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Sequential price of anarchy for atomic congestion games with limited number of players

Kolev, Kiril (2016) Sequential price of anarchy for atomic congestion games with limited number of players.

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Abstract:We consider sequentially played atomic congestion games with linear latency functions. To measure the quality of sub-game perfect equilibria of sequentially played games, we analyze the Sequential Price of Anarchy (SPoA), which is de�ned to be the ratio of the total cost given by the worst sub-game perfect equilibrium to the total cost of the social optimum. In this project, we want to improve lower and upper bounds on the value of SPoA using a linear programming approach. We limit the number of players to 4, 5 and 6 players and consider di�erent combinations of their possible actions and resources they use. Additionaly we consider two player sequentially played non-atomic congestion games with split ow and give new results for the SPoA in all the possible cases
Item Type:Essay (Master)
Faculty:EEMCS: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
Subject:02 science and culture in general
Programme:Applied Mathematics MSc (60348)
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/essays/71121
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