, resulting in a certain degree of policy convergence in Scandinavian countries (Hernes, 2018).

H6: migratory movements throughout the Schengen Area created a certain degree of interdependency of policy decisions during the refugee management crisis, facilitating the competitive diffusion of similar policy instruments and therefore restrictive asylum policy introductions.

4. Research design

This section will discuss the case selection (4.1.), introduce the chosen research method of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (4.2.) and the operationalization of 'restrictive' asylum policies (4.3.).

4.1. Case selection

This section will reflect on the principles of case selection and their definition concerning research context and goals. Here, this project draws from Ragin's rather functional concept of "casing", where cases are characterized as intermediate products to link theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence to pursue research goals effectively (Ragin, 1992, Chapter 10). Here, the case selection follows Rihoux & Ragin (2009, Chapter 2) intending to establish a group of cases sharing a certain degree of homogeneity concerning background characteristics tied to their expected causal implications but also representing "maximum heterogeneity over a minimum number of cases" (p. 21). In this context, an important aspect to consider for a successful QCA is to define a manageable number of cases, as the QCA requires retaining a certain degree of case knowledge and the ability to acquire it if necessary during the research process, which can be characterized as a constant back and forth between ideas and evidence (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, Chapter 11). Therefore, the case selection was driven by the aim to select not significantly more than 15 cases, ultimately settling for this number after a thorough case selection process.

First, regarding the element of shared background characteristics and their inherent causal implications for the introduction of restrictive asylum policies attached to it, the location along the main refugee routes of the Schengen Area will be the main factor for the case selection. Fig. 2 shows the number of irregular border crossings recorded by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in 2015.

Fig. 1: irregular border crossings along main refugee routes in 2015.



(FAZ, 2019, translated)

Looking at the irregular border crossings from 2015, it is evident, that most people seeking international protection in Europe initially entered the Schengen Area through the Central (Italy) and particularly through the Eastern (Greece) Mediterranean route. Here, Slovenia and Hungary represent points of re-entry, as the majority of secondary movements originating from Greece continued over the Balkan route during the refugee management crisis. Fig. 2 illustrates the direction of refugee flows throughout Europe in more detail.

Fig. 2: main refugee routes throughout Europe.



(Ambrosini, 2016)

It is visible, that secondary movements throughout the Schengen Area, particularly those originating from the Balkan route, mainly span over Central, Western and Northern Europe. With the aim to select not significantly more than 15 countries for the QCA, while achieving a certain heterogeneity within the case population to test the effects of a variety of policy determinants in different country contexts, the following groups of countries are selected based on conceptual and empirical considerations. Note, for some countries, there is an overlap concerning their grouping indicated by “[ ]”.

- *Transit countries, points of (re-) entry to the Schengen area:*
    - Greece, Italy, [Hungary, Slovenia]
- *Central and Western EU-15 countries:*
    - Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands
- *Nordic countries:*
    - Denmark, Norway, Sweden
- *More recent/Eastern European EU members*:
    - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

Regarding this selection of 15 countries, it is important to reflect on the most notable exclusions of cases. First, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg and Malta are excluded due to their low population sizes. Second, Finland, Portugal and Spain are excluded as they are not primarily located around the main routes of secondary movements and showed very minor legislative changes in an initial policy review. Maybe the most notable exception is Switzerland, which is grounded in the empirical conclusion, that its application of direct democracy elements skews the postulated streamlined relationship between policy determinants and government decisions, particularly concerning the rather salient issue of immigration (Bader, 2018).

4.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

The QCA method founded by Charles Ragin is designed as a "middle way" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, p. 14) between qualitative and quantitative research approaches. It is grounded in the logic of set-theoretic connections which differs significantly from standard quantitative methodology. In distinction to symmetrical statistical approaches measuring the correlation of independent and dependent variables, it identifies causal relationships through asymmetrical sub-set relations of cases in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (Ragin 2009, pp. 15-16). In this regard, the QCA resembles comparative case study approaches as it focuses on case commonalities regarding the systematic presence or absence of certain conditions (policy determinants) and (policy) outcomes while expanding the research scope to a larger number of cases through software-based analysis (Ragin, 2009). Therefore, the QCA method provides a tool particularly well-suited to address the methodological gap between small-N case studies and large-N statistics, combining an explicit case focus with a systematic and comparative analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007).

The following will briefly introduce the analytic process of the QCA and the concept of sufficient and necessary conditions. In short, the chosen crisp-set QCA approach (cs/QCA) divides the empirical information across all cases into sub-sets categorized by each explanatory conditions and outcomes. Further analysis is based on a truth table, where the presence (1) or absence (0) of each condition and outcome is portrayed in a dichotomous manner (Ragin, 2014, Chapter 6). Fig. 4. shows an illustrative example of a truth table.

Fig. 3: truth table

Table 4.1 Data matrix with ten cases, three conditions, and outcome

		Conditions			Outcome
Row	Cases	A	B	C	Y
1	ARG	1	1	1	0
2	PER	1	0	0	0
3	BOL	1	1	0	0
4	CHI	0	1	0	1
5	ECU	1	0	0	0
6	BRZ	0	1	1	1
7	URU	1	0	1	1
8	PAR	0	0	1	1
9	COL	0	0	0	1
10	VEN	1	1	1	0

Y = set of countries with stable democracies
A = set of countries with violent upheavals in the past
B = set of countries with ethnically homogeneous population
C = set of countries with pluralistic party system

(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 95)

The subsequent analysis of such truth tables scrutinizes patterns of the systematic presence/absence of conditions and outcomes in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, Chapter 2). Here, sufficient conditions will be the focal point of this project and are met when a condition or a combination of them systematically leads to a specific outcome across the population of cases/countries. Additionally, the discovery of necessary conditions, which must be systematically present when the outcome is present, may also provide valuable supplementary insights. But in contrast to sufficient conditions, this leaves the possibility, that necessary conditions are present when the outcome is not – thus sufficient conditions are more meaningful regarding the identification of policy determinants behind specific policy decisions. The results of the QCA are portrayed in solution terms that show sufficient (or necessary) conditions across the population of cases. Below is an example of a solution term of sufficient conditions.

$$a + b*C \rightarrow Y_1$$

Here, a letter is assigned to every condition, while its presence is depicted by capital letters and its absence by lowercase letters. Configurational causality, meaning that the combination of two conditions is sufficient for the outcome, is marked by "*" whereas the existence of multiple causal pathways towards a specific outcome is illustrated by "+". Therefore, the solution term above reads as follows: The systematic absence of condition A, as well as the combination of the absence of condition B and the presence of condition C, have shown to be sufficient causal pathways towards outcome Y_1. Note, that the denotations for the QCA in this project are tied to the name of specific conditions and outcomes and therefore deviate from this stylized example using the ABC.

In this context, the QCA has method-specific quality measures to evaluate these solution terms. As the calculation of these measures naturally differs in case of sufficient and necessary conditions, the following focus on sufficient conditions. First, the measure of consistency identifies the percentage of cases sharing a sufficient solution term aligning with the presence of the outcome in question, as a perfect alignment of sufficient conditions and outcomes is not always the case in social science research. Here, a minimum threshold for valid results is defined, which should be set to a high standard of at least 75% but can also be raised in accordance with the research context (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, Chapter 2). Second, raw coverage is used to measure the share of outcomes explained by a solution term, while unique coverage assesses the share to which individual sufficient conditions explain the outcome in case multiple sufficient conditions provide different causal pathways towards the outcome, it can therefore be helpful to asses their individual explanatory power (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, Chapter 2). Therefore, consistency aims to examine the internal validity of sufficient conditions established by the QCA, whereas coverage is concerned with their explanatory power to explain outcomes across the totality of cases.

The following will discuss the conceptual foundations of using the QCA within the chosen research context. The use of asymmetrical set-relations through the QCA has two significant conceptual advantages for policy determinant research with its explicit focus on configurational causality and equifinality. First, although conditions can represent sufficient or necessary causal pathways towards a certain policy outcome on their own, they are likely to be a result of the systematic presence or absence of multiple conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). This allows to grasp the complex policy dynamics behind policy decisions in a very structured way, while sets of sufficient conditions remain attached to specific countries. Second, a related aspect is causal equifinality, as the QCA enables the identification of different causal pathways to a certain policy outcome across cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). This ability to identify distinct causal pathways within the population of cases and towards the same outcome is a particular advantage looking at the heterogenous group of Schengen countries.

A third conceptual advantage is related to the qualitative calibration within the QCA method. Using the dichotomous crisp-set QCA approach (cs/QCA), the presence and absence of conditions and outcomes will be marked by a qualitative threshold guided by prior theoretical and empirical knowledge (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008, Chapter 3). The qualitative focus of this approach enables the use of a variety of data types and combinations of them, providing the ability to combine strong conceptual foundations with a systematic and comparative empirical inquiry.

Within this project, the QCA method will be used for an explorative mapping of the root causes behind specific asylum policy outcomes during the refugee management crisis. Drawing from the concept of 'analytical inductions' introduced in the literature review, the main goal of this project is to identify typological causal pathways that link policy determinants with specific policy reactions across the 15 Schengen countries.

4.3. Operationalizing 'restrictive' asylum policies

This section will outline the conceptualization and operationalization of asylum policy introductions as outcomes in the cs/QCA, which are largely based on the Asylum Policy Index (API), but its framework will be adjusted in certain conceptual aspects.

The Asylum Policy Index (Hatton 2004, 2009) will provide a basic conceptual framework for the evaluation of asylum policies across three policy categories: access to territory, processing of asylum applications and determination of status and welfare towards asylum seekers (see Appendix A.5.). Within its application in correlation-based quantitative studies, the API works through simple addition and subtraction, assigning the value 1 for liberal and the value -1 for the introduction of restrictive asylum policies based on a pre-defined framework to evaluate policies in each asylum policy category. Here, the calibration of these API scores as QCA outcomes should be done carefully through a qualitative evaluation considering the research context, particularly because the number of policy introductions in certain asylum policy categories will likely be limited concerning the chosen timeframe between mid-2015 and the end of 2016 (e.g., in the case of border controls). In this context, the assessment of "major" asylum policy changes naturally entails a certain degree of subjectivity and ultimately rather indicates the direction of change rather than an in-depth qualitative evaluation regarding their absolute level in comparison to policy introductions in other countries. Nevertheless, two specific criteria are used to conceptualize and identify "major" policy changes: "firstly that the policy change is likely to affect a significant proportion of asylum seekers and, secondly, that it substantially alters access to asylum procedures, or the likelihood of a successful claim, or the material welfare of asylum seekers" (Hatton, 2009, p. 211).

Further, a few specific changes are made regarding the API framework in consideration of additional conceptual contributions to the field of asylum policy research, especially concerning the category of" welfare" policies. These changes will be primarily based on the conceptual insights presented by Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017). In the following, the three original API policy categories will be discussed briefly, and selected changes will be explained.

First, the API policy category "access to territory" entails measures to prevent the access of asylum seekers to a country's territory mainly through enhanced border controls or the erection of border fences, which practically subject's asylum claims to accelerate procedures at the countries border.

Secondly, the API category "processing of asylum applications and determination" will only undergo one minor change, but its terminology will be changed to "accessibility of international protection". Generally, this category encompasses measures to prevent or limit the accessibility to domestic asylum procedures and/or the statuses of international protection[9] for those who have already reached a country's territory. Therefore, it can be understood as a

[9] The status as a refugee is only granted in case of a justified fear of persecution in the country of origin based on race, religion, public opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Furthermore, there are various forms of subsidiary protection, which usually provide fewer rights and can be granted on grounds of an individual risk of serious harm tied to internal conflict or widespread practices of torture and inhumane treatment in the country of origin.

retroactive measure to achieve a similar objective as the first category, namely reducing the ability to gain international protection in the respective country. For example, “safe country of origin” or “safe third country” concepts are employed to deny protection and subsequently return asylum seekers either to their country of origin or to countries from which they entered. The specific change for this category concerns subsidiary protection, where the API establishes a ‘Changing scope for granting humanitarian status to those not qualifying under the [Geneva]Convention, or significant alteration to the terms of such status. Concerning the second part, the alteration of terms attached to this status (e.g., reduced time periods for residence permits for those with subsidiary protection) will be transferred to the third asylum policy category and only changes related to the alteration of the scope to qualify for subsidiary protection will remain in this category.

Third, the scope of the API category “welfare towards asylum seekers” will be broadened in conceptual terms resulting in the change of terminology to “indirect deterrence” policies. This particularly concerns not only considering changes regarding the welfare towards asylum seekers but also to those for whom a status of international protection has been granted. In this vein, indirect deterrence measures, in distinction to direct deterrence measures described above, aim to discourage people to seek protection in the own country or to divert them to other countries by reducing the welfare attached to protection statuses. This can be best described as a strategy of ‘negative nation branding’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017) and it is therefore sensible to not only include welfare during the asylum application process but especially the prospect of welfare after receiving international protection in the respective country. Most commonly, restrictive changes in this category encompass stricter rules on social benefits, the duration of residence permits, possibilities of family reunification or detention practices. Table 1 illustrates the revised framework for policy evaluation based on the API for the outcome evaluation regarding the QCA. The calibration of the QCA outcomes will be presented in the following section.

Table 2: policy evaluation framework

ACCESS TO TERRITORY	
VISA REQUIREMENTS	Change in the stringency of visa requirements such as application from abroad, biometric passports, fingerprinting.
BORDER CONTROLS/FENCES	Excision of territory; enhanced border patrols; turning back or deporting undocumented arrivals or erection of border fences.
PENALTIES FOR TRAFFICKING	Significantly enhanced apprehension of traffickers; detention/deportation or imprisonment.
CARRIER LIABILITY	Significant change in financial or other penalties for carriers by land, sea or air of undocumented arrivals.
OFFSHORE APPLICATIONS	Change in the opportunity to apply for asylum from an embassy or consulate abroad rather than in-country.
ACCESSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION	
DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE	Rules relating to the causes of persecution such as gender, persecution by non-state agents, internal flight alternative.
SPEEDING UP OF PROCESSING	Typically reducing the maximum period for decisions, or a general decrease in processing times.
MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED APPLICATIONS	Changes in grounds for applying the presumption of ineligibility, such as safe country of origin, safe third country, time elapsed since arrival or insufficient documentation.
SUBSIDIARY STATUS	Changing scope for granting humanitarian status to those not qualifying under the Convention.
APPEALS	Changes in access to appeals, changing number of levels of appeal, or altering the suspensive effect of appeals.
INDIRECT DETERRENCE	
DETENTION	Changes in rules or practices on the detention of applicants during processing, for those with failed claims or beneficiaries of international protection.
DEPORTATION	Changes in the practices of deporting failed asylum seekers, including raising targets or widening the set of those eligible for deportation
EMPLOYMENT	Changes in the right to seek employment while an asylum claim is being determined or after international protection is granted, including increased waiting times for permission to work.
ACCESS TO BENEFIT	Shift from cash to in-kind benefit; access to benefit only at reception centres; dispersal to non-metropolitan reception centres
FAMILY REUNIFICATION	Changes in the possibility of family reunification during the asylum application or for beneficiaries of international protection.
RESIDENCE PERMITS	Changes regarding the duration and conditions of residence permits

5. Data calibration

This section will illustrate the calibration for conditions and outcomes to prepare the QCA analysis.

5.1. Outcomes: asylum policies

To calibrate the outcomes for the QCA, the framework established in the previous section is applied to the annual reports of the European Asylum Support Office 'on the situation of asylum in the European Union' for the years 2015-16 to account for the length of policymaking processes (EASO, 2015, 2016) These reports gather asylum policy introductions in all countries selected within this project[10]. Here, API scores are calculated for each of four outcomes, (1) access to territory, (2) accessibility of international protection, (3) indirect deterrence and (4) the total API score. A detailed overview of introduced policies considered and their calibration can be found in the Appendix (A.6.). The following table illustrates the API scores per country and outcome category as well as the selected thresholds for their calibration. The decision for the threshold for each outcome is briefly addressed below.

[10] Concerning the Temporary Reintroduction of Border Controls in the Schengen area, more detailed information is taken from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en.

Table 3: API scores and calibration outcomes (policy categories)

Country	Access to territory	Country	Accessibility of international protection	Country	Indirect deterrence	Country	Total API
Austria	-2	Norway	-5	Denmark	-4	Norway	-10
Hungary	-2	France	-2	Hungary	-4	Hungary	-7
Belgium	-1	Germany	-2	Norway	-4	Denmark	-6
Czech Republic	-1	Slovenia	-2	Sweden	-3	Austria	-5
Denmark	-1	Austria	-1	Austria	-2	Germany	-4
Germany	-1	Czech Republic	-1	Belgium	-1	Sweden	-4
Norway	-1	Denmark	-1	Germany	-1	Belgium	-2
Sweden	-1	Greece	-1	France	0	France	-2
France	0	Hungary	-1	Italy	0	Slovenia	-2
Greece	0	Italy	-1	Netherlan ds	0	Czech Republic	-1
Italy	0	Netherla-nds	-1	Poland	0	Italy	-1
Netherla-nds	0	Belgium	0	Slovenia	0	Netherla-nds	-1
Poland	0	Poland	0	Czech Republic	1	Greece	0
Slovakia	0	Slovakia	0	Greece	1	Poland	0
Slovenia	0	Sweden	0	Slovakia	1	Slovakia	1

First, for the outcome access to territory, the threshold (red, includes country and all countries above) is set for the API score -1, as the introduction/enhancement of border controls or the erection of a border fence represents a significant restrictive policy change. The group with the API score -1 either used the Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control within the Schengen Area for at least six months or significantly increased its border controls in general (Czech Republic). Furthermore, there are two countries with an API score of -2 in Austria and Hungary due to different reasons. In Austria, this is due to the Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control as well as the erection of a fence on the Slovenian border. In Hungary, a fence was erected on the Serbian border and very restrictive legislation was introduced, allowing authorities to apprehend, criminally charge and return third country nationals to Serbia if found within eight kilometers of the border.

Second, policies restricting the accessibility of international protection were introduced across a large share of countries. This is due to the fact, that many countries amended or introduced safe country of origin lists. However, this wide distribution of single restrictive policies per country complicates the outcome coding. Ultimately, the decision is made to set the threshold for -2 to distinguish a country group with at least two restrictive policy introductions. It should be noticed that Norway stands out with an API score of -5 relating to a variety of specific changes regarding the accessibility of international protection, which might overestimate the level of change in its asylum policy system.

Third, regarding outcome indirect deterrence policies, there are countries with positive API scores and several countries without significant policy changes. Although there is a certain variance regarding those countries with negative API scores, it is arguably sensible to set the threshold for -1 looking at the distribution of values and therefore to distinguish the country group, which at least introduced one restrictive policy in this category.

Fourth, naturally the threshold for the API total is set higher than for the previous outcomes. Comparing the distribution of API scores, it is sensible to set the threshold at -4 to identify the group of countries with a particularly high degree of restrictive introductions during the refugee management crisis considering the aggregate of all asylum policy categories.

The following table represents the resulting QCA calibration for each country and outcome, distinguishing the presence of “predominantly restrictive” (1) or “moderate/minor restrictive” (0) policy introductions.

Table 4: overview outcome calibration

Country	Access to territory	Accessibility international protection	Indirect deterrence	Total API
Austria	1	0	1	1
Belgium	1	0	1	0
Czech Republic	1	0	0	0
Denmark	1	0	1	1
France	0	1	0	0
Germany	1	1	1	1
Greece	0	0	0	0
Hungary	1	0	1	1
Italy	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Norway	1	1	1	1
Poland	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	1	0	0
Sweden	1	0	1	1

5.2. Conditions: policy determinants

This section will initially discuss the basic principles of the calibration of QCA conditions, with a particular focus on the issue concerning the dichotomization of comprehensive interval-scale data. Afterwards, the final calibration will be illustrated and briefly discussed. A detailed overview of the condition calibration including all data tables can be found in Appendix (A.3.)

Concerning the calibration within the QCA, scholars very generally emphasize, that the dichotomization of conditions/outcomes should be based on a combination of "theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 32). In this vein, the calibration of conditions and outcomes is defined as a "half-conceptual, half-empirical process" (Greckhammer, 2018, p. 7) where substantial empirical and/or theoretical knowledge external to the data is used to derive meaningful qualitative anchors for the dichotomization across the case population (Greckhammer, 2018; Berg-Schlosser, 2018).

In this context, interval-scale data represents a particular challenge. Here, the problem in dealing with interval-scale data using the QCA, and that a not insignificant number of QCA studies apply statistical measures such as the mean or median in a rather "mechanical" and therefore problematic fashion, is widely acknowledged by QCA scholars (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, Chapter 3). Ultimately, this issue cannot be "solved" as qualitative thresholds for the dichotomization of interval-scale data naturally include a certain degree of "arbitrariness" (Berg-Schlosser, 2018). It is therefore important to put forward a clear and transparent calibration strategy aiming to mitigate these issues, mainly through the prior theoretical and/or substantive empirical knowledge about the field respectively specific cases (Schneider & Wagemmann, 2012). In any case, a purely "mechanical" use of statistical measures should be avoided as this likely places cases with similar values into different set memberships and further undermines the necessary conceptual depth the calibration of QCA conditions should entail, especially in context of the need for dichotomization (Schneider & Wagemmann, 2012; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Ultimately, the chosen calibration strategy is based on two pillars aimed to mitigate the issue of calibrating interval-scale data within the QCA.

1) Assuring the conceptual quality of the data input for each condition regarding the hypothesized causal relationship. This entails a careful reflection on underlying causal assumptions and different data sources available. Further, it might be sensible to combine different strings of empirical data to fully capture the targeted concept, using additive measures within the same condition (Emmenegger, 2011).

2) Although this project also relies on drop-off points/natural breaks within data and uses the guidance of the median in the assessment of data across the country population, as the majority of QCA studies do if confronted with interval-scale data, this approach should be undertaken transparently and systematically wherever possible. This aim results in a primary and a secondary calibration approach.

   a. *Primary*: if possible, data drop-offs/natural breaks in data can be justifiably assigned to the conceptual considerations for the condition in question.

b. *Secondary*: If confronted with a blurrier picture regarding the distribution of data, the median is used to identify the most sensible drop-off point above or below. Here, mean values and the standard deviation can be considered as additional guidance if necessary.

5.2.1. Major destination countries

H1: The status as major destination countries during the refugee management crisis facilitated restrictive asylum policy introductions.

Following the established conceptualization, this QCA condition aims to distinguish "major destination countries" (1) from "non-major destination countries" (0). The subsequent operationalization is based on an additive measure, which combines per capita asylum application numbers from 2015 to capture the peak of the refugee management crisis well as the change of refugee stock from 2014-2016 to account for the actual number of people for which international protection was granted. Regarding the use of asylum application numbers, an additional aspect is considered, adjusting application numbers by the withdrawn applications during the same timeframe. This is done to identify the trend on how many asylum applicants left the respective country to pursue international protection in another Schengen country (secondary movements). For example, in Greece and Hungary, the measure of per capita asylum applications drops by around half for the former and over two-thirds for the latter if controlling for withdrawn asylum applications in 2015.

The following table shows the resulting calibration of this condition. Only countries above the thresholds in both measures of adjusted asylum applications in 2015 and the percentual change in refugee stock from 2014-2016 (y/n) will be designated as "major destination countries" (1), while the rest of the case population will be calibrated as "non-major destination countries" (0).

Table 5: calibration major destination countries

Country	Asylum applications	Refugee stock	Calibration
Austria	**y**	**y**	**1**
Belgium	y	n	0
Czechia	n	n	0
Denmark	**y**	**y**	**1**
France	n	n	0
Germany	**y**	**y**	**1**
Greece	n	y	0
Hungary	y	n	0
Italy	n	n	0
Netherlands	n	n	0
Norway	**y**	**y**	**1**
Poland	n	n	0
Slovakia	n	n	0
Slovenia	n	n	0
Sweden	**y**	**y**	**1**

5.2.2. Government partisanship

H2: At least center-right governments facilitated restrictive asylum policy introductions.

Two sources of data are used for the calibration of this condition, the Comparative Political Data Set" (CPDS) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) from 2014. In consideration of the timeframe for policy evaluation, general information about governments in office between mid-2015 until the end of 2016 is taken from the supplement of the CPDS (Armingeon et al., 2021a). Further, three strings of empirical data are used as criteria for the calibration to deepen the calibration of this condition. From the CPDS (Armingeon et al., 2021b) the indicator "gov_party" based on the Schmidt-Index is used to determine if any "left" parties, meaning social democratic parties and those to their left, are part of the government.

However, in some cases, this measure does not fully grasp a party's position on immigration and asylum because it focuses on economic issues to evaluate left-right ideological positions (Schmidt, 1996). To derive a more nuanced picture, CHES data is used to determine the overall ideological positions of government parties (LRGEN)[11] and their stance on immigration policies (IMMIGRATE_POLICY)[12] on a scale from 1 to 10. Regarding both, the value 5 represents an initial threshold to be considered as (at least) center-right parties respectively to have a restrictive stance on immigration policies. However, the qualitative calibration as a "right-government" (1) is guided by the triangulation of all three of these criteria and relies on their interpretation as well as the consideration of contextual factors in the individual case. It will therefore not apply the CPDS categorization, nor the CHES values mechanically. Further, government changes at the end of 2016 are not considered in context of the policy evaluation timeframe. The following table shows which countries are calibrated as "right-governments" (1) following the discussed conceptualization[13]. A detailed overview of the used data can be found in Appendix A.4.

Table 6: calibration government partisanship

Country	Calibration
Austria	0
Belgium	1
Czechia	0
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	0

[11] LRGEN = position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance. 0 = Extreme left: 5 = Center: 10 = Extreme right

[12] IMMIGRATE_POLICY = position on immigration policy. 0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration: 10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration

[13]Due to the very restrictive stance towards immigration by the Social Democratic in government in Slovakia (Smer-SD), Slovakia was calibrated as (1).

Netherlands	0
Norway	1
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	0
Sweden	0

5.2.3. Public preferences

H3: either public preferences or issue salience facilitate restrictive policy introductions on their independently.

Regarding the public opinion towards immigration and asylum issues, the Eurobarometer (EB) and the European Social Survey (ESS) can be considered the most detailed and frequent surveys available. Concerning the data availability for the case population, the EB (Norway missing) is used as the primary measure for both, public preferences and issue salience. However, in the case of Norway, the ESS (Denmark, Greece, Slovakia missing) is used as a substitute measure for public preferences. For the rest of the case population an item from the EB asking respondents if they agree with the statement, that their respective country should help refugees is used to capture public preferences for restrictive asylum policies in each country[14][15]. Using the EB 84.3[16], this data selection aims to assess public preferences around the peak of the refugee management crisis. The EB item comprises answer possibilities on a 1-5 Likert scale, ranging from the answer possibilities "totally agree" to "totally disagree", including the answer possibility "don't care". For the calibration of this condition, the rounded percentage aggregate of total "disagreement" ("totally disagree", "tend to disagree") is used to set a threshold, distinguishing countries with "significant restrictive preferences" (1) as "minor restrictive preferences" (0). Under the established assumption, that policymakers react

[14] qd11_6 - STATEMENTS: COUNTRY SHOULD HELP REFUGEES.

[15] The data is weighted to account for different sample sizes and therefore a straightforward comparison already in the source material.

[16] Fieldwork: 7/11 - 17/11/2015.

proactively if they fear a deterioration of public approval, roughly one-third as a minimum aggregate value for “disagreement” is chosen as the threshold, considering, that this represents a significant share of the population in context of electoral competition and its majority arithmetics. The subsequent calibration is illustrated in the following table.

Table 7: calibration public preferences

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	0
France	1
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	1
Netherlands	0
Norway	0
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	0

5.2.4. Issue salience

H4: a high level of issue salience transforms negative public preferences to significant public pressure, increasing the urgency to act for policymakers and subsequently pass restrictive asylum legislation.

Issue salience is operationalized through another survey item from the Eurobarometer, asking respondents to select the two most important issues their country is facing at the moment out of a wide range of 13 political issues, including immigration[17]. The timeframe of measurement respectively the selection of EB surveys is based on an initial review on how the salience of policy issues changed over time. While the percentage of people naming immigration as one of the two most important issues their country is facing increased quite significantly already from 2013 onwards, a steep increase between November 2014 (2014/02) to May 2015 (2015/1) and an even steeper increase between May and November of 2015 (2015/2), culminating in close to 60% of respondents identifying immigration as one of the two most important issues, is visible. As this project focuses on the peak of the refugee management from the late summer of 2015 onwards, and in consideration of the increase from below 40% to almost 60% from May to November, the data from the respective EB issues 83.3 (May) and 84.3. (November) will be used to assess the level and change of issue salience regarding immigration around the peak of the refugee management crisis. Subsequently, countries are either calibrated as "highly salient" (1) or "moderate/low saliency" (0)[18]. The resulting calibration is illustrated in the following table.

[17] QA3A, what do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?

[18] Unfortunately, in the case of Norway, there is no sensible measure for issue salience available. Here, the rise of polling numbers for the right-wing Progress Party from 12% at the end of May to 17% in December 2015 is used as a proxy for "highly salient" (1) during the refugee management crisis, also considering that all "major destination" countries identified earlier are above the threshold, indicating a similar effect for Norway.

Table 8: calibration issue salience

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	0
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	1
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Italy	0
Netherlands	1
Norway	1
Poland	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1

5.2.5. Immigration culture

H5: The external shock of large-scale immigration towards Europe during the refugee management crisis had a stronger effect on countries with minor than in those with prolonged immigration cultures, facilitating restrictive policy introductions.

The operationalization of this condition will be based on an additive measure combining the percentages of the non-EU foreign-born population (Eurostat, 2021b) and the Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2017) within the case population. The calibration will distinguish between “minor” (1) and “moderate/large immigration” cultures (0). For both measures, the same country group is identified. These findings align with the characterization of these four countries, also known as the Visegrad group, as countries with only recent immigration histories and very homogenous ethnic and cultural populations (Zaun, 2018), although the degree to which this country group deviates from the rest of the case population is quite remarkable, particularly concerning their very marginal shares of Muslim populations below 0,5% compared to the average of 4,9% in Europe. The following table illustrates the resulting calibration for this condition.

Table 9: calibration immigration culture

Country	Calibration
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	0
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	0
Netherlands	0
Norway	0
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	0
Sweden	0

5.2.6. Competitive policy diffusion

H6: Migratory movements throughout the Schengen Area created a certain degree of interdependency of policy decisions during the refugee management crisis, facilitating the competitive diffusion of similar policy instruments and therefore restrictive asylum policy introductions.

The operationalization of competitive diffusion dynamics is based on a specific diffusion pattern of temporarily reintroduced internal border controls in the Schengen Area, between the five major destination countries identified earlier. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Denmark successively introduced internal Schengen borders between September 2015 and January 2016 and continued this normally highly regulated measure limited to a maximum period of six months in case of major political summits, sports events or immediate terrorist threats etc. for several years with specific reference to migratory pressures (European Commission, n.d.). Pastore & Henry (2016) characterized this as an evident case of competitive diffusion, driven by the aim to not become a "dead end" for people seeking protection. Regarding the calibration of this condition, this pattern is intended as a proxy measure, designating every country included in this sustained diffusion pattern as "diffusion" (1) and all other countries as "no diffusion" (0) under the assumption, that this initial diffusion pattern indicates competitive diffusion across other asylum policy areas, which might be a further explanatory determinant for a variety of restrictive asylum policy decisions.

However, the alignment with the condition of major destination countries will tie these conditions together within the QCA. Nevertheless, the alignment of both conditions is of theoretical importance, as this diffusion pattern is likely caused by the high migratory inflow to these countries. The following table shows the subsequent calibration for the competitive policy diffusion condition.

Table 10: calibration competitive policy diffusion

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	0
Czechia	0
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	1
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Italy	0
Netherlands	0
Norway	1
Poland	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	0
Sweden	1

6. Results

The QCA is conducted through the Tosmana software (Cronquist, 2019), using the Quine–McCluskey algorithm. To pursue the analysis of the QCA results, it is important to briefly reiterate its methodological foundations and to discuss specific methodological choices (4.2.)

First, two specific methodological choices are made within this application of the QCA to identify the core group of causal relevant policy determinants. First, this concerns the threshold for consistency regarding the inclusion of sufficient conditions for the outcome in question, which is set at the level of 0.9. This means, that almost no contradictory cases are allowed in the establishment of a sufficient condition. Further, the analysis will focus on the parsimonious QCA solution, while the conservative solution will be considered if relevant for causal interpretation. Within the scope of this project, it is not sensible to reiterate the vast and controversial discussion among QCA scholars regarding the respective benefits and disadvantages in using the parsimonious or conservative solution[19]. In short, while the parsimonious solution might exclude relevant conditions through its strong minimization of the QCA solution, the conservative solution is in danger to include conditions without causal relevance (Thomann, 2020). Therefore, the parsimonious solution better represents the aim to identify a core group of meaningful policy determinants across the rather heterogenous case population.

Second, as the QCA is asymmetric, it is not only important to test for sufficient conditions for the presence (1) of the outcome but also its absence (0), because both might reveal relevant systematic cross-case relationships (Rubinson et al., 2019).

Lastly, as the shared group of cases for the condition major destination countries and competitive diffusion would lead to a duplicity of QCA solutions, they are merged to the condition m_dest_diff for the analysis.

The analysis will begin with the results for the presence of the outcome 'predominantly restrictive' asylum policies across the four outcome categories. Therefore, the following tables display the final truth table encompassing the calibration for each condition and outcome, followed by the QCA results.

[19]In light of this discussion the 'intermediate solution' was also developed, however, the parsimonious solution arguably remains the most sensible choice in the given research context.

Table 11: overview condition and outcome calibration

Country	m_dest_diff	partisan	preference	salience	i_cult	access_t	protection	i_deter	API_tot
Austria	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
Belgium	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Czech Republic	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Denmark	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
France	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Germany	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Italy	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Poland	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Sweden	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
Total (1)	**5**	**6**	**9**	**8**	**4**	**8**	**4**	**7**	**6**

Table 12: QCA results restrictive asylum policies (1).

	access_t	protection	i_deter	API_tot
Outcome (1): predominantly restrictive policy introductions				
Solution term	**M_DEST_DIFF + PARTISAN*i_cult**			
Implicant 1	M_DEST_DIFF			
Countries covered	Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway			
Consistency	1	-	1	1
Unique coverage	0,625	-	0,714	0,833
Implicant 2	PARTISAN*i_cult			
Countries covered	Belgium, Denmark, Norway			
Consistency	1	-	1	-
Unique coverage	0,375	-	0, 429	-

The table above represents the QCA results (sufficient conditions) for each asylum policy category and their aggregate (API_tot), testing the relationship between the established policy determinants and the presence of predominantly restrictive asylum policy introductions. The results contain an overall solution term for the QCA (highlighted) combining all relevant implicants, and therefore individual sufficient conditions within the overall solution term. The common consistency value of 1 illustrates, that no contradictory case, sharing the same condition (-s) but having a different outcome, exists across the QCA results. Concerning the QCA terminology, the existence of multiple implicants is illustrated by the logical "or" (+) while configurational causality, meaning that a specific combination of conditions leads to the outcome, is illustrated by the logical "and" (*). Lastly, the systematic presence (1) of conditions is illustrated by uppercase and their absence by lowercase letters (0).

The results illustrate an acknowledged problem within the application of the QCA in the overlap of cases covered by the individual implicants and therefore different theoretical explanations. Here, Denmark and Norway are part of both sufficient implicants M_DEST_DIFF and PARTISAN*i_cult. The best strategy to deal with this issue is their interpretation based on theoretical and empirical case knowledge in combination with the use of the QCA quality measure unique coverage, which illustrates to which degree each implicant individually explains the outcome in question (Rubinson et al., 2019).

Reflecting on this issue, the solution term M_DEST_DIFF combining the status as major destination countries and the proxy for competitive diffusion dynamics in the (continued) temporarily reintroduced internal border controls can be identified as the more meaningful causal relationship. First, this conclusion draws from existing empirical evidence. In particular, the cases of Denmark and Norway have been scrutinized by comparative case studies introduced during the literature review (Hernes, 2018; Hagelund, 2020). Although they concluded that the ideology of the Danish government contributed to the level of restrictiveness regarding introduced policies, their main conclusion was, that regulatory competition driven by high migratory pressures became the main objective behind a variety of restrictive policy introductions during the refugee management crisis in Denmark and Norway (as well as Sweden). Therefore, these findings indicate, that migratory pressures and regulatory competition can be seen as main causal factors behind restrictive policy introductions in both countries.

In light of these findings as well as the high coverage scores of the sufficient condition M_DEST_DIFF across all three outcomes it explains[20], this condition is deemed as the considerably more meaningful explanation with a reasonable degree of confidence. In addition, under the assumption, that M_DEST_DIFF presents a more valid sufficient condition regarding Denmark and Norway, the case of Belgium would not pose a sufficient causal explanation through the comparative approach of the QCA. In conclusion, the combination of a major destination country status and competitive diffusion dynamics regarding the reintroduction of internal border controls represents a strong typology encompassing high coverage values and therefore explains the majority of outcomes deemed as predominantly restrictive across all but one outcome category (accessibility international protection).

To further enrich this conclusion, the following will scrutinize the diffusion of policies across the other asylum policy areas in this country group and particularly within the category of indirect deterrence. For this aim, a similar approach to Hernes' (2018) will be applied, assessing types of similar policy instruments as well as their specific setting. The aim behind this is to expand the scope of this study concerned with the convergence of a particular set of indirect deterrence policies across the three Scandinavian countries by putting additional scrutiny on Austria and Germany. Before this, it should be noted, that within the category of accessibility of international protection, no specific pattern of converging policies can be identified regarding the five countries covered by M_DEST_DIFF, although a variety of Schengen countries made restrictive changes concerning the extent of their safe country of origin definitions. Concerning indirect deterrence measures, the following table summarizes similar policy instruments adopted within the five countries regarding the duration of residence permits, social benefits and family reunification rights.

[20]Here, it should be mentioned, that the proxy for competitive diffusion, the continued pattern of reintroduced internal border controls, is naturally part of the restrictive policies/outcomes identified in the outcome access to territory. However, due to the fact, that this outcome was calibrated on the question if or if not, policies restricting the access to the own territory were introduced, this does not pose an issue for causal inference.

Table 13: indirect deterrence policies 2015-16

Policy type	Austria	Denmark	Germany	Norway	Sweden
Residence permits	From unlimited to 3 years (refugees)	Reduced from 5 to 3 years (refugees), from 5 to 1 year (subsidiary protection)			From unlimited to 3 years (refugees), 13 months (subsidiary protection)
Social benefits		Seizure belongings to cover costs, reduced financial allowances (both for asylum seekers)		10-20% reduction allowances for asylum seekers	
Family reunification	Timeframe application reduced to 3 months (refugees, subsidiary protection), proof of sufficient means (subsidiary protection)	Application can only be made after 3 years of residence instead of 1 (subsidiary protection)	Suspended for 2 years (subsidiary protection)	24-year age requirement, grounds for rejection if family 'has stronger ties' in safe third country (refugees, subsidiary protection)	3-month limit to apply without material requirements (refugees), suspension of family reunification (subsidiary protection)

As illustrated in the table, it is important to note, that indirect deterrence/welfare policies often discriminate between different types of international protection regarding the extent of benefits and rights provided[21]. The table illustrates that the majority of countries curtailed the rights to family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection quite drastically. While Germany and Sweden[22] (temporarily) suspended these rights completely, Denmark and Austria limited the access to family reunification by establishing practical barriers in terms of requiring a prolonged time of residence or sufficient financial means. In the case of Norway, the introduced restrictions for both, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, are rather difficult to interpret concerning their restrictiveness in practice. Further, Austria, Denmark and Sweden all limited the duration of residence permits for refugees to 3 years, while the latter two reduced the duration for beneficiaries of subsidiary to around 1 year.

[21] The status as a refugee is only granted in case of a justified fear of persecution in the country of origin based on race, religion, public opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Furthermore, there are various forms of subsidiary protection, which usually provide fewer rights and can be granted on grounds of an individual risk of serious harm tied to internal conflict or widespread practices of torture and inhumane treatment in the country of origin.

[22]The restrictive policy changes in Sweden were largely based on the Temporary Aliens Act (2016), which had the specific aim to transition Sweden's asylum from the most welcoming in Europe to the EU minimum standards for a period of 3 years, which was later extended until 2021 (Emilsson, 2020)

Additionally, Norway and Denmark employed social benefit cuts toward asylum seekers. Here, the rather infamous 'jewelry law' enabling Danish authorities to seize the belongings of asylum seekers to cover the cost of their stay (Hernes, 2018) stands out in particular, as it represents one of the most restrictive policy introductions during the crisis in general. In sum, a certain degree of convergence between the introduced indirect deterrence policies can be identified, particularly regarding restrictions on family reunification and residence permits. Also based on these insights, the following will draw back to the established hypotheses concerning the status as major destination countries and competitive policy diffusion. For this aim, H1 and H6 are displayed below.

H1: The status as major destination countries during the refugee management crisis facilitated restrictive asylum policy introductions.

H6: Migratory movements throughout the Schengen Area created a certain degree of interdependency of policy decisions during the refugee management crisis, facilitating the competitive diffusion of similar policy instruments and therefore restrictive asylum policy introductions.

Concerning the underlying logic for causal inference within the QCA method, the major destination country and the competitive diffusion condition would yield equally valid individual sufficient conditions, as they share the same country group. However, there is an evident interaction effect between the two, as common migratory pressures are hypothesized to trigger the (perceived) need for policy reactions. This is based on the fear, that migratory pressures will be diverted to the own territory if others 'successfully' restrict or deter asylum seekers from pursuing international protection in their country (Blatter et al. 2021). But while overarching migratory pressures can be seen as the root cause for competitive diffusion dynamics, their perception as a policy problem is significantly affected by the structural interdependency of asylum policymaking in the Schengen Area in face of significant secondary movements, due to the proximity of European countries, the principle of free movement within the Schengen Area and the harmonization of a baseline regarding rules and practices through the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) . Therefore, rather than a linear cause and effect relationship between the two, their interaction can rather be seen as reciprocal and their causal explanation for restrictive asylum policy introduction as configurational, meaning both policy determinants contribute to the outcome, in line with one of the basic principles of the QCA (configurational causality).

Regarding the hypotheses, H1 is confirmed, as the major destination status can be considered as the core element of the sufficient condition M_DEST_DIFF. Concerning the condition of competitive policy diffusion, H6 can rather be considered partially confirmed. While it is not farfetched to argue, that the common membership in the Schengen Area and secondary movements within it caused a certain degree of interdependency regarding (national) asylum policymaking in Europe, there is less convergence regarding similar policy instruments concerning indirect deterrence policies as with the common (continued) temporarily reintroduced internal border controls in the Schengen Area used to operationalize the competitive diffusion condition. Although some policy decisions are characterized through a similar objective in the category of indirect deterrence (e.g., the common restriction of family reunification rights), it can be argued, that rather than a diffusion of specific policy instruments, the variety of indirect deterrence policies within the five countries can rather be seen as a diffusion of policy goals (Hernes, 2018). In this vein, the competitive dynamics among this country group can be characterized through a 'dual strategy', on the one hand preventing the access of asylum seekers to the own territory through the reintroduction of internal border controls and to deter people from seeking protection in the own country by reducing the rights and benefits of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection on the other hand (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017).

Concerning the absence of predominantly restrictive policy introductions during the refugee management crisis, the QCA also established the sufficient condition m_dest_diff*partisan*i_cult regarding the outcomes of access to territory and indirect deterrence, encompassing the country group of Greece, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Slovenia.

Table 14: QCA results for the absence of restrictive asylum policies (0).

	access_t	protection	i_deter	API_tot
Outcome (0): moderate/minor restrictive policy introductions				
Solution term	**m_dest_diff*partisan*i_cult**			
Countries covered	Greece, Netherlands, France, Italy, Slovenia			
Consistency	1	-	1	-
(raw) coverage	0,714	-	0,625	-
Outcome (0), not part of solution	Poland, Slovakia		Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia	

Interpreting the established sufficient condition m_dest_diff*partisan*i_cult, the inclusion of the systematic absence concerning the major destination status/competitive diffusion condition (m_dest_diff) is a rather evident, as it yielded a significant explanation for restrictive policy introductions. But it further exemplifies the importance of migratory pressures in explaining if countries resorted to restrictive asylum policies during the refugee management crisis. Further, the absence of an at least exclusively center-right government (partisan) and the presence of an at least moderate immigration culture (i_cult) were also part of this sufficient condition explaining the absence of predominantly restrictive asylum policy introductions for the asylum policy categories access to territory and indirect deterrence to a quite significant degree looking at the respective coverage scores[23]. However, the theoretical depth of this sufficient condition is considerably lower compared to the sufficient condition explaining the presence of restrictive policies (M_DEST_DIFF), where the connection between migratory pressures, competitive diffusion and restrictive asylum policies established by the QCA was reiterated through substantive theory and empirical findings on cases included in it. Nevertheless, this sufficient condition should not be disregarded but rather be further scrutinized, as the QCA established a strong initial empirical connection to the absence of restrictive policy introductions. Further, another conclusion can be drawn based on these

[23]Due to a variety of sufficient conditions established for the outcome API_tot, an interpretation of the existing sufficient conditions for this group was not sensible despite the alignment of this country group with the absence of the outcome.

results. Since testing explicitly for sufficient conditions for the absence of restrictive asylum policies, this implicates that the presence of a at least center-right government (H2) and/or minor immigration cultures (H5) did yield an effect in some countries. For example, Hungary would fulfill both criteria and is among one of the countries registering for the most restrictive policy introductions across asylum policy categories (see section 4.3.).

In relation to this, a look at those Eastern European countries sharing the absence of predominantly restrictive policy introductions (0) and are not part of the sufficient condition is quite interesting. It seems to support the conclusion of several case studies established in the literature review, that the vocal and largely xenophobic common opposition to a supranational relocation scheme among the Visegrad group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) does not necessarily reflect their national policy decisions.

Further reflecting on the theoretical concepts put forward for the QCA, it is noticeable, that public opinion effects did not yield any cross-case relationship during the analysis. For the area of public opinion, the concepts of public preferences and issue salience were established as potential causal explanations behind the presence or absence of restrictive asylum policy introductions, formulating the following two hypotheses accounting for the possibility of an individual or configurational causal explanation of these concepts.

H3: either public preferences or issue salience facilitate restrictive policy introductions independently.

H4: a high level of issue salience transforms negative public preferences to significant public pressure, increasing the urgency to act for policymakers and subsequently pass restrictive asylum legislation.

The conclusion, that public opinion effects did not yield any relevancy within the QCA results is particularly interesting in context of understanding the refugee management crisis as a focusing event. As introduced earlier, a focusing event is understood to significantly affect public opinion, and especially the salience of issues, therefore politicizing a certain issue within the national discourse to a degree that can hardly be ignored by policymakers (Birkland, 1997). While the assumed effect of focusing events on public opinion can be observed regarding the refugee management crisis based on the survey data used in this project, showing increasing negative public preferences towards refugees and high levels as well as a stark rise in issue salience (Appendix A.3.), the absence of an evident effect on policymaking within the QCA results is quite puzzling. Especially considering, that public opinion effects are often a key element of studies concerned with the determinants of immigration policy decisions and yielded a relevant causal explanation for restrictive immigration policies in several empirical findings (Givens & Luedtke, 2005, Hatton, 2017b). Here, a potential explanation for the absence of public opinion effects uncovered by the QCA might lie in its need for dichotomization, as it could be argued that quantitative research designs based on correlation might be better able to identify the trends and nuances of public opinion data. The following conclusion will summarize and discuss the results of this project.

7. Conclusion

The conclusion will summarize the results of the QCA and discuss the strengths and limitations of these findings.

The basic interest of this project was to explore if the presence or absence of restrictive policy reactions to the refugee management crisis among the 15 Schengen countries selected can be systematically explained by a total of six policy determinants and therefore individual theoretical concepts. Here, the specific aim was to derive distinct typologies representing a systematic relationship between these policy determinants and the (non-) introduction of restrictive asylum policies across three distinct policy categories. The QCA identified two distinct typologies, which both included 5 out of the total 15 countries, whereas each typology either posed an explanation of the presence or absence of restrictive policy reactions to the refugee management crisis. Therefore, these two typologies potentially explain the reactions of 10 out of the 15 Schengen countries selected within this project, mainly in two asylum policy categories. However, as discussed earlier, the theoretical depth behind them differs, which should be reflected upon viewing these results.

The first typology (M_DEST_DIFF) includes Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden. It concluded that the status as major destination countries combined with competitive policy diffusion dynamics[24] posed an explanation for a substantial share of those countries evaluated as predominantly restrictive (per asylum policy category). These three policy

[24]Operationalized through the proxy of the pattern of continued reintroduced internal border controls in the Schengen Area regarded as an evident case of policy diffusion (see 5.2.6.)

categories encompass (1) access to territory, (2) accessibility of international protection and (3) indirect deterrence policies.

In sum, this typology explains 62,5% (5/8) of cases/countries significantly restricting the access to their territory through enhanced border controls/fences and 71,4% (5/7) of cases introducing policies significantly reducing rights and benefits to deter people from seeking international protection in their country. Further, if evaluating the total of measures introduced across policy categories to derive a more comprehensive picture on how countries reacted to the refugee management crisis, 83,3% (5/6) of cases with predominantly restrictive asylum policy introductions are covered. Therefore, this typology comprising major destination countries and (prevalent) competitive diffusion dynamics explains a large share of restrictive policy reactions to the refugee management crisis. Through the individual evaluation of indirect deterrence policies, an additional conclusion can be drawn. Although there is a certain degree of convergence regarding some policy types (e.g., restrictions on family reunification rights), the extent of different policy instruments introduced rather indicates a diffusion of the goal to indirectly deter people seeking international protection rather than a diffusion of specific policy instruments as with the reintroduction of internal border controls.

In this vein, it can be stated, that these countries mainly pursued a ‘dual strategy to limit the access to their territory and deter people from seeking international protection at their country. The degree of confidence in this typology and its underlying relationship between high migratory pressures and competitive policy dynamics is high, stemming from robust QCA results, a strong theoretical foundation, and case study findings available for the Scandinavian countries

The second typology (m_dest_diff*partisan*i_cult) includes Greece, Netherlands, France, Italy, and Slovenia. It concludes that non-major destination countries without at least center-right governments and (at least) moderate immigration cultures did not introduce predominantly restrictive policies regarding the access to their territory and indirect deterrence policies. Albeit the fact, that it explains a significant number of cases without restrictive asylum policy reactions, it does not possess the theoretical and empirical depth as the sufficient condition for the introduction of restrictive policies.

This touches upon an issue regularly discussed in critiques of the QCA method, the possibility of false positives and negatives through the stark empirical focus on (dichotomized) case commonalities and differences (Hug, 2017). In this vein, the strength of the sufficient condition m_dest_diff*partisan*i_cult in explaining the absence of restrictive policy introductions in empirical terms is questioned by a missing theoretical connection between the individual policy determinants included. Here, it cannot be ruled out with high confidence, that this sufficient condition and its connection to policy outcomes represents a random empirical overlap between country characteristics. Therefore, this sufficient condition is viewed with caution regarding this project, as the best general strategy to deal with QCA results that seem to miss theoretical linkages is to pursue them through a qualitative case study methodology (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). However, since testing for the absence of restrictive asylum policy introductions, an evident conclusion is, that partisanship and immigration culture did align with restrictive policy decisions in some cases.

Ultimately, this project was able to confirm and empirically expand the conclusion of prior studies, that particularly high migratory pressures (major destination countries) in combination with competitive diffusion dynamics can be seen as the major driver for restrictive policy reactions to the refugee management crisis among the group of 15 Schengen countries scrutinized. Regarding the definition of the crisis as a focusing event, it is a surprising conclusion, that the QCA did not find any relevant connection between public opinion effects and policy introductions, despite a stark increase in issue salience. The QCA has proven to be a valuable tool to systematically scrutinize a variety of theoretical concepts and their linkages to specific policy outcomes. However, the possible limitations of causal inferences purely based on (dichotomous) case commonalities and differences should be reflected on carefully when conducting the QCA, as empirical insights should always be accompanied by a certain degree of theoretical depth.

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Appendix

A.1. Overview EU legislation 2014

EU Legislation

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was established in 2003. It consists of:

Dublin Regulation (604/2013) – Establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examination of an asylum application. Generally, an asylum-seeker must register and go through the asylum process where they entered the EU and remain in that country until a determination has been made (predecessors: Dublin I, 2000; Dublin II 2003).

EURODAC Regulation (603/2013) (recast took effect July 2015) – Fingerprinting to determine in which EU member state an asylumseeker arrived.

Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) – Defines 'refugee' and provides for 'subsidiary protection'. Establishes common grounds to grant refugee or subsidiary protection status. (Third-country nationals may also be granted asylum status on humanitarian grounds, but it is not a matter for EU law for this is a national determination as defined in member state legislation.)

Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) (recast took effect July 2015) – Attempts to standardize rules and cut down on asylum shopping. The rules include such detail as providing access to employment for an asylum-seeker within nine months.

Asylum Procedure Directive (2013/32/EU) (recast took effect July 2015) – Establishes common procedures for granting and withdrawing asylum status.

(Buonanno, 2017).

A.2. Search terms comprehensive google scholar search

Refugee crisis

- refugee crisis policy
- refugee crisis policy determinants
- refugee crisis policy change

- *Control search*: refugee crisis Europe

Migration crisis

- Migration crisis Europe policy
- Migration crisis Europe policy determinant
- Migration crisis Europe policy change

- *Control search*: refugee crisis Europe

Per country

- refugee crisis policy (country)

- migration crisis policy (country)

A.3. Detailed calibration overview QCA conditions (policy determinants)

Calibration principles

Concerning the calibration within the QCA, scholars very generally emphasize, that the dichotomization of conditions/outcomes should be based on a combination of "theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 32). In this vein, the calibration of conditions and outcomes is defined as a "half-conceptual, half-empirical process" (Greckhammer, 2018, p. 7) where substantial empirical and/or theoretical knowledge external to the data is used to derive meaningful qualitative anchors for the dichotomization across the case population (Greckhammer, 2018; Berg-Schlosser, 2018).

Two basic general conceptual considerations should be undertaken concerning the translation of priorly established concepts into a threshold for dichotomization. Firstly, to define which variances in the data sample constitutes a meaningful difference regarding the underlying concept applied and its hypothesized consequences (Misangy et al., 2017).

Regarding the calibration of conditions, interval-scale data is a particular challenge. Here, the problem in dealing with interval-scale data using the QCA, and that a not insignificant number of QCA studies apply statistical measures such as the mean or median a rather "mechanical" and therefore problematic fashion, is widely acknowledged by QCA scholars (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007, Chapter 3). Ultimately, this issue cannot be "solved" as qualitative thresholds for the dichotomization of interval-scale data naturally include a certain degree of "arbitrariness" (Berg-Schlosser, 2018). It is therefore important to put forward a clear and transparent calibration strategy aiming to mitigate these issues, mainly through the prior theoretical and/or substantive empirical knowledge about the field respectively specific cases (Schneider & Wagemmann, 2012), resulting in a strong conceptual foundation for data calibration. In any case a purely "mechanical" use of statistical measures should be avoided as this likely places cases with similar values into different set memberships and further undermines the necessary conceptual depth the calibration of QCA conditions should entail, especially in context of the need for dichotomization (Schneider & Wagemmann, 2012; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).

Baring this in mind, the contextuality of the data calibration lies at the core of the chosen strategy, as the specific meaning of concepts, and the subsequent assignment of set memberships (1/0), is highly dependent on the research context (Ragin, 2008). For example, if one would attempt to identify "rich countries" within a dichotomization based on GDP data, Hungary would not qualify in the European context but do so from a global perspective (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, Chapter 1.2.). Therefore, the relationship between externally derived conceptualizations and the data distribution across the selected case population should be viewed as dialectical and calibration as a process to translate these conceptual expectations into meaningful thresholds within the population of cases. In this project, the conceptual foundation for conditions is largely derived from previous scientific contributions on determining factors for restrictive immigration and asylum policies, which can be of theoretical and empirical nature in principle but are mostly a result of the empirical testing of theorized concepts, either in quantitative or qualitative studies. Another source for conceptualization is contextual empirical knowledge about the case population. Ultimately, the calibration strategy is based on two pillars aimed to mitigate the issue of calibrating interval-scale data within the QCA.

1. Assuring the conceptual quality of the data input for each condition regarding the hypothesized causal relationship. This entails a careful reflection on underlying causal assumptions and different data sources available. Further, it might be sensible to combine different strings of empirical data to fully capture the targeted concept, using additive measures within the same condition (Emmenegger, 2011).

2. Although this project also relies on drop-off points/natural breaks within data and uses the guidance of the median in the assessment of data across the country population, as the majority of QCA studies do if confronted with interval-scale data, this approach should be undertaken in a transparent and systematic fashion wherever possible. This aim results in a primary and a secondary calibration approach.

Primary: if possible, data drop-offs/natural breaks in data can be justifiably assigned to the conceptual considerations for the condition in question.

Secondary: If confronted with a blurrier picture regarding the distribution of data, the median is used to identify the most sensible drop-off point above or below. Here, mean values and the standard deviation can be considered as additional guidance if necessary.

Major destination countries

This condition aims to identify a core group of "major destination countries" during the refugee management crisis. While asylum applications seem to be a rather straightforward causal factor at first glance, its conceptualization in the research context requires a nuanced approach. To distinguish "major destination countries" (1) from "non-major destination countries" (0), this condition will use an additive measure, combining asylum application numbers with the change of refugee stock as a controlling measure.

Here, the conceptualization and operationalization of asylum application numbers needs to be considered carefully within the research context. In previous quantitative policy determinant studies, totals of annual asylum applications have been used for operationalization (Hatton, 2004; Han, 2013) but two specific adjustments should be made regarding the research context and the QCA method.

First, this concerns the translation of this measure from correlation-based statistics to the set-theoretic logic of the QCA. Here, while for almost all countries application numbers increased significantly in percentual terms due to the vast increase of people seeking protection in Europe, the comparison of application numbers in relation to the respective country population represents a more accurate picture of the migratory pressures in each country.

Second, in consideration of the specific nature of secondary movements during the refugee management crisis, it is arguably more sensible to apply a measure that adjusts application totals in context of withdrawn applications during the same timeframe. This is due to the empirical conclusion, that the country where the first asylum application is filed can often be considered rather as a "transit" than a "destination" country, often tied to its geographic position around the border of the EU respectively Schengen area. This dynamic was further facilitated by the de-facto breakdown of the Dublin system at the peak of the refugee crisis (Zaun, 2018;). For example, in Greece and Hungary the measure of per capita asylum applications drops by around half for the former and over two thirds for the latter if controlling for withdrawn asylum applications in 2015. Here, the vast majority are implicit withdrawals, where applications are determined as abandoned because authorities are no longer able to locate the asylum seeker, and which can therefore be considered as a valid proxy for secondary movements towards other countries. In line with the established timeframes of measurement (3.2.) the following table depicts the adjusted asylum application per million of the population in 2015[25].

Adjusted asylum applications per million of the population in 2015:

Country	Total applications	Withdrawn applications	Adjusted application totals	Adjusted applications p/m of the population
Sweden	162.450	9.090	153.360	**15.733**
Austria	88.160	7.840	80.320	**9.356**
Hungary	177.135	103.015	74.120	**7.521**
Norway	31.115	360	30.755	**5.953**
Germany	476.510	14.535	461.975	**5.690**
Belgium	44.665	1.320	43.345	**3.857**
Denmark	20.935	1.730	19.205	**3.393**
Netherlands	44.970	910	44.060	**2.607**
Italy	83.540	6.750	76.790	**1.263**
France	76.165	690	75.475	**1.136**
Greece	13.205	6.255	6.950	**640**
Czechia	1.515	125	1.390	**132**
Slovenia	275	90	185	**90**
Poland	12.190	9.360	2.830	**74**
Slovakia	330	125	205	**38**
Median	**44.665**	**1.730**	**43.345**	**2.607**
Mean	**82.211**	**10.813**	**71.398**	**3.832**

[25]Two things should be acknowledged regarding the data for this measure. First, it represents a trend measure, as during the same timeframe of measurement (2015) the independent numbers of total applications and withdrawn applications naturally do not completely align. Second, for data coherence concerning the withdrawn applications, the total of asylum applications (including appeals etc.) is used, however these numbers do not differ significantly from the first-time applications in 2015.

Standard deviation	**118.251**	**25.023**	**112.311**		**4.287**

Source: Eurostat (migr_asyappctza, migr_asywitha, demo_pjan).

Scrutinizing the distribution of adjusted asylum applications p/m of the population, it becomes evident, that the inflow of people seeking protection highly varies within the case population. Especially if comparing the group of Eastern European countries at the bottom of the table to the country group above the median, it would be not farfetched to argue, that the former was only minorly affected in light of the scale of people entering Europe in need of international protection. However, the dichotomization of this data is more challenging. It is visible that the median value (Netherlands, yellow) is subordinated in the middle of a rather evident drop-off point in the data between Denmark and Italy. This gap arguably represents a sensible distinction between major destination countries and countries with a low or moderate inflow of asylum seekers considering the aim to identify a threshold for the expected effect in set-theoretic terms and not to measure the "net effect" to which degree more of X leads to more Y. Taking into account the aim to identify countries with a particularly high migratory pressure and the mean of the data distribution, the Netherlands, subordinated within this gap, will not be considered for the classification as a major destination country, setting the threshold for Denmark (red). Interestingly, the main entry points of the Central and Eastern Mediterranean route (Italy and Greece) fall below the threshold consistent with their description as transit rather than destination countries (Zaun, 2017), while Hungary, positioned at the main point of (re-) entry to the Schengen area through the Balkan route, registers the third highest application numbers despite over 100.000 withdrawn applications (58%).

To derive a more accurate picture on which countries can be classified as major destination countries, the increase of refugee stock during the refugee management crisis will be considered as well, aiming to control application numbers with the degree to which each country's refugee population actually increased during the crisis[26]. Examples for the application of this measure can be found in a quantitative policy determinant study on asylum policies by Han (2013), as a control variable, and in Guerin's (2018) QCA study interested in determining factors for the alignment with European asylum policies regarding countries of the European Neighborhood Policy. While Guerin used per capita shares of refugee stock to measure levels

[26]This measure includes people in refugee like situations and therefore also subsidiary protection statuses.

of “migratory pressure”, it will be operationalized as the percentage change in refugee stock totals between of the years 2014 and 2016 in accordance with the research context. This timeframe of measurement takes into account, that the asylum application process usually takes up to several months and that the majority of asylum applicants around the peak of the refugee management crisis in Autumn 2015 would subsequently be granted international protection in 2016. As refugee stock is a cumulative measure, refugees recognized in 2015 are included as well. The following table illustrates the change in refugee stock from 2014 to 2016 as percentage of the overall population.

Percentage change refugee stock from 2014 to 2016.

Country	2014 refugee stock	% refugee Stock 2014	2016 refugee Stock	% refugee Stock 2016	2014 to 2016 % Change
Sweden	142.197	1,46%	230.158,00	2,30%	**0,84%**
Germany	216.956	0,27%	669.468,00	0,81%	**0,54%**
Austria	60.724	0,71%	93.242,00	1,06%	**0,36%**
Greece	10.292	0,09%	46.411,00	0,43%	**0,34%**
Denmark	17.767	0,31%	33.501,00	0,58%	**0,27%**
Norway	47.025	0,91%	59.512,00	1,13%	**0,22%**
Belgium	29.170	0,26%	42.158,00	0,37%	**0,11%**
Netherlands	82.483	0,49%	101.727,00	0,60%	**0,11%**
Italy	93.712	0,15%	147.362,00	0,24%	**0,09%**
France	252.248	0,38%	304.527,00	0,46%	**0,08%**
Hungary	2.854	0,03%	4.736,00	0,05%	**0,02%**
Slovenia	251	0,01%	454,00	0,02%	**0,01%**
Czechia	3.129	0,03%	3.640,00	0,03%	**0,00%**
Slovakia	791	0,01%	980,00	0,02%	**0,00%**
Poland	15.730	0,04%	11.738,00	0,03%	**-0,01%**
Median	**29.170**	**0,26%**	**46.411,00**	**0,43%**	**0,11%**
Mean	**65.022**	**0,34%**	**116.640,93**	**0,54%**	**0,20%**
Standard deviation	**77.685**	**0,39%**	**171.142,85**	**0,59%**	**0,23%**

Source: UNHCR (Refugees, including people in refugee-like situation); Eurostat (demo_pjan).

Similar to the measurement of adjusted asylum applications, the change of refugee stock displays a significant variance across the case population. Guided by the median and in consideration of the mean, the threshold (red) is set at Norway, based on the twofold increase from the median value (Netherlands, Belgium). Considering the research context, the case population can be roughly distinguished into three tiers. The country group showing a particularly high change in refugee stock (Norway-Sweden), a mid-tier with a comparatively moderate increase (France-Belgium) and a third country group with only marginal changes (Poland-Hungary).

While the classification of countries mostly aligns for the measures of adjusted asylum applications in 2015 and the percentage change in refugee stock between 2014-16, it is important to reflect on those cases showing evident differences between the two measures to retain conceptual soundness in the calibration of this additive condition.

Here, Hungary is the most drastic example, showing the third-highest value of adjusted asylum applications on the one hand but being subordinated within the country group displaying only marginal changes in refugee stock on the other. This discrepancy can be explained by the delayed effect of the decision by a "coalition of the willing"[27] led by Germany to take in large numbers of asylum seekers stuck in Hungary, often suffering unbearable conditions in reception facilities. Partially, this was practiced already in August but formalized through an agreement between Angela Merkel and Victor Orban at the begin of September 2015 (Weber, 2016). The further review of monthly application and withdrawal data shows, that the adjusted application data of 2015 does not fully capture this effect. Hungary experienced a stark drop of total asylum applications from their high peak in August to a very marginal level since October 2015, while the monthly numbers of withdrawn applications continued to be very high throughout the beginning of 2016. In fact, looking at the adjusted asylum application data for 2016 only, Hungary is the only country with a negative balance, a high minus of 1.579 per million of the population[28]. Therefore, the determination of Hungary as a non-major destination below can be empirically justified.

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[27] Mainly Germany, Austria, Scandinavian and Benelux countries but the direct transit of asylum seekers from Hungary first to Germany and Austria.

[28] The converse effect is visible in Germany, which registered even more asylum applications in 2016. This can, at least partially, be explained by the lag between the arrival and the filing of a subsequent asylum application by asylum seekers from Hungary (PEW, 2017), supported by high monthly application numbers in the first months

Conversely, Greece ranks significantly higher in refugee stock change compared to the adjusted asylum applications measure. This is due to vastly higher application numbers in 2016, where monthly numbers spike in the second half of the year. As introduced earlier, due to the definition of the peak of the refugee crisis as a focused event and the lengthy nature legislative processes, it is assumed, that the inflow of people seeking protection in the second half of 2015 is mainly determining policy adoptions between the second half of 2015 and the end of 2016, the timeframe set for policy evaluation. Although policy decisions influenced by the increase of application numbers in Greece, especially those of ad-hoc nature (decrees etc.), cannot be completely ruled out, the effect is considered to be limited in the research context[29].

Lastly, it should be acknowledged that Belgium especially but also the Netherlands represent "close calls" because of the necessary parsimony within the dichotomous QCA calibration, as those countries evolve around the thresholds in both measures, with Belgium even above the threshold of adjusted asylum applications. Nevertheless, the significant data drop-off following the threshold set for the change of refugee stock is arguably a sensible reason to for the exclusion of both countries regarding the aim to determine the core group of major destination countries with particularly high migratory pressures during the refugee management crisis.

The following table shows the resulting calibration of this condition. Only countries above the thresholds in both measures of adjusted asylum applications in 2015 and the percentual change in refugee stock from 2014-2016 (y/n) will be designated as "major destination countries" (1), while rest of the case population will calibrated as "non-major destination countries" (0).

of 2016. As a consequence of its high 2016 application numbers, Germany records the second-highest change in refugee stock while only the fifth-highest adjusted asylum applications in 2015.

[29] Further, the QCA method is limited regarding the analysis of the dynamic aspects of the policy process and its evolution over time (Thomann, 2020, 6).

Calibration major destination countries

Country	Asylum applications	Refugee stock	Calibration
Austria	**y**	**y**	**1**
Belgium	y	n	0
Czechia	n	n	0
Denmark	**y**	**y**	**1**
France	n	n	0
Germany	**y**	**y**	**1**
Greece	n	y	0
Hungary	y	n	0
Italy	n	n	0
Netherlands	n	n	0
Norway	**y**	**y**	**1**
Poland	n	n	0
Slovakia	n	n	0
Slovenia	n	n	0
Sweden	**y**	**y**	**1**

Government partisanship

For the cs/QCA analysis, the conceptualization and coding of government partisanship will use exclusively center-right governments as a cut-off point, for the presence/absence of a "right government" (1/0). This decision is based on the empirical conclusion, that center-right parties can be considered as a major driver of restrictive asylum policies in Europe in both, exclusively center-right or coalition governments with right-wing parties (Bale, 2008; Akkermann, 2012), although this represents a (necessary) generalization regarding the complexity of the political party spectrum. Two sources of data are used for the calibration, the Comparative Political Data Set" (CPDS) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2014. In consideration of the timeframe for policy evaluation, general information about governments in office between mid-2015 until the end of 2016 is taken from the supplement of the CPDS (Armingeon et al., 2021a). Three strings of empirical data are used as criteria for the calibration.

From the CPDS (Armingeon et al., 2021b) the indicator “gov_party” based on the Schmidt-Index is used to determine if any “left” parties, meaning social democratic parties and those to their left, are part of the government. However, in some cases this measure does not fully grasp a party’s position on immigration and asylum because it focuses on economic issues to evaluate left-right ideological positions (Schmidt, 1996). To derive a more nuanced picture, CHES data is used to determine the overall ideological positions of government parties (LRGEN)[30] and their stance on immigration policies (IMMIGRATE_POLICY)[31] on a scale from 1 to 10. Regarding both, the value 5 represents an initial threshold to be considered as (at least) center-right parties respectively to have a restrictive stance on immigration policies. However, the qualitative calibration as a “right-government” (1) is guided by the triangulation of all three of these criteria and relies on their interpretation as well as the consideration of contextual factors in the individual case. It will therefore not apply the CPDS categorization, nor the CHES values mechanically. Further, government changes at the end of 2016 are not considered in context of the policy evaluation timeframe.

Due to the extent of information per country, the following table only depicts those cases calibrated as “right-governments” (1). All relevant information used for the calibration is illustrated.

Regarding the calibration of “right-governments” (1) a few remarks should be made. For Hungary and Belgium, the calibration based on the established criteria is quite clear. Both countries have no “left” parties in government according to the CPDS definition and governing parties, respectively the aggregate of the Belgian government coalition, adjusted by parliamentary seats, score considerably above 5 concerning their overall ideological position and their favoring of restrictive immigration policies. Subsequently both countries are calibrated as “right governments” (1). This is also the case for Denmark and Norway but in both countries’ minority governments were in place. Although this might affect their ability implement restrictive policy agendas both countries are calibrated as (1) but this issue should be considered in the analysis of the QCA results. In Slovakia, the data shows an indifferent picture at first glance concerning the Smer – sociálna demokracia (Smer-SD), which governed Slovakia through a single-party majority until late March 2016 and formed a coalition

[30] LRGEN = position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance. 0 = Extreme left: 5 = Center: 10 = Extreme right

[31] IMMIGRATE_POLICY = position on immigration policy. 0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration: 10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration

government after the elections. Ultimately, the discrepancy between the CPDS indicator and the CHES score on its overall ideological position on the one hand and the considerable high score regarding its support of restrictive immigration policies on the other, is a result of the fact, that it is a social democratic party with evidently strong restrictive views on immigration and Muslim immigrants specifically (Zeit, 2016). Lastly, Poland represents a difficult coding decision due to the change of government in November 2015. Regarding the Kopacz I government with the leading Platforma Obywatelska (PO), which represented the vast majority of parliamentary seats within the coalition, there is a certain ambiguity looking at the CHES indicators on overall political ideology (5,7) and the stance on restrictive immigration policies (4). However, considering this ambiguity in context of the change in government in November 2015 to a single majority government by the PiS party, it is arguably sensible to include Poland in the group of "right-governments". The following table illustrates all data and the respective calibration of countries.

Governments and party ideologies 2015-2016

Country	Government (Party PM)	Government change	Government type	Left parties in Government (Y/N)[32]	Government parties (% parliament seats)	Overall ideological position	Position on immigration policies	Calibration
Belgium	Michel I (MR)	N	Minimal winning coalition	N (1)	MR (13,3%), N-VA (22%), CD&V (12%), VLD (9,3)	MR: 7 N-VA: 7,8 CD&V: 5,4 VLD. 7	MR: 6,2 N-VA: 7,6 CD&V: 5,4 VLD: 6,6	1
Denmark	Løkke Rasmussen II (LIB[33]) [28.06.2015]	N	Single-party minority government,	N (1,1)	LIB/Ventre* (19,4%)	LIB/Venstre*: 7	LIB/Venstre: 7,7	1
Hungary	Orbán III (FIDESZ)	N	Single-party majority government	N (1)	FIDESZ (66,8%)	FIDESZ: 7,9	FIDESZ: 7,8	1
Norway	Solberg I (H)	N	Multi-party minority government	N (1)	H (28,4%) FrP: (17,2%)	H: 7,25 FrP: 8,25	H: 6,3 FrP: 9	1
Poland	Kopacz I (PO), Szydlo I (PiS) [16.11.2015]	Y, elections	Minimal winning coalition, Single-party majority government	Y (2), N (1)	PO (44%) PSL (7%) [Kopacz I] PiS (51,1%) [Szydlo I]	PO: 5,7 PSL: 5,3 [Kopacz I] PiS: 7,9 [Szydlo I]	PO: 4 PSL: 6, 4 [Kopacz I] PiS: 6,2 [Szydlo I]	1
Slovakia	Fico II (Smer-SD), Fico III (Smer-SD) [23.03.2016]	Y, elections	Single-party majority government, Minimal winning coalition	Y, (5, 4)	Smer-SD (55,3%) [Fico II] Smer-SD (32,7%) SNS (10%) Most-Hid (7,3%)	Smer-SD*: 3,7 [Fico II] Smer-SD* SNS: 8,4 Most-Hid: 6,2 Sieť: 7 [Fico III]	Smer-SD*: 6,5 [Fico II] Smer-SD* SNS: 9,3 Most-Hid: 5,4 Sieť: 6	1

[32] Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index): (1) hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties), (2) dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties), (3) balance of power between left and, (4) dominance of social-democratic and other left parties, (5) hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties.

					Sieť (4,7%) [Fico III]		[Fico III]	

Calibration government partisanship

Country	Calibration
Austria	0
Belgium	1
Czechia	0
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	0
Netherlands	0
Norway	1
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	0
Sweden	0

Public preferences

In the domain of public opinion, this project will distinguish two interrelated concepts in public preferences and the issue salience of asylum policies (3.3.4.). The inclusion of both concepts is designed to achieve a more nuanced picture of public opinion effects as well as to scrutinize interaction effects between them as outlined by Hatton (2017b). The cs/QCA has the potential to derive a clearer picture on how both dimensions influence policy decisions on the country-level within each case. Regarding the public opinion towards immigration and asylum issues, the Eurobarometer (EB) and the European Social Survey (ESS) can be considered as the most detailed and frequent surveys available. Concerning the data availability for the case population, the EB (Norway missing) is used as the primary measure for both conditions. However, in the case of Norway the ESS (Denmark, Greece, Slovakia missing) is used as a substitute measure.

This condition aims to identify a baseline of (negative) public preferences towards people seeking international protection in Europe during the refugee management crisis. Regarding public opinion on policy issues in general, it is assumed, that in a broader context of electoral competitiveness, policymakers are wary to anticipate and subsequently avoid or mitigate the perceived effects emerging situations have on their public approval (Hatton, 2011). For this aim, an item from the EB asking respondents if they agree with the statement, that their respective country should help refugees is used to capture public preferences for restrictive asylum policies in each country[34][35]. Using the EB 84.3, fieldwork period in November 2015[36], this data selection aims to assess public preferences around the peak of the refugee management crisis. In the following table, the rounded percentages ranging from the answer possibilities "totally agree" to "totally disagree", which includes the answer possibility "don't care", are displayed. The aggregate totals for agreement and disagreement are also included, while the latter is the main measure to calibrate this condition.

Should (your) country help refugees (EB)

Country	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Don't care	Total "Agree"	Total "Disagree"
Hungary	5%	24%	28%	39%	4%	29%	**67%**
Czech Republic	3%	25%	31%	35%	6%	28%	**66%**
Slovakia	4%	30%	31%	27%	8%	34%	**58%**
Italy	6%	36%	24%	22%	12%	42%	**46%**
Slovenia	13%	41%	24%	17%	5%	54%	**41%**

[34] qd11_6 - STATEMENTS: COUNTRY SHOULD HELP REFUGEES.

[35] The data is weighted to account for different sample sizes and therefore a straightforward comparison already in the source material.

[36] Fieldwork: 7/11 - 17/11/2015.

Poland	6%	44%	21%	15%	14%	50%	**36%**
France	16%	43%	19%	14%	8%	59%	**33%**
Austria	20%	42%	17%	14%	7%	62%	**31%**
Belgium	18%	51%	18%	10%	3%	69%	**28%**
Germany	34%	49%	10%	4%	3%	83%	**14%**
Greece	34%	51%	10%	3%	2%	85%	**13%**
Denmark	46%	40%	8%	4%	2%	86%	**12%**
Netherlands	44%	44%	8%	2%	2%	88%	**10%**
Sweden	69%	25%	4%	2%	-	94%	**6%**
Median	**17,0%**	**41,5%**	**18,5%**	**14,0%**	**5,0%**	**60,5%**	**32,0%**
Mean	**22,7%**	**38,9%**	**18,1%**	**14,9%**	**5,8%**	**61,6%**	**32,9%**
Standard variation	**19,2%**	**9,2%**	**8,6%**	**11,7%**	**3,7%**	**22,3%**	**20,0%**

Within the data, the largest drop-off point is between Belgium and Germany, which is subordinated closely below the median value and constitutes a twofold gap between the 28% aggregate for “disagree” for the former and the 14% for the latter. In this context, the threshold is set for Belgium and all countries above for two reasons.

First, this distinguishes the group above the threshold (1) from a country group (Germany-Sweden) with comparatively low “disagreement”. Here, not only below 15% of respondents in aggregate “disagree” with the statement but also only 5% or less “totally disagree”, which both represents significant contrast to the rest of the case population above the threshold.

Second, under the established assumption, that policymakers react proactively if they fear a deterioration of public approval, roughly one third as a minimum aggregate value for “disagreement” arguably represents a significant share in context of electoral competition and its majority arithmetic’s. Ultimately, the threshold could be viewed as rather conservatively if looking at the high values at the top of the table. But this is arguably justified contemplating, that the most evident data drop-off is used in light of explicit conceptual considerations and considering that such a conservative strategy is sensible if we aim to test interaction effects between public preferences and issue salience without comprehensive prior knowledge concerning the degrees to which they affect one another. In conclusion, countries above the threshold are coded as “significant restrictive preferences” (1) and the rest of the case population as "minor restrictive preferences" (0) towards the countries approach on asylum policy decisions. Lastly, Norway is coded as (0) regarding its second-lowest position in a similar measure from the ESS[37]. This results in the respective calibration displayed in the following table.

Calibration public preferences

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	0
France	1
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	1
Netherlands	0
Norway	0
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	0

[37] ESS Round 8 (2016)., C42, the government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status: 1- Agree strongly, 2- Agree, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree, 5-Disagree strongly, 7-(Refusal), 8-(Don'tknow).

Issue salience

The degree of issue salience concerning asylum seekers and asylum policymaking is considered as an important factor to transform restrictive public preferences within the respective country populations into restrictive policies. Therefore, the effects of public preferences on asylum policymaking likely depend on the salience of the political issue in question (Hatton, 2016, 2017b). This is based on the idea, that the public conflict around immigration issues directly effects policy objectives and priorities within governments (Freeman, 1994). Empirical evidence for this relationship can be found in Ford, Jennings & Somerville (2015), which illustrated, that a strong politicization of immigration issues in the public domain initiated restrictive policy responses to negative attitudes on asylum in the United Kingdom. However, the distinction of public opinion effects in public preferences and issue salience within the application of the QCA is specifically designed to test this assumed interaction effect, as it is certainly a possibility that only one of these conditions can systematically explain the introduction of restrictive asylum policies, especially considering, that the degree to which public preferences and issue salience correlate tends to vary across European countries (Hatton, 2017b).

Issue salience is operationalized through another survey item from the Eurobarometer, asking respondents to select the two most important issues their country is facing at the moment out of a wide range of 13 political issues, including immigration[38]. The timeframe of measurement respectively the selection of EB surveys is based on an initial review on how the salience of policy issues changed over time. Figure 5 illustrates the percentage change of a variety of political issues including immigration since 2010 in the European Union (EU 28).

[38] QA3A, what do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?

Most important issues 2010-2018 (EB).



(Bíró-Nagy, 2022, p. 10)

While the percentage of people naming immigration as one of the two most important issues their country is facing increased quite significantly already from 2013 onwards, a steep increase between November 2014 (2014/02) to May 2015 (2015/1) and an even steeper increase between May and November of 2015 (2015/2), culminating in close to 60% of respondents identifying immigration as one of the two most important issues, is visible. Note that the values above are an indication for trends regarding the case population, the specific mean values for the selected countries naturally differ. As this project focuses on the peak of the refugee management from the late summer of 2015 onwards, and in consideration of the increase from below 40% to almost 60% from May to November, the data from the respective EB issues 83.3 (May) and 84.3. (November) will be used to assess the level and change of issue salience regarding immigration. The following table displays the totals of respondents naming immigration as one of the two most important issues in both survey issues as well as the percentual change between the two.

Issue salience immigration May to November 2015

Country	EB 83.3 (05/2015)	EB 84.3 (11/2015)	Percentage change
Germany	46%	**76%**	30%
Denmark	35%	**60%**	25%
Netherlands	23%	**56%**	33%
Austria	31%	**56%**	25%
Sweden	28%	**53%**	25%
Slovenia	1%	**48%**	47%
Czech Republic	18%	**47%**	29%
Belgium	23%	**38%**	15%
Hungary	13%	**34%**	21%
Italy	31%	**30%**	-1%
France	12%	**22%**	10%
Greece	11%	**20%**	9%
Slovakia	4%	**19%**	15%
Poland	9%	**17%**	8%
Median	**20,5%**	**42,5%**	**23,0%**
Mean	**20,4%**	**41,1%**	**20,8%**
Standard deviation	**12,4%**	**17,5%**	**12,0%**

The percentage values of respondents identifying immigration as one of the most important issues from the EB 84.3. is the first and the main measure for the calibration of this condition. Looking at the distribution of data, two thresholds around the median were considered.

First, the drop-off between Italy and France from 30% to 22% would represent a conservative choice, which would align with the threshold of a roughly one third aggregate "disagreement" with the statement that the respondent's country should help refugees, chosen for the previous condition of C) public preferences.

However, the second, and less conservative threshold from the Czech Republic upwards (red), is arguably more sensible in conceptual as well as in empirical terms. In conceptual terms, regarding the assumed relationship between public preferences and issue salience, Hatton outlines that "such [restrictive] preferences will not gain political traction unless salience is sufficiently high to make it a political priority" (2017b, p. 2). A similar dynamic arguably applies in case that issue salience presents an independent explanation for restrictive policy decisions. Therefore, the aim is to identify a "sufficient" level of issue salience which puts enough pressure on policymakers to introduce restrictive asylum policies, very much in line with the dichotomous logic of the QCA. Arguably, this threshold for the level of salience should be rather higher than lower, especially if considering, that the survey was conducted close to the peak of the refugee management crisis, where a high degree of politicization was present in the public discourse and the media in particular. Further, the decision for a less conservative threshold is also sensible considering the level of percentage change between May and November, as high increases in this short timeframe imply a high degree of urgency within the political discourse. Here, the country group of the less conservative threshold not only shows percentage totals close to 50% and above in November but also significantly higher increases in issue salience since May compared to the group below the threshold[39]. Subsequently, the countries from the threshold upwards are coded as "high salience" (1) while the countries below the threshold are coded as "moderate/low salience" (0).

Unfortunately, in the case of Norway, there is no sensible measure for issue salience available. Here, the rise of polling numbers for the right-wing Progress Party from 12% at the end of May to 17% in December 2015[40] is used as a proxy for "high salience" (1) during the refugee management crisis, also considering that all "major destination" countries identified earlier are above the threshold, indicating a similar effect for Norway.

[39] Except Hungary, which shows a comparatively low November total of 34% on the other hand.

[40] https://www.newsinenglish.no/2015/12/03/progress-party-soars-in-the-polls/
https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/norway/

Calibration issue salience

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	0
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	1
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Italy	0
Netherlands	1
Norway	1
Poland	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1

Immigration culture

The conceptualization of immigration culture as a condition is a complex issue. Existing literature predominantly focuses on the effect of the ethnic and cultural makeup of country populations on public attitudes towards immigration (Berg, 2009; Hatton, 2016;2017b). But this approach can arguably be adapted to the level of policymaking[41]. In this sense, the "contact hypothesis" (Berg, 2009, p. 43), which concludes, that negative attitudes public attitudes decrease through multicultural personal contacts, will basically be translated to level of national

[41] In this context it should be mentioned that interaction effects between immigration culture and public attitudes are not a reason of concern due to the emphasis of configurational causality within the QCA. Conversely, identified causal linkages between the condition of immigration culture and those of public preferences (D) and/or political salience (E) would provide valuable insights.

asylum policy regimes. Regarding the research context, this is particularly tied to two empirical conclusions. First, that historically marginal numbers of asylum applications lead to the absence of significant political discussion around the topic (Vermeersch, 2005), which evidently changed throughout all European countries during the refugee management crisis. And second, that that immigration policy regimes in countries with a homogenous ethnic and cultural makeup tend to favor immigration of similar ethnic and cultural composition (Carens, 1998; Meyers, 2004), which is of particular interest, since the vast majority of people seeking protection during the refugee management crisis have their origin in Arabic countries and Syria in particular. In sum, this condition assumes, that large-scale immigration events, especially of dissimilar ethnic and cultural composition, have a stronger effect on political discourse and policy making in countries with a minor immigration history than in those with prolonged immigration cultures. Likely leading to more restrictive policy decisions.

The operationalization of this condition will be based on the percentages of the non-EU foreign-born population (Eurostat, 2021b) and the Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2017) within the case population. The calibration will distinguish between “minor” (1) and “moderate/large immigration” cultures (0). The following table illustrates the percentage of the non-EU foreign-born population per country.

Percentage of the non-EU foreign-born population per country[42]

Country	2015 non-EU foreign-born	2015 population	% foreign-born
Sweden	1.083.307	9.747.355	11,1%
Austria	801.565	8.584.926	9,3%
Netherlands	1.464.036	16.900.726	8,7%
France	5.729.400	66.458.153	8,6%
Belgium	933.916	11.237.274	8,3%
Greece	897.268	10.858.018	8,3%
Slovenia	169.525	2.062.874	8,2%
Norway	407.240	5.166.493	7,9%
Germany	6.210.058	81.197.537	7,6%
Denmark	393.027	5.659.715	6,9%
Italy	3.989.783	60.795.612	6,6%
Czech Republic	252.981	10.538.275	2,4%
Hungary	165.912	9.855.571	1,7%
Poland	392.860	38.005.614	1,0%
Slovakia	29.701	5.421.349	0,5%
Median	801.565	10.538.275	7,9%
Mean	1.528.039	22.832.633	6,5%
Standard deviation	1.975.150	24.939.127	3,2%

Source: Eurostat (migr_pop3ctb, demo_pjan)

Looking at the data distribution regarding the share of the non-EU foreign-born population per country, there is an evident drop-off between the four countries downwards from the illustrated threshold (red) and the rest of the case population. Interestingly, the later is rather evenly distributed if comparing it to the previous conditions, showing a certain homogeneity. On the other hand, the four countries below the threshold show percentages of the foreign-born population ranging from considerably low to marginal. Although this presents a rather evident picture, the share of the Muslim population per country will be considered as well for a more nuanced picture in accordance with the established conceptualization. Fig. 6 displays the estimated[43] shares of Muslims in European populations in mid-2016.

[42] January 1st totals of the non-EU foreign-born and the overall population.

[43] The 2016 estimates are based on Pew Research Center analysis and projections of the best available census and survey data in each country combined with data on immigration from Eurostat and other sources. While Muslim

Estimated shares of Muslims in European population by mid-2016.



Source: Pew Research Center (2017, p. 4)

Comparing the shares of the Muslim population in Europe with the priorly established threshold based on the shares of the non-EU foreign-born population across the case population, the threshold can be upheld, and is arguably even sharpened, as all four countries display very marginal shares of Muslims in relation to their overall population in mid-2016, even including the effects of the refugee management crisis. In sum, these findings align with the characterization of these four countries, also known as the Visegrad group, as countries with only recent immigration histories and very homogenous ethnic and cultural populations (Zaun, 2018), although the degree to which this country group deviates from the rest of the case population in the selected measure is quite remarkable. The following table illustrates the

identity is often measured directly, in some cases it must be estimated indirectly based upon the national origins of migrants.

respective coding for this condition, distinguishing countries with a "minor immigration culture" (1) from those with a "moderate/large immigration culture" (0).

Calibration immigration culture

Country	Calibration
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	0
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	1
Italy	0
Netherlands	0
Norway	0
Poland	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	0
Sweden	0

Policy diffusion

The operationalization of competitive diffusion dynamics is based a specific diffusion pattern of temporarily reintroduced internal border controls in the Schengen area. Across one of the main routes for secondary movements, the Balkan route, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Denmark successively introduced internal Schengen borders between September 2015 and January 2016 and continued this normally highly regulated measure limited to a maximum period of six months in case of major political summits, sport events or immediate terrorist threats etc. for several years with specific reference to migratory pressures (European Commission, n.d.). Pastore & Henry (2016) characterized this as a evident case of competitive diffusion, driven by the aim to not become a "dead end" for people seeking protection. Regarding the calibration of this condition, this pattern is intended as a proxy measure, designating every country included in this sustained diffusion pattern as "diffusion" (1) and all other countries as "no diffusion" (0) under the assumption, that this initial diffusion pattern indicates competitive diffusion across other asylum policy areas, which might be a further explanatory determinant for a variety of restrictive asylum policy decisions.

But it should be mentioned that this group of countries aligns with the group of "major destination countries", which will lead to a duplicity of QCA results. Further, the assumption is evident, that this diffusion pattern is likely caused by the high migratory inflow to these countries. Therefore, this likely causal relationship between these two conditions has to be reflected upon carefully during the analysis of QCA results. Nevertheless, it is arguably fruitful to use the condition of policy diffusion as part of the QCA to include it in the result analysis. The following table shows the subsequent calibration for this condition.

calibration policy diffusion

Country	Calibration
Austria	1
Belgium	0
Czechia	0
Denmark	1
France	0
Germany	1
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Italy	0
Netherlands	0
Norway	1
Poland	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	0
Sweden	1

A.4. Governments and party ideologies 2015-16 and QCA calibration

Country	Government (party of PM)	Government change (06_15'-2016)	Government type	Left parties in Government (y/n)	Government parties (% parl. Seats)	Overall ideological position (LRGEN)	Position on immigration policies (IMMIGRATE_POLICY)	(1/0)
Austria	Faymann II (SPÖ), Kern I (SPÖ) [17.05.2016]	Y, voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister	Minimal winning coalition	Y (3)	SPÖ (28,4%), ÖVP (27,3%)	SPÖ: 3,9 ÖVP: 6	SPÖ: 4,4 ÖVP: 6,1	0
Belgium	Michel I (MR)	n	Minimal winning coalition	N (1)	MR (13,3%), N-VA (22%), CD&V (12%), VLD (9,3)	MR: 7 N-VA: 7,8 CD&V: 5,4 VLD. 7	MR: 6,2 N-VA: 7,6 CD&V: 5,4 VLD: 6,6	1
Czechia	Sobotka I (CSSD)	n	Minimal winning coalition	Y (3)	CSSD (25%) ANO (23,5%) KDU-CSL (7%)	CSSD: 3,1 ANO: 5,8 KDU-CSL: 5,9	CSSD: 4,3 ANO: 5,9 KDU-CSL: 7	0
Denmark	Løkke Rasmussen II (LIB[44]) [28.06.2015], Løkke Rasmussen III (LIB) [28.11.2016]	Y, broadening of the coalition (inclusion of new parties)	Single-party minority government, Multi-party minority government	N (1,1)	LIB*[45] (19,4%) [Rasmussen II], LIB* LA (7,4%) KF (3,4%) [Rasmussen III]	LIB*: 7 [Rasmussen II], LIB* LA: 7,9 KF: 7 [Rasmussen III]	LIB*: 7,7 [Rasmussen II], LIB* LA: 4,1 KF: 7,1 [Rasmussen III]	1
France	Valls I (PS), Valls II (PS) [11.02.2016]	Y, broadening of the coalition (inclusion of new parties)	Minimal winning coalition	Y (5)	PS* (48,1%) PRG** (2,1%) [Valls I] PS* PRG** V (2,9 %) [Valls II]	PS*: 3,8 PRG**: 3,8 [Valls I] PS* PRG**: V/EELV: 3,1 [Valls II]	PS*: 4,7 PRG**: 4 [Valls I] PS* PRG**: V/EELV: 2,1 [Valls II]	0
Germany	Merkel III (CDU)	N	Minimal winning coalition	Y (3)	CDU (40,4%) CSU (8,9%) SPD (30,6%)	CDU: 5,9 CSU: 7,2 SPD: 3,8	CDU: 5,7 CSU: 7,5 SPD: 3,9	0
Greece	Tsipras I (SYRIZA), Tsipras II (SYRIZA) [23.09.2015]	Y, non-partisan caretaker government	Minimal winning coalition	Y (4)	SYRIZA (49,7%) ANEL (4,3%) [Tsipras I]	SYRIZA: 2 ANEL: 8,8	SYRIZA: 2,2 ANEL: 9,1	0

[44] Venstre = lib

[45] Unchanged value

		[28.08-23.09.2015], elections			SYRIZA (48,3%) ANEL (3,3%) [Tsipras II]			
Hungary	Orbán III (FIDESZ)	N	Single-party majority government	N (1)	FIDESZ (66,8%)	FIDESZ: 7,9	FIDESZ: 7,8	1
Italy	Renzi I (PD), Gentiloni I (PD) [12.12.2016]	Y, voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister	Minimal winning coalition	Y (4)	PD (47,3%) NCD-UDC (4,6%)	PD: 3,6 NCD: 5,3 UDC: 6,1	PD: 3,3 NCD: 4,7 UDC: 7,5	0
Netherlands	Rutte II (VVD)	N	Minimal winning coalition	Y (3)	VVD (27,3%) PvdA (25,3%)	VVD: 7,9 PvdA: 3,7	VVD: 7,5 PvdA: 4,1	0
Norway	Solberg I (H)	N	Multi-party minority government	N (1)	H (28,4%) FrP: (17,2%)	H: 7,25 FrP: 8,25	H: 6,3 FrP: 9	1
Poland	Kopacz I (PO), Szydlo I (PiS) [16.11.2015]	Y, elections	Minimal winning coalition, Single-party majority government	Y (2), N (1)	PO (44%) PSL (7%) [Kopacz I] PiS (51,1%) [Szydlo I]	PO: 5,7 PSL: 5,3 [Kopacz I] PiS: 7,9 [Szydlo I]	PO: 4 PSL: 6, 4 [Kopacz I] PiS: 6,2 [Szydlo I]	1
Slovakia	Fico II (Smer-SD), Fico III (Smer-SD) [23.03.2016]	Y, elections	Single-party majority government, Minimal winning coalition	Y, (5, 4)	Smer-SD (55,3%) [Fico II] Smer-SD (32,7%) SNS (10%) Most-Hid (7,3%) Sieť (4,7%) [Fico III]	Smer-SD*: 3,7 [Fico II] Smer-SD* SNS: 8,4 Most-Hid: 6,2 Sieť: 7 [Fico III]	Smer-SD*: 6,5 [Fico II] Smer-SD* SNS: 9,3 Most-Hid: 5,4 Sieť: 6 [Fico III]	1
Slovenia	Cerar I (MC)	N	Surplus coalition	Y, (3)	MC (40%) DeSUS (11,1%) SD (6,7%)	MC/SMC: 5,3 DeSUS: 4,1 SD: 3,2	MC/SMC: 3,5 DeSUS: 4,5 SD: 3,3	0
Sweden	Löfven I (S)	N	Multi-party minority government	Y, (5)	S (32,4%) MP (7,2%)	S: 3,8 MP: 3,3	S: 2,3 MP: 0,6	0

A.5. Asylum Policy Index (API)

The different components of the index and the typical changes that they involve are listed in the following table:

Conditions relating to access to territory	
Visa Requirements	Change in the stringency of visa requirements such as application from abroad, biometric passports, fingerprinting
Border Controls	Excision of territory; enhanced border patrols; turning back or deporting undocumented arrivals.
Penalties for trafficking	Significantly enhanced apprehension of traffickers; detention/deportation or imprisonment.
Carrier liability	Significant change in financial or other penalties for carriers by land, sea or air of undocumented arrivals.
Offshore applications	Change in the opportunity to apply for asylum from an embassy or consulate abroad rather than in-country.
Conditions relating to the processing of applications and the determination of status	
Definition of a refugee	Rules relating to the causes of persecution such as gender, persecution by non-state agents, internal flight alternative.
Manifestly unfounded applications	Changes in grounds for applying the presumption of ineligibility, such as 'safe country of origin', 'safe third country', time elapsed since arrival or insufficient documentation.
Speeding up of processing	Typically reducing the maximum period for decisions, or a general decrease in processing times.
Subsidiary status	Changing scope for granting humanitarian status to those not qualifying under the Convention, or significant alteration to the terms of such status.
Appeals	Changes in access to appeals, changing number of levels of appeal, or altering the suspensive effect of appeals.
Conditions relating to the welfare of asylum seekers	
Detention	Changes in rules or practices on the detention of applicants during processing or for those with failed claims
Deportation	Changes in the practices of deporting failed asylum seekers, including raising targets or widening the set of those eligible for deportation.
Employment	Changes in the right to seek employment while an asylum claim is being determined, or to the waiting time for permission to work.
Access to benefit	Shift from cash to in-kind benefit; access to benefit only at reception centres; dispersal to non-metropolitan reception centres.
Family reunification	Changes in the possibility of family reunification during or after processing

(Hatton, 2009: F212)

A.6. Policy evaluation (EASO reports)

These country tables represent the policy evaluation based on the 'Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union' from 2015 and 2016 (EASO, 2015,2016). For the collection of relevant policies, the sections '3.2.4. Major legislative changes in Member States' and '4. The Functioning of the CEAS' were considered[46]. The respective page numbers for each policy collected are included.

Austria -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				-2
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 17.09. 2015 - continued. Big influx of persons seeking international protection, all borders, focus on land borders with Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia.	2015	-1	
	(89) In November 2015, Austria started building a fence at the border with Slovenia in order to better manage the influx of arriving migrants along the Western Balkan route	2015	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(105) The revised Regulation on Countries of Origin was published on 16 February 2016 and subsequently entered into force on 17 February 2016 in Austria. As a result the following countries are additionally defined as 'safe countries of origin' within the meaning of the Asylum Act: Algeria, Georgia, Ghana, Morocco, Mongolia and Tunisia. Accelerated asylum procedures can be conducted for individuals from safe countries of origin, while the suspensory effect of a complaint lodged against a negative asylum decision can be lifted in such cases.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				-2
	(137) In Austria the new asylum law entered into force on 1 June 2016. Following an amendment to the Austrian Asylum Act that entered into force on 1 July 2016, the so far unlimited residence permit for refugees was limited to three years.	2016	-1	

[46] More detailed information on temporarily reintroduced internal border controls is taken from https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en

	(69) In Austria the new asylum law entered into force on 1 June 2016. Stricter rules were introduced for family reunification, as for applications for family reunification that are not lodged within three months after the refugee status has been granted, as well as those lodged by beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, now require presenting proof of having sufficient means, adequate accommodation and health insurance	2016	-1	
API total				-5

Belgium -	**Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				-1
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 23.02.2016 - 22.04.2016. Irregular migrants attempting to travel to UK - Border between the Province of West-Vlaanderen and France.	2016	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				0
Indirect deterrence				-1
	(137) As of 8 July 2016 people granted refugee status no longer receive a residence permit of unlimited duration. Instead, they obtain a temporary residence permit with a validity of 5 years. This period of 5 years starts from the moment the asylum application was lodged. After 5 years, the refugee will receive a residence permit of unlimited duration, unless the refugee status has been withdrawn	2016	-1	
API total				-2

Czech - Republic	**Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				-1
	(88) The Czech Republic stepped up border controls, intensified presence and conducted enhanced checks	2015	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				-1

	(78) The Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior passed a decree, based on the amendment to the Asylum Act of 18 December 2015, determining the list of safe countries of origin. The list contains (among other countries such as the US and Norway) all Western Balkan countries and Mongolia, and therefore the accelerated procedure is applied for applicants from the listed countries	2015	-1	
Indirect deterrence				1
	(78) The Czech Republic's Asylum Act (Act No 325/1999 Coll. on Asylum) of 18 December 2015 was amended. This has reduced the period in which applicants are not allowed to work from 12 months to six months	2015	1	
API total				-1

Denmark -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				-1
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 04.01.2016 - continued. Unexpected migratory flow. All internal borders, with focus on ferries from Germany and land border with Germany.	2016	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(91) Law proposal pending for an "emergency brake" (during separately proclaimed "time of emergency"), during which Denmark can refuse entry of asylum seekers wishing to enter from another Dublin country […] The law was adopted by the Parliament on 11 May 2017.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				-4
	(137) The duration of residence permits for recognised refugees with convention status was reduced from 5 years to 2 years, where as in the case of persons with subsidiary protection, it was reduced from 5 years to 1 year with possible extensions of 2 years each. Residence permit granted to refugees with so-called temporary protection status was reduced from 1 year to an initial 1-year residence permit, which may be extended two times for 1 year each. After the	2016	-1	

	first two extensions, further extensions can be granted for 2 years each.			
	(69) On 26 January 2016, the Danish parliament adopted a new law, amending the current Aliens Act. Asylum applicants' belongings can also be seized, if they exceed DKK 10 000 (~EUR 1 350), to cover accommodation costs, cost of their or families' maintenance and necessary healthcare services (items with sentimental value to applicant are exempt from seizure).	2016	-1	
	(139) Denmark reduced financial allowances available to beneficiaries of international protection. Special lower integration allowance for refugees expanded to all recognised refugees, as opposed to only those having arrived post-September 2015.	2016	-1	
	(69/138) On 26 January 2016, the Danish parliament adopted a new law, amending the current Aliens Act. […] the right to family reunification for persons who were granted temporary protection status was restricted. Whereas previously a beneficiary with this status could apply for family reunification after 1 year of residence, now a beneficiary can only apply after 3 years of residence.	2016	-1	
API total				-6

France -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				-2
	(96 f.)) A major overhaul to special procedures in France occurred under the Act of 29 July 2015, which replaces the 'priority' procedure with an accelerated procedure with several changes to the process. [...]Following legislative amendments on 29 July 2015, border procedures allow for refusing access to the territory for asylum purposes when claims are found to be inadmissible where another Member States is responsible for examining the case according to Dublin Regulation and when the claim is found to be manifestly unfounded by OFPRA, according to the definition in the law.	2015	-1	

	(103 f.) In March 2016 France adopted a new law (Loi n° 2016-274 du 7 mars 2016 relative au droit des étrangers en France) relating to immigration with provisions specifically related to asylum. These specific provisions enable, since 1 November 2016, the administrative authority to consider as inadmissible any application for international protection made in detention after the 5-day time limit if the applicant comes from a safe country of origin and if the application was submitted in order to frustrate the enforcement of their imminent removal (the conditions are cumulative). In any case, the claim shall be deemed admissible if the applicant submits elements that occurred after the 5-day time limit.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				0
API total				-2

Germany -	**Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				-1
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 13.09.2015 - continued. Big influx of persons seeking international protection, all borders with focus on Austrian land borders.	2015	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				-2
	(78) Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro were designated as safe countries of origin.	2015	-1	
	(70) On 17 March 2016, the law implementing the so-called Second Asylum Package entered into force, introducing accelerated procedures for certain groups of applicants, such as applicants from safe countries of origin, repeated applicants and un-cooperative applicants. The accelerated procedures will be conducted in special reception facilities and decided within one week.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				-1
	(138) Family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection who have been granted this status after	2016	-1	

	17 March 2016 was suspended for a period of two years (until 16 March 2018). This change came into effect only eight months after beneficiaries of subsidiary protection had rights in terms of family reunification			
API total				
				-4

Greece -	**Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(124) The legislative framework of appeals procedure was changed by the new Law 4375/2016 (as amended by Law 4399/2016 including the time limits for lodging an appeal.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				1
	(71 f.) Also the Greek asylum legislation underwent significant changes, under new Law 4375/2016 (266), bringing changes in a number of key areas […] Asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection do not need work permits to access the labour market, as was the case before.	2016	1	
API total				0

Hungary -	**Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				-2
	(89) In Hungary, temporary border restrictions were implemented at the border with Serbia with the construction of a fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border.	2015	-1	
	(89 f.) […] changes in legislation stipulating that third country nationals who irregularly crossed the border were subject to criminal	2016	-1	

	charges and should be returned to Serbia if found within eight kilometres of the border.			
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(96) Hungary introduced an accelerated procedure on 1 August 2015 (and a list of safe third countries and safe countries of origin by Government Decree 191/2015 (VII.21)	2015	-1	
Indirect deterrence				-4
	(71) In Hungary an amended act on asylum came into effect on 1 June 2016 […] as well as shortening the provision of accommodation and other services (maximum 30 days, from 60 days prior).	2015	-1	
	(137) The duration of Hungarian IDs issued to refugees was reduced from 10 years to 3 years, whereas in the case of persons with subsidiary protection, it was reduced from 5 years to 3 years as of 1 June 2016. According to the same reform, refugee and subsidiary protection statuses are to be reviewed every 3 years.	2016	-1	
	(71) In Hungary an amended act on asylum came into effect on 1 June 2016. The legal status of persons granted tolerated stay is now regulated under asylum law (and not under the legislation concerning third country nationals). Previous financial support is no longer available to those persons; only services and housing at reception centres and basic medical care [...] (111) In Hungary, the monthly financial allowance as well as school-enrolment benefits were terminated. The amount of non-defined educational support was also reduced.	2016	-1	
	(138) As of 1 July 2016, family members of recognised refugees have only three months to start the family reunification procedure under favourable conditions instead of the previously given 6-months period.	2016	-1	
API total				-7

Italy -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score

Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(96) In Italy an accelerated procedure for manifestly unfounded applications was introduced, in law and in practice, whereas manifestly founded applications continue to be decided only after a full assessment by the Territorial Commissions.	2015	-1	
Indirect deterrence				0
API total				-1

Netherlands -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				-1
	(105) The following countries were added to the list [safe countries of origin] in 2016 in the Netherlands: Ghana, India, Jamaica, Morocco, Mongolia and Senegal (February 2016), Algeria, Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia (October 2016), and Togo (December 2016) (423). For some countries that are regarded as safe there is an exception for certain groups of people (e.g. LGBTs) or certain regions.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				0
API total				-1

Norway -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				-1
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 26.11.2015 - continued. Unexpected migratory flow. All borders with focus on ports with ferry connections to Norway via internal borders.	2015	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				-5
	(91 f.) […] on 16 November 2015 the Norwegian Parliament adopted amendments to the 2008 Immigration Act, Section 32. These related to the legal authorities of the Cabinet (King in Council) when facing, at the border between Norway and its neighbouring Nordic countries, a situation of crisis with extraordinary high arrivals of applicants. The change has been applicable as of 1 September 2016. (72) [...] Art. 32 (5) was amended (refusal to examine an application for international protection on the merits) in case of extraordinary high arrivals at the border of Norway and other neighbouring Nordic country,the applications for asylum can be rejected without considering the merits of the application.	2016	-1	
	(72) In Norway several elements of the Immigration Act were revised regarding asylum as internal flight alternative. On 1 October 2016, Art. 28 (5) was amended (the application of the notion of internal flight alterative). A foreign national, who has applied for international protection in Norway, can now be rejected protection if s/he can be referred to seek protection in other parts of his or her country of origin and the authorities are no longer obliged to assess whether or not this referral is reasonable. It is still required that the foreign national can obtain effective protection in the referred part of the country.	2016	-1	
	(105) In Norway some changes were made in the list of countries [safe country of origin] by which applicants are dealt with in	2016	-1	

	an accelerated procedure, the so-called 48 hours procedure. With some exceptions, as of April 2016, applicants from Armenia, Botswana, Ghana, India, Namibia and Tanzania will be dealt with using this accelerated procedure.			
	(125) In Norway a new provision Article 94a in the Immigration act means applicants have less time to appeal a negative decision in case of a manifestly unfounded application for international protection. Also in Norway, an amendment to the Immigration regulation, with effect from 1 September 2016, shortened the deadline for appeals (now one week) if the applicant clearly does not need protection.	2016	-1	
	(137) [...] a former provision in the Immigration regulation which stated that 'a foreigner who has not received his application for protection settled by the Directorate of Immigration within 15 months after the alien met the police and sought protection, can be granted a resident permit', was abolished with effect from 1 July 2016.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				-4
	(72) In Norway several elements of the Immigration Act were revised regarding asylum as administrative detention […] In line with Article 105(1)(e), a foreign national can be subjected to an obligation of notification/report, or required to stay in a specific place if their asylum application has been, or is likely to be, rejected without consideration of the merits of the application. In line with Article 106(1)(k), foreign nationals may be arrested and remanded in custody if their asylum application has been, or is likely to be, rejected without consideration of the merits of the application.	2016	-1	
	(72) In Norway several elements of the Immigration Act were revised regarding asylum as grounds for expulsion [...] A new section to Article 66, Article 66(1)(f) was added. This provision stipulates that foreign nationals that have had their applications rejected in accordance with Article 32(1) (a - the applicant has been granted asylum or another form of protection in another	2016	-1	

	country,) or (the applicant has travelled to the realm after having stayed in a state or an area where the foreign national was not persecuted, and where the foreign national's application for protection will be examined.), or it is found that the applicant has misused the institute of asylum, can be expelled.			
	(111) Allowances were reduced for most groups of asylum seekers by 10-20 % and, as of January 2017, a cap was introduced on the total amount of financial assistance asylum-seeking families could receive per month.	2016	-1	
	(138) According to the new law (in force as of 1 January 2017), a 24-year age requirement in family formation cases was introduced (both parties must be at least 24 years of age before an application for a residence permit as the sponsor's spouse or cohabitant may be granted). The rationale to introduce the 24-year age requirement was to prevent forced marriages. In addition, according to this requirement an application for family immigration may be rejected where family life can be exercised in a safe third country where the family has stronger ties than to Norway.	2016	-1	
API total				-10

Poland	**- Introduced policies**	**Year**	**Policy evaluation (individual)**	**API score**
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				0
Indirect deterrence				0
API total				0

Slovakia -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				0
Indirect deterrence				1
	(72) Amendments on the Act on Residence of Foreigners and the Act on Employment Services, entered into force on 1 January 2016, simplifying the access of third country nationals to the Slovak labour market. In particular, the maximum period of temporary residence granted for the purpose of employment was extended from two to five years.	2016	1	
API total				1

Slovenia -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				0
Accessibility of international protection				-2
	(72) Slovenia adopted a new Law on International Protection. In addition the change to the Alien Act was adopted by the parliament in beginning of January 2017 after being negotiated among different stakeholders during 2016 and adopted by the government at the end of last year. This provides the activation of a special measure (Article 10b) in case of a huge migratory influx towards national borders and when public order and security of the state is threatened. Such measure will be activated for the six months with the possibility of extension,	2016	-1	

	based on a pre-assessment of migration and security situation in the country and recommendations by the MOI and government.			
	(105) The Slovenian government established a national list of safe countries of origin, including Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Egypt, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Morocco, Serbia, Tunisia and Turkey.	2016	-1	
Indirect deterrence				0
API total				-2

Sweden -	Introduced policies	Year	Policy evaluation (individual)	API score
Access to territory				-1
	Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control (Schengen), 12.09.2015 - continued. Unprecedented influx of persons. All borders, with special focus on harbours in Police Region South and Police Region West as well as on the Öresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden.	2015	-1	
Accessibility of international protection				0
Indirect deterrence				-3
	(72) A temporary law amending the Aliens Act entered into force on 20 July 2016. It will be in force for three years (until 19 July 2019), and aims to temporarily adjust the Swedish asylum regulations to the minimum level as required under EU asylum directives. It primarily aims to reduce the number of asylum applicants in Sweden. (137) Starting from 20 July 2016, when the new temporary law on migration entered into force (in force until 19 July 2019), recognised refugees are granted a 3-year temporary permit with the right to family reunification if the application is made within three months of the reference person receiving their permit. Beneficiaries of subsidiary	2016	-1	

	protection will be granted an initial period of 13 months temporary residence permit with no right to family reunification. The permit can be extended another 2 years if protection grounds persist.			
	(143) On 22 September 2016, the Swedish Government presented a number of measures aiming at improving the return of rejected asylum seekers. Among these measures there are: a clearer division and allocation of responsibilities between the relevant authorities, mainly the Swedish Migration Agency and the police; the possibility to detain persons in facilities other than ordinary detention centres for up to three days to avoid long transports to specialised facilities; extended possibilities for authorities to confiscate passports and ID documents as well as to take fingerprints at internal checks on foreigners; and reviewing the minimum age of 14 years for fingerprinting. Rejected asylum seekers are now no longer entitled to accommodation and daily allowance from the Swedish Migration Agency when the deadline for voluntary return has expired.	2016	-1	
	(138) Following the entry into force of the temporary law in 2016 (in force until 20 July 2019), beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are not eligible for family reunification as a rule. The law has also introduced restrictive conditions for recognised refugees, who must apply within 3 months in order to be exempt from material requirements (income, accommodation)	2016	-1	
API total				-4