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On equilibria in facility location games in random graphs

Kroeze, Arnout (2022) On equilibria in facility location games in random graphs.

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Abstract:We consider facility location games where both clients and facilities compete against each other. Facilities compete by selecting a location and clients compete by distributing their spending power strategically. A client minimizes the average facility load, weighted by how much spending power the client spends at the facilities. We show that there always exist an equilibrium for the clients, and that the price of anarchy is generally lower on sparse graphs. We also analyzed the time complexity of our algorithm, which we used to find client and facility equilibria.
Item Type:Essay (Bachelor)
Faculty:EEMCS: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
Subject:31 mathematics
Programme:Applied Mathematics BSc (56965)
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